

Satellite Photos from NOAA Florida hit by two Category 4 Hurricanes: "Floyd" (14 September 1999, 50% larger at 120 knots 155 Mph 250 Km/h, 77 dead, 2.6 million people evacuated & \$4.5 billions in damages in South East) vs. "Andrew" (23 August 1992, 50% smaller at 140 knots 175 mph 280 km/h, 65 dead & 26.5 billions in damages). Free use by NOAA, U.S. Government, see: http://www.nodc.noaa.gov/img/climate/extreme/1999/sepember/double_pg.JPG

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Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.



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Spring-Summer 2013



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Florida Political Chronicle

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Past issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, like the “2012 Presidential Elections” (v.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) and the on-line Archive of older issues are *free* to readers in two parallel tabs on the Florida Political Science Association Web-site at: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>.
Only the current issue is exclusively accessible via password and FPSA subscription until a new issue is out!

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the annual regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association (published with Saint Leo University) and encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) essays for consideration:

- Essays must be sent both in double-spaced print & Word e-mail for record-keeping.
- Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1 inch margin (no landscape-size tables!).
- Add at the end of the essay, or in a separate file, a 2-paragraphs Author’s Biography.
- Please do not use the First Person (“I”); use the Third Person or a neutral “The study”.
- No PDF or Acrobat. If you have Acrobat you can use its selector and convert into Word.
- Style and footnoting preferred is in Chicago Manual of Style, but are accepted also in APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
- All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will add suggested changes and e-mail back the work.
- Book-Reviews are welcome! Submit for consideration 1-2 pages-long Reviews in Word.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

President's Introduction: A Great Year of Accomplishments!

FPSA Exiting-President Sean D. Foreman, Ph.D., Barry University

Dear FPSA Members and All Interested Readers,

2012-to-2013 was another wonderful period for the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA). The FPSA continued to evolve and progress as a result of the great work of our members making important contributions throughout the Political Science disciplines and academic community.

Some notable accomplishments of the FPSA in the past year include the strong revival of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, our scholarly regional journal. The *Florida Political Chronicle* returned to publication since Summer 2012 (vol.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) under the leadership of Editor Marco Rimanelli, an International Politics Professor at Saint Leo University, who had been its Editor earlier in 1993-1999. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is now published on-line and in full color. It highlights great practical and theoretical scholarly articles by our colleagues and each volume features a winning selection from the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper competitions of recent years.

Visit www.fpsa.org to read all past and present *Florida Political Chronicle* volumes. On our FPSA web-site you can also learn about up-coming conferences and Board members, and peruse the FPSA's by-laws and Constitution (also reprinted at the end of this issue).

The new FPSA on-line registration system for membership and conference payment has been implemented since last year. The system has successfully reduced the time required by our Secretary Aubrey Jewett (University of Central Florida-Orlando) to manage our finances. The FPSA continues to be economically vibrant, due to the great stewardship of our Treasurers and entire Executive Council.

We have had many great contributions for the Best Graduate Student Paper competition the past several years. I have had the honor of serving as the Award Committee Chair for three years. This current *Florida Political Chronicle* issue brings to you the 2012 FPSA Best Graduate Winner, *Politicians of a Feather, Tweet Together* by Tammie Marcus Clary of Florida Atlantic University-Miami, while in the next 2013 December/Winter issue (vol.23, n.1-2, 2013-2014) we will present the 2013 FPSA Best Graduate Winner on, *The Arab Connection and the Upsurge of Insurgency in Africa: a Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria* by Doctoral candidate and Assistant Lecturer Essien Ukpe Ukoyo Ukpe at the University of Uyo (formerly-University of Cross River State) of Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria. Not only did Essien write a great paper, but he also traveled all the way from Nigeria to participate in our 2013 FPSA 41st Annual Conference in Miami.

The FPSA's 41st Annual Meeting on 16 March 2013, was a great gathering held at Florida International University (FIU) in Miami. A big thank you to FIU's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) for hosting us in their wonderful, new facilities! More than 90 professors with graduate and undergraduate students all presented their research. The FPSA annual conference continues to grow beyond a Florida-based event to hosting participants from several regional states and throughout the U.S.A., as well as from foreign countries (including Canada, Jamaica and Nigeria).

Finally, the next 42nd FPSA Annual Conference will be on 8 March 2014 at Flagler College and we are pleased to visit beautiful St. Augustine just as Florida celebrates the 500 year anniversary of Ponce de Leon's arrival to our shores. We hope that you will join us to share your latest research, learn what others are working on and to network. Whether your area is national or local politics, comparative or international politics, we always have a place for you in our annual conference program! We hope to see you at next year's 2014 annual meeting at Flagler College in St. Augustine.

I wish to our FPSA Incoming-President Kevin D. Wagner (Florida Atlantic University, Miami) and all the officers a great year, and I am excited to continue supporting this fine professional organization.

Best wishes for 2013-2014!

Sean D. Foreman, Ph.D.

**Exiting-President FPSA
Associate-Professor of Political Science
Barry University, Miami**

Editor's Introduction: In Full Swing with Only "New" Essays!

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists, Fellow-Travelers and Readers,

since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, covering all issues of political and international affairs in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way that fully embodies the current U.S. Department of Education's requirements on public policy in universities.

The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Science and related Disciplines: American Government & Politics, Political Theory & Philosophy, Comparative Politics, International Affairs & Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, and International Law & Organizations (see submissions requirements on p.4 above).

This current *Florida Political Chronicle* issue of Spring-Summer 2013 (vol.22, n.1-2, 2012-2013) welcomes readers to his end-of-Term Introduction from exiting-President of the Florida Political Science Association Sean Foreman (Barry University, Miami) who is being replaced as President by Kevin Wagner (Florida Atlantic University, Miami). The related ceremonies were held at the FPSA's 41st Annual Conference on 16 March 2013 at Florida International University (FIU) in Miami. Below are the latest changes for our journal:

1. This current colour issue vol. 22 (n.1-2, 2011-2012 of Spring-Summer 2013) is the first one to carry *only new scholarly essays* with the 2012 Best FPSA Graduate Student Paper Awards (Tammie Marcus Clary of FAU), while the Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile highlights Florida International University of Miami where the FPSA's 2012 Annual Conference was held in March (also future FPSA Conference sponsor-universities—like Flagler College of St. Augustine in 2014—will be honoured with a future colour Back-Cover on our journal).
2. Both the previous published colour issues of vol.20 ("2012 Presidential Elections", n.1-2, 2009-2012 of August 2012) and vol. 21 (n.1-2, 2010-2012 of December 2012) blended new essays with unpublished older scholarly ones and all unpublished earlier Best FPSA Graduate Student Papers Awards, thus closing any remaining unfinished business. Additionally, as new Editor it was important to expand the journal's appeal by penning in both past issues a Book-Report and Editor's Introduction, plus adding Introductions by serving FPSA Presidents. Also reintroduced (in colour now) with the FPSA Executive Council agreement has been the older tradition of having the journal Back-Covers highlight FPSA University Member Profiles: the current rationale is to honour institutions sponsoring on campus FPSA Annual Conferences (FIU 2013, Flagler 2014) and home-institutions of currently rotating FPSA Presidents (Barry University-Miami in vol.21, n.1-2, 2010-2012 of December 2013 to reflect exiting-President Sean Foreman, while future vol.23, n.1-2, 2013-2014 of December/Winter 2013 covers Florida Atlantic University-Miami for incoming-President Kevin Wagner).
3. Since Spring 2012, after the FPSA launched its on-line web-site, all recently published colour issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (like the "2012 Presidential Elections" one) and our older scanned black & white printed ones in the Archives (1989-2009) are always available *free to the public* through the Florida Political Science Association's Web-site Chronicle Tab (<http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html>) and Archives Tab (<http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>). Only the currently published new colour issue (vol. 22) is restricted exclusively to *members* through password and a modicum FPSA yearly subscription (see p.64). Once the newest future issue replaces the current one, it too will then be opened to the general public readership.

The current issue's first essay, **"Tomorrow's Warfare is Being Fought Today"** is the latest contribution by FPSA's **former-Founding Editor** of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, **Professor-Emeritus Bernie Schechterman (University of Miami)**. In his timely essay, he debates both the new concept of "Drone warfare" in U.S. anti-terrorism policies and its blurred psychologico-moral-legal implications in the historical quest by government decision-makers to "desensitize" war's violence. Avionics Drones are the latest technological evolution of creating both surveillance and attack platforms (*Predator, Sentinel, Reaper, Switchblade, Solareagle*) to help troops on the ground through area reconnaissance, or to launch missiles to pulverize buildings. The U.S. massive use of "Drone warfare" in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and soon potentially globally in the world against anti-Western terrorists has armed the Pentagon by 2013 with over 19,000 Drones and the CIA with uncounted others, while 50 countries also seek Drones and in the U.S. civilian surveillance on the Mexican border and by major urban Police departments. President Barak Obama in its first three years ordered 268 covert strikes, five times more than George W. Bush Jr.'s preceding eight years, while U.S. Drone strikes in 2010-12 killed 19 Al-Qaeda leaders, Talibani commanders and 3,000 "designated" terrorists. However, international criticism condemns the killing of U.S.-dual citizen terrorists and accidental deaths of 800 civilians (with women and 174 minors below 18), while U.S.-NATO security relations with pro-Western Afghanistan and Pakistan have plummeted. Yet, the Obama Administration strongly denies civilian casualties, insisting all targets formed terrorist groupings (both terrorists and "support elements"). Thus, U.S. use of "Drone warfare" reconfirms the old principle of government reliance on "desensitizing" combat techniques to destroy despised enemies—global "War on Terrorism"—even at the cost of blurred legal-moral grounds and "collateral damages".

The second essay, **"NATO's Security Transformation, Partnerships and Post-Cold War Peacekeeping"** by the Editor of this journal, **Professor Marco Rimanelli (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges)**, examines NATO's evolving TransAtlantic security (U.S. and Europe) from Cold War threats of a Soviet invasion and World War III to current post-Cold War Enlargements to Partners and new Allies in joint-peacekeeping against new threats. NATO has successfully cut conventional-nuclear-chemical arms at Cold War's end and in peacekeeping (Yugoslavia sanctions, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, "War on Terrorism", Afghanistan, Libya), while divisiveness by few members over controversial missions saw the re-enlisting of most Allies and Partners in new U.S.-led Coalitions (Lebanon; Gulf Naval patrols; First and Second Gulf Wars) and more controversial long post-war peacekeeping against insurgencies (Iraq and Afghanistan). NATO continues to guarantee peace in Europe and a new broader TransAtlantic security architecture of Allies and Partners, despite Russia's cyclical dualism on anti-Western opposition (Missile Defense, Iraq, Iran, Syria) vs. limited cooperation on NATO Partnership, anti-terrorism and Afghanistan (or Libya). Yet, NATO's international strategic accomplishments are now being eroded by declining European defense budgets that slowly shift the weight of common defense more on U.S. shoulders (also reduced and unable to pursue earlier "Unilateralism"), coupled with international financial crises, rising Western hostile public apathy to new humanitarian missions and the U.S. new "pivot" to Asia. These recent changes, magnified by U.S.-NATO withdrawals from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014), plus paralysis over Iran and Syria, risk retrenching the Alliance into its older stifling European-based security, while already brewing a bitter sense of "drift".

The third essay, **"Politicians of a Feather, Tweet Together"** is the **FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award of 2012** by Graduate student **Tammie Marcus Clary (2012 M.A. Florida Atlantic University, Miami)**, who is now a Ph.D. student in American Politics at Florida International University, Miami and also holds a Juris Doctorate Degree from Nova Southeastern University of Fort Lauderdale. Clary's research analyzes how potential candidates use every effort to be elected, including incorporating new technologies into their campaigns. Clary's innovative research focuses on Twitter use among candidates for U.S. Congress prior to the 2010 elections, exploring complementarities and whether traditional forms of campaigning are being replaced or supplemented by Social Media, specifically Twitter. Her data on 884 candidates for the 2010 elections determine relationships between total number of Congressional Tweets and candidates' incumbency, years in office, political experience, expenditures, chamber of Congress, party, sex and age. Through a linear regression analysis, the candidates' sex display high correlations with numbers of Tweets, while other correlations on incumbency, expenditures, party and Congressional Chamber are easily explained through a political economy approach to transaction costs and campaigning.

This *Florida Political Chronicle* issue would not be complete without highlighting to the public also the **Constitution** of the **Florida Political Science Association**, already available in the FPSA's web-site, but still not well known.

Finally, the **Book-Review** on Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, eds., *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), ISBN 978-0-8133-4819-3, is by **Professor of History and Middle East Jack J. McTague (Saint Leo University)**. Our external Reviewer both praises this work as an innovative overview of hard-to-follow current Middle Eastern political events, demonstrations, revolutions and civil wars, while highlighting the book's few inescapable weaknesses of being an edited volume with 13 mostly excellent contributions, soon outdated by fast-changing political movements and events since its print in 2012. This insightful analysis covers the unfolding of the "Arab Spring" in two ways: on one hand, local countries most affected by its unrest (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, but omits Yemen due to the editors' time limits in securing experts), while on the other, all those regional Powers whose foreign policies have been also impacted by the "Arab Spring" (Iran, Turkey, Israel, Russia and the U.S.A.). Yet, while waiting for an up-dated version, this book remains a very valuable analysis of the "Arab Spring" events in an easy-to-understand way for both experts and laymen about this critical period, and Professor McTague highly recommends it for Social Scientists in any discipline interested in this complex and chronically unstable region.

As Editor of this regional scholarly journal, I remain deeply grateful to the FPSA's Ex-Officio past President Houman Sadri (University of Central Florida-Orlando), to exiting-President Sean Foreman (Barry University, Miami) and to incoming-President Kevin Wagner (Florida Atlantic University, Miami), as well as to all my colleagues at FPSA and Saint Leo University for their continuing support in this voluntary service for our Disciplines and Academic Community. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is a regional scholarly publication that embodies the U.S. Department of Education's new emphasis on public policy in universities, and together with all FPSA Officers we are committed to publishing a high-quality, modern, regional scholarly journal to keep enticing your intellectual fire as we have done since our first issues under our past Editors Drs. Bernie Schechterman (1989-1993), myself (1993-1999, 2012-current) and Houman Sadri (1999-2003).

Best wishes to all!

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA

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TOMORROW'S WARFARE IS BEING FOUGHT TODAY

Bernie Schechterman, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, University of Miami

ABSTRACT: This analysis explores the newer concept of “Drone warfare” in U.S. anti-terrorism policies. In the history of warfare, government decision-makers have sought to “desensitize” war and the latest novel technique is using avionics Drones as both surveillance and attack platforms (*Predator, Sentinel, Reaper, Switchblade, Solareagle*) to help troops on the ground through area reconnaissance or deliver explosives to pulverize a building. The U.S.A. massively used “Drone warfare” in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and now potentially anywhere in the world against terrorists fighting the U.S.A. and West (by 2013 the Pentagon has over 19,000 Drones and the CIA has uncounted others), while 50 countries seek Drones and their ramifications has reached civilian surveillance (Mexican border, major U.S. urban Police departments). President Barack Obama in its first three years ordered 268 covert strikes, five times more than his predecessor George W. Bush in eight years, with U.S. and Allies’ counter-terrorism Drone attacks in 2010-2012 killing 19 Al-Qaeda leaders/commanders, top Talibani commanders and 3,000 “designated” terrorists. However, international criticism condemned the killing of four U.S.-dual citizen terrorists and the accidental death of 800 civilians (including women and 174 minors below 18), while relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan have plummeted. Yet, the Obama Administration strongly denies civilian casualties, insisting all targeted people formed terrorist groupings (both terrorists and “facilitators” as their “support elements”). Thus, U.S. use of avionics “Drone warfare” reconfirms the old principle of government preference for “desensitized” combat techniques that more effectively destroy the enemy—like in the global “War on Terrorism”—despite blurring legal-moral grounds over “collateral damage”.

In the realm of ‘International Politics’, ‘World Politics’ and ‘International Relations’ university courses a major topic of discourse is “war” or military violence. A sub-topic of this generic subject is “warfare”, studying the instruments, the technology, the tactics and strategies associated with this form of behavior. Often this is understood and approached from an evolutionary or historical perspective. This is especially useful for analyzing the newer concept of “Drone warfare”.

The most pronounced emphasis to start with is the broad principle that in the history of warfare Mankind and especially governmental or leadership decision-makers, have often sought to “impersonalize this mode of behavior” as much as possible. Shifting increasingly with-in a historical perspective from past hand-to-hand physical and personal confrontations by combatants, to the most removed application of war-making capabilities (from javelins and arrows to guns and artillery) has been a perpetual goal of the decision-makers. The technique of using Drones as both attack and surveillance instruments represents an ideal and expected development consistent with this basic principle as the most recent evolution of avionics in warfare. Since the late-XVIIIth to early-XIXth Centuries, balloons introduced avionics as a tool for surveillance over enemy positions. On occasion, bombings were also initiated by ballooners. Subsequently since early-1900s, other new forms of avionics replaced this early crude aerial technique with dirigibles/zeppelins, fighter-planes, bombers, missiles and satellites. Drones

represent the latest advancement and nuanced avionics technique with special warfare applications, in the on-going history of surveillance and attack warfare.

The United States has become the primary focus point in the analysis and discussion surrounding this innovative technology and its application to recent and current warfare around the world. Other Western nations are involved in this effort as well. This is especially true for the Israelis in Gaza and Lebanon. Aside from its direct and indirect impact and ramifications for traditional battlefield warfare, it has become a central focus in the more indirect “War on Terror” that transcends the formal war engagements. America has gone to great lengths to innovate and initiate independent “drone warfare” in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and now potentially anywhere around the world in its fight against terrorists aligned against the U.S.A. and the West in general. Technical instruments of “Drone warfare” like the *Predator*, *Sentinel* and *Reaper*, supplemented by the mini-version *Switchblade*, have entered the lexicon of military language hardware and become central factors in the planning and implementation of military strategy (see Appendix A). Because of the novelty of these weapons, the transition permits use of them in conjunction with other instruments and capabilities of warfare, especially in their surveillance role helping troops on the ground. But with the capacity for transporting and delivering enormous destructive capabilities, they can perform individual missions on their own. Both the *Predator* and *Reaper* have the capacity to deliver 100 pound laser-guided Hellfire missiles or 500 pound GPS-guided smart-bombs, each capable to reduce an entire building and contents to rubble.

The issues with these weapons, to be discussed shortly, is partially resolved by the emergence of the *Switchblade*, a 2-foot-long device weighing less than 6 pounds, that is so precise, it can target a single person. The fact that it can be folded-up allows it to be back-packed by field-soldiers and employed when and where they need video and GPS coordinates on the battlefield. This is a perfect example of the new technology enhancing traditional warfare, rather than necessarily replacing it. Critically, *Switchblade* is an adaptive response to the greater damage inflicted on civilians (“collateral damage”) by *Predators* and *Reapers*, which sparked widespread criticism of U.S. “Drone warfare”.

What kind of record impact have these new weapons achieved since their first use under the Bill Clinton Administration (when Osama Bin-Laden was twice discovered only to miss killing him because unarmed Drones could not also strike their targets, while follow-up air-strikes missed the now re-hidden Osama)? Between 2010 and May 2012, U.S. Drone attacks killed over 19 Al-Qaeda leaders and commanders, as well as several top Talibani commanders (see a partial list of people, dates and locations in Appendixes B, C, D & E). Other modes of attacks, bombings by other means and physical assaults have led to other leaders also being killed and/or captured.

The hit list overall has grown if you summarize U.S.A. and Allied operations beyond the four nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Iraq. Drone operations have been used over Iran, Libya, Somalia, Yemen and Syria as pertains to the Middle East and North Africa regions. Since counter-terrorism operations by the U.S.A. and Allies focus on Al-Qaeda world-wide (a terrorist umbrella organization operating with affiliates in 105 countries), the total picture of use and effectiveness of “Drone warfare” is still very incomplete: i.e. Indonesia, Philippine, operations against local (Abu Sayaf) and regional groups (Islamic Jemaah in South-East Asia).

For the record, by early-2013 the U.S.A. deploys over 19,000 Drones under Pentagon command, but this does not account for the CIA’s use of countless Drones in their own Para-military operations very similar to the Pentagon’s Special Forces units or covert operatives. This represents an important expansion of the CIA’s traditional intelligence role in overlapping with the Pentagon’s own role in counter-terrorism warfare.

The Barack Obama Administration in its first three years ordered 268 covert strikes, five times more than his predecessor George W. Bush “Jr.” called for during his own eight years in office. The record indicates that Obama has continued relentlessly the global “War on Terror” launched under Bush Jr. and may very well have enhanced his political national security credentials. Indeed, the “War on Terrorism” is what really galvanized also the novel “Drone warfare” effort. As of 2000 the Pentagon was pushing the Drone program with the intent of having a third of U.S. aircraft unmanned by 2010, and in 2006 the Pentagon was speculating on actually reaching a 45% plateau in its long-distance mission aircraft made up of Drones. But the impact has been phenomenal also world-wide, with 50 countries now seeking to acquire Drones and producing at least a \$6 billions-a-year industry. Moreover, considering its potential in civilian surveillance prospects (Mexican border, New York and other major urban Police departments) the “Drone” surveillance industry is just starting to blossom. Already experimentation forecasts the *Solareagle*, the largest Drone with a 400 foot wingspan and the ability to replace satellites by staying in the air over a five year period.

Every device or strategy in warfare produces a critique or evidences problematic questions, some technical and some philosophical. As indicated already, a harsh criticism has been leveled at the U.S.A. in its Pakistan and Afghanistan operations, over the death toll of civilian populations beyond the targeted terrorist(s). Internationally, the U.S.A. has been condemned for its errant Drone strikes, which are estimated to have killed over 800 civilians, many women and children. Moreover, 3,000 people “designated” as terrorists, including four U.S.-dual citizens have been killed through 2012, with 174 presumed under the age of 18. But the Obama administration disagrees vigorously with these figures. A partial list of people, approximate dates and locations are in Appendixes C, D & E.

The political ramifications for the U.S.A. have become very apparent in the current extremely tense relations with the pro-U.S. Afghan and Pakistani governments. Compensation, a traditional demand in Middle East societies, has not quelled the anger that prevails in leadership and especially public circles over this emotional matter. Pakistan’s temporary closing-off of NATO truck-supply routes was one of the politico-military casualties of this situation. This refers especially to the incident of March 2011, which U.S.A. claims killed 21 terrorists and Pakistan claims killed 42 civilians. The Karzai government of Afghanistan demand that the U.S. and NATO leave sooner than strategized for 2014 is another example of this local anti-Drone reaction. Admittedly, both respective governments’ are playing to their domestic audiences. However, though the Pew Research poll shows a Pakistani increase in perception of the U.S.A. as an “enemy” (from 64% to 75% as of June 2012), the early figure indicates a long-term and prevailing attitude of negative outlook even before the killing of Osama Bin-Laden (on 2 May 2011 by a human Seals Team-6 force) and later U.S. Drone attacks upped the figures. All this has happened despite America serving as a “protective ally” for both régimes. The partial response by the U.S.A. is the innovation and introduction of the more sophisticated *Switchblade* Drone, 50 of which have been deployed in Afghanistan by Summer 2012. Their experimental use in 2011 proved very effective and called for their further production and proliferation on the battlefield.

Another problem—this time anticipated—is of a personal-psychological nature. As an Air-Force function, experienced pilots envisioned the new technology as a threat to their very existence. At first it was hoped that voluntary shifts would take place and pilots would be trained at the New Mexico State University center. But resistance was great. This was followed by non-voluntary selections for an intensive one-year training course with simulated robotic missions. Younger men were eventually found to be a better prospect as they more readily identified themselves as Drone operators, playing

something akin to video games. Thus, military jargon for a Drone kill of an individual enemy is “bug splat”, confirming the growing depersonalization impact of “Drone warfare”.

Unfortunately, such “desensitization” has been a problem at every step of the way in military technological innovation. The same complaints were said for long bow arrows, artillery, mortars, airplane bombers, nuclear attacks, bio-chemical warfare, etc. Yet, none of these arguments and critiques have ever stymied, stalled or reversed the technological innovations and their negative humanitarian features. In almost every instance the justifications for their further use have included: saving lives on your own side as a priority, or “if we do not build them, they will”. Once the knowledge genie is out of the bottle it becomes a free-for-all to gain an advantage versus others, while also racing to find a countering capability to such new dangerous “unbalancing of power” technology. Idealism and wishful thinking are not in danger of triumphing in the world of international politics, as national security (“survival”) triumphs as the primary and only bottom-line concern.

None of this critique has dealt with the issue of competing bureaucracies and personnel. Should the American ambassadors be privy to missions or even have approval rights beforehand? The fall-out in Afghanistan and Pakistan made this an explosive political issue vs. the need for secrecy up-and-down the operational line. It often became an issue of politics vs. military strategy and went beyond the White House to military commanders and State Department representatives abroad. This tricky situation was not a cut-and-dry war event, like most examples of past justified involvements.

The biggest battle raged over the morality of the “Drone warfare” in the first place and especially the results of its implementation. Human rights groups used every conceivable argument to condemn such program, listing arguments of government immorality or illegal behavior. The U.S. government had early on set-up bureaucratically an array of legal personnel to review and justify specific actions, especially “personality strikes (assassinations)” on high-value targets, as well as “signature strikes (militant groups)” with terrorist track-records or most suspicious behavior. Some highly visible lawyers and academics were brought in by the Obama administration (i.e.: Harold Koh, ex-Dean of Yale Law School) to justify and defend the administration’s targeted Drone killings (including that of a highly visible American citizen and renowned Arab terrorist, Anwar al-Alwaki). “Target lists”, which evoked even more outrage, were acknowledged to exist and approved at various levels of the U.S. government.

Despite all these human rights protestations, the Obama Administration received strong political support not only from Republicans, but also from most Democrats. And a White House official countered the moralistic attacks about International Law violations: “if your poster boy is Anwar al-Alwaki as to why we shouldn’t do drone strikes, good f***** luck.” Few, if any terrorists evoke sympathy, especially since the “9/11” Terrorist Attacks of 2011. And as indicated already, all criticisms have been denied or rebutted, according to administration representatives. Indeed, John Brennan, Head of the Counter-Terrorism Center, has gone as far as to insist that not a single “civilian” has been killed in drone attacks. The inference seems clear that all targeted people were part of terrorist groupings (inclusive of actual terrorists and their “support elements”).

The border line between terrorists and “facilitators” (as their “support elements”) has always been subject to dispute. Such issues of philosophical and legal morality are not likely to ever be resolved. This is why the evolution or historical perspective on war and warfare is most revealing. We are simply into a newer version of the old familiar problem of using novel “desensitizing” war-techniques to more efficiently wipe-out despicable enemies, despite blurred moral-legal grounds. Meanwhile, consequentially and controversially, “the United States continues to lead from above.”

Postscript:

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Gaza Strip is an early model of the future nature of warfare around the world. Drones were an essential ingredient in locating and destroying Hamas missiles (*Fajr's*) launched against Israeli territory, and observing and shutting-down smuggling tunnels along the Egyptian-Gaza border. Drones were also used by the Israelis to keep tabs on off-shore ship smuggling of weapons and goods by the Hamas government. And this was viewed by both the Israeli and American military as a facet of warfare in that engagement.

NOTES

Appendix A: Drones Platforms (public domain).

Appendix B: chronology compiled from various Media outlets (2010-2012).

Appendix C: source is *Long War Journal* (December 2012).

Appendix D: chronology compiled from *New America Foundation* & *Wall Street Journal* (2010-2012).

Appendix E: source is *Long War Journal* (2009-2012).

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Greg Miller, "U.S. Predator Strikes Ravage Al-Qaida" in *Sun-Sentinel* (12 January 2010).

Charles Levinson, "Israeli Robots Remake Battlefield" in *Wall Street Journal* (12 January 2010).

Keith Johnson, "U.S. Defends Legality of Killing with Drones" in *Wall Street Journal* (6 March 2010).

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Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, "CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes" in *Wall Street Journal* (14 June 2011).

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Ken Dilanian, "Precision Strikes seen as Key to Beat Al-Qaida" in *Sun-Sentinel* (30 June 2011).

"Out of the Blue: Drones in Pakistan" in *Economist* (30 July 2011).

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Sudanand Dhume, "The Morality of Drone Warfare" in *Wall Street Journal* (17 August 2011).

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"Drones and the Law" in *Economist* (8 October 2011).

Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Julian Barnes, "U.S. Tightens Drone Rules" in *Wall Street Journal* (4 November 2011).

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Ken Dilanian & David S. Cloud, "U.S. Escalates Yemen Attacks" in *Sun-Sentinel* (2 April 2012).

Michael Hasatings, "The Rise of the Killer Drones: How America goes to War in Secret" in *Rolling Stone* (26 April 2012).

"Al-Qaida is Down, but Far from Out" in *Economist* (April 2012).

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Julian Barnes, "U.S. Expands Drone Flights to take Aim at East Africa", see Appendix C in *Wall Street Journal* (25 June 2011).

"March of the Robots: Robotics" in *Economist Technology Quarterly* (2 June 2012).

David S. Cloud, "U.S. Drone Subs Patrol Iran Strait" in *Sun-Sentinel* (12 July 2012).

Ken Dilanian, "Activist Groups File Suit over 2 Drone Airstrikes" in *Sun-Sentinel* (19 July 2012).

Appendix A Drone Platforms




MQ-8B Fire Scout
UAV helicopter, introduced in 2002
Developed into the Sikorsky S-434
Length 23.95ft Cruise speed 124mph
Rotor diameter 27.5ft Endurance 8 hours
Height 9.71 ft Service ceiling 20,000ft
Max speed 137mph



RQ-7 Shadow
Reconnaissance UAV, introduced in 2002
Cost \$15.5m per system Max speed 127 mph
Length 11ft 2in Range 68 miles
Wingspan 14 ft Endurance 6 hours
Height 39.4in Service ceiling 15,000 ft



RQ-11B Raven B
Remote controlled UAV, introduced in 2003
Wing Span 55in Range 6.2 miles
Length 36in Endurance approx. 60-90 min
Cruising speed approx. 35 mph



Boeing ScanEagle
Small UAV, introduced in 2005
Wingspan 10ft
Maximum speed 85mph
Cruise speed 69mph
Endurance record 22 hours



Wasp Block III
Small lightweight RC UAV, introduced in 2007
Length 15in
Wingspan 28.5in
Cruise speed 25-40mph
Range 3 miles
Armament:
High resolution, day/night cameras with digital image stabilization



RQ-170 Sentinel
Stealth UAV, introduced in 2007
Length 14 ft 9in
Wingspan 39ft 4in estimated
Height 6ft est.
Service ceiling 50,000 ft est.



Appendix B

Published Drone Killings (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen)


- * Shaykh Sa' id al-Masri – May 2010
- ^ Baitullah Mehsud – August 2009
- * Badar Mansoor – February 2012
- ^ Sanbaz Zadran – October 2011
- * Abdul Rahman al-Awalki – October 2011
- * Ibrahim al-Banna – October 2011
- ^ Hakimullah Mehsud – January 2012
- * Abu Hafs as-Shahri – September 2011
- * Samir Khan – September 2011
- ^ Sakhr al-Taif – May 2012
- * Abu Mus' ab al-Zarqawi – June 2006
- * Abu Yahya al-Livi – May 2012 or June 2012
- ^ Mushin Musa Matwalliatwah – April 2006
- * Hamza Rabi' a – December 2005
- * Younis al-Mauritani – September 2011
- * Fahd al-Quso – May 2012
- * Muhammad Atef – November 2011
- ^ Ilyas al-Kashmiri – June 2011
- * Atiyah Abd al-Rahmaw – August 2011
- ^ Mullah Dafullah – September 2012
- * Muhammad Ahmad al-Mansoor – December 2012
- * Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti – December 2012
- ^ Baddrudin Medullah – September 2012

*AQ


^Taliban

Appendix C Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Annual Hits 2004-2012

2004 – 1	(George W. Bush Administration-R)
2005 – 3	(“)
2006 – 3	(“)
2007 – 5	(“)
2008 – 38	(“)
2009 – 53	(Barak Obama Administration-D)
2010 – 114/128	(“)
2011 – 75	(“)
2012 – 42	(“)



Appendix D Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Monthly Hits 2010-2012



1. Fall 2010: CIA increases strikes in Pakistan to disrupt suspected Al-Qaeda Plan to strike Europe.
2. January 2011: CIA contractor arrested in Lahore, Pakistan after killing 2 men he feared were undercover terrorists following him; public mobs protest U.S. drone strikes and contractor’s role.
3. March 2011: CIA contractor freed; a U.S. drone strikes sparks angry Pakistani government response.
4. May 2011: Osama Bin-Laden killed by U.S. Navy Seals raid; Pakistan stops responding to CIA drone strikes notifications, but continues to clear air-space in strike areas.
5. August 2011: U.S. drone strike kills Al-Qaeda’s N.2 successor to Osama Bin-Laden.
6. September 2011: General David Petraeus becomes Director of the CIA
7. November 2011: U.S. combat-jets kill accidentally two dozen Pakistani troops mistaken as Talibani terrorists firing at U.S. positions; U.S.A. refuses to apologize.
8. December 2011: Pakistan closes U.S. secret CIA drone base on its territory.
9. April 2012: U.S. Counter-terrorism Chief John Brenner publicly defends at the White House drone strikes, even with civilian casualties.
10. June 2012: U.S. drone strike kills new Al-Qaeda’s N.2.
11. August 2012: U.S.A. apologizes for accidental death in November 2011 of Pakistani troops.

Appendix E

Unconfirmed Statistical Data

U.S. Drone Bases for Middle-East/North Africa:

- Shamsi Air-Base (Baluchistan-Expelled);
- Camp Lenonier (Djibouti);
- Seychelles islands;
- Ethiopia.

Pentagon Overall Operations:

- 7,000 Drones in the air; 12,000 on the ground;
- more “Drone pilots” trained for unmanned aircraft than for manned fighters and bombers.

Yemen Operations:

- March 2012—6 *Predator* strikes;
- April 2012—4 *Predator* strikes (90 militants killed).

Libyan Operations:

- 119 Air-Strikes by U.S.A. (39 Drone strikes).

Deaths:

- 2009: 400/500 suspected militants killed by CIA Drones (20 civilians death estimates).
- By September 2011: 2,000 militants killed (most in 2010-11).
- 2004-11: 2,551 killed in Pakistan, of which 35 Leaders, 500 civilians (80% militants in 2004-09, then 95% by 2010-11).

Terrorist leaders Deaths:

- 2008 January: 1
- 2008 March: 1
- 2008 May: 1
- 2008 July: 4
- 2008 August: 1
- 2008 September: 6
- 2008 October: 3
- 2008 November: 2
- 2009 January: 2
- 2009 April: 1
- 2009 June: 1
- 2009 July: 2
- 2009 August: 2
- 2009 September: 3
- 2009 October: 1
- 2009 December: 4
- 2010 January: 4
- 2010 February: 4
- 2010 March: 1
- 2010 May: 2
- 2010 June: 3
- 2010 September: 4
- 2010 December: 1
- 2011 February: 1
- 2011 June: 1
- 2011 August: 1

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Bernie Schechterman, Ph.D. is Professor Emeritus in Political Science from the University of Miami in Florida, was its former department Chair, has authored/co-authored 14 books, and was editor on several professional journals (including as founding Editor of the *Florida Political Chronicle*). His specializations are Middle East affairs, Terrorism, International Politics and American Foreign Policy. For over 50 years, he has been a consultant and lecturer for the U.S. State and Defense Departments, as well as the Israeli, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian governments. His publications encompass all of the areas above, with greater emphasis on terrorism. The *Florida Political Chronicle* published one of his early works on Bin-Laden and the Al-Qaeda terrorist movement based on his 1986-2000 research. Although retired, he has recently given lectures locally at the University of Miami and Florida Atlantic University. Much of his work is not in the public realm.

NATO'S SECURITY TRANSFORMATION, PARTNERSHIPS AND POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

ABSTRACT: This analysis examines challenges to NATO's TransAtlantic security (U.S. and Europe) from Cold War threats of a Soviet invasion and World War III to current post-Cold War Enlargements to Partners and new Allies, bonded by common peacekeeping against new threats. NATO's security successes in arms-control (large conventional-nuclear-chemical reductions) and peacekeeping missions (Yugoslavia air-naval sanctions, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, "War on Terrorism", Afghanistan and Libya) have been countered through time by declining European defense funds that slowly shift the weight of common defense and willingness to intervene more on U.S. shoulders (yet declining U.S. forces also deny any return to exclusive U.S. "Unilateralism"). Further, Alliance divisiveness by few members over controversial combat missions have repositioned some-to-most NATO Allies and Partners in U.S.-led Coalitions for combat (Lebanon I & II MNF; Gulf Naval patrols against Iran and Iraq; First and Second Gulf Wars against Iraq) and controversial long post-war peacekeeping against insurgencies (Iraq and Afghanistan), while discreet U.S.-NATO-Gulf-Saudi Arabia security cooperation seek to contain Iran's aggressive regional policies (nuclear proliferation, interference in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria). Thus, NATO will continue to guarantee politico-military peace in Europe and a broader TransAtlantic security architecture of Allies and Partners, despite Russia's cyclical alternance between anti-Western challenges (Missile Defense, Iraq, Iran and Syria) and cooperation (Partnership, terrorism, Afghanistan, or reluctantly Libya). More troubling, NATO's international strategic accomplishments are now being eroded by Western hostile public apathy to further humanitarian missions, international financial crises, declining European defense budgets that slowly shift the weight of common defense more on U.S. shoulders (also reduced and unable to pursue earlier "Unilateralism", while also "pivoting" its forces more towards Asia). All these recent changes, magnified by the withdrawals from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014), plus paralysis over Iran and Syria, risk now confining NATO back again to its older Europe-based mostly security posture, with an already brewing sense of "drift".

Introduction: Historical Successes vs. Divisiveness or "Drift"?

Cemented politically and ideologically in the Allies' common heritage of combat and democratic ideology against both German imperialism in Two World Wars (1914-18, 1939-45) and Soviet hegemony in the Cold War (1946-90), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues today its successful post-Cold War security missions of TransAtlantic Collective Defense and peace over a diffuse wider "Vancouver-to-Vladivostok" region. Thus, since 1990 the 16-members "Alliance" has enlarged its traditional TransAtlantic area (North America, West Europe and Atlantic) to 12 new Allies and Partners among Euro-Mediterranean-Gulf ex-neutrals, East European/post-Soviet ex-enemies, Russia and since 2008 also a handful of Western global Strategic Partners on bilateral security relations with NATO).

NATO's success is centered on its post-World War II TransAtlantic partnership between an Isolationist-prone America and a hegemonic-weary Europe to assure their mutual security throughout 45 years of Cold War bipolar conventional-nuclear deterrence against common threats by:

- countering the risk of World War III by a hegemonic Soviet Union (USSR) and its East European Communist satellites of the Warsaw Pact;
- permanently tying America's security to Europe's through its joint-forces, the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" and non-hegemonic leadership of NATO;
- guaranteeing through NATO the security of all its members against any European hegemonic threat (mostly Germany), or renewed historical rivalries among European ex-enemies;
- reintegrating in the West and NATO under U.S. guarantees a defeated, disarmed Germany for the common forward defense against the USSR.¹

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) and Communism in 1991-92, NATO has continued for 20+ years of post-Cold War peacekeeping within a diffused "Arc of Crisis" from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Middle-East/Gulf to Afghanistan. Indeed, to remain relevant for Western security, NATO has successfully revamped itself in the 1990s from a Cold War TransAtlantic regional defensive Alliance for conventional armoured and nuclear combat between the SuperPowers to a post-Cold War global collective alliance of expanding Allies and Partners within the broad Euro-Atlantic-Mediterranean area and buttressed by its mobile multinational "Out-of-Area" peacekeeping forces. To survive as a viable, flexible Alliance, NATO has also reinvented itself five times through new, evolving Strategic Visions and missions adapted to a decade-by-decade changing palette of threats:

- reconfirming since early-1990s U.S.-European political strengthening of the TransAtlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War to guarantee U.S. continued commitment to European security after the Two World Wars and Cold War, and dispel cyclical fears of a possible U.S. withdrawal from Europe and disbanding of the Alliance now that the common enemy—USSR and Warsaw Pact—had collapsed;
- promoting in the 1990s-2000s East-West and regional stability through arms control, anti-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), regional mediation, peacekeeping and anti-terrorism cooperation;
- evolving in the 1990s-2000s into a regional two-tiered alliance-system of full-member Allies plus new Partners from ex-"neutrals" and ex-enemies, all committed to democracy and security for a unified Europe and its Partners, protecting also the parallel E.U. politico-economic integration;
- expanding cyclically its full-member Allies in three post-Cold War Enlargements (1997-1999, 2002-2004, 2008) and its multi-tiered Partners;
- restructuring its integrated military from a conventional/nuclear World War III alliance into a globally-mobile multinational force geared to new "Out-of-Area" peacekeeping missions under U.N. mandates (from the Mediterranean and Balkans to Central Asia).²

NATO's successful revamping from a Cold War regional defensive Alliance to a post-Cold War global collective defense system, has confounded critics and preserved peace in the greater Euro-Atlantic security zone of Allies and Partners from "Vancouver to Vladivostok", adding also global Strategic Partners in joint training and peacekeeping (U.N., E.U., Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq). Yet, NATO's main contributor in forces, technology and treasury remains its leader, the

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994); Francis Heller & John Gillingham, eds., *NATO: Founding the Alliance & Integration of Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

² Marco Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & Other International Security Organizations* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow/Rowman, Littlefield, 2009, p.980), see Introduction; Gülnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991* (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997).

U.S.A., and both Presidents George W. Bush “Jr.” and Barack Obama have started to shift some U.S. forces away from Europe (NATO’s backbone) as partial redeployment in the Asia-Pacific region to support Afghan peacekeeping and especially shore-up pro-Western countries (Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, as well as indirectly South Korea and Japan) harassed by China’s new economic rise and nationalistic-military aggressiveness over their uninhabited off-shore islands and international waters where Beijing is seeking to seize natural resources hidden beneath. Such gradual strategic “Asian pivot” only strengthens existing U.S. military forces since World War II in the southern Asia-Pacific theater under the U.S. Pacific Command (PACCOM), which have declined after the IInd Viet-Nam War (1964-75), while basically slowly repositioning U.S. forces from quieter theaters (like from the U.S. European Command under NATO in Europe during 2006-2016) without increasing an already declining U.S. military. Yet, China’s predictable criticism of any regional coordination that limits her recent intimidating penetrations, are also matched by NATO-European concerns that the Alliance is becoming “peripheral” for the Obama Administration.

Furthermore since 2010, the Alliance has also had to fight and is “losing” at home a growing political ambiguity on global security commitments. On one hand, politically-divided governments (pro-interventionist Conservative coalitions vs. semi-pacifist Leftist coalitions) reflect growing public opinion opposition to more controversial humanitarian missions. On the other, the mutually-reinforcing dual international economic crises of 2008 (U.S.) and 2010 (EuroZone) have sharpened the decline in resources and political will among all NATO Allies, U.S. included (as the Barak Obama Administration has quietly folded its combat role in Iraq since 2011 and with NATO in Afghanistan by 2014). This portends even weaker political and military appetite for any future, long-run controversial peacekeeping or humanitarian missions (with loss of public/government support sharpest from full intervention in Afghanistan, to public divisiveness and unofficial support in Iraq, to qualified limited air-intervention in Libya vs. implicit Western consensus on non-intervention in Syria’s Civil War), which risks to retrench NATO as a military force back to its old European and TransAtlantic security zone, while maintaining a lower global profile through its Partnerships and joint-training, as well as occasional logistical support of U.N. or regional peacekeeping (i.e.: Darfur, Mali).³

NATO from World War III Threats to Post-Cold War Security and Arms Control in Europe

After Nazi Germany’s bloody hegemony over Europe during World War II, the Allies and USSR destroyed the rest, while seeking to “Liberate” the Continent (1939-45). Further, the Allies’ Idealist promise of world peace through the United Nations’ Collective Security regime controlled by winning Allies never materialized, once Europe and the world fell into 45 years of East-West Cold War (1946-90) between the Soviet-Communist totalitarian bloc (USSR, East Europe, other states and temporarily Red China) vs. a U.S.-led democratic West (North America, Western Europe, Latin America, Oceania, Japan, Israel and few other states). The central international conflict zone remained mostly Europe, Germany and its ex-capital Berlin, all three split politico-economically and militarily among the SuperPowers in two rival alliance-systems: the USSR-led Communist East/Warsaw Pact vs. the U.S.-led NATO and West.

As the longest, peacetime, multi-national alliance in History (1949-current), NATO’s success is centered on its post-World War II TransAtlantic partnership between the United States (U.S.) and an anti-hegemonic Europe to assure their mutual security from Two World Wars to encompass 45 years of Cold War bipolar conventional-nuclear deterrence against a range of 4-5 types of common threats to:

³ David Calleo, *Rethinking Europe’s Future* (Princeton University Press, 2001); John Gaddis, *United States and End of Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 1992); Alfred Grosser, *Western Alliance* (New York: Vintage, 1980); Stephen Ambrose & Donald Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1938* (New York: Penguin, 1999).

1. counter any potential powerful external hegemonic threat and risk of World War III by the Soviet Union (USSR) and its East European Communist satellites of the Warsaw Pact to destroy Western military independence and conquer Western Europe’s industrial resources in the name of an ideological “World Communist Revolution”;
2. permanently anchor America’s security presence in a divided Cold War Europe through its forward-bases, “nuclear umbrella” and benevolent (non-hegemonic) politico-military leadership of a post-World War II, anti-Soviet coalition of both ex-Allies and ex-vanquished European states;
3. guarantee through the Alliance the Collective Defense of its member-states (or “Allies” to politically symbolize their past and continued democratic ideological identification since both World Wars) against any intra-European hegemonic threats (Germany, France), or renewed historical rivalries by ex-enemies (France vs. Italy, Great Britain vs. Italy, Great Britain vs. France, Greece vs. Turkey);
4. reintegrate under U.S. guarantees a defeated and disarmed Germany in the West (Europe 1950 and NATO 1955) as vital cornerstone for TransAtlantic “Forward defense” against the USSR.⁴

Consequently, the Alliance has steadily grown as an “island” of peace in a politico-militarily divided Europe and an ideologico-economically divided bipolar world between the U.S.-led West and Soviet-led Communist bloc, where regional tensions between permanently based large hostile military forces could at any time spark either localized conflicts or even escalate into World War III. Moreover, in such highly-charges context of international military tensions and risks of nuclear holocaust, NATO’s permanently-based multi-national forces, U.S.-led military training and shared democratic values against the common Communist enemy, has forged over the decades a common new TransAtlantic ideologico-political identity bonding together as a new organizational structure since 1949-55 both the ex-winners of World War II (U.S.A., Great Britain, Canada, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Norway) and vanquished ex-enemies (Germany, Italy, Spain) with their collaborators (“Vichy France”, “Quisling Norway”, pro-German neutral Turkey and neutral Sweden) (see Table 1 below).


North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949-2020s									
NATO-12: 1949		NATO-14: 1950-52		NATO-16½: 1990		NATO-26: 2002		NATO-28: 2008	
BELGIUM ✧	ITALY ✧	GERMANY (LEFT OUT)		(EAST GERMANY)		BULGARIA ✧		ALBANIA ✧	
CANADA ✧	LUXEMBURG ✧	SPAIN (LEFT OUT)		EAST EUROPE (LEFT OUT)		ESTONIA ✧		CROATIA ✧	
DENMARK ✧	NETHERLANDS ✧	E.D.C.: 1950-54		PARTNERS: 1990-2006		LATVIA ✧		MACEDONIA (LEFT OUT)	
FRANCE ✧	NORWAY ✧	GREECE ✧ 1952		EAST EUROPE NEUTRALS, EX-SOVIETS, RUSSIA, MEDITERRANEAN & GULF		LITHUANIA ✧		NATO-30+: 2010-2020?	
ICELAND ✧	PORTUGAL ✧	TURKEY ✧ 1952				ROMANIA ✧		MACEDONIA	AUSTRIA?
GREAT BRITAIN/UNITED KINGDOM ✧		NATO-15: 1955		NATO-19: 1999		SLOVAKIA ✧		FINLAND?	SWEDEN?
UNITED STATES of AMERICA ✧		(WEST) GERMANY ✧		CZECH REPUBLIC ✧		SLOVENIA ✧		IRELAND?	CYPRUS?
SPAIN (LEFT OUT)	GERMANY (LEFT OUT)	NATO-16: 1981-82		HUNGARY ✧		CROATIA (LEFT OUT)		SWITZERLAND?	BOSNIA?
GREECE (LEFT OUT)	TURKEY (LEFT OUT)	SPAIN ✧		POLAND ✧		ALBANIA (LEFT OUT)		MONTENEGRO?	SERBIA?

Table 1: “NATO, 1949-2020” created by author from NATO and various sources (Unclassified).


⁴ Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: U.S. & European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); F.H. Heller & J.R. Gilligham, eds., NATO: Founding the Alliance, p.24-192; M. Rimaneli, Historical Dictionary NATO & International Security Organizations, see Introduction.

The strategic goal of strengthening TransAtlantic defenses against a Soviet-launched World War III pushed NATO to expand during the Cold War from its 12 Founding Allies of 1949 to 14 by 1952, 15 by 1955 and 16 by 1981 (see Table 1 above), notwithstanding sharp cyclical contrasts on adding more controversial states, which delayed their eventual membership for years: West Germany was rejected in 1949, 1950 and 1954 (after the alternative 1950-54 French Pleven Plan/European Defence Community collapsed), but was indirectly integrated through the 1954 Western European union (WEU) and accepted in 1955 under U.S. pressure (and finally able to re-integrate also Communist East Germany by the 1990 “2 plus 4 Treaty” on German Re-Unification); Greece and Turkey under U.S. protection since the 1947 Truman Doctrine were rejected in 1949, but accepted in 1954; Fascist Spain was rejected in 1949 and 1952, but was indirectly integrated through the 1952 U.S.-Spanish alliance for support of NATO in case of World War III, and accepted finally by 1981 after its conversion to democracy.⁵


Maps 1-2-3: USSR/Warsaw Pact vs. NATO World War III Scenarios 1-2-3



Map 1: Soviet/Warsaw Pact Western TVD invasion of NATO's Central Front (<http://techconex.com/images/wwiii/large/western.jpg>).



Map 2: Soviet/Warsaw Pact South-Western TVD invasion of NATO's Southern Flank/Balkans (<http://techconex.com/images/wwiii/large/southwestern.jpg>).



Map 3: Soviet/Warsaw Pact North-Western TVD invasion of NATO's Northern Flank/Scandinavia (<http://techconex.com/images/wwiii/large/northwestern.jpg>).


Maps 1-2-3 on World War III scenarios from: U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1987* (Washington DC: GPO, 1987), global free distribution.

From 1947 to 1988, Cold War threats focused mostly on Western Europe with the risk of a Soviet invasion of the Continent in a devastating dual conventional-nuclear World War III (see Maps 1-2-3 above).

⁵ Gustav Schmidt, ed., *A History of NATO: First Fifty Years*, 3 vols. (New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's, 2001); NATO, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2012); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on Cold War, U.S.A. & NATO memberships; Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *NATO: Next Thirty Years* (Boulder, CO: CSIS/Westview, 1980).

NATO's politico-military response has been to always tighten regional Western security around the U.S.-European Trans-Atlantic Alliance with permanent peacetime multinational forces, joint-training and peaceful domestic stability, backed by U.S. forces and "nuclear umbrella" for deterrence. During 1947-60s the U.S./NATO forecasted World War III as a quick Soviet conventional invasion of West Germany to then conquer most of Western Europe and Greece, followed later by Turkey, and finally also the Middle-East, North Africa and Mediterranean while cornering NATO's broken defenses into the North Atlantic maritime region (U.S.A., Canada, Great Britain, Ireland and Iceland). With World War III lasting several years, only a U.S. massive invasion of Europe from the British Isles would finally destroy the Soviet "Empire" at the price of devastating all of Europe. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-60) deployed for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe (Germany, Italy, Great Britain and Turkey) to shore-up U.S./NATO's weaker conventional defenses with the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" in an all-out war ("Massive Retaliation" Doctrine) against any massed Soviet armour and infantry attack on NATO's Central Front. However, the controversial nature of nuclear warfare, devastation, long-term radioactive "Fall-out" and the impossibility of waging limited nuclear strikes within a larger conventional war forced later the Alliance to cut its tactical "nukes" and under President John Kennedy to expand U.S. conventional forces and strategic nuclear missiles to deter the USSR threat ("Flexible Response" Doctrine and nuclear "Mutual Assured Destruction" concept).

Maps 4-5: USSR/Warsaw Pact vs. NATO World War III Scenarios 4



Map 4: Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces against NATO's Central Front; Map 5: Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO's Central Front
 Maps 4-5 on World War III scenarios from: General Hackett, *The Third World War* (New York: 1985).

By the 1970s-80s Soviet/Warsaw Pact traditional conventional superiority over the U.S./NATO focused on a surprise, short World War III conventional offensive to crush NATO with massive fast armored breakthroughs in the Central Front to conquer West Germany's industrial Rhine-Ruhr areas and

the German-Dutch-Belgian coastlines with their vital international port facilities in a 3-weeks operational window to force West Germany's surrender and NATO's defeat (see Maps 4-5 above). But by week 3, NATO would start receiving massive convoys of U.S./Canadian armoured reinforcements shipped through the Atlantic ("Return of Forces to Germany"/REFORGER's NATO annual war-exercises for such scenario) that could eventually rescue NATO's Central Front and Northern Flank from military collapse under the massive Soviet armour invasion. Finally, anytime during such 3-weeks East-West conventional combat could quickly escalate into nuclear warfare in a desperate U.S. gamble to halt World War III and NATO's defeat by also exposing both SuperPowers' homelands to each other's strategic nuclear strikes.⁶

As an integrated regional military defense alliance under U.S. Command, NATO's mix of conventional and nuclear forces deterred any World War III by superior Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces and contained Soviet-Communist expansionism since the late-1940s. Moreover, the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" and front-line troops assured the automatic combat involvement of a now vulnerable America across the oceans in distant Europe reversing the U.S. Isolationism of both World Wars. As a truly integrated Euro-Atlantic defense alliance of "equal" members ("Allies") under U.S. leadership (not hegemony), NATO preserves each Ally's national independence and dampened old European ethno-nationalist tensions through decades of politico-military cooperation and TransAtlantic identity. Thus, the Alliance has surmounted these Cold War politico-military challenges and fears of total annihilation at the hands of its "common enemy". By 1988 renewed East/West Détente has led to deep NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional arms cuts in Europe with the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), halving forces and eliminated the risk of a surprise Soviet World War III strike. At the same time, the 1987 INF Treaty eliminated all NATO-Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear "Euromissiles", while the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) halved strategic nuclear weapons. Finally, the Cold War ended with the 1989-90 peaceful anti-Communist revolts in Eastern Europe and fall of the Berlin Wall, due to Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachëv's indecision between reforms and repressions. The USSR lost all Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Warsaw Pact front-line defenses against NATO, followed by the 1990 re-Unification of Germany. Also the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in late-1990 by its restless East European Satellites, who look at NATO as a beacon of democracy in the post-Cold War and immediately sought U.S. protection and integration in both NATO and European Union (E.U.) through parallel Enlargements in 1990-2008 against both a future resurgent ex-Soviet Russia, and each other over their rival minorities and unjust borders.⁷


Indeed, the Cold War's end and collapse of both Communism and the USSR suddenly released in the 1990s old pent-up ethno-nationalisms from Europe to the ex-USSR, while U.S. leadership of the West and NATO was reconfirmed as the permanent protector of Euro-Atlantic security and peace. The post-Cold War (1990-now) early global euphoria for the West's "triumph" over the collapsing Communist Bloc and Warsaw Pact suddenly turned into bitter criticism of NATO as having outlived its missions, while U.S./NATO Allies and Partners scaled-down their military budgets and NATO commitments ("Peace Dividend"). Since 1990 the chaotic post-Cold War world and erosion of Euro-

⁶ David C. Isby & Charles Kamps Jr., *Armies of NATO's Central Front* (London: Jane's, 1985); Wolfram Hanrieder & Graeme Auton, *Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Great Britain* (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1980); M. Rimanelli, *NATO & International Security Organizations: Historical Dictionary*, see related Dictionary Entries on World War III & NATO-Warsaw Pact Fronts; Jeffrey Simon, ed., *NATO-Warsaw Pact Mobilization* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1988); Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981); Barry M. Blechman & Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978).

⁷ Michael Beschloss & Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993); Marco Rimanelli, "East-West Arms Control & USSR's Fall, 1967-95" in *East European Quarterly* (vol.29) n.2 (June 1995): p.237-273; David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on NATO Post-Cold War, Partnerships and Enlargements; H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.733-836; George Bush & Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), p.3-205.

Atlantic cooperation over divisive perceptions of “Future Threats” has been influenced by ethno-nationalist disintegration and genocide (Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent the ex-USSR), two international wars against Iraq (1990-91 and 2003-07), proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea), and globalist onslaught of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism (linked to Al-Qaeda). In this milieu, the sharp reduction of U.S.-NATO military expenditures made the Alliance’s Enlargements part of a concerted drive to unify with the E.U. both sides of the “Iron Curtain” into a broad pan-European politico-security area encompassing most OSCE and NACC Partners, with selective force-building through NATO’s Enlargements from 16 Cold War Allies to 28 Post-Cold War member-states in 1997-2008 with 44 other Partners (see Maps 6-7 below and Table 2 on the next page).

Maps 6-7: NATO ENLARGEMENTS: COLD WAR TO POST-COLD WAR



Map 6: Cold War NATO-16's Central Front vs. USSR/Warsaw Pact




Map 7: Post-Cold War NATO-27 Enlargements, 1999-2008

NATO has also been a beacon of democracy in the post-Cold War for all Partners seeking to join it to forge a new national “Western” identity and protection against both a future resurgent ex-Soviet Russia, and each other over their rival minorities and unjust borders. Thus, to preserve stability in a wider European area and gradually draw in newly-democratic ex-enemies from East Europe and ex-USSR, NATO changed the old Atlantic security system from its rigid, Cold War East-West collective defense strategy to a new evolving inter-locking, Euro-Atlantic security architecture (see Map 8 in next page) with “Out-of-Area” global peacekeeping and Western democratic values for all Allies and Partners (1995 *Principles on NATO Enlargement*). The post-Cold War security architecture combined a reformed, highly mobile NATO for both combat and peacekeeping) with slow NATO Enlargements to 12 Partners in 1999-2008. Once Aspirant-Partners embraced democratic values, conflict-resolution and peacekeeping with NATO and U.N., by 1999-2008 all ex-Warsaw Pact states, Croatia and Albania joined both NATO and E.U. first as Partners (1990-95), then as Allies: the 1997-99 First-tranche Enlargement (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland); 2002-04 Second Enlargement (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia); 2008 Third Enlargement (Albania, Croatia); with all of them also entering the E.U. as equal “Western” members (2002-2008), while some wait a slow domestic political consensus to join (Macedonia, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland).⁸

⁸ Philip Gordon, ed., *NATs Transformation: Changing Shape of Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman-Littlefield, 1997); Marco Rimanelli, *NATO Enlargement after 2002: Opportunities & Strategies for a New Administration* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2001, limited U.S. government use); Gale Mattox & Arthur Rachwald, eds., *Enlarging NATO: National Debates* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2001); Sven Biscop & Johan Lembke, eds., *E.U. Enlargement and the TransAtlantic Alliance* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2008).

MAP 8: NATO, E.U. & EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, 2008



Map 8: created by author from NATO, E.U. and various sources (U).

NATO EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 2013 (28 ALLIES & 44 PARTNERS)						
EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC-50: 28 Allies & 22 Partners)						
Albania ◇	Armenia	Austria*	Azerbaijan	Belarus'		
Belgium ◇*	Bosnia	Bulgaria ◇*	Canada ◇	Croatia ◇*		
Czech Republic ◇*	Denmark ◇*	Estonia ◇*	Finland*	France ◇*		
Germany ◇*	Georgia	Great Britain ◇*	Greece ◇*	Hungary ◇*		
Iceland ◇	Ireland*	Italy ◇*	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzia		
Latvia ◇*	Lithuania ◇*	Luxemburg ◇*	Macedonia	Malta*		
Moldova	Montenegro	Netherlands ◇*	Norway ◇*	Poland ◇*		
Portugal ◇*	Romania ◇*	Russia	Serbia	Slovakia ◇*		
Slovenia ◇*	Spain ◇*	Sweden*	Switzerland	Tajikistan		
Turkmenistan	Turkey ◇	United States of America ◇	Ukraine	Uzbekistan		
(Cyprus*)**	(Kosovo)**	NATO Allies ◇	E.U. States*	(Not yet Partner)**		
MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS (+7 Partners)						
Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Mauritania	Morocco	Tunisia
GULF/ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE PARTNERS (+4 Partners)						
Bahrain	Qatar	Kuwait	United Arab Emirates			
STRATEGIC GLOBAL PARTNERS (+11 Partners)						
Afghanistan	Australia	Iraq	Japan	Pakistan		
Korea	New Zealand	Mongolia	(India)**	(Not yet Partner)**		
European Union (E.U.)*	Organization on Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)		United Nations (U.N.)			

Table 2: created by author from NATO and various sources (U).

NATO's "Out-of-Area" Peacekeeping during the Post-Cold War: First Gulf War vs. Bosnia and Kosovo

The Cold War era's bipolar nuclear and conventional balance of terror had also assured an unprecedented degree of regional stability: East-West deterrence and inter-bloc "policing" had cajoled the respective reluctant European allies to overcome past nationalist hatreds and cooperate as partners on daily inter-bloc politico-military alliance integration within NATO and Warsaw Pact. The 1990s explosion of pent-up nationalist and religious hatreds affected mostly the ex-Yugoslavia and part of the ex-USSR, while threatening to spread out of control to most of Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet successor states with countless deaths and refugees. In the post-Cold War, NATO remains the only security organization capable of guaranteeing permanent U.S. commitment to European security and an integrated military alliance able to quickly intervene in regional conflicts once consensus is achieved. Thus, NATO repeatedly updated its Cold War Strategic Concept to meet Post-Cold War challenges (1991, 1999 and 2010) to allow "Out-of-Area" humanitarian peacekeeping and collective security missions within a broader Euro-Atlantic security area, like the 1992-95 NATO's air-naval support of UN peacekeeping in Yugoslavia; 1995-96 International Force (IFOR) and 1996-2004 Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia; 1999-current Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, Albania and briefly in Macedonia too; 2001-current International Security of Afghanistan Force (ISAF); "War on Terror" against Al-Qaeda and other Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Somalia); and U.N.-mandated air-combat for Libyan rebels who fought and won Moammar Ghaddafi's régime (2011).


NATO's first post-Cold War major reorganization severely cut military expenditures in 1991-99, reducing U.S. and Allied forces, scaling-down its Commands and turning over to Europeans several influential traditional U.S. posts, while expanding its mobile Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). However, as during the 1980s, also in 1990-2003 NATO's finely tuned military remained often paralyzed by internal political and public opinion fears of bloody post-Cold War guerrilla warfare. The Alliance failed repeatedly to quickly intervene militarily outside its traditional European border into vital "Out-of-Area" regional crises ignited by the collapsing Cold War system, which threatened Western security and economic interests, and were temporally patched with U.S.-led Western "Coalitions-of-Willing": in Sinai with MFO peacekeeping (1980-now); Lebanon with MNF I and II peacekeeping (1982-84); Western protection of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War (1986-now); First Gulf War against Iraq's threat to Gulf oil-fields (1990-91); Yugoslavia's Civil Wars (1991-99); Southern and Northern Watch Air Patrols on Iraq (1992-2003); Second Gulf War (2003) over Western fears of renewed Iraqi WMDs proliferation after the U.N. disarmament of 1991-98; and Iraq's peacekeeping Occupation (2003-11).⁹

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and threat to Middle-Eastern oil routes propelled President Bush Sr. to organize a grand U.S.-led coalition under U.N. mandate to defeat Iraq. Although NATO did not openly fight in this 1990-91 First Gulf War (due to domestic opposition in Germany and Greece to "Out-of-Area" combat), most Allies and NATO assets contributed to the war, with the bulk of U.S. troops in Europe shipped over and REFORGER used to trans-ship in 6 months 600,000 men, heavy weapons and materiel to Saudi Arabia (twice the distance planned in REFORGER). SHAPE also protected Mediterranean Allies from feared Iraqi missile strikes through NATO Airborne Early-Warning aircrafts, naval protection of Mediterranean shipping, massive logistics and air-defense of Turkey. Iraq's defeat in a short war was a

⁹ Jeffrey Simon, ed., *European Security Policy after the 1989 Revolutions* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1991); Robert J. Jackson, ed., *Europe in Transition: Managing Security after the Cold War* (New York: Praeger, 1992); Marco Rimanelli, *Strategic Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War* (Tampa FL: Center on Inter-American & World Studies, 1998); Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Question of Legitimacy* (New York: St.Martin's, 2000); Kathleen C. Bailey, *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many* (Urbana, IL: University Illinois Press, 1991); Peter Beckman, Steven Lee, Michael Dobkowski & Paul Crumlish, *Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear States and Terrorism* (Cornwall-on-Hudson, N.Y.: SLOAN, 2006).

vindication of both Bush Sr.’s diplomatic skills in crafting a wide Coalition (including virtually all NATO Allies) and implementing in combat the U.S./NATO 1980s Cold War combined-arms doctrine FOFA, which decimated the Soviet-trained and armed Iraqis (see Maps 9-10 below).

Maps 9-10: NATO’s INDIRECT POST-COLD WAR OUT-OF-AREA PEACEKEEPING



Map 9: I Gulf War & Kuwait (<http://techconex.com/images/wwii/large/western.jpg>). Map 10: II Gulf War & Invasion of Iraq (<http://techconex.com/images/wwii/large/western.jpg>). Maps 6-7: I Gulf War & II Gulf War (<http://techconex.com/images/wwii/large/western.jpg>).

Only by 1991 the risks of exponential regional destabilization finally forced NATO to adapt its missions to this new strategic environment: from anti-Soviet conventional-nuclear deterrence to mobile regional interventions and peacekeeping in many “Out-of-Area” missions against both ethno-nationalist hatred in the Balkans (ex-Yugoslavia; Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania) and regional destabilization near the oil-rich Persian Gulf (Afghanistan). NATO's reorganization brought into fruition the combat lessons learned in the 1990-91 “Desert Storm Operation” against Iraq, and for the smooth U.S.-NATO peacekeeping for the U.N. in Bosnia (1995-2004), Macedonia (1998-2003), Albania (1995-2003), Kosovo (1999-now) and Afghanistan (2001-14).¹⁰


The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (1989-90) and USSR (1991-92) also led to the brake-up of independent Communist Yugoslavia along regional religious lines away from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia under President Slobodan Milošević, while Serb minorities in the new states fought to create a “Greater Serbia” with Yugoslav military aid. The break-up of Yugoslavia ushered five civil wars in a decade (1991-2000): Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-92, 1995), Bosnia (1992-95), Kosovo (1998-99) and Macedonia (2000-2001), with Serb-led ethnic-cleansing and atrocities (250,000 dead, tens of thousands of rapes and hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to Europe), dashing E.U., U.N. and NATO diplomatic mediations, while isolating the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers in 1992-95. NATO air-naval patrols of the Adriatic Sea imposed a U.N. naval embargo against arms shipments to the ex-Yugoslavia in 1992-96, with the blockade under direct NATO command through Allied Forces Southern Europe-AFSOUTH. Since 1992 NATO also enforced U.N. no-fly zones over Bosnia to prevent attacks, followed by selective NATO air-strikes since April 1993 against the Serbs. These were NATO’s first combat actions since its founding in 1949, destroying selected Serb positions, providing NATO humanitarian air-drops, protecting from the air U.N.

¹⁰ Rob Johnson, *The Iran-Iraq War* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2011); Dilip Hiro & Craig Tenney, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm* (New York: iUniverse, 1992); G. Bush & B. Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p.205-518; H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p.803-836.

humanitarian convoys. But persistent Allied divisiveness and U.S. opposition prevented any NATO ground combat operations until the Bosnian-Serbs overran in summer 1995 the U.N. "Safe-Area" of Šrebrenica, slaughtering all Bosniak Muslim males and attacking more U.N. Safe-Areas. This precipitated NATO's Operation Deliberate Force (August-September 1995) with air-strikes destroying all Bosnian-Serb Command-Control and heavy weapons, while Croatia's entry in war defeated Serb forces both inside Croatia (Serb-controlled Krajina area) and Western Bosnia (see Map 11 below).¹¹

These parallel, independent NATO-Croat actions forced all warring ethnic factions to sign the U.N. Dayton Peace Accords (November 1995), with their disarmament and peace enforced on the ground by NATO's heavily armed peacekeepers pouring in from Germany during Winter (Operation Joint Endeavour) to absorb local U.N. peacekeepers in NATO's Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR, 1995-96). IFOR was the largest military operation in Europe since World War II with 65,000 IFOR peacekeepers: 50,000 NATO troops from all Allies and 17 non-NATO Partners with Russia (NATO's historic Cold War enemy), plus 15,000 ex-U.N. peacekeepers, quickly separating the three ethnic armies into cantonment and storage sites, while transferring areas between hostile communities. IFOR's success enabled the High-Representative for Bosnia to implement Dayton's Accords, while IFOR was replaced by a smaller NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR, 1996-2004) with 32,000 peacekeepers (see NATO IFOR/SFOR in Map 12 below). SFOR force-levels were gradually drawn down through six-month reviews (NAC+N Meetings) until replaced by E.U. peacekeeping (EUFOR, 2005-now). NATO's 2006 Riga Summit made Bosnia a Partner (Croatia joined in 2001), while E.U. aid promotes economic integration of all West Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia) through the E.U. Stabilisation Pact.¹²

Maps 11-14: NATO's POST-COLD WAR OUT-OF-AREA PEACEKEEPING (IFOR/SFOR & KFOR)



Map 11. Yugoslavia Civil Wars' Ethnicities 1991-2000. Map 12. NATO's IFOR/SFOR Control of Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Peace with Dark-Green for Bosnian-Serb Republic vs. Light-Crimson for Bosniac Muslim and Bosnian-Croat Federation. Map 13. Serbia and 1998-99 Kosovo War with ethnic-cleansing of Albanian-Kosovars. Map 14. NATO's KFOR in Kosovo since 1999. All maps unclassified free global distribution.

Nevertheless, NATO had to fight again in the Balkans against Yugoslavia/Serbia with the 1999 Kosovo War to stop ethnic-cleansing of Albanian Muslims in Serbia's province of Kosovo. During 1998, tensions among ethnic Albanians and Serb minority within Kosovo broke out between Serbian military and secessionist insurgents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), leaving over 1,500 Kosovar-Albanians dead and 400,000 refugees in a major humanitarian crisis as the Serbs forced civilians to flee Kosovo.

¹¹ Jasminka Udovički & James Ridgeway, eds., *Burn this House: Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998); David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998); Oleg Kobtzeff, "Not a Clash of Civilizations: the Conflict in Kosovo Revisited", p.433-442, in Hall Gardner & Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., *Ashgate Research Companion to War* (Aldershot, G.B.: Ashgate, 2012).

¹² R. Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p.199-304; D. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p.201-288; D.S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p.70-301; M. Rimaneli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on Bosnia, UNOPROFOR, NATO's IFOR & SFOR.

International diplomatic pressures coupled with NATO's threat of air-strikes on Yugoslavia/Bosnia forced President Milošević in October 1998 to withdraw large numbers of Serbian security forces from Kosovo. Yet, as fighting resumed in January 1999 between Kosovar-Albanian insurgents and massive Serbs reinforcements violating the October 1998 Accord, only renewed threats of NATO air-strikes forced the two sides to the Rambouillet talks in France (February-March 1999). In the end peace talks collapsed, while the Serb forces' scorched-earth strategy evicted 80% of Kosovo's Albanians (1.5 million people as 90% of the population of Kosovo compared to the Serb minority): by late-May 1999 5,000 were dead, 800,000 had fled abroad and 580,000 more were homeless inside Kosovo (see Map 13 preceding page).

NATO launched massive air-strikes in March-May 1999, while pro-Serb Russia and China broke-up temporarily with NATO over its U.N.-backed intervention in a sovereign state (both feared Kosovo foreshadowed future U.N. interventions against Russian repression in Chechnya and China's in Tibet and Turkic Sinkiang), but the start of NATO's ground offensive was met by a total Serb military withdrawal from Kosovo on 9 June 1999 to NATO's peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR), while civilian duties were ran by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR comprised 50,000 peacekeepers, with 40,000 from all 19 NATO members and 20 non-NATO countries, including 16 Partners, Switzerland and an unwelcome Russian contingent of 3,200 men who broke-off from their Bosnian base racing to occupy the Pristina Airport in Kosovo ahead of NATO (see NATO KFOR in Map 14 on preceding page). Notwithstanding the return of all refugees and NATO/international aid to rebuild Kosovo, ethnic tensions forced now KFOR to protect the local Serb minority from revenge, while in 2008 the U.N. allowed Kosovo to become basically independent despite vigorous condemnations from Russia and now democratic Serbia (once a popular coup deposed its disgraced nationalist leader Slobodan Milošević he was later prosecuted with the Serb-Bosnian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić for their war-crimes by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal on the ex-Yugoslavia-ICTY).

The final Balkan conflict came by Summer 2001 with the undeclared civil war in the ex-Yugoslav state of Macedonia between its insurgent Albanian Muslims and the majority Slav-Macedonians. NATO's Task-Force Harvest was deployed in just 5 days, successfully enforcing a ceasefire, collecting weapons and stabilizing the country with political power-sharing (Operation Amber Fox) until turning over its task to E.U. peacekeepers. Macedonia's volatility has subsided, but Greece's veto still denies her membership in NATO and E.U., despite Croatia's and Albania's 2008 entry in NATO.¹³

NATO's "Out-of-Area" Peacekeeping II: Second Gulf War vs. Afghanistan, Global Terrorism & WMDs

NATO's continued TransAtlantic security relevance against post-Cold War "New Threats" along an "Arc of Crises" (from Europe to the Middle-East/Gulf and Central Asia) has been questioned cyclically since the USSR's collapse in 1989-92 by critics, who mindless of History's lessons keep criticizing its continued existence as a military Alliance bereft of its old Cold War "common enemy". Critics saw NATO as irrelevant since the First Gulf War/Desert Storm against Iraq (1990-91), although most of the U.S.-led Coalition forces under U.N. mandate were NATO (only a politically-motivated constitutional challenge in Germany kept the Alliance from intervening officially). Europe and America forged in NATO common TransAtlantic policies on building a Europe whole, free and at peace, while facing "New Threats", WMD proliferation, peacekeeping, Balkan stabilization and enlargements to new Allies and Partners. The U.S. global containment of New

¹³ Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax/Hyperion, 2003); Kori N. Schake, "NATO Chronicles: New World Disorder" in *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1999): p.18-24; Mike Corder, "Prosecutor Mulls Trying Mladic, Karadzic Together" in Associated Press/MSNBC (27 May 2011) see: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43195341>; Associated Press, "Kosovo Campaign no Model" in *AOL News* (2 July 1999); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, NATO's AFOR & KFOR.

Threats now combined older Cold War geo-strategic concerns over the Middle-East/Gulf with remote ex-Soviet Central Asia and even Art.V collective defense for the post-“9/11” anti-Terrorist War in Afghanistan, despite strains on Allies and Partners from long peacekeeping missions.¹⁴

The earliest involvement in this remote region was unplanned as a reaction to the 1979-89 USSR’s invasion and First Afghan War to rescue its local Communist state from being overrun by Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas (Mujahedeens), who also threatened Soviet Muslim Central Asia/Caucasus. Plagued by the parallel 1979 Teheran Hostage Crisis with Islamic Iran, U.S. President Jimmy Carter was morally outraged at Moscow’s brutal demotion of the decade-old East-West Détente and its conquest of Afghanistan implicitly threatened near-by Western and world oil-routes through the Persian Gulf. Unwilling idealistically to use secret diplomacy to exploit the USSR’s own fear of Islamic fundamentalist contagion of Soviet Central Asia from Islamic Iran and Afghanistan, Carter refused to trade-off U.S. acquiescence of the USSR’s First Afghan War in exchange for Moscow’s lifting its veto to crippling U.N. sanctions against Islamic Iran. Instead, American economic embargoes targeted both Islamic Iran and the USSR, followed by a massive U.S. arms rearmament (expanded by his successor President Ronald Reagan) and the 1980 Carter Doctrine restating the World War II policy of militarily defending the vital Persian Gulf oil-routes from any threat by creating a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force/Central Command (with bases and an operational range from East Africa and Middle-East/Gulf to Central Asia). Both the 1957 Eisenhower and 1980 Carter Doctrines were the unofficial foundations for Reagan’s 1986-2003 Western combat naval patrol of the Gulf and Hormuz Straits to counter both Islamic Iran in 1986-88 and the USSR in 1986-90, later extended by Presidents Bush Sr., Clinton and Bush Jr. also against Iraq in 1990-2003. Equally so was the 1981 Reagan Doctrine of armed “liberation” of oppressed people under Communist yoke (the modern adaptation of Eisenhower’s and Foster Dulles’ failed 1950s “Roll-back Theory”), which fuelled the U.S.-Arabs-Pakistani secret arms flows into Afghanistan to the Mujahedeens fighting Soviet forces (yet only when anti-air *Stinger* missiles destroyed Soviet air-superiority did the Kremlin withdraw in 1989), while arming also the Contras in Nicaragua and Unita guerrillas in Angola.¹⁵

However, after Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, America’s swiftly withdrew as well, leaving the country still torn by the follow-up 1990-95 civil war among its Mujahedeen warlords, until thereafter Pakistani-based Islamic fundamentalists Talibani conquered most of the country against the besieged Northern Alliance of ethnic Tajik and Uzbeki Afghani-Mujahedeens. The Taliban government also protected fundamentalist terrorist groups in Central Asia and Chechnya, as well as al-Qaeda. Instead, the U.S. since the 1980s-90s mostly focused on supporting Israel and stability in the greater Middle-East/Gulf region with a “Dual Containment” policy of both Saddam’s Iraq and Islamic Iran (1980-86 and 1990-2001), embroiled in the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, followed by Two Gulf Wars against Iraq (1990-91 and 2003). Until the 2001 “9/11” Terrorist attacks, the U.S. and NATO did not perceive any imminent threat in the Central Asia or globally from Islamic terrorism, while both were also mired in Eurocentric post-Cold War security focused on Russia and NATO’s 1999-2004 dual Enlargements to East Europe, rather than new post-Cold War global threats.¹⁶

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Does American need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou & Basil Germond, eds., *Routledge Handbook of TransAtlantic Security* (London: Routledge, 2010).

¹⁵ Stephen Ambrose, “The Presidency and Foreign Policy” in *Foreign Affairs* (1992): p.120-137; Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

¹⁶ AAVV, *Géopolitique: Asie Centrale*, n.79 (Paris: Cahiers de Mars, 2003), especially: Brenda Shaffer, “Opportunités et Menaces en Asie Centrale et Caucase”, p.76-81 & Jean Radvanyi, “Vent Américain au Caucase”, p.25-32.

Instead, the U.S. promoted an ambitious strategic oil/gas network of pipelines to outside world markets, in cooperation with most regional players (Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, Central Asia, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India), while fostering increasing interdependence and stabilization among ex-rivals and ex-enemies. The U.S.-NATO and European sought to diversify energy supplies away from their traditional Middle-East/Gulf dependency by stabilizing politico-militarily the Caucasus and Central Asia, and opening-up economically its remote oil/gas resources (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on land and offshore under the Caspian Sea) for future export world-wide through new East-West pipelines to Georgia (bypassing both Russia's monopoly of ex-Soviet pipelines in the North, or blocked Southern routes via Iran and Afghanistan). Thus, within this evolving geo-strategic post-Cold War context, the ex-Soviet Partners looked for closer security ties with the U.S.-NATO to rebalance Russia's predominance (with an option to even join NATO in the future through its 1999 "Open Door" policy). Yet, the U.S. and NATO remained reluctant to cross here Russia's "red-lines" on its "Near-Abroad" area of influence. Since 1992, NATO's Partnership with Central Asia focused on bilateral military and regional security cooperation, joint peacekeeping, democratization and intelligence-sharing, plus 2000-01 rotation of U.S. special forces in Central Asia (training for possible joint actions) against the common threats of Islamic Taliban Afghanistan, Islamic Iran and transnational Islamic terrorist groups (Al-Qaeda, IMU-Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Chechen rebels) operating in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia (Chechnia, Daghestan, Ingushetia and Moscow). Yet, since the second Afghan War these same states have also cooperated more closely with Russia and China in the loose anti-Western "Shanghai-7" Asian Economic and security association. Thus, U.S.-NATO low-key politico-military cooperation with their ex-Soviet Central Asian/Caucasus Partners sought mostly to stabilize the region against either a remote Russia/Communist resurgence, or more likely Islamic Fundamentalist revolutions. NATO's security Partnership included ex-Soviet Central Asia/Caucasus states via OSCE and NACC (1990-95), plus the Partnership and EAPC (1995-99).¹⁷


Once Osama bin-Laden's Islamist terrorist group Al-Qaeda suddenly attacked New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 ("9/11" Terrorist strikes), President George W. Bush "Jr." co-opted since 2001 both Russia and China with U.N. Mandate and NATO's support (Art.V for attacks against members) in a U.S.-led global anti-Terrorism War against Islamists throughout the new "Arc of Crises". The U.S. initiated since October 2001 a Second Afghan War (2001-02) and decade-long peacekeeping (2002-14), first through a 3-tiered global Coalition by injecting inside Taliban Afghanistan thousands of U.S.-British and French special forces ("Operation Enduring Freedom") with air-power to destroy the local Islamist Taliban government allied to Al-Qaeda, while allowing the besieged Afghan Northern Alliance rebels anti-Talibani militants of the Northern Alliance (the ex-Mujahedeens who had won the First Afghan War against the USSR in 1979-89), then with a larger *ad hoc* Coalition. After this first phase of combat operations exclusively by the U.S.-led Coalition (October-December 2001) and Northern Alliance, NATO deployed to Kabul from December 2001 to July 2002 its own International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF: 5,000 peacekeepers from 19 states) to help the Northern Alliance resume power as a new democratic Afghan government (22 December 2001), and provide humanitarian aid, military-police training and combat peacekeeping to relieve U.S.-Coalition forces. ISAF's combat mission was the first time NATO's Art V for self-defense combat had been used in its history (peacekeeping operations in Bosnia

¹⁷ AAVV, *Géopolitique: Asie Centrale*, n.79 (Paris: Cahiers de Mars, 2003), especially: Brenda Shaffer, "Opportunités et Menaces en Asie Centrale et Caucase", p.76-81 & Jean Radvanyi, "Vent Américain au Caucase", p.25-32; Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

and Kosovo were under Art. IV). U.S./NATO global operations deep in ex-Soviet Central Asia blended special forces, aviation, long-range bombing, combat units and multi-national diplomacy, but not large-scale armies, while also refraining from deploying Central Asian peacekeepers in Afghanistan to avoid the USSR’s mistake of the First Afghan War of 1979-89 (its 120,000-to-80,000 combat forces included many Soviet Central Asian Muslim troops, which turned out to be both ineffective and sometimes sympathetic to local Islamist insurgents from their same ethnic Tajik-Uzbeki backgrounds, forcing a later replacement of tens of thousands of troops with ethnic-Slavs). Additionally, NATO continued to promote Turkish military leadership among ethnic Central Asian Turkic populations (both ex-Soviet Partners and Afghan-Turkics) to de-emphasize local Muslim reaction to foreign troops.¹⁸

NATO’s ex-Soviet Central Asia Partners and Russia played key security roles against Al-Qaeda and Taliban-Afghanistan by providing NATO with intelligence, military support and logistics (strategic land-routes and ex-Soviet air-bases at Khanabad in Uzbekistan, Manas in Kyrgyzstan and Dushanbé in Tajikistan), as well as Russian and Kazakhi air-space and logistics. By 2005, ISAF assumed command from the U.S.-Coalition in northern and western Afghanistan, while by 2006 it expanded also in pro-Taliban southern Afghanistan (see Maps 15-16 below). By December 2006 ISAF had complete peacekeeping control of Afghanistan, including U.S.-Coalition forces, while having to fight in 2006-14 resurgent Talibani attacks and suicide-bombings infiltrating out of unstable Pakistan (where local Talibani also attacked the government along the Tribal North-West Frontier until partially crushed in 2009-10 by the Pakistani Army). As the new Talibani insurgency raged, both NATO’s Summits at Prague (2002) and Istanbul (2006) faced post-Cold War “New Threats” (international terrorism and WMDs proliferation) and committed the Alliance since 2001 “to strike at threats anywhere in the world, and harden domestic targets and urban centers against terrorists with WMD and missiles”, while spurring NATO-Russian-E.U. cooperation against Al-Qaeda attacks in Europe.¹⁹

Maps 15-16: NATO’s POST-COLD WAR OUT-OF-AREA PEACEKEEPING 2 (ISAF)



Map 15. U.S./NATO in II Afghan War & Occupation, 2001-2013.



Map 16. NATO ISAF. All maps unclassified free global distribution.

¹⁸ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). Mark Urban, *War in Afghanistan* (London: Macmillan: 1990); P.L. Bergen, *The Longest War: Enduring Conflict between America & Al-Qaeda*, p.120-271; B. Shaffer, “Opportunités et Menaces en Asie Centrale et Caucase”, p.76-81.

¹⁹ Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy & War on Terrorism* (London: Ashgate, 2005); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, “Russie, États-Unis et l’Arc de Crise du 11 Septembre” in *Géopolitique: Asie Centrale*, n.79 (Paris: Cahiers de Mars, 2003); Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism & Radicalisation Challenge: European & U.S. Experiences* (Aldershot, G.B.: Ashgate, 2004).

But NATO's successes in the 1990s and U.S. global leadership as "sole Superpower" were suddenly put in question by the severe TransAtlantic rift of 2003 over U.S. "unilateralist" policies against Iraq. Indeed, Bush Jr.'s highly controversial "Preventive Doctrine" had added to his internationally-lauded anti-Terrorism War against Islamic Fundamentalists ("First-tier" strategy) also a controversial parallel "Second-tier" of preventive "Out-of-Area" wars against "rogue-states" engaged in WMD proliferation ("Axis of Evil": Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya), or a "Third-tier" international strategy of multilateral diplomatic pressures and sanctions against any WMD threat. Finally, another controversial "Fourth-tier" strategy addressed anemically both the stalled Israeli-Palestinian "Two-states" Peace Initiative and Middle-East Democratization (which backfired by unwittingly helping the Palestinian Hamas Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists to seize power in the Gaza Strip after winning elections against their rival pro-West PLO/PA).

The U.S. remained focused in 2001-08 on quick diplomatic or military strikes at all WMD "rogue-states" (especially Iraq militarily, while threatening Iran, North Korea and Libya) well "before" they could mature their individual growing WMD threat against the West. The international consensus among U.S., NATO, U.N. and all intelligence services, plus high-placed witnesses (like Saddam's sons-in-law, before he had them killed) was that Iraq retained some secret WMD weapons despite losing the 1990-91 First Gulf War, U.N. sanctions and 1991-96 U.N. inspectors' disarmament. Bush Jr. also floated embarrassingly unsubstantiated allegations that anti-Islamist Saddam Hussein's Iraq could even provide WMD technologies to Islamic terrorists to indirectly strike the West under the cover of Al-Qaeda's "9/11" success. Thus, sharp international and Allied divisiveness over a 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq split the U.N., NATO and E.U.: acrimonious international public opposition and unprecedented acrimonious anti-Americanism fostered by an unlikely "pacifist" front of few Allies/Partners (Jacques Chirac's "nationalist" France, Gerhard Schroeder's "leftist" Germany, Greece, Belgium, Turkey, Austria, Sweden and Turkey), semi-rivals (Russia, China) and Western Leftist public opinions (Great Britain, Italy, Spain), which scuttled U.S. attempts to forge an interventionist consensus with U.N., E.U. and NATO military support in a Second Gulf War against Iraq, unless a new U.N. Resolution declared war. The open Franco-German anti-war vetoes at NATO, E.U. and U.N. (backed by Russia and China at the U.N.) against a U.S.-led Second Gulf War on Iraq, briefly undermined NATO's 50 years of common security gains and TransAtlantic solidarity, but soon most "old" and "new" Allies joined a new U.S.-led anti-Iraqi Coalition to fight in the name of the U.N.'s previous 12 years of anti-Iraq Resolutions, leaving aside their Franco-German-Russian-Chinese opponents.²⁰

The global storm of anti-U.S. criticism in 2002-03 reflected mostly a dramatic chasm in style and international authority between Bush Sr.'s 1990-91 "Desert Storm" Coalition against Saddam's Iraq vs. Bush Jr.'s Second Gulf War coalition of 2003-10 that destroyed Iraq and captured Saddam, but was unable to exercise an effective Occupation over a fractured country in near-civil war between rival Iraqi insurgencies (Baathists and nationalist Sunnis; Al-Qaeda Islamic terrorists; Shi'a fundamentalists) fighting the U.S. and each other for power. Both U.S. presidents pursued energetic wars as the main U.S. strategy to prevent Saddam's Iraq WMD proliferation and imperialism, but the first had the more compelling "casus belli" (Kuwait's invasion) and diligent assembly of a U.N. sponsored international effort, while clothing U.S. unilateralism in the face of nebulous WMD threats posed by Saddam's Iraq.

Thus, the U.S. Coalition in 2003 raced out of its Kuwaiti bases and destroyed in few weeks all Iraqi forces, reaching Baghdad and toppling Saddam (who was executed by a local tribunal years later). By 2006-08, reversals of governments in Germany and France turned Berlin and Paris back to the pro-U.S.

²⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy & War on Terrorism* (London: Ashgate, 2005); Kenneth Pollock, *Threatening Storm: Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002).

and pro-NATO camp and external NATO assistance in Iraq's post-war stabilization (likewise Italy, Spain, Australia and Japan flip-flopped electorally twice between Conservative governments supporting the U.S. in Iraq with national combat troops vs. Leftist governments that later withdrew the same troops). However, the Bush Jr. Administration remained politically hobbled internationally and at home by its glaring inability to find any WMDs in Iraq (it was apparent after that Saddam had bluffed to all that he had kept some weapons after the 1991-98 U.N. disarmament of his WMDs, but it was also apparent that he did indeed still have the blueprints and will to recreate his prohibited arsenal once U.N. sanctions had finally collapsed freeing him to replenish his treasury and WMD-development programs, while some components had been shipped at war's end into neighbouring Syria where it was destroyed by a secret Israel air-strike in 2008). Moreover, the Bush Jr. Administration's ideological focus to keep as little forces as possible in both Afghanistan and Iraq, while discounting both the need for long-term country stabilization/reconstruction and the risk of local insurgencies, left the U.S.-led Coalition (Iraq) and NATO (Afghanistan) equally vulnerable to unexpected, fast-growing anti-Western insurgencies in both countries: on one hand, the Talibani in Afghanistan, with parallel operations also in pro-Western Pakistan; on the other, a four-some of rival insurgencies in Iraq by waning pro-Saddam Nationalist Sunnis (mines, suicide-bombers and ambushes), rising Al-Qaeda in Iraq against the U.S.-Coalition (mines, suicide-bombers and the two Fallujah Battles) and Shi'a civilians (massacres), Shi'a militias against Sunni civilians (massacres) and the U.S.-Coalition defending them (ambushes), and anti-Shi'a Sunni nationalist Defense-leagues (mines and ambushes) who were later were co-opted by the U.S.-Coalition to join it against both Al-Qaeda and pro-Saddam forces. Although the later "Surge" in Iraq by massive temporary U.S. forces and a later mini-"surge" in Afghanistan succeeded for a while in crushing the respective insurgencies, this came too late and was politically undermined by anti-war sentiments in the U.S. since the 2008 election of President Barack Obama who quietly implemented (by now politically bipartisan) with the Coalition and NATO a gradual withdrawal from both fragile countries (December 2011 from Iraq and December 2014 from Afghanistan), with few thousand U.S. troops left behind in no-combat roles for local training.²¹

America remains the "sole SuperPower" committed to Iraq's post-war democratization and reconstruction, regardless of years of virulent Iraqi anti-Coalition insurgency, while Europe too is targeted by Al-Qaeda mass terrorism (Madrid 2002; Casablanca 2003; London 2005; Heathrow 2006). But the "Iraqi lesson" and Saddam's defeat in 2003 perversely accelerated two other "rogue-states" WMD arms-race as a hoped-for national shield or bargaining-chip against other "preventive" U.S. strikes, while only Libya understood the lesson and bargained away in 2004 its WMDs to U.S./U.N. inspections and disarmament in exchange for international reintegration. Thus, the 2002 dramatic public nuclear race by North Korea and Islamic Iran since 2003 (both transgressors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty), led only to repeated failures on North Korea to enforce the Six-Party Accords it had twice signed and violated in 2007-08, while Islamic Iran trumped in-turn U.N. sanctions and international diplomatic accords on non-proliferation, despite strong U.N. sanctions. Consequently, the U.S. and its NATO-European Allies have tried to foster a common approach against both, without risking a new even more unpredictable and costly conflict to topple Islamic Iran (as advocated under Bush Jr. by the same "neo-Cons" who had been the infamous ideological force behind the controversial régime-

²¹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); Henri Vernet & Thomas Cantaloube, *Chirac contre Bush Jr.* (Paris: Lattès, 2004); Bob Woodward, *Essence of Decision: War on Iraq* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005); Michael R. Gordon & Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: Inside Story of Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006); John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Vintage, 2005); Thomas Mowle, *Allies at Odds? U.S. & European Union* (New York: Palgrave/ Macmillan, 2004); Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Porter & Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States" in *Foreign Affairs* (January 2005); Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco!* (New York: Penguin, 2006); Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco!* (New York: Penguin, 2006); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007); Bob Woodward, *The War Within: 2006-08* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).

change Second Afghan War and Second Gulf War against Iraq), or surgical air-strikes to disarm the nuclear facilities of Iran (advocated by Israel in 2010-13) and North Korea (first contemplated by the U.S. in 1995).²²

Throughout almost 25 years of post-Cold War, the “Arc of Crisis” of diffused “New Threats” (WMDs proliferation, ethno-nationalist civil wars, Islamic terrorism, illegal migrations, trafficking, pandemics, ecologic blight) contrasted starkly with the West’s earlier 1990s optimistic Euro-TransAtlantic “Arc of Stability” to replace Cold War divisions with a new spirit of international cooperation, Europe’s politico-economic unification, and NATO-E.U. enlargements. These “New Threats” pushed NATO and the U.S. to implement their parallel third major military reorganization in 12 years to better cope with the entire range of missions. On the one hand, NATO’s old Central Front Allied Command Europe (ACE) became Allied Command Operations (ACO) for all combat operations throughout NATO’s Euro-Atlantic area and globally. On the other, Allied Command Atlantic (ACA) became Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with innovative XXI Century technologies. Finally, the U.S. announced in 2004 that by 2006-16 it would massively restructure forces a third time since the end of the Cold War by pulling-out 70-100,000 troops from Europe and Asia, plus 100,000 dependents, given the “lack of Cold War strategic justification and the need to face XXI Century world threats and terrorism.” Two-thirds of U.S. troops repatriated come out of Europe, where in 2004 the U.S. had 100,000 forces, mostly in Germany with 70,000 men of which 50% will leave (including the two U.S. armored divisions), while cutting NATO bases in Germany and thousands of U.S. troops transferred to new rapid-deployment bases in East European Allies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania).²³

Yet, NATO’s regional and international role remains fragile, despite application of Art.V (self-defensive war) for the “9/11” attacks and Second Afghan War. As NATO grew since the Cold War from a tighter massive military Alliance to a larger, political security organization of 27+ Allies and 20+ Partners, its post-Cold War influence has increasingly supported U.S.-led “Coalitions” and E.U. humanitarian peacekeeping globally for joint U.N.-Western goals. But with casualties rising in Afghanistan and rising opposition by Western public opinion’s “pacifism” (despite NATO’s enforcement of U.N. Mandates for peace), the Alliance has had to bolster its “Out-of-Area” geo-strategic reach since 2004 by integrating also its Mediterranean Dialogue and Gulf Partners (or Istanbul Initiative, who train with the U.S. and NATO to stabilize Iraq and contain Islamic Iran), plus new Strategic Partners in 2006-08 (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India and Pakistan, all supporting NATO peacekeeping in Afghanistan). Yet, while targeted massive U.S., NATO and Afghan military campaigns have successfully repelled Talibani insurgents in southern Afghanistan, they countered since 2011 with brazen suicide attacks against high-profile Afghan and NATO officials. This in turn, hastened on one hand an escalation of U.S. covert strikes with unmanned-flying armed drones to kill terrorist leaders, while on the other the cost in losses for the Alliance has spurred the rise of Western “pacifist” popular opposition to further combat peacekeeping missions. This has now forced NATO-U.S. to plan a slow withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2013-14, leaving only indirect U.S. assistance to the Afghan government’s counter-guerrilla efforts (see in Table 4 below the 2004 height of U.S.-NATO-Coalition forces deployed in such key “Out-of-Area” operations).²⁴

²² Gary Berntsen, *Jawbreaker: Attack on Bin Laden* (New York: Crown, 2005); Hall Gardner, *Global War on Terrorism*, p.123-267; M. Rimaneli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on NATO’s ISAF.

²³ AAVV, *Géopolitique: Iran*, n.64 (Paris: Cahiers de Mars, 1999): p.1-100; Kenneth Timmerman, *Countdown to Crisis: Nuclear Showdown with Iran* (New York: Crown, 2005); Robert Baer, *The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower* (New York: Crown, 2008); M. Rimaneli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, see related entries on NATO ACO, ACT and forces.

²⁴ Bob Woodward, *The War Within, 2006-2008* (New York: Simon-Schuster, 2008); Bob Woodward, *Obama’s Wars* (New York: Simon-Schuster, 2011); AAVV, *Asie Centrale* (Paris: Cahiers de Mars, 2003); Patrick Quinn & Rahim Faiez, “Taliban Executes New Tactic: High-Profile Inside Jobs” in *HuffPost-AOL News* (29 May 2011) see: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/taliban-inside-jobs_n_868542.html?icid=maing-grid7%7Cmain5%7Cd1%7Csec1_inlk3%7C66847.

NATO-WESTERN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS “OUT-OF-AREA”, 2004			
AFGHANISTAN NATO-ISAF (35 Members)*		IRAQ*	
U.S.A.	17,000	U.S.A.	138,000
Other Coalition Forces	3,000	GREAT BRITAIN	8,330
U.S.-led Coalition Totals	20,000	ITALY	2,700
CANADA	1,860	POLAND	2,400
GERMANY	1,740	UKRAINE	1,700
FRANCE	530	NETHERLANDS	1,400
ITALY	490	SOUTH KOREA	465-to-3,000
GREAT BRITAIN	330	ROMANIA	700
Other 19 NATO Members	2,000	JAPAN	600
Non-U.S. NATO-ISAF Totals	6,500	AUSTRALIA	250
		U.S.-led Coalition Totals	156,215
BOSNIA NATO-SFOR**		KOSOVO NATO-KFOR**	
ITALY	1,200	ITALY	2,600
Other NATO Members	5,800	Other NATO Members	17,400
U.S./NATO-SFOR Totals	7,000	U.S./NATO-KFOR Totals	20,000

Table 4: *Corriere della Sera* (27 June 2004, Italy): p.12. ** *Repubblica* (27 June 2004, Italy): p.14.

The latest case of unplanned NATO “Out-of-Area” operation came in response to the glaring human rights conflict in Libya since February 2011, due to governmental repression of grass-roots democracy demonstrators. On 25 February the U.N. ordered Libya to “stop any attacks against civilians and respect the popular will... of its people”. The U.N. approved limited military actions against Libyan forces by a Western coalition (U.S., France and Great Britain) and NATO in March to force a collapse of Muammar Ghaddafi’s régime (and his death) in support of popular democratic rebels in Libya. But NATO was also criticized for limited military strikes and timid U.N. mandates that could not break the bloody stalemate between intermixed Libyan troops and fumbling rebels. However limited in military effort, NATO’s successful Libyan intervention over-extended the Alliance’s scarce resources (spread thin in Afghanistan and Mediterranean) and could not be duplicated to stop Syria’s civil war in 2011-13. On one hand, no ground peacekeepers (NATO or U.N.) were ever dispatched to Libya nor were they able to provide support to help the new rebel government disarm its fractioned local and Islamist militias. On the other, the NATO-U.N. Libyan “No-Fly Zone” that had initially been supported by Russia and China, was later publicly condemned by Moscow and Beijing who now felt the NATO operation had moved beyond limited U.N.-sanctioned support for the rebels to fully backing them from the air against Ghaddafi’s “legitimate” government (this criticism echoed prior anti-NATO/U.N. interventions in Kosovo and Iraq for humanitarian missions that denied the reciprocal old respect of sovereign authority of all independent states in their absolute legal “domestic jurisdiction” to go as far as to even massacre their own subjects without interference from other countries).

Additionally, growing Western public opposition to further bloody and costly humanitarian missions (mainly from the Left, but also generalized across party-lines now in the U.S.A.), coupled with the twin 2008-10 international financial crises are eroding European defense funds and slowly shifting

the weight of common defense and willingness to intervene more on U.S. shoulders (yet here too declining U.S. forces from President Bush Sr. since 1992 to the end of the Obama Administration in 2018 also deny any U.S. return to exclusive “Unilateralist” policies of the past). Thus, President Obama has presided over an implicit bi-partisan political consensus on withdrawing the U.S.-led dwindling Coalition from Iraq in late-2011, withdrawing with NATO from Afghanistan by 2014, and facing a growing politico-military paralysis to use force if the consensual international sanctions (U.N.-E.U.-NATO) failed to stop either Islamic Iran’s dangerous race to nuclear proliferation, or Syria’s Civil War. Indeed, the West and NATO were unable to rally the U.N. (blocked by the threat of Russian and Chinese vetoes) for a new Syrian “No-Fly-Zone”, despite indiscriminate Syrian air-bombing of civilian areas and over 120,000 deaths by end-2013. Further, any unilateral U.S.-NATO air-strike and limited interventions in Syria threatened by President Obama, Great Britain and France once Syria used gas against its rebel-held areas faced unexpected embarrassing parliamentary oppositions at home and growing Western governmental fears of another quagmire, with the possibility that any Western strike that could help hasten the collapse of the Iranian-supported Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad would also backfire by allowing local pro-Al-Qaeda Syrian rebels to overwhelm their own weaker pro-Western rebel coalition and seize power in the country (akin to the ineffectual efforts by local Islamist militias to exploit the vacuum of power in pro-Western Libya since Ghaddafi’s fall).²⁵

The result has an embarrassing mix of ineffective politico-diplomatic hand-wrangling by the U.S., West (NATO, E.U.) and U.N., plus NATO support of Turkish anti-air missile-defenses against occasional Syrian government air and artillery hits across Turkey’s border on Syrian rebels and refugees, while only Israel has launched unilaterally few limited air-strikes to pulverize key Syrian WMD facilities (both “disarming” its enemy Syria and also pre-empting that any of it might fall to the Syrian rebel forces interlaced by uncontrollable Islamist fighters who are also anti-Israeli). Meanwhile, behind-the-curtains a discreet U.S.-NATO-Gulf-Saudi Arabia security cooperation has evolved as an indirect regional containment of Iran’s aggressive policies (nuclear proliferation, interference in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria), while the U.S. has since 2011 both supported Israel’s security against the Iranian nuclear threat and covertly jointly sabotaged Iranian enrichment facilities, but also discouraged Israel’s open warnings that it could unilaterally launch large-scale air-attacks on Iran to destroy (or attempt according to the West, unless joined by the larger U.S. air-power) its multiple nuclear development facilities.²⁶

Conclusion: Future “Drift” after Historical Successes?

NATO’s success as the longest alliance in History is cemented politically and ideologically in the common U.S.-European combat and democratic heritage against the USSR during the Cold War, NATO’s integrated military alliance in peacetime, under U.S. Command provided conventional and nuclear defenses against the threat of World War III by the superior USSR and Warsaw Pact. In the post-Cold War, NATO’s East/West arms control conventional-nuclear cuts, triple military restructuring, regional stability, triple Eastern Enlargements and new “Out-of-Area” peacekeeping missions under U.N. mandates (from the Balkans to the Mediterranean to Central Asia) has repeatedly confounded critics who cyclically predicted its demise after 45 years of Cold War service and 20 of post-Cold War peacekeeping. Instead in the current post-Cold War diffuse “Arc of Crisis”, NATO has successfully developed a global Western collective security network of expanding Allies and Partners within a

²⁵ D. Kirkpatrick & E. Bumiller, “Allies Intensify Air Assault in Libya as Rebels Regroup”, p.13; S.L. Myers & D. Kirkpatrick, “Allies Split over Goal of Libya Mission”, p.9.

²⁶ K. Timmerman, *Countdown to Crisis: Nuclear Showdown with Iran*, p.15-205; R. Baer, *Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower*, p.205-278.

broader Euro-Atlantic areas and “Out-of-Area” peacekeeping for regional stability, arms control, WMD anti-proliferation and anti-terrorism. NATO has been also the beacon of democracy in the post-Cold War (1995 Principles on NATO Enlargement) for Partners and Aspirant Allies in sequential Enlargements (1999-2008) as protection against Russia and each other over rival minorities or unjust borders.

NATO’s 1988-2014 security successes in arms-control (large conventional-nuclear-chemical reductions) and unprecedented large-scale post-Cold War peacekeeping missions (Yugoslavia air-naval sanctions, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, “War on Terrorism”, Afghanistan and Libya) has been also paralleled by large-scale U.S.-led Coalitions (with unofficial NATO support) in those controversial “Out-of-Area” combat and peacekeeping operations where Alliance resolve fractured. In these specific cases, Alliance divisiveness by few members made unanimousness impossible and initially scuttled U.S.-Allied efforts for official NATO combat operations under Art.IV, while virtually most NATO Allies and also Partners then joined U.S.-led “ad hoc” Coalitions for both combat (Lebanon I & II MNF Missions; Gulf Naval patrols against Iran and Iraq; First and Second Gulf Wars against Iraq) and even more controversial long post-war peacekeeping against local insurgencies (Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan).²⁷

Beyond 2014, NATO will continue in the foreseen future its politico-military success in guaranteeing peace in Europe and the broader TransAtlantic security architecture of Allies and Partners, and supporting “step-by-step” U.S.-U.N.-Iranian early talks of 2013 to eventually curb Iran’s nuclear plans. NATO will also continue to face an ambivalent Russia under President Putin, where its cyclical anti-Western rhetoric, Russo-Chinese politico-economic cooperation (Shanghai-7 group), covert support of government repression of pro-Western reformists in Ukraine, domestic corruption and business-military export interests still challenge NATO over Missile Defense, Iraq, Iran and Syria, just as much as it cooperates with the Alliance on Partnership, terrorism and Afghanistan (or reluctantly Libya). NATO will also continue with U.S. and Russian support the slowly waning, but still dangerous global “War on Terrorism” against Al-Qaeda after the May 2011 U.S. killing of its leader Osama bin-Laden hiding in Pakistan, and through the prolonged U.S.-NATO “Drone war” of 2010-14 against top Islamist terrorist commanders and cadres (Al-Qaeda, Taliban and regional outfits).

However, more troubling for NATO’s continued post-Cold War relevance as the primary international security organization, is the insidious domestic challenge of Western pacifist apathy against further controversial humanitarian missions, coupled with international financial crises, declining defense budgets, and a new U.S. “pivot” to sustain its Asian allies (many of which are also now NATO global Strategic Partners) to unofficially “contain” an economically and militarily expanding China. All these developments are stalling the Alliance ability to intervene in prolonged peacekeeping and successful turn-overs of security to fragile local pro-Western government forces (like in Iraq since the 2011 U.S.-Coalition withdrawal, or Afghanistan against the Talibani after the 2014 U.S.-NATO withdrawal, or paralysis over Iran and Syria’s Civil War). Thus, with NATO’s international strategic accomplishments now being eroded by such recent changes, the Alliance risks an uneasy future political retrenchment to a mostly European-based TransAtlantic security posture, like during the Cold War. A dispiriting prospect, which is already brewing a growing sense of “drift”.²⁸

²⁷ D. Calleo, *Rethinking Europe’s Future*, p.2-271; M. Rimaneli, *NATO & International Organizations*, p.1-57, 282-666; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, “Osama Bin Laden Raid Avenged Deaths of CIA Members” in HuffPost-AOL News (29 May 2011), see: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/osama-bin-laden-raid-cia-deaths_n_868536.html; Stephen Fidler, “A Weakened Russia Looks to Europe” in *Wall Street Journal* (11 September 2010): p. A9.

²⁸ Niall Fergusson, *Civilization: the West and the Rest* (London: Allen Lane, 2011); Anatole Kaletsky, “Blaming China Won’t Help the Economy” in *New York Times* (27 September 2010): p.A12; Aaron Friedberg, “The New Era of U.S.-China Rivalry” in *Wall Street Journal* (18 January 2011): p.A15; Andrew F. Krepinevich, “China’s Finlandization Strategy in the Pacific” in *Wall Street Journal* (11 September, 2010): p.A13; Robert D. Kaplan, “Obama Takes Asia by Sea” in *New York Times* (12 November 2010): p.A23; Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Seven Deadly Scenarios: a Military Futurist Explores War in 21st Century* (New York: Bantam, 2009).

NATO-E.U. MEMBER-STATES & ASPIRANTS, 2004-2013							
COUNTRIES:	NATO ✧	E.U.*	POPULATION	G.D.P.	MILITARY	RESERVES	BUDGETS
U.S.A. ✧	X	—	300,000,000	\$9,9tr.	1,367,000	1,211,500	\$ 294,7bn
GERMANY ✧*	X	X	82,500,000	\$1,8tr.	308,000	364,300	\$ 28,2bn
TURKEY ✧	X	2015?	67,600,000	\$210bn	515,100	379,000	\$ 10,7bn
GREAT BRITAIN ✧*	X	X	59,000,000	\$1,4tr.	211,400	303,000	\$ 33,9bn
FRANCE ✧*	X	X	59,000,000	\$1,3tr.	274,000	419,000	\$ 34,3bn
ITALY ✧*	X	X	57,200,000	\$1,1tr.	230,400	65,200	\$ 20,5bn
SPAIN ✧*	X	X	39,700,000	\$568bn.	143,500	448,000	\$ 7,1bn
POLAND ✧*	X	X	38,800,000	\$160bn.	206,000	406,000	\$ 3,2bn
CANADA ✧	X	—	31,800,000	\$705bn.	57,000	43,300	\$ 7,4bn
ROMANIA ✧	X	X	22,200,000	\$38,4bn.	103,000	470,000	\$ 0,8bn
NETHERLANDS ✧*	X	X	15,800,000	\$347bn.	50,500	32,200	\$ 6,4bn
GREECE ✧*	X	X	10,700,000	\$113bn.	159,200	291,000	\$ 5,4bn
BELGIUM ✧*	X	X	10,200,000	\$238bn.	39,400	152,100	\$ 3,3bn
CZECH REPUBLIC ✧*	X	X	10,200,000	\$52bn.	53,600	240,000	\$ 1,1bn
HUNGARY ✧*	X	X	10,000,000	\$47bn.	33,800	90,300	\$ 0,7bn
PORTUGAL ✧*	X	X	9,900,000	\$104bn.	43,600	211,000	\$ 2,2bn
SWEDEN*	Aspirant?	X	9,000,000	\$239bn.	33,900	570,000	\$ 5,2bn
BULGARIA ✧	X	X	8,200,000	\$12,8bn.	77,300	303,000	\$ 0,3bn
AUSTRIA*	Aspirant?	X	8,200,000	\$194bn.	34,600	75,000	\$ 1,6bn
SWITZERLAND	Partner	Aspirant?	7,450,000	\$245bn.	3,600	351,200	\$ 2,9bn
SLOVAKIA ✧*	X	X	5,400,000	\$19,6bn.	33,000	20,000	\$ 0,3bn
DENMARK ✧*	X	X	5,310,000	\$162bn.	21,400	65,000	\$ 2,4bn
FINLAND*	Aspirant?	X	5,200,000	\$120bn.	32,300	485,000	\$ 1,5bn
NORWAY ✧	X	Aspirant?	4,500,000	\$162bn.	26,700	222,000	\$ 2,8bn
CROATIA ✧*	2008	2013	4,400,000	\$19,4bn.	58,300	220,000	\$ 0,5bn
IRELAND*	Aspirant?	X	3,750,000	\$97,9bn.	10,500	14,800	\$ 0,7bn
LITHUANIA ✧*	X	X	3,650,000	\$11,2bn.	12,200	27,700	\$ 0,2bn
ALBANIA ✧	2008	Associate	3,030,000	\$ 3,8bn.	27,000	155,000	\$ 0,1bn
LATVIA ✧*	X	X	2,300,000	\$ 7,2bn.	6,500	14,500	\$ 0,07bn
MACEDONIA	Aspirant	Associate	2,000,000	\$ 3,6bn.	16,000	60,000	\$ 0,07bn
SLOVENIA ✧*	X	X	2,000,000	\$18,6bn.	7,600	61,000	\$ 0,2bn
ESTONIA ✧*	X	X	1,400,000	\$ 5,6bn.	4,500	10,000	\$ 0,08bn
CYPRUS (Greek part)*	Partner?	X	*790,000+215,000	\$ 5,5bn.	10,000+5,000	60,000+26,000	\$ 0,4bn
LUXEMBURG ✧*	X	X	436,000	\$17bn.	900	N/A	\$ 0,1bn
MALTA*	Partner?	X	400,000	\$3,6bn.	2,100	N/A	\$ 0,02bn
ICELAND ✧	X	Associate	280,000	\$ 9bn.	120	N/A	N/A
TOT. "OLD" NATO	✧	X	755,400,000	\$18,4tr.	3,448,590	3,774,000	\$460.95bn.
TOT. NATO POST-1999	✧	X	872,000,000	\$1,9tr.	892,300	2,547,000	\$ 36.28bn.
TOT. "OLD" E.U.	X	*	376,036,000	\$7,8tr.	1,593,500	2,771,500	\$156.73bn.
TOT. E.U. POST-2007	X	*	479,000,000	\$8,2tr.	2,247,300	2,927,000	\$165.1bn.

Chart 5: NATO; E.U.; *Le Monde*; IISS, *Military Balance, 2001-2002* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

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Politicians of a Feather, Tweet Together

by Tammie Marcus Clary (Florida Atlantic University)
FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2012

ABSTRACT: David Mayhew set the stage in 1974 when he argued that candidates are seekers of re-election (Mayhew, 1974). Based on this premise, one would expect potential candidates to utilize every effort possible to help realize this goal, including incorporating new technology into their campaigns. This paper analyzes Twitter usage among candidates running for office within the U.S. Congress, prior to the 2010 elections to explore the extent of complementarities and determine whether traditional forms of campaigning have been replaced or supplemented with social media, specifically Twitter. Data was gathered on 884 candidates who ran for election during 2010 to determine relationships between total number of Congressional Tweets versus the candidates' incumbency, years in office, political experience, expenditures, chamber of Congress, party, sex and age. Through a linear regression analysis, the candidates' sex uniquely displayed high correlations with the number of Congressional Tweets. Additionally, the regression analysis displayed correlations among incumbency, expenditures, Congressional Chamber and party identification. This data is most easily explained through a political economy approach to transaction costs and campaigning.

Introduction

As technology continues to evolve, conventional campaigning is becoming a thing of the past. Wasted, inefficient efforts and money that could be more efficiently utilized to strategically help achieve election and/or re-election. According to Mayhew, candidates are primarily concerned with seeking re-election (1974). With the invention of social networking sites, communications spread at a fast pace, enabling information to become outdated within days. Without an on/ off switch, one is unable to control the flow of information, which could have potentially devastating effects. Twitter is relatively new, making its debut in 2006. It enables followers to send 140 character limit bursts of information. The quickness and speed allows for instant communication around the world from any computer or mobile device. Twitter enables candidates to reach a surplus of new potential voters with little to no costs. In line with Mayhew (1974), candidates should therefore engage and use Twitter to their benefit, possibly increasing potential votes to massive numbers. This study seeks to explore the factors that influence a politician's decision to Tweet. By looking at candidate's campaign strategies, researchers will be able to determine if Tweeting enables candidates to reach out to a larger audience and collect additional votes, complementing the already existent campaign strategy.

The Digital Divides

As increases in technology advance, Internet usage has steadily improved. The 1990s marked a dramatic growth with electronic discussion and in November of 1999, President Bill Clinton became the

first president to go online and answer e-mail queries from citizens (Davis, 2005). Ten years later President Obama embraced the Internet's wide and expanding reach, encouraging citizens to Tweet their political thoughts and opinions.

What began as a media outlet that was distant from the general public at large because it represented mostly young, well educated, and affluent (Gainous & Wagner, 2007; Davis, 2005), has since expanded at exponential rates. The Internet has spread from an exclusive group to the broader population (Klotz, 2004). According to Gulati and Williams, education, income, ethnicity, age and urbanization are all potential influences on a candidate's Internet use (2010). Approximately one in three young voters under the age of 36 rely on the Internet as their main source of political information (Panagopoulos, 2009). Finally, college graduates have been found to be the most familiar with information technology because of their continuous interaction throughout their lives (Norris, 2001).

However, other researchers have also found the Internet as a vehicle that is guilty of exacerbating the pattern of unequal participation based on income (Mossberger & Stansbury, 2003), creating further marginalization (Norris, 2001). This further encourages the digital divide between the haves and the have-nots. Ironically, because findings on race and ethnicity have been mixed, education has become the most important factor in the digital democratic divide (Mossberger & Stansbury, 2003). Education and income both have independent effects on the Internet because of the costs and technical knowledge required to gain access (Klotz, 2004). Through the obvious correlation of education and income, the Internet encourages the digital divide shifting the focus from outreaching to potential voters to reinforcing participation. Therefore, the Internet is not capturing new, potential voters, but instead encouraging and supporting the beliefs already in place. Furthermore, even though the Internet alters the resources necessary for political activity, the individuals who are participating online are similar to those participating offline (Best, 2005). This sequence further encourages an ever-evolving circle where Internet participation is reinforcing rather than supplementing.

Progression in Social Media

The expansion of the Internet into politics brought forth unrealized visions of direct democracy surrounded with citizen involvement. Voters would be able to communicate directly with Representatives and relay any possible concerns or criticisms. Moreover, Representatives would feel a sense of accountability and responsibility. However, according to Davis, the outcome has encouraged the reinforcement of opinions rather than the exchange of views, because political group discussions tend to be dominated by certain ideological views (2005). Furthermore, online media is more diverse and ideologically extreme when juxtaposed with mainstream media (Mossberger, 2008).

During the 2000 campaigns, candidates embraced chat-rooms and Town Hall-style formats, encouraging and fostering electronic discussion (Davis, 2005). Candidates were not only able to maintain direct and continued control over the questions asked, they were able to monitor and manipulate messages similar to the exclusively candidate controlled messages found in television ads and websites (Bimber & Davis, 2003). With the expansion of social networking sites, this is no longer the case. Social networking sites have presented the candidates with unprecedented opportunities, allowing blogs to take over the traditional role of political parties (Panagopoulos, 2009). Furthermore, candidates are no longer able to control the flow of information. Bode, et. al., examined candidates for the 2010 Senate to understand how the use of Twitter within campaigns relates to traditional campaign tactics (2011). The authors found that because traditional media outlets require candidates to surrender control over content and disposition of messages, Twitter enables and allows candidates to circumvent this control

(Bode, et. al., 2011). This creates a new personalization of politics by utilizing Twitter as a candidate centered medium that is unconstrained by party control. Internet users in general are able to post blogs, web-sites and Tweets about or referencing anyone they choose, including potential candidates. Additionally, as these sites become more mainstream and conventional, they are gaining appeal across generations, which will help to lessen the age gap that was once dominant.

Bimber and Davis found that Internet users are not attempting to bypass traditional media (2003). Rather than using the Internet to displace information, people are supplementing their current positions with information gathering (Bimber & Davis, 2003). Therefore, the people who are already interested in politics are supplementing the information they already currently have, displaying that the Internet is not attracting new uninterested voters into making a conscious choice. Moreover, Hill and Hughes also believe that the Internet reinforces beliefs that are already developed rather than fundamentally changing people and their attitudes (1998). The Internet is reinforcing the already present political attachments, providing additional data and information for voters who are seeking to bolster their vote choices (Bimber & Davis, 2003). Again, the Internet is enabling voters to find out additional information, not transform them.

On the other hand, the Internet does provide the opportunity to reach potential voters that are not interested in politics through mass communications. This can translate into intensity either for or against a candidate (Panagopoulos, 2009). However, intensity for or against a candidate does not necessarily translate into votes. The circle of reinforcing beliefs could excel and stimulate potential participation, but it is just as likely to quell participation in response to negative information. In the end, the biggest problem involves reaching potential voters who have not already developed a strong ideological position who are using the Internet to reinforce their beliefs, because the research indicates that these voters are not the average Internet users.

Influences on Internet Usage

According to Fenno, members of Congress have three goals: achieving re-election, achieving power in Congress, and creating good public policy (2003). Fiorina explains how members of Congress are rational maximizers who are seeking re-election and will choose efficient strategies in order to achieve their goals (1977). These theories shift the focus of campaigning onto voter approval. By employing multiple strategies, targeted at specific groups, member of Congress have the ability to use precise campaigning techniques in their home style that are individually tailored. Through the presentation of self, allocation of resources, and explanation of Washington activities, home style skills are able to ensure re-election victory for potential candidates (Fenno, 2003).

If a candidate is following Mayhew and Fenno's theory of seeking and achieving re-election, the Internet could be beneficial if used strategically. Kenny and McBurnett analyzed contested congressional district races in 1984 and found that incumbents who reached a large percentage of the electorate are difficult to beat (1997). However, the authors also found that challengers are able to achieve a greater direct effect from contact in general because they are less well known (Kenny and McBurnett, 1997). Although their research focused on the use of television to enhance the effects of spending, a modern twist on their research would expect Twitter usage to aide in the effects of campaign contact. Incumbents should embrace new technology and use Twitter to reach a greater percentage of the electorate, while challengers should also embrace Twitter in order to gain additional contact and become better known. For example, Puopolo found that when analyzing the 2000 Senate race, challengers used the web as an additional tool to maximize their chances of being elected (2001).

Because the actual cost of Twitter is low, every candidate, incumbent or challenger, has an equal opportunity of utilizing it as a complementary campaign tool.

Further, beyond the digital divide, candidates utilize constituency composition when deciding whether to implement the Internet into campaign techniques. Herrnson, Stokes-Brown and Hindman (2007) found that although candidates with younger and better educated constituents engage in more on-line campaigning, the strategic and structural circumstances of the race along with the number of years a candidate has spent in electoral politics is also relevant. Thus, candidates tailor on-line campaigns to the characteristics of the constituents. The authors concluded that incumbency, campaign spending, electoral competitiveness, and the number of people who live in a district provide the best explanations for why candidates invest in online campaigning (Herrnson, Stokes-Brown & Hindman, 2007). Moreover, these authors also found that candidates with longer careers in electoral politics were less likely to campaign on-line when compared to those with shorter careers. Thus, political experience and incumbency should affect whether a candidate engages and utilizes online campaigning options, without accounting for transaction costs. Transaction costs enable and encourage a candidate to utilize Twitter, irrelevant of experience or incumbency, because it is a rational, cost effective choice. Candidates can gain political attention without expending resources.

Wagner and Gainous also found that web presence is a significant predictor of the total votes obtained in the 2006 Congressional elections, even when controlling for funding, experience, and incumbency (2009). This demonstrates that candidates are evolving from simply supplementing traditional media outlets to engaging the Internet as part of a detailed campaign strategy to win office. Because web presence could be influencing the amount of total votes obtained, candidates can strategically use the Internet to bypass the once circular motion of participation and use on-line campaigning to their electoral victory benefit.

Examining Congressional web-sites in October and November of 2002, Lipinski and Neddenriep concluded that candidates were using web-sites to facilitate the work of journalists, enhancing and expanding traditional media (2004). Specifically examining campaigning with Twitter, Williams and Gulati found that constituency attributes also influenced the decision to adopt Twitter as a medium of campaigning without affecting the impact on Twitter usage (2010). This previous research suggests that candidates implement the Internet as a campaign tool when it will aide and expand the current campaign in a complementary fashion.

Websites/ YouTube

An analysis of Congressional websites during 2006 revealed conflicting impetuses for website usage: challengers demonstrated a greater interest in relationship building and connection with the voters (Gulati & Williams, 2007). This competitiveness increased the likelihood of using websites for mobilizing supporters, while incumbents and poorly financed candidates tended to opt out of posting on websites (Gulati & Williams, 2007). Moreover, Esterling, Lazer and Neblo (2005) found that shorter tenure contributed to successful innovation of quality web-sites. Additional research examined Congressional candidates' use of YouTube during 2008 and concluded through a multivariate analysis that better financed candidates and those in competitive elections were more likely to become early adopters of YouTube (Gulati & Williams, 2010). Again, YouTube is not replacing traditional campaign tools, but instead it is effectively augmenting and supplementing communications produced by traditional media outlets. This focuses the thrust of the Internet on involving and connecting with voters as opposed to mobilizing potential support.

Web-sites and YouTube are similar to Twitter because they are immediate, easy and cost effective. Candidates can engage in these social networking sites irrespective of their campaign-spending budget. Moreover, candidates can also engage their assistants to utilize these social networking sites on their behalf. Due to the exquisite nature of technology, aides and assistants are able to post links, maintain web-sites, upload videos to YouTube, and send out messages on Twitter as if they themselves were the candidates running for office. This allows the candidate to enjoy the benefits received from technology with little, if any, effort. Finally, the swiftness and speed of the Internet also enables candidates, or their assistants, to respond to developments instantly, thoroughly keeping the candidates involved in current, up to date discussions if he or she chooses to do so. Therefore, assuming every candidate rationally uses Twitter, the quality and content of Tweets are brought centerstage, morphing the focus from who Tweets to the specific content of Tweets.

Influences on Twitter Usage

Chi and Yang found that Democrats and Republicans benefit from Twitter in different ways (2010). Democrats are mostly seeking transparency where the citizens are receiving the information they want, while Republicans engage through outreach where the government is telling the citizens what they want to hear (Chi & Yang, 2010). According to Chi and Yang, Republicans utilize Twitter through the Internet community to generate public support and coerce ideological rivals to vote in favor of the policies the Representative is sponsoring (2010). On the other hand, transparency is most important to younger politicians who lack experience and are yet to gain the public's trust, therefore resulting in Representatives who adopt Twitter being mostly electorally secure (Chi & Yang, 2010).²⁹

Furthermore, Golbeck found that Representatives are using Twitter as a vehicle for self-promotion to disperse information that their offices would normally share to other forms of media (2010). Although Twitter communication can enable direct communication with constituents, Representatives are fostering the illusion that citizens are actually more connected with Representatives. These sounds bites and informational posts are not aimed at improving transparency where the citizens are receiving pertinent information. Instead, Tweets are reinforcing the information that the Representative wants to disperse, which further supplements traditional media campaigning. However, unlike historically where the media acted as a gatekeeper, Twitter allows the candidate to control the message. With candidates controlling the message, the war chest of campaign funds becomes even more important with Twitter functioning as a complimentary of the campaign.

Moreover, Lassen, Brown and Riding conclude that candidates are more likely to use Twitter if they are members of the Minority party, if party leaders urge them so, if they are young, or if they serve in the Senate (2011). Further, the authors found that electoral vulnerability has little or no effect and only age has strong and consistent effect (Lassen, Brown & Riding, 2011). This result is expected because younger members are more comfortable with new technologies; and therefore more likely to understand its potential and utilize it as part of a campaign strategy. However, because Twitter is cost effective, everyone has access to it, regardless of age. In line with previous research (Herrnson, Stokes-Brown & Hindman, 2007), Lassen, Brown and Riding also found that Senators are more likely to use the Internet when compared to members of the House of Representatives (2011). Because the constituents that make up a Senate district are much larger when compared to House districts, Senate members are forced to rely on innovative techniques to reach voters and garner support for election or re-election.

²⁹ This is contrary to other research: see Alder, Gent & Overmeyer (1998).

Finally, Twitter's cost effectiveness encourages all potential candidates to use Twitter, focusing differentials on content, response time and quality, instead of actual usage.

Williams and Gulati found that party identification, specifically Republicans, and campaign resources lead to extensive Twitter usage, while a member's age and urban constituency breakdown do not (2010). Although these results differ from Lassen, Brown and Riding's conclusion that candidates are more likely to utilize Twitter if they are young (2011), they are not surprising given the fact that candidates themselves do not have to engage in Tweeting and can delegate the task to their (potentially younger) assistants. Ironically, even though the vote share that the incumbent receives was not significant, Williams and Gulati did find that members with secure margins of victory tweet more often (2010), further supporting the theory that candidates are attempting to supplement their current campaign strategies by using Twitter.

Glassman, Straus and Shogun (2009) analyzed Twitter usage during August and September 2009 and found that on average the House sent more tweets than the Senate (79% compared to 21%) and House Republicans sent more than House Democrats (55% to 24%) and Senators (12% to 9%). Juxtaposing the number of Tweets per day, Wednesdays received the most reported Tweets followed by Tuesdays, Thursdays, Mondays and Fridays, leaving Saturdays and Sundays with considerably less numbers of total Tweets (Glassman, Straus & Shogun, 2009). These results are consistent given that a majority of business takes place during the middle part of the week. Furthermore, the selective use of Twitter during the week implies that candidates are engaging Twitter as a campaign tool, utilizing the quick and ease of relaying messages to keep constituents apprised of the latest developments, changing the focus to the content of Tweets.

Campaigns as Firms

Although the previous literature has successfully speculated correlations among candidates and Twitter usage, most have failed to examine candidates and Twitter through the guise of political economy. The broad features of transaction costs permit varied transactions to fit within the political economy framework (Williamson, 1979). Treating the campaign as an organization or a firm enables the researcher to examine campaign decisions based upon rational transaction costs, as opposed to subjective qualifications. According to Coase, transaction costs associated with using the market enable the development of organizations (1937). Furthermore, organizations are rational actors that will seek to maximize profits, while decreasing expenditures. In order to efficiently run the organization, transaction costs must be taken into account.

The study and application of transaction costs within the campaign setting allows the researcher to explore the campaign as a sustaining organization that is willing to engage in complementarities as supplementing campaign tools, not replacing them. Any candidate has the ability to utilize available complementarities, especially when the transaction cost is low to nonexistent. Moreover, campaigns with additional resources are able to engage in complementarities more frequently, or to a greater extent, juxtaposed to their less financed opponents.

A hierarchical structure is developed where larger and more financially secure campaigns are able to delegate and employ staffers to engage in the complementarities available. As previous research has demonstrated, the Internet is used to help campaigns supplement their current strategy with complementarities as opposed to replacing traditional campaign methods. Because of this, all potential candidates, regardless of incumbency or political experience, should engage in Tweeting because of the low to non-existent transactions costs within their campaign.

Hypothesis

Based upon the previous literature, the researcher believes that challengers should be more likely to Tweet than incumbents because challengers should embrace unconventional, new technologies more frequently and with alacrity. Challengers should be more willing to reach out to possible potential voters in any way possible to win the election, including Tweeting. However, because of the low transaction costs associated with Tweeting, incumbents and challengers should both be engaging in this activity. Also it would be expected that the number of years as an incumbent and the amount of political experience would not affect the propensity to Tweet. The researcher hypothesizes that the greater amount of time as an incumbent or time in politics would not lower the decision to engage in Tweeting simply because of the low transaction costs. Conforming to Mayhew (1974) and Fenno (2003), candidates seeking re-election would engage in Tweeting irrespective of the amount of time spent in politics or as an incumbent because they would be concerned with transaction costs, while Tweeting allows for name recognition and publicity without additional costs.

Moreover, the researcher would expect the amount of expenditures spent during the 2010 campaign to also influence the number of Tweets congressional candidates engaged in. The candidate with greater expenditures should Tweet more frequently than candidates with smaller total expenditures because they are fully engaging their campaign efforts and funds. Also, greater expenditures would allow a candidate to hire a specialized staffer whose sole responsibility would be to follow and engage in Tweeting. Additionally, in conformance with previous research by Gulati and Williams (2010), as well as by Peterson and Surzhko-Harned (2011), Republicans should be more likely to Tweet than their Democrat counterparts, and Senators should be more likely to Tweet than member of the House as evidenced by Lassen, Brown and Riding (2010). Furthermore, the researcher also hypothesizes that candidates with lower total expenditures will also engage in Tweeting because of the low transaction costs. Candidates with fewer resources will not be able to hire specialized staffers to Tweet, but because of the nature of Tweeting, they are able to do it themselves.

Finally, the researcher believes that sex and age should not influence a candidate's propensity to Tweet. Moreover, because the transaction costs are low with Tweeting, it would behoove any candidate, regardless of age or sex to Tweet. Moreover, the researcher believes that age could affect a candidate's decision to Tweet. Younger politicians who have continuously been exposed to newer technology and social networking media throughout their lives might be more likely to understand and incorporate Twitter in their campaign. Lastly, because Twitter enables other people to engage in Tweeting on behalf of a candidate, the age of the candidate should not play a significant role in the amount of Tweets.

Specifications and Data

In examining the number of Tweets 884 candidates engaged in during the six months prior to the 2010 November election and reviewing 64,557 Tweets,³⁰ candidates engaged in Tweeting anywhere from zero times to 1,340 times during the six-month period. The dependent variable, total number of Tweets, is coded as the total raw number of Tweets during the analyzed time period.

- Candidates are categorized by states, chambers ("1" for House of Representatives and "2" for Senate) and districts.³¹

³⁰ The actual data collection of Tweets was conducted by Dr. Kevin Wagner from Florida Atlantic University and Dr. Jason Gainous from the University of Louisville. Their data was supplemented with age and sex information by the author.

³¹ District is used if they are seeking election in the House of Representatives or else coded "0" for Senate elections.

- Additional information concerning the candidates' sex ("0" for Male and "1" for Female) and ethnicity ("0" for White, "1" for African-American, "2" for Hispanic/Latino, "3" for Asian-American, "4" for Middle-Eastern, "5" for South-Asian, "6" for Native-American and "7" if information is unavailable) is also gathered and coded.
- Each candidate's age is gathered and coded as the raw number.
- Information regarding the candidates' incumbency status is gathered and coded as "1" for incumbents and "0" for challengers.
- Data regarding incumbency experience and political experience is coded as a raw number, by the number of years the candidate has been an incumbent in that particular office and the number of years the candidate has spent in Congress, respectively.
- The total number of expenditures for the winner of 2010 and loser of 2010 is also recorded and coded as a raw number, in addition to whether the candidates actually won or lost in 2010 ("0" for Lost during 2010 and "1" for Winner of 2010).
- Furthermore, 2008 winner votes and 2008 loser votes were also recorded and coded as raw numbers.
- The total number of candidates was recorded along with the total vote share received for the 2010 election, both as raw numbers.
- Finally, party identification was coded as "0" for Democrats, "1" for Republicans and "2" for Independents.³²

Methodology

Multiple models are used in order to explore the potential relationship between candidates and Tweeting. After conducting several linear regression analyses, clear correlations developed between candidates and the total number of Tweets, similar to previous research and analyses.³³ As displayed by the regressions, incumbency and chamber of Congress were both significant. Moreover, as variables winners' expenditures for 2010 and losers' expenditures for 2010 were also significant. Finally, sex of the candidate was also significant, revealing that women are more likely to Tweet more frequently than men, within the data set. A T-Test was conducted to verify the correlation between a candidate's sex, incumbency and number of Tweets to rule-out potential errors.³⁴

Lastly, bi-variate cross-tabulations were also conducted to examine the unequal variances across the groups. The dependent variable, total congressional Tweets, was recoded into two groups divided by the median. The lower group is coded "0" for 0 through 80, and the larger group was coded "1" for 81 through 1,340. The independent variables political experience, expenditures for winner 2010, expenditures for loser 2010, 2008 winner vote, 2008 loser vote, total number of candidates and age were also recoded into two groups divided by the median.³⁵ The results of the cross tabs displayed significant results for the same previous variables as the regressions, indicating that the shared variances are not attributable to each other.³⁶

³² There was only one Independent recorded: Charles Crist from Florida.

³³ See Linear Regression Exploratory Table in Appendix.

³⁴ See T-Test Exploratory Table in Appendix.

³⁵ See Coding Scheme Exploratory Table in Appendix.

³⁶ See Cross Tabs Exploratory Table in Appendix.

Analysis

The models, consisting of multiple linear regression analyses, while conforming to previous research, did display unexpected results: there is a strong negative relation between incumbency and number of Tweets: the less a candidate is an incumbent, the more likely they are to Tweet.

Table 1- Linear Regression Model of Tweeting

Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Chamber of Congress	44.629	30.4	0.089	1.468	0.143
Incumbency	-63.811	14.044	-0.194	-4.544	0.000 ***
Winner Expend 2010	7.09E-06	0.000	0.156	2.365	0.018 **
Loser Expend 2010	2.25E-06	0.000	0.064	1.201	0.230
Party of Candidate	59.324	13.827	0.183	4.290	0.000 ***
Sex of Candidate	49.797	17.625	0.12	2.825	0.005 **

* = .05 < p < .1

** = .001 < p < .05

*** = p < .001

Exploratory Table - Linear Regression

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Incumbency	-76.239	14.277	-0.231	-5.34	0.000 ***
Winner Expend 2010	1.166E-05	0.000	0.256	5.976	0.000 ***
Sex of Candidate	42.826	17.776	0.103	2.409	0.016 **
Age of Candidate	0.002	0.037	0.003	0.058	0.954

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Incumbency	-82.487	19.566	-0.25	-4.216	0.000 ***
Years Incumbent	0.851	1.162	0.045	0.733	0.464
Political Experience	-0.827	0.362	-0.108	-2.284	0.023 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Chamber of Congress	124.327	22.157	0.248	5.611	0.000 ***
Age of Candidate	0.035	0.037	0.041	0.933	0.351
Sex of Candidate	44.04	18.393	0.106	2.394	0.017 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Chamber of Congress	113.435	23.355	0.227	4.857	0.000 ***
Age of Candidate	0.038	0.037	0.045	1.006	0.315
Sex of Candidate	47.851	18.556	0.115	2.579	0.010 **
District in US House	-1.042	0.714	-0.069	-1.459	0.145

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Ethnicity	4.688	5.027	0.043	0.933	0.351
Sex of Candidate	44.419	19.002	0.107	2.338	0.020 **
Age of Candidate	0.016	0.039	0.019	0.422	0.673

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Total No. Candidates	11.515	5.727	0.095	2.011	0.045 **
Winner Expend 2010	7.746E-06	0.000	0.170	2.994	0.003 **
Loser Expend 2010	3.790E-06	0.000	0.107	1.956	0.051 *

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
2008 Winner Vote	-4.041E-05	0.000	-0.068	-0.632	0.528
2008 Loser Vote	0.000	0.000	0.114	1.056	0.292

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Total Vote Cast	4.227E-05	0.000	0.256	5.841	0.000 ***
Win or Lose 2010	-40.623	14.337	-0.124	-2.833	0.005 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Total Vote Cast	2.163E-05	0.000	0.131	2.331	0.020 **
Win or Lose 2010	5.009	17.229	0.150	0.291	0.771
Incumbency	-77.988	17.411	-0.237	-4.479	0.000 ***
Winner Expend 2010	7.848E-06	0.000	0.172	3.064	0.002 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Age of Candidate	-0.002	0.037	-0.002	-0.045	0.964
Incumbency	-76.449	19.208	-0.232	-3.980	0.000 ***
Years Incumbent	0.755	1.127	0.040	0.670	0.503
Political Experience	-0.812	0.352	-0.106	-2.309	0.021 **
Total Vote Cast	4.002E-05	0.000	0.243	5.635	0.000 ***

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Win or Lose 2010	-28.773	21.905	-0.088	-1.314	0.190
Vote Share	-49.057	59.777	-0.055	-0.821	0.412

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Party of Candidate	69.449	14.521	0.214	4.783	0.000 ***
Sex of Candidate	55.861	18.657	0.134	2.994	0.003 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Party of Candidate	70.664	14.054	0.218	5.028	0.000 ***
Sex of Candidate	54.358	18.057	0.131	3.010	0.003 **
Chamber of Congress	124.446	21.556	0.248	5.773	0.000 ***

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Vote Share	-91.975	39.237	-0.103	-2.344	0.190
Winner Expend 2010	7.996E-06	0.000	0.175	3.102	0.002 **
Loser Expend 2010	3.702E-06	0.000	0.105	1.919	0.056 *
Total No. Candidates	9.660	5.755	0.079	1.679	0.094 *

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
2008 Winner Vote	-3.320E-05	0.000	-0.056	-0.522	0.602
2008 Loser Vote	0.000	0.000	0.104	0.969	0.333
Vote Share	-106.345	40.552	-0.119	-2.622	0.009 **

Model	B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
Age of Candidate	0.031	0.038	0.037	0.823	0.411
Chamber of Congress	125.022	22.265	0.250	5.615	0.000 ***

* = .05 < p < .1

** = .001 < p < .05

*** = p < .001

Exploratory Table - T-Test

T-Test	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Incumbency	0.47	884	0.499	0.017
Sex of Candidate	0.1697	884	0.37557	0.01263

	N	Correlation	Sig.
Incumbency & Sex of Candidate	884	0.023	0.501

Paired Differences				95% Confidence		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error Mean	Lower	Upper			
Incumbency & Sex of Candidate	0.29864	0.61793	0.02078	0.25785	0.33943	14.369	883	0.000

Exploratory Table - Coding Scheme

Dependent Variable	Coding Scheme	Recode
Total Congressional Tweets	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-80 1 = 81-1340

Independent Variable	Coding Scheme	Recode
Incumbency	0 = Challenger 1 = Incumbent	
Incumbency experience	Coded as Raw #	
Political Experience	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-8 1 = 9-57
Expenditures for Winner 2010	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-1271364.27 1 = 1271364.28-22548567
Expenditures for Loser 2010	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-221752.07 1 = 221752.08-50181464
2008 Winner Vote	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-185959 1 = 185960-3615844
2008 Loser Vote	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-102372 1 = 102373-1520621
Total Number of Candidates	Coded as Raw #	0 = 0-3 1 = 4-12
Party Identification	0 = Democrat 1 = Republican 2 = Independent	
Vote Share	Coded as Raw #	
Win or Lose 2010	0 = Lose 1 = Win	
Sex	0 = Male 1 = Female	
Age	Coded as Raw # 999 = System Missing	0 = 0-55 1 = 56-88
Ethnicity	0 = White 1 = African-American 2 = Hispanic/Latino 3 = Asian-American 4 = Middle-Eastern 5 = South-Asian 6 = Native-American 7 = Information Unavailable	
Chamber	1 = House 2 = Senate	
District	Coded as Raw # 0 = Senate	
Total Vote Cast 2010	Coded as Raw #	

Exploratory Table – Crosstabs

Cross-tabulation	Phi	Sig.	Cramer's V	Contingency Coefficient
Total Tweets * Political Experience	-0.102	**	0.102	0.101
Total Tweets * Winner Expend 2010	0.052		0.052	0.052
Total Tweets * Loser Expend 2010	0.069	**	0.069	0.069
Total Tweets * 2008 Winner Vote	0.037		0.037	0.037
Total Tweets * 2008 Loser Vote	-0.006		0.006	0.006
Total Tweets * Total # of Candidates	0.104	**	0.104	0.104
Total Tweets * Age of Candidate	0.007		0.007	0.007

* = .05 < p < .1

** = .001 < p < .05

*** = p < .001

Exploratory Table – Variable Frequencies

Dependent Variable	N	Missing	Mean	Median	Mode	Standard Deviation
Total Congressional Tweets	480	404	134.49	80	20	163.402

Independent Variable	N	Missing	Mean	Median	Mode	Standard Deviation
Incumbency	884	0	0.47	0	0	0.499
Incumbency experience	884	0	5.7	0	0	8.834
Political Experience	834	50	11.16	8	0	12.24
Expenditures for Winner 2010	884	0	2055176.965	1271364.27	4113372	2810743.447
Expenditures for Loser 2010	884	0	1278946.094	221752.065	0	3591929.423
2008 Winner Vote	838	46	214852.69	185959	198798	215613.211
2008 Loser Vote	832	52	112050.93	102372	0	132421.548
Total Number of Candidates	884	0	3.09	3	3	1.276
Party Identification	883	1	0.513	1	1	0.50238
Vote Share	884	0	0.5119	0.5081	1	0.18147
Win or Lose 2010	883	1	0.53	1	1	0.5
Sex	884	0	0.1697	0	0	0.37557
Age	842	42	55.3729	55	53	11.10467
Ethnicity	882	2	0.53	0	0	1.558
Chamber	884	0	1.08	1	1	0.275
District	884	0	9.37	6	1	10.517
Total Vote Cast 2010	881	3	347846.7	208103	251081	749397.059

Dependent Variable	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis	Range	Minimum	Maximum
Total Congressional Tweets	26700.376	3.033	13.894	1340	0	1340

Independent Variable						
Incumbency	0.249	0.127	-1.988	1	0	1
Incumbency experience	78.043	1.883	3.674	56	0	56
Political Experience	149.828	0.972	0.202	57	0	57
Expenditures Winner 2010	7.90E+12	4.642	24.739	22395786.77	152780.23	22548567
Expenditures Loser 2010	1.29E+13	8.293	90.951	50181464	0	50181464
2008 Winner Vote	4.65E+10	10.816	152.036	3584526	31318	3615844
2008 Loser Vote	1.75E+10	6.052	46.2	1520621	0	1520621
Number of Candidates	1.627	2.025	8.317	11	1	12
Party Identification	0.252	-0.025	-1.933	2	0	2
Vote Share	0.033	0.755	3.784	1.83	0.1	1.94
Win or Lose 2010	0.250	-0.107	-1.993	1	0	1
Sex	0.141	1.763	1.111	1	0	1
Age	123.314	-0.057	-0.173	62	26	88
Ethnicity	2.429	3.445	11.081	7	0	7
Chamber	0.076	3.038	7.247	1	1	2
District	110.597	1.908	3.723	53	0	53
Total Vote Cast 2010	5.62E+11	7.712	75.637	9935422	64438	9999860

The result of the above Tables is consistent with previous research that predicts that challengers are more likely to utilize new technology in hopes of winning the election or re-election. Moreover, the data conforms to Mayhew’s theory that candidates are seekers of re-election (1974). However, because incumbents, when compared to challengers, are not using Twitter greatly, Mayhew’s theory begins to lose ground, although is not altogether defeated. Ideally, Mayhew’s re-election theory would be bolstered if incumbents and challengers Tweeted at identical amounts, both attempting to gain support to win the election or re-election. Yet, incumbents might not utilize Twitter, while still engaging and acquiescing to Mayhew’s theory of re-election. If Twitter was not an active part of the incumbent’s campaign strategy before, the candidate might decide not to take any chances and continue on the same campaign path that secured their election in the first place. Further, given the political economy impact of its low transaction costs, all candidates should incorporate Twitter in their campaign strategy.

Moreover, the statistical results also displayed a relationship between the Winner Expenditures 2010 and the number of Tweets. The more money spent on the campaign, the more likely the candidate was to Tweet. Although one would expect the frugal campaign to make use of and utilize every potential advertising avenue available, especially if the cost was low, the significance of the variable indicates that highly funded candidates are using Twitter because it is low cost. Because the correlation was not present in the data, it is assumed that the Internet is not the free speaking, open classroom once assumed. Instead, the Internet is just an additional avenue, besides television ads, where candidates are getting their already overly publicized message out to voters. The Internet is not being used to open the door for less funded candidates; but alternatively, is another pawn in a capitalistic election due to low transaction costs and rational campaign strategies.

Additionally, similar to previous research, the data displayed a relationship between the Chamber of Congress and the total number of Tweets, indicating that members of the Senate are more likely to Tweet than fellow members of the House. This result conforms to what others researchers have found and indicates that the Senate is utilizing Twitter as an effective mechanism for reaching out

to and informing constituents/ voters. Because the Senate, while pursuing re-election, has a larger constituency base when juxtaposed with the House, it is expected that they would utilize every potential avenue of contact to gain name recognition, especially if it is versatile and free (aka: low transaction costs). Also, because the data did not demonstrate a correlation between age and total number of Tweets, candidates of all ages are engaging in Tweeting, further showing that candidates use Twitter within campaign strategies because it is a cost-effective supplement to traditional campaign methods.

Finally, the data revealed a correlation between the sex of the candidate and the total number of Tweets, indicating that women were more likely to Tweet than men. Traditionally, female candidates have fewer resources dedicated to their campaign strategy. One would expect that those with fewer resources would more actively engage the services of free advertising and outreach by Twitter. However, this is in direct conflict with the results from the Winner Expenditures 2010 results above. Furthermore, transaction cost theory would support the result that all candidates should use Twitter because it imposes little cost on the candidate. Additionally, women could have specific targeted constituencies where Twitter is the appropriate medium to reach these voters. In comparison to their male counterparts, women might focus more on reaching younger voters, while males do not single out specific individuals, but instead attempt to reach the entire constituency as a whole. Furthermore, women might rely on organizations and connections established prior to entering office. All in all, women and men are both using Twitter to supplement and complement their current campaign, but because women use Twitter more frequently than men is a fact that requires additional exploration.

Discussion and Conclusions

The results obtained from the data were consistent with previous research on Twitter usage among Congressional members. Among Congressional candidates, challengers are more likely to Tweet, Senators are more likely to Tweet, and the more money spent in campaigning increases their Tweeting. Interestingly, the research revealed that women are more likely to Tweet than men. These relationships are best explained through a political economy approach examining transaction costs.

Because campaigns are organizations, run like firms, transaction costs play an intricate role in the development and implementation of campaign fund and spending allocation. The significant variables display correlations between incumbency and expenditures, indicating that all candidates are Tweeting. Since transaction costs are extremely low for Tweeting, candidates are able to implement Twitter into their campaign strategies as a low cost complement to their existing tools. This information suggests that the quality and substance of the Tweets needs to be examined more closely.

Moreover, the results from the data further suggest that in accordance with "the nature of the firm" candidates are utilizing Twitter to supplement their current campaigns. The focus then becomes on the war-chest of resources each candidate has at his/her disposal. Additional resources enable a candidate to hire a staffer whose specific job description entails following and responding via Twitter. Juxtaposed to a candidate with less availability of resources, who is also responsible for Tweeting messages individually, should display different techniques and possibly even different levels of successfulness. Therefore, the hierarchical structure of the campaign becomes an efficient resource and variable affecting content analysis of Tweets.

In conclusion, the expansion of the Internet into social networking sites like Twitter has left many unanswered questions regarding the transformation of the political process. Will the political empowerment of Social Media through Twitter, Facebook and YouTube enable or even encourage the government to become more accountable because of direct citizen input? Thus, more questions

remain: will Congress become more personal and will Congressional approval increase? At the same time, Political Economists question whether the apparent influences in Tweeting are simply artifacts.

Beyond the reaches of this paper, it would be interesting to analyze data regarding Congressional approval and trust to determine if Tweeting creates a stronger bond and relationship between the constituency and their elected representative. Additionally, turn-out investment should be analyzed, focusing on whether candidates are measuring returns on social networking use. This would enable researchers to determine if candidates are responding to Tweets from constituents or just using Twitter as a push medium. In the future, it would also be interesting to examine the nature of Congressional Tweets. Are the candidates simply using Twitter as a campaign tool for election or do the messages continue throughout the term? Are the Tweets personal in nature where the candidate is developing a personal bond with constituents? All these questions tantalize researchers who are attempting to predict and explain politically the ever-evolving relationship between voters and Congress.

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The 2014 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at **Flagler College** in **St. Augustine, Florida** on **Saturday 8 March 2014**. Information on directions, parking and hotels will be sent in **December**.

Pre-registration before the conference day is **\$75** for Faculty and **\$35** for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants are asked to pre-register. **Registration at the meeting** is **\$85** for Faculty and **\$40** for students. Registration includes lunch, refreshments and a subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*. For pre-registration, please go to the FPSA website: www.fpsanet.org & <http://www.fpsanet.org/annual-meeting.html>

Faculty, talented undergraduates and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. A \$250 award is given to the Best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference. **Please send paper proposals to the following Section Chairs by 17 January 2014. Accepted papers will be notified by 27 January 2014.**

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CONSTITUTION OF THE FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

ARTICLE I: Name

1. The name of this organization shall be the Florida Political Science Association.

ARTICLE II: Object

1. It shall be the purpose of this Association to encourage the study, writing and teaching of Political Science in the State of Florida, to encourage community service by Political Scientists and to promote the interest of the profession in the community-at-large.

ARTICLE III: Membership

1. Any person interested in the study, writing and teaching of Political Science may become a member of the Association upon payment of annual dues.
2. The amount of the dues may be changed by majority vote of those members present at the annual business meeting.

ARTICLE IV: Officers

1. The Executive Officers of the Association shall consist of a President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President and a Secretary-Treasurer.
2. A Council vested with the affairs of the Association, shall consist of the President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer and nine additional members elected by the membership. Nominations for the Council will seek to achieve representation from among colleges and universities in the State of Florida (Amendment, March 16, 2013). The outgoing President of the Association shall serve as a member of the Council ex-officio.

ARTICLE V: Selection of Officers

1. The President, Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer and the Members of the Council shall be elected by a majority vote of those members present and voting at annual meetings. Terms of the President and Vice-President shall be for one year. Effective as of the election of Officers at the annual meeting in 1981, the term of the Secretary-Treasurer shall be for two years. The terms of the Council Members shall be for three years (Amendment, April 19, 1980).

2. There shall be a Council of nine members. No more than six of the nine Council members shall be from either four-year colleges and universities on the one hand, or two-year and state colleges on the other (Amendment, March 16, 2013). In 1982, those three Council members elected with the highest number of votes shall serve for three years: those three receiving the next highest number of votes shall serve for two years; and the next three elected shall serve for one year. Thereafter, three members of the Council shall be elected annually unless there is need to fill vacancies in which case election to fill vacancies will be added (Amendment, April 19, 1980).
3. The President shall appoint a Nominating Committee representing state colleges, four-year colleges and universities of not less than three members, not less than thirty days prior to each annual business meeting (Amendment, March 16, 2013). The Nominating Committee shall present nominations for officers at the annual business meeting.
4. Additional nominations may be made from the floor.
5. When a member of the Council has not participated in Council activities, nor notified the President of inability to participate, for a period of at least one year, the Council shall have the power to declare the seat vacant (Amendment, May 6, 1977).
6. When a Council seat is vacated, either by declaration of the Council as provided in section 5 or by resignation of a Council member, the Council may appoint a successor to serve until the next annual meeting of the Association (Amendment, May 13, 1978).

ARTICLE VI: Duties of Officers

1. The President shall be the executive head of the Association and shall preside at meetings of the Council. The President shall appoint all committees of the Association with the approval of the Council and shall perform such other duties as the Council may assign to him. In his absence the duties shall devolve upon the First Vice-President, the Second Vice-President or the Secretary-Treasurer.
2. The Second Vice-President shall serve as program chairman for the annual meeting.
3. The Secretary-Treasurer, acting under the direction of the President, shall maintain the records of the Association and shall collect and disburse money of the Association. The position of Secretary-Treasurer would be divided into two positions - Secretary and Treasurer - effective immediately after the meeting on March 17, 2012 (Amendment, March 22, 2011).
4. An Executive Committee composed of the President, 1st Vice-President, 2nd Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurer shall conduct the business of the Association between meetings of the Association's Council.


ARTICLE VII: Meetings

1. The Association shall hold an annual business meeting and such other general business of conference meetings as the Council may cause to be announced.
2. Announcement of the time and place of such general business meetings as provided above shall be mailed to all members at least ten days prior thereto with a notation as to the nature of the business to be transacted.
3. Business of the Council shall be transacted at a meeting or by mail. The Council shall meet on call by the President or any five of its members.
4. Seven members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business in the Council.
5. Roberts Rules of Order Newly Revised shall govern the proceedings of the annual business meeting.

ARTICLE VIII: Adoption of this Constitution and Amendments

1. This Constitution shall be in effect from and after its adoption at a meeting to which shall be invited all individuals interested in the study, writing, and teaching of Political Science in the State of Florida.
2. At the time of the adoption of this Constitution officers shall be elected to serve the Association until the next annual business meeting of the Association.
3. The Constitution may be amended by a majority vote of members present at any annual meeting of the Association upon recommendation of the Council or upon petition of ten members, provided the notice of the meeting at which the vote shall be taken contains the text of the proposed amendment and the provisions which it is intended to amend.

BOOK-REVIEW



Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, eds., *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), ISBN 978-0-8133-4819-3.

The series of upheavals that began in December 2010 in Tunisia and commonly dubbed the “Arab Spring” have been the most electrifying events in the Middle East/North Africa region in many decades. In their recent book, *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance*, editors Mark Haas and David Lesch attempt to analyze these events in a manner that both experts and laymen can comprehend. They have chosen contributors who are scholars of specific countries both inside and outside the region, and asked them to give their best analysis of this rapidly unfolding situation at the time of writing (2012).

As an overview, unfortunately this valuable book has two inevitable weaknesses. Being an edited volume with 13 different contributors, the chapters vary in quality, although most are excellent. And as a chronicle of a political movement that is still ongoing, the material in some chapters has been outdated by fast-changing events since the contributors’ deadline, sometime in Summer 2012. But with those caveats in mind, the book remains a very valuable source of information about this critical period in Middle Eastern history.

The editors have divided the book into two parts. The first half consists of chapters on countries in the region that experienced various degrees of unrest (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan). But why was Yemen excluded? Haas and Lesch note in their Preface that they could not always find a scholar willing and able to meet their deadline, and perhaps that was true in this case. In the second half, they present chapters on other regional and external Powers also impacted by the “Arab Spring” (Iran, Turkey, Israel, Russia and U.S.A.) with key changes in their foreign policies. The overall effect is a volume rich in insights that can be read by scholars in many disciplines.

Several chapters stand out as particularly enlightening. Bruce Rutherford’s Egypt, though overtaken by recent events, is highly informative. He points out that the country’s first president, Gamal al-Nasser (1952-70), established a social contract whereby the public’s basic needs were provided for by the state in return for a monopoly on politics, but by the 1990s this welfare state had become too expensive to maintain and was gradually cut back. While the private sector grew, that growth only benefited those with skills and education, and as a consequence, by the beginning of 2011 (when their local “Arab Spring” revolution began), over 40% of Egyptians were living in poverty. The seeds of unrest had been sown.

Rutherford points out that despite all the credit given for the success of the Egyptian protests to the Internet, Facebook and Twitter, one element was key: the refusal of the Egyptian Army to fire on the demonstrators. All the generals had been appointed by President Hosni Mubarak, yet when the chips were down, they turned on him and forced him out as a national scapegoat to contain the grassroots revolution. They since have come to regret that decision, as events since this chapter was finished have witnessed the drastic replacement of all top military officers by the new President Mohammed Morsi of the anti-Mubarak populist Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which as the most organized opposition political group was able to hi-jack Egypt’s reformist demonstrators “Arab Spring” revolution and monopolize the new Islamist civilian government. Yet, Morsi’s controversial rise to power and year of abysmal civil administration of Egypt sparked fresh reformist demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood’s socio-religious agenda, prompting in turn an unexpected military take-over to ‘restore stability’ under Army Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood and arresting Morsi.

Another insightful chapter was written by Lesch on Syria, a country he knows well. Particularly interesting are Lesch's comments about President Bashar al-Assad, a man he has met many times. He believes that Bashar came to power in 2000 (after the death of his long-ruling father Hafez al-Assad) hoping to reform the system, but found that resistance to change was intractable among the old guard he had inherited. But Lesch also feels that the changes Bashar al-Assad has made have not received enough credit and are by now buried in the wake of the horrendous carnage that has taken place since 2011. Despite over 70,000 deaths in the Syrian Civil War by the time of his writing (which have mushroomed since to 120,000 by 2013), Lesch stresses that, "I do not see him as either an eccentric or a bloodthirsty killer along the lines of Muammar al-Gadafi or Saddam Hussein" (p. 91), and "...Bashar was different from the typical Middle Eastern dictator, which led many people, including me, to hope for the best—and maybe even engage in wishful thinking" (p. 91). The chapter is infused with a sadness over a potential for change that did not materialize and that now has sparked a nightmare that cannot end well.

In other chapters, contributors Steve Yetiv and Curtis Ryan discuss the reasons why Saudi Arabia and Jordan have not had revolutions. In the case of the former, Yetiv argues that oil wealth has allowed the government to assuage economic grievances, while King Abdullah is genuinely popular with the public and the huge royal family (the nation's founder King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud had over 40 sons) dominates all the key institutions in the country. As for Jordan, Ryan sees danger ahead if real reform continues to be thwarted, as it has been so far. Up to the time of writing he believed that domestic political demands were for reform, rather than revolution, but the situation could still change.

The chapter on Iran is another informative one. Authors Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi note that the revolutionary government in Tehran initially applauded the overthrow of both Zine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, which they felt would give them credibility with the Arab masses. However, since the unraveling of Syria into civil war, Teheran has given total support to Assad, which in turn has antagonized Sunni Muslims (who are fighting Assad's minoritarian Shi'a Alawites) throughout the Middle East. The end result has been a net loss in Iran's drive to become the dominant power in the region, which would require broad support from Sunni Arabs (Iran is primarily Persian and Shi'a).

Ilan Peleg's chapter on Israel shows how Israelis are deeply worried about developments surrounding the "Arab Spring", since they had succeeded in maintaining stable relations with the dictators in Egypt and Syria. They are concerned about the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood on their southern border and fear the same thing could eventually happen in Syria if Bashar al-Assad fell. Such uncertainties also give the Netanyahu government another excuse to avoid negotiations with the Palestinians.

In an excellent concluding chapter, James Gelvin divides the Arab Spring results into four categories, based on the tentative results as of Summer 2012. While one could argue over his placement of Syria and Bahrain in the same category, overall his chapter provides a solid summation of events in a large number of countries, giving all his readers plenty of food for thought.

In sum, this book is highly recommended for Social Scientists in any discipline who have interest in the Middle East. Hopefully, there will be an up-dated second edition in a year or two as events continue to unravel.

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