

satellite Photos from NOAA: Florida hit by two Category 4 Hurricanes: "Floyd" (14 September 1999, 50% larger at 120 knots 155 Mph 250 Km/h, 77 dead, 2.6 mi

# *Florida Political Chronicle*

**Regional Scholarly Journal**  
**Florida Political Science Association**

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**Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.**



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Winter 2013-Spring 2014



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# Florida Political Chronicle

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Each past issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, like the “2012 Presidential Elections” (v.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) and the on-line Archive of older issues is FREE for readers by clicking two tabs on the Florida Political Science Association’s Web-site: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>.  
Only the current issue is exclusively accessible via password and FPSA subscription until a new issue is printed!

## – ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli ([Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu)) essays for consideration:

- Essays must be sent both in double-spaced print & Word e-mail for record-keeping.
- Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1 inch margin (no landscape-size tables!).
- Add at paper’s end, a 2-paragraphs Author’s Biography, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.
- Please do not use the First Person (“I”); instead use the neutral “The study” or “This work”.
- No PDF or Acrobat. If you have Acrobat you can use its selector and convert it into Word.
- Preferred style and footnoting (at end of each page) is in Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
- All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
- Book-Reviews are welcome on important topics! Submit your average 2 pages-long Review in Word.

**DISCLAIMER:** All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

## **New President's Introduction: Keeping Political Science Relevant!**

**FPSA President Kevin Wagner, Ph.D., Florida Atlantic University**

Dear FPSA Members and All Interested Readers,

2013-2014 was an exciting time for the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA): the FPSA continues to grow in both membership and activities thanks to the inspired work of our membership. FPSA members have made important contributions throughout all Political Science disciplines and our regional academic community of private universities and colleges, state universities, and community colleges.

The FPSA has seen the on-line rebirth of our scholarly journal, the *Florida Political Chronicle* since 2012, under the renewed leadership of Editor Marco Rimanelli, International Politics Professor at Saint Leo University who is continuing this publication from abroad while serving as 2013-2014 Fulbright-Schuman Chair at the graduate College of Europe-Bruges in Belgium during his one-year Sabbatical. With the move to an on-line journal, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is now being published *twice a year* in full color with *free back issues* available to scholars and other readers. We are also proud to announce the return of the *Political Scientist* Newsletter under the direction of Dr. Judithanne Scourfield McLachlan of USF-St. Petersburg.

Please visit [www.fpsa.org](http://www.fpsa.org) to read all past and present *Florida Political Chronicle* volumes and to read the latest issues of the *Political Scientist*. With its fresh design and new content, our FPSA web-site is a great resource for scholars, members and students. You can conduct research, learn about upcoming annual conferences and Board Members, as well as peruse FPSA's by-laws and Constitution.

Since the past year, FPSA has focused on the increasing importance of the discipline of Political Science to academic discourse and to basic education for citizens. Political Science has come under attack at both the State and Federal levels. Members of Congress have introduced legislation to defund Political Science research and prevent the National Science Foundation ("NSF") from funding future grants. At the level of our State of Florida, the valuable emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics ("STEM") has had the paradoxical negative effect to leave the equally-important Social Sciences, including Political Science, outside this new focus of the State University system.

Few have taken up the task of reminding people why citizenship and civic education are vital. The FPSA as the State of Florida regional association of Political Science as a discipline, should be, and will be, the champion of civic education in highlighting its importance in a democratic society. Citizenship is not just a right; it is a duty for all Americans! The lack of knowledge about our political system, the role of people in a democracy or even the structure and function of our nation, strikes at the heart of who we are as a people and a country.

The FPSA has led efforts to inform and educate about the importance of teaching citizenship, civics and the science of politics. Political Scientists have come together at our teaching round-tables to discuss strategies and approaches to making Political Science relevant to politicians, and more importantly, to students and people across the State of Florida. We brought focus to the importance of civic engagement and education about the role of citizens in our democracy with the inclusion of former-Congressman Lou Frey at our annual meeting on 8 March 2014. Congressman Frey has championed these efforts, including with his, “Lou Frey Institute of Politics and Government”, plus multiple programs connecting government to its citizens, teachers and professors to the resources they need. We hope not only to work with the Institute toward these goals, but to lead efforts to highlight the importance of civic education programs at colleges and universities throughout the state.

Ultimately as Political Scientists, it is our mission to encourage thoughtful debate and discussion about current policy issues, teach civic and political skills and encourage their growth through research, policy analysis and service. I hope all members will join me in supporting this mission throughout Florida.

Finally, I want to thank all the members of the FPSA for making our annual conference possible. The work that the officers and the members of our Executive Council do is vital and often unheralded. It is thanks to them that the FPSA is once again becoming one of the most vibrant and important State Political Science associations in the country. Each year the organization is growing and working together to improve and encourage the growth of Political Science throughout the State of Florida. I am very proud to work with so many impressive colleagues and to be a part of this fine professional organization.

Best wishes for 2014-2015!

*Kevin M. Wagner, J.D., Ph.D.*

**President FPSA  
Associate-Professor of Political Science  
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton**



## Editor's Introduction: "Zut"! More "New" Essays in 2 Issues Annually!

**Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges**

Dear FPSA Political Scientists, Fellow-Travelers and Readers,

since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way that fully embodies the current U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Science and related Disciplines: American Government & Politics, Political Theory & Philosophy, Comparative Politics, International Affairs & Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, and International Law & Organizations (see submissions requirements on p.4 above).

This new *Florida Political Chronicle* issue of Winter 2013-Spring 2014 (vol.23, n.1, 2013-2014) welcomes its readers to an Introduction from our new President of the Florida Political Science Association, Dr. Kevin Wagner of Florida Atlantic University in Miami. Below are the latest innovations to our journal:

1. This current colour issue, is the first one to reintroduce the old tradition of running two annual numbers of the *Florida Political Chronicle* with all new essays from a good international mix of professors and professionals (the detailed synopsis of each paper's main points follows on the next page):
  - my senior colleague Jack McTague of Saint Leo University gave us maybe his best analytical interpretation distilled out of the wisdom of years of one of the most convoluted democratic political systems: Israel;
  - in a parallel vein, Cherie Farrell Executive-Director of the IPAC Research Center in Orlando and completing her Ph.D. at FIU in Miami, gave us a great geo-strategic overview of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Gulf;
  - from abroad, my other colleague Chair Hall Gardner from American University of Paris in France has contributed a masterful, 6-pages-long book-review synthesis of the best five current books of 2013-2014 on the Centennial of World War I, including his own manuscript on this topic;
  - also from abroad, Essien Ukpe Ukoyo Ukpe of the University of Uyo-Obio Akpa in Nigeria sheds light on the Islamic terrorist-Jihadist group *Boku Haram*, and is the first foreign scholar to win the 2013 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award;
  - Dr. Dukhong Kim of FAU in Boca Raton has done a difficult statistical research of summarizing U.S. élites' value-changes in foreign policy after the "9/11" terrorist attacks and Second Gulf War.
2. As two "firsts", this issue has reached 103 pages (instead of its average 70+ pages since my renewed Editorship) and now publishes for our record the entire FPSA's 2014 Program of the Annual Conference at Flagler College, our co-sponsoring-university (this year Flagler is generously also hosting also the other regional scholarly association, the Florida Conference of Historians). The editorial goal would be to repeat both achievements in the forecasted 2015 first number of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (early-Spring) with the future FPSA's March 2015 Program of the Annual Conference to be held at Stetson University in DeLand.
3. This number's Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile highlights Florida Atlantic University of Boca Raton, as home-institution of the FPSA's new President Kevin Wagner and his colleague Dukhong Kim. As standard rotation, our second annual issue in 2014 of the *Florida Political Chronicle* scheduled to for August 2014 (vol.23, n.2, Fall 2014) will post as its Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile, Flagler College, where the FPSA is holding its March 2014 Annual Conference. Following this same rotation rationale, our Spring 2015 first number of the *Florida Political Chronicle* will highlight as Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile, Stetson University in DeLand, which is the host-institution for the FPSA's March 2015 Annual Conference.

4. Since 2012, the FPSA's on-line web-site provides all readers access to all recently published colour issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (like "2012 Presidential Elections") and older scanned black & white printed issues in the Archives (1989-2009), available *free to the public* through the FPSA Web-site Chronicle Tab (<http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html>) or Archives Tab (<http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>). Only the current colour issue (vol. 23, n.1, 2013-2014) is restricted exclusively to *members* through password and FPSA subscription until a new issues replaces the latest one and opened to the general public readership.

#### Synopsis of the Current Issue's Essays:

This first timely essay, "**Recent Trends in Israeli Elections, 1990s-2013**" from **Professor Jack McTague (Saint Leo University)** is his latest contribution: he has published in the last *Florida Political Chronicle* (v.22, no. 1-2 (2012-2013): p.66-67) a thoughtful Book-Review on the "Arab Spring", and earlier in the 1995 *Florida Political Chronicle* (see *Archives*: v.7, no. 1 (1995): p.4-7) also a break-through analysis of "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel", up-dated in a 1999 book to cover all 1948-1999 elections. In this follow-up essay, Professor McTague surveys recent trends in Israeli politics and elections from 1992 to the latest in 2013, discerning the continuing evolution of earlier Israeli politics from the one-party-dominant system of 1948-1977 to a competitive two-party and then two-bloc system where Labor (L) and Likud (R) kept a rough ideological balance in 1977-1992. After the pivotal 1992 elections, Israeli politics have witnessed the continued fragmenting of the party-system and decline of once dominant Labor and Likud, undermining even their long-term ability to sustain occasional Grand Coalitions. At the same time smaller parties (religious, nationalist or ethnic) continue to grow in determining how government coalitions can be formed given the weakness of larger parties. Thus, Israel's generalized political fragmentation and inability of any ruling party to be reconfirmed in power was paradoxically accelerated by the Prime Minister's direct election law meant to strengthen Labor's and Likud's slipping hold, and only temporarily reversed by its 2003 repeal. Also the electorate's ever-changing mood both catapults to the fore unknown smaller parties who in few years also swiftly collapse back into obscurity, preventing further growths to challenge Labor and Likud (a fate that befell in 2013 even on the most durable ruling challenger, *Kadima*).

The second long essay also focuses on the Middle-East/Gulf region, "**Saudi Arabia vs. Iran: Tensions after the Arab Spring**" by **Cherie J. Farrell (Florida International University-Miami)**, who is the Executive-Director of the IPAC Research Center in Orlando and is completing her Ph.D. at FIU in Miami. In a great geo-strategic overview of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Gulf, she depicts how recent Middle-Eastern political developments have intensified the rivalry and regional competition for influence. Several factors contribute to the increase in tension in the Gulf as a regional security complex, as the "Arab Spring" and a regional re-balancing of power have altered its political and security dynamics. First the essay explains the Gulf's regional security bilateral tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, then the impact of the "Arab Spring" destabilizations on Syria, Libya and Egypt, plus the parallel influence of Qatar. Then, U.S. influence is examined due to its predominant security presence in the region from Cold War off-shore balancer (1940s-90) to regional *de facto* Power with boots on the ground (1990-2014 in Iraq and Afghanistan), until its scheduled pull-out from both countries and a return of the U.S. to the role of off-shore balancer, despite plus paralysis over Iran and Syria. All these factors play varying, essential roles in the Gulf regional strategic security system ("RSC") as conflict and re-balancing of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran seeks to achieve relative "RSC" stability.

A third essay, "**Stability and Change of Foreign Policy Values among Élites: Effects of "9/11 Attacks" and Second Gulf War against Iraq on Élites' Values**" by **Assistant-Professor Dukhong Kim (Florida Atlantic University-Boca Raton)**, explains how U.S. élites change their belief in foreign policy values in reaction to international events. It uses surveys of U.S. foreign policy élites by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, 2002 and 2004. The findings are that U.S. élites selectively modify their belief in values in response to international events: the élites' political partisanship and decision-making role moderates the effect of political crises—"9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and 2003 invasion of Iraq—on their belief in humanitarianism, democracy promotion and militarism. Further, both elements simultaneously moderate the effect of events on U.S. élites' beliefs in supporting humanitarianism and, lesser, national economic interests, while élites' partisanship and roles inside or outside U.S. national decision-making also condition the effect of political events on their belief in U.S. foreign policy values.



The fourth essay is another “first” innovation: “**Arab Connections and Upsurge of Insurgency in Africa: Case-Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria**” is the **FPSA 2013 Best Graduate Paper Award** by foreign Doctoral candidate and Instructor **Essien Ukpe Ukoyo Ukpe (University of Uyo-Obio Akpa, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria)**, is the first Best Graduate Award given to a foreign scholar and to a Nigerian colleague. In his work, Essien delves into the causes of the dramatic increase in intra-state conflicts and upsurge of insurgency in the African continent in recent times, and then focuses in particular on the *Boko Haram* menace in Nigeria. The paper looks at the origin of *Boko Haram* and probes into its links with international terrorist organizations, like “Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) and *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. Using religious imperialism as the framework, the paper concludes that the *Boko Haram* insurgency is inspired by *jihadi-Salafi* ideology espoused by Saudi Arabia and is the last stage of the long drawn attempt to Islamize Nigeria. Only if the Nigerian government with international cooperation takes serious proactive steps and military action it can end *Boko Haram’s* menace, and also stem the rise of other regional Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies in the future.

Finally, the last “first” innovation is this masterful **Book-Review** as a long 6-pager, thematic synthesis of the most important five current books of 2013-2014 on the Centennial of World War I (including his own manuscript soon in print) by a really “external Reviewer” from abroad, **Chair & Professor Hall Gardner (American University of Paris, France)**. According to him, the best recent books published the 2014 Centenary of World War I in August 1914 are:

- **Max Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914*** (London: William Collins, 2013), ISBN 978-0-00-746764-8
- **Margaret MacMillan, *The War that Ended the Peace*** (London: Profile Books, 2013), ISBN 978-1-84-668272-8
- **Sean McMeekin, *July 1914: Countdown to War*** (London: Basic Books, 2013), ISBN 978-1-84831-593-8
- **Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*** (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), ISBN 978-0-06-114665-7
- **Hall Gardner, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the Unexpected Armageddon*** (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, Fall 2014).

Each of these five WW I books provide a good solid different outlook on the reasons for the outbreak of the Great War and alternative viewpoints to that of contemporary classics (Luigi Albertini’s masterpiece 3-vols., *The Origins of the War of 1914*; A.J.P. Taylor’s classic masterpiece, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*; or Barbara Tuchman’s influential, *Guns of August*), yet all miss these classics’ very wide-range perspective of long-term politico-diplomatic-economic roots of this global conflict (except for the broad scope of Gardner’s own forthcoming book, in the views of this Editor).

As Editor of this regional scholarly journal, I remain deeply grateful to the current FPSA’s President Kevin Wagner (Florida Atlantic University, Miami), and the FPSA’s Ex-Officio past two Presidents, Dr. Sean Foreman (Barry University, Miami) and Dr. Houman Sadri (University of Central Florida-Orlando), as well as to all my colleagues at FPSA and Saint Leo University for their continuing support in this voluntary service for our Disciplines and Academic Community. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is a regional scholarly publication of the academic Discipline of Political Science that embodies the U.S. Department of Education’s new emphasis on public policy in universities. Together with all FPSA Officers we are committed to publishing a high-quality, modern, non-political regional scholarly journal to entice your intellectual fire as we have done since 1989 with our past Editors Drs. Bernie Schechterman (1989-1993), myself (1993-1999 & 2012-current) and Houman Sadri (1999-2003).

Best wishes to all!

*Marco Rimanelli Ph.D.*

**Editor of Florida Political Chronicle, FPSA**

**2013-14 Fulbright-Schuman Chair at graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Belgium,  
Professor of Polical Science & World Affairs at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A.**

# RECENT TRENDS IN ISRAELI ELECTIONS, 1990s-2013

Jack McTague, Ph.D., Saint Leo University

**ABSTRACT:** The essay surveys recent political trends in Israel's electoral history from 1992 to the latest in 2013, discerning the continuing evolution of earlier Israeli politics from the one-party-dominant system of 1948-1977 to a competitive two-party and then two-bloc system where Labor and Likud with their "satellite parties" kept a roughly equal ideological balance during 1977-1992. Yet since the pivotal 1992 elections, these earlier trends in Israeli elections have somewhat continued, while diverging in others into really uncharted waters: the continued fragmenting of the party-system and decline of the dominant Labor (L) and Likud (R) parties undermined even their long-term ability to sustain Grand Coalitions; political fragmentation and instability was paradoxically accelerated by the Prime Minister's direct election law meant to strengthen Labor's and Likud's slipping hold, and was only mildly and temporarily reversed by its repeal in 2003; the historical influence of smaller parties (whether religious, nationalist or ethnic) continue to grow in determining how government coalitions can be formed given the weakness of larger parties, but the electorate's ever-changing mood both catapults to the fore unknown smaller Centrist parties and after few years also swiftly consigns them back to obscurity after their "15 minutes of fame", preventing any consolidation and further growth to challenge durably the traditional Labor and Likud (a fate that befell in 2013 even on the most durable and ex-ruling *Kadima*).

## Introduction

In an earlier essay for the *Florida Political Chronicle*,<sup>1</sup> this author surveyed trends in Israel's electoral history from the founding of the state in 1948 up to the pivotal 1992 vote, which brought the Labor Party back to power after a long dry spell and led to the famous 1993 Oslo Accords. That essay also noted how Israeli politics evolved from a one-party-dominant system, which it had been from 1948 to 1977, to a competitive two-party and then two-bloc system in which Labor and Likud with their "satellite parties" maintained a roughly equal ideological balance. In this current essay, the author examines recent trends in Israeli elections since 1992, which in some aspects have continued the earlier trends, but in others have diverged into uncharted waters. The conclusion examines the most recent Israeli election held in 2013.

One pivotal political change out of the most recent elections was the ill-fated experiment of the direct election of the Prime Minister, which was attempted three times between 1996 and 2001 before being discarded as a failure ahead of the 2003 election. The purpose of the direct election bill was to stop, or at least slow the gradual decline of the two major parties (Labor and Likud) from a combined high in the 1981 election of 95 seats (out of 120 in the unicameral *Knesset*) to 76 by 1992. The idea was that by creating a strong Prime Minister directly chosen by the voters, the power of the smaller parties to bargain and blackmail would be diluted. The first time this was tried in 1996, Benjamin "Bibi" Netanyahu of Likud defeated Labor's Shimon Peres 50.4%-to-49.5%, but the two parties combined won only 66 *Knesset* seats with a decline of 10 seats. The second time, three years later, Ehud Barak of Labor decisively beat Netanyahu 56%-to-44%, but Labor only won 26 seats and Likud 19, for a combined total of 45, which is an all-time electoral low for both parties so far.

It had become clear that the new electoral system paradoxically only strengthened the smaller parties, as many voters were now splitting their ticket, which they had not been able to do before, when

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<sup>1</sup> Jack McTague, "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel" in *Political Chronicle*, v.7, no. 1 (1995): p. 4-7; Jack McTague, "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel" in Marco Rimanelli, ed., *Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-Party-Dominant Countries* (New York: Palgrave/St. Martin's Press/Macmillan, 1999), Chp. V.

the only vote cast in the *Knesset* was for a party as a whole (not for individual candidates). Since only Labor and Likud both fielded rival candidates for Prime Minister (other parties' candidates later always dropped-out before election day), voters from smaller parties found out they could cast one vote for their choice for the top government job and another for the party they really believed in. In the end, the two largest parties lost a total of 31 seats from 1992 to 1999, and between them controlled less than half the *Knesset*, a hitherto unknown political trend which has continued down to the present.<sup>2</sup>

Another trend which is a continuation of the 1977-1992 political period is the extremely competitive nature of elections held over the past two decades. Until the Likud retained power in 2013, no party had managed to win re-election since Yitzhak Rabin's Labor ousted Yitzhak Shamir in 1992. The rival blocs of the Right and the Left remained amazingly close during this period, with Centrist parties generally leaning to the Left to maintain the delicate balance. A brief look at elections during this time-span will demonstrate this fact.

The period after Rabin's 1992 assumption of power was a traumatic one for Israelis. First, the government stunned the entire world by signing the 1993 Oslo Accords for reconciliation and land-share with the ex-terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), signified by the famous handshake between Rabin and PLO leader Yassir Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993. Then two years later in 1995, in an unprecedented shocking action, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a Right-wing student intent on thwarting the Oslo Peace Process. Shimon Peres, Rabin's long-time comrade/rival, was chosen to replace him amidst a huge ground-swell of sympathy, and he decided to advance the elections to 1996, just six months after the murder. But soon after this announcement, *Hamas*, the radical Palestinian movement born out of the First *Intifada* and totally opposed to Oslo, began carrying out a series of terrorist suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in crowded busses, restaurants and night-clubs, which created such a political backlash that it wiped out the huge advantage Labor had held. With the Israeli public now deeply divided over the value of peace, the Prime Minister's direct election law came into effect with newcomer Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu edging Peres by less than 1%, while Labor still out-pollled Likud in the *Knesset* 34-32. Under the old system Labor would have formed the government (assuming their parliamentary lead held firm), but now Likud was back in power.<sup>3</sup>

However, another change took place three years later. Netanyahu's first government was undermined by his inept leadership that alienated opponents and supporters alike, including most of his Cabinet. Under pressure from the U.S. to make progress on negotiations with the Palestinians, despite his and the Likud's reluctance to support Oslo, he was trapped in a no-win situation which caused his coalition to disintegrate and early-elections for May 1999. With many in his own party deserting him and challenged by Labor's Chairman Ehud Barak, the nation's most decorated soldier who could not be attacked as weak on terrorism (undercover commando against the PLO, IDF Chief of Staff, Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs). Thus, Netanyahu was crushed by a 56%-44% margin and resigned from the *Knesset*. Labor (running as "One Israel" Party) lost eight *Knesset* seats, down to 26, but Barak's decisive victory made it easy for him to form a governmental coalition, while he held the combined posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Little did anyone know it would be so short-lived.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Don Peretz, Rebecca Kook & Gideon Doron, "Knesset Elections 2003: Why Likud Regained Dominance and Labor Continued to Fade Out" in *Middle-East Journal*, v. 57, n. 4 (2003): p. 588-604; J. McTague, "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel", *ibid*, Chp.V.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel Elazar & Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Israel at the Polls 1996* (London: Frank Cass, 1998) ; J. McTague, "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel", *ibid*, Chp.V; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Yitzhak Rabin" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yitzhak\\_Rabin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yitzhak_Rabin); "Shimon Perez" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon\\_Perez](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon_Perez)

<sup>4</sup> Asher Arian & Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 1999* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2002); as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Benjamin Netanyahu" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu)

In May 2000, barely a year after taking office, Ehud Barak withdrew Israeli forces from their Southern Lebanon occupation strip after a 22-years stay, but soon after *Hezbollah's* raids undermined the political gains of this move with the Israeli electorate. At the same time, Barak had resumed peace negotiations with the Palestinians and by Summer 2000 went to Camp David to meet Arafat at the urging of Democrat U.S. President Bill Clinton, who rolled the dice in an effort to get the 1993 Oslo Accords back on-track in the same historical site of the earlier U.S.-brokered peace accord between Egypt and Israel by his predecessor President Jimmy Carter. But this politico-diplomatic gamble back-fired as the two sides could not agree on the status of Jerusalem and any “right of return” for Palestinian refugees: while Arafat received the lion’s share of the blame for rejecting an apparently advantageous U.S.-mediated “Camp David II” peace proposal (because it did not give him 100% of the Occupied Territories with East Jerusalem), Barak saw his government coalition disintegrate as the ultra-religious *Shas* (*Shomrei Sfarad* or “Sfarad's guards of the Torah”) with its 17 seats and two other smaller parties quit over his diplomatic agreement to hand-over to the PLO over 90% of the West Bank (but without East Jerusalem and the largest Jewish settlements) in exchange for a permanent peace treaty.<sup>5</sup>

Two months later the situation deteriorated drastically when a Second (*al-Aqsa*) *Intifada* broke-out with support of all Palestinian forces. Barak’s visible inability to control the violence caused his popularity to plummet and with his majority in the *Knesset* gone, he shrewdly called, not for a general election, but one only for the Prime Minister’s post as permitted in the direct election law. This undermined Netanyahu’s impending electoral challenge, as he had resigned from the *Knesset* after his 1999 defeat and only sitting *Knesset* members could run for Prime Minister, leaving controversial war-hero Ariel “Arik” Sharon as Likud’s leader and main challenger against Barak in the February 2001 election. Barak assumed he could defeat Sharon, but with his security credibility shattered by the Second *Intifada*, Sharon crushed him instead 62%-to-35% (Barak then resigned as Labor Chairman and left the *Knesset*) and formed a “National Unity” grand coalition government with Labor’s new leader Shimon Peres (as Foreign Minister) and others until the next *Knesset* elections. This was the death-knell for the system of direct elections and the *Knesset* voted to return to the old electoral format used before 1996.<sup>6</sup>

Sharon too was initially unable to stop the growing violence of the Second *Intifada*, in which all Palestinian groups (*Hamas* and PLO) resorted to suicide-bombers in an effort to bring the conflict into Israel’s cities, but his energetic response—re-invading Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank and building a security Fence/Wall to isolate Palestinian areas—reinforced his image as the strong leader that Israelis were seeking in that period of turmoil. Consequently, when new elections were called for January 2003, he and Likud were in an excellent position to win a resounding victory, capturing 38 seats, the most for any party since 1992, and more than any other party has managed to gain ever since. They even doubled Labor’s total of 19, the largest margin since the 1960s when Likud had not even been created. The abolition of the direct election law did reverse the decline of the two major parties, as they combined for a total of 57 seats, an improvement of 12 seats over 1999.<sup>7</sup> But this proved to be a temporary high-water mark, as no two parties in the following three elections have managed to win that many seats. Consequently, for the past five elections the top two parties have been unable to win even

<sup>5</sup> Ian Bickerton & Carla Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 2010); as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Shas” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shas>

<sup>6</sup> Asher Arian & Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 2003* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2005); as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Ehud Barak” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Barak](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Barak); “Shimon Perez” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon\\_Peris](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon_Peris)

<sup>7</sup> A. Arian & M. Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 2003*, *ibid*; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Ariel Sharon” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel\\_Sharon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel_Sharon)

half the *Knesset* seats, a trend that does not bode well for those who wish to see Israel with a strong government capable of making tough political and security decisions.

The stage seemed to be set for a long period of Likud dominance, but such was not to be. Already since September 2001 Sharon had for the first time agreed that Palestinians should have the right to establish their own state in the future and by May 2003 after pacifying the West Bank he endorsed the U.S.-E.U.-Russia Roadmap for Peace. Then in 2005 Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, which had few Israeli settlers (9,450 in 21 settlements) and was a hotbed of terrorism by Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement, a rival of the Palestinian Authority). This controversial unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, while controlling all its land, coastal and air-space accesses, was welcomed initially by Palestinians, Israel's Left and 80% of the electorate, but was bitterly opposed by large segments of his own Likud party and Right-wing Israelis with consequent government crisis. Sharon pushed ahead with the unilateral withdrawal anyway in August 2005, successfully evacuating and bulldozing 21 settlements in Gaza and 3 more in the West Bank, followed by the Israeli troops' pull-out of Gaza by September. But this step was opposed inside Likud with a vote against the withdrawal and against his leadership: on 27 September 2005, he narrowly defeated 52%–48% a leadership challenge by his rival Netanyahu who had left the cabinet to protest Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza, but by November Sharon announced that he was resigning as leader of Likud and dissolved the *Knesset*, while forming the new Centrist party *Kadima* ("Forward"). Then, less than two months later he suffered a devastating stroke leaving him in a 8-years-long coma (until his death in January 2014), which also left his brand new party leaderless.<sup>8</sup>

However, an impressive number of both Likud and Labor politicians had already joined Sharon in his new party, and his own Deputy Ehud Olmert (popular ex-Mayor of Jerusalem) deftly stepped into the void to keep *Kadima* afloat. With both major parties in disarray (not only had Sharon and Olmert left Likud with others, but Peres had also deserted Labor after losing the leadership to Amir Peretz and joined the new *Kadima* party as Vice-Prime Minister, then in 2007-2014 as the longest-serving politician was elected Israel's President), much of the Israeli public was now aligned to the political Center, allowing *Kadima* to become the first party beyond Labor or Likud to win a national election. And it was a decisive win—29 seats, with Labor in second place at 19 seats. Likud under Netanyahu again as leader had its worst showing since the early-1960s (when it was called *Herut*) with only 12 seats, tied with the Sephardi ultra-religious party *Shas*. Once again the incumbent ruling party had been defeated, albeit in the most unusual circumstances of seeing most of its leaders desert it, while *Kadima's* ascent and cross-ideological Centrist appeared to be a possible game-changer.<sup>9</sup>

But Olmert quickly squandered much of his popularity. Only a couple months after the election, *Hezbollah* captured two Israeli soldiers and killed 7 more along the Lebanese border, forcing the Prime Minister to respond with an attack and limited invasion that lasted a month, but brought inconclusive results against *Hezbollah*: while Lebanese suffered far more casualties in this 2006 Second Lebanon War (1,190/1,300 Lebanese dead, one million Lebanese displaced and shattered Lebanese civil infrastructures), Israeli losses were high as well (165 dead), especially among civilians who were subjected to rocket fire in Northern Israel as far south as Haifa (300/500,000 Israelis displaced) from the surprisingly well-entrenched *Hezbollah* that remained strong with unprecedented aid from Islamic Iran. Premier Olmert, Defense

<sup>8</sup> As further quick on-line references on Israeli politics see: "Ariel Sharon" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel\\_Sharon](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariel_Sharon); "Kadima" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>

<sup>9</sup> Asher Arian & Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 2006* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2008); as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Kadima" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>; "Ehud Olmert" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Olmert](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert); "Shimon Perez" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon\\_Perez](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shimon_Perez)



Minister Peretz and their generals were all severely criticized and politically weakened by a war widely regarded as a failure by the Israeli public. A year later, Hamas expelled the Palestinian Authority from Gaza, and rocket attacks from there into Southern Israel became more frequent.<sup>10</sup>

The sense that *Kadima* was not adequately protecting Israel's security kept weakening politically Olmert, despite the replacement of Peretz as Defense Minister with his rival Barak (who had ousted him also as new Labor Chairman), who later launched in December 2008-January 2009 "Operation Cast Lead" in an unsuccessful short Gaza War to stop *Hamas'* rockets and arms-smuggling, leaving 1,166/1,417 Palestinian and 13 Israeli dead. These security woes, in turn, led to a revival of popularity for Likud and its leader Netanyahu. The final blow to Olmert came in Autumn 2008 when he was accused of illegally taking money from a donor, and he announced that he would resign upon the formation of a new government. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni was elected *Kadima's* new leader, but she could not put together a government coalition, so new elections were called for February 2009.<sup>11</sup>

Most pre-election polls showed Likud finishing first, but Livni campaigned energetically and managed to surprise the pundits on election day by edging Likud 28-27 in seats. This was an impressive accomplishment, but parties from the Right had out-pollled those of the Center-Left, making it easier for Netanyahu to build a government coalition. Meanwhile, Labor, once again led by Barak since 2007, had its worst performance ever, dropping to fourth place with just 13 seats. Netanyahu was asked to form a coalition government, and while *Kadima* refused to join, Barak managed to get a divided Labor Party to accept, making the government coalition look less Right-wing than it could have been (while Netanyahu reconfirmed Barak with his coveted joint-post of Deputy-Prime Minister and Defense Minister). It was the first time Labor had finished out of the top two, after Likud had done the same in 2006. And for the sixth straight election, the party in power failed to repeat its victory (although *Kadima* did win most seats). Then as Netanyahu's coalition weakened and Labor squabbled about leaving, by January 2011 Barak and other Labor legislators formed the break-away party *Atzmaut* ("Independence") allowing a reshuffled Netanyahu coalition to keep a smaller majority in the *Knesset*, while Barak retained his Defense Minister post.<sup>12</sup> And this brings us to the most recent political poll taken in January 2013.

### Israel's January 2013 Election: an Analysis

The most striking result of Israel's 22 January 2013 national election is the fact that most of the pre-election forecasts proved to be dramatically wrong. The forecasts were as follows:

1. the electorate was apathetic and voter turnout would be low;
2. parties of the Center and Left would perform very poorly, losing seats from the last 2009 election;
3. comparing the two new faces of the campaign—Naftali Bennett of the "Jewish Home" (*HaBayit HaYehudi*) Party and Yair Lapid of "There is a Future" (*Yesh Atid*) Party—Bennett would have the bigger impact by winning more seats;

<sup>10</sup> I. Bickerton & C. Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Chp.14; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "2006 Lebanon War" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Lebanon\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War); "Ehud Olmert" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Olmert](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert)

<sup>11</sup> I. Bickerton & C. Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Chp.14; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Ehud Olmert" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Olmert](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Olmert); "Ehud Barak" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Barak](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Barak); "Gaza War" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Cast\\_Lead](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cast_Lead); "Kadima" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>; "Tzipi Livni" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi\\_Livni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi_Livni)

<sup>12</sup> Asher Arian & Michal Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel 2009* (New York: Transaction, 2011); as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Kadima" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>; "Benjamin Netanyahu" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu); "Ehud Barak" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud\\_Barak](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ehud_Barak)



4. the brief November 2012 Second Gaza War against *Hamas* (“Operation Pillar of Defense” with 5 Israeli and 158/177 Palestinians dead) ensured that national security issues would favor Netanyahu and keep trumping socio-economic ones, as the norm in past elections.<sup>13</sup>

None of these predictions came true.

1. Voter turn-out was surprisingly robust and reached 66.6%, the highest turn-out since the 1999 election, when Barak did beat Netanyahu in a landslide.
2. The Center-Left, although made-up of extremely diverse parties ranging from Arab parties to Lapid’s new party which supports retaining all of Jerusalem under Israeli rule, nearly drew even with the Right, taking 59 seats (out of 120), an increase of four from the previous election.
3. Although Bennett’s “Jewish Home” did garner 12 seats, Lapid was the surprise of the campaign, leading his party to 19 seats, second only to Netanyahu’s new Right-wing Likud-*Beyteinu* joint-party, which while finishing first, disappointingly tallied only 31 seats.
4. The success of Lapid’s Party and Labor (15 seats), both of whom campaigned primarily on socio-economic issues, demonstrated that national security was not as dominant a theme as in the past (a point not lost also on ex-Labor leader Barak unable to sustain his break-away party and who since November 2012 had announced his retirement from politics after the 2013 elections).
5. Another prediction also fell by the wayside, that the election would bring no new talks with the Palestinians. Despite a poor performance by Tzipi Livni’s new party (a breaking-away from *Kadima*) who campaigned for just such negotiations, but won only six seats, it was U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s persistence that got a new round of talks started over the reluctance of both sides.

The electoral campaign began in October 2012, when Prime Minister Netanyahu called for new elections after nearly four years in office. He then pulled-off a first surprise by announcing that his Likud Party was merging with his coalition partner *Yisrael Beyteinu* (“Israel Our Home”) Party and its leader Avigdor Lieberman as new Foreign Minister. Considering that the two parties had combined to win 42 seats in 2009, this maneuver seemed to ensure that their new joint-party (Likud-*Beyteinu*) would finish first, giving Netanyahu the first opportunity to form a government. This step was intended to avoid a repeat of 2009, when Livni’s *Kadima* barely bested Likud in seats 28-27.<sup>14</sup>

This maneuver should have prompted the parties of the Center-Left to attempt to merge as well, but on the contrary, they splintered even further. There were already two major Center-Left parties: *Kadima*, which had finished first both in 2006 and 2009, and Labor the historic party that founded the state of Israel in 1948 and ran the government for the first 29 years of its existence. Then in January 2012, Lapid announced that he would form a new Centrist party, rather than join an existing one, further muddying the waters. Livni, who had been ousted as *Kadima* leader by Shaul Mofaz in a primary in Summer 2012, complicated the problem even further when she formed her own break-away party in November 2012, leaving now four major parties to compete for the Center-Left vote.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *International Jerusalem Post* (30 November-6 December 2012): p. 14-15; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Yair Lapid” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair\\_Lapid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair_Lapid); “Yesh Atid” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yesh\\_Atid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yesh_Atid); “Gaza-Israel Conflict” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93Israel\\_conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93Israel_conflict)

<sup>14</sup> *International Jerusalem Post* (2-8 November 2012): p. 12; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Yisrael Beiteinu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael\\_Beiteinu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael_Beiteinu); “Naftali Bennett” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali\\_Bennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali_Bennett); “The Jewish Home” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Jewish\\_Home](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jewish_Home); “Yair Lapid” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair\\_Lapid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair_Lapid); “Yesh Atid” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yesh\\_Atid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yesh_Atid); “Kadima” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>; “Tzipi Livni” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi\\_Livni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi_Livni)

<sup>15</sup> *New York Times* (28 November 2012): p. A8; *International Jerusalem Post* (30 November-6 December 2012): p. 8; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Ehud Barak” in *Jewish Virtual Library* (2013), see: <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/barak.html>; “Kadima” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>; “Tzipi Livni” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi\\_Livni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi_Livni)

These Center-Left parties hoped to capitalize on the discontent of the Israeli middle-class, which had first surfaced in Summer 2011, when massive protests broke-out over the rising cost of living, particularly housing and food. Added to that was a growing resentment by secular Israelis over the military exemptions and generous welfare benefits for the *Haredi* (ultra-religious Jews politically backed by *Shas* and “United Torah Judaism”, who spend their lives studying the Torah instead of working or doing any military duty). The plan of the Left was to shift focus of the campaign away from national security, which had usually dominated in the past, to socio-economic ones, where Likud-*Beyteinu* was not strong.<sup>16</sup>

But in November 2012, Netanyahu’s dramatic speech at the United Nations in New York, in which he forcefully re-emphasized Israel’s Right to defend itself against Islamic Iran, and another brief 2012 conflict with *Hamas* in Gaza, both seemingly brought national security issues to the fore once again, causing most pundits to predict that the chances of the center-left had been dealt a fatal blow. This gloomy forecast was reinforced the next month when the Center-Left parties missed the deadline for presenting a joint-slate of candidates, almost guaranteeing that Netanyahu would remain as Prime Minister.<sup>17</sup>

But then the fortunes of the Right suffered a wound in December 2012 when Foreign Minister Lieberman, founder of *Yisrael Beyteinu* and number two candidate on the joint Likud-*Beyteinu* slate, was indicted for fraud and forced to step down from his Cabinet post, though not from his slot on the party list. Given that he was the dominant figure in his old party, this was a significant blow to their chances, and the polling numbers for the now-merged Likud-*Beyteinu* began to slip.<sup>18</sup> That same month the polls showed a dramatic surge in support for “Jewish Home”, a Right-wing party which had won just three seats in 2009 but gained traction under a dynamic new leader, Naftali Bennett. An ex-member of an élite Israeli military (IDF) unit who had later made a fortune in the high-tech sector, while still in his early-40s, Bennett caused an uproar when he announced that if in uniform, he would refuse an order to evacuate Jewish settlements in the West Bank. While he later retracted that remark, he became a darling of the Israeli Right and was clearly taking votes away from Netanyahu.<sup>19</sup>

The Prime Minister seemingly chose to “sit on his lead” and tried to emphasize that he was the strong leader that Israel needed, yet offered no dramatic new ideas on socio-economic problems or foreign affairs. The Center-Left parties raised the issue that he had leaned too much towards U.S. Republican challenger Mitt Romney and by “backing the wrong horse” had damaged Israel’s relations with the re-elected Democratic Barack Obama Administration. Comments from the President as reported by columnist Jeffrey Goldberg, such as “Israel doesn’t know what its own best interests are” and “Netanyahu is moving his country down a path toward near-isolation” were viewed in the Likud as payback for the Prime Minister’s interference in the U.S. election.<sup>20</sup>

Yet polls right up to the final week showed that, while Likud-*Beyteinu* was steadily losing ground, it was the parties on the far-Right that were benefitting from the slippage and that the Center-Left would also lose seats from its 2009 tally. Therefore, when exit-poll results began to appear, followed a day later by the official results, there was nation-wide shock such as had not been seen since Netanyahu’s upset victory over Shimon Peres in 1996: Likud-*Beyteinu* did finish first, but their 31 seats

<sup>16</sup> Herb Keinon, “Op-ed” in *International Jerusalem Post* (30 November-6 December 2012): p. 14-15; “Shas” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shas>; “United Torah Judaism” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Torah\\_Judaism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Torah_Judaism)

<sup>17</sup> *International Jerusalem Post* (14-20 December 2012): p. 7; “Benjamin Netanyahu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu); “Gaza-Israel Conflict” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93Israel\\_conflict](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza%E2%80%93Israel_conflict)

<sup>18</sup> *New York Times* (15 December 2012): p. A4; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Yisrael Beiteinu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael\\_Beiteinu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael_Beiteinu).

<sup>19</sup> *New York Times* (27 December 2012): p. A12; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Naftali Bennett” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali\\_Bennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali_Bennett)

<sup>20</sup> *International Jerusalem Post* (18-24 January 2013): p. 10; “Benjamin Netanyahu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu)

total was 11 fewer than they had won in 2009 and a major set-back, more of a pyrrhic victory. The big winner was Yair Lapid and “There is a Future”, which captured 19 seats for second place as a Center-Left party. Then came Labor with 15 seats, Bennett’s “Jewish Home” Party with 12, *Shas* with 11, three Arab parties totaling 11, the ultra-religious 2004 joint-party “United Torah Judaism” (*Yahadut HaTorah HaMeukhedet*) with 7, Tzipi Livni’s Party and the 1992 joint-Leftist *Meretz* (“Energy”) at 6 apiece, and *Kadima* just making the bare minimum of 2% of votes with two seats. The parties of the Right (including the ultra-religious ones) took in 61 seats and the Center-Left 59 seats.<sup>21</sup>

In looking at winners and losers, it is ironic that while Likud-*Beyteinu* finished first and Netanyahu remains Prime Minister, they performed poorly, losing 11 seats from the last election. Likud itself won only 20 seats, barely ahead of Lapid’s party, while *Yisrael Beyteinu* took the other 11. The merger now appears to have been a major mistake on “Bibi’s” part, since Lieberman’s indictment (which should have been anticipated) severely weakened *Yisrael Beyteinu*’s value as a partner. Netanyahu received withering criticism from within the party for that decision and for the lackadaisical electoral campaign he ran.

Livni also has to be perceived as a loser, for the six seats she won were far fewer than she had hoped for, as her program of re-opening talks with the Palestinians fell on deaf ears. But an even bigger loser was her former-party, *Kadima*, which won the 2006 and 2009 elections, yet could muster only two seats (the constitutional bare minimum to survive as a party in the *Knesset*) after ousting Livni as leader and looking foolish by then joining Netanyahu’s coalition for just two months in 2012. It will join a long list of Centrist parties that had their “15 minutes of fame” before disappearing.<sup>22</sup>

Obviously, the biggest winner was Yair Lapid and his “There is a Future” Party, winning 19 seats in their first electoral campaign. Lapid’s success showed that domestic issues, specifically the frustration of the middle-class with their diminishing standard of living, are a top priority at the moment and will have to be dealt with in a serious way. Lapid, who had never served in the *Knesset* before, was given the prestigious post of Finance Minister, which seems appropriate given his emphasis on economic issues during the campaign.<sup>23</sup> He had expressed an interest in the Foreign Ministry, but that job was held in reserve for Liebermann, who was finally found not guilty of all charges in November 2013.<sup>24</sup>

Although he did not win as many seats as predicted, Naftali Bennett and his “Jewish Home” party still won nine more seats than they did under different leadership in 2009. His party also joined the government coalition and he became Economy Minister. “United Torah Judaism” and *Meretz* won three more seats than they did last time, and Labor two more seats as well, making all three of them minor political successes (Labor is now left as the main Opposition, alongside the ultra-religious *Shas* against Netanyahu’s Center-Right 2013 coalition government).<sup>25</sup>

One of the ironies of the election is the paradox that the certainty of Netanyahu’s victory might have hurt him at the polls. For the first time since 1973, there was no close competition between Right and Left to see who would form the government. Starting in 1977, when Menachem Begin’s Likud historical upset of the Labor Party’s traditional monopoly on Israeli governments, there has always been suspense about the winner. But this time, with the Center-Left failing to unite behind a single candidate,

<sup>21</sup> See: Jpost.com (24 January 2013); *International Jerusalem Post* (25-31 January 2013): p. 10-11; “United Torah Judaism” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Torah\\_Judaism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Torah_Judaism); “Meretz” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meretz>

<sup>22</sup> See: Jpost.com (24 January 2013); *International Jerusalem Post* (25-31 January 2013): p. 10-11; as further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: “Benjamin Netanyahu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu); “Yisrael Beiteinu” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael\\_Beiteinu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael_Beiteinu); “Tzipi Livni” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi\\_Livni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi_Livni)

<sup>23</sup> Karl Vick, “Man in the Middle” in *Time* (11 February 2013): p.38-41; “Yair Lapid” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair\\_Lapid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair_Lapid)

<sup>24</sup> *International Jerusalem Post* (8-14 November 2013): p. 6; “Kadima” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kadima>

<sup>25</sup> “Naftali Bennett” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali\\_Bennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naftali_Bennett); “Shas” in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shas>

Netanyahu was assured of finishing first, especially after the agreement with *Yisrael Beyteinu*. But this apparently caused many Center-Right voters to switch to Lapid's party, allowing them to register their discontent over socio-economic issues without worrying that Netanyahu would lose. This is probably the main reason for Likud-*Beyteinu's* disappointing performance at just 31 seats.

Netanyahu did manage to put together a government on 15 March 2013, just a few days before Barack Obama arrived for his historic first visit to Israel as President. As expected, in addition to his party's 31 seats, he added Lapid's "There is a Future" 19 seats and Bennett's "Jewish Home" 12 seats, plus Livni's six seats (making her Minister of Justice). Under pressure from both Lapid and Bennett, Netanyahu this time did not include in his coalition government *Shas* (who had always been in most coalitions since 1984) or other ultra-religious parties, a rarity in Israeli politics, but he still has a comfortable majority of 68 seats.<sup>26</sup>

If we look at these recent elections, one obvious trend is that Likud and Labor are no longer the undisputed "big two" parties in Israeli politics. In three straight elections (2006, 2009, 2013) one of them fell to third or fourth place (Likud in 2006, Labor in the last two), something which had never happened before. Will this trend continue? The parties that beat them, *Kadima* and Lapid's Party, were both from the Center of the political spectrum, but Centrist parties historically have a short shelf-life in Israeli politics. *Kadima* is already on life-support despite having secured unprecedented victories in 2006 and 2009. No other Centrist party has equaled that achievement. Lapid has boldly claimed that he wants to be Prime Minister in the near future, but he has only to look at the example of his own prematurely-deceased father, fiery TV journalist Tommy Lapid, who led in 1999-2006 the Centrist *Shinui* ("Change") Party to an impressive 15 seats in 2003, only to get shut-out just three years later by infightings. Yair Lapid will have to show some results in the difficult job of Finance Minister, as will the other ministers from his party, if he hopes to have continued electoral success.<sup>27</sup>

The continued fragmenting of Israel's party system was accelerated by the direct election law and only mildly reversed by its repeal. In 1999, the second time the law was in force, Labor and Likud combined to win just 45 seats, the first time they had ever fallen below half. Repeal of the law brought slight improvement in 2003 to 57, but in the last three election the two largest parties (including *Kadima* in 2006 and 2009, and Lapid's Party in 2013) totaled 48, 55 and 50 seats respectively. This means that smaller parties, whether religious, nationalist or ethnic, will continue to have outsized influence on politics, because no governmental coalition can be formed without them. And while that was always true in Israeli politics, the weakness of the large parties makes the smaller ones even more influential than in the past.

Finally, the other major political change is that for the first time since the 1980s the incumbent ruling party has been able to remain in power. In 1992, Rabin (Labor) ousted Shamir (Likud). Then in 1996, Netanyahu (Likud) beat Peres (Labor), but three years later Barak (Labor) knocked-off Netanyahu. In 2001, in a special race for only the Prime Minister's post, Sharon (Likud) beat Barak, followed in 2003 by a regular election in which Likud out-pollled Labor. But in 2006, Sharon's new *Kadima* Party led by Olmert ousted Likud, only to see Netanyahu and Likud return to power just three years later. Thus, Netanyahu's recent re-election in 2013 is a true electoral first ever since Shamir's victory in 1988. But can this be the real harbinger of a new trend? In Israeli politics all, and nothing, are both possible...

<sup>26</sup> See: [online.wsj.com](http://online.wsj.com) (15 March 2013); J. McTague, "Political Polarization and Electoral Change in Israel", *ibid*; as further on-line references on Israeli politics see: "Benjamin Netanyahu" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin\\_Netanyahu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu); "Yisrael Beiteinu" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael\\_Beiteinu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yisrael_Beiteinu); "Tzipi Livni" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi\\_Livni](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzipi_Livni); "Shas" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shas>

<sup>27</sup> As further quick on-line references on Israeli politics consult also: "Tommy Lapid" in *Wikipedia* (2013): [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tommy\\_Lapid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tommy_Lapid); "Shinui" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinui>; "Yair Lapid" in *Wikipedia* (2013), see: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair\\_Lapid](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yair_Lapid)

## ISRAELI ELECTION RESULTS, 1996-2013

Seats won in each election:

	1996	1999	2003	2006	2009	2013
Labor	34	26	19	19	13	15
Likud	32	19	38	12	27	31
<i>Shas</i>	10	17	11	12	11	11
National Religious P.	9	5	6	#	--	--
<i>Meretz</i>	9	10	6	5	3	6
<i>Yisrael Ba'aliya</i>	7	6	2	%	--	--
United Torah Judaism	4	5	5	6	4	7
<i>Hadash</i>	5	3	3	3	4	4
United Arab List	4	5	2	4	5	4
Third Way	4	--	--	--	--	--
<i>Molodet</i>	2	--	--	--	--	--
<i>Shinui</i>	--	6	15	--	--	--
Center	--	6	--	--	--	--
National Union	--	4	7	9	4	--
<i>Yisrael Beyteinu</i>	--	4	*	11	15	*
<i>Balad</i>	--	2	3	3	3	3
Pensioners	--	--	--	7	--	--
<i>Am Ehad</i>	--	2	3	--	--	--
<i>Kadima</i>	--	--	--	29	28	2
Jewish Home	--	--	--	--	3	12
<i>Yesh Atid</i>	--	--	--	--	--	19
<i>Hatnua</i> (Livni)	--	--	--	--	--	6

\* Yisrael Beyteinu ran a joint list with National Union in 2003, then again with Likud in 2013

# National Religious Party merged first with National Union, then Jewish Home

% Yisrael Ba'aliya merged with Likud

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# SAUDI ARABIA vs. IRAN: TENSIONS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

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**ABSTRACT:** Recent Middle-Eastern political developments have resulted in an intensification of the rivalry in the Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran as these two regional Powers compete for influence. Several factors contribute to the increase in tension in the Gulf as a regional security complex, as the “Arab Spring” and a regional re-balancing of power have altered its political and security dynamics. This essay analyzes the Gulf’s regional security and Saudi Arabia’s bilateral tension with Iran, the “Arab Spring” and the influence of Qatar. Additionally, U.S. influence is examined due to its predominant security presence in the region. These factors play varying, but essential roles in the Gulf security system as conflict and balancing of power continue. Due to the reshaping of the regional strategic dynamics, Gulf regional security (“RSC”) can achieve relative stability—with balancing between Saudi Arabia and Iran—and a return of the U.S. to the role of off-shore balancer.

## Introduction

“While these tenuous conditions [from the Arab Spring] are of relatively recent emergence, several older problems—storms that have been brewing for some time, as it were—exist, and their outcomes appear equally difficult to determine. First among these, and intimately linked with the difficulties many Arab nations are now facing, is the case of the ambitions of Iran’s leaders. From our perspective, there are two overwhelming issues with them—their ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and their persistent meddling in the affairs of other nations”,<sup>1</sup> so spoke Saudi Arabia’s Prince Turki Al Faisal, ex-Director-General of the Saudi Intelligence Agency and ex-Saudi Ambassador to the United States (U.S.), in a keynote speech at the World Affairs Council in Washington D.C. in December 2011. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, asymmetric warfare, covert methods, influence in Iraq, the Arab Spring, the reassertion of Islam and regional influence of Qatar, all shape the complex, dynamic and multi-dimensional incongruity between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Rivalry and tension between the two states—although past periods of cooperation have occurred as well—is embedded in centuries of religious, political and ideological divisions, which more recently, are exacerbated by regional political, societal and military developments. Saudis and Iranians, cognizant of their rivalry, are engaged in constant complex strategic balancing, both bilaterally and regionally. While both of these regional players have extensive bilateral interactions, their larger place in the global system is determined to a significant degree by their roles within the Gulf regional security, which is undergoing profound changes, that impact regional rivalries and tensions. This essay looks at the general interactions and placement of both actors within the Gulf regional security.

## The Gulf Regional Security Complex

To understand the characteristics of Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s interactions and bilateral tension, as well as the Gulf’s overall regional strategic security dynamics, it is necessary to use a multi-dimensional conceptual framework that allows for both static and dynamic analysis of the region, while

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<sup>1</sup> Prince Turki al-Faisal, “A Tour d’ Horizon of the Saudi Political Seas” in *World Affairs Council* (15 December 2011), see: <http://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/ATourdHorizonoftheSaudiPoliticalSeas>.

providing the ability to locate change within the structure of international security relations.<sup>2</sup> The Gulf has been a volatile region in which relations of amity and enmity change rapidly. More recently, levels of insecurity have been extremely high in the region, due to Iran's nuclear ambitions, asymmetric warfare, covert methods and influence in Iraq, as well as the growing regional influence of Qatar. This volatile pattern is reinforced by the on-going transformation in many Gulf and nearby Levant states.

Since security threats travel more easily over short distances, proximity plays a crucial role for the security inter-dependence of regional states.<sup>3</sup> The Gulf regional security is comprised of a group of states inter-connected in their security inter-dependence in a way that, over time, establishes them as separate and different from other security regions.<sup>4</sup> Security transformations in one unit of the complex will affect other units and consequently, security inter-dependence will likely be more intense among states within the Gulf regional security complex ("RSC") than those outside it.<sup>5</sup> For the purposes of this analysis, an "RSC" is defined as "a set of units whose major processes of securization, de-securization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another."<sup>6</sup> "RSCs" have two types of relations, power and patterns of amity and enmity, in which regional states can be analyzed in terms of polarity.<sup>7</sup> Amity and enmity is not solely contributed to balance of power, as there are many issues that can affect the interactions (i.e. ideology, territory, ethnicity and historical precedent).<sup>8</sup> As a region once balanced by Iraq and Iran, with the U.S. as the off-shore balancer—a time in which the Gulf "RSC" experienced the most relative stability—it is possible that this "RSC" can be balanced by Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the U.S. returning to its former position.

Within this study, the Gulf "RSC" encompasses the original six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain—Morocco and Jordan have been excluded), as well as Iran and Iraq. While Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Yemen (as well as Morocco and Jordan) are external states not included in the Gulf "RSC", their security intentions are often focused and related to Gulf states and therefore, they are briefly discussed in some sections of analysis. Utilizing Regional Security Complex Theory ("RSC" Theory), this analysis seeks to determine to what extent the "Arab Spring" has contributed to the bilateral tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran; how Saudi Arabia's reasserted role in the GCC and wider Gulf region has contributed to conflict-resolution within the complex; how Qatar's rising regional influence now factors into the interactions of the two regional Powers; and finally due to the reshaping of these regional strategic dynamics, the return to a regional balancing of power, by Saudi Arabia, Iran and the U.S. (as off-shore balancer).

### **Saudi Arabia and Iran: the View from Riyadh**

Saudi Arabia's historical view of Iran has three broad dimensions: 1) Saudi-Iranian bilateral relations remain uncertain, due to sectarian differences; 2) more specifically, since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the ensuing Islamic Republic has held a different political and ideological view of regional order than the Arab monarchy; 3) ever since the Iranian Revolution, Riyadh has looked at Tehran as either a hostile or a competitive regional Power.

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<sup>2</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (London: Rienner, 1998), p.5.

<sup>3</sup> Barry Buzan & Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p.47-88.

<sup>5</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Hertfordshire: Harvester/Wheatsheaf Books, 1991), p. 194-195.

<sup>6</sup> Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998: p. 201.

<sup>7</sup> Buzan & Waever, 2003: p. 49.

<sup>8</sup> Buzan, 1991: p. 189-190.

Both states have held a certain degree of disdain, as well as diplomatic, cultural and strategic distance from each other with occasional accommodation and public displays of cooperation. Diplomatic relations began in 1928, followed by a period of ‘relationship building’ in the 1960s, during which King Faysal of Saudi Arabia and Shah Pahlavi of Iran officially visited the other state and ultimately took leadership positions for regional security—although in different ways—following the withdraw of Great Britain. During this time, Saudi Arabia and Iran were more suitable due to their conservative nature and anti-communist views.<sup>9</sup> These political gestures and mutual security concerns led to the development of an era of ‘friendship’ between the two states which survived the complex politics of the decade leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.<sup>10</sup>

Iran’s Islamic Revolution ended the ‘friendship’: Teheran shifted to an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini who openly criticized and challenged the religious Islamic identity and legitimacy of the Saudi Kingdom. This transformation dramatically changed the strategic environment, as competition shifted to religion—previously seen as an area of strategic partnership, despite their religious differences between Shi’a and Sunni denominations—in the quest for regional hegemony. The 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran increased tension as Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran, supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and was instrumental in forging an Arab alliance against Iran’s expansionism.<sup>11</sup>

Bilateral relations were later restored in 1991. Two important events led to an alignment between the two states in the 1990s: after the 1990-91 First Gulf War, Saddam’s Iraq still posed a greater threat to Saudi Arabia than Iran, while an internationally isolated Iran turned its focus to national interest instead of international religious proselytizing and terrorism.<sup>12</sup> However, by the early-2000s relations once again deteriorated when Islamic Iran shifted its foreign policy focus under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Sayeed Ali Khamenei.<sup>13</sup> Following the Second Gulf War in 2003 against Iraq, due to political and military collapse of Saddam’s régime and long instability within Iraq, the traditional Saudi security paradigm of playing Iraq and Iran against one another, was no longer an option.<sup>14</sup> Once again, recent developments in the region forced the Saudi security environment to be reshaped. Consequently, the current security environment is more threatening to the Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies. The historical tension and mixed relations are an important aspect in understanding the recent increase in bilateral tension between the Saudi Kingdom and Iran’s Islamic Republic.

### **New Security Dilemma: Reshaping Gulf Strategic Dynamics—Military Dimension**

Iran’s Islamic revolutionary and geo-political aspirations in the region—use of asymmetric warfare, alleged nuclear ambitions and conflict by proxy—are considered by the Saudi Kingdom as substantial threats to its security.<sup>15</sup> Over the past two decades, asymmetric and irregular warfare have played a critical role in Iran’s strategy, focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) improvement of its military and security policies.<sup>16</sup> Since most of Iran’s enemies base their military doctrine on more conventional methods of fighting, the use of asymmetric and irregular warfare has

<sup>9</sup> Henner Furtig, “Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal ‘Gamecocks’” in *Middle East Institute* (29 January 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: the Case of Saudi Arabia” in *Middle East Journal*, v. 60, n.3 (Summer 2006).

<sup>15</sup> Prince al-Faisal, A Tour d’Horizon Speech; and Ross Colvin, “‘Cut Off Head of Snake’ Saudis told U.S. on Iran” in *Reuters* (29 November 2010).

<sup>16</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, et al., “U.S./Gulf-Iranian Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions” in *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (14 November 2012): p.14, see: [http://csis.org/files/publication/120221\\_Iran\\_Gulf\\_MilBal\\_ConvAsym.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf).

proven to be useful.<sup>17</sup> Iran has also attempted to use its naval forces to have some strategic impact on supply routes within the region, in particular the Strait of Hormuz, which is vital to the global energy supply.<sup>18</sup> These methods are often projected against regional and global rivals (U.S.) to both deter and intimidate.<sup>19</sup> Iran has gone to considerable lengths to use asymmetric and irregular warfare methods in proxies to influence regional states and undermine the U.S. presence. The Islamic Republic has also provided extensive material support and training to Shi'a groups in Iraq post-2003. This also occurred in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia during the "Arab Spring" of 2011 and presently in Syria, although the most important impact there is the proxy conventional military intervention of Iranian-controlled Lebanese Hezbollah units assisting the Syrian army against anti-Assad insurgents.<sup>20</sup> Iran has used the Al-Quds force and support for extremist groups in many other areas—including the Levant—which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

This emphasis on asymmetric and irregular warfare methods must be examined in connection with Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions. Taken together, these strategies compensate for limitations on Iran's conventional forces and methods. While the Iranian government maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful, skepticism remains from global and regional actors, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").<sup>21</sup> As recent as September 2012, the IAEA adopted the implementation of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"), which expressed serious concern about Iran's nuclear advances and reaffirmed desire for a peaceful resolution.<sup>22</sup>

Iran's asymmetric warfare and nuclear ambitions have led both regional states and the U.S. to seek counter-measures to Iranian tactics. While any nuclear containment of Iran by Saudi Arabia and other regional actors remain unrealistic (except for Israel, which is shun by the Saudi and Gulf states), Saudi Arabia has already altered its strategy to counter-balance the assertion of Iranian regional power. Traditionally, the Saudi Kingdom has aligned itself in the position of a nuclear-free Middle-East—which includes both Iran and Israel.<sup>23</sup> However, a nuclear armed Islamic Iran will likely spur the Saudis to seek a national nuclear capability as well.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> W. Jonathan Rue, "Iran's Navy Threatens the Security of the Persian Gulf: Tehran's New Plan to Dominate its Region—and Beyond" in *Foreign Affairs* (24 October 2011); "Iranian Navy Ships Arrive in Saudi Port" in *Fars News Agency* (4 February 2012); "Saudi Allows Iranian Ships to Dock at Jeddah Port" in *Reuters* (26 February 2012).

<sup>19</sup> "IRGC Forces Exercise Asymmetric Tactics on Second Day of Drills" in *Fars News Agency* (8 January 2012); and "Commander Stresses Iran's High Capability in Asymmetric Warfare" in *Fars News Agency* (28 August 2011); see also note 15 here above.

<sup>20</sup> Cordesman, 2012: p. 14-15.

<sup>21</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman & Khalid R. al-Rodhan, "Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Uncertain Nature of Iran's Nuclear Programs" in *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (12 April 2006): p. 4-6 see: [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/060412\\_iran\\_uncertainty.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/060412_iran_uncertainty.pdf); Casey Addis, et al., "Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy" in *Congressional Research Service* (13 January 2010), see: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40849.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> "U.N. Agency Rebukes Iran for Failing to Cooperate" in *Reuters* (13 September 2012); "Resolution", *IAEA Board of Governors* (12 September 2012), see: <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-50.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> Most recently, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly session in New York, Saudi Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Multilateral Relations, Prince Turki bin-Mohammed bin-Saud Al-Kabeer, stated, "that only the elimination of nuclear weapons will guarantee against their use" quoted from News Release, *Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington, D.C.* (29 September 2012), see: [http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest\\_news/news09291203.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news09291203.aspx). Saudi Prince Saud al-Faysal at a January 2006 terrorism conference in London, stated, "[w]e are urging Iran to accept the position that we have taken to make the Gulf and the entire Middle-East nuclear free and free of weapons of mass destruction" quoted from Richard Beeston, "Saudis Warn Iran that its Nuclear Plan Risks Disaster" in *The Times* (16 January 2006); see also: Press Release, *Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington, D.C.* (18 September 2003), at: <http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2003/press/page21.aspx>; Press Release, *Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington, D.C.* (17 June 2009), see: <http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2003/press/page21.aspx>; John Glaser, "Saudi Official Calls for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Mid-East" in *Antiwar* (25 January 2012); Abdul Wahab Bashir, "Arab States Call for Nuclear-Free M-E" in *Arab News* (28 May 2004). During the Abu Dhabi Arab Summit of December 2005, Gulf Arab leaders considered a plan to declare the Gulf region a Nuclear-Free Zone. While this was an attempt to persuade Iran to join the initiative and reduce tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear program, it was criticized by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, who felt that it should also include Israel.

In 2011, at the “Gulf on the Globe” conference in Riyadh, Prince al-Faisal stressed that the Saudi Kingdom, “must, as a duty to our country and people, look into all options we are given, including obtaining these [nuclear] weapons ourselves.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia and GCC states have stepped-up efforts to build their own nuclear power for ‘peaceful use’.<sup>25</sup> According to the Saudi civil nuclear agency coordinator, nuclear plans include 16 civilian nuclear reactors over the next two decades at a cost of \$80 billion, with the help of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S.-Saudi Arabia Business Council (“USSABC”) and private contractors.<sup>26</sup> Last year, the Saudi Kingdom strengthened its public warnings with regard to its intent to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did.<sup>27</sup> Many believe that Saudi Arabia has already struck a deal with Pakistan in which in return for heavy investments in the Pakistani nuclear program, they will have access to nuclear weapons when needed. Yet, Iranian sources continue to downplay any Saudi Arabia threat perception.<sup>28</sup>

More recently, after Iran’s new moderate President Hassan Rouhani replaced former President Ahmadinejad, the U.S. (along with the five other major Contact Group Powers of Russia, China, France, Great Britain and Germany) and Iran reached a nuclear agreement in November 2013 to take effect by January 2014.<sup>29</sup> This temporary agreement is intended to pave the way to a solution over the nuclear stand-off between Iran and the West, however, the terms of a final settlement agreement remain still to be negotiated. Diplomats on both sides warn that the long-term agreement will be difficult to negotiate, due to long-standing mistrust between Iran and the West. If the Islamic Republic lives up to its end of the initial agreement, the U.S. and other nations will begin to ease their economic sanctions on Iran. Whether or not Iran will live up to the expectations of this agreement remains to be seen, and for the time being Iran’s nuclear enrichment program continues to be a vital concern for Saudi Arabia and other states in the region.

Renown Realist theorist Kenneth Waltz argued that if Iran went nuclear, the result would be that Israel and Iran would deter each other and that no other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear weapons, finally leading to “a Middle-East that is more stable than it is today.”<sup>30</sup> Interestingly, however, Saudi regional threat perceptions and containment strategies indicate national willingness to disprove Waltz’ nuclear deterrence assumptions in favor of obtaining national Saudi nuclear arms to counter-balance a nuclear Iran. Since the 1980s, Saudi policies and media reports have indicated that the Saudi Kingdom has shown growing interest in nuclear weapons capabilities.<sup>31</sup> Neither Israeli nor Iranian rival nuclear capabilities and potential regional deterrence seem sufficient to provide the Saudi Kingdom with a nuclear national security it lacks, especially in light of less reliable U.S. nuclear security

<sup>24</sup> “Saudi Arabia May Need Nuclear Weapons to Fend-Off Threat from Iran and Israel, Says Former-Intelligence Chief” in *Daily Mail* (6 December 2011); “Prince Turki al-Faisal Calls for Stronger Gulf Block” in *Al Arabiya News* (6 December 2011).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.; “GCC Work Team on Peaceful Nuclear Energy Use Meets” in *Oman Daily Observer* (20 May 2009); James Kanter, “France Set to Announce UAE Nuclear Deal” in *International Herald Tribune* (14 January 2008); Jay Solomon, et al., “Oil-Rich Arab State Pushes Nuclear Bid with U.S. Help,” *The Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 2, 2009; “Kuwait Eyes Civilian Nuclear Power Project with French Help” in *The Peninsula* (Doha, 19 February 2009); “Russia, Jordan Sign Nuclear Cooperation Agreement” in *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv, 23 May 2009); “Russia-Egypt Nuclear Deal Signed” in *BBC News* (25 March 2008).

<sup>26</sup> M.D. Rasooldeen, “U.S. Energy Mission in Riyadh for Key Talks” in *Arab News* (11 November 2012).

<sup>27</sup> “Saudi Nuclear Weapons ‘On Order’ from Pakistan” in *BBC* (6 November 2013).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Parisa Hafezi & Justyna Pawlak, “Iran Nuclear Deal to Take Effect on January 20” in *Reuters* (12 January 2014).

<sup>30</sup> Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability” in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2012).

<sup>31</sup> In 1994 Muhammad al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the U.N., sought political asylum in the U.S. and alleged that the Saudis aided Iraq with its nuclear program. Additionally, the Saudi government has close ties to Pakistan, both with largely Sunni populations and in 1999 it was reported that Prince Sultan ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz visited an uranium enrichment plant there. See Bahgat, 2006: p. 423-424; Michael A. Levi, “Would the Saudis Go Nuclear?” in *Brookings Institute* (2 June 2003).



guarantees in the post-Cold War international system.<sup>32</sup> Thus, Saudi Arabia will continue on its path toward ‘peaceful’ nuclear capabilities and potentially seek nuclear weapons capabilities if Iran obtains it. Although, analysis of Saudi strategy for counter-balancing Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities must also take into account Saudi Arabia’s conventional military and remaining U.S. security guarantees.

While Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have maintained a ‘strategic partnership’ since World War I at least, the U.S. has shifted its strategy in the Gulf region. Historically, the U.S. has been the Saudi Kingdom’s primary security guarantor from any external military threat. More recently, however, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region (Iraq in December 2011 and Afghanistan in December 2014) and increased arms-transfers to GCC states, signifies that U.S. strategy has shifted back to more of an off-shore traditional role. U.S. arms-transfers strategy focuses on maintaining stability throughout regions of the Developing world—the First Gulf War of 1990-91 was the catalyst for the Gulf’s rise to the top of arms-purchasing regions. GCC states’ advanced arms-purchases have subsequently continued over concerns of a growing strategic threat from Iran.<sup>33</sup> In 2011, U.S. arms agreements with Saudi Arabia alone represented the largest share of U.S. arms-trade in the world: in the last eight years, Saudi Arabia accounted for almost 22% of all Developing world arms-transfer agreements.<sup>34</sup> From 2004-2011, the Saudi Kingdom led the Developing world with \$75.7 billion in arms-transfer agreements. In the most recent period from 2008-2011, the Saudi Kingdom made \$52.1 billion in arms-transfer agreements, almost double the \$23.6 billion in the 2004-2007 period.<sup>35</sup> In 2011 alone, the Saudi government purchased dozens of Apache and Black Hawk helicopters from the U.S. for a total of \$33.4 billions. According to SIPRI, the Saudi Kingdom’s total spending for 2011 was \$48.5 billion, which indicates a significant up-grade in airpower.<sup>36</sup>

While these numbers indicate increases in Saudi (and other GCC states) arms purchases, the percentage of the GDP on military expenditures, also indicates a recent increase in military spending.<sup>37</sup> Historically, Saudi military spending coincides cyclically with regional conflicts and modernization of its military forces—with the highest spending years being the late-1980s (the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and structural development of the military), 1990s (the 1990-91 First Gulf War with the highest crisis level of military spending), early-2000s (leading to the 2003 Second Gulf War) and most recently from 2009 to present.<sup>38</sup>

States strengthen their armaments, in either (or both) quantity and quality, due to threats that states perceive from other states and will “arm themselves either to seek security against the threats posted by others or increase power to achieve political objectives against the interest of others.”<sup>39</sup> Saudi strategic objectives have influenced Saudi military spending. The Saudi Kingdom has consistently maintained (with increases during modernization or regional conflict) significant levels of military spending as a percentage of its GDP, in particular since the First Gulf War, so much so that their defense budget has hindered other aspects of the state’s overall budget. The most recent increase in Saudi (and GCC states) spending for U.S. arms- transfer agreements reflects efforts to modernize and expand their

<sup>32</sup> Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics” in *International Security*, v. 18, n. 2 (Fall 1993): p. 44-79; Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb” in *International Security*, v. 21, n. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): p. 54-86; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War” in *International Security*, v. 15, n. 1 (Summer 1990): p. 5-56.

<sup>33</sup> Richard F. Grimmett & Paul K. Kerr, “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011” in *Congressional Research Service* (24 August 2012), see: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf>, p. 7 & 14.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *SIPRI Yearbook 2012* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Table 4.2, see: [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex\\_15](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, “Arms Races”, p. 83-118 in *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1998).



conventional military capabilities (and possibly symbolize Saudi resolve and power) as a strategic response to the Iranian threat. While the weak demographic structure of all Gulf monarchies restrains also Saudi Arabia's ability to create any large and strong military—in particular ground forces—it has not stopped the Saudi Kingdom from increasing military spending and modernization in ways that do not threaten the monarchy.<sup>40</sup> Thus, it can be seen as a balancing of sorts, both in military power, as well as political power, that the Saudi and GCC states are willing to spend considerable amounts of oil wealth toward this effort. Due to a potentially dangerous convergence of events—Iran's asymmetric warfare, Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions, recent changes in quality and quantity of Saudi conventional military and U.S. security guarantees, or lack there-of—when examined together indicate that Saudi Arabia is the most likely state in the Gulf "RSC" to proliferate in response to a nuclear Iran.

### **New Security Dilemma: Reshaping Gulf Strategic Dynamics—Socio-Political Dimensions**

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran—both at times of rivalry and of cooperation—have had a significant impact on the Gulf "RSC" and more broadly, the entire Middle-East. At the regional level, several recent political and societal dynamics have reshaped their relations. These include Iran's influence in Iraq after the 2003 Second Gulf War, the "Arab Spring" in 2011, the Sunni-Shi'a politico-religious dichotomy, covert-methods, Saudi reassertion of Arab leadership within the GCC and Gulf region, as well as Qatar's rising regional influence.

First, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran represented a challenge and common enemy for both Saudi Arabia and Saddam's Iraq. Both states—out of concern and fear—sought to limit the impact this politico-religious revolution would have on their Shi'a minority populations. Later, during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War the Saudi Kingdom provided significant financial and military support to Iraq, in part to limit the Iranian threat. Yet, by the 1990-91 First Gulf War Iraq's invasion of Kuwait led the equally-threatened Saudi Kingdom to allow U.S. and Western allies to use its military bases to defeat Iraq, at the price of strained relations over the following decade. The 2003 Second Gulf War, however, created both challenges and opportunities for Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both countries share close geographical proximity and borders with Iraq; the emerging Shi'a-dominated political structure in today's Iraq tends to give Iran an advantage in the regional competition; and Iraq's internal power struggles have resulted in instability and sectarian tensions, which foster extremism also targeting Saudi Arabia in the future.

Throughout 2003-11 Saudi Arabia played a passive role, while U.S. troops remained in Iraq. However, since the December 2011 withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq (and the forecasted December 2014 one from Afghanistan) the Saudi Kingdom is now seeking a more active role with a series of diplomatic gestures with Iraq. In February of 2012, the Saudis reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq for the first time since the 2003 Second Gulf War and appointed the first Saudi ambassador (the Saudi Ambassador to Jordan serving as the new 'non-resident' envoy) to Iraq since 1990.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, the Saudi Kingdom entertained a series of Iraqi visitors and signed a new security agreement as "an introduction to restore relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in political terms".<sup>42</sup> While these diplomatic gestures signal a recent shift in Saudi strategy toward Iraq, the Saudi government remains still unwilling to open an official Embassy, or forgive the debt owed during Saddam Hussein's

<sup>40</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 124-125.

<sup>41</sup> Jack Healy, "Saudis Pick First Envoy to Baghdad in 20 Years" in *New York Times* (21 February 2012).

<sup>42</sup> Statement of Iraq's security and defense committee member, Hamid al-Mutlaq, a leader of *Iraqiya*; "Iraqi Political Blocs Welcome Security Agreement between Baghdad and Riyadh" in *Kurdistan News Agency* (3 March 2012); Alice Fordham, "Iraq, Saudi Arabia Show Signs of Improved Relations after Years of Strain" in *Washington Post* (4 March 2012).

dictatorship, and has constructed a large security fence along its shared border with Iraq.<sup>43</sup> Saudi Arabia will likely continue to increase diplomatic relations in an effort to stifle Iranian influence, especially during new U.S. sanctions against a weakened Iran, in hopes of influencing a new Iraqi leadership in the future. Likewise, in an effort to win back a leading role in the Arab world, a more nationalist Iraq may one day further explore Saudi diplomatic relations in order to separate itself from its close ties to Iran.

Second, while Saudi Arabia was able to remain relatively free from the up-risings and revolutions that occurred in many of the nearby states—through the initiation of massive spending programs using oil wealth to address key economic and social needs, strengthening its internal security forces, reducing Shi'a hostilities in the Eastern Province and moving towards greater political participation.<sup>44</sup> Due to weak socio-political structures, lack of monetary reserves and inadequate security forces, other states in the Gulf and nearby Levant region were unable to achieve similar results.

In the Gulf "RSC", both domestic and regional security levels are blurred in complicated and contradictory ways for a variety of reasons: Arab nationalism, Islamism and anti-West views.<sup>45</sup> While these reasons do not necessarily threaten the state directly, they significantly affect how the state operates within the Gulf "RSC".<sup>46</sup> Many of the states in this region have weak socio-political cohesion and the levels are also blurred, due to state governments supporting non-state actors in other states.<sup>47</sup> There are several recent, ongoing examples of these occurrences in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and other states, with Saudi Arabia and Iran placing themselves on opposite sides of any of the following local conflicts.

#### a. Yemen

In early-2011, after a slow-burning insurgency and local Al-Qaeda infiltration, the GCC attempted to mediate the situation between Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and local revolutionaries in a transition deal that would have had him step down.<sup>48</sup> While initially supporting Saleh, Saudi Arabia realized he was no longer providing stability and had become more of a threat to it.<sup>49</sup> After an assassination attempt at the Presidential Palace left President Saleh severely hurt, power was temporarily transferred to Vice-President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, while President Saleh was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia.<sup>50</sup> A GCC-led political transition initiative was finally signed in November of 2011, in which President Saleh stepped down and transferred his power to the Vice-President in exchange for his immunity.<sup>51</sup> In February of 2012, Yemen swore in its first new president in more than 30 years, Abdu Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, but the GCC-led political transition deal was rejected by many revolutionaries.<sup>52</sup> Thus, the new Yemeni President faces numerous political, economic and security issues since taking office and the state remains beset by further civil unrest.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.; "Iraq Seeks Arab Debt Forgiveness" in *Iraq Business News* (29 March 2012); Turki al-Saheil, "Securing the Saudi-Iraq Border" in *Asharq Al-Awsat* (28 July 2010).

<sup>44</sup> Nawaf Obaid, "There Will Be No Uprising in Saudi Arabia" in *Foreign Policy* (10 March 2011); "Saudis Hold their Last All-Male Election" in *Associated Press* (30 September 2011); Neil MacFarquhar, "Saudi Monarch Grants Women Right to Vote" in *New York Times* (25 September 2011); "Saudi King Authorizes Women to Run in Local Elections, Join Shoura Council," *Bloomberg* (26 September 2011).

<sup>45</sup> Buzan, 2003: p. 196.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> "Yemen Transition Deal Collapses" in *Al Jazeera* (22 May 2011).

<sup>49</sup> Bernard Haykel, "Saudi Arabia's Yemen Dilemma" in *Foreign Affairs* (14 June 2011).

<sup>50</sup> Ernesto Londono & Sudarsan Raghavan, "Yemen Crowds Celebrate after President Transfers Power, Flies to Saudi Arabia" in *Washington Post* (4 June 2011).

<sup>51</sup> "Yemen's Saleh Agrees to Transfer Power" in *Al Jazeera* (24 November 2011).

<sup>52</sup> Laura Kasinof, "Yemen Swears in New President to the Sound of Applause and Violence" in *New York Times* (25 February 2012).

<sup>53</sup> Blake Hounshell, "Yemen's President Warns of Civil War 'Worse than Afghanistan'" in *Foreign Policy* (29 September 2012).

Numerous power struggles, insurgency and terrorism are taking place in Yemen at the same time. Saudi Arabia is concerned over Iranian influence and support of the Shi'a *Houthi* rebels in the north as recent reports suggest.<sup>54</sup> In addition to the *Houthi* rebels, the Yemeni government is fighting separate "undeclared wars" with al-Qaeda rebels and pirates in the Gulf of Aden.<sup>55</sup> With an approximately 1,000 mile shared border, Saudi Arabia has sought to stifle the unrest and contain Iranian influence south of the Saudi border by using its military forces within Yemen and providing \$3.25 billion in aid.<sup>56</sup> In 2008, Saudi Arabia also restarted construction of the barrier along part of its shared desert border, at a cost of \$8.5 billion.<sup>57</sup> It remains to be seen if the late-2013 national dialogue ends in failure; if so it will compromise the execution of the second phase of the GCC-led initiative.<sup>58</sup> The recently renewed outbreak of conflict between *Houthis* and ultra-religious *Salafis* in Yemen's *Saada* Province already threatens the national dialogue and transitional process, leaving Yemen as a complex and vital geo-strategic security woe for Saudi Arabia.

#### b. Bahrain

The unrest in Bahrain highlights Saudi Arabia's and other GCC states' strategy with regard to Iran's covert methods and regional influence. Bahrain's has a large Shi'a population, but is ruled by the Sunni al-Khalifa Royal family.<sup>59</sup> In early-2011, Bahraini King Hamid al-Khalifa declared a state of emergency against protests by its Shi'a majority, and also requested assistance from Saudi Arabia and other GCC states.<sup>60</sup> Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened to support the Bahraini government's repression of Shi'a riots, with 1,000 Saudi soldiers securing Bahraini government facilities.<sup>61</sup> A total of 5,000 GCC soldiers were deployed in Bahrain during months of the uprisings.<sup>62</sup> Iran in turn condemned Saudi troops deployments and urged the Bahraini government to deal with protestors peacefully.<sup>63</sup> By October 2011, King al-Khalifa reopened Parliament, held elections and included the first two women Bahrain's Parliament.<sup>64</sup>

In November 2011, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry was released, which alleged Iran's intervention in the domestic affairs of Bahrain during the uprisings in February-March 2011; that Iranian covert involvement in Bahraini domestic affairs had been ongoing since the 1979 Iranian Revolution; and that Bahrain's request for GCC forces was to prevent possible armed Iranian intervention in its domestic affairs.<sup>65</sup> The report also noted that Kuwaiti naval reconnaissance was requested to prevent any Iranian naval delivery of weapons to Shi'a insurgents.<sup>66</sup> Bahrain also alleged that Iran used various media outlets to influence the uprisings by disseminating false events in Bahrain and elsewhere.<sup>67</sup> Thus, Bahrain remains unstable as protests continue two years later.<sup>68</sup> As a result of these dynamics, Bahrain has served as a proxy arena for Iranian retaliation and subversion.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Ibid; Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, "With Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role" in *New York Times* (15 March 2012).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> New Release, "Saudi Conference Pledges \$6.4 billion in aid to Yemen" in *Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington, D.C.* (4 September 2012), at: [http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest\\_news/news09041201.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news09041201.aspx); "Saudi Arabia Sends War Tanks to Yemen" in *Yemen Post* (14 September 2011).

<sup>57</sup> Gwynne Dyer, "Why Walls Are Going Up All Over the World" in *Arab News* (13 February 2007).

<sup>58</sup> Fakhri al-Arashi, "A Consensus on the National Dialogue Conference's Importance" in *National Yemen* (24 November 2012).

<sup>59</sup> "Mapping the Global Muslim Population" (2009): p. 8-10.

<sup>60</sup> "Bahrain Declares State of Emergency after Unrest" in *Reuters* (15 March 2011).

<sup>61</sup> "Bahrain King Declares State of Emergency after Protests" in *BBC News* (15 March 2011); "Iran Objects to Foreign Troops in Bahrain" in *Reuters* (15 March 2011).

<sup>62</sup> "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry" in *Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry* (23 November 2011): p. 383-387.

<sup>63</sup> "Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain" in *Al Jazeera* (15 March 2011); "Iran Objects to Foreign Troops in Bahrain" 2011.

<sup>64</sup> "Bahrain's King Hails National Developments" in *UPI* (10 October 2011).

<sup>65</sup> "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry" (2011): p. 383-387.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid; "Arab League to Iran: Stop Anti-Bahraini Campaign" in *Reuters* (21 May 2012).

### c. Syria

More than two years after the initial uprising, Syria is entrenched in a civil war with “armed terrorism” operating within its borders against President Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship.<sup>70</sup> The opposition formed the Free Syrian Army to topple al-Assad from power and by June 2012 counted 40,000 militants.<sup>71</sup> In 2012, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”) Summit with Saudi Arabia as its host—and Iranian President Ahmadinejad seated next to Saudi King Abdullah—suspended Syria’s membership, as a result of al-Assad’s bloody suppression of the insurgency.<sup>72</sup> Fighting continued throughout 2012-14, despite the United Nations (U.N.) attempt in early-April 2012 to negotiate a peace plan involving also Iran—Syria’s longtime ally—as part of the solution.<sup>73</sup> However, by June 2012, the U.N. peace plan was tabled and the U.N. mission withdrawn from Syria, although the U.N. has renewed efforts for peace to stop the bloodshed.<sup>74</sup> U.N. Syria peace talks resumed inconclusively in January 2014 in Switzerland, absent Iran and soon failed again.<sup>75</sup>

Syria is of strategic importance to Iran for diplomatic support in a region and world where Iran is increasingly isolated. Allegations that Iran has sent arms, troops, vessels, financial support and intelligence techniques to assist its besieged ally are prevalent.<sup>76</sup> Even Russia has received criticism for its support of the al-Assad régime.<sup>77</sup> Consequently, Saudi Arabia has indirectly and covertly supported the removal of al-Assad from power in an effort to further isolate and weaken both Syria and Iran.<sup>78</sup> Turkey too has aligned with Saudi Arabia in efforts to remove the Syrian dictator and has gone so far as to train and arm the Syrian opposition.<sup>79</sup> Recently, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, reiterated his country’s call for an international commitment to end the civil war by removing al-Assad stating, “[t]he absence of serious international intervention is critical to put an end to this growing humanitarian tragedy, end the oppressive regime in Syria and begin the transition of power based on a clear and explicit resolution from the United Nations Security Council.”<sup>80</sup>

Yemen, Bahrain and Syria are all the most recent political pawns in the broader Sunni-Shi’a dichotomy between rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran with their respective allies. Both states have used covert and overt methods throughout the “Arab Spring” states to achieve their geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-cultural objectives. In the current regional security dynamic, sectarianism has risen to new levels of importance, yet the primary concern remains how to thwart Iran’s regional influence and assertion of power. For Saudi Arabia, the use of sectarianism to counter Iranian influence in the region can be viewed as a “double-edged sword.”<sup>81</sup> As F. Gregory Gause suggests, while such an effort might mobilize the Sunni

<sup>68</sup> “Bahrain Uprising: Police Fire Tear Gas, Rubber Bullets on Protestors” in *RT* (14 August 2012); “Bahrain News-The Protests” in *New York Times* (12 January 2014), at: <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bahrain/index.html>

<sup>69</sup> Frederic Wehrey, *et al.*, “Saudi-Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam” in *RAND* (2009): p. 53-54, at: [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\\_MG840.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG840.pdf).

<sup>70</sup> “Opposition: 127 Dead as Syrian Forces Target Civilians” in *CNN* (7 April 2012).

<sup>71</sup> “Syria After the Big Bomb: How Long Can the Regime Last?” in *Economist* (21 July 2012).

<sup>72</sup> “Organization of Islamic Cooperation Suspends Syria” in *Reuters* (15 August 2012).

<sup>73</sup> “UN-Arab League Envoy Presses for Ceasefire in Syria” in *U.N. News Centre* (10 April 2012); “U.N.-Arab League Envoy ‘Gravely Concerned’ Over Latest Reports of Violence in Syria” in *U.N. News Centre* (11 June 2012).

<sup>74</sup> “Syria: U.N.-Arab League Envoy Calls on Security Council to Agree on Resolution to Help End Crisis” in *U.N. News Centre* (5 November 2012).

<sup>75</sup> Peter James Spielmann, “U.N.: Iran Not Yet Invited to Syria Peace Talks” in *New York Times* (6 January 2014).

<sup>76</sup> “Iranian Warships Enter Mediterranean via Suez Canal” in *BBC News* (18 February 2012); Géneviève Abdo, “How Iran Keeps Assad in Power in Syria” in *Foreign Affairs* (25 August 2011); “Iran Sends Elite Troops to Aid Bashar al-Assad Regime in Syria” in *The Telegraph* (6 September 2012); Louis Charbonneau, “Iran Flouts U.N. Sanctions, Sends Arms to Syria” in *Reuters* (16 May 2012).

<sup>77</sup> “Russia Repeats Western Mistakes in Arab Spring” in *Human Rights Watch* (23 January 2012).

<sup>78</sup> Shamus Cooke, “Proxy War in Syria Threatens Catastrophe for the Middle East” in *Global Research* (30 January 2012).

<sup>79</sup> Michael Weiss, “Syrian Rebels Say Turkey is Arming and Training Them” in *The Telegraph* (22 May 2012).

<sup>80</sup> News Release, “Prince Saud Calls for International Commitment to End Crisis in Syria” in Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington, D.C. (13 November, 2012), see: [http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest\\_news/news11131201.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news11131201.aspx)

<sup>81</sup> F. Gregory Gause III, “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance and the Sectarian Question” in *Strategic Insights*, v. VI, Issue 2 (March 2007).

Arab world against Iran's efforts to expand its regional influence, in the long term, it also directly encourages the world view of Sunni extremists.<sup>82</sup> Saudi Arabia and the GCC states view events in Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (as well as other states in the region) as pieces of a larger puzzle which confirms their suspicions of an Iranian regional strategy of retaliation and subversion. While these covert and overt proxies are not new between Saudis and Iranians, the frequency of these events has increased during the past few years, because both Iran and Saudi Arabia see their geo-political position slipping and will continue to covertly contain the other's regional influence and power.

Third, these covert methods are not only being played out in proxy in "Arab Spring" states, but also in states around the world. Increasingly, there have been in 2012 several allegations of Iranian-backed assassination attempts on Saudi ambassadors and other diplomats—in the U.S., Egypt and Pakistan.<sup>83</sup> Iran also has a history of alleged assassination attempts of Israeli diplomats in India, Azerbaijan, Thailand and Georgia, in 2012 as well.<sup>84</sup> Further, allegations of Iranian cyber-attacks on U.S. banks, Saudi oil company Aramco and Qatar's gas company Rasgas export facilities might be part of an increased Iranian cyber offensive—Iran is believed to have spent \$1 billion on such efforts in 2012.<sup>85</sup>

In spite of these accusations, Saudi Arabia and Iran have continued their overt diplomatic gestures in recent months. Saudi King Abdullah and ex-Iranian President Ahmadinejad sat next to each other during the 2012 OIC Summit on Syria and it was seen by many as an important gesture of solidarity by the people of both countries, even in spite of their differences in proxy conflicts.<sup>86</sup> Recently, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif extended an open invitation to Saudi Arabia to work together with Iran to achieve regional stability, by stating, "[w]e believe that Iran and Saudi Arabia should work together in order to promote peace and stability in the region."<sup>87</sup> Additionally, other diplomatic cooperation can be seen by both countries. Yet, continued covert activities indicate the persistence of a hidden show of force between the countries as "political message" and as a discreet strategic alternative to any open conventional military action.<sup>88</sup>

Fourth, Saudi Arabia has reasserted its leadership role with its GCC allies and within the Gulf region in an effort to counter Iranian regional influence and power. The Saudi Kingdom's strategies include public statements, fundings and military support to achieve its geo-strategic objectives. It has also strengthened its regional alliances with other Sunni controlled states—most recently, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. In attempts to further stabilize the region, the GCC states invited Morocco and Jordan to join their strategic alliance and at their first meeting the GCC announced it would fund a five-year economic development assistance program to help both two countries.<sup>89</sup> The GCC also agreed to grant \$20 billion in funding split between Bahrain and Oman for the development of domestic social projects.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, "Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy" in *New York Times* (11 October 2011); Mark Hosenball & Parisa Hafezi, "Saudis, U.S. Trade Charges with Iran Over Plot" in *Reuters* (11 October 2011); Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "U.S. Creates an Iranian Albatross" in *Asia Times* (18 November 2011); "Egypt Foiled 'Iranian' Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador in Cairo: Embassy Advisor" in *Al Arabiya* (1 May 2012); Avi Issacharoff, "Report: Egypt Foils Iranian Plot to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador" in *Haaretz* (1 May 2012); Peter Finn, "Iranian American in Iran-Backed Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador Gets 25 Years" in *Washington Post* (30 May 2013).

<sup>84</sup> Rym Momtaz, "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Accused in Israeli Embassy Bombing: Report" in *ABC News* (30 July 2012); Adrian Blomfield, "Azerbaijan Police Foil Iran Plot to Assassinate Israel Ambassador" in *The Telegraph* (25 January 2012); Kate Hodel, "'Bangkok Bombers' Were Assassins Not Terrorists, Says Thai Official" in *The Guardian* (15 February 2012).

<sup>85</sup> Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, "Iran Blamed for Cyber-attacks" in *Wall Street Journal* (12 October 2012).

<sup>86</sup> "Saudi King Sits Next to Ahmadinejad" in *Reuters* (15 August 2012); "Ahmadinejad Heads to Saudi Summit, Urges Muslim Countries to Show Greater Unity" in *Al Arabiya News* (13 August 2012).

<sup>87</sup> "Zarif Asks Saudi Arabia to Work with Iran" in *Al Jazeera* (2 December 2013).

<sup>88</sup> "Iran-Saudi Relations Positive for Region: Mottaki" in *Tehran Times* (27 October 2010).

<sup>89</sup> "Morocco, Jordan Attend First GCC Ministerial Meeting in Jeddah" in *Al Arabiya News* (11 September 2011).

<sup>90</sup> "Bahrain 'Set to Receive GCC Fund'" in *Gulf Daily News* (21 June 2012).



During March 2011, following a request to GCC members, the Saudi Kingdom sent troops and the UAE sent police into Bahrain against local Shi'a unrest, with Bahraini Deputy Chair of the Parliament, Abdel al-Mowada indicating this was due "not to a lack of security forces in Bahrain, [but was] a showing of solidarity among the GCC."<sup>91</sup> The Saudi strategy to contain unrest in nearby regional states—through its leadership of the GCC, adding Morocco and Jordan to the bloc, plus GCC funding of other states' social programs, has reasserted Saudi influence within the new GCC alliance and more broadly in the Gulf region. Additionally, most GCC states are also "Istanbul Partners" of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provides them with bilateral training and security cooperation as needed (a discreet form of regional deterrence vs. Iran, as most GCC states are not really active in NATO's Partnership).

#### d. Qatar

Qatar is a rising influential actor in the Persian Gulf "RSC" with abundant natural gas reserves—the third largest in the world—and the leading global producer and exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas ("LNG") and Gas-to-Liquid Fuels ("GTL").<sup>92</sup> Thus, Qatar's position is consequential to the region and world as well, especially since it also hosts the U.S. Central Command's Forward Headquarters since after the 2003 Second Gulf War. Qatari strategy has included developing and solidifying diplomatic ties with key regional actors. At the 2012 OIC Summit, the Emir of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani, sat on the Saudi King's side opposite ex-Iranian President Ahmadinejad.<sup>93</sup> Additionally, the Al-Jazeera TV media founded and financed by the Emir, has now a far-reaching impact and utilizes editorial independence to shape regional developments, which has proven to be an innovative method of projecting Qatari power-policy issues.<sup>94</sup>

Qatar has also engaged itself in many high profile aspects of recent regional politics—Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Sudan, Chad, Libya, Iraq, Bahrain and Syria. Qatar's involvement in Libya, both financially and through irregular warfare, successfully overwhelmed Muammar al-Qadhafi's security forces.<sup>95</sup> Furthermore, Qatar has emerged as an adept and proactive state in diffusing and mediating conflict: Qatar was instrumental in negotiating an earlier end to the crises in Lebanon and Yemen; mediated agreements between Sudan and Chad in a failed attempt to end their feud; and recently offered to mediate between the Talibani insurgents in Afghanistan and the international community.<sup>96</sup> Indeed, diplomatic mediation has become one of the essential components to Qatari security strategy.<sup>97</sup>

The Qatari government has exploited tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, particularly by aligning with Iran on the Lebanon and Syrian civil conflicts, in an effort to balance or possibly subvert, Saudi activities.<sup>98</sup> Historically, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have had mixed rival relations, which showed strains when Qatar extended an invitation to ex-Iranian President Ahmadinejad, Syria's President al-Assad, Iraq's Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi and *Hamas* leader Khaled Mishal to an Arab League Summit.<sup>99</sup> Qatar's rising regional influence and unconventional new diplomatic approach to regional affairs will remain a significant concern for both the Saudi Kingdom and Islamic Iran.

<sup>91</sup> "Saudi Soldiers Sent into Bahrain" (2011).

<sup>92</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, "Qatar, Background and U.S. Relations" in *Congressional Research Service* (6 June 2012), see: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>.

<sup>93</sup> "Saudi King Sits Next to Ahmadinejad" in *Reuters* (15 August 2012).

<sup>94</sup> Anthony Shadid, "Qatar Wields an Outsize of Influence in Arab Politics" in *New York Times* (14 November 2011).

<sup>95</sup> Sam Dagher & Charles Levinson, "Tiny Kingdom's Huge Role in Libya Draws Concern" in *Wall Street Journal* (17 October 2011).

<sup>96</sup> Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy" in *Middle-East Journal* (Autumn 2011).

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> "Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam," p. 48-49.

<sup>99</sup> "Kingdom Dislikes High-Level Gaza Summit" in *Press TV* (14 January 2009).

**New Security Dilemma: Reshaping Gulf Strategic Dynamics—Economic Security Dynamics**

In the Persian Gulf “RSC”, wealth from oil exports provide capability to achieve strategic objectives. With regard to the “Arab Spring” dynamics, oil wealth has provided the capability to support opposition forces, purchase arms, fund social programs in Bahrain and Oman, purchase and bribe allies and engage in proxy conflicts. In particular, Saudi Arabia has distributed a total of \$130 billion (the amount the Saudi Kingdom earns from 8-months of oil exports), to develop programs within the state and in nearby states.<sup>100</sup> While the Saudi Kingdom is able to buy its way out of difficult situations, it places a burden on the Saudi budget.<sup>101</sup> This oil wealth has provided Gulf states with the opportunity to develop strategies and form certain political alliances that are nearly impossible for poorer states. Additionally, it forces regional Powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran, to reevaluate their national strategies, due to long-term economic interests, rather than short-term political objectives.

Saudi security is heavily dependent on the global economy and global demand for oil. While the Saudi economy was under strain during the late-1990s and early-2000s, it has benefited in recent years from a rise in oil prices.<sup>102</sup> Further, with approximately 25% of the world’s proven oil reserves (Iran has approximately 13%), the Saudi Kingdom is by far the dominant regional power in the global energy market.<sup>103</sup> With larger oil reserves and a smaller population, the Saudis can have a more long-term perspective on oil prices and production. In 2011 and 2012, the Saudi Kingdom agreed—much to the outrage of Iran—to twice boost oil production to compensate for the international demand loss, due to U.N.-U.S.-European sanctions against Iran.<sup>104</sup> Iran struggled to find reliable consumers, although it has maintained preferential oil supplies to China and India.<sup>105</sup> While renewed U.S. and European sanctions hindered Iran’s economy and crude oil production levels, Iran has plans to boost its oil production as U.N. sanctions are lifted later in 2014 following Teheran’s initial agreement on international monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program.<sup>106</sup> While Islamic Iran maintains the world’s second largest natural gas supply and is geo-strategically located between the Gulf and Caspian Sea, it remains to be seen exactly how much developments on the recent nuclear agreement and potential lifting of sanctions will boost Iran’s crippled economy.<sup>107</sup>

**Conclusion**

Within the Persian Gulf “RSC”, domestic and regional security levels are blurred and complex, due to ongoing conflict from the “Arab Spring” and regional Powers’ support of non-state actors to influence the outcome of events in other states. Examples of this can be seen in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and nearby states. Due to the complex nature of the Gulf “RSC” system in particular, the political and societal sectors are significantly inter-mingled. While internal uprisings no longer acutely threaten Saudi domestic security, it continues to affect how the Kingdom operates within the greater Middle-East/Gulf region. Further, the insecurity of the ruling élite plays a significant role in reshaping regional security dynamics. While the Sunni-Shi’a politico-religious dichotomy influences strategy, the mutual containment of rival regional Powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Qatar, or Egypt) remains the more

<sup>100</sup> Joel Kukemelk, “Saudi Arabia Distributes \$130 Billion” in *Persian Gulf Fund*.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region* (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009): p. 8-10.

<sup>103</sup> “OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2011”, see: [http://www.opec.org/opec\\_web/en/data\\_graphs/330.htm](http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm).

<sup>104</sup> “Iran Lashes Out at Saudi Over Oil Increase” in *Al Arabiya News* (29 May 2012).

<sup>105</sup> Dan Graeber, “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Exports” in *Global Research* (17 August 2012).

<sup>106</sup> Matt Clinch, “Saudi Arabia: Markets Will Handle Iran Oil Boost” in *CNBC* (4 December 2013).

<sup>107</sup> Rick Gladstone, “Iran Cites I.M.F. Data to Prove Sanctions Aren’t Working” in *New York Times* (9 October 2012); *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, November 2012), at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo1112.pdf>

important factor. However, given the complex nature of the geo-political and geo-cultural dynamics, critical geography may prove useful in understanding subtle socio-cultural linkages within the broader Gulf “RSC” and overall international inter-connectedness.

Saudi Arabia’s reassertion of its leadership within the GCC strategic alliance and broadly within the region is central to this larger Sunni-Shi’a dichotomy, Saudi-Iran tensions and re-balancing of regional power. Security inter-dependence within the greater Middle-East/Gulf region is substantial and without a comprehensive, strong regional security organization to resolve conflicts, all states rely on alliances and blocs to maintain their national stability and security within the region. Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies have relied on their GCC alliance to achieve broader geo-strategic objectives. Qatar continues to play an influential semi-independentist “Third Force” role in the regional security dynamics—in Saudi Arabia-Iran tension, proxy conflicts and as the regional “mediator”—but is unlikely that the state can shift polarity in the region. Bilateral tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue in light of Iran’s nuclear military ambitions and on-going proxy conflicts, however, Riyadh will likely continue to seek avoidance of any open military clash with Tehran and instead persist in containing Iranian influence and power in the region. The Gulf “RSC” remains a complex regional balance of power system, in which the Saudi Kingdom and Islamic Iran perceive long-term external threats from both regional and global actors.

At present, the U.S. pursues four main interests in the Gulf:

1) to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz through the 1980 Carter Doctrine (if Iran were to stop shipments it would wreck havoc on the global energy market, and the U.S. has long built an international military presence regionally against such threat from either the USSR during the Cold War or Islamic Iran or Saddam’s Iraq);

2) to keep U.S. troops out of Iraq’s continuing civil-strife, which has experienced the worst year of fighting since 2008 due to al-Qaeda-linked Sunni extremists (who also oppose Iranian regional influence);

3) to negotiate a final nuclear agreement with Iran by 2014 (which could help regional stability); and

4) to restore the regional balance of power to foster overall stability and avoid any regional hegemony. For the U.S., its military pull-out of Iraq since December 2011, the initial restoration efforts to the balance of power system and increased arms-transfers to GCC states, indicate a shift to its earlier traditional role of off-shore balancer and force-projection. Since the U.S. is widely seen as a source of threat by the “Arab street” and several regional states (Iran, Syria) who question its role, a return to off-shore balancing can potentially contribute to regional stability and security. While the securization of “Arab Spring” states and positive nuclear negotiations with Iran will remain key security issues (and the best possible regional outcomes), it is important that Saudi Arabia continues to reassert its regional leadership and power to sustain in the long-run any relatively “stable” Gulf region security system in cooperation with the U.S. and GCC states.

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# STABILITY AND CHANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY VALUES AMONG ÉLITES: EFFECTS OF THE “9/11 ATTACKS” AND SECOND GULF WAR AGAINST IRAQ ON ÉLITES' VALUES

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**ABSTRACT:** This study addresses the question of how U.S. élites change their belief in foreign policy values in reaction to international events. It uses surveys of U.S. foreign policy élites conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, 2002 and 2004. The ordinary least square regression was used to estimate the model. The findings are that U.S. élites selectively modify their belief in values in response to international events: élites' partisanship and U.S. decision-making role moderates the effect of political events—“9/11 Terrorist Attacks” and 2003 invasion of Iraq—on their belief in humanitarianism, democracy promotion and militarism. Furthermore, these two elements simultaneously moderate the effect of events on their belief in supporting humanitarianism and, to a lesser degree, in national economic interests. Élites' partisanship and their roles inside or outside the U.S. national decision-making process also selectively condition the effect of political events on their belief in U.S. foreign policy values.

## U.S. Élites and Values Change

Studies have shown that values play a significant role in accounting for the mass public's belief-system (Feldman 1988, Kinder 1983, Conover & Feldman 1984) and opinions toward policies and vote choices (e.g., Kinder & Sanders 1996, Zaller 1991, Kluegel & Smith 1986, Miller & Shanks 1996). However, little is known about what accounts for élites' acceptance of values and under what conditions they modify or maintain their values. This study examines the question of whether U.S. élites modify their foreign policy values or not, and if they do what accounts for value-changes in response to the specific external conditions. The experience of the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” and Second Gulf War against Iraq provide us with opportunities to explore the influence of political events on élites' attitudes towards the United States (U.S.) foreign policy and the way that élites' individual level characteristics condition the effect of events on their values. As a way to explore the question, this study adopts a perspective which emphasizes the interaction between political context and élites' individual level characteristics in accounting for their belief in foreign policy values. Thus, while élites maintain their belief in some foreign policy values during these tumultuous periods, they also selectively modify their attachment to values in reaction to specific political events. Also, the élites' political predisposition and role in decision-making modify the way they interpret the external events and shape their belief in these values. The following sections discuss existing studies on élites' values, belief-systems, hypotheses and findings.

## U.S. Élites' Belief-Systems and Values

Studies on public opinion on foreign policy suggest that élites' belief-systems are relatively well organized and stable compared to that of public opinions because they have cognitive capacity, motivation, skills and active involvement in politics. Some scholars (Lippmann 1955, Almond 1950 & 1960) suggest that, unlike the mass public whose opinion is moody, unpredictable and easily influenced by emotional appeals, élites tend to make stable, coherent and strategic decisions with better knowledge, interests and comprehension of complex political situations and choices.

Similarly, Converse (1964) clearly laid out the claim regarding the different structure and organization of belief-systems between élites and the public: only a limited segment of society—i.e., élites or political activists—possesses a high level of interest and knowledge on politics and is capable of maintaining stable, coherent and ideologically-based attitudes. In a comparative study on élites, Putnam (1976) agrees with the observations that élites' belief-systems are well organized, structured and stable over time because of their cognitive capacity, knowledge on specific policy issues and high education levels.

While these studies argue that U.S. élites' belief-systems and opinion are different from the public because élites have more knowledge, time, interest, capacity to process information and engagement in politics, other studies focused on élites' belief-system in foreign policy area (Holsti & Rosenau 1990, Wittkopf & Maggiotto 1983, Wittkopf 1987, Chittick, Billingsley & Travis 1990) examine the existence of the components and organization of belief-system by paying attention to a few numbers of postures or values. They agree on the idea that a small number of postures (or values) can be identified and these are the key elements that define élites' opinion on foreign policy, but they differ on the actual number(or dimensions) of values. For instance, Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) proposes two postures of belief-system—cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism—as an alternative to the one-dimensional understanding of foreign policy values – internationalism vs. isolationism. On the other hand, Chittick and others (1990) propose three factors that structure élites and the public belief-system: international milieu goals, national security and national economic interest. Although the debate on the number of postures of belief-system has not resolved, these studies provide a ground for further analysis of the sources of these values, the effects of these values on specific policy attitudes and the change of these values.

In addition to identifying the structure of U.S. élites' belief-system, Holsti and Rosenau (1990) explore the sources of values and found that political predispositions (partisanship and ideology) and professional occupation of élites are strongly correlated with these values. Democrats, Liberals, educators, clergy and media leaders are more likely to be “accommodationists”, while Republicans, Conservatives, military officers and business executives are more likely to be “hard-liners” (ibid, p.116-117). It suggests that partisan and ideological divisions are also related to foreign policy attitudes. Similarly, Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) show that ideology and partisanship are strongly correlated to different policy attitudes. In studying two major values in America—Capitalism and democracy—McClosky and Zaller (1984) found similar results: Liberal élites are more likely than Conservatives to believe in egalitarianism and are far more critical than Conservatives on values representing capitalism. Although some scholars (like Dye & Zeigler 1981) argue the homogeneity of élites in their share of values, empirical studies show that there exist important partisan or ideological divisions on values among élites.

Related to the question of the source of foreign policy values and principles is how élites change their values. Relatively few studies pay attention to this question. Chittick and others (1990) examine the change of élites' foreign policy opinions in comparison with the mass public by using the surveys conducted by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR). They found that élites' foreign policy beliefs in international milieu, national security and national economic interests did not change over the periods of 1974, 1978, 1982 and 1986. But the mass public reveals changes of their postures between 1974 and 1978 and again between 1982 and 1986. The changed political environment affects the public's foreign policy beliefs, but élites remain stable. Their finding is consistent with that of Murray (2002). In studying the change of élites' foreign policy attitudes with panel data, Murray (2002) shows that élites did not change their traditional foreign policy postures—militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism—while they shifted their perceptions regarding Russia and the potential

threat from that country after the collapse of the ex-Soviet Union. In other words, although élites changed their specific policy attitudes toward Russia in reaction to changed political environment, their postures are not easily changed. Furthermore, the relationship between ideology and these foreign policy postures remained stable between 1989 and 1992. According to Murray, élites maintain their policy-beliefs and attitudes as they are able to organize and maintain a coherent belief-system regarding foreign policy issues along ideological lines. Ideology instead anchors élites' postures.

### **The Interaction Model for U.S. Élites' Value-Changes**

These studies on the U.S. élites' belief-systems structure, the source of foreign policy values and stability of postures provide important insights on élites' value-changes. However, the proposition on the stability of élites' belief in values and the effect of political disposition on values still needs to be tested. In doing so it is also necessary to expand theoretical discussions on élites' value change since existing studies on values and opinion change can provide useful guidelines. Existing studies (Inglehart 1981, Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach 1989, Rokeach 1973, Sears & Valentino 1997, Zaller 1992) on opinion change provide theoretical perspectives on under what conditions individuals would change their belief in values. They show that at least two factors should be considered to examine the change of values: external environment and individual level characteristics. The changing environments initiate the change and the strength and relevance of the external events will make a difference on values. Inglehart (1981) proposes that, when the socialization process (facilitated by economic conditions) influences individuals to pursue higher order needs rather than lower order needs, they shift their values from materialistic (fighting rising prices and maintaining order) to post-materialistic (protecting freedom of speech and having more say in government). Similarly, Inglehart & Abramson (1994) suggest that post-materialistic values are prevalent among younger generations in advanced countries the more these countries experience significant economic development. Changed economic conditions make individuals and society focus on post-materialist values. In a similar vein, Sears and Valentino (1997) explored how political events influence the socialization process of pre-adults at the individual level. They suggest that political events (Presidential election campaigns) can generate changes in pre-adults' long-standing and stable predispositions, but the effects of events on the attitudes of pre-adults is selective and limited to salient attitude objects. Also, the socialization of pre-adults occurs periodically rather than continuously, because such potentially socializing events tend to happen only periodically. They direct to the importance of the impact of external events (or information) and the relevance of the events on the attitude objects, i.e. values. Not all values are going to be influenced by the events but only the values that are relevant to the events will be the target of change.

Another important consideration on values change is the characteristics of individuals. The previous studies (Murray 2002, Wittkopf & Maggiotto 1983, McClosky & Zaller 1984) show that political predisposition will differentiate the way élites believe in values. More importantly, these predispositions filter the external events and in turn affect élites' belief in values. They will condition the effect of events on values change. As Zaller (1992) laid out in his model of attitude change, it is necessary to take into account both the characteristics of the external conditions and individual level characteristics, as well as the interaction of these two components. The way that individuals change their attitudes depends on the intensity of the messages, individuals' awareness levels and political predisposition. Consistent with psychological theory on information processing (e.g., Fiske & Taylor 1991, Chen & Shelly 1999), Zaller's theory emphasizes that citizens process new information according to the characteristics of the evaluation objects and their predispositions. Furthermore, studies suggest that citizens' partisanship

influences their information processing of candidates Rahn (1993), opinion changes Bartels (2002), acceptance of values (e.g., Goren 2005) and attitude changes (e.g., Zaller 1992). Strong partisanship, like stereotyping, colors the information that individuals receive from external conditions (e.g., either from élites or direct experiences). For example, it is difficult to change the opinions and attitudes of a person who has strong partisan orientation unless the new information overwhelmingly shakes that person's beliefs. More importantly, Goren (2005) and McCann (1997) show that partisanship is more stable than core values (e.g., egalitarianism and individualism). This provides a stronger ground for the role of partisanship as a modifying factor in accounting for value-changes.

In addition to the interaction between partisanship and events, this study considers another individual level difference: élites' role in decision-making. As studies (Tetlock 1981, Tetlock 1983, Suedfeld & Rank 1976) on élites' decision-making or reasoning show, élites' role in the political system influences the way that they engage in thinking and reasoning. As the role of élites gives them a sense of greater responsibility for their decisions, they are more likely to be cautious and to engage in an integratively complex reasoning process in their decision-making or statements. For example, Tetlock (1983) found that individuals who are put in positions of responsibility are more likely than others to engage in strategic and thoughtful information processing. In analyzing the statements of revolutionary leaders in other nations, Suedfeld & Rank (1976) argue that revolutionary leaders make more measured and reasoned statements once they are in power and become responsible for maintaining their power. In a similar study, Tetlock (1981) presents that, once American Presidential candidates have won the election, they issue policy statements which reflect integratively complex reasoning as they become aware of the responsibility of governance. These studies give strong support to the idea that élites' role will influence the way they engage in information-processing.

The core of Interaction Theory is its emphasis on the interactions between these individual characteristics and contextual conditions. Not only do political predispositions serve to filter individuals' interpretations of events independently, but also they affect the interpretations of events in combination with political contexts and other individual characteristics. For example, Tetlock (1984) shows that ideologically Liberal and moderate senators demonstrated more integratively complex reasoning than Conservative Senators when Congress was under Democratic control, but this political complexity declined when it was under Republican control. Similarly, Tetlock, Hannum & Micheletti (1984) argue that, although liberal and moderate élites are more likely than Conservative élites to engage in complex reasoning, this tendency depends on political conditions. Especially, whether élites are in charge of decision-making or not has a significant influence on whether they engage in complex reasoning. Liberals are more likely to present policies in integratively-complex terms when they are responsible for decision-making, but they do not so actively employ this type of reasoning when they are not in a position to take responsibility for the decisions. In contrast, Conservatives show a relatively stable level of integratively-complex reasoning within and across the U.S. Congress.

In line with these studies, this study stresses the effect of the interaction between élites' political predispositions and their role in the decision-making in accounting for their values in reaction to events. By taking into account both factors, the theory can further details who modify their values in reaction to political events in different contexts. In this study, partisanship is the main political predisposition because of the heightened partisan division among élites in recent years. As Sears and Valentino (1997) pointed out, the effect of events on values depends on the characteristics of events. The "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and Second Gulf War against Iraq share similarity in that both events reminded citizens of the precariousness of international politics and the importance of national security: terrorist attacks were



always limited in their domestic political repercussions, but the above case-studies also differ in that the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” drew unified action from citizens but the 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq and the prolonged war efforts created political divisions at home and abroad. Because of this political difference, both events will have different impacts on élites’ values. Also the types of values matters when élites reacted to such events and form their belief in values. Before cogent hypotheses can be presented based on the discussion of the Interaction Model, this study briefly describes the characteristics of the values examined.

### Values

Four different types of foreign policy values are examined in this work. Existing studies on public opinion vs. foreign policy (Hurwitz & Peffley 1987, Holsti 2004, Wittkopf 1986, Richman, Malone & Nolle 1997) have highlighted various types of values affecting national foreign policy: internationalism, cooperative internationalism, militant internationalism or anti-Communism. Most of these works identify these values by analyzing the CCFR’s quadrennial surveys, which are accepted to a degree as examples of values in this study, it also includes other values as well: militarism, domestic economic interest, humanitarianism and democracy-promotion. Militarism represents a Realist’s perspective reflecting the belief that maintaining superior military power to protect national security is an important U.S. foreign policy goal. Similarly, domestic economic interests captures the belief in economic trade and resources as dominant self-interests in the area of foreign policy. These two values represent the two most important elements of national interest: physical and economic security. Previous studies (Wittkopf 1986, Richman, Malone & Nolle 1997, Chittick, Billingsley & Travis 1995) treat humanitarianism and democracy-promotion as “cooperative internationalism”, “multilateralism-unilateralism” (Chittick & others 1995), or “global altruism” (Richman & others 1997).<sup>1</sup>

However, these works tended to overlook the differences between humanitarianism and democracy-promotion. Indeed, traditional Realists (Morgenthau 1952, Kennan 1984, Mearsheimer 2001) would consider them Idealist values, as they both share a similarity in values emphasizing normative ideals in contrast to self-interest-oriented goals. Both of these latter values reflect traditional Liberal internationalism, but also represent two different aspects of it. Humanitarianism appeals for unconditional altruism towards other human beings (Feldman & Steenbergen 2001), representing individuals’ concern and care only because the victims are humans, without attaching any specific conditions in helping the individuals or countries at risk (Feldman & Steenbergen 2001, Gibney 1999). Furthermore, humanitarianism is different from democracy-promotion because the former value emphasizes humanity and neutrality in helping the needy, which is close to the principles of the International Committee of Red Cross (Chandler 2001, Barnett 2005).

Democracy-promotion is another central value that represents Liberal internationalism. As studies (e.g., Brands 1998, Monten 2005) have shown, democracy-promotion builds on the historico-ideological belief in U.S. foreign policy views of the 1780s-1900s of American “exceptionalism” and on its self-perceived difference from other countries and cultures. Thus, it is a “God-given” mission not only to set a global example for the superiority of democracy in the U.S., but also to spread this ideal to the world under U.S. guidance since the Two World Wars. This missionary belief is consistent with the belief that the U.S. should “move beyond example and undertake active measures to vindicate the right”

<sup>1</sup> They reach these conclusions using data from surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. As their main goal was to show that citizens’ foreign policy beliefs are organized along a limited number of dimensions or principles, they provide an important base for this study in regards to the number of values considered.

(Brands 1998, p.VIII; Monten 2005), and that it is the mission of the U.S. to spread its universal political values and institutions by actively taking measures beyond mere passive example-setting.<sup>1</sup>

While this value had been prominent in the history of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Encarnación 2005, Hunt 1987, Lieven 2004, McCartney 2004), developments in international politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided the political opportunity for it to gain prominence among élites and pundits again. Scholars and pundits from Liberals (e.g., Diamond 1992, Allison & Beschel 1992, Talbott 1996) to neoConservatives (e.g., Kristol & Kagan 1996), who observed this collapse and a series of newly independent countries struggling to establish democracy in Eastern Europe, argued that promoting democracy should be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Although they differed on the specific ways to achieve this goal, they agreed on the importance of the value. In addition, the George W. Bush Jr. administration made the value a core principle in its foreign policy doctrine. Thus, it is proper to examine this value as an independent variable from other values, especially from humanitarianism.

### Hypotheses

Drawing from the discussion on the theories of mass public opinion and values change among élites, this study tests three hypotheses. First when élites react to external events in adjusting their values, their political predispositions will moderate their attachment to those values. Specifically, partisanship moderates the impact of major events on their belief in Idealist values, rather than Realist ones, as dramatic events—"9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and invasion of Iraq—produce disagreements on the pursuit of Idealist values or traditional Realist values. Both Democrats and Republicans would feel the importance of Realist values, but there will be more room to disagree on the values that are not directly related with national security. Thus, Democrats will be more likely to believe in Idealist values in world affairs than Republicans as response to the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks". But the 2003 Second Gulf War invasion of Iraq against the inhuman dictatorship of Saddam Hussein did also paradoxically force a reexamination of their belief in democracy-promotion and to undermine their commitment since the administration made the value salient to the justification of the war. For Realist values, the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and the invasion of Iraq will not have a significant influence on them as élites regardless of partisanship, as they tend to accept the paramount importance of national security (military strength and economic safety). But the controversial invasion of Iraq and the ensuing long-term occupation and peacekeeping did lead many Democrats to reconsider their belief in any "humanitarian"-oriented militarism and to withdraw their support for this key value.

Second, the élites' role in decision-making will influence the way that they filter the impact of events in defining and adjusting their Idealist values. Specifically, those élites who participate in decision-making institutions—the U.S. administration, House and Senate—will react more sensitively to external events than those élites who are outside of the decision-making circle in showing their support for the idealistic values. As they feel pressure to be responsible in their decision-making and they know

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<sup>1</sup> According to them, there is another element of Liberal "exceptionalism": "exemplarism". This belief shares the same exceptionalism, but it stresses the importance of securing and maintaining democracy as a value and an institution in the U.S. first and setting the example to the outside world without going out to the world. Similar studies (Burns 1957, McDougall 1997, Schlesinger Jr. 1986) on the history of American identity, culture and foreign policy propose that America is exceptional in its place in the world, due to its adherence to Idealism (Liberal democracy) and its belief in its purpose of achieving a God-given mission—creating "the City upon a hill"—as a chosen people. This traditional value was the norm in the past (1780s-1900s), but is today advocated only by proponents of Liberal "exceptionalism", while since 1917 President Woodrow Wilson's Idealism advocated the more activist internationalization of the U.S. democratic experiment alongside Collective Security and peace through the League of nations and later the United Nations.

more about details on the events, decision-making élites will increase their commitment to the Idealist values (humanitarianism and democracy-promotion) in response to the events, but they will not be different in their belief in Realist values.

Third, the élites' partisanship and participation in decision-making will work together to define the influence of the political events on their attachment to Idealist values. In statistical terms, there will be a three-way interaction effect—partisanship, élites' role and events—on these values. The interaction between partisanship and events will be conditioned by élites' role in decision making. Partisan differences in their belief in Idealist values in reaction to the events will vary by their role in the institution. The difference between Democrats and Republicans in their belief in Idealist values will likely be smaller among decision-makers than among non-decision-makers in both events.

### Data and Measurement

For the analysis of U.S. élites' values, this study uses three surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in 1998, 2002 and 2004. Respondents to the surveys include foreign policy leaders from various institutions and organizations. They include policy-makers (government officials from the executive branch and members of the Senate and House), members of interest groups (business and labor organizations), educators from universities, members of foreign policy think tanks and private foreign policy organizations, members of religious organizations and members of the mass-media (newspapers, magazines and TV). Although the foreign policy élites are not selected through randomization, the respondents represent members of major social and political organizations, plus institutions involved in foreign policy-making. The number of respondents in each survey varies: 379, 397 and 450 in 1998, 2002 and 2004 respectively. Compared to the previous surveys, the survey of 2004 includes more than the usual number of respondents from House and Senate. Thus, whenever the statistical means are presented for 2004, the weight which takes into account the over-sampling of the members of the House and Senate has been used to make the statistics mean for 2004 comparable to other years.

An important advantage of these surveys is that the élites were asked the same questions as the public on various foreign policy issues and values. Owing to this, it is possible to examine the effect of political events on élites' acceptance of values in comparative perspective. In addition, as the surveys were conducted before and after major political events - the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and the Second Gulf War invasion of Iraq - it is possible to examine the impact of these events on values. Although these surveys are not panel data, they provide us with an opportunity to capture the effect of these rare political events on élites' foreign policy values.

### Measures

The dependent variables are four values: humanitarianism, democracy, militarism and domestic interest.

1. To construct the *humanitarianism* measure, this study uses two items from the questionnaire. The questions ask respondents whether "combating world hunger" and "helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations" should be a "very important", "somewhat important" or "not at all important" as foreign policy goal. These two questions are moderately correlated and their correlation remains stable over the years. The simple Pearson's correlations between these two items are .50, .51 and .48 in 1998, 2002 and 2004 respectively. The two items are added linearly to construct a scale of humanitarianism.
2. To measure *democracy*, a question is used that asks respondents whether "helping to bring a democratic form of government in other countries" should be an important U.S. foreign policy goal.

3. To measure *militarism*, the following question was used: Should “maintaining the superior military power worldwide” be an important foreign policy goal or not.
4. For *national economic interest*, two questions were used: “protecting the jobs of American workers” and “securing adequate supplies of energy” should be an important foreign policy goal or not. The correlations between these two items are .28, .25 and .24 in 1998, 2002 and 2004 respectively.
5. *Partisanship* is measured by using the traditional question asking respondents what is their partisan affiliation. Partisanship has three categories: Democrats, Republicans and Independents.
6. To measure *ideology*, the question used asks respondents to identify their ideological stance on a 5 points scale from strong Liberal to strong Conservative.

Since the category of jobs or affiliations provides important information about whether élites are members of government organizations that directly participate in the decision-making, that question is used to create a dichotomous variable: *decision-making role*. The question asks respondents to indicate their job categories. It includes élites from the administration, House, Senate, educators, private foreign policy organizations (e.g., labor organizations, business organizations and religious organizations), mass-media and think-tanks.<sup>1</sup> If leaders are members of the administration, House or Senate, they are included in the decision-making group, otherwise they are coded as a “non-decision-making” members.

Unlike the mass public, the sample of élites is fairly homogeneous in terms of education level. Although there is no data on education in 2002, the data in 1998 and 2004 reveal that all the élites have at least some college education. Thus, the variable—*education*—has been excluded in the model. In addition, the information on racial and ethnic identity is not available. Thus, the basic demographic variables include only “gender” and “age.”

## Findings

### a. Values Change in Aggregate Level

In this section, this study briefly describes the statistics of these values over several years before going into the results from the interaction model estimations. Table 1 shows the means of these values in each year. In 1998 militarism was the most popular value (.74) and democracy-promotion the least popular (.58) one.<sup>2</sup> Humanitarianism and National economic interest were located in the middle of the list. By 2002 humanitarianism continues to be the most popular value (.73). Although democracy-promotion is still least popular (.62), it gained support compared to 1998. The magnitude of increase .04 is actually the largest among these values by 2002. Paradoxically, those traditional values that reflect Realists’ perspective lost their support after the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” but Idealism gained their support among élites. In addition, the invasion of Iraq influenced élites’ attachment to these values. Thereafter, humanitarianism gained largest support and become the most popular value (.82), while democracy-promotion shrank back to the level of 1998. Élites’ belief in militarism also suffered significantly (.61): compared to 1998, élites lost their belief in militarism by 13%, which is the largest change among the values studied. The controversial 2003 invasion of Iraq and the long post-war peacekeeping against local bloody insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan significantly undermined the élites’ attachment to militarism. However, its negative effect on national interest remains very limited. These findings suggest that political event do influence élites’ belief in values in aggregate level, but such influence is selective. Only humanitarianism and militarism changed significantly after the

<sup>1</sup> The Appendix provides detailed information about the categories.

<sup>2</sup> The mean statistics are calculated by normalizing the scale of the dependent variables on a 0 to 1 scale.

experience of the Second Gulf War against Iraq and the dragging of it over almost a decade. The picture of change of values will become clearer once this study moves to the individual level analysis since this descriptive statistics can mask differences by individual level variables.

**Table 1: Mean and Mean Changes of Values among U.S. Élites**

	1998	2002	2004
Humanitarianism			
Mean	0.71	0.73	0.82
(st. dev)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.23)
N	376	397	446
Democracy			
	0.58	0.62	0.57
	(0.3)	(0.31)	(0.33)
	377	397	445
Militarism			
	0.74	0.71	0.61
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.35)
	377	396	448
National Economic interest			
	0.72	0.67	0.71
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
	376	393	439

**b. Partisanship and Values Change**

To evaluate the effects of political events on values over the years in a single model, this essay pools three surveys. The estimation results are presented in Table 2 below. In these model estimations, the base category is year 1998 as a dummy variable with Non-decision-making and Republicans. So the effect of the year dummy variable is the comparative effect of the years of 2002 and 2004. Similarly, the interaction terms should be interpreted in comparison to 1998, Non-decision-making Republicans. The first hypothesis states that partisanship conditions the effect of political events on decision-makers’ beliefs in Idealist values.

The first column of Table 2 shows the estimation results of the model for humanitarianism. Since this model estimation shows that there are meaningful three way interactions among events, partisanship and elite’s role in decision-making, the interpretation of the coefficients is complicated. Thus, using figures helps our understanding of the results more intuitive way. These figures are based on the estimation results. The predicted values for the dependent variables were obtained by setting other control variables at their mean or median and using the coefficients for each group.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Several studies ( Kam & Robert J. 2007; Aiken & West 1991) recommend to use graphs to probe the interaction model estimations to present the results more informative way. Each figure is drawn directly based on the estimation results. The predicted values of the dependent variables are obtained by changing the range of the interested independent variable (e.g., partisanship), while all the other remaining independent variables are held at their constant. The package “effects” (Fox & Hong 2009) is used to get the predicted values in R.



**Table 2: Interaction of Partisanship, Events and Sophistication in Accounting for Values**

	Humanitarianism	Democracy Prom.	Militarism	National Int.
Year: 2002	-0.08*	-0.08	-0.02	-0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Year: 2004	0.03	0.01	0.03	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Independents	-0.01	-0.07	0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Democrats	0.02	0.03	0.05	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Decision-Maker	-0.12*	0.04	0.10	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Ideology (high=lib.)	0.06***	0.00	-0.14***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender (female=1)	-0.04*	0.06**	0.04	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.02***	-0.02**	-0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Year: 2002 * Independents	0.12*	0.16*	-0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Year: 2002 * Democrats	0.11*	0.11	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Year: 2004 * Independents	0.11*	0.00	-0.24***	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Year: 2004 * Democrats	0.09*	-0.08	-0.20**	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Year: 2002 * Decision-Maker	0.24***	0.20*	-0.04	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Year: 2004 * Decision-Maker	0.20**	0.13	-0.04	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Independents * Decision-Maker	0.18*	0.09	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Democrats * Decision-Maker	0.15*	0.03	-0.03	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Year: 2002 * Ind * Decision-Maker	-0.27*	-0.19	0.07	-0.10
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Year: 2002 * Demo * Decision- Maker	-0.23**	-0.09	0.05	-0.06
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Year: 2004 * Indep * Decision-Maker	-0.34**	-0.21	0.30*	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Year: 2004 * Demo * Decision-Maker	-0.26**	-0.11	0.06	-0.17
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)
(Intercept)	0.45***	0.61***	1.12***	0.75**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
R2	0.19	0.08	0.26	0.03
N	1159	1159	1161	1151

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05; + p < 0.1; two tailed; OLS estimation results.

Although major interest in the effect of partisanship is the difference between Democrats and Republicans and there are no specific theoretical expectation on Independents, the results for Independents are also presented here. Democrats and Independents are not significantly different from Republicans in their attachment to humanitarianism in 1998 among non-decision-makers, although Democrats are slightly more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than Republicans. The coefficients for Independent and Democrats (-.01 and .02) are small in their size, and thus are statistically insignificant. However, the difference on humanitarianism between Democrats and Republicans who are not participating in decision-making in 2002 grows larger. The coefficients for the interaction between partisanship and years are statistically significant.

The interaction terms between 2002 and Independent and 2002 and Democrats are .12 and .11 respectively. Both of them are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). This suggests that non-decision-making Democrats and Independents in 2002 are more likely than Republicans in 2002 to support humanitarianism when other variables are controlled. The same pattern persists in 2004. Although the size of coefficients get slightly smaller (.1 for Independents and .09 for Democrats in 2004), they are still statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ). Table 3 and Figure 1 (Panel 1) show the estimation results more clearly. Since the three-way interaction term shows the variation by “decision-making role”, the comparison is discussed in a later section. So far the interaction between partisanship and events are limited to non-decision-makers.

**Table 3: Predicted Values: Humanitarianism**

U.S. Élites’ Role						
Non-Decision-Maker			Decision-Maker			
Partisanship			Partisanship			
year	Republicans	Independents	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
1998	0.70	0.70	0.72	0.58	0.75	0.75
2002	0.62	0.74	0.76	0.74	0.76	0.79
2004	0.73	0.83	0.84	0.81	0.75	0.82

The model estimation for democracy shows a different result from the model for humanitarianism.<sup>1</sup> The estimation results in Table 2 (second column) reveal that partisanship does not have a significant differential effect in the baseline year, 1998. In that year, Democrats and Republicans (among non-decision-makers) were not much different in their belief in democracy promotion. But after the 9/11 attacks, Democrat non-decision-making elites were more likely (about 10%) than their counterpart Republicans to believe in democracy-promotion. The same tendency applies to Independents. However, the 2003 invasion of Iraq had a limited influence on non-decision-making Democrats and Independents. The coefficients of the interaction term are negative, which is consistent with expectation, but their magnitude is not large enough ( $b = -.08$ ).

<sup>1</sup> Although the three-way interaction model performs poorly for “democracy-promotion” this study presents this model to make comparison with other values consistent. The two-way interaction model produces a slightly different results. Especially, the interaction between year 2004 and Democrats is negative and statistically significant while other findings are the same. This suggests that Democrats are far less likely to be supportive of democracy-promotion than Republicans in 2004, regardless of their decision-making role. The two-way interaction model estimation is available from author upon request.

**Table 4: Predicted Values: Democracy-Promotion**

Year	U.S. Élites' Role					
	Non-Decision-Maker			Decision-Maker		
	Partisanship			Partisanship		
	Republicans	Independents	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
1998	0.57	0.5	0.6	0.61	0.64	0.67
2002	0.48	0.58	0.62	0.73	0.72	0.81
2004	0.58	0.51	0.53	0.76	0.58	0.63

This result suggests that both non-decision-making Democrats and Independents became more supportive of democracy-promotion after they experienced the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks”. Also their belief in democracy-promotion was influenced by their experience with the Second Gulf War invasion of Iraq with limited magnitude.

Table 4 and Figure 1 (Panel 3) show that the partisan differences among non-decision-makers. There is large differences between Democrats and Republicans in 2002 (.14). The gap (-.05) grow larger in 2004, although it is not statistically significant. The “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” made non-decision-making Democrats and Independents more than Republicans believe in democracy-promotion, but the invasion of Iraq made them become cautious on such ideal once they observed the Bush Jr. administration’s decision to invade Iraq and unfolding events.

While partisanship differentiates the way elites interpret the events in accounting for their belief in the Idealist values, the interaction terms between years and partisanship in accounting for militarism and national interests show a limited effect. An exception is the interaction terms between year 2004 and partisanship in militarism and national economic interest. The negative coefficients in the interaction term between partisanship and year 2004 (-.17 for Democrats and -.17 for Independent) suggest that non-decision-making Democrats and Independents began to distance themselves from their earlier belief in militarism after the experience of the invasion of Iraq and the long-term post-war peacekeeping.

Figure 2 (Panel 1) shows non-decision-making partisans’ contrasting reaction to the Second Gulf War against Iraq in accounting for their belief in militarism. While there was no virtual difference in their belief in militarism by partisans in 1998 and 2002, the gap between Democrats and Republicans emerged in 2004 after the Second Gulf War against Iraq among non-decision-makers. The same difference shows-up among Independents.

On the other hand, non-decision-making Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe in national economic interest in 2004 (b=.09). The Second Gulf War against Iraq made non-decision-making Democrats pay more attention to national economic interest. Unlike the expectation, the Second Gulf War and long-term post-war peacekeeping influenced partisan division on Realist values too.

Figure 1: Events, Partisanship and Decision-Making Role on Idealist Values




Table 5: Predicted Values: Militarism

U.S. Élites' Role							
Non-Decision-Maker				Decision-Maker			
Partisanship				Partisanship			
year	Republicans	Independents	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	Democrats	
1998	0.7	0.73	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.81	
2002	0.68	0.67	0.71	0.73	0.72	0.8	
2004	0.73	0.51	0.58	0.78	0.78	0.67	

Table 6: Predicted Values: National Interest

U.S. Élites' Role					
Non-Decision-Maker			Decision-Maker		
Partisanship			Partisanship		
Republicans	Independents	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	Democrats
0.73	0.7	0.71	0.71	0.62	0.79
0.65	0.67	0.64	0.72	0.59	0.75
0.66	0.68	0.72	0.74	0.69	0.74

### c. U.S. Élites' Role in the Decision-Making and Values Change

Consistent with the expectation in the second hypothesis elites' role in the decision-making process differentiates the effects of events on U.S. elites' belief in Idealist values. Tables 2 and 3 show that the effect of elites' affiliation on humanitarianism. As the effect of elites' role in decision-making depends on the events and partisanship it is necessary to understand the effect in the context of three-way interaction estimation. The coefficients show that there are strong differential effect by elites' decision-making role in accounting for their belief in humanitarianism in 1998, 2002 and 2004. The predicted values and figures (Figure 1) clearly shows that Republican decision-makers are far less likely (12%) than Republican non-decision-makers believe in humanitarianism in 1998. But this shifts dramatically after they experience the 9/11 attacks. Those Republican elites who worked in the administration, House and Senate are less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than elites who were affiliated with private think tanks, universities, religious organizations and mass-media in 1998. But this relationship began to change when the elites experienced the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and 2003 invasion of Iraq. In other words, the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" made those Republican elites who participated directly in foreign policy decision-making accept humanitarianism more readily than those Republican elites who were not involved in the decision-making process. This is an understandable reaction from the perspective of Republican elites who are in charge of government decision-making. Those events required American decision-makers to consider their commitment in international affairs to increase the legitimacy of American leadership. One important way to enhance the image of America as a world leader is to employ an ideal not only on which Americans can easily agree, but also which world citizens can readily accept as an important goal of foreign policy. Humanitarianism fulfilled such task in situations such as that in which America was attacked by international terrorists. Even after the Second Gulf War and failure to stabilize Iraq, Republican decision-makers were substantially more likely than non-decision-making Republicans to believe in humanitarianism. The "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and Second Gulf War against Iraq made Republican decision-makers believe in the importance of humanitarianism.

While Republican decision-makers and non-decision-makers are reacting differently to events, Democrat and Independent decision-makers show similar reaction to the events. For example, Democrat decision-makers are about 3% more likely than Democrat non-decision-makers to believe in humanitarianism (Table 3) in 1998. This tendency of small gap between decision-makers and non-decision-makers among Democrats and Independents persist over the years. This contrasting picture shows that the main effect of decision-making role in accounting for elites' belief in humanitarianism depends on partisanship. This will be elaborated in the later section.


The elites' role in decision-making influences their belief in democracy-promotion: elites who work in the government and dealt with foreign policy issues were not much different from those elites who were not in the government in their stance toward democracy-promotion regardless of partisanship in 1998. But this began to change after the 9/11 attacks. The coefficient of interaction term between the elites' affiliation and year 2002 is .20 and statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction action term for 2004 is .13, although it fails to pass the significant test. The predicted values in Table 4 and Figure 2 show that the relationship between elites' affiliation with government and their acceptance of democracy as foreign policy goal changed according to political events. Experiencing the disastrous attack on America made the decision-making elites embrace democracy-promotion as an important foreign policy goal compared to the non-decision-making elites across all partisan groups. The decision-making elites' reaction to the event and their stance towards



democracy is important because it counters the general expectation that democracy-promotion became important among elites as a justification for the invasion of Iraq. After the Second Gulf War against Iraq began, the decision-making elites showed even higher support for democracy, but there is a variation by partisanship. This result shows that decision-making elites were keener on the idea than non-decision-making elites earlier than we might otherwise have assumed. Although the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent failures to achieve the proposed goals of the war contributed to the reduced gap between the decision-making elites and non-decision-making elites regarding their support for democracy promotion, the gap between the decision-making elites and non-decision-making elites was larger after 9/11. The external threat had a more significant impact on decision-makers than non-decision-makers, because the decision-makers are responsible for their decisions and protecting the nation from threat. With this pressure, the decision-makers were more likely to pursue democracy-promotion as a strategic goal than the non-decision-makers.

Although the decision-making role conditions the effect of events on elites’ beliefs in idealist values, it does not conditions the effect of events on elites belief in the Realist values: militarism and national economic interest. Regardless of their role in decision-making elites show similar reaction to the events in forming their belief in the values.

Figure 2: Events, Partisanship and Decision-Making Role on Realist Values



#### d. The Interaction of Partisanship and the Decision-Making Role

The main point of interest in exploring the three way interaction term is whether Democrats who worked in the decision-making process would react differently to the events and in turn change their belief in humanitarianism. Although there are different ways to examine the three-way interactions, this study pays attention to the question of how the two-way interaction effect of “partisanship and events” changed according to élites’ affiliation. The two-way interaction effect has already been established above. Democrats were more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism after they experienced 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. The more important question is whether the élites’ affiliation with decision-making affected the relationship or not. The sign of the three way interaction term between year 2002, Democrats and decision-makers in the Table 2 is  $-.23$ . Since there was a significant large difference between Democrats and Republicans in supporting humanitarianism in 2002, the negative sign of the three way interaction suggests that the difference between these partisans is getting significantly smaller among the decision-makers as compared to the non-decision-makers. This does not mean that Democrat decision-makers were less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism, but only that the gap has been reduced among the decision-makers in 2002. The gap could have been reduced because Democrat decision-makers were less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than non-decision-making Democrats or because Republican decision-makers increased their support for humanitarianism after they experienced the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks”. This will be clearer when the relevant graph is examined. The same logic is applied to the coefficient of Independent decision-makers in 2002, because the coefficient for the three-way interaction term is negative ( $b = -.27$ ) and statistically significant.

The 2003 Second Gulf War and invasion of Iraq, followed by the failure to permanently stabilize that country against local insurgencies, affected U.S. partisan support for humanitarianism. The coefficients of the three-way interaction terms of Democrats, affiliation and year 2004 is  $-.26$  and is statistically significant. The coefficient for Independents, decision-makers and year 2004 is even greater  $-.34$  and statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ). The negative sign of the coefficients, again, suggests that the events made the gap between Democrats and Republicans (and Independents and Republicans) among decision-makers smaller than among non-decision-makers in 2004. Similar to the effect of the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Iraq and unfolding events could lead rival partisan decision-makers in 2004 closer to each other regarding their support for humanitarianism.

The predicted values in Table 3 and Figure 1 (Panels 1 and 2) provide a better way of understanding the relationship among partisanship, élites’ affiliation and the political events noted. Although there are three different ways to probe the three way interaction terms, this study privileges this particular graph to show how the élites’ affiliation with decision-making in government affects the relationship between partisanship and political events.<sup>1</sup> The left panel of the graph shows the change in the relationship between partisanship and support for humanitarianism along the years among the non-decision-makers. In contrast to the left panel, the right panel shows the same relationship among the

<sup>1</sup> Different ways of graphical presentation of the three-way interaction effects depend on our interest in a specific variable. For example, if we want to know how the two-way interaction between “partisanship and year” varies by “élites’ affiliation with decision-making organization”, we can make the affiliation as a varying independent variable. The graph here is based on this approach. If we want to know how the two-way interaction between “year and élite’s affiliation” varies by “partisanship”, we can set the “partisanship” as a varying independent variable. Finally, if we want to know how the two-way interaction between “élites’ affiliation and partisanship” varies by “year”, we can set the “year” variable as an independent variable in making the graphs. In all, the graphs are based on the  $3$  (partisanship categories)  $\times 3$  (years)  $\times 2$  (affiliation categories) = 18 points of predicted values from the estimation.

decision-makers. The three-way interaction among partisanship, élites' affiliation and year can be clearly seen by comparing these two panels. We can see that the gap reduction between Democrat decision-makers and Republican decision-makers stems from Republicans decision-makers' change. Republican decision-makers' support for humanitarianism has dramatically increased from 1998 to 2002. The sharp increase of support for humanitarianism among decision-makers stands in stark contrast to the response of Republican non-decision-making élites in 2002. In reaction to the 9/11 events Republican non-decision-makers withdrew their support for humanitarianism. As the graph shows the slope for Republicans in the left panel moves downward. By 2004, Republican decision-makers move even further in their support for humanitarianism and their level of support for the ideal converges with the level of Democrat decision-makers. Although Republican non-decision-makers (see the left panel) increase their support for humanitarianism in reaction to the experience of the invasion of Iraq, the gap between Democrat (or Independent) non-decision-makers and their Republican counterparts is not narrowing. The gap between Republicans and Democrats in non-decision-makers is growing, while the gap is reduced among decision-making partisans as they experience the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and the Second Gulf War. This clearly suggests the conditional effect of the decision-making role on the effect of partisanship and events on élites' belief in humanitarianism.

The three-way interaction term (year, partisanship and elite's affiliation with decision-making) in the model for democracy shows a very different picture than that for humanitarianism. As mentioned above, partisans responded differently to the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and showed their different level of attachment to democracy promotion. The three-way interaction term demonstrates how those élites who were in the decision-making positions reacted to the events differently from those élites who were not members of government decision-making institutions. The coefficients of the three-way interaction of year 2002, Democrats and decision-makers is negative (-.09), but it is not statistically significant. This means that, while there was a large gap between Democrat and Republican non-decision-makers in their support for democracy in 2002, that gap is not different from the gap between Democrat decision-makers and Republican decision-makers in that year. Participating in the decision-making process did not change the impact of the political event of 9/11 on Democrat and Republican decision-makers, whose difference on democracy-promotion is still maintained. The pattern is the same for Independents.

The conditional effect of U.S. élites' role in the decision-making process on the relationship between the invasion of Iraq and partisanship on democracy-promotion shows a similar pattern. The coefficient of the interaction term year 2004, Democrats and decision-making élites is -.11, but it fails to reach a conventional significance level: the direction is inconsistent with the expectation. It was hypothesized that the partisan gap on their belief in democracy-promotion will be smaller among decision-makers than among non-decision-makers. Being involved in decision-making does not differentiate the impact of the invasion of Iraq and partisanship on democracy-promotion. Both Democrats who participated in decision-making institutions and those Democrats who did withdraw their support for democracy-promotion after they experienced the invasion of Iraq. Similar pattern is found for Independents. The predicted values in Table 4 and Figure 1 shows the pattern of change. The gap between Republicans and Democrats (or Independents) in each year among non-decision-makers group and decision-makers group show a similar pattern with a limited magnitude of difference. The gap between Republicans and Democrats among non-decision-makers is .03, .14 and -.05 in 1998, 2002 and 2004 respectively. Similarly, the gap between Republican and Democrat decision-makers is .06, .08 and -.13 in 1998, 2002 and 2004 respectively. It shows a limited magnitude of conditioning effect of decision-making, even though there is a tendency of it.

The three-way interaction effect is limited in U.S. élites' belief in militarism and national interests. As it is shown in Table 2, Independents decision-makers and non-decision-makers sharply differ in their belief in militarism in 2004. After the invasion of Iraq the gap between Republican and Independent non-decision-makers are far greater (-.22) than that of decision-makers (0). While Independent non-decision-makers are less likely to support militarism, Independent decision-makers, like Republican decision-makers, believe in militarism. But there is no three-way interaction effect for Democrats, which is consistent with the expectation. In terms of national economic interests, the three-way interaction exists only for Democrats in 2004. The gap between Democrats and Republicans among non-decision-makers is .06, but there is no gap between Democrat and Republican decision-makers in that year. This conditional effect of the decision-making role is unexpected, although the magnitude of effect remains relatively small. An *ad hoc* explanation for this finding is that decision-makers regardless of partisan orientation share common beliefs in the importance of both economic interests and humanitarianism after the Second Gulf War against Iraq, while partisan division between Democrats and Republicans trumps the effect of the "decision-making role" on their belief in democracy-promotion and militarism. Thus, U.S. partisan division is so strong that the "decision-making role" fails to moderate the effect of partisanship on these values.

### Conclusions

The results show how élites respond to events and adjust their belief in foreign policy values. One general pattern is that there is a different pattern of change. The effect of events is fairly limited in accounting for their belief in Realist values. On the other hand, the effect of events in accounting for U.S. élites' belief in Idealist values depends on élites' political predisposition and the decision-making role within the institutions. The "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and Second Gulf War confirmed the importance of national security based on military power and economic security. Under this emergency and crisis situation, élites are more likely to adopt Realist values in their view of foreign policy. As for Idealist values, élites' partisanship and role in decision-making differentiate their belief in these values. Being Democrats and Republicans makes a difference in their acceptance of humanitarianism in different political contexts. Similarly, decision-making status differentiates élites' beliefs in humanitarianism. Furthermore, the effect of partisanship on the value is moderated by the decision-making role.

Among the non-decision-makers, partisanship gap is growing as they experience the events. But among decision-makers, the partisan gap is reduced over the years. Thus, U.S. élites' belief in humanitarianism becomes a central issue that draws partisan attention. In addition, the finding shows that decision-makers do have different perspective, due to their responsibilities. For example, Republican decision-makers quickly catch up with their Democrat counterparts in their belief in humanitarianism after the "9/11 Terrorist Attacks" and Second Gulf War. Given that Republicans tend to be hawkish and Realist in foreign policy, this is an unusual move. But Republicans in the decision-making arena, control the direction of the national foreign policy and cross-resolution have to be more cautious in coming up with alternatives and solutions. When out-of-power, the Republican élites, including President Bush Jr., were initially critical of U.S. involvement in international affairs during the Bill Clinton administration and emphasized Realist and even neo-Isolationist approach. But once they were in power with responsible positions, Republican élites, as studies have shown (Tetlock and others 1984) modified their belief in humanitarianism. The clear difference between Republican non-decision-makers and decision-makers strongly support this. Partisanship and the decision-making role in government individually moderate the effect of crises on élites' belief in democracy-promotion. The effect of three

way interaction is limited for democracy-promotion and militarism. Regardless of decision-making role, Democrats are more likely to be disillusioned with “democracy-promotion” and “militarism” after the experience of the Second Gulf War.

An implication of these findings is that U.S. élites selectively modified their beliefs in values in reaction to foreign crises selectively. Studies on values change tend to focus on stability of élites’ attitudes. But what we are observing here is that that this argument is only half true. Although élites tend to remain stable in their belief in values under different political context, external shocks do shake up élites’ belief in some values: Idealist values. As scholars (e.g., Inglehart 1981; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989) point-out individuals adjust their values in response to external crises. Under these conditions self-preserving security remains the major concern, there will not be substantial division over Realist values. But there is a plenty of room for differences to emerge towards Idealist values. These values are harder to agree on and invite different interpretations. Studies on public opinion (e.g., Carmines & Stimson 1980, Alvarez & Brehm 2002, Wittkopf & Maggiotto 1983) already pointed-out that types of issues (hard or easy) make certain elements of reasoning (e.g., sophistication level and partisanship) play more important roles in forming opinions. Thus, the political context and the characteristics of values produce different reactions.

A related, but more important implication is that the impact of the events on élites’ belief in values are moderated by élites’ characteristics. Contrary to *Elite Theory* (e.g., Dye 2002, Dye & Zeigler 1981) that posits that homogeneous élites would share similar values and react to external conditions in a similar way, élites are not homogenous in their belief in Idealist values. Consistent with existing studies that emphasize the precedence and central role of partisanship (Goren 2005, Goren, Federico & Kittilson 2009, McCann 1997) and role in institutions (Tetlock 1984), the élites’ political predisposition and role in institution conditions the way they interpret events and in turn form their belief in values. Unlike the theory that emphasize the homogeneity of élites, this study provides a more nuanced findings. Although U.S. élites share similarity in their socio-economic status, knowledge, information and interest in politics, their political orientation and decision-making role distinguishes their belief in values. Especially, the partisan affiliation and decision-making role of élites’ clearly filters their interpretation of events and belief in values. But the effect of partisanship on élites’ beliefs in values emerged only after the U.S. experienced unprecedented crises. Even though Democrat and Republican élites had clashed over foreign policy goals during the Clinton administration, they did not differ substantially over the values. But the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” and the 2003 invasion of Iraq shook élites and sparked more partisan reactions towards them. While Democrats and Republicans differ mostly on Idealist values, the partisan discord is strengthened on militarism after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It shows that the severe fall-out on Democrat élites’ belief in militarism comes with the Second Gulf War, which remains a core element of national security. The post-war failure to stabilize Iraq and achieve the originally-proposed goals of régime-change and democratization strengthened the partisan divisions on the role of militarism, which was not initially considered an object of partisan interpretation.

Similarly, decision-making role modifies the effect of events in accounting for élites’ belief in Idealist values. U.S. élites who were in the decision-making circle showed a substantially different stance towards these values in reaction to crises events. Élites who took part in the foreign policy decision-making process were more likely to accept Idealists after they experienced the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As élites who were in the decision-making circle might have felt pressure to be more responsible for the events, they took a more comprehensive stance in dealing with the new crises by emphasizing Idealism as well as military power. Being in a responsible position in government



decision-making place élites in a different mind-set and forces them to interpret the events differently from élites who do not have to take such responsibilities. In addition, their position would foster them to engage in instrumental thinking. To deal with terrorist attacks, élites might need to consider all possible alternatives, rather than a limited number of choices. With this need, they have to go outside of their usual patterns of consideration and belief-systems. Although élites are relatively small compared to the mass public, there are still divisions and differences among élites in shaping their foreign policy goals. It is particularly interesting to see such divisions become prominent when the nation faces serious crises. Usually, it is expected that national crises might produce a united reaction from élites. The difference between decision-makers and non-decision-makers on the Idealist values was strengthened after they experienced the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks”, which supposedly united all Americans. Even if the terrorists’ attacks united Americans, they also provoked divisions among élites over the foreign policy goals according to their role in decision-making.

Although the source to anchor U.S. élites’ values is slightly different from Murray’s (2002) study, the strong effect of partisanship in accounting for élites’ value-changes suggest that partisans division is not limited in domestic politics. Especially the Second Gulf War against Iraq worsened élites’ partisan division on democracy-promotion and militarism, which are important elements of neo-Conservatives’ foreign policy belief. Although it needs more study on the lasting effect of the Second Gulf War against Iraq on values among élites, the findings implies that the Second Gulf War alone stoked partisan divisions among U.S. élites regarding their belief in those values. The long peacekeeping against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan with the justification of the war with the ideal of democracy-promotion undermined Democrats’ belief in democracy-promotion. This experience pushed even Independents to behave like Democrats. The worsening partisan division on these values cast a pessimistic future on Liberal internationalism (or active internationalism in general) in U.S. foreign policy. But there is a sign of agreement between partisan elite decision-makers on humanitarianism. At least this conversion suggests that the experience of the “9/11 Terrorist Attacks” and Second Gulf War against Iraq made élite decision-makers to reconsider the importance of humanitarianism in U.S. foreign policy. The existence of a three-way interaction effect on humanitarianism and national economic interest, but the lack of this effect on democracy-promotion and militarism suggest that the Second Gulf War against Iraq created the strongest possible partisan division on the values that representing neoConservatism.

## Appendix

The U.S. public opinion surveys used in this research work were conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, 2002 and 2004 through a telephone survey. There are 9 categories from which U.S. élites are drawn: U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, Administration, business, media, labor leaders, educators, religious leaders, special interest-groups and private foreign policy organizations. These members were selected in a similar way for each survey, by using the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations’ Leadership *Topline* 2002 annual survey. The respondents for each group were selected in the following way:

- all U.S. Representatives’ names were selected from the *Congressional Yellow Book* (published by Leadership Directories, 2002). If the House or Senate member was not available, the interview was conducted with their Legislative Assistants responsible for foreign affairs.
- The names of U.S. Assistant Secretaries and other senior level staff in the Administration who were interviewed were selected from various agencies and offices dealing with foreign affairs (see the *Federal Yellow Book*, published by Leadership Directories, 2002).

- In the business sector, Vice-Presidents in charge of international affairs were interviewed and top industrial corporations in the *Fortune 1000* list were included. Business respondents' names were provided by idEXEC, a leading supplier of sampling of business executives.
- In the media, interviews were conducted with television and radio news directors, network news-casters, newspaper editors and columnists, selected from: *News Media Yellow Book* (published by Leadership Directories, 2002).
- For Labor Leaders, interviews targeted some Presidents of the largest Labor Unions, using as directory the *Capital Source* (published by the National Journal Group, 2002, and Dun and Bradstreet, 2002).
- Educators included Presidents and faculty who teach in the area of foreign affairs from a list of universities provided by *Market Data Retrieval* (2002), a firm specializing in sampling for educational institutions.
- Religious leaders included religious leaders representing all faiths, proportionate to the number of Americans worshipping each faith, based on the directory, *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000).
- Special interest-groups interviews were conducted with Presidents from large interest-groups involved in foreign policy, using as directory, *Capital Source* (published by the National Journal Group, 2002).
- For private foreign policy organizations, interviews were conducted with Presidents from major private foreign policy organizations using as directory, *Capital Source, The Who's Who, What, Where in Washington: Think-Tanks* (published by National Journal Group, 2002).

### Dependent Variables and Questions Posed

Question posed: "Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all?"

#### *Democracy-promotion*

"Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations?" ("very important"=1, somewhat important"=.5, "not important at all"=0)

#### *Humanitarianism*

"Combating world hunger or Helping to improve the standard of living of less-Developed nations?" ("very important"=1, somewhat important"=.5, "not important at all"=0)

#### *Militarism*

"Maintaining superior military power world-wide?" ("very important"=1, somewhat important"=.5, "not important at all"=0)

#### *National Economic Interest*

"Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" (yes=1, no=0)?

### Independent Variables:

#### *Partisanship:*

"How would you describe your party affiliation?" (Republican=1, Independent=2, Democrat=3)

*Political Ideology:*

“How would you describe your political views range: from extremely Conservative=1 to extremely Liberal=6?”

*Decision-making role:*

Dichotomous variable. U.S. Members of House of Representatives or Senate or Administration =1, otherwise (business, media, labor leaders, education, religious organizations, interest-groups and private foreign policy organizations) =0.

*Gender:* Gender of Respondent (Male=1, Female=0)

*Age:* Age of respondent.

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## ARAB CONNECTIONS AND UPSURGE OF INSURGENCY IN AFRICA: CASE-STUDY OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

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FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2013

**ABSTRACT:** There has been a dramatic increase in intra-state conflicts in Africa and many countries in Africa have experienced an upsurge of insurgency within their territories. This paper begins with the history of insurgency in Africa and delves into the causes of the upsurge of insurgency in the continent in recent times with particular reference to the *Boko Haram* menace within Nigeria. The paper traces the origin of *Boko Haram* and probes into its links with international terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. Using religious imperialism as the framework, the paper concludes that the *Boko Haram* insurgency is inspired by *jihadi-Salafi* ideology espoused by Saudi Arabia and is the last stage of the long drawn attempt to Islamize Nigeria. Only if the Nigerian government with international cooperation takes serious proactive steps to end *Boko Haram's* menace, it can also stem the rise of other regional Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies in the future.

### Introduction

The history of insurgent uprising in Africa started with the *Mau-Mau* peasant revolt in Kenya in 1952. The *Mau-Mau* revolt was as a result "of economic and social disaffection in rural areas combined with the political radicalism of Nairobi" (Heather, 1999: p.1). Since then insurgent confrontations have been on the increase on the African continent especially in recent times.

Some of these wars have had negative reverberations on the continent that transcend national boundaries. Every year, thousands of lives are lost in Africa because of armed conflict: the Council on Foreign Relations (2012: p1) estimates the death toll due to armed conflict at about 250,000 per year. Perry (2011: p.1-2) has chronicled a list of terrorist activities in the continent in recent times to include the kidnapping of a Swede, a Dutch and a South African from a restaurant in Timbuktu, the killing of a German and the abduction of two French geologists in Mali, plus *al-Shabab's* war against the official government in Somalia and its protectors (African Union soldiers from Uganda and Burundi) with several grenade attacks by *al-Shabab* suicide-bombers in Kenya that killed 76 people in the Ugandan capital, Kampala in July 2010.

This has led to a redefinition in a negative image for Africa as a continent that is perpetually at war: a land of "...'evil', 'danger', 'criminality', 'disease', 'disorder', 'anarchy' and 'mindless violence'" (Omeje, 2007: p.101). As such, Africa's unique history as the cradle of civilization has been obliterated today by these internecine wars in various parts of the continent. Thus, according to Irele (1999: p.100):

*The visual image that is beamed on television across the world about Africa is that of a continent embroiled in fratricidal wars that are ethnically motivated. This image has become the predominant signifier of the continent's woes presented by the Western media for their viewer's consumption. Again and again, in newscasts about Africa, one encounters this image in their monotonous regularity and the image has become so pervasive and fixed in people's sub-consciousness to the extent that it has become the generative source of all ideas about the entire continent.*

This problem has portrayed Africa to the outside world as a continent pervaded with "...poverty, diseases, civil disturbances, revolt, insurgence, guerrilla warfare, domestic rebellion and in recent time terrorism..." (Ogundiya, 2010: p.1). This informs the post 9/11 re-securization of Africa by the West as a zone of terror (Omeje, 2007: p.93). According to him (Omeje, 2007: p.102), "Africa is increasingly securitized as a zone of terror in the U.S. ..." Quoting Keenan (2004b) and Diallo (2005), Omeje (2007: p.102) noted that "senior officials of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), senior U.S. government officials, CIA counter-intelligence reports and Western media have played a big part in the redefinition of Africa as a potential breeding ground for Islamist militancy and a safe-haven for terrorists..."

Although most authors have attributed these recurrent spates of violence on the continent to ethnic rivalries and the failures of African governments, the major cause of frequent uprisings in Africa must be sought also outside the continent, while it cannot however be denied that in most countries of Africa, the state has reneged on its responsibility in the social contract, which is the basis upon which patriotism is founded (Achebe, 1984: p.15). This is just a part of the explanation for insurgent violence against governments of such states, including Nigeria, where violence is traceable to one section that has some connection with the Arab world, while other sections not having close affinities with the Arab world and whose people are living under the same conditions wrought by failed government remain peaceful and devoid of insurgent uprisings.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Twenty-First Century Africa has been rebranded as a continent ridden with insurgency and a breeding ground for terrorists and suicide-bombers. This unfortunate appellation is due to the ubiquity of insurgent uprisings in the continent in recent times. However such rebranding is a very wide generalization as there remain some parts of Africa that are not beleaguered by this blight.

Arab North Africa has witnessed the greatest occurrences of insurgent movements compared to Black Africa south of the Sahara. The greatest factor that has amplified the upsurge of insurgency in Africa is the Arab connection. The trade and most importantly, the religious relations of North Africa with the Arab world have contributed to the increasing manifestation of insurgency in this part of the continent and a consequent destabilization of the entire continent through agents from this geographic section. For instance, the "Arab Springs" spilled over into North Africa and resulted in the Algerian students' protest against the government of Abdellaziz Bouteflika in April 2011. This reverberated into Egypt and other parts of Africa.

Extremism and terrorism in North Africa seems to have reached alarming proportions. Quoting Mazrui (2005: p.15) and Keenan (2004a), Omeje (2007: p.102) shows that "the new realization that there are large Muslim population in Africa north of the equator (West Africa, Sahel-Arab Maghreb and Horn of Africa) has suddenly fuelled disquieting discourses of anger and terror in the West since the commencement of the global war on terror."

CSIS (2010: p.2) reported that North African terrorism which was largely directed at domestic governments in the 1990s has later assumed the international dimensions of today, with Arab terrorists from Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya have been known to have sponsored or be directly involved in terrorist activities in Europe, etc.

Until the 2007 United States' strikes against "al-Qaeda in Iraq", faction-ridden Iraq seemed to have become the breeding-ground also for North African terrorists groups. It projected some local insurgent groups like the *Salafi* Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) into international terrorist limelight, it provided a stream of suicide-bombers with logistics and became the rallying point and

recruitment center for the training of *ihadists* to be set to Europe and America. Iraq therefore provided the “fateful triangle” [à la Professor Jean-Pierre Filiu] between North Africa, Europe and Iraq (CSIS, 2010: p.2).

The defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq witnessed the later metamorphosis of the Algerian GPSC into the “Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Godec, Deputy-Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism at the State Department, as quoted by CSIS (2010: p.3), AQIM is “today, the biggest terrorist challenge facing the Maghreb... and in terms of statements, strategy and tactics, AQIM’s behavior mimics that of al-Qaeda generally.” The report went further to show that “AQIM operates, recruits and plans in ungoverned spaces, launches attacks against both civilians and military targets and kidnaps Westerners. In approving the creation of AQIM, al-Qaeda’s central leadership hoped that Algeria would become another center of the global *ihad*”.

The desire of AQIM and other insurgent groups therefore is to internationalize terror. Unfortunately, the defeat of their global goal through U.S. military efforts has led these groups to shift the focus of their operations to regions and specific strategic countries through which they could ultimately achieve their long term goal of global coverage. This informs the rise of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria.

### Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The methodology used for this study is descriptive analysis based on secondary data. It drew inspiration from published and unpublished materials such as international, national, governmental, semi-governmental, private corporate bodies, expert committee and commission, newspaper and magazine reports, books, as well as research reports. Some of the reports consulted include annually, quarterly, monthly, fortnightly, weekly and daily published works by organizations like:

- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- United Nations Organization
- Local and International Dailies, etc.

Other sources consulted include published research work by scholars on the upsurge of insurgencies in Africa and the *Boko Haram* in Nigeria in particular. Some unpublished research works were also consulted in the course of the study.

One of the major causes of problems in Africa is the imperialist exploits of the continent, especially religious imperialism. Some of the alien religions that have been brought to Africa have had negative swelling impact on the continent.

Imperialism has diverse strands including political imperialism, economic imperialism, religious imperialism, cultural imperialism and assimilative imperialism, etc. Of all these forms of imperialism, religious imperialism seems to be more subtle than the other forms of imperialism because it reinforces the other forms, especially, cultural imperialism and assimilative imperialism.

Religion, it would be agreed, is part of the culture of its originators and therefore it carries in its spread the threads of such culture. Religious imperialism seeks to “civilize” the target population based on the claim of the superiority of the object of worship. Religious imperialists therefore disparage the object of worship of the target population and thereby brand them as “idol worshippers”, “barbarians”, “unbelievers” or the extreme of “infidels”. Being redefined as “barbarians”, the target population is regarded as “semi-humans”, inferior spiritually, morally and even intellectually and socially. Therefore, religious imperialists feel “compelled” to convert them to their religion in order to “civilize” them. Where they resist conversion, some religion, like Islam, encourages the bloody elimination of “infidels”.

The process of conversion involves the transmission of the tenets of a particular faith to the prospective converts. Such transmission most of the time takes place in the language of the imperialists.

With language which is a part of the culture of the imperialist forces, a wholesale transmission of the culture of the imperialists takes place. The end result is that, the convert is dispossessed, not only of his original object of worship, but of his original personality and character which are transformed into copies of the imperialists. According to Maunier (1949: p.184), this results in assimilation or assimilative imperialism. The overall effect is that the people are disinherited: they begin to feel that they no longer belong to the nationality of their forebears, and so disparage their origins and believe they belong to, become more loyal to and receive and act on the basis of the instructions of the imperialists.

This seems to validate Karl Marx assertion that religion is the opiate of the people and is also the explanation for the allegiance and sympathy Africans north of the Sahara manifest towards Arab cause.

### Origins of Boko Haram

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri by a radical Islamic cleric, Mohammad Yusuf with the official Arabic name of *جماعة الدعوة والجهاد لخدمة أهل السنة والجماعة* translated as *Jama'atul Ahul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad*, which means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad" (Johnson, 2011). But over the years, the name *Boko Haram*, meaning "Western Education is Sin" has supplanted the official name of the group. This name, as reported in *Ngex* (2012), is believed to have been given as a label to this extremist group by the immediate community of Maiduguri, in Bornu State, where the group was founded as a result of Yusuf's abhorrence of anything Western. The sect however has since accepted this name in their official nomenclature.

However, others say that the label *Boko Haram* is just a cover name to confuse, mislead or a calculated attempt to deceive the public on the main aim of the organization (Usman, 2011), beyond the implication that the group's major goal should be the eradication of Western Education or its structures. Instead, the group's targets to date and main intention according to *Ngex* (2012) are that: "...Some of the group's recent attacks, like the bombing of a United Nations (U.N.) building in Abuja, seem to suggest that the group's ambitions are broader than initially believed..." Thus, Johnson (2011) and *Ngex* (2012) affirm that the acknowledged goal of the *Boko Haram* is: "to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of criminal Sharia courts across the country".

It would be agreed that such imposing goals and the magnitude of terrorist activities carried out by the group to date can neither be conceived nor achieved by a group that is largely without an organized structure. This fact suggests that there may be some form of invisible hand outside the group that is controlling its operations from behind the scenes.

### Boko Haram's Massacres in Nigeria

Since 2009, *Boko Haram* has been terrorizing Nigeria by bombing churches, in particular and attacking other public institutions, including the U.N. building in Abuja in August 2011. In an apparent underestimation of the group's capability and range at its inception, President Goodluck Jonathan promised to deal decisively with the terrorists, which he called "a faceless group of enemies of our democracy and prosperity of our nation..." (AFP, 2012). In reaction to the President's threat, the group's current leader, Abubakar Shekau, according to a report in the *Journal of Turkish News* (2012), released a 14-minute YouTube video calling the President's reaction as an empty threat. To make good his words, the *Boko Haram* terrorists began to carry out a number of suicide-bombings and assassinations from Maiduguri to Abuja. A chronological account of the terrorist activities of the group from 2009 to January 2012 reported by *Ngex* (2012) include: the refusal of *Boko Haram* members in June 2009 to follow a motor-bike helmet law which resulted in clashes with joint military and police patrol and 17 *Boko Haram*

members killed. In reaction, Mohammed Yusuf released another video to the President in which he threatened revenge attacks.

In July 2009, *Boko Haram* attacked Maiduguri police stations where hundreds were killed. In September 2010, *Boko Haram* members attacked a prison in Bauchi and freed hundreds of prisoners, including about 100 *Boko Haram* prisoners. In December 2010, the group carried out an attack on Army barracks in Abuja. In December 2010, they bombed strategic places in both Jos, Plateau State and in Maiduguri, Borno State, killing about 80 people. In December 2010, a Governorship candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno State and 7 others were shot dead by gunmen suspected to be *Boko Haram* members. In May 2011, *Boko Haram* carried out bomb attacks in several states after President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration. In June 2011, the Police Headquarters in Abuja was bombed. In June 2011, Ibrahim Birkuti a Muslim cleric critical of *Boko Haram*, was shot dead by two gunmen on a motorcycle. In July 2011, the Federal government announced its plan to create a panel to initiate negotiations with *Boko Haram*, which the group rejected. In August 2011, the U.N. headquarters in Abuja was bombed. *Boko Haram* claimed responsibility for all suicide-bombs where 23 people were killed.

Furthermore, in September 2011, Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law of late-*Boko Haram* leader Mohammed Yusuf, was shot dead two days after attending a peace meeting with ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo, although *Boko Haram* denied any involvement in the incident. In November 2011, a series of bomb and gun attacks took place in both Yobe and Borno States. In November 2011, *Boko Haram* announced that it will not hold talks with the government until all arrested members of its sect, have been released. In December 2011, *Boko Haram* bombed Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State, near Abuja on Christmas Day. One policeman was killed in a failed bomb attack on a church in Jos, Plateau State during the same period. Finally in January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 15 local government areas in Borno, Yobe and Plateau States and closed Nigeria's land borders in the north, while he also accused *Boko Haram* to have infiltrated Nigeria's government, including the executive, national assembly and judiciary.

Nevertheless, again in January 2012, *Boko Haram* launched bomb attacks and heavy gun battles in Kano targeting the police headquarters, with 150 people killed. Idegu (2012: p.1 &3) reported that the *Boko Haram* attacks against Tse and Shong villages in Plateau State reduced the two villages to rubble "with no house standing", with 45 houses burnt and 140 dead. Unfortunately, as the bodies were to be buried the following day, the terrorists attacked again scattering those assembled at the mass burial ground, as well as killing fleeing Senator Gyang Dantong and Honourable Gyang Fulani (Idegu, et. al., 2012: p.1 & 3). Idegu (2012: p.60) further reported that 5,500 people were left displaced in Plateau State, after the *Boko Haram* attacks.

*Boko Haram's* attacks became more virulent since May 2013 when President Goodluck Jonathan ordered a military operation to crush the terrorist organization. These include the killing of more than 143 people at a check-point mounted by its guerrillans on the highway between Maiduguri and Damaturu and its night invasion and killing of more than 40 students at University of Agriculture in Yobe State on 29 September 2013 and beheading 8 travelers along the Maiduguri road (Admin., 2013).

Moreover, *Boko Haram's* increasing kidnappings of government officials, foreign nationals and civilians since February 2013 is believed to be the result of greater collaboration between the group and *Ansaru*, as well as the "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa" (MUJAO). *Boko Haram's* collaboration with *Ansaru* has made it possible for it to benefit from the networks and skills that *Ansaru's* members developed from training and operating with "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) and MUJAO members in the Sahel region (Zenn, 2013: p.1). Coupled with this link, the National



Counter-terrorism Center (2013) believes that AQIM has been providing direct funding and training for *Boko Haram's* members.

Moreover, *Boko Haram* militants' raids of border towns in Borno State using pick-up trucks equipped for desert fighting and the capture of heavily armed *Boko Haram* members on Algerian borders reveal that the group has or is in the process of linking with "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM). This essay therefore stresses that the later defeat of *Boko Haram* in Mali and Algeria, as well as the group's fear of a possible future defeat in Nigeria, has encouraged it to already forge even stronger ties with other al-Qaeda affiliate-Islamic militants in north-western Africa, with the ominous possibility of launching more devastating attacks against Nigeria and other countries within sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Boko Haram and the Arab Connection**

Omeje (2007: p.99) has attributed most of the insurgencies in Africa, like the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War in the late-1960s, the Ugandan Liberation War in the 1980s, the Eritrean separatist war against Ethiopia, and the civil wars in Liberia, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, DR-Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone to outside sponsorship. This is true also for *Boko Haram*.

Therefore, rating the *Boko Haram* insurgency in Nigeria as a local Nigerian terrorist organization may be incorrect. Evidence reveals that the group has international connections with North Africa and the Arab world. Most of its suicide-bombers have been known to be Islamic *jihadists* imported from other North African states. Analysts have argued that the ingenuity of execution, the impact and the colossal nature of the suicide-bombing of the U.N. Headquarters on 26 August 2011 by Mohammed Abul Barra proves that *Boko Haram* suicide-bombers are trained by expert terrorist organizations outside Nigeria (eerily reminiscing of the U.N. Headquarters' late-2003 bombing in Baghdad, Iraq).

Some scholars like Johnson (2012) and Perry (2011) have affirmed that *Boko Haram* has a link with "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) and Somalia's *al-Shabaab*, which has contributed to the "increasing level of sophistication and organization" of the group. It would not be out of place therefore to say that the group has become a local subsidiary of AQIM, and a fulfillment of AQIM's long-term goal of becoming a regional and global force through the integration of extremist groups from all of North Africa into a single terrorist organization (CSIS, 2010: p.3).

Further, Perry (2011) has reported that Abu Qaqa, *Boko Haram's* Spokesman has boasted to journalists of sending hundreds of fighters to be trained by *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. In an interview with the Temple of Praise International Church in Maryland, one of the ex-leaders of *Boko Haram*, Evangelist Blessed Usman, formerly-Sheik Sani Haliru, confessed that the training of *Boko Haram* members takes place in Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Egypt, as well as Niger. He also confessed that he was originally from the Republic of Niger (Usman, 2011).

Moreover, the avowed agenda of *Boko Haram* to Islamize Nigeria at all cost and the sophistication of its operations prove that the group has international connections with more formidable terrorists organizations outside Nigeria. Johnson (2011) and Ngex (2012) affirm this international connection. For instance, Johnson (2011) reported that *Boko Haram* has entered an agreement with "...al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize their efforts". This proves why Usman (2011) in his confession claims that Osama Bin-Laden was his mentor.

Although other scholars including Johnson (2011), Oluwajuyitan (2011) and Tande (2012:2), have argued that economic disparity in Nigeria between the north and south, poverty, political marginalization, social inequality, injustice, corruption and failed government, are all local reasons for the rise of *Boko Haram*, the group itself has never accepted these reasons as the *raison d'être* for its actions.

This essay stresses that the prevalence of these socio-economic factors in Nigeria does not, in any way, justify the carnage regularly wrought by *Boko Haram's* terrorist attacks. This violence cannot solve the above problems, but instead creates other problems which the group would not be able to correct afterwards. It may be true to say that *Boko Haram* is inspired by a global *jihadist* ideology and is a continuation of a long drawn attempt by the Arab world to Islamize Nigeria and also use Nigeria as a launching pad for international terrorist activities against the West. *Boko Haram* appears to be the last stage of the Islamization project, which is either going to succeed in changing the secular nature of the Nigerian state or the corporate existence of the country.

The effort to Islamize Nigeria started with the *Sharia* debate during Nigeria's Second Republic since the late-1970s. The *Sharia* debate which sparked continued debates about the role of Islam in Nigeria's national life and the country's place in the Muslim world, were sponsored by Northern Nigerian political leaders who have held the reins of power for the greater part of Nigeria's independent existence. These debates have inspired the emergence of extremist Islamic groups that held *jihadist* ideology. The first orchestrated attempt by Islamic fundamentalists to challenge the secular nature of the Nigerian state came also during the country's Second Republic. Since then, the country has witnessed an upsurge of Islamic radicalism (Tande, 2012: p.5). Other Islamic fundamentalist groups that arose before *Boko Haram* include the *Talakawas*, *Maitatsine*, *Isawa* Movement, Islam in Africa Organization, *Hezbollah* Movement Nigeria, *Tablib* group, *Kala Kato*, *Yan Izala*, Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Nigerian *Taliban*, *Al Sunna Wal Jamma* and the Shiite Organization, etc.

The activities of these groups were heightened during the Third Republic when the Islamic leaders in power at the time formerly registered Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.). Before this time, Murtala Mohammed's administration had initiated the national Islamization project, but he was assassinated before the plan could come into full fruition. Quoting Omo Omuruyi of the Nairaland Forum (2012), the cabinet of Olusegun Obasanjo that succeeded the government of Murtala regrettably could not push through the Islamization Plan, due to the presence of some "... avid defenders of the secularism in the Supreme Military Council..."

Nairaland Forum (2012) further shows that although Ibrahim Babangida restarted the process of upgrading Nigeria to full membership of the O.I.C. during his tenure as military Head of State, it was Buhari who finally submitted the application to up-grading Nigeria to full membership in the O.I.C. instead of the Observer status it had enjoyed since the Gowon régime. The process was concluded during Babangida's tenure as a civilian Head of State. On his second ascension to power, Babangida silently acquiesced to the *status quo* by affirming Nigeria's full-fledged membership of the OIC. This further strengthened the Islamization project.

Inspired by global *jihadist* ideology coupled with internal backing by those in leadership position, more radical Islamic groups who were bent on ensuring the full implementation of the *Sharia* emerged in the country in the Fourth Republic. This move was further fueled by events outside the country which included the Arab awakening and the Iranian Revolution (Tande, 2012: p.5 & 7). One of such groups was a Shi'a organization, the "Islamic Movement in Nigeria", which beheaded Gideon Alakuta in 1994 for allegedly desecrating the Koran. Unfortunately, the perpetrators of such act in a democratic nation have not been brought to book to date. This was followed by the adoption of the *Sharia* in Zamfara State in October 1999, followed shortly by 11 other Northern States (Tande, 2011: p.11-12).

Tande (2011: p.16) believes that the economic and political factors that favour the rise of Islamic fundamentalists are the prevalence of a conducive environment that facilitates the growth and "...entrenchment of extremism in Northern Nigeria". The literature on insurgency in Africa in general, and

*Boko Haram* in particular, seems to ignore the part religion plays in terrorism and thereby obscure the role of Saudi Arabia in sponsoring terrorism through the spread of religious ideology and teaching promoted by the Saudi state. This puritanical religious ideology disseminated during the annual *Hajj* to Mecca creates an explosive sentiment for violence and extremism among Islamic pilgrims to that Holy land.

Thus, as *Salafi* ideology "...espouses violence against state authority" (CSIS, 2010: p.5), it became the inspiration for *Boko Haram*. Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of *Boko Haram*, studied in Saudi Arabia and on his return to Nigeria, he set up a camp called Afghanistan to train volunteers for a revolution (Perry, 2011: p.2). Yusuf was therefore trained to raise and lead an international terrorist *jihād* in Nigeria on his return. This has manifested as *Boko Haram*. This, coupled with its sponsorship of the establishment of an Islamic bank in Nigeria makes the Saudi state culpable.

### Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The birth, survival and success of *Boko Haram* to date, unlike past Islamic fundamentalist groups in northern Nigeria, have proved beyond reasonable doubt that it has international links and support outside Nigeria. It is also regrettably, an indication that global *jihād*ist terrorism is spreading into sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, *Boko Haram* could be redefined as an Arab-inspired Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization, upholding *Salafi-jihād* ideology and committed to the global *jihād* ideology of al-Qaeda. According to Geoff Porter, director for the Middle-East and North Africa at Eurasia Group, as quoted by CSIS (2010: p.5), "once someone embraces *jihād* ideology and plots or commits terror attacks, regional governments have few tools beyond police action to neutralize them."

Such extremists motivated solely by ideology are less likely to consider any amnesty programs or negotiated political solutions (CSIS, 2010: p.5). *Boko Haram's* refusal to negotiate with the Federal Government (Abdallah, 2012) and the rejection of amnesty by its members (Johnson, 2011) is a clear indication that the group espouses *Salafi-jihād* ideology. While *Boko Haram* may, in the short-term, be a security threat mostly to Nigeria, the huge security gaps in many sub-Saharan African states heightens the vulnerability of all these countries, especially in the West African sub-region to instability, due to spill-over effect in case of possible escalation and a possible increase in refugee crisis that may cost the international community a fortune in blood and treasure. This is a possibility as long as the bombings and terrorism continues. The arrest of *Boko Haram* members at the Algerian border is a clear proof.

As recommendations to control the *Boko Haram* insurgency, one solution would be to identify its links with international terrorist organizations outside Nigeria and thereby deal with its source of financing with the aim of crippling its "life-wire". Moreover, the Nigerian government should take proactive measures to control the spread of *Salafi-jihād* ideology by controlling the curricula of Islamic studies in all *Almajiris* schools and religious departments in local universities in the hope of defining, controlling and enforcing an acceptable interpretation of Islam and a non-violence-inspired training of future Islamic religious clerics. Where possible, the appointment and preaching of Moslem clerics should be also be regulated by the Nigerian government.

Since "conflict prevention, mitigation and response", according to Council on Foreign Relations (2012: p.1) "are global concerns, because instability often spills across borders and triggers piracy, drug trafficking, small-arms sales, environmental exploitation and terrorism", vital multilateral cooperation and action by the international community with the government of Nigeria is necessary to end also the *Boko Haram* menace. This could be further facilitated by the UNDP's Bureau for Crisis-Prevention and Response to circumvent the nationalist principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of affected states. Only close inter-governmental cooperation with the Nigerian government can finally defeat both *Boko Haram* and stem the rise of other regional Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies in the future.

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**Call for Papers**  
**2014 Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting**  
**Saturday 8 March 2014 Flagler College-St. Augustine, Florida**

**Keynote Luncheon by Congressman Lou Frey**

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 Florida International University  
 Phone: 305-348-2859  
[depalok@fiu.edu](mailto:depalok@fiu.edu)

**Arrangements Chair: Will Miller**  
 Flagler College  
 Phone: 904-819-6322  
[wmiller@flagler.edu](mailto:wmiller@flagler.edu)

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<b>Public Policy/Public Administration</b>	Jonathan West University of Miami	<a href="mailto:jwest@miami.edu">jwest@miami.edu</a> 305-284-2500
<b>State &amp; Local Governments</b>	Mirya Holman Florida Atlantic University	<a href="mailto:mholman5@fau.edu">mholman5@fau.edu</a> 561-297-3491
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<b>Round-table: Teaching Political Science</b>	Richard Murgu Tallahassee Community College	<a href="mailto:MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu">MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu</a> 850-201-8145

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Call for Submissions for *The Political Scientist* newsletter: announcements, book-reviews, short articles on teaching or research, job openings and more. Please contact Editor Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan at [jsm2@usfsp.edu](mailto:jsm2@usfsp.edu)  
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**FPSA: 1972-2014**



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**Program Chair:** Kathryn DePalo  
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Comparative Politics	Leah Blumenfeld Barry University	<a href="mailto:lblumenfeld@barry.edu">lblumenfeld@barry.edu</a> 305-899-3386
Roundtable on Teaching Political Science	Richard Murgó Tallahassee Community College	<a href="mailto:MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu">MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu</a> 850-201-8145

**Program Schedule**

Registration 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM  
 Session 1 8:30 AM to 10:00 AM  
 Break 10:00 AM to 10:15 AM  
 Session 2 10:15 AM to 11:45 AM  
 Lunch/Meeting 11:45 AM to 1:45 PM  
 Session 3 1:45 PM to 3:15 PM  
 Break 3:15 PM to 3:30 PM  
 Session 4 3:30 PM to 5:00 PM  
 Cocktail Reception 5:00 PM to 6:30 PM

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Turn left onto Markland Pl.  
Parking reserved in lot on the right (Parking is free - no permit required)  
Signage will guide you from parking lot to Ringhaver Student Center (#18 on campus map attached)

**SESSION 1: 8:30 AM to 10:00 AM****Roundtable on Teaching Political Science: STCR 213**

Panelists will explore innovative ways of teaching political science with the help of open access resources, the internet, and local, community resources.

**Moderator:** Richard Murgor, Tallahassee Community College, [murgor@tcc.fl.edu](mailto:murgor@tcc.fl.edu)

**Panelists:** Kathryn A. DePalo, Florida International University, [depalok@fiu.edu](mailto:depalok@fiu.edu)  
 Brenda Kauffman, Flagler College, [BKauffman@flagler.edu](mailto:BKauffman@flagler.edu)  
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 Carol M. Glen, Valdosta State University, [cmglen@valdosta.edu](mailto:cmglen@valdosta.edu)

**Undergraduate Panel: *IR/Comparative Politics*, STCR 214**

**Chair & Discussant:** Will Miller, Flagler College, [wmillier@flagler.edu](mailto:wmillier@flagler.edu)

*The Development of the Political Economy of South Africa*  
 Hannah Ferris, Flagler College, [ferrishl@att.net](mailto:ferrishl@att.net)

*Israeli-Palestine Relations Past, Present and Future*  
 David Arreola, Flagler College, [DArreola449@flagler.edu](mailto:DArreola449@flagler.edu)

*Does The People's Republic of China Rival the United States of America in Terms of Global Superpower, Economics, Military Power, and Political Influence?*  
 Donn Matthew Garby, Flagler College, [DGarby300@flagler.edu](mailto:DGarby300@flagler.edu)

*Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia*  
 Morgan Reed, Flagler College, [MReed655@flagler.edu](mailto:MReed655@flagler.edu)

*Thatcher: Uniting the Kingdom and Dividing the Union*  
 Matthew Minton, Flagler College, [MMinton072@flagler.edu](mailto:MMinton072@flagler.edu)

**International Relations: *Issues in the Middle East*, Virginia Room**

**Chair & Discussant:** Kelly A. McHugh, Florida Southern College, [kmchugh@flsouthern.edu](mailto:kmchugh@flsouthern.edu)

*The Influence of Hamas in Palestinian Politics and Middle Eastern Affairs: The Role of Pragmatism*  
Daniel Baracsckay, Valdosta State University, [dbaracsckay@valdosta.edu](mailto:dbaracsckay@valdosta.edu)

*Terrorism a Serious Challenge to Transnational Relations and World Peace*  
Muhammad Ahmed Qadri, University of Karachi, [pro.qadri@gmail.com](mailto:pro.qadri@gmail.com)

*Globalization and the Effectiveness of Sanctions-Regimes: The Case of Iran*  
Manuel DeLeon, Bethune-Cookman University, [deleonm@cookman.edu](mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu)  
Douglas Rivero, Bethune-Cookman University, [riverod@cookman.edu](mailto:riverod@cookman.edu)

**Public Administration & Public Policy: Domestic and Global Challenges,**  
STCR 215

**Chair & Discussant:** Richard Brumback, University of Miami, [r.brumback@miami.edu](mailto:r.brumback@miami.edu)

*Establishing and Maintaining Voter Trust*  
Michael Ertel, Seminole County Supervisor of Elections, [ertel@VoteSeminole.org](mailto:ertel@VoteSeminole.org)

*Socio-Economic Institutions as Global Administrative Challenges*  
Seyed R. Eftekhari, Islamic Azad University, [srezaeftekhari@gmail.com](mailto:srezaeftekhari@gmail.com)

*The Dynamics of Organizational Transformation: A Case of U.S. HUD Management Reforms*  
James Agbodzakey, Nova Southeastern University, [dzakey@hotmail.com](mailto:dzakey@hotmail.com)

*Three Eras of Iraq: The Trends and Evolution of Corruption*  
Stephen Strenge, University of South Florida, [sstrenge@gmail.com](mailto:sstrenge@gmail.com)

**American Politics: Policy and Influence in American Governance,** STCR  
201

**Chair & Discussant:** Joe Saviak, Flagler College, [jsaviak@flagler.edu](mailto:jsaviak@flagler.edu)

*Broadband Internet and Political Behavior: Evidence from the United States*  
Ahmed Jaber, Cornell University, [aj238@cornell.edu](mailto:aj238@cornell.edu)

*What is So Bad with the American Healthcare System? A Critical View of the Affordable Care Act in Unsettled Context*  
Aori Nyambati, University College London, [nyambatiaori@yahoo.com](mailto:nyambatiaori@yahoo.com)

*The Politics and Fourth Amendment Law of Big Data*  
Timothy Lenz, Florida Atlantic University, [lenz@fau.edu](mailto:lenz@fau.edu)



*The Nomenclature of War: The War of Framing and Packaging Conflict*

Harold N. Orndoff III, Daytona State College, [orndorh@daytonastate.edu](mailto:orndorh@daytonastate.edu)

*Does Religious Difference between Dyadic States Lead to Interrupted Rivalry?*

Manar Elkhaldi, University of Central Florida, [melkhaldi@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:melkhaldi@knights.ucf.edu)

## **Comparative Politics: Issues of Security, Violence, and Trauma, STCR 202**

**Chair & Discussant:** Ari Litwin, University of Central Florida, [ari.litwin@gmail.com](mailto:ari.litwin@gmail.com)

*The Security Dilemma in South Asia, East Asia, and Latin America's Southern Cone: a cross-regional comparison*

Bibek Chand, Florida International University, [bchan016@fiu.edu](mailto:bchan016@fiu.edu)

Lukas K. Danner, Florida International University, [lukas.danner1@fiu.edu](mailto:lukas.danner1@fiu.edu)

Nicolás Terradas, Florida International University, [nterr005@fiu.edu](mailto:nterr005@fiu.edu)

*Measuring Economic Inequality and Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Iraq*

Adam Howe, Florida International University, [ahowe015@fiu.edu](mailto:ahowe015@fiu.edu)

*"A House Divided": Testing Theories of Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi*

Zachary A. Karazsia, Florida International University, [zkara002@fiu.edu](mailto:zkara002@fiu.edu)

*The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Case Study In Gender Issues*

Gabriel Stephen Willman, University of Central Florida, [Gabriel.Willman@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:Gabriel.Willman@knights.ucf.edu)

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## **SESSION 2: 10:15 AM to 11:45 AM**

### **International Relations: Soft Power and Human Rights, STCR 214**

**Chair & Discussant:** Douglas Rivero, Bethune-Cookman University, [riverod@cookman.edu](mailto:riverod@cookman.edu)

*The MPAA Cartel, the Government, and the World Market*

Michael Wartenbe, Florida International University, [mwart001@fiu.edu](mailto:mwart001@fiu.edu)

*Constructivism and the Problem of Human Rights*

Candice Maneri, Montclair State University, [maneric2@mail.montclair.edu](mailto:maneric2@mail.montclair.edu)

*U.S. and China's Economic Diplomacy Rivalry in Southeast Asia*

Yuanyuan Fang, Florida International University, [yfang004@fiu.edu](mailto:yfang004@fiu.edu)

*Turkish Airlines as a Soft Power Tool in the Context of Turkish Foreign Policy*

Orçun Selçuk, Florida International University, [oselc001@fiu.edu](mailto:oselc001@fiu.edu)

### **International Relations: Issues in Foreign Policy, STCR 214**

**Chair & Discussant:** Manuel De Leon, Bethune-Cookman University, [deleonm@cookman.edu](mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu)

*Impact of Democratization on Foreign Policy: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish-Israeli Alliance*

Onur Erpul, Florida International University, [oepru001@fiu.edu](mailto:oepru001@fiu.edu)

*U.S. Foreign Policy from 1979 to Current: a Realist Critique of Neo-Conservative and Liberal Institutional Policy Decisions*

Nicholas Lanier, Saint Leo University, [nicholas.lanier@email.saintleo.edu](mailto:nicholas.lanier@email.saintleo.edu)

*The Neoconservative War on Modernity*

Ben Luongo, University of South Florida, [benjaminluongo@gmail.com](mailto:benjaminluongo@gmail.com)

*American Foreign Policy*

Scott A. Camuto, Boston College, [camutos@bc.edu](mailto:camutos@bc.edu)

*The Peace Between Iran and America*

Christopher Parmly, Florida International University, [cparm002@fiu.edu](mailto:cparm002@fiu.edu)

### **Political Theory: Modern Political Thinkers, STCR 215**

**Chair & Discussant:** Brian Kupfer, Tallahassee Community College, [kupferb@tcc.fl.edu](mailto:kupferb@tcc.fl.edu)

*The Key Elements of Democracy*

Melissa Diaz, Daytona State College, [DiazM@daytonastate.edu](mailto:DiazM@daytonastate.edu)

*Deliberative Democracy and Science and Technology Policy*

Darrell P. Arnold, St. Thomas University, [darnold@STU.EDU](mailto:darnold@STU.EDU)

*Killing the Sons of Brutus: Machiavelli on 'Return Toward Beginnings'*

Sean Erwin, Barry University, [SErwin@barry.edu](mailto:SErwin@barry.edu)

### **American Politics: Parties, Candidates, and Performance, STCR 201**

**Chair & Discussant:** Rachel Cremona, Flagler College, [rcremona@flagler.edu](mailto:rcremona@flagler.edu)

*A Case Study on a US Congressman as related to Richard Fenno's Homestyle*  
Taylor Wilhoit, University of West Florida, [trw11@students.uwf.edu](mailto:trw11@students.uwf.edu)

*Does the "Big Dawg's" Endorsement Matter? Examining Candidate Endorsements by Former President Bill Clinton*

Sean D. Foreman, Barry University, [sforeman@barry.edu](mailto:sforeman@barry.edu)

*Gubernatorial Strength and Executive Prerogative*

Robert Crew, Florida State University, [rcrew@fsu.edu](mailto:rcrew@fsu.edu)

Alexandra Cockerham, Florida State University, [Amg08k@fsu.edu](mailto:Amg08k@fsu.edu)

*Absentee Voting: A Cross State Analysis*

Enrijeta Shino, University of Florida, [enrijetashino@ufl.edu](mailto:enrijetashino@ufl.edu)

*Tea Time: A Study of the Tea Party Movement and the Republican Caucus in the United States House of Representatives in the One Hundred and Twelfth Congress*

Stephen C. Phillips, University of Central Florida, [stephen.phillips@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:stephen.phillips@knights.ucf.edu)

## **Comparative Politics: Undergraduate Research on Latin America, STCR 202**

**Chair:** Denis Rey, University of Tampa, [denis.rey@ut.edu](mailto:denis.rey@ut.edu)

**Discussant:** Leah Blumenfeld, Barry University, [LBlumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:LBlumenfeld@barry.edu)

*The Effects of Trade Liberalization on Political Participation in Latin America*

Kimberly Gordon, University of Tampa, [Kimberly.gordon@spartans.ut.edu](mailto:Kimberly.gordon@spartans.ut.edu)

*The Impact of Inequality on Trade Openness*

Jessica Gores, University of Tampa, [Jessica.gores@spartans.ut.edu](mailto:Jessica.gores@spartans.ut.edu)

*Underlying Forces Driving Female Workforce Participation in Latin America During the Market Reform Era*

Milena Boasherliera, University of Tampa, [Milena.boasherlieva@spartans.ut.edu](mailto:Milena.boasherlieva@spartans.ut.edu)

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Lunch, Business Meeting, and Keynote Address by Congressman Lou Frey:  
11:45 AM to 1:45 PM  
Virginia Room



## FPSA Business Meeting

**Kevin Wagner, President**  
 Florida Atlantic University  
[kwagne15@fau.edu](mailto:kwagne15@fau.edu)

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### Keynote Address: Congressman Lou Frey



Lou Frey's service to our country began in 1955 when he enlisted in the U.S. Navy. He was on active duty until 1958, and continued his military career until 1978 retiring as a Captain in the Navy Reserve.

His life in politics and public service began in 1961 as an Assistant County Solicitor in Orange County, Florida. Since that time, he has served the people of Florida in many different capacities, including five terms in the U.S. House of Representatives (1969-1979). He was a member of the Republican House Leadership in the 93rd and 94th Congresses. In his last campaign he received nearly 80% of the vote in a Democratic district. He was also a candidate in Florida for Governor and Senator.

Because of his vision and leadership, when it became apparent in the early 1970's that McCoy Air Force Base would be closed, Congressman Frey appealed to President Richard Nixon to let the City of Orlando take over the property for \$1.00 and turn it into a commercial airfield, now the Orlando International Airport.

Congressman Frey is past president of the United States Association of Former Members of Congress. In 2009, the Association named Congressman Frey as the recipient of its *Distinguished Service Award*. The Award recognizes a former Member of Congress who has shown an exemplary dedication to public service before, during, or after his or her time on Capitol Hill. Past recipients include Gerald Ford, Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, Dick Cheney, Al Gore, Bob Dole, and George Mitchell.

Congressman Frey's dedication to the youth of America and to teaching about public service has marked his career. While in Congress, Frey was instrumental in involving young Americans in their government. He co-authored the report on *Youth of America: Congress Looks at the Campus* (1969). The report called for the 18-year-old vote, draft reform, expansion of various student loan programs, opposition to repressive legislation against colleges where protests against the Vietnam War took place, and establishment of a Commission on Higher Education. He established a high school intern program where over 300 students from his district elected by their peers came to Washington for seven days to learn firsthand about their government.

Frey graduated cum laude from Colgate University in 1955 with Honors in English. He graduated with highest honors from the University of Michigan Law School in 1961, was a member of the Order of the Coif, the Barristers, and Assistant Editor of the Law Review.



Frey is a partner in the law firm of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed in Orlando, Florida. He has edited and written two books on the Congress: *Inside the House: Former Members Reveal How Congress Really Works* and *Political Rules of the Road: Representatives, Senators and Presidents Share their Rules for Success in Congress, Politics and Life*.

He is the founder of the Lou Frey Institute of Politics and Government at the University of Central Florida which over the last 10 years, has become one of the most important Institutes in the nation and recognized internationally. The Lou Frey Institute promotes the development of enlightened, responsible, and actively-engaged citizens.

He is married to the former Marcia Turner and has five children, seven grandchildren and one great grandchild.

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### **SESSION 3: 1:45 PM to 3:15 PM**

#### **Political Theory: *Decision Making in War and Economics*, STCR 213**

**Chair & Discussant:** *Ted Duggan, Tallahassee Community College, [DUGGANE@tcc.fl.edu](mailto:DUGGANE@tcc.fl.edu)*

*Expanding Game Theory: The "Brute" Strategy*

Stephen Macharia Magu, Old Dominion University, [smagu002@odu.edu](mailto:smagu002@odu.edu)

*Personal Responsibility and Capitalism: A Discussion of the Necessity for Liberal Ideas in Economic Policy*

Candice Maneri, Montclair State University, [Maneric2@mail.montclair.edu](mailto:Maneric2@mail.montclair.edu)

*Feminism's Sex Wars*

Lorna Bracewell, University of Florida, [lbracewell@ufl.edu](mailto:lbracewell@ufl.edu)

#### **International Relations: *Civic Society, Gender and Social Issues*, STCR 213**

**Chair & Discussant:** *Giselle Jamison, St. Thomas University, [gjamison@stu.edu](mailto:gjamison@stu.edu)*

*Representing the "Other Half": Measuring Dimensions of Female Civic Engagement in Latin America*

Pamela Medina, University of Central Florida, [Pamela\\_medina@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:Pamela_medina@knights.ucf.edu)

*Not same in the Sejm: Polish Women in Government*

Maria Gabryszewska, Florida International University, [mgabr009@fiu.edu](mailto:mgabr009@fiu.edu)

*Social Trust and Civil Society Vibrancy in Post-genocide Rwanda: Examining the Potentialities of Intra-society Civic Participation*



Fiacre Bienvenu, Florida International University, [fbien001@fiu.edu](mailto:fbien001@fiu.edu)

**Undergraduate Panel: *Challenges to the Status Quo*, STCR 215**

**Chair & Discussant:** Sean Foreman, Barry University, [sforeman@barry.edu](mailto:sforeman@barry.edu)

*Hunger Strikes as a Form of Political Protest*

Alexandra Furbee, Flagler College, [AFurbee577@flagler.edu](mailto:AFurbee577@flagler.edu)

*The Wall of Separation: Constitutional Imperative or Secularist Myth?*

Jonathan Hermes, Flagler College, [JHermes131@flagler.edu](mailto:JHermes131@flagler.edu)

*Government Performance and Public Trust*

Uriah Jones, University of North Florida, [n00864626@ospreys.unf.edu](mailto:n00864626@ospreys.unf.edu)

*Is there a correlation between Project Tiger and the population decline of tiger in India?*

Ericka D. Saeb, University of Central Florida, [slerika@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:slerika@knights.ucf.edu)

**State and Local Government: *Challenges and Opportunities in State and Local Policymaking*, STCR 201**

**Chair:** Tim Lenz, Florida Atlantic University, [lenz@fau.edu](mailto:lenz@fau.edu)

**Discussant:** Chris Stenson, Florida Atlantic University, [cstenson1@fau.edu](mailto:cstenson1@fau.edu)

*The Art and Science of Using Business Planning Principles in Local Government*

Robert W. Robertson, Argosy University, [rwr robertson@argosy.edu](mailto:rwr robertson@argosy.edu)

*Federalism Looks Different from the Bottom Up: Local Option Policies and State Marijuana Laws in Washington and Colorado*

Leah Blumenfeld, Barry University, [LBlumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:LBlumenfeld@barry.edu)

*Renewing the Brownsville Community: A New Kind of Community Cleanup*

Greg L. Lowhorn, Pensacola Christian College, [lowhorn@cox.net](mailto:lowhorn@cox.net)

Douglas W. Devaney, South College – Knoxville, [ddevaney@southcollegetn.edu](mailto:ddevaney@southcollegetn.edu)

*Different Faces of Criminal Justice: Using Social Diversity to Analyze Stop, Question, and Frisk*

Rolda L. Darlington, University of Florida, [Rolly713@ufl.edu](mailto:Rolly713@ufl.edu)

*Continuity and Change in Florida's Interest Group System*

Aubrey Jewett, University of Central Florida, [Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu](mailto:Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu)

**Comparative Politics: *The Role of Institutions*, STCR 202**

**Chair & Discussant:** Rachel Cremona, Flagler College, [rcremona@flagler.edu](mailto:rcremona@flagler.edu)

*Institutional Variation and Public Policy Outcomes in Latin America: How Electoral Rules Impact the Protection of Human Rights*

Denis Rey, University of Tampa, [denis.rey@ut.edu](mailto:denis.rey@ut.edu)

Joshua Ozymy, Texas A&M Corpus Christi, [Joshua.ozymy@tamucc.edu](mailto:Joshua.ozymy@tamucc.edu)

Melissa Jarrell, Texas A&M Corpus Christi, [Melissa.jarrell@tamucc.edu](mailto:Melissa.jarrell@tamucc.edu)

*The Effect of Electoral Systems on the Influence of Nationalist Parties in Western Europe*

William Simoneau, [william.m.simoneau@gmail.com](mailto:william.m.simoneau@gmail.com)

*Making the Electoral Connection to Judicial Review*

Bill Myers, University of Tampa, [wmyers@ut.edu](mailto:wmyers@ut.edu)

*Devolution in the U.K.*

Lance Bardsley, University of North Georgia, [lance.bardsley@ung.edu](mailto:lance.bardsley@ung.edu)

*Institutions and Women's Legislative Representation in sub-Saharan Africa, 1910-2013*

Amanda B. Edgell, University of Florida, [abedgell@ufl.edu](mailto:abedgell@ufl.edu)

*The Effects of Federalism on Women's Political Representation: A Case Study of German Federalism*

Christine Comfort, University of Central Florida, [ccomfortucf@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:ccomfortucf@knights.ucf.edu)

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**SESSION 4: 3:30 PM to 5:00 PM**

**Public Administration & Public Policy: *Current Issues*, STCR 213**

**Chair & Discussant:** Richard Brumback, University of Miami, [r.brumback@miami.edu](mailto:r.brumback@miami.edu)

*A Bridge to Nowhere? Assessing the Divide between Political Scientists and Policymakers*

Zachary Karazsia, Florida International University, [zkara002@fiu.edu](mailto:zkara002@fiu.edu)

*Mirrored Reflections: An Investigation into the Identity Crises that Public Administration and Public Health Share*

Blair Thomas, Florida State University, [mbt12@my.fsu.edu](mailto:mbt12@my.fsu.edu)

*Successfully Communicating about Public Policies—Public-Private Partnerships in Florida*

Joe Saviak, Flagler College, [jsaviak@flagler.edu](mailto:jsaviak@flagler.edu)

Lawrence Martin, University of Central Florida, [lawrence.martin@ucf.edu](mailto:lawrence.martin@ucf.edu)  
Wendell Lawther, University of Central Florida, [wendell.lawther@ucf.edu](mailto:wendell.lawther@ucf.edu)

*Market Failures: To Tax or Subsidize? That is the Question...*

Gary Boulware, University of Florida, [gboulware@pky.ufl.edu](mailto:gboulware@pky.ufl.edu)

### **International Relations: State Behavior, Security and Foreign Policy, STCR 214**

**Chair & Discussant:** Aleksandar Jankovski, University of Miami, [aleksandarjankovski@yahoo.com](mailto:aleksandarjankovski@yahoo.com)

*An Evaluation of Group Cohesiveness, Dynamics, and Quality of Decision Making: A Review of Groupthink Literature and The Works Investigating Its Claims*

Elias Assaf, University of Central Florida, [elia@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:elia@knights.ucf.edu)

*Political Economy of Alliances*

Nikoloz Esitashvili, Florida International University, [nika\\_esi@yahoo.com](mailto:nika_esi@yahoo.com)

*Framing Foreign Policy: Understanding Why Democracies Abandon Foreign Policy Commitments in the Periphery*

Kelly A. McHugh, Florida Southern College, [kmchugh@flsouthern.edu](mailto:kmchugh@flsouthern.edu)

*Treaty Accession as an Instrumentally Rational Undertaking: First Image Reversed*

Aleksandar Jankovski, University of Miami, [aleksandarjankovski@yahoo.com](mailto:aleksandarjankovski@yahoo.com)

### **International Relations: New International Development, STCR 215**

**Chair:** Houman Sadri, University of Central Florida, [Houman.Sadri@ucf.edu](mailto:Houman.Sadri@ucf.edu)

**Discussant:** Leah S. Delaney, [leahsuedelaney@gmail.com](mailto:leahsuedelaney@gmail.com)

*Impacts of Extremism and Terror within Kazakhstan and Central Asia*

Marcus Bragg, University of Central Florida, [marcus\\_bragg@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:marcus_bragg@knights.ucf.edu)

*Analyzing Kazakhstan's Economic Trade Trends with an Eye towards Politics*

Andrea Miller, University of Central Florida, [millera2011@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:millera2011@knights.ucf.edu)

*Women & Economic Empowerment in the Middle East*

Hanady Nabut, University of Central Florida, [hnabut@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:hnabut@knights.ucf.edu)

*Asymmetric Relations and the Conundrum of Power*

Houman Sadri, University of Central Florida, [Houman.Sadri@ucf.edu](mailto:Houman.Sadri@ucf.edu)

Greg McDowall, University of Central Florida, [gmc dowall@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:gmc dowall@knights.ucf.edu)

*Uzbekistan: Contemporary Politics, Military, and the Development of an Opposition*  
Dominic Martin, University of Central Florida, [dmartinucf@knights.ucf.edu](mailto:dmartinucf@knights.ucf.edu)

**American Politics: Foreign Influences on Domestic Happenings, STCR 201**

**Chair & Discussant:** Brenda Kauffman, Flagler College, [bkauffman@flagler.edu](mailto:bkauffman@flagler.edu)

*Lawful Entry: Analyzing and Contrasting the Effects of Lawful Immigrants and Unlawful Immigration in the United States from the 1986 Reagan Amnesty to the Present*  
Arianna Mendez, St. Thomas University, [amendez2@stu.edu](mailto:amendez2@stu.edu)

*Quo Vadis? Why Can't we Pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform? Understanding the Reasons behind the Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States*  
Giselle D. Jamison, St. Thomas University, [gjamison@stu.edu](mailto:gjamison@stu.edu)

*The Obama Presidency and US-Persian Gulf Relations: The Relevance of the 1970s for the Obama Era*  
Eliot Lynch, University of Otago, [eliotlynch@hotmail.com](mailto:eliotlynch@hotmail.com)

*The Most Powerful Man in the World: Presidential War Powers and the United Nations*  
Thomas Just, Florida International University, [tjust004@fiu.edu](mailto:tjust004@fiu.edu)

*The Role of Presidential Party on the Size of the US Military*  
James Brennan, Barry University, [james.brennan@mymail.barry.edu](mailto:james.brennan@mymail.barry.edu)

**Comparative Politics: Political Participation and Mobilization, STCR 202**

**Chair:** Leah Blumenfeld, Barry University, [LBlumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:LBlumenfeld@barry.edu)

**Discussant:** Dimmy Herard, Florida International University, [dhera002@fiu.edu](mailto:dhera002@fiu.edu)

*Does Internet Promote Political Participation in Transformational China?*  
Leizhen Zang, Peking University & Harvard- Kennedy School of Government,  
[leizhen\\_zang@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:leizhen_zang@hks.harvard.edu)

*Political participation through complaining*  
Joshua Solomon, Stetson University, [jbsolomo@stetson.edu](mailto:jbsolomo@stetson.edu)

*The 'Politics of Land' in Cajamarca, Peru: Beyond Social Movement Theories*  
Brandon Huson, University of South Florida, [brandon32@usf.edu](mailto:brandon32@usf.edu)

*The Green Movement and the Arab Spring*  
Chris Parmly, Florida International University, [cparm002@fiu.edu](mailto:cparm002@fiu.edu)

*Killing Them Softly with Our Songs: Grassroots Resistance to Communism in Poland*  
Marek Payerhin, Lynchburg College, [payerhin@lynchburg.edu](mailto:payerhin@lynchburg.edu)

**Comparative Politics: Issues of Identity, Nationalism, and Integration,**  
Virginia Room

**Chair & Discussant:** *Bill Myers, University of Tampa, [wmyers@ut.edu](mailto:wmyers@ut.edu)*

*The Challenges of Religious Multiculturalism in Europe*  
Ashley Hudson, University of Florida, [HUDSONASH12@UFL.EDU](mailto:HUDSONASH12@UFL.EDU)

*Ghosts of Europe's Past: Freedom, Fear and the Far Right Challenge for European Identity*  
Rachel K. Cremona, Flagler College, [rcremona@flagler.edu](mailto:rcremona@flagler.edu)

*Nationalism as interplay between state and society: Basque nationalism in France and Spain compared*  
Dragana Svraka, University of Florida, [dragana.svraka@ufl.edu](mailto:dragana.svraka@ufl.edu)

*Between East and West – Ukraine's eternal state*  
Ksenia S. Kulakova, University of South Florida, [kulakova@mail.usf.edu](mailto:kulakova@mail.usf.edu)

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**COCKTAIL RECEPTION: 5:00 PM to 6:30 PM—Markland House**

Please join fellow FPSA members for a cocktail reception at the historic Markland House located behind the Ringhaver Student Center. Special thanks to Alan Woolfolk, Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of the Faculty at Flagler for hosting this event.



**Institutions and Organizations Participating in the 2014 FPSA Program**

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*Save the Date!*

Florida Political Science Association  
2015 Annual Meeting at Stetson University  
Deland, Florida  
Date: TBA

2015 Arrangements Chair: David Hill, Stetson University, [dhill@stetson.edu](mailto:dhill@stetson.edu)

2015 Program Chair: Leah Blumenfeld, Barry University, [l Blumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:l Blumenfeld@barry.edu)

Look for the Call for Papers in October 2014

Please check the FPESA website for the latest information: [www.fpsanet.org](http://www.fpsanet.org)



### FPSA Awards

- Manning J. Dauer Award
- Best Graduate Paper Award

## Manning J. Dauer Award

Manning J. Dauer was a distinguished professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida for over half a century. When he passed away in 1986, he left a legacy that is unparalleled in the State of Florida. He had served as both a formal and an informal advisor to scores of governors, the state legislature, mayors, county commissioners, and city councilpersons. Indeed, it is said that he left his imprint on many public policies at both the state and local level. He is perhaps best known for leading a team of scholars and public officials that devised a reapportionment scheme for the State in the aftermath of the famous *Baker v. Carr* and *Reynolds v. Sims* cases. As an academic, he wrote numerous articles and books on state and local government and politics, and his work was frequently cited by other scholars. He also edited a well-received book on government and politics in Florida in 1980. Upon his death, Professor Robert J. Huckshorn (Florida Atlantic University) carried the book into two additional editions. The book is now edited by Professor J. Edwin Benton (University of South Florida). Moreover, Professor Dauer was a well-known figure within the political science and public administration communities and served in numerous capacities in national and regional associations of both disciplines. But, his heart and loyalty were perhaps tied closest to the organization that he helped to co-found—the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA).

In the late 1990s, the FPSA decided that it was time to establish a lasting and fitting tribute to the person who had breathed life into our Association and devoted so much of his time and energy to the FPSA and the state he loved. To that end, the Association's officers, Executive Council, and membership in 2000 created the Manning J. Dauer Award that would be given every three years to a faculty member at a Florida institution. The purpose of the award was to honor a scholar, like Professor Dauer, who had unequivocally distinguished herself/himself nationally and internationally in both basic and applied research. Like Professor Dauer, this person would be someone whose research would be read by not only other scholars but also would have practical value to public officials and the public at-large in the quest to encourage and facilitate informed decision-making. Furthermore, it was expected that the recipient would possess an exemplary record in research pertinent to Florida government and politics and, as a result, be recognized as a foremost authority and quoted source in this area. Since its inception, the award has been bestowed on **Thomas R. Dye** (Florida State University), **Susan A. MacManus** (University of South Florida), **Joan Carver** (Jacksonville University), **J. Edwin Benton** (University of South Florida) and **Richard C. Feiock** (Florida State University).



## Best Graduate Paper Award

The FPSA recognizes the best graduate paper presented at the annual meeting. The recipient of the award is recognized at the following meeting with a plaque and a \$250 check from the association. In addition, the paper is considered for inclusion in the next volume of the association's journal, *The Florida Political Chronicle*.

The winner of the 2013 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award was Essien Ukpe, University of Uyo, Nigeria for his paper entitled: "The Arab Connection and the Upsurge of Insurgency in Africa: A Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria." [View Award-winning Papers Here](#)

### Nominations for the Best Graduate Student Paper

Presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting

*are due by May 1, 2014.*

Are you a graduate student who presented a high quality paper at the 2014 Annual Meeting in Miami? If so, we encourage you to **submit your paper to the Best Graduate Student Paper Award by May 1<sup>st</sup>**. Please email your paper as an attachment (MS Word or PDF) to the Chair of the Best Graduate Student Paper Award Selection Committee: Sean Foreman, [sforeman@barry.edu](mailto:sforeman@barry.edu)

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A Special Thanks to our Arrangements Chair

**Will Miller**

**Alan Woolfolk**

and to Flagler College

And to the sponsor of our breakfast:

**Doug Ryan Consulting**

## **Publications of the Florida Political Science Association**

### ***Florida Political Chronicle***

<http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html>

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is an annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association and encourages submissions from all disciplinary subfields. Please contact journal editor, **Marco Rimanelli**, [marco.Rimanelli@saitleo.edu](mailto:marco.Rimanelli@saitleo.edu), for more information about submission guidelines.

### ***The Political Scientist:***

### ***The Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association***

<http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html>

*The Political Scientist* is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact Editor **Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan**, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg, [jsm2@stpt.usf.edu](mailto:jsm2@stpt.usf.edu), for more information about submission guidelines.

website: [www.fpsanet.org](http://www.fpsanet.org)



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





# BOOK-REVIEW

## World War I Centennial: Search for the Origins

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- **Max Hastings**, *Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914* (London: William Collins, 2013), ISBN 978-0-00-746764-8
- **Margaret MacMillan**, *The War that Ended the Peace* (London: Profile Books, 2013), ISBN 978-1-84-668272-8
- **Sean McMeekin**, *July 1914: Countdown to War* (London: Basic Books, 2013), ISBN 978-1-84831-593-8
- **Christopher Clark**, *The Sleepwalkers* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), ISBN 978-0-06-114665-7
- **Hall Gardner**, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the Unexpected Armageddon* (forthcoming by Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, Fall 2014).



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At least four solid books, among others, have come out before the 2014 Centenary of the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Each of these books provides a different outlook on the reasons for the outbreak of the Great War. None really reaches the wide-ranging perspective of Luigi Albertini's classic 3-volumes, *The Origins of the War of 1914*; yet each book nevertheless contributes some new dimensions to the origins of World War I (or the war itself). Each of these books also provides an alternative viewpoint to that of the contemporary classics of Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*,<sup>1</sup> which emphasized the long-term political-economic roots of the conflict, and Barbara Tuchman's influential *Guns of August*, which high-lighted naval and arms races.<sup>2</sup>

In most traditional interpretations on the origins of World War I, the centerpiece is the polarization of the two rival alliance-systems, the *Entente* of France, Russia and Great Britain against the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy that framed the decision-making approaches of the rival foreign policy élites, and consequently led to the Great War. Here, however, the impact of alliance structures and automatic mobilizations time-tables as major causes of World War I (among other factors such as the post-1900 Anglo-German naval race or political economic rivalries) has been challenged by both McMeekin and Clark, but not so much by MacMillan or Hastings. Both McMeekin and Clark also challenge the old Fritz Fischer thesis,<sup>3</sup> which puts German aggression at the heart of the cause of World War I; the two argue that both France and Russia possessed and relied on offensive military strategies, and thus Germany was not alone in aggressively starting the war.

Max Hastings' book, *Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914*, focuses primarily on the horrors of World War I itself, devoting about 100 pages out of 566 pages on its origins. Nevertheless, the book provides an interesting sketch of the officials who executed the decisions to go to war, plus a balanced depiction of the social and ideological context, in which the decision to go to war was made, before it moves to examine the battles of the Great War itself.

<sup>1</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London, Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: MacMillan, 1962).

<sup>3</sup> Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1961); Fritz Fischer *War of Illusions* (New York: Norton, 1975).

As a generally traditional account, the book examines the primary reasons as why the British Cabinet was so indecisive up until its 4 August 1914 declaration of war. It explains, on the one hand, how it was really the 1912 Anglo-French Naval Accord (the British fleet would defend the North Atlantic and the French fleet would cover the Mediterranean), that ultimately drew the British into World War I. The latter defense accord, coupled with the German military thrust into neutral Belgium (as a surprise envelopment of French border defenses and potentially threaten the English Channel), provided Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey with the grist to convince a divided Cabinet and country into militarily supporting France and Russia.<sup>4</sup> Hastings also points out several historical ironies conveniently papered-over by Allied propaganda: that London came to the defense of Belgium even though the Belgians in general had passionately supported the Boers (alongside Germany) in their struggle against Great Britain in the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War over South Africa, or that also the French and British military did not respect the Belgian armed forces, or that the Belgian Catholic press supported Catholic Austrian interests against those of Orthodox Serbia, and that there was considerable political hostility in Belgium against the Franco-Russian Pact as “an alliance against nature.”<sup>5</sup>

The Margaret MacMillan book, *The War that Ended the Peace*, is perhaps more in the tradition of Barbara Tuchman’s, *The Proud Tower: a Portrait of the World before the War, 1890-1914*<sup>6</sup> than of Tuchman’s more well-known classic, *The Guns of August*. The MacMillan book depicts the domestic socio-cultural and international political context in which World War I broke-out, by going back further into history than the Hastings book to discuss how key events from 1895-1900 eventually led to the explosion of a global war by August 1914, as well as the reasons why Great Britain left her “Splendid Isolation”. These reasons include: the rise of the Anglo-German naval and Dreadnought rivalry (which is part of the traditional explanation for the war, although MacMillan appears to miss the relevance of Great Britain’s 1893 Spencer Naval Program), and the establishment of the 1904 Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale* (in which she correctly sees democratic France and Great Britain as “unlikely friends”). The *Entente Cordiale* is then followed by a French-inspired Anglo-Russian *entente* in 1907, which also represented a new alliance-system (the triple *Entente* of France, Russia and Great Britain) that provoked strong Austro-German reactions. MacMillan continues to explore the general international socio-politico-ideological context in which the Great War was planned. At the beginning of the book, MacMillan asserts that France and Great Britain did not want war, but could have “done more to stop it”;<sup>7</sup> and then ends her book with the statement, “there are always choices.”<sup>8</sup> But MacMillan really does not go much further than that in explaining what those alternative choices could have been, or how the very possibility of peace-oriented options had narrowed considerably in the immediate years before World War I.<sup>9</sup> There are no alternative strategies suggested, nor are there many of what have been dubbed as “counter-factual” arguments by historians that might help illuminate the significance of certain options taken at the time. Here, contrary to the general view, policy options that were actually proposed at the time, but not adopted, cannot be considered “counter-factual.” This is true as they were part of the historical record, but simply represent policy options not taken at that time. It is a mistake for historians to ignore so-called counter-factuals because some options that for whatever reason are not taken in one era may reappear a decade, if not a century or more, later!

The more provocative Sean McMeekin book, *July 1914: Countdown to War*, points out a number of illuminating “counter-factuals” and more closely analyzes day-by-day the unfolding of the July 1914 events, as

<sup>4</sup> Max Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914* (London: William Collins, 2013), p.85-102.

<sup>5</sup> Hastings, p.89-90.

<sup>6</sup> Barbara Tuchman, *The Proud Tower: a Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914* (London: MacMillan, 1966).

<sup>7</sup> Margaret MacMillan, *The War that Ended the Peace* (London: Profile Books, 2013), Introduction & p. XXXI.

<sup>8</sup> MacMillan, p.605.

<sup>9</sup> [Editor’s Note: Indeed, the influential British historian A.J.P. Taylor’s classic masterpiece, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954, ISBN 978-0-19-881270-8, especially p.385-531), depicts each international crisis of 1904-to-1914 as cascading clashes where diplomatic brinkmanship could at any time precipitate a much-feared generalized war, thus eroding any restraint by the time of the 1914 Sarajevo Crisis.]

compared to the previous two books. McMeekin's book also looks at the socio-political context in which the war broke out, but its strongest focus is the psychology of the personalities involved in the decision-making and debates in the British Cabinet, as well as those inside France, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. McMeekin goes into these much more deeply than the Hastings' book, which is not really the latter's primary focus.

One of the interesting facts that McMeekin unveils is how in Austria-Hungary Archduke Franz Ferdinand had blocked Chief-of-Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's requests for pre-emptive war against Serbia at least 25 times in 1913 alone!<sup>10</sup> The Archduke's assassination in 1914 thus unleashed the Austro-Hungarian military intervention against Serbia—even if Vienna did not want war with Russia! The Archduke's assassination was, in itself, accidental, due to the fact that his driver had made a wrong turn on the street where the Bosnian-Serb assassin, Gavrilo Princip, just happened to be standing. McMeekin also points out, that had a political alliance between French Radical plutocrat Joseph Caillaux and anti-*revanchist* Socialist Jean Jaurès come to power, then France itself might have pursued a *rapprochement* with Germany. Likewise, there was plenty of opposition inside Germany to any preventive war: German Chief-of-Staff Helmuth von Moltke Jr. had argued for preventive war in the past, but he was not in charge. Neither Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg nor the Kaiser Wilhelm II had urged a preventive war, but both were seen as “two old women” by the German hard-liners. And most crucially, neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany herself were totally prepared for war.<sup>11</sup> Germany did fear British entrance into the war, but von Moltke Jr. both weakened and then implemented his predecessor as Chief-of-Staff Alfred von Schlieffen's Plan to defeat France with a surprise envelopment through neutral Belgium, thinking that London would definitely enter the war anyway, although that option was not necessarily a foregone conclusion.

In effect, McMeekin argues against structural causation (the formation of the *Entente* vs. the Triple Alliance) as the main factor causing the World War I. Instead, he stresses that the conflict was not a consequence of alliance structures, but more to bad luck, accidents, poor calculations, poor judgment and confused decision-making. At the same time, however, despite his claims that “France and Russia were just as free to determine whether or not to go to war in 1914 as in all previous years of their Dual Alliance since 1894”<sup>12</sup> even he appears to admit that the *Entente's* alliance noose around Imperial Germany was tightening, in part due to the attempted purchase by the Turkish-Ottoman Empire of British-made Dreadnoughts originally sold to Brazil, which then tried to resell them to the Ottomans until such delivery was blocked by London. This *imbroglio* forced Great Britain and Russia into closer defense consultations, which were in turn complimented by closer Franco-Russian military ties.<sup>13</sup> McMeekin makes the case that France and particularly Russia (given the latter's mobilization) were more willing to go to war than was Germany, and definitely more than Austria-Hungary, which was ready to fight Serbia, but definitely not against Russia. McMeekin argues that had Berlin thoroughly pre-planned the Great War, as argued by the Fischer School, then one would have expected Berlin to engage in closer defense cooperation with Vienna.<sup>14</sup>

Although McMeekin addresses a good number of other so-called counter-factuals, he does not appear to address the fact that Rasputin, the Tsar's spiritual and political advisor, had tried to warn against entering the war, but had been incapacitated in an attempted assassination at the time. Yet, in moving away from such speculation, one still has to question: how much of Russian mobilization was pushed by France and how much was of Russian inspiration—as a result of Russian fears of Austro-German penetration into the Balkans, Ottoman Empire and Near-East? McMeekin argues that the slow-moving Russia actually began to mobilize even before Serbia or Austria-Hungary did, and that the Tsar had ordered a secret Period

<sup>10</sup> Sean McMeekin, *July 1914: Countdown to War* (London: Basic Books, 2013), p.386.

<sup>11</sup> McMeekin, p.385.

<sup>12</sup> McMeekin, p.384.

<sup>13</sup> McMeekin, p.388-390.

<sup>14</sup> McMeekin, p.387.

Preparatory of War at Midnight of July 25-26, although later it was claimed that such so-called partial mobilization “did not mean war”!<sup>15</sup> But the initial Russian secret mobilization (not lost on Germany) certainly exacerbated the situation until by July 28-29 the Tsar reluctantly ordered full mobilization of Russian forces—knowing full-well that such mobilization meant war.

By contrast with the McMeekin book, Christopher Clark’s work, *The Sleepwalkers*, tends to place greater emphasis on French political and financial influence over Russia. Clark introduces his book by questioning state-compiled documentation on the origins of the Great War, as each country possessed its own political motivation for publicizing such documents. For its part, post-war Austria wanted to head-off an international investigation on the origins of the World War I (possibly by the League of Nations). The post-Russian Soviet Union wanted to prove Tsarist responsibility by linking the origins of the Great War to French President Raymond Poincaré in an effort not to pay back Russia’s pre-WWI loans. The British claimed to want to serve the needs of scholars to help them understand why war broke-out, but nevertheless concealed key documents. The memoirs of German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, French President Raymond Poincaré and British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey either overlook or avoid responsibility for their key decisions, disregard the facts, or else propagandize. In addition, Clark notes how crucial French and Russian documents omit the secret minutes of the crucial meetings between Poincaré and the Russians in St. Petersburg during 20-23 June 1914.<sup>16</sup> Important information also missing is the Serbian role in the crisis, including information known to the French on Archduke Franz-Ferdinand’s assassination.

It is the Clark book that best explains the role of France (and not just Russia) in the financial and military support of Serbia from 1903 to 1914. Clark points out that France had offered Belgrade yet another huge loan in January 1914, equal to twice Serbia’s entire State budget of 1912—and enough to cover her huge military expenditures, plus a military aid package negotiated with St. Petersburg. The significant French weapons sale to Serbia in 1914 was justified on the (false) basis that Austria-Hungary was delivering similar weapons to Bulgaria with German financing—as St. Petersburg had blocked French loans, opening the door for German finance.<sup>17</sup> Significant French support for Serbia thus raises questions as to whether both France and Russia were purposely provoking Austria-Hungary and Imperial Germany into taking military action against Belgrade.

However the main problem is that, as informative as these books are, particularly those of McMeekin and Clark, none of them really goes to the roots as to why World War I became a systemic global war, and thus why the Austro-Serb dispute did not remain a localized conflict, or a ‘Third Balkan War’ in 1914. In other words, due to a lack of in-depth historical focus on European diplomacy from at least the 1870-71 Franco-German War, none of these books fully explain why the Austro-Serb Balkan conflict in 1914 necessarily involved both France and Great Britain except in terms of general reference to the 1894 Franco-Russian Dual Alliance, the 1904-05 Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale* and the 1907 Anglo-Russian *entente*, plus the military pacts that strengthened such *ententes*. This is not a criticism of the excellent research of these books; it is only to point out that such a project requires an even longer framework of analysis.

While the issue is touched upon by the latter of the three books, for example, the role of French Republican *revanche* against the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and how this issue played an integral role in Franco-German foreign policy and security disputes from 1871 to 1914 (as well as later in 1940-44 when Alsace was re-annexed by Nazi Germany), it is unfortunately not a major focus in any of these four books. A different historical approach would help explain how the Alsace-Lorraine and Balkan questions became so intertwined in Anglo-German-French colonial rivalries and the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance,

<sup>15</sup> McMeekin, p.376-400.

<sup>16</sup> Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), p. XXIV-XXV.

<sup>17</sup> Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, p.258-263, 272-281, 357, 633 & note 152.



particularly once French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcassé picked-up from Adolphe Thiers' foreign policy after the 1870-71 Franco-German War.

The Franco-Russian Dual Alliance was crafted, in part, as a consequence of the failure of France and Great Britain to come to terms after Great Britain's unilateral 1882 intervention (and later annexation) in Egypt, in addition to Kaiser Wilhelm II's decision to drop by 1891 Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's 1887 Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty. Indeed, France first opted for an alliance with Russia in order to pressure *both* Germany *and* Great Britain (against Georges Clemenceau's views in 1891, for example). The fact that Paris was able to manipulate the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance in such a way as to prevent Great Britain from aligning with either Germany or Russia, that is, before Paris and London were finally able to establish their own *Entente Cordiale* in 1904 plays a major role in exacerbating global tensions. And, ironically, after finally establishing relations with London as "unlikely friends," it was Paris that helped facilitate the 1907 Anglo-Russian *entente*. This had the effect of forging an "encircling" military bloc around Germany (plus new French hopes to reverse Germany's peaceful hegemony over the Continent) that Berlin felt it could not break free from without the use of force, if not a two-front-war.

This is *not* to say that France caused World War I by forging the *Entente* with Russia and Great Britain, but that the failure to prevent the Great War *as a global or systemic war* was largely due to the historical failure to resolve the historical Franco-German dispute over Alsace-Lorraine (which actually runs as far back as to France's fateful annexation of these old German lands in 1640s-81 under the "Sun King" Louis XIV). MacMillan, for example, does touch upon the Zabern/Saverne affair in 1913 in Alsace and its impact on the credibility of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg and Prussian Minister of War General Erich von Falkenhayn (later the second of three German Chiefs-of-Staff in World War I),<sup>18</sup> for example, but without really explaining its historical significance—in that the Zabern/Saverne Affair undermined the Prussian leadership and its legitimacy (as overlords of Alsace-Lorraine) given von Bethmann-Hollweg's failure to implement successful political autonomist reforms in Alsace-Lorraine in 1911. Thus, none of these books look at actual discussions at the time (by both politicians such as Jean Jaurès and peace activists) as to how France and Germany might have attempted to resolve the Alsace-Lorraine question.

Also not deeply explored is how the tightening Anglo-American relationship blocked a possible Anglo-German accord in the period 1898-1902, thus exacerbating friction between Great Britain and Germany, over 15 years prior to Berlin's foolhardy attempts to check the American entry into World War I by intimidating the U.S. through U-boat commerce sinking and support of Mexican irredentist claims (1917 Zimmermann Telegram). The relatively minor Italian role in the origins of the Great War represents an additionally unexplored factor leading to the conflict, given Italian irredentist claims to Austrian lands (Trento, Trieste and Dalmatia) and secret accords with France that lead Italy to plan to split from the Triple Alliance if it started an aggressive war against the *Entente*, despite parallel Italian pledges to stay in the Triple Alliance if Austria-Hungary finally ceded these irredentist lands in compensation, which however Vienna refused despite pressure from Berlin to accept. Thus, one can raise the question as to how Austria-Hungary and Germany might have reacted had Italy defected from the Triple Alliance at an earlier date (such as 1913), or conversely, how emboldened Italy would have been if the *Irredenta* had been ceded to her in 1914 thus leading to a nationalist mobilization against France preventing French army corps from being secretly withdrawn from the Alps and redeployed to strengthen the Germany/Alsatian border.

In conclusion, there are a large number of issues that still need consideration if a full explanation of the origins of World War I can be written. Evidently there are tens of thousands of books on the subject and it is impossible to read them all. Nevertheless, as author of this Book-Review, I am also publishing by Fall 2014, a hundred years after the onslaught of the Great War, a book on this topic, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the*

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<sup>18</sup> MacMillan, p.264. [Editor's Note: German General Erich von Falkenhayn later became Chief-of-Staff in World War I by replacing in 1914-16 a broken Helmuth von Moltke Jr., only to be replaced himself in 1916-18 by war-hero Paul von Hindenburg as the last Chief-of-Staff in 1916-18.]



*Unexpected Armageddon* that seeks to highlight issues that the previous four excellent books reviewed here do not elaborate in great detail.<sup>19</sup> Most crucially, *The Failure to Prevent World War I* focuses primarily on how French foreign policy and its quest for *revanche* evolved since the end of the 1870-71 Franco-German War, given the fact that France, at least until the 1911 Agadir Crisis, if not as late as January 1914, when Poincaré dined at the German Embassy in Paris, still hoped to exchange French colonies for Alsace-Lorraine.

My forthcoming book also examines how earlier British Premier William Gladstone sought, but failed, in 1871, to find a compromise solution between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine and how Anglo-French-German policy then developed, while many Germans sought to integrate Alsace-Lorraine into the rest of Germany as a political equal to the Southern German states. In effect, *The Failure to Prevent World War I* argues that the roots of the global conflict can be found in the period 1887-1894 when Great Britain, Germany and France missed a possible opportunity to forge a broader *entente*. Instead, France turned towards Russia, forging a tight Franco-Russian Dual Alliance by 1894 which proved impossible to break. This was followed by the fact that France was then able to draw-in to her side Great Britain, once Paris finally relinquished claims on all disputed colonial lands in Africa, most importantly Egypt in exchange for Morocco.

Once the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance evolved into sequential French and Russian *ententes* with Great Britain (1904 and 1907), this new bloc raised German fears of “encirclement” by 1908, and especially after the *Entente* evolved into an actual alliance by 1912. While it is true, as the McMeekin and Clark books argue, that the leaderships of each of the major Great Powers could have adopted alternate policies that may have achieved a different diplomatic outcome instead of the Great War, the fact of the matter is that the formation of the *Entente* as a rival bloc against the German-led Triple Alliance tended to shape and limit the direction of those alternatives. This Anglo-French-Russian “nightmare of coalitions” made a global or systemic Great War much more likely after 1908, given German fears of the disaggregation of its Bismarckian alliance-system, if not also the ethnic disintegration of Austria-Hungary or even an eventual future collapse of Germany herself and her own Monarchist rule—much as forewarned by German Chancellor von Bismarck prior to his dismissal in 1890.

In sum, all these books are highly recommended for all who are interested in the latest historico-political re-interpretations of World War I in the Centennial of this bloody First Armageddon that had consumed Europe in 1914-1918.

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[**EDITOR'S NOTE:** As passing reminder for all readers, please consult the related World War I Book-Review that I authored in the earlier *Florida Political Chronicle's* vol.20, n.1-2 (2009-2012): p.58-59, on the break-through work of John M. Barry, *The Great Influenza: Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History* (New York, ISBN 0-14-303448-0), available FREE on the Florida Political Science Association's Web-site: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive> ].

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<sup>19</sup> Hall Gardner, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the Unexpected Armageddon* (forthcoming, Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, Fall 2014) up-dates, elaborates and documents my argument first presented in, “The Failure to Prevent World War I” in Hall Gardner & Oleg Kobtzeff, eds. *Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2012), p.291-323.

