

Florida County Map with County Seat Cities

Florida Political Chronicle

Regional Scholarly Journal
Florida Political Science Association

VOLUME 23, N.2 (2014-2015)

Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.



ISSN: 1549-1323

Winter 2014-2015

Journal of Florida' Political Science Association - - Table of Contents -

Illustrated Florida Cover	1
Table of Contents	2
Officers—Florida Political Science Association 2014-2015	3
Essays Submission Requirements to <i>Florida Political Chronicle</i>	4
President’s Introduction: Goin’ Forth: Mid-Term Elections & FPSA News! by FPSA President Kathryn DePalo, Ph.D. (Florida International University-Miami)	5
Editor’s Introduction: Starting a Second Fist-full of Scholarly Essays Annually! by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges)	6
The Changing Interest Group System in Florida by Aubrey Jewett, Ph.D. (University of Central Florida-Orlando)	8
“R2P” or Not “R2P”, That is the Question! by Mark Grzegorzewski, Ph.D. (University of South Florida-Tampa)	33
Jamaica vs. World Economic Responses to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index by Omar E. Hawthorne, Ph.D. (University of West Indies-Mona, Kingston, Jamaica)	49
Absentee Voting: a Cross-State Analysis by Enrijeta Shino (University of Florida), FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2014	64
Announcements:	
❖ FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION—Membership (www.fpsanet.org)	78
❖ 2015 FPSA Annual Conference, University of Central Florida-Orlando: Call for Papers	79
❖ 2015 FPSA Conference Program (28 March 2015)	80
❖ Book-Review: Stephen Sestanovich, <i>Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama</i> by Steven Ekovich (American University of Paris, France)	102
❖ Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: Flagler College-St. Augustine	109
Winter 2014-2015	



FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OFFICERS 2014–2015

FPSA PRESIDENT KATHRYN A. DePALO

CHAIR 2014 & 2015 CONFERENCES

Florida International University, Miami

depalok@fiu.edu

LEAH BLUMENFELD,

1st Vice-President

Barry University, Miami

l Blumenfeld@barry.edu

WILL MILLER, Secretary

Flagler College, St. Augustine

w miller@flagler.edu

MARCO RIMANELLI

Editor, *Florida Political Chronicle*

Saint Leo University, Near Tampa

Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu



DENIS REY,

2nd Vice-President

University of Tampa

denis.rey@ut.edu

AUBREY JEWETT, Treasurer

University of Central Florida-Orlando

aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu

JUDITHANE SCUFFELD McLAUCHAN

Editor Newsletter, *Political Scientist*

University South Florida-St. Petersburg

jsm2@stpt.usf.edu

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 2012-TO-2017

(staggered 3-years terms)

MARK LOGAS (2012-15)

Valencia College, Orlando

mlogas@valenciacollege.edu

JOSEPH USCINSKI (2012-15)

University of Miami

uscinski@miami.edu

GISELLE JAMISON (2011-13)

St. Thomas University, Miami

GJamison@stu.edu

MIRYA HOLMAN (2013-16)

Florida Atlantic University

mholman5@fau.edu

BRIAN KUPFER (2014-17)

Tallahassee Community College

bkupfer@tcc.fl.edu

RICHARD MURGO (2012-15)

Tallahassee Community College

murgor@tcc.fl.edu

SEAN FOREMAN (2014-17) ex-President

Barry University, Miami

sforeman@mail.barry.edu

DAVID HILL (2014-16)*

Stetson University-DeLand

dhill@stetson.edu

MANUEL DELEON (2014-17)

Bethune-Cookman

deleonm@cookman.edu

KEVIN WAGNER ex-Officio Past-President

Florida Atlantic University

kwagne15@fau.edu

* Elected to fill remainder of Denis Ray's term.

Florida Political Chronicle

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES FOR ESSAYS

ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS to:

Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.
 Professor Political Science & International Studies
 SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY
 Social Sciences Department
 MC-2127, P.O.-Box 6665
 Saint Leo, Florida, 33574-6665, U.S.A.
 E-mail: Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

SUBSCRIPTIONS for FPC & FPSA:

go to FPSA web-site:
<http://www.fpsanet.org/>
 then at bottom page click on:
[Join FPSA/Conference Registration](#)

Any problems e-mail Treasurer:
Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

Each past issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (like the “2012 Presidential Elections”, v.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) and the on-line Archive of older issues are FREE for readers by clicking two tabs on the Florida Political Science Association’s Website: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>.
Only the current issue is exclusively accessible via password and FPSA subscription until a new issue is printed!

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS GUIDELINES –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

GUIDELINES--e-mail essays to Editor Marco Rimanelli Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

- Essays must be sent both in double-spaced print & Word e-mail.
- Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1 inch margin (no landscape-size tables!). Ask the Editor!
- Add at paper’s end, a **2-paragraphs Author’s Biography**, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.
- In your work **do not use the First Person (“I”)**; instead use the neutral “The study” or “This work”.
- **No PDF** or Acrobat. If you have Acrobat you can use its selector and **convert it into Word**.
- Preferred style and footnoting (at end of each page) is in Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
- All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
- **Book-Reviews are welcome** on important topics! Submit your Review in Word (any length accepted).

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

New President's Introduction: Goin' Forth: Mid-Term Elections & FPSA News!

FPSA President Kathryn A. DePalo, Ph.D., Florida International University

Dear FPSA Members and All Interested Readers:

Welcome to the 2014 second issue of the 23th volume of the *Florida Political Chronicle*. Under the direction of our wonderful Editor, Marco Rimanelli Ph.D., a Professor of Politics and International Studies at Saint Leo University near Tampa, we have continued our tradition of scholarship and excellence with these publications.

FPSA enjoyed another successful conference at Flagler College in Florida's beautiful and historic city of St. Augustine this past March 2014. Participants hailing from 48 colleges and universities presented over 80 papers in all areas of Political Science: American Politics, International Relations, Comparative Politics, Political Theory, Public Administration, and State and Local Government.

We are pleased to announce the winner of the 2014 FPSA Best Graduate Paper presented at our 2014 annual conference: "Absentee Voting: a Cross State Analysis" by Enrijeta Shino of the University of Florida. The winning paper is posted on the current issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and also on FPSA's web-site at: http://www.fpsanet.org/uploads/8/8/7/3/8873825/2014_nominee_shino.pdf

Save the Date: our 2015 FPSA Annual Conference will be held at the University of Central Florida in Orlando on Saturday, 28 March 2015. Aubrey Jewett of UCF will be the Arrangements Chair and Leah Blumenfeld of Barry University is the designated Program Chair. Call for Papers were distributed in October 2014 have a submission deadline by 15 January 2015. We hope you all shall attend.

In local and national politics during the 2014 Mid-Term Election season, all eyes will once again be on Florida as Republican incumbent, Governor Rick Scott faces former-Republican Governor-turned-Democrat, Charlie Crist in the most-watched gubernatorial race in the nation. FPSA remains the pre-eminent place to talk Florida politics with an array of experts on our Board and among our membership.

I hope my tenure as new President of FPSA continues the tradition of great leadership exhibited by our past Presidents and the progress our members have made. We continue to actively fight for the importance of civic education in Florida as an integral part of education curriculum at all levels. I strongly encourage Faculty, graduate students, and our growing number of outstanding undergraduate students to be involved in FPSA and plan to attend all our annual conferences.

Please visit www.fpsa.org to read all past and present *Florida Political Chronicle* volumes and to read the latest issues of the *Political Scientist*. With its fresh design and new content, our FPSA web-site is a great resource for scholars, members and students. You can conduct research, learn about upcoming annual conferences and Board Members, as well as peruse FPSA's by-laws and Constitution.

Thank you to everyone who makes FPSA such a strong and vital organization. Best wishes for 2014-2015!

Kathryn A. DePalo, Ph.D.

**President FPSA
Associate-Professor of Political Science
Florida International University, Miami**

Editor's Introduction: Starting a Second Fist-full of Scholarly Essays Annually!

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair at College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists, Fellow-Travelers and Readers,

welcome to a new *Florida Political Chronicle* (vol.23, n.2, Winter 2014) as our second issue published in 2014 (despite a technical delay), soon to be followed by two more issues for the current year 2015. This new issue welcomes its readers to an Introduction from our new President of the Florida Political Science Association, Associate-Professor Kathryn DePalo from Florida International University, who also brings us up to speed with the forthcoming FPSA Annual Conference on Saturday 28 March 2015 at the University of Central Florida-Orlando. Please look over at p.80 to the 2015 FPSA Conference list of 24 panels and an interesting lunch-time Round-Table on Florida Politics. Additionally, this issue sports 3 scholarly essays and the 2014 Best Graduate Student Paper Award.

The first essay is "The Changing Interest Group System in Florida" by Associate-Professor Aubrey Jewett of the University of Central Florida-Orlando. He analyzes how the interest group system in Florida has changed since the Republican take-over of state government in 1999, despite little change among the most influential interest group sectors. While pro-Democrats unions and newspapers have generally lost influence, pro-Republican Florida business associations and individual businesses remain influential under the 15 years of Republican leadership: in 1998 the largest lobbyists were tied mostly to the Democratic Party, ever since the most influential lobbyists tend to have Republican ties, despite Republicans-sponsored laws restricting lobbyists and regulating groups that can be formed to influence elections, as well as massive increases in political campaign-financing limits favoring Republicans.

The second essay, "R2P" or Not "R2P", That Is the Question!" by Instructor Mark Grzegorzewski Ph.D. of the University of South Florida-Tampa, focuses on the concept of "responsibility to protect" ("R2P") in International Relations, by explaining how state sovereignty must protect its citizens, although powerful states always seek to manipulate this concept to serve their own interests (like Damascus and international positions on the 2011-15 Syrian Civil War).

The third essay, "Jamaica vs. World Economic Responses to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index" is a foreign study by Dr. Omar E. Hawthorne, Lecturer at the University of West Indies-Mona in Kingston, Jamaica. With corruption in Third World countries being a key factor in weakening development policies, this research examines the impact of Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and whether it matters as an authoritative tool to assess a country's corruption score. In the case of Jamaica, the most cited corruption index, the annual CPI is reflective of the global market perceptions of Jamaica's economy, but it does not change the international policy-makers' economic behavior, nor affect negatively the investment flows into Jamaica, or impacted its credit-ratings, foreign direct investments, bond spreads and exchange-rates.

The last essay, "Absentee Voting: a Cross-State Analysis" by Ms. Enrijeta Shino of the University of Florida, was selected for the 2014 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award. This research analyses the differences between in-person early voting and absentee voting practices in the U.S. 2008 and 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections to identify the importance of the institutional environment over the casting of absentee ballots in a given election year and how it has increased general turnout in the 2008 Presidential election, compared to lack of data for the 2012 Presidential elections.

Finally, this issue's Book-Report is by U.S. "Expat" Associate-Professor Steven Ekovich of the American University of Paris in France. He reviews the book, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama* (New York: Knopf, 2014), of Professor Stephen Sestanovich of Columbia University and the New York Council of Foreign Relations. As an ex-career diplomat from the Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton years (having worked under both parties), Sestanovich's provides a thoroughly documented and engaging history of contemporary U.S. foreign policy that bridges book learning and government practice of the last 12 U.S. Presidents over 70 years since World War II from Harry Truman to Barrack Obama.

Sestanovich analyses cyclical waxing and waning of America's global power, through alternating policies between "Maximalist" and "Retrenchist" Presidents. "Maximalist" Presidents (from Democratic Presidents, like Truman, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to Republicans under Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush Sr. and George W. Bush Jr.) have used power to shape the international system in a Liberal-Capitalist direction under U.S. interests. Instead, openly "Retrenchist" ones (like Democrats Jimmy Carter and Obama, and reluctant Republicans Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon) have criticized this as an over-reaching that places excessive burdens on national capabilities and public support, plus unwelcome strategic consequences of actually weakening the U.S. position via over-extension. The author depicts the ebb and flow of U.S. world diplomacy as a story of "Retrenchers" bringing under control the over-extension of "Maximalists". In turn, "Maximalists" accuse "Retrenchers" of weakening U.S. global standing, leaving the country and its allies exposed to merciless battering by hostile Powers who challenge the U.S.-led Liberal international order. In the end, as "Maximalists" were called back into power in reaction to an external crisis created by the negative consequences of a vacuum of power left by the "Retrenchers" themselves (see the current criticism of U.S. global weakness and irresolution under Obama), also some openly "Retrenchist" Presidents were finally forced back into "Maximalist" policies by unexpected international crises threatening U.S. interests and position (see Democrat Bill Clinton). In the end, U.S. foreign policy under any President must always follow three imperatives: "1. Bring the boys home. 2. Don't be Santa Claus. 3. Don't be pushed around", while skillfully blending U.S. foreign policy leadership and worries over Europe's viability, USSR aims, and America's degree of firmness.

Since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way that fully embodies the current U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Science and related Disciplines: American Government & Politics, Political Theory & Philosophy, Comparative Politics, International Affairs & Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, and International Law & Organizations (submissions requirements are on p.4).

Best wishes to all!

Marco Rimanelli Ph.D.

Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA

Professor of Polical Science & International Studies at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A. & 2013-2014 Fulbright-Schuman Chair at E.U. graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Belgium.

THE CHANGING INTEREST GROUP SYSTEM IN FLORIDA

Aubrey Jewett, Ph.D., University of Central Florida-Orlando

ABSTRACT: How has the interest group system in Florida changed since the Republican takeover of state government in 1999 and how much is it the same? Generally the most influential interest group sectors have remained the same, although some of the important issues they face and largest specific corporations within industry categories have changed. Florida business continues to be influential in the new Republican era, while unions and newspapers have lost influence. Over the past 15 years, Republicans have passed laws banning lobbyist gift-giving, restricting lobbying by former-colleagues, and requiring more financial disclosure by lobbyists. In 1998 the largest and most successful lobbyists in the state generally had connections to the Democratic Party, but the most influential lobbyists today tend to have Republican ties. Florida Republicans have also modified rules regulating groups that can be formed to influence elections, increased the amount of money that can be donated to campaigns, and continued to allow political parties to receive unlimited donations. Since 1998 there has been a massive increase in campaign spending (generally favoring Republicans) and an increase in the use of independent spending groups to influence election outcomes (typically dominated by Republican conservative pro-business). Overall, compared to 1998, many of the top donor industries and some of the specific groups have remained the same, although Republican candidates now typically receive more money than Democrats. The two major political parties continue to draw disproportionate support from different groups: lawyers, lobbyists and unions give more to the Democratic Party, while business associations and individual businesses give more to the Republican Party.

What does the interest group system in Florida look like today? How has the interest group system in Florida changed since the Republican take-over of state government and how much has it remained the same? Why have some elements changed and some remained the same? To answer these questions, the current state of interest groups, lobbying and money in Florida is assessed and compared to the previous system. Florida's post-World War II political system is described through three phases:

1. traditional dominance by conservative segregationist Democrats which faded by the late-1960s;
2. progressive Democratic governance that ran from 1970 to 1998; and
3. conservative Republican control since then.

Florida's traditional interest group system and the changes that occurred during the more recent progressive Democratic decades were well summarized by Tom Dye in 1998:

"Florida's growth and diversification over the years brought about a gradual fragmentation of the state's traditional power structure. It is no longer possible for a few powerful individuals—like the late-Ed Ball, who headed the extensive DuPont land and railroad holdings in the state; the late-Chester Ferguson of Lykes Meat Company; the late-Ben Hill Griffin of agribusiness; or the late-attorney Chesterfield Smith of Holland and Knight, who wrote the Florida Constitution—to dictate policy in the state capital.¹ Traditionally strong interests in Florida—citrus, cattle, horse racing, phosphate, electric power and liquor industries—now share power with service and tourism industries, builders and contractors, banking and insurance, health-care providers, labor unions, teachers, public employees, environmentalists, feminist and civil rights organizations, and the ever-present trial lawyers. And, of course, in Florida the influence of senior citizens, including the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), is especially important."²

Dye has described in detail the interest group system that evolved and existed after 28 years of more progressive Democratic control of the state legislature and executive branch (a period of unified Democratic Party control broken only by one four year term of Republican Governor Bob Martinez in 1987-1991). Subsequently, information about power, money and influence in Florida were up-dated by Jewett, along with MacManus and Dye in 2007 and 2011 (also with Bonanza).³

This research up-dates the previous studies above with more recent findings on Florida's interest group system, specifically by comparing today's system after 14 years of Republican dominance with the one found after three decades of progressive Democratic control, and explaining why some facets of the system have changed and others have not. The organization of this research roughly follows the structure established by Dye in 1998.

Economic Interests: Corporations

In 1998 Dye noted that "economic interests dominate politics in Tallahassee and nearly everywhere else."⁴ Overall, economic interests are even more dominant today under Republican control (and because of a severe recession and slow recovery), but a number of the largest interests in Florida have changed over time, due to structural alterations in the state and national economy, competition, and other market forces. Further, some of the challenges faced and policies sought by the various economic interests have changed over time.

Table 1 compares Florida's largest corporations as of 2012 vs. their same ranking in 1998. These large public and private corporations maintain influence with lawmakers because of their importance to Florida's economy (providing jobs and tax revenue) and because they have the resources to make sizable donations to sympathetic political campaigns and causes. A number of companies made both lists: Publix, Tech Data, Carnival, FPL, Auto Nation, Office Depot, JM Family Enterprises, and Darden Restaurants. Yet, several of these companies were not in the top 15 in 1998. Both private equity firms were not among the top 450 companies in 1998 (Sun Capital Partners founded in 1995 and HIG Capital founded in 1993). CSX became one of Florida's largest companies in 2003 when it moved its headquarters to Jacksonville. Several others were listed in 1998, but have moved up in the rankings: World Fuel Services (ranked 51 in 1998), Jabil Circuits (ranked 38 in 1998), Southern Wine and Spirits (48 in 1998) and Royal Caribbean Cruises (ranked 16th in 1998).

Several of Florida's largest companies in 1998 fell out of the top 15 by 2012. Winn Dixie dropped to 16th after being bought out by South Carolina chain BI-LO in 2012 (BI-LO then opened up the new corporate headquarters in Jacksonville). Winn Dixie had been the largest company in Florida for a number of years prior to 1998, but increased competition from Walmart on prices and from Publix on quality and service drove Winn Dixie into bankruptcy and reorganization in 2005, pushing it subsequently into buyout (its stores in Florida continue to operate under the Winn Dixie brand). CHS Electronics filed for bankruptcy in 2000 and eventually went out of business after investigation for tax fraud and allegations of financial impropriety. Rival Konica bought out Danka in 2008 and while the new company continues to operate out of St. Petersburg it is now a subsidiary of Japan's Konica Minolta. Ryder continues to roll along and simply dropped a few positions to 18 by 2012. Altamonte Springs-based Adventist Health System is no longer ranked by Florida Trend under corporations, but the non-profit hospital giant would still be a top 20 Florida company if it was.

Below are all main Florida Corporations and interest-groups divided by category:

Table 1. Florida’s Largest Corporations by Revenue 2012 vs. 1998

Rank	Name	Revenue (B \$)	Employees	Headquarters	Type of Business
2012					
1.	Sun Capital Partners	40.5	165	Boca Raton	Private Equity
2.	World Fuel Services	34.6	1,798	Miami	Fuel Supply
3.	Publix Supermarkets	27.2	70,000	Lakeland	Grocery Stores
4.	Tech Data	26.5	8,300	Clearwater	Hardware/Software
5.	Jabil Circuit	16.5	121,000	St. Petersburg	Circuit Boards
6.	Carnival	15.8	91,300	Miami	Cruise Line
7.	NextEra Energy/FPL	15.3	4,700	Juno Beach	Electric Power
8.	AutoNation	13.8	19,400	Fort Lauderdale	Automobiles
9.	CSX	11.7	31,000	Jacksonville	Rail Transportation
9.	Office Depot	11.5	39,000	Boca Raton	Office Supply
11.	Southern Wine & Spirits	9.5	12,500	Miami	Alcohol Supply
12.	JM Family Enterprises	8.9	3,800	Deerfield Beach	Automobiles
13.	HIG Capital Management	8.5	225	Miami	Private Equity
14.	Royal Caribbean Cruises	7.5	61,040	Miami	Cruise Line
15.	Darden Restaurants	7.5	178,500	Orlando	Restaurants
1998					
1.	Auto Nation	16.1	42,000	Fort Lauderdale	Automobiles
2.	Winn Dixie	13.6	139,000	Jacksonville	Grocery Stores
3.	Publix Supermarkets	12.1	47,000	Lakeland	Grocery Stores
4.	Tech Data	11.5	8,200	Clearwater	Hardware/Software
5.	Office Depot	9.0	44,000	Delray Beach	Office Supply
6.	CHS Electronics	8.5	6,800	Miami	Hardware/Software
7.	FPL Group	6.7	9,800	Juno Beach	Electric Power
8.	JM Family Enterprises	6.2	3000	Deerfield Beach	Automobiles
9.	Ryder Systems	5.2	5,300	Miami	Transportation
10.	Harris	3.9	28,500	Melbourne	Communications
11.	Florida Progress	3.6	4,700	St. Petersburg	Electric Power
12.	Danka Business Systems	3.3	20,000	St. Petersburg	Office Imaging
13.	Darden Restaurants	3.3	114,800	Orlando	Restaurants
14.	Adventist Health System	3.6	20,000	Winter Park	Healthcare
15.	Carnival	3.0	22,000	Miami	Cruise Line

Source: Top Rank Florida, *Florida Trend* (June 2012 & September 1999) issues.

Banks

Table 2 displays the largest bank holding companies operating in Florida as of 2012 vs. their same ranking in 1998. Due to Federal deregulation and intense competition the largest banks in the state are now mostly corporations with out-of-state national headquarters rather than “home grown” Florida companies, but only one bank in the top five remains the same since 1998, SunTrust, which was and still remains today the number three. For many decades Barnett Bank of Jacksonville was the largest bank in Florida (often called “Florida’s Bank”) until NationsBank bought Barnett in 1997 (hence NationsBank’s Number One ranking in 1998). Then in late-1998 NationsBank merged with BankAmerica as the new Bank of America, continues to be the largest bank in Florida today (and 2nd largest in the country).

Florida National Bank of Jacksonville was 2nd largest bank in Florida when it was bought by First Union in 1990 (which helped First Union achieve the 2nd ranking in Florida in 1998). First Union merged with Wachovia in 2001. In 2004, Wachovia acquired SouthTrust (Florida’s 4th largest bank in 1998). Finally, Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia at the end of 2008 leading to Wells Fargo becoming the 2nd largest bank in Florida today (and 4th largest in the country). Regions Financial Corporation bought Amsouth Bancorporation in 2006 helping Regions Bank to the 4th position in Florida in 2012. The largest bank in the country, JPMorgan Chase, is now the 5th largest in Florida. While there are about 275 banks in Florida holding deposits, the five largest control 50% of all banking deposits in the Sunshine State.⁵

Table 2. Florida’s Largest Banks by Florida Deposits (\$ Billions), 2012 vs. 1998

Rank	2012		1998	
1. (2) ^a	Bank of America	77.76	NationsBank	47.82
2. (4)	Wells Fargo Bank	69.01	First Union Corp. of FL	33.62
3. (12)	SunTrust Banks of FL	42.60	Sun Trust Banks of FL	20.37
4. (16)	Regions Financial Corp.	18.64	SouthTrust	9.71
5. (1)	JPMorgan Chase Bank	15.31	Amsouth Bancorporation	5.1

Source: iBanknet, *Florida Bank Branch Deposits* (2012); *Florida Trend* (October 1999); National Rank in 2013 in parentheses

Despite a loosening of some governmental rules regarding ownership and mergers, banks are still heavily regulated by both the national and state government. Large individual banks and the Florida Banker’s Association lobby the legislature for favorable legislation concerning charters and branches, deposit and loan requirements, interest-rate restrictions, debt collection, foreclosure and repossession. These banks constantly lobby the executive branch for favorable interpretation of statutes and reasonable oversight by the Florida Division of Financial Institutions located within the Florida Office of Financial Regulation. Florida bank deposits have grown as Florida has grown and Florida banks have helped to fuel the state’s growth by loaning money to start up and expand businesses, purchase and develop land, and build and buy new construction. Because banks are essential to Florida’s economy, are heavily regulated and have enormous sums of money, they are powerful interests in Tallahassee.

Health Care

Health care access, costs and regulations are enormous issues in the state because of Florida’s large elderly population and sizable number of residents without health insurance (at 19.8% or the 4th highest of all 50 states by 2012).⁶ Containing health insurance costs, while trying to expand health insurance coverage and maintain quality, have been important, but conflicting priorities in the Florida legislature and U.S. Congress over the last decade. Decisions regarding these priorities, including implementation of the Affordable Care Act (aka “Obamacare”) are heavily influenced by the major health insurance companies and hospitals operating in the state (see Tables 3 and 4 below).

Table 3. Florida Largest Health Insurers by Florida Premiums (\$ Billions), 2012 vs. 1998

	2012		1998	
1.	Blue Cross & Blue Shield	6.13	Blue Cross & Blue Shield	1.6
2.	United Healthcare	5.09	United Healthcare	.43
3.	Humana Medical	4.86	Humana Medical	.3
4.	Aetna Health	1.48	Principal Life Insurance	.18
5.	AvMed	1.29	United Wisconsin Life Insurance	.16

Source: Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, *Fast Facts* (December 2012); *Florida Trend* (August 1999).

Table 4. Florida Largest Hospitals by Revenue (\$ Billions) in 2012 and Admissions 1998^a

2012		1998	
1. (4) ^b	Florida Hospital Orlando	8.01	Jackson Memorial Hospital (Miami) 55,143
2. (11)	Orlando Regional Medical Center	5.71	Orlando Regional Medical Center 49,747
3. (22)	Tampa General Hospital	4.16	Florida Hospital Orlando 39,110
4. (24)	Jackson Memorial Hospital (Miami)	4.15	St. Joseph’s Hospitals (Tampa) 37,164
5. (49)	Baptist Hospital of Miami	3.2	Sarasota Memorial Health Care 29,446

Source: Sabrina Rodak, “50 Top Grossing Hospitals” in *Becker’s Hospital Review* (13 June 2012); *Florida Trend* (June 1999); a. Revenue figures not available for 1998; b. National Rank in 2012 in parentheses

Blue Cross Blue Shield (now re-branded as Florida Blue), United Healthcare, and Humana Medical remain the largest three health insurance companies in the state. While their rankings have not changed, premiums have skyrocketed over 14 years with each of the top three bringing in \$5-6 billion annually. The five largest hospitals in Florida by revenue are also in the top 50 in the nation. The state’s largest hospital, Florida Hospital-Orlando, brings in over \$8 billion in annual revenue while the 2nd largest, Orlando Regional Medical Center, brings \$5.7 billion. Tampa General and Jackson Memorial both bring in over \$4 billion. Florida’s largest health insurance companies and hospitals are quite influential because of their economic impact on local areas (both in terms of jobs and providing health care) and because they have large sums of money available for lobbying and donations.

Florida’s health insurance companies typically lobby for increased rates, controlling medical costs (which they have to pay), and an expansion of coverage to the poor that allows them to compete for new policies (for instance requiring people to buy health insurance as opposed to the government providing coverage directly through Medicaid). All insurance companies in the state are regulated by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. Florida hospitals (and many doctors who are increasingly employed by hospitals rather than independent practices) usually lobby for continued freedom to set prices and make medical decisions, higher reimbursement rates, health coverage for the indigent (since they must treat critically ill patients whether they are insured or not), and flexibility in the state rules governing their day to day operation (overseen by the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration).

Property and Casualty Insurance

Property and casualty insurance companies are also heavily regulated by the state and must seek approval for any rate increase. Traditionally the state tracked property and casualty insurance companies as a group, regardless of whether they insured automobiles or buildings (see Table 5 on next page). However the insurance market for property has changed dramatically due to losses brought on by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and multiple major hurricanes in 2004-2005, and the state now tracks and reports property insurance and automobile insurance separately (see Table 6 on next page). The major national residential insurance companies stopped writing new homeowners policies, began shedding existing policies and created Florida subsidiaries to limit the national companies’ exposure to future losses: Travelers established First Floridian, Allstate established Castle Key and then Encompass Floridian, State Farm established State Farm Florida, and Nationwide established Nationwide of Florida. This created an insurance crisis in Florida as premiums rose dramatically and it became more difficult for coastal homeowners to find insurance at any price. Over the next two decades, 50-60 new “domestic insurers” specific to Florida formed and began writing home-owner policies, however many did not have adequate reserves to pay claims and eight of these new companies became insolvent in 2006-2011, forcing the state-sponsored Florida Insurance Guarantee Association to assist home-owners with unpaid claims.⁷

Table 5. Property and Casualty Insurance Companies by 1998 Premiums (\$ Billions)

Rank	Name	Amount
1.	State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance	1.72
2.	Allstate Insurance Company	.93
3.	State Farm Fire and Casualty	.92
4.	Progressive Express Insurance Company	.53
5.	Allstate Indemnity Company	.51
6.	Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company	.44
7.	Allstate Floridian Insurance Company	.33
8.	United Services Automobile Association	.29
9.	GEICO General Insurance Company	.27
10.	FCCI Mutual Insurance Company	.25

Table 6. 2012 Residential Insurance by Policies and Automobile Insurance by Premiums (\$ Billions)

Rank	Company	Amount
Personal Residential Insurance		(FL Policies, by number)
1.	Citizens	1,423,160
2.	Universal Property & Casualty	578,825
3.	State Farm	453,997
4.	St. Johns	174,021
5.	Security First	147,080
Automobile Insurance		(FL Premiums, in billions of \$)
1.	State Farm	2.46
2.	GEICO	2.30
3.	Allstate Property & Casualty	1.48
4.	Progressive American	1.32
5.	United Services Auto	.79

Source: Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, *Fast Facts* (December 2012); automobile premiums are the combined totals of various subsidiaries of the main company.

The Florida legislature responded to this situation by strengthening Florida’s building code, merging two state-back associations to establish Citizens Property Insurance Corporation in 2002 to issue residential policies, and setting up the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to provide reimbursement to property insurance companies for a certain amount of hurricane losses they incur (the private companies must purchase this coverage from the state). The end result of all these challenges and changes was that by 2012 Citizens became the largest residential insurance company in Florida and wrote more new policies each year than the next nine companies combined, but still would not have enough funds to cover a major catastrophe because of continued political pressure by homeowners to keep rates low.⁸ The state of Florida, and thus taxpayers, would be on the financial hook in the event of a major catastrophe and Citizens is authorized to charge an assessment on all homeowners insurance policies in the state to help make-up losses (a small surcharge is already being assessed and a much larger one could be imposed in the event of a large hurricane with heavy losses). Florida has not been hit with a major hurricane since 2005, which has allowed the residential insurance market to recover somewhat, although increasing claims (plus rate increases) for sinkhole damages threatens to make the situation even worse. Citizen has imposed heavy rates against sink-hole losses.

More recently, the Florida legislature required Citizens to raise rates and reduce policies and potential taxpayer liability and it has done so at a rapid rate. By early-2013 the number of Floridians covered by Citizen fell below one million for the first time since 2006, with projected decreases to 725,000 by 2015 and the percentage of policies rated “actuarially sound” is expected to rise from 26% to 52% by the end of 2014. In addition, taxpayer risk has been reduced from \$12 billion to \$4 billion in the event of a catastrophic hurricane. Under the new rules, private insurance companies have been taking over policies in batches, rather than individually, and a new state clearing-house requires that any Citizens policyholder up for renewal that receives a bid from a private company within 15% of the Citizens rate cannot stay with Citizens, unless they expressly request to continue coverage.⁹ Property insurance is likely to remain an important political issue in Florida since the average Florida homeowner currently pays \$1933 a year for property insurance, which is the highest of all 50 states and double the national average.¹⁰

By comparison, the automobile insurance market in Florida is healthy and profitable with many large well-capitalized private companies competing to offer insurance at reasonable rates for good drivers (many of the same national corporations that competed for business in 1998). Florida law requires all drivers to purchase a minimum amount of liability insurance (\$10,000 for injury liability for one person, \$20,000 for all injuries and \$10,000 for property damage in an accident) and \$10,000 worth of personal injury protection (PIP). The auto insurance industry has lobbied for many years to end the requirement for PIP arguing that many of the claims are fraudulent (organized gangs fake accident and injury, while working with “shady” health care providers to submit bills to the insurance company with the insurance pay-out split among the members of the criminal racket). However hospitals have fought to keep PIP since in a number of real accidents this is the only source of health insurance for the working poor and the only way that hospitals get paid if one motorist is “uninsured”. The legislature reformed the PIP system to try and reduce fraud with the mandate that PIP rates be reduced. PIP requirements may be unilaterally abolished if rates do not come down and/or if the Affordable Care Act results in most Floridians obtaining health coverage.

Development and Construction

Florida’s population growth over the decades has traditionally fueled the real estate, development and construction industries (see Table 7 on next page). These industries remain influential with the legislature in Tallahassee since they provide residential housing, commercial buildings, jobs and taxes. Already, for most of the past half-century, Florida grew so fast that the state struggled to maintain quality of life and enacted laws for growth management and environmental protection. The 1998 Recession hammered these industries causing many bankruptcies and liquidations. Walter Industries abandoned home-building, evolved into an energy company and left the state. WCI declared bankruptcy and reformed as a smaller company and Engle was bought out by a larger homebuilder (TOUSA) which eventually also declared bankruptcy. The state legislature and governor responded by eliminating or relaxing many regulations in an attempt to encourage, rather than manage growth. Two companies weathered the 1998 Recession and remained in the top five by 2012. Lennar is one of the largest homebuilders in the country and Haskell pioneered the design-build method where one company handles both architecture and construction on a project. In addition, “The Villages”, an active retirement community in Central Florida, has grown to over 100,000 residents—many wealthy Republican retirees from the Mid-West. “The Villages” has become an important campaign stop for Republican politicians, while its developer, Gary Morse, has contributed large sums of money to the Republican Party, its candidates and committees.

Finally, since 2013-14 the real-estate, land-development and building industries in Florida are slowly rebounding as home prices stabilize and foreclosures lessen, but high property taxes and property insurance rates hurt the market and these industries now strongly advocate reducing both.

Table 7. Florida’s Largest Developers and Builders (by Revenue in Millions)

2012		1998		
1.	Lennar	3,100	Lennar	2,417
2.	The Villages	763	Walter Industries	1,837
3.	The Haskell Company	594	WCI	539
4.	Stellar	493	Engel Homes	536
5.	G.L. Homes	308	The Haskell Company	394

Source: Top Rank Florida, *Florida Trend* (September 1999 & June 2012) issues.

Utilities

Florida’s largest electric utilities grew between 1998 and 2012, as they have for decades, in order to provide power for the increasing number of Florida homes and businesses. The 1998 Recession slowed their growth, but had little impact on their profitability. The top five utilities remained the same from 1998 to 2012 although the names of many of them changed, due to a wave of consolidation and buy-outs in the industry: Florida Power and Light (FPL) became NextEra Energy, Florida Power became Progress Energy which was then bought out by Duke Energy, Tampa Electric became TECO Energy, and Gulf Power became Southern Company. NextEra Energy/Florida Power and Light, and the other top three electric utilities in Florida are investor owned, while the Jacksonville Electric Authority and some others major utilities around the state (like the Orlando Utilities Commission) are run by municipalities. The issues of energy deregulation, competition, disaster recovery, nuclear power, energy prices and rate increases have dominated the agenda of electric utilities over the years. And of course, as a heavily regulated industry, utilities constantly lobby the legislature and the Florida Public Service Commission that has oversight responsibility for the industry and give generously to political candidates and parties.

Table 8. Florida’s Largest Utilities (by Number of Customers)

2012		1998		
1.	NextEra Energy / FPL	4,576,415	Florida Power & Light (FPL)	3,680,481
2.	Duke Energy / Progress Energy	1,645,133	Florida Power	1,300,000
3.	TECO Energy Inc./ Tampa Electric	684,235	Tampa Electric	537,000
4.	Southern Company / Gulf Power	434,441	Gulf Power	353,972
5.	Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA)	413,017	Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA)	343,560

Source: Top Rank Florida, *Florida Trend* (September 1999) issue; *Statistics of the Florida Electric Utility Industry 2012* (Florida Public Service Commission, 2013): <http://www.floridapsc.com/utilities/electricgas/statistics/statistics-2013.pdf>

Tourism

Tourism is the number one industry in Florida and one of the state’s top employers with nearly one million people directly employed by the tourism industry (many in low-wage service jobs). Florida’s taxpayers depend on tourists to pay a healthy percentage of total sales taxes. For instance, in 2012, an estimated 89 million tourists visited Florida and spent about \$72 billion and paid over \$4 billion in sales tax.¹¹ Theme parks are one of the most important destinations for Florida tourists (see Table 9 on next page) and all major theme parks added attractions and saw increased attendance during 1998-2012. While Disney World remained under control of the Disney Corporation, the other three major theme

parks changed ownership in the past decade: media giant Comcast now owns Universal and the private equity firm Blackstone bought Sea World and Busch Gardens making them public through a new company called Sea World Entertainment (Blackstone retains a majority share). Blackstone also owns a large share of Merlin Entertainment, which opened Legoland Florida in 2011 as the largest Legoland Park in the world and 5th largest theme park in Florida (attendance figures are yet unreleased for Legoland Florida, but smaller Legoland Parks in Europe average 1.5–2 million visitors a year).

Table 9. Florida’s Largest Theme Parks (by Annual Attendance in Millions)

Rank	Name	2012	1998
1.	Walt Disney World (4 Theme & 2 Water Parks) ^a	51,398	36,311
2.	Universal (2 Theme Parks & 1 Water Park)	14, 941	8,900
3.	Sea World (Includes Aquatica)	6,702	4,900
4.	Busch Gardens Tampa (Includes Adventure Island)	4,928	4,200
5.	Legoland Florida (Opened in 2011)	Estimates unavailable	N/A

Source: TEA/AECOM, *Global Attractions Attendance Report* (1998 & 2012); a. Descriptions apply to the parks in 2012.

Walt Disney World alone employs over 60,000 people in Central Florida and is one of the most powerful interest groups in the state in terms of lobbying and providing cash for political campaigns, parties and committees. Disney has had clout since they announced they were going to build in Central Florida in the 1960s and the state legislature allowed them to form and control three local governments: Reedy Creek Improvement District, Bay Lake, and Lake Buena Vista.¹² Disney and the rest of the theme park industry have tremendous influence on labor and tourism policy, theme park regulation, and taxes.

One significant change in the tourism industry since 1998 has been the controversial expansion of casino gambling and the rise in power of the Seminole Tribe of Florida (which bought Hard Rock International in 2007 for almost \$1 billion). In 2010, after decades of negotiations, Republican governor Rick Scott and legislature approved a five-year compact with the Seminole Tribe allowing exclusive rights to certain types of gambling (slots machines outside of Miami Dade and Broward, and banked state-wide card games, like Blackjack) in return for a very large guaranteed pay-out by the tribe to the state (about \$250 million a year). As the original compact is being renegotiated with the Seminoles, other national and international gambling consortiums are fighting for the same right to open-up destination casinos in South Florida and elsewhere in the state. Disney and the established theme parks in Central Florida have been fighting the expansion of casino gambling in Florida as they fear it will change the “family friendly” image they have created through marketing, while tourism dollars may be diverted to gambling, rather than spent at their parks.

Agriculture

After tourism, agriculture is the second largest sector of the Florida economy. As Table 10 shows citrus and sugar are two of the most important crops in Florida. The largest company in 2012, Fanjul/Florida Crystals, was also one of the largest in 1998 although it was not listed because the privately held company (called Flo-Sun until 1998) did not release its earnings (estimated in 1997 to be over \$1.5 billion).¹³ Likewise U.S. Sugar fell from the list in 2012 because it did not release its earnings but would most likely still be in the top five if it did—a 2008 estimate suggested revenues of \$650 million when sugar prices were relatively low).¹⁴ The sugar industry in South Florida depends on Federal tariffs on imported sugar to stay profitable and is impacted by environmental regulations and clean-up efforts in the Everglades and thus lobbies heavily in Washington, as well as in Tallahassee. The expatriate Cuban

Fanjul family runs Florida Crystals and is extremely influential due to their wealth and political connections. In 2008 Governor Charlie Crist announced a plan to completely buy out U.S. Sugar as part of his plan to clean up the Everglades, but the state eventually purchased just some of the acreage.

Table 10. Florida’s Largest Agribusiness (by Revenue in Millions)

2012		1998		
1.	Fanjul/Florida Crystals Corp.	5,500	Fresh Del Monte Produce	1,600
2.	Fresh Del Monte Produce	3,600	Citrus World/FL Natural Growers	470
3.	Florida’s Natural Growers	615	U.S. Sugar	440
4.	A. Duda & Sons	410	A. Duda & Sons	280
5.	Peace River Citrus Products	392	Lykes	230

Source: Top Rank Florida, *Florida Trend* (September 1999 & June 2012) issues.

Florida’s Natural Growers and Peace River Citrus were both in the top five in 2012 and 1998 and are well represented in Tallahassee with a Florida Citrus Commission appointed by the Governor that acts as the board of directors for the Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC). The FDOC is funded by an excise tax placed on each box of citrus sold through commercial channels with about 80% of the department’s budget going towards advertising and public relations.¹⁵ Florida Citrus Mutual is the association that represents the interests of citrus growers and some of their most important industry issues include combatting bacterial diseases like citrus canker and citrus greening, securing fair trade deals (especially concerning Brazil), protecting the frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) tariff (a tax on imported citrus juice) and ensuring an adequate supply of immigrant labor to work in the citrus groves.

Law Firms

Table 11 shows that the largest law firms in the state have grown since 1998, but remain mostly the same firms. Greenberg Traurig now employees the most lawyers and support staff (they had \$1.2 billion in revenue in 2012), while Holland and Knight has fallen to number two (with \$568 million in revenue in 2012). Akerman Senterfitt and Carlton Fields remain at the 3rd and 4th position. All of these law firms, and many others in Florida, represent the interests of their clients on a variety of issues as well as in civil and/or criminal court. The size of the firm does not guarantee influence or success, but larger firms usually have stronger reputations and more resources to put to work for their clients. Law firms also have their own interests. For instance trial lawyers typically have fought Republican legislative efforts at tort reform designed to make it more difficult for lawyers to win lawsuits against businesses and doctors. Trial lawyers have had little influence with the GOP legislature since 1998 but have had some success in the courts and by sponsoring or supporting constitutional initiatives.

Table 11. Florida’s Top Law Firms (by Number of Employees)

2012		1998		
1.	Greenberg Traurig	3535	Holland & Knight	805
2.	Holland and Knight	1893	Greenberg Traurig	700
3.	Akerman Senterfitt	1112	Akerman Senterfitt	500
4.	Carlton Fields	616	Carlton Fields	420
5.	Gray Robinson, P.A.	599	Fowler White	405

Source: Top Rank Florida, *Florida Trend* (September 1999 & June 2012) issues.

Newspapers

As Table 12 shows, there has been a dramatic drop-off in circulation among Florida’s 20 largest newspapers—a trend similar to all other states. Collectively Sunday circulation for the top 20 newspapers has dropped over 42% since 1998 from about 3.7 million to 2.1 million. The decline is actually worse than it appears since Florida’s overall population grew by about 3 million residents over that same period of time. The largest newspaper by Sunday circulation in Florida is the *Tampa Bay Times* (formerly *St. Petersburg Times*)—the ex-Number One, *Miami Herald/El Nuevo Herald*, has seen its circulation drop by more than 50%. One of the only newspapers to gain circulation over the past 14 years is the *Villages Daily Sun*, which more than doubled its circulation as wealthy retirees have moved to “The Villages”. Overall though, many former-subscribers and many young people who never subscribed now get up-to-date news free on-line and from local or cable news. More importantly, newspapers used to have a quasi-monopoly on local classified advertising, which provided the majority of their revenue, but now must compete with numerous free on-line sources. The decline in circulation along with the decrease in advertising revenue has crippled most established newspapers. Many newspapers have struggled through cutbacks, lay-offs and bankruptcies and have expanded their internet presence and have encouraged digital subscriptions by limiting access to on-line stories for frequent users. Newspapers still play an important role in Florida politics. They do investigative reports that highlight problems, run editorials to support or oppose positions, endorse candidates and report on the activities of elected officials helping to hold them accountable to the electorate. However the impact of local newspapers continues to decline and their long-term survival is still in question, unless they can figure-out a more viable business model.

Table 12. Florida’s Largest Daily Newspapers (by Average Sunday Circulation)

2012		1998		
1.	Tampa Bay Times	379,375	Miami Herald / El Nuevo Herald	551,972
2.	Orlando Sentinel	271,824	St. Petersburg Times	452,723
3.	Tampa Tribune	271,658	South Florida Sun Sentinel	391,996
4.	Miami Herald / El Nuevo Herald	258,599	Orlando Sentinel	390,851
5.	South Florida Sun Sentinel	213,526	Tampa Tribune	332,329
6.	Florida Times Union	143,991	Florida Times Union	241,041
7.	Palm Beach Post	142,679	Palm Beach Post	235,536
8.	Treasure Coast News Press	80,205	Sarasota Herald Tribune	146,465
9.	Sarasota Herald Tribune	79, 641	Daytona Beach News Journal	123,083
10.	Daytona Beach News Journal	79, 589	Treasure Coast News Press	120,164
11.	Fort Myers News Press	72, 915	Florida Today	116,078
12.	Florida Today	69,494	Lakeland Ledger	98,681
13.	Lakeland Ledger	56,884	Pensacola News Journal	84,393
14.	Naples Daily News	55,745	Naples Daily News	75,227
15.	Pensacola News Journal	54, 135	Tallahassee Democrat	71,302
16.	Charlotte Sun	40,970	Gainesville Sun	61,525
17.	The Villages Daily Sun	38,812	Bradenton Herald	57,354
18.	Tallahassee Democrat	38,697	Ocala Star Banner	55,851
19.	Gainesville Sun	38,208	Northwest Florida Daily News	49,022
20.	Bradenton Herald	36,889	Stuart News	48,685
Total Circulation Top 20		2,137,556	Total Circulation Top 20	3,704,278

Source: Alliance for Audited Media Report (30 September 2012); Audit Bureau of Circulation Report (31 March 1999).

Associations and Interest Groups

There are a large number of associations, interest groups and unions in Tallahassee representing a wide variety of private and public interests. Some of these associations were strong when Democrats were in charge of state government and remain still strong today under Republican rule. Other groups have seen their influence wane with the change in party control in 1998 and have seen limited policy success and even then often by circumventing the legislature or going to court.

General business groups have long been successful in Florida. Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida Chamber of Commerce, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses were successful when Democrats were in charge, and have been even more successful under the pro-business GOP. Business groups have been successful in reducing or shaping favorable regulation, gaining specific tax-breaks, increasing the use of business incentives, and creating more opportunities for taking on services traditionally provided by state and local governments.

Conversely unions used to have some access and influence with the Democratic legislature but have virtually no influence with the Republican legislature. The teacher's union (Florida Teaching Professional–National Education Association or AFT-NEA) is one of the largest in Florida with over 130,000 members, but has seen state government pass numerous laws, which they criticize as weakening public education and hurt teachers by expanding school choice for private and charter schools, limiting pay increases, eliminating tenure for new hirers, and evaluating teachers based on student performance on standardized tests.

Similarly Florida's major public employee union (American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees—or AFSCME) has seen stagnating wages and reduced benefits, increases in privatization and contracting government services out to the private sector, and may face an end to the traditional pensions system in the near future. Private employee unions have been declining for decades and also have had very little influence with the GOP controlled legislature—although they were able to get a boost in the minimum wage by going directly to the Florida voters using the initiative petition to change the state constitution in 2004.

Public interest groups which claim to represent large classes of people, rather than more narrow interests, have seen mixed success since 1998. Florida Tax Watch has been extremely influential for decades and continues to have influence today since their overall message is generally in keeping with core Republican values: keeping state and local taxes at a modest level, cutting back on wasteful spending, and performing government services efficiently to give taxpayers a good value. Environmental groups originally did not see a big drop off in influence when Republicans took control of the legislature since many Democrats had been pro-business and conversely many Republicans were at least modestly pro-environment.

However, the fortunes of environmental groups changed with the 1998 Recession and election of Governor Rick Scott with a more Conservative Republican legislature who reduced many environmental regulations and growth management laws in an attempt to stimulate economic growth. The Florida League of Women Voters has had some success in fighting for expanded voting opportunities and more fair election and registration procedures, but this has mostly come through court battles, public opinion pressure and initiative petitions (such as the Fair Districts Amendments to reduce partisan and incumbent Gerry-mandering of electoral districts), rather than clear direct influence over the legislature and Governor's office.

Lobbying and Lobbyists

The Republican-controlled legislature adopted a number of new rules concerning lobbying since taking control of state government in 1998. Their stated goals were to make the process more transparent and to help restore public faith in government. The GOP legislature clarified the definition of lobbying and lobbyists, passed stricter reporting and disclosure requirements for lobbyists, eliminated most gift-giving by lobbyists and limited lobbying by ex-legislators.

“Lobbying” is generally defined as any communication directed at government decision-makers with the hope of influencing public policy. The *Florida Statutes* define a *lobbyist* as “a person who is employed and receives payment, or who contracts for economic consideration, for the purpose of lobbying, or a person who is principally employed for governmental affairs by another person, or governmental entity to lobby on behalf of that other person, or governmental entity.”¹⁶ Under Florida law, the act of *lobbying* is defined as “influencing or attempting to influence legislative action, or non-action through oral, or written communication, or an attempt to obtain the goodwill of a member or employee of the legislature.”¹⁷

Florida law has long required all lobbyists to register with the Lobbyist Registration Office, but under the new rules, lobbyist must also identify the clients, or principals they represent (a *principal* is defined as “the person, firm, corporation, or other entity that has employed, or retained a lobbyist”). They must register separately to lobby the executive and legislative branches. In addition, the legislature imposed a strict *compensation disclosure requirement* on lobbyists. Each lobbying firm must now file quarterly reports that detail the total compensation *received by the firm* from all its principals (clients) within pre-set ranges: \$0; \$1 to \$49,999; \$50,000 to \$99,999; \$100,000 to \$249,999; \$250,000 to \$499,999; \$500,000 to \$999,999; \$1 million or more. Each firm’s report must also list *for each of its principals* their name and contact information and total compensation provided or owed to the firm within set ranges: \$0, \$1 to \$9,999; \$10,000 to \$19,999; \$20,000 to \$29,999; \$30,000-\$39,999; \$40,000-\$49,999; \$50,000 or more. In 2012, principals paid registered lobbyists total compensation of \$120 million dollars to lobby the legislature.¹⁸

In addition to disclosure requirements, the GOP legislature also passed a ban on gifts from lobbyists to legislators. Historically lobbyists could provide food, drinks and small gifts to legislators. But the new law prohibits lobbyists from making direct or indirect “expenditures” to members and employees of the Florida Senate or House and prohibits members and employees from directly or indirectly taking any “expenditure” from a lobbyist. Thus lobbyists can no longer buy legislators lunches, dinners, or even a cup of coffee. And if legislators attend a reception put on by an interest group they must reimburse the group for the cost of their meals and drinks. Some critics see this move as largely symbolic since lobbyists can still give large donations to a legislator’s campaign and unlimited donations to political parties, political committees and electioneering communication organizations. Still the legislation has succeeded in removing any appearance of directly buying influence by giving legislators gifts.

Finally, the last major lobbying reform undertaken by the Republican legislature was to crack down on the revolving door where former-members become paid lobbyists and then come back immediately to lobby their old friends and colleagues in the House and Senate. Ex-legislators are barred by state law from lobbying their former-colleagues for two years after they leave office—and more recently the two year ban also now applies to lobbying the executive branch. Of course legislators can still have influence indirectly as lobbyists since they may join a firm or start a firm and then others members of the firm can lobby the legislature during that two year time-frame.

Which lobbying firms are the biggest and potentially the most influential? One way to judge success is to compare how much the lobby firms earn since this gives some indication of which firms are perceived to be successful by interest groups and individuals who are willing to pay for their services. It is not a perfect measure but the fact that some smaller lobbying firms have complained that larger firms may be inflating their reported income in order to seem more successful indicates that the lobbyists themselves believe that total compensation is a proxy for perceived success (following up on the complaints, the legislature has vowed to begin auditing the reported compensation levels in the future). Table 13 lists Florida’s top lobby firms based on their average annual total compensation, plus a sample of their key clients.¹⁹

Table 13. Florida’s Largest and Most Successful Lobby Firms

Rank	Name	Revenue Range	Notable Clients
1.	Ballard Partners	> \$8 million	Amazon.com, FPL, Florida Virtual School, Harris Corp., New York Yankees, Tampa General Hospital, U.S. Sugar
1.	Southern Strategy Group	> \$8 million	Amtrak, Apple, Florida Chamber, IBM, Intntl Speedway, Miccosukee Tribe, TECO Energy, Walt Disney World
3.	Ronald L. Book	> \$5 million	AutoNation, FL Apartment Asstn, FPL, Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami Dolphins, Sun Life Stadium, U of Miami
4.	Colodny Tass Talenfeld Karlinsky Abate Webb	\$4-8 million	Dosal Tobacco, Florida’s Children First, FL Police Chiefs Asstn, Property Casualty Ins Asstn, Timeshares Direct
4.	Dutko Poole McKinley	\$4-8 million	Accenture, Comcast, GM, Motion Picture Asstn of Am, Seminole Tribe, United Technologies, U of Phoenix
4.	Foley Lardner	\$4-8 million	Aetna, Cisco Systems, Dosal Tobacco, Florida Farm Bureau Ins, Habitat for Humanity, Verizon, Xerox
4.	Johnson & Blanton	\$4-8 million	Adventist Health Care, FL Adoption Council, FL Chamber, FL Crystals, FL Hospital, FL Retail Federation, Pfizer
8.	GrayRobinson	> \$5.5 million	Darden Restaurants, JP Morgan Chase, Lockheed Martin, NFIB, Orlando Magic, Tampa Bay Bucs, Walgreens
9.	The Rubin Group	\$3.75-7.5 million	Armor Correctional Services, Bright House Networks, Embracer Aircraft, FL Crystal, FL Virtual School, Humana,
10.	Fowler White Boggs	\$3-6 million	AT&T, FL League of Cities, Gulf Power, Keiser U, Time Warner, U.S. Sugar, USF Med School, State Farm
10.	The Advocacy Group at Cardenas Partners	\$3-6 million	AT&T, AIF, FL Asstn of Realtors, Independent Colleges & Universities, Marriot, PGA, Progress Energy, The Villages

Source: Amy Keller, “Florida’s Top Lobbying Firms” in *Florida Trend* (15 March 2013).

Ballard Partners and Southern Strategies are the two largest lobbying firms in the state with annual revenue of over \$8 million, followed by a group of other firms earning between \$3 and \$8 million dollars a year. Not surprisingly, the top **two** firms, and many of the others, were founded by, or employ, notable Republicans who are seeking to influence the Republican state legislature and Executive branch. For instance: Brian Ballard founder of Ballard Partners was Governor Jeb Bush’s Chief of Staff; Sothern Strategies founder Paul Bradshaw worked for then Republican Governors Charlie Crist and Bob Martinez; Van Pool and Will McKinley who are Managing Partners of Dutko Poole McKinley both served as Chair and Executive Director of the Republican Party of Florida; and Jon Johnson who founded Johnson & Blanton was a ex-fund-raiser and Finance Director for the Republican Party of Florida. The Republican ties are a large, if predictable, change from 1998 when Tom Dye had identified the most influential lobbyists in Tallahassee and almost all of them had Democratic connections.²⁰

Money and Campaign Finance

The amount of money spent on campaigns has increased and the rules for campaign finance have changed since the Republican take-over of Florida state government in 1998. In 1994 over \$50 million was spent to elect the Governor, Cabinet and legislature, while \$15 million was spent in 1996 in the off-year election.²¹ In 2010 over \$332 million was donated to influence state elections: \$117 million for the Governor’s race, \$22 million for Cabinet races, \$30 million for 120 House seats, \$14 million for 20 Senate seats, \$27 million for ballot initiatives and \$119 million to political party committees.²² In 2012 when there was no Governor or Cabinet races, \$119 million was spent on state races: \$32 million for House races, \$25 million for Senate, \$1.5 million for Supreme Court retention elections, \$13 million for various ballot measures and \$38 million for political party committees.²³

Table 14. Campaign Contribution Limits: State vs. National Offices

Donation Limits on:	Florida Regulations	National Regulations (2013-2014 Cycle)
Individual to Campaign (per election cycle)*	\$1,000 to candidates for state/local offices EXCEPT \$3000 to candidates for statewide office (Governor, Cabinet, Supreme Court Justice)	\$2,600** to candidates for Federal office (\$48,600** limit to all candidates)
PAC to Campaign (per election cycle)*	\$1,000 to candidates for state/local offices EXCEPT \$3000 to candidates for statewide office (Governor, Cabinet, Supreme Court Justice)	\$5,000 from multi-candidate PAC*** to candidate for federal office \$2,600** from other PACs to candidate for Federal office
Party to Campaign (per election cycle)*	\$50,000 to candidate for state office**** \$250,000 to candidate for statewide office (Governor or Cabinet)****	\$5,000 from national party to U.S. House candidate \$45,400** from national party to U.S. Senate candidate \$5,000 from state and local party combined to House or Senate candidate for Federal office
Individual to Party (per year)	Unlimited to state party	\$32,400** to national party
PAC to Party (per year)	Unlimited to state party	\$15,000 from multi-candidate PAC*** to national party \$32,400** from other PACs to national party

Notes: Florida campaign donations were limited to \$500 for all offices until raised in 2012.

* In both state and national elections, contributors can give the maximum amount in both the primary election and in the general election. For example, a person could contribute \$1,000 to a state house candidate’s primary campaign and another \$1,000 to that candidate’s general election campaign. Or in a federal election, a person could donate \$2,600 to a congressional candidate’s primary campaign and another \$2,600 to that candidate’s general election campaign.

** Amounts indexed to inflation.

*** Multi-candidate PACs have been registered for at least 6 months, have received contributions from more than 50 contributors and have made contributions to at least 5 federal candidates.

**** Political parties may provide polling services, research services, cost for campaign staff, professional consulting services, and telephone calls and contributions are not counted toward the contribution limits, but must still be reported by the candidate.

Sources: Florida Division of Elections, and Federal Election Commission.

This increase over time in the amount of money spent on campaigns in Florida can be tied to Florida's population growth (it costs more money to reach more voters), inflation in the cost of campaign advertising and other expenses, the growing number of outside political groups who can collect donations in unlimited amounts, the rising revenues of large corporations and unions willing to spend more to pursue their interests, and the influential emergence of some prolific political fundraisers and independently wealthy candidates.

From 1991 to 2012 Florida had a relative low \$500 limit for contributions to candidates and political committees (only three states had a lower limit by 2012), but allowed unlimited donations to political parties. At the Federal level, campaign contributions were limited to \$1,000 per candidate with unlimited donations to political parties from the early-1970s until 2003. Since then however, both the Florida limits and Federal limits have changed. Table 14 above displays the current set of campaign contribution limits that apply to state and Federal elections in Florida.

At the state level in 2013, the Republican legislature increased the individual campaign donations limit to \$1,000 for most offices except for candidates for state-wide office (Governor, Cabinet and Supreme Court justice) who may collect up to \$3,000 per donation. Florida Republicans left unchanged the ability to give unlimited amounts to the state political parties. At the national level the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 increased the amount of individual money for political campaigns to \$2,000 and indexed it to inflation (as of 2013-2014 that limit has risen to \$2,600) and also imposed limits on the total amount of money that could be donated in an election cycle (currently \$123,200 overall with no more than \$48,600 to all candidates, \$32,400 to a political party and \$42,200 to all PACs). This limit on political parties contributions closed the "soft money" loophole at the Federal level. However, Florida is one of 13 states that allow unlimited contributions to state parties.²⁴ Florida's state political parties can legally contribute up to \$50,000 directly to a state candidate's campaign, or \$250,000 to a candidate for state-wide office (like Governor or Cabinet).

Forming Groups to Influence Elections

In 2013 the Florida legislature made significant changes to the rules governing groups that emerge seeking to influence elections in Florida. The most important changes include clarifying what each type of group can do, allowing unlimited donations to political committees, requiring more frequent disclosure of donations and eliminating one type of group called Committees of Continuing Existence. Florida law establishes several types of groups that can be formed to raise and spend money to influence elections, including Political Committees (PCs), Electioneering Communication Organizations (ECOs), Independent Expenditure Organizations (IXOs) and Political Parties and Affiliated Party Committees.²⁵ All of these groups must register with the Florida Division of Elections and report their contributions and expenditures. These groups differ in a number of ways including their purpose, how they can raise money and how they can spend money including donating to candidates, independent expenditures and electioneering communication. Table 15 below provides a comparison between Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations.

Political Committees have the broadest purpose and thus may support or oppose any candidate, issue, PC, ECO, or political party, and may engage in independent expenditures and electioneering communication. Contributions to PCs are now unlimited although contribution reports are now required more frequently (at first weekly and then daily within the last 10 days of the election). PCs may contribute up to \$1,000 to candidates (\$3,000 to state-wide candidates) and unlimited amounts to

political parties, ECOs, or other PCs. PCs are extremely common (there are about 500 registered with the state) and are a major source of funding for candidates.

Table 15. Political Committees and Electioneering Communication Organizations

	PC	ECO
Primary Purpose	To support or oppose any candidate, issue, PC, ECO or political party.	To make electioneering communications*
Limits on Donations <u>to</u> the Group	No monetary limit	No monetary limit
Limits on Spending <u>by</u> the Group	Contributions to a candidate - \$1000 per election, except limit to candidates for statewide office or Supreme Court Justice - \$3000 (donations to candidates cannot be made within 5 days of the election) PC to a political party, ECO or another PC—no limit.	ECO on electioneering communications – no limits ECO to another ECO – no limits May not make contributions to a candidate, political party or a PC
Additional Clarifications	May expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate May make independent expenditures but cannot coordinate with candidate when doing so May make electioneering communications which are not considered candidate contributions	May not “expressly advocate” the election or defeat of a candidate May not make independent expenditures** May coordinate with candidates May make electioneering communications which are not considered candidate contributions
Filing Deadlines for Reports to the Division of Elections	WEEKLY full reports up to and including the 4 th day before the general election DAILY contribution-only reports beginning on the 10 th day before the general election and ending on the 5 th day before the general election	WEEKLY full reports up to and including the 4 th day before the general election DAILY contribution-only reports beginning on the 10 th day before the general election and ending on the day before the general election

* An electioneering communication:

1. Is a communication publicly distributed by TV station, radio station, cable TV system, satellite system, newspaper, magazine, direct mail, or telephone;
2. Refers to a clearly identified candidate without expressly advocating election or defeat, but is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate;
3. Is made within 30 days before a primary or special primary or 60 days before any other election for the office sought by the candidate;
4. Is targeted to the relevant electorate in the geographic area the candidate would represent if elected.

** An independent expenditure is an expenditure made for the purpose of expressly advocating the election/defeat of candidate/issue where the expenditure is not controlled by, coordinated with, or made upon consultation with any candidate, political committee, or agent.

Electioneering Communication Organizations may only make electioneering communications as defined by Florida law (see the note underneath Table 15 for the four-parts definition). The most

important part of the definition is that the advertisement cannot say “vote for” or “vote against” a candidate. As before, there are no limits on contributions to ECOs, and ECOs may spend unlimited amounts. However, ECOs must now disclose contributions more frequently (weekly and then daily starting ten days before the election). There are about 200 ECOs registered in Florida and many candidates for state office have established their own ECOs as a way to take in more money and appeal to voters and evade the hard limit on contributions made directly to their campaigns.

Until they were eliminated in 2013, Florida used to have a third type of political group called Committees of Continuing Existence. There were even more CCEs (600) than there were PCs primarily, because CCEs could take in unlimited sums of money and PCs were limited to \$500 donations under the old rules. In addition, most candidates were setting-up CCEs, because they could then spend the money on campaign related activities and even use CCE money as a legal “slush fund” to pay for expensive travel, hotels and meals that otherwise would be prohibited by the ban on direct gifts from lobbyists to law-makers.

In another change approved since the Republican take-over of Florida’s state government in 1998, legislative leaders can now also collect money for their own *Affiliated Party Committees*. These so-called “leadership funds” allow each political party conference (Democratic and Republican) of the state House of Representatives and Senate to establish a separate, affiliated party committee to support the election of candidates of the leader’s political party. In this context, a leader is defined as the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the Minority Leader of either House of the Legislature. Thus a total of four affiliated party committees can be created (Republican House and Senate, plus Democratic House and Senate). These funds are separate from those donated to the state political parties and the contributions and expenditures are tracked and reported. In terms of collecting contributions and spending money the affiliated party committees are treated the same as the political parties: contributions to the leadership funds are unlimited, while contributions made by the leadership fund are limited to \$50,000 to an individual party candidate and \$250,000 to candidates for state-wide office (like Governor or Cabinet officer).²⁶

Florida law also recognizes Independent Expenditure Organizations (IXOs), which can raise unlimited amounts of money and run advertisements that do expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate or issue, as long as this is done without consulting or coordinating with any candidate or political committee. As a practical matter very few IXOs have been created in Florida as PCs and ECOs have been the groups of choice for most individuals and groups seeking to influence elections.

Another significant change since 1998 is the rise of independent advocacy groups that have flourished under Federal law, and can raise unlimited amounts of money and influence elections in Florida. For instance Federal Political Action Committees (PACs) that only engage in independent expenditures and do not make contributions to candidates may now receive unlimited donations amounts, despite the \$5000 limit established by the BCRA for normal PACs that donate to candidates. These groups are now commonly known as “Super-PACs”, because of the amount of money they can raise.

Different “political” groups can be set up under different sections of the IRS tax code: *501(c) groups* are non-profit tax-exempt groups that are not supposed to engage in direct political activity as a primary purpose, but may provide “educational” material on public policy with a political or ideological point of view; *501(c)3 groups* must report their donors; yet *501(c)4 groups* do not have to report their donors; and *527 groups* are also tax-exempt, but may raise unlimited amounts of money for political activity, like voter-mobilization and issue advocacy, yet must report their donors.

Neither 501(c) nor 527 groups may expressly advocate the election or defeat of a Federal candidate. These groups file disclosure reports with the IRS, rather than the Federal Elections

Commission. Another type of group is the *non-Federal group*, which organizes to raise unlimited amounts of soft-money to influence state or local politics through voter-mobilization or issue-ads that criticize or promote a candidate's record. Both 501(c) and 527 groups may raise non-Federal funds. The 527 groups have spent millions in Florida to influence the outcome of both Federal and state races since the McCain-Feingold Act became law, and 501(c)4 groups became more popular in 2012 once donors realized they could give big money to influence elections, yet still remain anonymous. In addition, 501(c) and 527 groups can work together to "launder" political donations. 501(c)4 groups can donate unlimited sums to 527 groups, thus allowing more direct political spending but still shielding their donors from publicity (the 527 groups do have to list their donors, but on the form simply list the name of the 501(c)4, thus shielding the original source of the money).²⁷

Independent groups spent almost \$48 million in Florida in the 2010 election cycle. Table 16 lists the twelve largest independent spenders in the 2010 election cycle in Florida—each was formed as a 527 group under the IRS tax code and registered with the State of Florida as an ECO (except the NRA which remains listed officially as a PAC).²⁸ Each of these groups spent more than \$648,000 and all 12 supported Republican, Conservative or pro-business issues and candidates, while the top two groups spent heavily to influence the Republican governor's race. Independently wealthy political new-comer Rick Scott formed and largely funded Let's Get to Work (\$17 million) to help him beat Republican establishment Attorney-General Bill McCollum in the GOP Primary and then Democrat CFO Alex Sink in the general election. The Republican establishment provided most of the money for the Florida First Initiative (\$6 million) in an unsuccessful attempt to keep McCollum financially competitive.

Florida interest groups and politicians rely increasingly on independent spending for two reasons:

- First, unlike campaign contributions, there is no limit on donations to these groups making it easier to raise and spend large sums.
- Second, it is difficult for the average voter to know who specifically is controlling and supporting these groups, and thus they are often used for negative attacks that might reflect badly on the sponsors of the ads if such sponsors were readily identifiable.

The 527 groups use the following three tactics to keep the public in the dark:

- First with rare exceptions the official names are usually very generic and offer few clues as to the real purpose of the group.
- Second, when the groups register with the IRS and the state, they often list a lawyer, lobbyist or party official as the main contact, but that person is not necessarily the person making decisions for the group (State Senate President Mike Haridopolos admitted controlling the third largest 527, Freedom First²⁹, but William Stafford Jones, Chair of the Alachua County Republican Party, was officially listed as the Chairperson, Treasurer and registered agent of the group).
- Third, while these groups must list their donors, it is common practice to start multiple groups and have one 527 give funds to another 527, thus making it more difficult to trace who is really funding particular groups (as another example, the same William Stafford Jones, Chair of the Alachua County Republican Party was also listed as Registered Agent for 17 different ECOs, and the 12th largest in Florida, Committee for Responsible Representation, was almost exclusively funded by another one, the 3rd largest Freedom First Committee, which also donated heavily to the 2nd largest, Florida First Initiative).

See Table 16 on next page

Table 16. Top 12 Independent Spenders (527s/ECOs) in the Florida 2010 Election

Rank	Name	Total \$ Spent	Description
1.	Let's Get To Work	\$17,453,125	Founded & mainly self-funded by GOP Gov. Rick Scott to help him win the GOP Primary and general election.
2.	Florida First Initiative	\$6,005,576	Formed to assist Bill McCollum in his unsuccessful GOP Primary race against independently wealthy Rick Scott.
3.	Freedom First Cmte	\$3,636,811	One of several 527s controlled but not registered to GOP conservative Senate President Mike Haridopolos.
4.	Florida Chamber of Commerce Alliance	\$2,495,863	Started and controlled by the influential FL Chamber of Commerce to support pro-business issues and candidates.
5.	Republican State Leadership Cmte	\$1,250,000	A national 527 whose mission is to help Republicans win or maintain control of state offices and legislatures including FL.
6.	Truth Matters	\$1,007,450	One of the 17 GOP/conservative 527/ECOs registered to Stafford Jones, Chair of the Alachua County Republican Party.
7.	Our Elders Count	\$887,853	Controlled and largely funded by the nursing home industry in FL to help candidates supportive of their industry.
8.	Florida Federation For Children	\$868,010	The FL chapter of a national 527 that supports educational choice (vouchers/charter schools) and conservative candidates.
9.	Floridians For Conservative Values	\$855,332	A 527/ECO funded largely by business interests that supports pro-business and conservative principles and candidates
10.	Florida's Future Fund	\$753,153	A GOP-backed 527 with ties to the Republican Gov.'s Asstn that attacked Democratic gubernatorial nominee Alex Sink.
11.	National Rifle Association	\$729,295	Issue only PAC funded by the NRA to promote 2 nd Amendment rights and their candidates, while opposing gun control legislation and their candidates
12.	Cmte for Responsible Representation	\$648,493	One of the 17 GOP/conservative 527/ECOs registered to Stafford Jones; funded by Haridopolos's Freedom First Cmte.

Source: followthemoney.org, "Florida Independent Spenders in 2010." Descriptions supplemented by author research.

Florida's Largest Political Donors

Which industries and individuals donated the most money in the most recent election cycle and how does this compare to donations in 1998?³⁰ Table 17 below shows the top 13 industries and contributors by amount donated in the 2012 election cycle—this includes all money donated to campaigns, political committees, political organizations and political parties.

The list of top industries today is very similar to the one collected by Dye in 1998: lawyers, insurance, health care, unions (including teachers), tourism (which includes gambling and casinos), utilities and business associations appeared on both lists. Only crop production and real-estate did not appear on the original 1998 list. Presumably the 1998 Recession that hammered the real-estate industry spurred donations in 2012.

Conversely only tobacco and beer appeared on the 1998 list and do not appear in 2012. Of course one might expect that the top individual contributors might change somewhat over 14 years (since new groups may form and different issues may be more important in a particular campaign season), but several do appear on both lists including: Blue Cross Blue Shield, Walt Disney and the Florida Education Association.

Table 17. Top 13 Political Donors in the Florida 2012 Election*

Top Industries	Total	Top Contributors	Total
Lawyers & Lobbyists	\$15,039,650	FL Association of Realtors	\$4,632,975
Real Estate	\$8,451,706	Public Education Defense Fund	\$1,721,000
Insurance	\$5,532,486	Blue Cross Blue Shield FL	\$1,292,528
Health Professionals	\$5,382,783	Walt Disney	\$1,158,000
Hospitals & Nursing Homes	\$4,141,687	Florida Power & Light	\$1,150,444
Health Services	\$4,072,420	Hospital Corp of American	\$869,800
Public Sector Unions	\$3,604,067	Progress Energy	866,484
Gambling & Casinos	\$3,113,333	FL Chamber Of Commerce	\$864,828
Crop Production & Basic Processing	\$2,623,959	Planned Parenthood of South FL & Treasure Coast	\$788,547
Electric Utilities	\$2,449,128	FL Education Association	\$646,295
Telecom Services & Equipment	\$2,001,819	Seminole Tribe of FL	\$639,462
Business Associations	\$1,965,141	Planned Parenthood of Southwest & Central FL	\$624,792
Education	\$1,446,514	TECO Energy	\$622,653

* Excludes candidate self-funding, party funding and public subsidy.

Source: followthemoney.org, "2012 Florida Elections, Top 20 Contributors and Top 15 Industries".

Since Florida limits donations to state candidates, but allows unlimited donations to political parties, contributors donate huge sums of money to the political parties. In 2010, the Republican Party of Florida raised almost \$69 million and the Democratic Party of Florida over \$50 million, which were record amounts for both parties. In 2012 with no Governor or Cabinet races these figures dropped to \$27 million and \$11 million respectively (see Table 18).

Table 18. Donations to Florida’s Major Political Parties

Republican (Total \$26,991,394)		Democratic (Total \$11,242,915)	
Top Industries	Top Contributors	Top Industries	Top Contributors
Insurance \$2,362,617	Blue Cross Blue Shield FL \$905,650	Lawyers & Lobbyists \$1,674,247	FL Education Association \$595,000
Hospitals/Nursing Homes \$1,578,679	Progress Energy \$697,354	Public Sector Unions \$1,386,409	Walt Disney \$560,000
Electric Utilities \$1,467,114	FL Chamber of Commerce \$690,000	Insurance \$702,020	FL Justice Association \$487,750
Gambling & Casinos \$1,430,792	Florida Power & Light \$687,260	Gambling & Casinos \$621,348	Florida Power & Light \$443,159
Business Associations \$1,130,500	Seminole Tribe of FL \$600,962	Electric Utilities \$598,139	Blue Cross Blue Shield FL \$325,000
Lawyers & Lobbyists \$1,065,504	Walt Disney \$597,500	TV/Movie Prdctn/Dstrbtn \$563,391	AFSCME \$324,359
Agriculture \$1,014,326	Rpblcn State Ldrshp Cmte \$550,000	Hospitals /Nursing Homes \$339,818	Brown, Christina L \$250,000
Real Estate \$997,177	US Sugar Corp \$550,000v	Telecom Srvc & Equipmnt \$283,912	FL Fire Fighters \$240,000
	Council for Senior FL \$424,480		Moving Orlando Forward \$160,000
	TECO Energy \$412,753		Hill Brow LLC \$150,000

Source: followthemoney.org, "2012 Florida Party Committees, Top 8 Industries and Top 10 Contributors."

The Republican lead in raising money reflected the realities of Republican-domination in the state capitol since 1998—previous to that time Democrats usually raised more than Republicans since they were the traditional party dominating Florida politics. Overall, interest groups gave disproportionately to the Republicans to help ensure access in Tallahassee. However, some specific groups gave much more to one party than the other. Lawyers and especially public sector unions, such as the Florida Education Association, AFSCME and Florida Firefighters gave more heavily to the Democratic Party. Businesses (like U.S. Sugar) and business associations (like the Florida Chamber of Commerce) gave more heavily to the Republican Party. While giving more to Republicans, still a number of industries pursued a targeted funding strategy of contributing to both political parties, including insurance (Blue Cross Blue Shield), hospitals and nursing homes, electric utilities (Florida Power and Light) and gambling, plus casino interests (Seminole Tribe of Florida). Also Walt Disney gave large amounts (over \$550,000) to both parties, and more discreetly the Cuban lobby as well (to prevent any national policy-shift to lift the U.S. sanctions against Cuba).

Conclusions

What has changed and what has stayed the same in Florida's interest group system since the Republican take-over of state government in 1999? Most of the important interests that were active in 1998 are still active today, although some of the specific largest corporations within group sectors, and a number of issues important to those interests, have changed over time. Among all interest groups, Florida business continues to be very influential including the largest public and private companies, two general business associations (Florida Chamber of Commerce and Associated Industries), and several specific sectors, including tourism, agriculture, insurance, banking, health care, builders and developers, and utilities. These businesses have influence with the Republican legislature because of the jobs they provide, economic activity they create, taxes they generate and pay, political donations they contribute, and outside spending they make to influence elections. In contrast, public and private labor unions and trial lawyers have lost power in the Florida state capitol in Tallahassee as Democrats have lost power (although many individual lawyers and large law firms continue to be influential representing the interests of others). In addition, the newspaper industry has lost influence over the past 15 years, due to their inability to keep paid subscribers and advertisers who increasingly are shifting to the Internet.

Republicans have made a number of legislative changes over the past 15 years that affect interest groups, lobbying and campaign donations. The GOP dominated legislature clarified the definition of lobbying and registration requirements, mandated that lobbyists list their clients and amounts paid within pre-set ranges, forbid legislators from accepting any gifts (including meals and drinks) from lobbyists, and slowed down the "revolving door" by requiring legislators to wait two years before lobbying their former-colleagues in the Legislative or Executive branches. Republicans increased the amount of money that individuals and groups can give to candidates from \$500 to \$1,000 dollars (or \$3,000 for state-wide candidates) and continued to allow unlimited donations to political parties. Republican legislators also got rid of committees of continuing existence, which were being used as "slush funds" by many candidates to evade the ban on gift-giving by lobbyists, while changing the rules governing the two other most commonly formed political groups: PCs and ECOs. PCs may now take unlimited donations (previously limited to \$500 under most circumstances) and both PCs and ECOs must make more frequent reports to the state.

Based on revenue, the largest and most successful lobbyists in the state currently are Ballard Partners and Southern Strategy Group whose founders have strong Republican ties. Previous to 1998,

the majority of influential lobbyists had connections to the dominant Democratic Party. Republican, Conservative and pro-business groups now dominate independent spending in Florida-not one Democratic, Liberal or labor group was among the top 12 527/ECOs in Florida in 2010.

The total amount of money spent on politics in Florida has continued to grow over the past 15 years. In 2010, with an open-seats Governors' race, over \$330 million was spend to influence state elections (\$50 million was spent in 1994) and in 2012 \$119 million was spent (compared to \$15 million spent in 1996). In addition to money given directly to campaigns, enormous sums were also donated to and spent by political parties, outside groups and political committees. The top-donor industries in Florida are lawyers and lobbyists, real-estate and insurance, and health and hospitals. Unlike the decades prior to 1998, the Republican Party of Florida has a significant money advantage over the Florida Democratic Party in large part because the GOP controls the executive and legislative branches in Tallahassee. Lawyers and lobbyists and public sector unions gave heavily to the Democratic Party, while business associations and some individual business interests gave more heavily to the Republican Party.

While Florida (and the Federal government) have enacted several reforms to regulate lobbying and campaign-finance, these efforts have largely been ineffective in reducing the influence of interest groups, lobbyists and money in Florida politics. With the money donated by the big interests, the political parties can provide party candidates help with reelection and host lavish events for legislators. And legislators know which groups get the credit for underwriting the expenses. Thus legislators can get legally and indirectly what is normally illegal as a direct contribution or gift, while lobbying firms, interest groups and individuals can get political credit for donations far in excess of their \$1000 or \$3000 campaign donation.

In addition, the U.S. Constitution and Florida law allows outside groups to collect unlimited donations and spend as much as they like on electioneering communication that influence issues and campaigns. Groups registered with the IRS as 501(c)4s do not have to release the names of their donors, while instead groups registered as 527s with the IRS and as ECOs in Florida do have to release their donors. However, group names are often uninformative, the listed contacts for the groups are often not the people that control the decisions on spending, and frequently multiple groups will be formed and then groups will raise and donate money to other groups making it very difficult for voters to actually determine what interests are being represented by any specific 527/ECO. In addition, while CCEs have been eliminated, many legislators now control their own ECOs and thus can take unlimited sums indirectly from interest groups and individuals, while using that money for a wide variety of purposes.

Despite the number of legislated changes to the interest group system since Republicans took control of state government, interest groups overall seems just as influential in Florida politics as they were in 1998. Money remains an important tool to shape public policy and seek influence from politicians. The GOP increased limits on donations directly to candidates, allowed unlimited donations to political committees, while leaving unchanged the ability to give unlimited donations to state parties and independent spending groups (ECOs). Until the Sunshine State Democrats become more competitive in the legislature or win the Governor's race, interest group money will continue to be primarily directed to the Republican Party of Florida and interest group influence will largely reflect Republican priorities.

ENDNOTES

1. "Florida's Establishment" in *Florida Trend* (November 1969).
2. Thomas R. Dye, *Politics in Florida* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p.69.
3. Thomas R. Dye, Aubrey Jewett & Susan A. MacManus, *Politics in Florida*, 2nd ed. (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Institute of Government Press, 2007), Ch. 5; Susan A. MacManus, Aubrey Jewett, Thomas R. Dye & David J. Bonanza, *Politics in Florida* 3rd ed. (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Institute of Government Press, 2001), Ch. 5.
4. Dye, *Politics in Florida*, p.69.
5. "Florida Bank Branch Deposits," iBanknet, <http://www.ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/filist.aspx?type=sodstatebanks&state=12>
6. <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032012/health/toc.htm>, "Health Insurance Coverage Status by State for All People, 2011".
7. The Florida Catastrophic Storm Risk Management Center at Florida State University, "The State of Florida's Property Insurance Market 2nd Annual Report" (January 2013). <http://www.stormrisk.org/sites/default/files/2nd%20Annual%20Insurance%20Market%20Rpt-FSU%20Storm%20Risk%20Center.pdf>
8. Ibid., p.32-33.
9. "Citizens Property Insurance drops below 1 million policies for the first time since 2006" in *Ft. Myers News Press* (11 February 2014); available at http://www.news-press.com/article/20140211/BUSINESS/140211003/Citizens-Property-Insurance-drops-below-1-million-policies-first-time-since-2006?nclick_check=1
10. Lloyd Dunkelberger, "Lower Florida insurance rates have been slow in coming" in *Daytona Beach News-Journal*, (20 January 2014): <http://www.news-journalonline.com/article/20140120/NEWS/140129974?p=3&tc=pg>
11. Statistics on tourism compiled by Visit Florida, the public—private partnership created by the legislature to promote tourism in Florida, see: <http://media.visitflorida.org/research/>
12. For a critical look at the power of Disney in Florida see: Richard E. Foglesong, *Married to the Mouse* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2001).
13. Diana B. Henriques, "Sugar Families Plan Merger of Flo-Sun and Savannah" in *New York Times* (16 July 1997): <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/16/business/sugar-families-plan-merger-of-flo-sun-and-savannah.html>
14. Susan Salisbury, "U.S. Sugar's Cane, Clewiston's Lifeblood, is Still Going Strong after 80 Years" in *The Palm Beach Post* (29 April 2011): <http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/business/us-sugars-cane-clewistons-lifeblood-is-still-going/nLr23/>
15. Florida Citrus Mutual, http://flcitrusmutual.com/industry-issues/fdoc_fcc.aspx
16. Joint Rule One Lobbyist Registration and Compensation Reporting Act, CS for SCR 1869, Florida Legislature 2006.
17. Ibid.
18. Florida Legislature, "Florida Legislature—2012 Year Total Compensation by Principal." Available at http://olcrpublic.leg.state.fl.us/Aggregate_totals/2012_a_1.pdf
19. Amy Keller, "Florida's Biggest Lobbyists: Turning Up the Heat" in *Florida Trend* (May 2011): p.116-120.
20. Dye, *Politics in Florida*, p.78.
21. Ibid, p.81.
22. http://www.followthemoney.org/database/state_overview.phtml?s=FL&y=2010; The Institute on Money and State Politics (Florida, 2010).
23. http://www.followthemoney.org/database/state_overview.phtml?s=FL&y=2012; The Institute on Money and State Politics (Florida, 2012).
24. According to data collected by the National Conference of State Legislatures, available at www.ncsl.org
25. *Political Committee Handbook 2010*, Florida Division of Elections.
26. See *Florida Statutes*, Title IX, Electors and Elections, Chapters 102 and 106.
27. See *Colbert Report* (29 September 2011) where campaign lawyer Trevor Potter sets up a shell corporation for Stephen Colbert to allow him to create a 501(c)4 and transfer anonymous donations to his 527 Super-PAC. See: <http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/398531/september-29-2011/colbert-super-pac---trevor-potter---stephen-s-shell-corporation>

28. Under Florida law a PAC, like the NRA Political Victory Fund, that only seeks to influence issues is not limited in the donations that it receives or in the expenditures that it makes.
29. John Kennedy, "With Public Cash in Doubt, McCollum Works the Money Margins" in *Sunshine State News* (28 July 2010): http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/public-cash-doubt-mccollum-works-money-margins?page=2&quicktabs_1=2
30. For a list of the biggest contributors in 1998 see: Dye, *Politics in Florida*, p.85.

AUTHOR

Aubrey Jewett, Ph.D., received both his Doctorate and M.A. from Florida State University. He is an Associate-Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida-Orlando and Treasurer of the Florida Political Science Association. Jewett has published numerous books, book chapters and articles on American and Florida politics. He recently co-authored *Politics in Florida*, 3rd edition available from the Florida Institute of Government Press on-line at www.lulu.com. Jewett received the Leon Weaver Award for his study of ballot invalidation in Florida during the 2000 Presidential election. He was awarded the 2003-2004 annual American Political Science Association Congressional Fellowship in Washington D.C.

“R2P” OR NOT “R2P”, THAT IS THE QUESTION!

Mark Grzegorzewski, Ph.D., University of South Florida-Tampa

ABSTRACT: The principle of “responsibility to protect” (or “R2P”) is a popular topic in both current events and International Relations literature. This concept holds that state sovereignty is conditional upon the state meeting its responsibility to protect its citizens, or sovereignty as responsibility. However, the unwieldiness of this concept has leant itself to abuse by the powerful. This essay seeks to demonstrate how powerful states have manipulated this concept to serve their own interests; the impact of the shallowness of “R2P” in the Syrian Civil War; and concluding recommendations on how to strengthen the concept of “R2P”.

Introduction

The principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (or “R2P”), emerged out of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo as a humanitarian peacekeeping mission. While such mission was viewed as morally justified in much of the world and a logic follow-up to NATO’s 1995 humanitarian mission in Bosnia), it also raised questions about “sovereignty, human rights and the laws governing the use of force”.¹ Specifically the debate focused on the authority to intervene and the threshold of intervention. To address these concerns, in 2001 the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This ICISS Report came in response to a challenge posed by the United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi Annan who questioned how states should respond to human rights violations in a world in which state sovereignty remains the basis for international order. The ICISS Report held that state sovereignty was conditional upon the state meeting its responsibility to protect its citizens, or sovereignty as responsibility.

This understanding was a move away from the traditional post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty, which granted states complete autonomy within their borders, meaning external agents had no role within the others’ domestic prerogatives (“Domestic Jurisdiction”). However, this understanding of sovereignty was an impediment to a world in which human rights was assuming a more central role in world affairs following the end of the Cold War. As such, if human rights were to become central to the discussion of world affairs, states would no longer be able to hide behind state sovereignty by making claims that state-sponsored repression could not be reviewed by the international community.

The ICISS Report and Post-Cold War re-conceptualization of state sovereignty held that if the state failed to meet their obligations, “the responsibility to protect transferred to the ‘international community.”² Moreover, the ICISS Report stressed prevention “as the single most important dimension” and that resources needed to be directed towards this end.³ It is here that “R2P” differs from traditional notions of humanitarian intervention: “R2P” intervention is only seen as a secondary measure if efforts to prevent a state from failing to meet its obligations are not met. Broadly speaking these measures include an international commitment to provide resources to failing countries.

¹ Aidan Hehir, “The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?’” in *International Relations* (2010): p.24.

² Hehir, p.24.

³ Catherine Lu, “Humanitarianism and the Use of Force” in Antonio Franceschet, ed., *The Ethics of Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2011).

The ICISS Report also stands apart from traditional humanitarian intervention in that it argues that there are responsibilities continuing on the ground after the post-intervention phase.⁴ The ICISS Report stressed six criteria in order to be justified as an extraordinary measure of external intervention:⁵

1. Just Cause: is there “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:

A. Large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action or state neglect, or inability to act, or a failed-state situation;

or

B. Large-scale ethnic-cleansing (actual or feared as imminent), whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or systematic mass-rapes.”

2. Right Intention: is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or avert human suffering, whatever other motives may be in play?

3. Last Resort: has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis been explored and are there reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures will not succeed?

4. Proportional Means: is the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective?

5. Reasonable Prospects: is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question and are the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?

6. Right Authority: there is no better or more appropriate body than the U.N. Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.

C. U.N. Security Council authorizations should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under U.N. Charter Article 99.

D. The U.N. Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic-cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.

E. The Permanent Five members of the U.N. Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, or to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.

F. If the U.N. Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:

⁴ Lu, p.85.

⁵ ICISS Report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, see: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>

- I. Consideration of the matter by the U.N. General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and
- II. Action within the area of jurisdiction of regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the U.N. Security Council.

G. The U.N. Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in extreme situations of atrocities and crimes against humanity, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation—and that the stature and credibility of the U.N. may suffer thereby out of such inaction.

While many states were receptive to the report produced by the ICISS Committee, including the members of the U.N. Security Council, many Developing countries have been skeptical of “R2P” in light of the Second Gulf War’s 2003 invasion of Iraq,⁶ NATO’s reinterpretation of its U.N. mandate in Libya and the failure of all international organizations to jointly or separately act in the current bloody Syrian Civil War. This skepticism is shared by academics such as Noam Chomsky who point to historical examples in which major Powers legitimized invasion on the grounds of humanitarian intervention.

These doubts, as well as the failure to properly operationalize “R2P”, leads to question the utility of “R2P” in today’s world: whether “R2P” is an emerging moral responsibility or a cover for states to engage in neo-colonialism. To answer this question this essay looks primarily to the P-5 states’ record and how they have abused the ambiguity of this concept for their own state-centric interests.

As such, the first task is to demonstrate that states have used “R2P” to further their own interests. Thus, it is important to establish that an increase in aid from United States (U.S.) to Developing countries, corresponds to a change in these states’ positions on “R2P”. Thus, to show how “R2P” has been invoked not as a Liberal humanitarian concept, but rather as a military capability masked as Liberal intervention. Third, to show the current selectivity of “R2P” by powerful states and how it hurts its development as a global norm. Finally, by concluding with recommendations on how states can institutionalize the concept of P-5 in an anarchic world.

Liberal Humanitarian Principle, or *Realpolitik*?

The question of whether “R2P” is really a Liberal Humanitarian Principle, or instead another form of Realism cloaked as Liberal humanitarian intervention has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Accordingly, Hehir focuses on the shallowness of “R2P” by claiming that supporters of “R2P” want to maintain the principle, or the brand name of “R2P”, all the while glossing over the fact that the process of “R2P” is “brief, confused and unoriginal.” He goes on to state that History shows that that violence is inevitable and thus “R2P” cannot eliminate the four crimes that it focuses on: genocide, war crimes, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity.⁷

Therefore, Hehir claims that we should not start with eliminating intra-state atrocities, but should focus on limiting the occurrence of violence, as well as punishing perpetrators. He states that there is nothing new today in regards to intra-state humanitarian crises despite the introduction “R2P”.⁸ States can still claim that they have absolute sovereignty and as such, deny any atrocity within their

⁶ Mehrdad Payandehh, “With Great Power comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect within the Process of International Lawmaking” in *Yale Journal of International Law* (2010): p.35.

⁷ Hehir, p.24.

⁸ Hehir, p.24.

borders. In addition, states still hold that as a result of the lack of any overarching global authority in the international system, they can act as they wish. What is lacking from Hehir's discussion is empirical account of how states construct "R2P" to meet their specific mutual interests.

The Constructivist perspective on how humanitarian norms and International Law channel behavior holds that "R2P" is an emerging norm. Norms in general are shared assessments outside of state control. These norms shape appropriate state behavior so that contrary rule-breaking behavior meet with disapproval. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms come about through a norm life-cycle in which domestic norms become international by way of norm international actors' repeated behavior. Eventually, until these norms regularize behavior and become institutionalized in the international system.⁹

The norm entrepreneur in the case of "R2P" was U.N. Ghanaian diplomat Kofi Annan, who during the Rwandan genocide was in charge of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The U.N. Security Council during the Rwandan genocide did little as a result of its earlier peacekeeping débâcle in Somalia. The U.S. during this calamity had seen first-hand how a low-risk humanitarian mission could turn into a large domestic political problem. As such, the U.S. as a member of the Security Council had no appetite for another African mission, but rather wanted significant reforms of the U.N. peacekeeping mission, while focusing all diplomatic efforts on the parallel Bosnian Crisis. Thus, the lack of leadership by the U.S. contributed to the Security Council not authorizing significant action in Rwanda.

As the U.N. Security Council did little to stop the Rwandan genocide, Annan was forced to sit idly by, unable to initiate any meaningful action.¹⁰ Years later Annan would again watch as the U.N. was paralyzed by inaction at the beginning of the Kosovo Crisis in 1998. As such, Annan decided to challenge the international community to agree upon a framework in which these type of atrocities would not occur as a result of international inaction.

The problem with Finnemore's and Sikkink's Norm-Cycle Theory is that although a majority of states may adopt a norm, it does not mean that all states will adhere to the that norm in the same way or for the same reason. For example, powerful states may adopt a norm in the name of a hidden interest, especially when norms have not been fully operationalized. Moreover, not all states that violate the norm are equally punished for violating that norm. For instance, powerful states are better able to shield themselves from sanctions, due to the power they wield in the international system. Moreover, also states who are allies with more powerful states can be shielded both diplomatically and militarily by their powerful ally.

Thus, currently the limited institutionalization of the "R2P" norm allows it to be used mostly against the less-powerful states that are at the mercy of the more-powerful states in the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, while the cause of "R2P" is noble, in many cases we continue to live in a world in which the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (paraphrasing Thucydides' book, *The Peloponnesian War*, as ground-work of Realism). This is most evident in the Security Council, especially in the case of the five Permanent veto Powers who control any eventual "R2P" intervention and can selectively choose whether a humanitarian cause reflects an institutionalized norm, or whether it is an internal matter to a state.¹¹ Therefore, although there is a principle that has been accepted

⁹ Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in *International Organization*, v.52 (1998): p.4.

¹⁰ Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide" in *The Atlantic* (September 2011).

¹¹ Nicholas J. Wheeler, "A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit", paper presented at the Conference 'The U.N. at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?' University of Toronto, Canada, 6-7 October 2005.

world-wide, it is limited in that it can only be activated once the gatekeepers at the Security Council determine that a norm violation has occurred.

2005 World Summit

The World Summit of 2005 was viewed by many as a success. The “R2P” principle had gone from a local level aspiration to a global principle. Moreover, the Security Council, after contentious debate publically recognized that it had responsibilities under “R2P”. The document that was adopted stated:

Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the U.N. in establishing an early-warning capability.

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war-crimes, ethnic-cleansing and crimes against humanity.¹²

Despite these advances, there were some drawbacks to the document agreed upon in 2005. For one, the debate did not address what to do in cases of unauthorized “R2P”. For instance, the regional organization African Union (A.U.), claimed the prerogative to intervene with or without U.N. Security Council approval.¹³ Another issue critics found with the 2005 document was that the Security Council still retained veto power over “R2P”.¹⁴ As a result, there could be future Rwanda’s and Kosovo’s because states who do not find intervention in their national interest could block a Security Council resolution.¹⁵ Finally, the 2005 World Summit did not create thresholds by which to determine whether “R2P” was justified.¹⁶ This issue would be taken up again in 2009.

2009 General Assembly Debate

The 2009 U.N. General Assembly debate to operationalize “R2P” was a follow-up to the 2005 World Summit. However, this aim left some supporters of “R2P” with a sense of unease due to the fear that the later 2009 World Summit would be used to retard whatever progress had been with “R2P”. Others feared that skeptical governments might use this forum to renegotiate their responsibilities under “R2P”.

To some supporters of “R2P”, the 2009 debate was an impediment for “R2P”. Hehir notes that the version of “R2P” which emerged from this World Summit was so superficial that it actually constitutes... a setback...¹⁷ Common themes that emerged during the debate was that “R2P” was

¹² UNGA, “2005 Summit Outcome” A/60/L.1 (20 September 2005), see: daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/511/30/PDF/N0551130.pdf?OpenElement.

¹³ Alex Bellamy, “Whither the Responsibility to Protect?” *Intervention and the 2005 World Summit* in *Ethics and International Affairs*, v.20 (2006): p.2.

¹⁴ Bellamy, p.20.

¹⁵ Nicholas Wheeler, “Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate over where Authority should be Located for the Use of Force” in *NUPI Report* (2008): p.3.

¹⁶ Bellamy, p.20

¹⁷ Hehir, p.24.

“designed to legitimize Western imposition of humanitarian standards and facilitate a return to pre-U.N. Charter colonial interference under the rubric of human rights.”¹⁸ Others charged that “R2P” was not a new legal principle since it was already enshrined in the U.N. Charter, which holds that under its Chapter VII the Security Council must “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security.”¹⁹ Therefore, there was no need to elaborate on the U.N. Charter since “R2P” “did not constitute a legal innovation, but rather amounted to a statement of resolve based on existing law.”²⁰

Indeed, what emerged from the 2009 World Summit debate was what “R2P” supporters feared the most, an agreement based upon the lowest common denominator.²¹ This was due to states not coming to agreement over how to operationalize “R2P”. Instead, states agreed to allow the principle to remain, but without any enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. for its part acknowledged that there was a “moral responsibility” to use appropriate means, but not an “obligation.”²²

The Case of Sub-Saharan Side Payments?

The following three cases are referenced in Alex Bellamy’s article “Realizing the Responsibility to Protect.” In this article, Bellamy takes note of Rwanda, Benin and Tanzania as taking a significant step to join with the West in supporting “R2P”. Yet, it is a mistake to simply accept as true that these countries joined with the West due to seemingly altruistic notions. The “R2P” literature goes to great lengths to note how Developing countries are against “R2P” out of fear that it might give the developed countries cover to intervene in the internal politics of Developing states. What follows brings to the fore one possible explanation as to why the following countries may have changed their stances.

In Rwanda one of the most horrific genocides occurred during the 1990s. During this time, little to no action was taken in the Security Council to prevent the massing killing of minority Tutsis at the hands of the majority Hutus. While this development may have been key in encouraging the development of human rights norms, it is no guarantee that the Rwandan government would support the development of “R2P”. In fact, Rwanda’s government currently support for rebels in the Congo shows that this state still supports mass-killing of its enemies as a bloody foreign policy tool.²³

Historically the U.S. has had diplomatic relations with Rwanda since 1962. Relations post-1994 have sought to “increase social cohesion in a peaceful, democratic and inclusive Rwanda that provides good governance and an economically-enabling environment.”²⁴ In 2004, prior to Rwanda voting on “R2P” at the World Summit in received \$7.57 million in aid from the U.S. In 2005, after voting in favor of “R2P” Rwandan aid spiked to \$9.39 million. For the rest of the George W. Bush Jr. administration Rwanda would receive \$7.93 million in 2006 and \$7.22 million more in 2007.²⁵

Regarding the U.S. and Benin, America has actively been engaged in Benin since 1991 to “expand the use of family health services; ensuring the availability of basic quality education; and protecting

¹⁸ Hehir, p.24.

¹⁹ U.N. Charter, see: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>

²⁰ Hehir, p.24.

²¹ Aidan Hehir, “The Responsibility to Protect in International Political Discourse: Encouraging Statement of Intent or Illusory Platitudes?” in *International Journal of Human Rights*, v.15 (2011): p.8.

²² Hehir, p.24.

²³ Voice of America, “U.S. Legislators Seek Action on Rwanda for Supporting of D.R. Congo Rebels”, see: <http://www.voanews.com/content/rwanda-m23-congo-rebels/1563124.html>

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/rw/facs/index.htm>

²⁵ Data in: <http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/1799/Rwanda>; [ForeignAssistance.gov, http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013&OUID=188&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent](http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013&OUID=188&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent)

vulnerable and at risk populations.”²⁶ In 2004, the year prior to voting on “R2P” at the U.N., Benin received from the U.S. \$9.41 million. After voting in favor of “R2P” Benin received \$6.83 million in 2005. The next two years Benin received \$13.4 million in 2006 and \$11 million more in 2007.²⁷

In the third case of Tanzania, the United States established diplomatic relations with this country in 1961. In Tanzania, the U.S. has focused on “health, food security, agricultural development and infrastructure.”²⁸ In 2004 prior to voting on “R2P”, U.S. aid to Tanzania was \$14.01 million. After voting in favor of “R2P”, aid spiked to \$18.16 million in 2005. For the remaining two years of the Bush Jr. administration it shrunk to \$7.93 million in 2006 and \$.3 million in 2007.²⁹

While I do not claim direct causation between U.S. foreign aid to these states and their votes in the United Nations, the fact that the U.S. did increase foreign aid to specific sub-Saharan countries after their vote in favor of “R2P” cannot be overlooked. Moreover, such spiked aid returned to normal levels the year after voting in favor of “R2P”. This abnormality cannot go without mention since during the administration of Bush Jr. foreign aid levels significantly decreased across the board.³⁰ Therefore, any increase should be viewed skeptically and display one possible explanation as to why these sub-Saharan countries may have voted in favor of “R2P”.

2007 Darfur

The three cases of “R2P” initiated interventions were chosen because the Security Council specifically invoked the term. Rather than choose cases of intervention that may have been driven by “R2P”, the case-studies chosen to avoid selection bias. While these three cases are undoubtedly a small sample and thus not indicative of the overall principle of “R2P”, they are telling in their inability to free themselves from the principle of *Realpolitik*.³¹ With that said, these three cases are not an indictment of this budding principle.

Concerning Darfur, for more than seven years civilians in Darfur were “massacred, raped and separated from their families by the government-supported *Janjaweed* militias.”³² In this conflict, over 400,000 people were killed. On 30 April 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1755, reaffirming the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. In addition to extending the mission in Southern Sudan for six months, it called upon all parties to “put an end to the violence and atrocities in Darfur.”³³

When the violence did not halt, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 authorizing the deployment of a 26,000-strong joint U.N.-A.U. force for Darfur. However, of this force only 9,000 soldiers have been deployed. In the case of Darfur there were several obstacles which may explain both why the Security Council took so long to act on Darfur and why such actions are not more robust.³⁴

First, Sudan is a non-Middle East oil state in which China, Russia and France have competing energy interests. Second, Sudan was identified by the U.S. as key site of counter-terrorism efforts in

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/bn/c27972.htm>

²⁷ Find the Data, see: <http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/212/Benin>;

ForeignAssistance.gov, http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=239&FY=2006&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent&tabID=tab_sct_Peace_Disbs

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/tz/facs/index.htm>

²⁹ Find the Data, see: <http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/2075/Tanzania>; ForeignAssistance.gov, http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013&OUID=178&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent

³⁰ Stephen, Radelet, “Bush and Foreign Aid” in *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2003).

³¹ Max W. Matthews, “Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: the Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur” in *Boston College International & Comparative Law Review*, 31 (2008): p.1.

³² International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-darfur>

³³ International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Darfur, *ibid*.

³⁴ International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Darfur, *ibid*.

Africa. This explains American reluctance to get involved in the Sudan since any actions there could fuel anti-Americanism and cause Sudan to revert back to being a state-sponsor of terror. Third, there was a feeling that any international intervention in Darfur would inflame other civil wars in Sudan and thus further destabilize the state.³⁵ As such, Darfur is a clear case in which the U.N. Security Council failed to take actions due to conflicting national interests. Further, even once “R2P” was invoked in the Sudan, it was below the accepted bare-minimum to do anything about the conflict.

2010 Ivory Coast

In 2010 a controversial election occurred in the Ivory Coast between incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and opposition member Alassane Ouattara. Although the challenger was declared the winner, Gbagbo refused to step down from power. As a consequence, the bloody conflict that broke out between the two political camp, over 1000 civilians and over 500,000 people were displaced. Both sides were equally guilty in committing horrendous crimes during this conflict.³⁶

In an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, a military operation began on 4 April 2010 following a statement by the U.N. Secretary-General in which he instructed U.N. operations in the Ivory Coast to “take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population.”³⁷ Months later the U.N. Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 1962 on 20 December 2010, which extended the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force through 30 June 2011 and added more troops and personnel to support the mission. The U.N. Security Council met again over the Ivory Coast Crisis on 30 March 2011 and unanimously adopted U.N. Resolution 1975, which issued “targeted sanctions on Gbagbo and his inner circle and stressed the support given to the mission to use all necessary means within its mandate to protect civilians under threat. The U.N. Resolution stated that attacks that targeted civilians amounted to crimes against humanity and reaffirmed the primary responsibility of all States to protect civilians.”³⁸

Further involving itself in the case of the Ivory Coast, the Security Council chose to back a candidature, Ouattara who was living in France as a political refugee and had ties to the French government. In addition, Ouattara’s party was a splinter group of the PDCI, which was the post-colonial ruling party of the Ivory Coast and which had strong patronage ties to France. Furthermore, not only did the Security Council overrule the finding of the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision that Gbagbo had won the elections over Ouattara, but eventually U.N. peacekeepers and French troops fought on the side of Ouattara’s forces and provided him with exclusive protection.³⁹ It is unknown why the U.N. Security Council chose this course of action since no formal statements were offered after the adoption of U.N. Resolution 1962.⁴⁰

Gbagbo’s hold on power ended on 11 April 2011 when he was arrested by Ouattara’s forces after days of fighting involving both U.N. operations and French military. Following this, there was debate about whether the U.N. had overstepped its mandate in the Ivory Coast. China and Russia complained that peacekeepers should have remained neutral. Brazil complained that involving U.N. peacekeepers would

³⁵ Paul D. Williams & Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur” in *Security Dialogue*, v.36 (2005): p.1.

³⁶ John Murphy, “R2P Comes of Age? A Skeptics View”, in *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law*, v.18 (2012).

³⁷ International Coalition of the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast>

³⁸ International Coalition of the Responsibility to Protect, Ivory Coast, *ibid*.

³⁹ Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya & the Responsibility to Protect” in *International Affairs*, v.87 (2011): p.4.

⁴⁰ International Coalition of the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast>

make them targets during a conflict. India stated that the peacekeepers became instruments of régime-change.⁴¹ Yet, in the end, no action was taken against France for operating outside of its mandate.

2011-2012: Selectivity in the Arab World

Following February 2011 political protests demanding an end to Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi's 41-year reign, Libyan civilians found themselves under attack by the Libyan government. Gadhafi would later go on TV and proclaim his intention to massacre Benghazi's population. He would declare that those engaged in the uprising were "cockroaches" and that he would search for them "house to house." This language was eerily similar to that used in the Rwandan genocide⁴² and which created an international feeling that there must be some collective response to the Libyan government's actions.

The U.N. Security Council responded to appeals from the African Union and Arab League and unanimously adopted U.N. Resolution 1970 on 26 February, imposing an arms embargo and travel ban on the Gadhafi family and Libyan government. However, this concern from the African Union and Arab League was highly nuanced. The African Union, including the three members on the Security Council, voted in favor on intervention in Libya, but expressed the desire that situation be resolved politically. This act was in accordance with Article 4(h) of the A.U.'s Constitutive Act which advocates outside action to stop crimes against humanity. This article, which arose from the history of grave atrocities, which occurred on the continent, stands in sharp contrast to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal politics.⁴³

It also must be noted that South Africa initially supported "R2P" and intervention in Libya as a result of the A.U. article of non-interference. However, South Africa, along with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICS countries), changed course and later supported a policy of non-intervention in Libya. This was a result of the U.N. mandate for a "No-Fly Zone" to protect Libyan civilians being interpreted by NATO as regime-change in Libya. Thus, South Africa switched its support and chose to align with the BRICS due to suspicion that "R2P" was simply a tool used by the West for regime change.⁴⁴

The Arab League also swiftly condemned the actions of Libya and on 22 February 2011 suspended Libya from the organization. The Arab League then backed U.N. condemnation of Libya and supported a No-Fly Zone over Libya.⁴⁵ These actions by the Arab League were later interpreted as being pushed by the wealthy oil-countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose massive oil wealth gave them disproportionate political influence in the Arab League.⁴⁶ As such, the six GCC counties virtually determine the direction of the GCC irrespective of the other member's wishes, and especially Saudi Arabia was able to drive Arab League policy and action against Gadhafi, the man who once called to King Abdullah "stupid."⁴⁷

Returning to U.N. Resolution 1970, it affirmed "Libya's 'responsibility to protect' and imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban on the Libyan government, froze the assets of the Gadhafi family and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court for investigation into reports of crimes against

⁴¹ International Coalition of the Responsibility to Protect, Ivory Coast, *ibid*.

⁴² Spencer Zifcak, "The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria" in *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, v.13 (2012).

⁴³ Simon Adams, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" in *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Occasional Paper Series*, N.3 (October 2012).

⁴⁴ Chris Keeler, "The End of the Responsibility to Protect?" *Foreign Policy Journal* October 12, (2011).

⁴⁵ Simon Adams, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" in *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Occasional Paper Series*, No.3 (October 2012).

⁴⁶ Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, "The Orwellian 'Responsibility to Protect' ('R2P') Used to Justify 'Regime Change' and All-Out-War" in *Strategic Culture Foundation* (29 November 2011).

⁴⁷ Pepe Escobar, "'R2P' is now Right 2 Plunder" in *Asia Times* (27 August 2011).

humanity.”⁴⁸ When the non-military measures authorized in U.N. Resolution 1970 failed to deter Gadhafi from attacking his population, the U.N. Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17th, although China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany abstained from the vote. The Resolution sanctioned a No-Fly Zone to protect Libyan civilians and authorized member-states, in cooperation with the Security Council, to take “all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat.”⁴⁹

Why was the Security Council so quick to act on Libyan? In this case, Gadhafi was already an international pariah. He had made threats against foreign leaders, was connected to terrorism and fueled African conflicts.⁵⁰ Therefore, it is not hard to discern why many states wanted to see him go. As soon as NATO was given an international mandate to provide a “No-Fly Zone”, it interpreted its authorization broadly and began attacking Gadhafi’s forces. Later Russia claimed that the use of force against Gadhafi was disproportion to the threat, while China claimed that NATO’s actions were going beyond the U.N. mandate. In the end, Russia and China took no action against NATO, while Gadhafi was deposed from power under the cover of NATO air-support, and swiftly killed by the insurgents.⁵¹

While the U.N. Security Council was relatively quick to act on Libya, it has dragged its feet for two years on Syria’s Civil War. As a consequence, the international community has questioned why there has not been internationally-sanctioned action in Syria. One such reason is that China and Russia became openly opposed to any U.N. action after seeing how the U.N.-authorized “R2P” in Libya turned immediately into a case of Western régime-change against Libya: the rhetoric changed from stopping atrocities to claiming the only way to stop the atrocities was through the removal of Gadhafi.⁵² To justify the removal of Gadhafi was making threatening statements is not enough, as other leaders have made threatening statements that the international community ignored. But in Libya the government’s bombing of insurgent-held areas provided the U.N. and NATO with the ultimate justification to act.⁵³

Compared to Libya, the case can be made that Syria is much more in need of an “R2P” intervention than Libya was. This is due to the many more peaceful protestors who have died in Syria compared with the armed rebels who died fighting as insurgents in Libya. However by 2014 the inconclusive bloody Syrian Civil War had produced over 130,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees.⁵⁴ This fact again begs the question of why Libya and not Syria. One explanation may be that there was much more international support to overthrow Gadhafi, but not the Assad family. In the case of the Assad family, the international community had been more willing to work with them dating back all the way to Henry Kissinger’s discussions with Hafez al-Assad over the return of the Golan Heights to Syria despite Israel’s having formally annexed them in the 1980s.⁵⁵ With Gaddafi, he had only recently been brought back on from cold, but still retained the image of an international pariah, and once he started his bloody repression of the Libyan population all countries turned their back to Gadhafi.

Saira Mohamed correctly notes the case of Libya was “not a successful implementation of the responsibility to protect and identifying it as such risks conflating an interest in intervention with a

⁴⁸ International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya>

⁴⁹ International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Libya

⁵⁰ Bellamy and Williams, 87.

⁵¹ Bellamy and Williams, 87.

⁵² Martha Hall Findley, “Can “R2P” Survive Libya and Syria?” in *Strategic Studies Working Group Papers* (2011).

⁵³ Martha Hall Findley, 2011, *ibid*.

⁵⁴ Martha Hall Findley, 2011, *ibid*.

⁵⁵ Aaron David Miller, *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Bantam, 2011).

responsibility to intervene.”⁵⁶ Here the distinction is drawn between a national interest to intervene in Libya as opposed to a responsibility to intervene in Libya. This distinction does nothing to further the cause of “R2P” since it informs state leaders in non-strategic parts of the world that Washington will not intervene in their humanitarian crises because their state does not fit into the national interest of the United States.

Taken a step further, President Barak Obama publically demonstrated that U.S. calculations over whether to intervene in Libya were driven over national security calculations, rather than a moral objective to protect the rights of people. This calculation meant to Obama that the problems in Libya “were worth solving.”⁵⁷ This gives the intervention in Libya the appearance of a cost-benefit analysis. If there is a chance of success and the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs then it is in the interest of the U.S. to intervene. Herein lays the problem, in that “R2P” is supposed to trump these national interest equations. Taken further, “R2P” is supposed to be in the interest of humanity since every person has a right to be protected against genocide.

Likewise, if the intervention in Libya was driven by “R2P” and if “R2P” is to be taken seriously, the international community also has responsibilities post-intervention.⁵⁸ These responsibilities were larger written-off by the international community and justified on the grounds that the new Libyan government did not want an occupying force on their territory. This is yet another point of contrast given the situation in Syria. In Libya, from relatively early on, there was a shaky single political voice for the rebels against the Gadhafi regime.⁵⁹ This voice, the Libyan Transition Council, gave the world community a tenuous political actor to coordinate with in Libya. This actor meant that the post-Gadhafi Libya would not necessarily descend into chaos since there would be a legitimate political actor who could step into the political-vacuum.

In this regard, Syria has not followed the path of Libya. The Syrian uprising, which began in March 2011, has not had a well-defined political opposition. Within this opposition are jihadi terrorists, secularists and Syrian military deserters, all vying for influence, while fighting the Assad government. This eclectic mix has been joined by members of the Syrian diaspora to form the Syrian National Council (SNC).⁶⁰ This council however is not legitimate in the eyes on many within Syria and is rejected by Islamist insurgents. As a consequence, the U.S. withheld formal recognition of the Syrian National Council until mid-December 2012.⁶¹ Now more inclusive in gender and filled with more current Syrian citizens, the Syrian National Council presented itself as the legitimate voice of Syria and a partner with the international community, although its influence on the battle-field remained tenuous. This development means that if “R2P” were to be invoked by the Security Council, the Syrian National Council could fill a political vacuum and post-intervention work (as required by “R2P”) could be initiated immediately after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

When and if, Assad falls there is a question of what to do with him. The treatment of Gadhafi in Libya has certainly given proponents of “R2P” in Syria pause. Gadhafi was captured in Libya as a prisoner of

⁵⁶ Mohamed, Saira, “Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect” in *Stanford Journal of International Law*, v.48 (2012).

⁵⁷ White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya” see: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>

⁵⁸ Bellamy, Alex J., “The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On” in *Ethics and International Affairs*, v.24 (2010): p.2.

⁵⁹ Reuters, “Anti-Gaddafi Figures say form National Council”, see: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/27/libya-council-revolution-idUSWEB194120110227>

⁶⁰ BBC News, “Syrian Opposition Launches Join National Council”, see: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15143293>

⁶¹ L.A. Times, “Obama: U.S. Recognizes Syria's Main Rebel Group”, see: <http://www.latimes.com/news/la-obama-us-recognizes-syrias-main-rebel-group-20121211,0,3617128.story>

war. Despite this status, Gadhafi was immediately murdered, thus constituting a war crime and it is a high likelihood that his murders will never be charged with a crime.⁶² Aside from the murder of Gaddafi, there were numerous reports of the rebels committing crimes against humanity in Libya. Also these crimes went unpunished.⁶³ Frighteningly these same crimes are now being committed in Syria.⁶⁴ If the experience with Gaddafi is not to be repeated in Syria, the international community and SNC will not to find a way to quickly establish the rule of law in Syria and bring Assad to justice. As a result of criminal proceedings, a guilty judgment against Assad will provide the SNC and “R2P” with legitimacy across the world.

Another factor distinguishing the cases is that in Libya there was unanimous regional support for intervention. In Syria, this is not the case. This means that the U.N. Security Council does not have the political cover to implement intervention. While the Arab League has been willing to suspend Syria from its regional organization, it has not been willing to propose international intervention.⁶⁵ One possible explanation is that in Syria it is a conflict between Sunnis and Shi’a. This fact has turned Syria into a proxy war for the region’s Sunni powers, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, against Shi’a-dominated (and the current chair of the Arab League) Lebanon and Iraq. Each side wants to see its sectarian backed horse win and does not want to see a ceasefire or intervention until their side is firmly ensconced in power. If the Arab League is to endorse an “R2P” intervention in Syria it will have to look past this sectarian divide and acknowledge the immense human suffering in Syria.

An additional possibility explanation behind this selectivity is the neo-Conservative (NeoCons) element within the American foreign policy establishment.⁶⁶ At least since the Bush Jr. administration, NeoCons have been pursuing an agenda to democratize the Middle East. This stems from the belief that American military superiority is unmatched in the world today and the U.S. has the power, if not the responsibility, to shape the world in its image. While Syria was not included in the infamous “Axis of Evil” speech, John Bolton later added it to the Axis.⁶⁷ Other neo-Conservatives have also dubbed Syria as belonging to the “Axis of Resistance” (along with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas).⁶⁸ Therefore, while the U.S. in recent history has had more congenial relations with the Assads relative to Gadhafi, the Syrian regime has also been targeted by hawkish elements within the U.S., thus creating distrust of U.S. intentions in Syria, especially in light of the U.S. removing another dictator, which did not toe the American line in neighboring Iraq.

Yet another reason why action is not being taken in Syria is the layout of the battlefield. In Libya the front-lines were relatively clear, while in Syria the front-lines are fuzzily drawn. This is a result of the type of insurgent fighting which is occurring in Syria. Armed groups are moving city-to-city, blending in with the local population and then melting away if their forces are overrun. In the case of Libya, there was a possibly- eminent case of genocide about to occur in one city, Benghazi. Gaddafi’s forces had lined up outside the city and were preparing to advance. Therefore, NATO could see who needed protection and who needed to be stopped. In Syria, NATO-style intervention *à la* Libya would not work. The régime

⁶² Murphy, p.18.

⁶³ Murphy, p.18.

⁶⁴ CBC News, “Syrian Rebels Accused of War Crimes in Execution Video”, see: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/11/02/syria-rebel-warcrimes-video.html>

⁶⁵ Washington Post, “At U.N., Qatar Emir calls on Arab Nations to Intervene in Syria”, see: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-25/world/35496045_1_syrian-opposition-syrian-people-syrian-forces-and-rebels

⁶⁶ Foreign Policy, “No Military Option in Syria”, see: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/17/no_military_options_in_syria

⁶⁷ BBC News, “U.S. Expands ‘Axis of Evil’”, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1971852.stm>

⁶⁸ CS Monitor, “Syria Crisis causes Iran-Led ‘Axis of Resistance’ to Fray”, see: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0316/Syria-crisis-causes-iran-led-axis-of-resistance-to-fray>

has taken the battle to the cities to fight the rebels. As a result, NATO's air-support cannot help the rebels without killing innocent civilians in the cross-fire.

The question of "R2P" in Syria gets even more complicated with considering Israel. Israel borders Syria and annexed the Golan Heights. Accordingly, Israel views the situation in Syria with trepidation. On the one hand, the Assad family is still in power, meaning that the Syrian government will take an uncompromising stance on the Golan Heights. On the other hand, Israelis fear a vacuum of power in Syria if the Assad family falls. For that reason, many Israeli leaders prefer to stick with "the devil they know" in Syria. Therefore, the Israelis may not be pressuring the U.S. to take imminent action in Syria.

Finally, the ultimate X-factor in Syria is chemical weapons. Libya, unlike Syria, had destroyed its extensive stockpile of chemical weapons in 2010 as called for under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This move by Libya was part of its *rapprochement* with the West following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. That being said, even if Libya has retained some chemical weapon capabilities when the uprising began, it did not have the delivery-systems needed to unleash these deadly weapons.⁶⁹ Conversely, in Syria, only as recently as January 2014 under a Russia-sponsored international agreement (to ward-off threats of U.S. air-strikes in response to the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons against local insurgents) have these weapons started to move out of Syria to be destroyed. Despite this positive step, skepticism remains as to whether Syria has divulged its entire chemical weapons program to the international community. Moreover, there are questions as to whether rebel groups in Syria have captured some of the Syria chemical weapons stockpile. Thus, the chemical weapon issue in Syria still leaves the international community with a sense of unease and doubt.

In sum, Syria is not Libya, although both cases demanded immediate attention. However, "R2P" was applied first in Libya and NATO may have gone outside its mandate. As a result when "R2P" is needed, such as in the case of Syria, Russia and China do not want to risk being side-stepped again by another U.N. humanitarian intervention within the internal affairs of a sovereign state (like Kosovo or Libya). Notwithstanding the multiple hurdles to be cleared in Syria and the different variables in that case, the Security Council needs to address the problem in Syria with or without invoking "R2P".

Conclusion and Recommendations

"R2P" has shown itself to be a pliable concept easily abused for political purposes, due to the lack of operationalization by the world community. As a result, there are no criteria by which to prevent a massacre of innocent civilians if they are revolting against an abusive government. Until this norm can be given concrete and institutionalized parameters for operationalization, it will remain a tool of the powerful against the powerless. Moreover, one should not conclude that weaker states are in favor of "R2P" for any altruistic purposes. These states have their own interests and can be encouraged to vote a particular way through inducements offered by states that are more powerful. While the data on why these countries voted for "R2P" in 2005 may never be available, one should not take at face value that altruism was involved in their voting calculations.

Finally, the selectivity of "R2P" via the U.N. Security Council ultimately is the political death knell for this principle. As the world stands by, again, Syrians are being killed by their government. The Russians and the Chinese do not want to intervene in order to preserve the old notion of sovereignty for fear that any limitation of sovereignty over humanitarian interventions in bloody civil wars or against repressive governments committing crimes against humanity on their domestic oppositions could come

⁶⁹ NBC News, "Libya has 'significant' stockpile of chemical weapons", see: http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/04/6183434-libya-has-significant-stockpile-of-chemical-weapons?lite

back to haunt them one day since they too have internal ethno-separatist movements (Chechnya, Tibet, Sinkiang, Taiwan). While the Americans, French and British frequently give signals that they would like to do something in Syria, nothing substantial is ever initiated, due to both international divisiveness (over the cost of committing Western forces on the ground in a bloody civil war, as well as Western disenchantment at the rise of Islamist-Jihadist insurgents with suspect ties to Al-Qaeda) and domestic opposition to more peacekeeping operations abroad, regardless of how noble the humanitarian cause (“war-fatigue” after Iraq and Afghanistan). This stance may be a result of not knowing what to do in Syria given the complexity of the situation.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, inaction by all sides means that “never again” is happening over and over again...

In the end, the hollowness of “R2P” cannot save Syria from its genuine humanitarian crisis. One can only hope that the international community’s failing in Syria will produce a more substantive debate on humanitarian intervention. Only through a genuine discussion on how to implement “R2P” can future atrocities such as this be averted. Yet, the question remains, can states put aside their own narrow national interests and support humanitarian issues that might run counter to their national security policies?

“R2P” needs to be sold to skeptical domestic and foreign audiences through trust-building, strengthened through transparency and accountability. Once these measures of trust and accountability are met, states can begin to tackle other larger policy issues, such as humanitarian intervention. At this stage, where both accountability and transparency requirements are met, states can begin to institutionalize their policy recommendations emerging from such international dialogue.⁷¹ This dialogue must occur between equals, meaning there must be a way to eliminate the asymmetry in power between the Industrialized and Developing world. This means also that the discussion cannot have the shadow of coercion behind it. Instead, states must be able to meet on a neutral platform where the best ideas will carry the discussion. Of course, this will also mean abandoning not only notions of power, but also of ethnic identity, class, gender and regional solidarity, amongst others. In sum, there cannot be ways to poison the discussion.

What arises from this debate will reflect human interest, not state interest. “R2P” will be seen as a humanitarian norm, not a principle, after finally completing its emergence.⁷² Its acceptance the world over will lead to its later codification and institutionalization in International Law.⁷³ States will still exist, but they will affirm their support to the norm of “R2P” just as they do to state sovereignty. The principle of “R2P” cannot remain on the sidelines, while unaccountable masses of people are killed arbitrarily by their own government in the effort to repress all domestic oppositions. There must be accountability. There must be transparency. There must be action!

⁷⁰ Hussain A. Gatlin, “A Problem of Mixed Motives: the Responsibility to Protect in Syria” in *Seton Hall Law eRepository* (Spring 2012).

⁷¹ Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, “Norms, Institutions and U.N. Reform: the Responsibility to Protect” in *Beyond the Headlines*, v.63 (2005): p.3.

⁷² Jutta Brunnee, “International Law and Collective Concerns: Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect” in *Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas* (2007).

⁷³ Nicole-Anne Hardwick, “Can the Doctrine of the “R2P” Make the World More Secure?” in *e-International Relations* (2012), see:

<http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/15/can-the-doctrine-of-the-”R2P”-make-the-world-more-secure/>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Simon, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" in *The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: Occasional Paper Series*, No. 3 (October 2012).
- Arbour, Louise, "The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and Practice", speech by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at Trinity College in Dublin, 23 November 2007.
- BBC News, "Syrian Opposition Launches Join National Council", see: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15143293>.
- BBC News, "U.S. Expands 'Axis of Evil'", see: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1971852.stm>.
- Bellamy, Alex J., "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect" in *International Studies Perspectives*, n.10 (2009).
- Bellamy, Alex J. & Paul D. Williams, "The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" in *International Affairs*, v.87 (2011): p.4.
- Bellamy, Alex J., "The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On" in *Ethics and International Affairs*, v.24 (2010): p.2.
- Bellamy, Alex J., "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit" in *Ethics and International Affairs* (2010).
- Badescu, Christina G. & Linnea Bergholm, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: the Big Let-Down" in *Security Dialogue*, v.40 (2009).
- Brunnee, Jutta & Stephen J. Toope, "Norms, Institutions and U.N. Reform: the Responsibility to Protect" in *Beyond the Headlines*, v.63 (2005): p.3.
- Brunnee, Jutta, "International Law and Collective Concerns: Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect" in *Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas* (2007).
- CBC News, "Syrian Rebels Accused of War-Crimes in Execution Video", see: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/11/02/syria-rebel-warcrimes-video.html>
- U.N. Charter, see: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>
- CS Monitor, "Syria Crisis Causes Iran-Led 'Axis of Resistance' to Fray", see: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0316/Syria-crisis-causes-iran-led-axis-of-resistance-to-fray>
- Escobar, Pepe, "'R2P' is now Right 2 Plunder" in *Asia Times* (27 August 2011).
- Find the Data, see: <http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/212/Benin;ForeignAssistance.gov>, http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?OUID=239&FY=2006&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent&tabID=tab_sct_Peace_Disbs
- Find the Data, see: [http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/1799/Rwanda; ForeignAssistance.gov](http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/1799/Rwanda;ForeignAssistance.gov), http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013&OUID=188&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent
- Find the Data, see: [http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/2075/Tanzania; ForeignAssistance.gov](http://us-foreign-aid.findthedata.org/l/2075/Tanzania;ForeignAssistance.gov), http://foreignassistance.gov/OU.aspx?FY=2013&OUID=178&AgencyID=0&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent
- Findley, Martha Hall, "Can 'R2P' Survive Libya and Syria?" in *Strategic Studies Working Group Papers* (2011).
- Finnemore, Martha & Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in *International Organization*, v.52 (1998): p.4.
- Foreign Policy, "No Military Option in Syria", see: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/17/no_military_options_in_syria
- Franceschet, Antonio, ed., *The Ethics of Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2011).
- Gatlin, Hussain A., "A Problem of Mixed Motives: the Responsibility to Protect in Syria" in *Seton Hall Law eRepository* (Spring 2012).
- Hehir, Aidan, "The Responsibility to Protect in International Political Discourse: Encouraging Statement of Intent or Illusory Platitudes?" in *International Journal of Human Rights*, v.15 (2011): p.8.
- Hehir, Aidan, "The Responsibility to Protect: 'Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?'" in *International Relations*, v.24 (2010).
- Hardwick, Nicole-Anne, "Can the Doctrine of the 'R2P' Make the World More Secure?" in *e-International Relations* (2012), see: <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/15/can-the-doctrine-of-the-'R2P'-make-the-world-more-secure/>
- ICISS Report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, see: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.
- International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-darfur>.
- International Coalition of the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast>.
- International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, see: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya>.
- Keeler, Chris. 2011. "The End of the Responsibility to Protect?" in *Foreign Policy Journal* (12 October 2011).

- L.A. Times, "Obama: U.S. Recognizes Syria's Main Rebel Group", see: <http://www.latimes.com/news/la-obama-us-recognizes-syrias-main-rebel-group-20121211,0,3617128.story>
- Lu, Catherine, "Humanitarianism and the Use of Force" in Antonio Franceschet, ed., *The Ethics of Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2011).
- Mahdi, Darius Nazemroaya, "The Orwellian 'Responsibility to Protect' ("R2P") Used to Justify 'Regime Change' and All-Out-War" in *Strategic Culture Foundation* (29 November 2011).
- Matthews, Max W., "Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: the Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur" in *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, v.31 (2008): p.1.
- Miller, Aaron David, *The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Bantam, 2011).
- Mohamed, Saira, "Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect" in *Stanford Journal of International Law*, v.48 (2012).
- NBC News, "Libya has 'Significant' Stockpile of Chemical Weapons", see: http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/04/6183434-libya-has-significant-stockpile-of-chemical-weapons?lite
- Payandehh, Mehrdad, "With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect within the Process of International Lawmaking" in *Yale Journal of International Law*, v.35 (2010).
- Power, Samantha, "Bystanders to Genocide" in *The Atlantic* (September 2011).
- Radelet, Stephen, "Bush and Foreign Aid" in *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2003).
- Reuters, "Anti-Gaddafi Figures say Form National Council", see: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/27/libya-council-revolution-idUSWEB194120110227>
- UNGA, "2005 Summit Outcome" in A/60/L.1 (20 September 2005), see: daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/511/30/PDF/N0551130.pdf?OpenElement.
- U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/bn/c27972.htm>
- U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/rw/facs/index.htm>
- U.S. Department of State, see: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/tz/facs/index.htm>
- Voice of America, "U.S. Legislators Seek Action on Rwanda for Supporting of DR Congo Rebels", see: <http://www.voanews.com/content/rwanda-m23-congo-rebels/1563124.html>
- Washington Post, "At U.N., Qatar Emir Calls on Arab Nations to Intervene in Syria", see: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-25/world/35496045_1_syrian-opposition-syrian-people-syrian-forces-and-rebels.
- Wheeler, Nicholas J., "A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit." Paper presented at the conference on 'U.N. at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?' University of Toronto, Canada, 6-7 October 2005.
- Wheeler, Nicholas, "Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: the Continuing Debate over where Authority should be Located for the Use of Force" in *NUPI Report*, v.3 (2008).
- White House, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya", see: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.
- Williams, Paul D. & Alex J. Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur" in *Security Dialogue*, v.36 (2005): p.1.

AUTHOR

Mark Grzegorzewski, Ph.D., holds a Doctorate in Political Science (2014) at the University of South Florida-Tampa (USF), where he also works as an Instructor of Political Science. He also holds both an M.A. and B.A. in Political Science from USF-Tampa, in addition to a Graduate Certificate on Globalization, plus a professional internship with the Defense Intelligence Agency at the U.S. Central Command at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida.

JAMAICA vs. WORLD ECONOMIC RESPONSES TO TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL'S CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX

Omar E. Hawthorne, Ph.D. (University of West Indies-Mona, Kingston, Jamaica)

ABSTRACT: This essay examines the impact of Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and whether or not this index, and hence TI matters. Corruption is regarded as a key hindrance to development policies and TI's CPI is used as the authoritative tool to assess a country's corruption perception score. Taking into consideration the importance scholars and policy-makers, both give to corruption's effect on development and using Jamaica as a case study, one of the key findings of this research indicates that the CPI, the most cited corruption index, does not change the international policy-makers' economic behavior. As in, when the index is published yearly, there is no correlation in regards to it impacting credit-ratings, foreign direct investments, bond spreads, and or exchange-rates in Jamaica. Also, there is no evidence that the CPI affected the investment flows into Jamaica. The research did however; indicate that TI's CPI is reflective of the global market perceptions of Jamaica's economy.

The World Bank calls corruption "the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends."¹ The economics literature, as well as popular press has begun to focus on the central role of corruption in economic development and financial market performance. Corruption has been shown to be associated with less foreign direct investment,² lower levels of investment and growth³ lower stock values,⁴ and the overall decline in some productive sectors of local economies. Other studies have analyzed the consequences or causes of corruption in a cross-section of countries.⁵

One of the aims of businesses world-wide is to secure investments in other countries. However, adding corrupt rent-seeking bureaucrats may not be effective in securing the political conditions; investors would simply prefer a non-corrupt environment in which to invest. Thus, since the TI's CPI is the most noted corruption index, estimating the impact of the world's economic responses to TI's CPI is important, but there is yet to be a study to assess whether TI's CPI affects the market. Key questions to be analyzed are the following:

1. do investors and policy-makers react to TI's CPI when it is published yearly?

¹ World Bank, "Fraud and Corruption: What is the World Bank doing to Fight Corruption?" See: <http://go.worldbank.org/JF938Z5CU0>

² Shang-Jin Wei, "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?" in *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 82, no.1 (2000): p.1.

³ Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v.110 (1995): p.681.

⁴ Charles M.C. Lee & David T. Ng., "Corruption and International Valuation: Does Virtue Pay?" (Cornell University, Working Papers: November 2002).

⁵ See Mauro, 1995; also Alberto Ades & Rafael di Tella. "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: a Review of Recent Empirical Contributions" in *IDS Bulletin*, 27, n.2 (1996): p.6-11; and Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei. "Does 'Grease Money' Speed up the Wheels of Commerce?" in *NBER Working Paper*, n. 7093 (1999).

2. If so, what impact does the CPI have, if any, on the behaviour of international economic policy-makers?

In order to determine the world's economic responses to TI's CPI the following will be examined:

1. Does an increase in TI's CPI ranking correlate with less foreign direct investment to Jamaica?
2. Does the publication of TI's CPI impact the credit-rating of Jamaica on Standard & Poor's weekly credit report 1-to-2 weeks before, or after the release of the CPI?
3. Does an increase in TI's CPI ranking correlate with an increase in Jamaica's market bond spread?
4. Does the publication of TI's CPI affect the exchange-rate of the Jamaican Dollar?

In many instances, corruption negatively affects businesses in a number of ways. Assessing from the investment perspective, corruption converts into high transaction costs for the business.⁶ This ultimately reduces investors' competitiveness within the host country. The extra payment that corruption adds to business transactions creates an unfriendly atmosphere for investors to operate in. This has the potential to affect performance, and as Richard Jerram note, "performance has diverged sharply over the past few years, in line with the divergence of corruption perceptions."⁷ Furthermore, "academic research generally fails to show a link between economic growth and equity market performance; hence the corruption perception index might offer the missing ingredient."⁸ Adding that, "The general literature shows corporate governance is worse under corrupt governments and firms from more corrupt countries trade at lower market multiples (such as price-to-earnings or price-to-book)."⁹

This is because higher corruption results in lower expected cash flows. This adds to Paolo Mauro's work, which demonstrated through empirical evidence that high levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of investment and GDP. Thus, the negative impact of corruption may be interpreted as a sort of tax, which correspondingly reduces incentives to invest.¹⁰

As there are no other systematic studies in this field, the current research presents inevitably some fundamental statistical issues: the number of observations is relatively few and this increases the chance of type II errors because of the limited number of observations. TI only started publishing the CPI in 1995; Jamaica first appeared on the index in 1998 and for the years 2000 and 2001 there was no ranking. In addition to the increased likelihood of type II errors, it also makes it difficult to potentially control for competing factors. With this said, correlation analysis instead of regression analysis is used. With regression analysis and fewer observations there is a greater risk of using variables, which would be measuring the same factors. Correlation is preferable to regression analysis because correlation analysis makes no *a priori* assumption as to whether one variable is dependent on the other and it is not concerned with the relationship between the variables. It gives an estimate as to the degree of association between the variables. On the other hand, regression analysis attempts to describe the dependence of a variable on one or more explanatory variables. The assumption is that there is a one way casual effect from the explanatory variable(s) to the response variable, regardless of whether the path of effect is direct or indirect. However, the fewer the observations, the more likely this might lead to some deficiencies of the data.

⁶ John Hongxin Zhao, Seung H. Kim & Jainjun Du, "The Impact of Corruption and Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment: an Empirical Analysis" in *Management International Review*, v.43, n.1, (2003): p.2.

⁷ For more see: Richard Jerram, Chief Economist, Bank of Singapore, "Economics Research Honesty, Growth and Markets," Bank of Singapore (13 February 2012). The Bank of Singapore was voted Outstanding Private Bank—Asia Pacific 2011 by Private Banker International. Additionally, a subsidiary of OCBC Bank voted World's Strongest Bank 2011-2012 by Bloomberg Markets.

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Paolo Mauro, "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure" in *IMF Working Paper* (September 1996): p.17.

Foreign Direct Investments

The determinants and motivations of foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows into a country often vary. But quite often it is related to growth and development of an economy, the ability to make a profit on an investment and other factors associated with potential new markets. Thus a competitive advantage within the global marketplace is important. Corruption increases the cost of doing business. Therefore, since TI’s CPI is the most widely used corruption ranking index, this study ascertains the relationship between TI’s CPI and FDI in Jamaica to assess if there is any correlation with TI’s CPI.

According to the World Development Indicators’ (WDI) estimates, the net inflows of FDI into Jamaica over the period 1995-2011 have been close to USD 9 billion dollars (8,949,081,680).¹¹ Nonetheless, in a globally competitive environment there are a number of factors, which might prove advantageous to one country’s economy compared to another. Since corruption increases the cost of business—the study’s expectations are that when Jamaica’s CPI increases it becomes less attractive to foreign investors and thus there should be a lagged effect in terms of FDI the following year. As Habib and Zurawicki elaborate, “understanding the role of corruption on FDI is important since corruption produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty and raises costs.”¹² FDI inflows can contribute to economic development. It can also boost domestic investment, and add to investible resources and capital formation. Another factor of why FDI is important for developing countries is that it also leads to transferring production technology, innovative capacity, and organizational and managerial practices between locations.

H₀: A change in TI’s CPI of Jamaica correlates with changes in Foreign Direct Investment in the following year.

Probably the best measure to determine if the CPI has any impact would be to examine the effects in the year after the CPI is published, than the current year in affecting investors’ decisions. However Table 1.1 shows that the Pearson’s *r* of -.041 is not statistically significant, (*p* = .904). One of the issues affected by these findings is the very small number of actual observations *n* = 12.

Table 1.1. Correlations between CPI and FDI, Net Inflows (% of GDP)

Correlations			
		CPI Score	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
CPI Score	Pearson Correlation	1	-.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.904
	N	12	11
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	Pearson Correlation	-.041	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.904	

Additionally, the statistical tests in this small number of observations have large standard errors as shown in Table 1.2 below. The limited number of observations can possibly lead to a type II error, as in finding no effects when in fact there might be some. Another issue with this test is that due to the

¹¹ Calculated from World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance

¹² Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment” in *Journal of International Business Studies*, 33, n.2 (2002): p.295.


relatively small number of observations there is the increased possibility that it might misrepresent the relationship. In that, a higher score on TI’s CPI implies less corruption, and a negative correlation would indicate less corruption, reducing FDI inflows.

Table 1.2. CPI and FDI Standard Error

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
CPI Score	12	3.5000	.09293	.32193	.104
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Balance of Payments U.S.\$)	16	559317604.9822	82002268.73787	328009074.95147	107589953250521968.000
Valid N (list-wise)	12				

Additionally, Figure 1.1 below demonstrates that there is no significant correlation between CPI score and FDI. Hence, there is a possibility that Jamaica has the capacity to attract FDI, whether or not it has a favorable CPI score. The higher the CPI score indicates a lower perception of corruption in the country. On TI’s CPI 1 to 10 with 10 indicating less corruption perceptions and 1 signifying high levels of corruption perceptions. Jamaica’s FDI changed over the years but the net inflow of FDI is not significantly correlated with the country’s CPI score, thus indicating that potentially other factors drive investors to continue investments in Jamaica. Noting especially that in spite of declining CPI scores, particularly over the period 2004 to 2009 (with improvements in 2006), the FDI net flow % of GDP saw increases during the period, despite a drastic fall in 2009 and 2010.

Figure 1.1. Jamaica’s CPI Score and FDI, Net Inflows (% of GDP 1995-2011)



In 2007 Jamaica's CPI was 3.3 and ranked 84th in the world. But the FDI as a % of GDP to Jamaica by 2008 was 10.08%, the highest over the period of focus for this study. There are a number of possible analyses that can be used to explain this significant change in FDI to Jamaica. The changes in the global economic market, competitiveness of the country to other economies, and or the change in political leadership in the September 2007 general election might provide some context to such change. A change in political leadership quite often has the possibility to influence confidence in a domestic market. The September 2007 election was important, in that, "the island's political landscape changed dramatically when Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding's Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) won national elections after 18 years in opposition."¹³

The perceptions of change in domestic politics might have been a casual factor in impacting investors' decisions. The previous government, the PNP, in addition to being in power for 18.5 years, was rocked by numerous corruption scandals. There were general sentiments that change was needed and the Bruce Golding led JLP campaigned strongly on corruption reform, attracting foreign investment and cutting the bureaucratic processes and making the country more attractive to foreign investors. Hence the perceived impending improvement in business conditions from the newly elected government could have boosted investment and helped to put Jamaica on a stronger growth path. As the USAID notes in its study, "Jamaica Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014":

The new government has appointed energetic reformers to key positions and placed critical champions of national integrity in important agencies. With the help of foreign experts and public opinion increasingly intolerant of high-level corruption, these reformers are beginning to use their legislative and statutory authority to act as change agents in a country long accustomed to 'business as usual'.¹⁴

The changes in CPI scores do not correlate with the level of FDI into Jamaica. This suggests that the CPI might not be impacting an investor's decision to invest in Jamaica. But due to the limited observations, which lead to statistical issues, the no correlation between CPI score and FDI net inflows, the standard errors makes it unlikely to find significant effects.

Credit-Rating by Standard & Poor's:

"In today's financial market-place, information moves fast. Those who fail to do their homework may not realize their full investment potential."¹⁵ Credit risk-analysis provides a valuable business tool. It informs investors and the markets alike. As the international credit-rating company Standard & Poor's¹⁶ boasts, "Behind every sound investment lies careful analysis."¹⁷

Ideally the best credit-rating a country could score is an 'AAA' rating, which indicates the obligator's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation as extremely strong. Instead,

¹³ USAID, "Jamaica Country Assistance Strategy 2010-2014," (2009), p.1.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Standard & Poor's "Rating Research" Standard & Poor's *CreditWeek* Issue.

¹⁶ A Standard & Poor's credit rating is a current opinion of the creditworthiness of an obligator with respect to a specific financial obligation, a specific class of financial obligations, or a specific financial program (including ratings on medium term note programs and commercial papers programs). For more reading see any Standard & Poor's *CreditWeek* Issue, "Issue Credit Rating Definitions."

¹⁷ For more see Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, Issue credit ratings are based, in varying degrees, on conditions such as: 1. Likelihood of payment—capacity and willingness of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on an obligation in accordance with the terms of its obligations; 2. Nature of and provisions of the obligation; 3. Protection afforded by, and relative position of, the obligation in the event of bankruptcy, reorganization or other arrangement under the laws of bankruptcy and other laws affecting creditors' rights.

obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC' and 'C' are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the highest.¹⁸

Additionally, for short-term issues a credit-rating of 'A-1' indicates the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation; a rating of 'B' is regarded as having speculative characteristics; a 'C' rating is considered vulnerable to non-payment and is dependent upon favorable business, financial and economic conditions; and a 'D' rating indicates that short-term obligations rated 'D' are in payment default.¹⁹ As it relates to outlook assessments, positive denotes that a rating may be raised; negative signifies that a rating may be lowered; stable symbolizes that a rating is not likely to change; developing indicates a rating may be raised or lowered and N.M. represents a rating that is not meaningful.²⁰

For the first time on 9 November 1999, Standard & Poor assigned long-term local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings to Jamaica. Standard & Poor also assigned a foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to the country. According to Standard & Poor:

The higher local currency rating is based on the sovereign's powers of taxation and control over its financial system, in addition to Jamaica's progress in reducing inflation and its track record of managing the maturity structure of domestic debt. Inflation likely will average 6% in 1999, while the five-year average maturity of the general government's local currency debt compares quite favorably with the debt structure of similarly rated sovereigns.²¹

For the first year, on the S&P Jamaica's credit-ratings were the following: "local currency B+/Stable, foreign currency: B/Stable." Amongst the factors given for this rating were: "a very high public sector debt, 'high fiscal imbalances', 'a challenging monetary stance' and 'modest economic growth prospects'."²²

Jamaica aims to encourage foreign investors as a means for economic development and growth. Hence with Standard & Poor's being the global leader in credit-risk analysis assessing whether there is a correlation between Jamaica's CPI and Standard & Poor's index is important. It would address the question of: what effects, if any, does TI's CPI have on risk-rating agencies? Do they pay attention to TI's CPI? And if so, when TI publishes its CPI is there any change in the weekly credit-rating?

H_0 : There is no relationship between TI's CPI and Standard & Poor's Credit-Rating.

H_a : There is a strong positive relationship between TI's CPI and Standard & Poor Credit-Rating.

The aim of this measure is to assess whether there is any impact of TI's CPI on the Standard & Poor's index that could impact and, or affect the credit rating of Jamaica. Here the movements in the Standard & Poor's index, before and after the CPI is published, will be examined. The premise for this observation is simply that, the CPI is published at different times each year, so if publication of the CPI were to have any major impact on Jamaica's credit rating there would be a shift after the index has been published. Thus, the Standard & Poor's will be examined one to two weeks prior to TI's CPI publication and 1-to-2 weeks after. Therefore, if TI's CPI were to impact the Standard & Poor's, a change in the credit rating 1-to-2 weeks after the publication of the CPI is expected.

¹⁸ For a more detailed analysis on the ratings definitions please see any issue of Standard & Poor's *CreditWeek*, particularly the sections on "Issue Credit Ratings Definitions" and "Issuer Credit Rating Definitions."

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Standard & Poor's, *CreditWeek* (17 November 1999): p.84.

²² Quote: Standard & Poor's, *CreditWeek* (17 November 1999): p. 84-85.

Table 1.3. Jamaica’s CPI Rank and Standard & Poor’s Credit-Rating 2 Weeks Before and After CPI Release Dates

Year	Date of Release	CPI Rank	2 Weeks Prior		1 Week Prior		Week Of Release		1 Week After		2 Weeks After	
			Local c	Foreign C	Local C	Foreign C	Local C	Foreign C	Local C	Foreign C	Local C	Foreign C
			L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR	L-TR/O/S-TR
2000	09/13/00		B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable	B+/Stable
2001	06/26/01		BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B
2002	08/28/02	45	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	BB-/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B
2003	10/07/03	57	B+/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B+/Stable/B	B/Stable/B
2004	10/19/04	74	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B	B/Negative/B
2005	10/17/05	64	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B
2006	11/06/06	61	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B
2007	09/11/07	84	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B
2008	09/28/08	96	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B	B/Stable/B
2009	11/17/09	99	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C	CCC+/Negative/C
2010	10/26/10	87	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C	B-/Stable/C
2011	11/24/11	86	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C	B-/Negative/C

* Local C=Local Currency; Foreign C=Foreign Currency;

* L-TR/O/S-TR=Long-Term Rate/Outlook/Short-Term Rate

* Jamaica first appeared in Standard & Poor’s rating 1999. But for its ratings to coincide with TI’s release date this did not start until 2000.

Table 1.3 above, demonstrates that when TI’s CPI is published it has no impact on the Standard & Poor’s rating. The credit-rating of Jamaica is the same 1-to-2 weeks prior to the CPI’s publication and it holds the same value 1-to-2 weeks after the publication. Hence the hypothesis has to be accepted that there is no relationship between TI’s CPI and Standard & Poor’s credit-rating. As stated before, if TI’s CPI had an impact on the Standard & Poor, a change would occur either in the immediate or subsequent week after the publication of the CPI. This finding is significant as the CPI is not published on the same date yearly, hence the variation in the publication dates would be of greater importance in effecting change as it pertains to credit-rating.


Since there is no impact on the Standard & Poor by TI’s CPI it can be argued that TI’s CPI might simply be reflective, and not causative, of factors in this aspect of the global market concerning Jamaica. When comparing the trends in TI’s CPI and the credit rating during the period of publication it shows that from 2002-2004 when Jamaica declined on TI’s CPI there was also a decline in the same years on the Standard & Poor. However, from 2005-2008 the Standard & Poor’s rating remained constant, while Jamaica’s CPI varied between the 64, 61, 84 and 96 positions. Nonetheless, in 2009 when Jamaica received its worse rating on the Standard & Poor (CCC+/Negative/C) it coincided with the worse ranking on TI’s CPI (99). Additionally, in 2010 when Jamaica’s CPI improved to the 87 position its Standard & Poor improved to B-/Stable/C.

Table 1.4. TI's CPI and Standard & Poor Global Equity Indices (Annual % Change)

		Correlations	
		S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change)	CPI Score
S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change)	Pearson Correlation	1	.022
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.946
	N	15	12
CPI Score	Pearson Correlation	.022	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.946	
	N	12	12

The Standard & Poor's rating just before and just after TI's CPI is released, shows no change in the credit rating of Jamaica. To extrapolate and assess further, the use of Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices (annual % change)²³ was used to see if on a yearly basis, whether TI's CPI have any correlation with the change in credit-ratings. Largely, using Table 5.4 above, the Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices variable indicate that the correlation is not statistically significant $p = .964$; the small number of observations $n = 12$ indicates the statistical tests will have very large standard errors, making it unlikely to find significant effects.

Figure 1.2. Trends between TI's CPI Score and Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices



²³ Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices measure the U.S. Dollar price change in the Stock Markets covered by the Standard & Poor/IFCI and Standard & Poor/Frontier BMI country indices.

Subsequently, Figure 1.2 above illustrates the trends in CPI score and Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices annual % change. Bearing in mind that the lower the CPI score the more corrupt Jamaica is perceived to be, the highest CPI the country has ever scored is 4, below the median on a scale of 1-to-10. The outlier in the chart is seen in the years 2003 to 2005 noting a drastic difference when the CPI scores and Standard & Poor's equity indices is observed.

The conclusion which can be drawn from the relationship between TI's CPI and the Standard & Poor's seems to indicate that the CPI does not have any impact on the publication of the CPI and the Standard & Poor's credit-rating of Jamaica one to two weeks prior or after the CPI is released. Furthermore, when the Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices and TI's CPI are assessed there is no significant correlation. In this instance it cannot be inferred that TI's CPI might have an impact on the Standard & Poor's Global Equity Indices.

TI's CPI and Bond Spreads

Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of interest for a period of more than one year. They include net flows through cross-border public and publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed bond issues in U.S. Dollars.²⁴ Thus, a bond is an 'I owe you' in which an investor agrees to loan money to a company or government in exchange for a pre-determined interest rate. "A bond spread is a direct measure of the cost of risk."²⁵ Also explained as the difference between yield to maturity on a zero-coupon corporate bond (corporate spot rate) and the yield to maturity on a zero-coupon government bond of the same maturity (government spot rate).²⁶ The spread of bonds, especially in some Developing Countries, above those issued in developed countries reflects the higher default probability associated with many developing and or emerging market debt. For a developed economy other factors might be more important for investment. However, for developing countries like Jamaica, corruption perceptions might have a significant impact on the perceptions of an investment. Thus, assessing the relationship between corruption perceptions and the perceived likelihood that a firm or government will default on its debt is relevant. Does TI's CPI correlates with bond spreads for countries such as Jamaica who are perceived to be highly corrupt? Citing Ciocchini's argument that countries that are perceived as more corrupt must pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds is relevant. Adding further, the global bond market ascribes a significant cost to corruption.²⁷

It is especially important in understanding how corruption affects bond spreads for these reasons:

1. "It contributes to one's understanding of what determines default probability in developing and emerging markets, a vital question in development finance."²⁸ Most research on this question has generally focused on which macro-economic factors contribute to the likelihood of sovereign default; with the crucial question being whether default risk arises from currency liquidity problems or insolvency. Thus, how important of a factor to default risk is corruption measured through TI's CPI ranking in addition to those identified macro-economic factors?
2. "Looking at corruption and spreads improves one's understanding of how corruption matters for economic growth."²⁹ Does higher corruption increase borrowing costs on the international market for both the government and businesses in Jamaica? Is there any channel through which corruption lowers investment in Jamaica's market? And how does it help understand the costs of corruption?

²⁴ World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance.

²⁵ Fank K. Reilly et al, "An Analysis of Credit Risk Spreads for High Yield Bonds" in *Springer Science + Business Media*, LLC (2010): p.179.

²⁶ Edwin J. Elton, et al "Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds" in *Journal of Finance*, V. LVI, no. 1, (2001): p.251.

²⁷ Fancisco Ciocchini, Erik Durbin & David T.C. Ng, "Does Corruption Increase Emerging Market Bond Spreads?" in *Journal of Economics & Business*, v.55 (2003): p.504.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

Corruption can take many forms. TI has been defined broadly as the misuse of public office for private gain.³⁰ Undoubtedly there are various ways that higher levels of corruption might lead to a higher likelihood of default. In the case of government debt, the impact of corruption is quite direct, in that, corrupt officials may confiscate loaned funds or other sources of government income and thereby limit the government's ability to meet debt obligations. Notwithstanding from direct theft, several researchers have shown that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower tax revenue, which would in turn lower the government's ability to repay loans.³¹

Public corruption can harm the economy in a variety of ways. Using Gunnar Myrdal and Paolo Mauro's analyses it can be assessed from the view that bureaucrats may over-regulate to increase the opportunities to collect bribes, thereby reducing the incentive to invest and diminishing overall economic performance.³²

Subsequently, debt would be more costly for corrupt governments as the cost of government project(s) may be inflated if public corruption takes the form of kickbacks to the bureaucrat who awards the contract(s). Thus, the more corrupt the government, the riskier is the debt it issues and the higher the premium the government must pay to borrow. As government debt is ultimately serviced through taxation, higher net interest costs impose an extra burden on a government's constituents, i.e., a negative pecuniary externality is created by public corruption.

For corporations, corruption may increase the likelihood of arbitrary government actions that reduce profits and leave the firm unable to repay loans. In the late-1990s when Jamaica was in a financial crisis, the government intervened by establishing FINSAC. In many instances private firms were taken over by the state and many resold when the owners could not repay their loans. Higher levels of corruption are also suggested as a correlating factor, which may lower the effectiveness of government services, making it even more difficult for firms to realize profits. In other cases corruption may reduce legal protection of bond-holders.

H_0 : There is no correlation between TI's CPI and Jamaica bond spreads.

H_a : There is a strong positive correlation between TI's CPI and Jamaica's bond spreads.

The model will assess the correlation between TI's CPI and bonds. For bonds, the variable 'portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current U.S. Dollars)' will be used. Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of interest for a period of more than one year. They include net flows through cross-border public and publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed bond issues. This variable was selected over PPG bonds³³, as it is more inclusive and it addresses both PPG and PNG type of bonds. Holding TI's CPI constant, this study expects that when the CPI indicated increased corruption perceptions the 'portfolio investment, bonds' would increase likewise.

³⁰ See: Transparency International; Susan Rose-Ackerman, "The Political Economy of Corruption," Chapter in *Corruption and Global Economy*, p.31-60 in *Institute for International Economics*; Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishney, "Corruption" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v.108, n.434 (August 1993): p.599-617.

³¹ Nadeem UI Haque & RatnaSahay, "Do Government Wages Cuts Close Budget Deficits? The Cost of Corruption" in *IMF Staff Papers*, Vol. 43, no 4. (January 1996): p.754-778; Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," Presented at the 110th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 3-5 January 1998; Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth" in *IMF Working Paper WP/97/139* (1997).

³² Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: an Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968); Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110 (1995): p.681-712.

³³ Public- and publicly-guaranteed debts from bonds that are either publicly issued, or privately placed. Interest payments are actual amounts of interest paid by the borrower in foreign currency, goods, or services in the year specified. Data are in current U.S. Dollars. World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance.

Table 1.5. R Square of CPI and Portfolio Investments, Bonds

R ² of CPI and Portfolio Investments, Bonds				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.597 ^a	.356	.195	522076016.137
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year, CPI Score				

With the CPI score and year held constant, as shown in Table 1.5 above, the adjusted *R* square of .195 indicates that TI’s CPI accounts for 20% of Portfolio investments in Jamaica. Using Pearson’s correlation, Table 1.6., shows the CPI score and ‘portfolio investment bonds’ of -.494, and *p* is .122 indicating that it is not statistically significant. However, with the very few observations, *n* = 11, indicates a deficit in the data, hence one cannot claim with certainty that the reported Pearson’s *r* is statistically different than zero. Hence, there is no correlation between the CPI score and portfolio investment, insofar as the very small sample on which the correlation coefficient is calculated.

Table 1.6. CPI Score and Portfolio Investment, Bonds


Correlations				
		Year	CPI Score	Portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US\$)
Year	Pearson Correlation	1	-.775**	.635**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.003	.008
	N	17	12	16
CPI Score	Pearson Correlation	-.775**	1	-.494
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003		.122
	N	12	12	11
Portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US\$)	Pearson Correlation	.635**	-.494	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	.122	
	N	16	11	16

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Due to this problem with the limited observation there is a probability that it might have affected the findings; noting that with a smaller number of observation the standard errors will be large and thus what is presented might lead to a type II error (like finding no effect when there might be some).

Additionally, Figure 1.3 below indicates a pattern with the portfolio investment, bonds and TI’s CPI over the years. The trend seems to indicate that changes in Jamaica’s rank on TI’s CPI reflect changes in bond spreads. Nonetheless, the change outlier in the model is between 2007 and 2008 and subsequently, 2009 changes. The 2007 to 2008 change, could possibly be explained within the context of political changes at the domestic level. Additionally it can also be situated within international events, which transpired in the financial markets. Moreover, there is no one factor that caused and or influence change in the price of bonds spreads.

Figure 1.3. CPI Rank and Portfolio Investments Bonds



TI's CPI and the Exchange-Rate

There are a number of factors that influence the exchange rate of a country. Jamaica operates on a flexible exchange rate and it is not pegged to the U.S. Dollar. Tornell and Velasco argue “flexible rates impose more fiscal discipline because fixed rates shift the costs of deficits into the future and thus induce reckless fiscal policy. Exchange rate instability deters international trade, and only central banks can offset this by stabilizing exchange-rates.”³⁴ Here an attempt is being made to assess the correlation between Jamaica’s CPI rank and the country’s exchange rate. Does TI’s CPI lead to panic amongst speculators about the country’s Dollar’s value level? Since there are several factors that could affect the exchange-rate of a country, assessing the correlation between Jamaica’s exchange-rate and TI’s ranking will provide further analysis to test whether there are correlations between the changes in TI’s ranking and the value of the Jamaican Dollar.

H₀: There is no correlation between Jamaica’s exchange rate and TI’s CPI Rank.

H_a: There is a strong positive correlation between Jamaica’s exchange rate and TI’s CPI rank.

One of the problems in assessing the correlation with Jamaica’s exchange rate and TI’s CPI rank is that it can reflect changes in other country’s corruption and policing efforts as much as it reflects Jamaica’s effort. In that, Jamaica might fall in ranking with no real change in corruption if other countries become better at reducing their corruption perceptions. Thus, the ranking does not represent the true picture of corruption perceptions changes in Jamaica overtime. For this purpose, this study uses changes in rank to assess the correlation between TI’s CPI and Jamaica’s exchange rate. Hence a ‘-3 position’ in the country’s

³⁴ Aaron Tornell & Andres Velasco, “Fixed versus flexible Exchange Rates: which Provides More Fiscal Discipline?” in *NBER Working Paper*, n.5108 (May 1995).

ranking would indicate an improvement, and a ‘+3 position’ would indicate it fell in ranking. Therefore, when the CPI is published yearly does it correlate with changes in the Jamaican Dollar exchange-rate? As in, when the country improves in the ranking is there a correlation with the Jamaican Dollar. The premise for the correlation is the level of inter-connectedness in the world’s markets and economy where the potential for a negative projection in one area might have an effect on other areas.

The findings presented in Table 1.7., above are intriguing. Bearing in mind that: 1) a ‘minus position’ on TI’s ranking is favorable and indicates improvement compared to the year before. 2) a minus in the value change in Jamaican Dollar indicates that it has strengthened compared to the previous year. Based on the data the only year where there is a corresponding improvement in the CPI ranking and value in the Jamaican Dollar is 2010. The CPI ranking improved from 99th ranking to 87th and the Jamaican Dollar strengthened by \$3.75. Additionally, in spite of other years in which the CPI rank improved (2002*, 2005, 2006 and 2011) compared to the previous year, 2010 is the only year in which the Jamaican Dollar made any gains in strengthening against the U.S. Dollar.

Subsequently, when using the -3 (improvement) and +3 (worsen) difference in CPI ranking and exchange-rate, in the years where the most improvement is made in the rank the corresponding changes in exchange-rate is not significantly different except in one case from 2009 to 2010. For the year 2002 to 2003 the CPI rank worsens by 4 aggregated positions and the Jamaican Dollar correspondingly worsened by \$10.98. Additionally, for 2003 to 2004 when the CPI rank fell by 5.67 aggregated positions, the Jamaican Dollar only fell by \$1.95. In 2004 to 2005 when the ranking improved by 3.33 aggregated positions, the Jamaican Dollar weakened by \$1.73. In the following year, 2006, when the CPI ranking improved an additional 1 aggregated position, the Jamaican Dollar weakened even further by \$3.01.

Table 1.7. Jamaica’s Exchange-rate and CPI Rank³⁵

Year	CPI Release Dates	CPI Rank	Rank Position 1 Year Later +/-	Forex Day of Release	Value Change in Forex 1 Year Later
1998	9/21/1998	49		36.69	
1999	10/25/1999	50	1	40.14	3.45
2002	8/28/2002	45	-5*	48.86	8.72
2003	10/7/2003	57	12	59.84	10.98
2004	10/19/2004	74	17	61.79	1.95
2005	10/17/2005	64	-10	63.52	1.73
2006	11/6/2006	61	-3	66.53	3.01
2007	9/11/2007	84	23	70.16	3.63
2008	9/29/2008	96	12	72.56	2.4
2009	11/17/2009	99	3	89.31	16.75
2010	10/26/2010	87	-12	85.56	-3.75
2011	11/24/2011	86	-1	86.71	1.15

On the other hand, when 2006 to 2007 is taken into account the CPI ranking worsens by 7.67 aggregated positions and the Jamaican Dollar only depreciated by \$3.63. Subsequently, for 2007 to 2008 when the CPI ranking worsens even further by an additional 4 aggregated positions the Jamaican Dollar

³⁵ The year 2002 has an * because it is reflecting the change between 1999 and 2002. There were no ranking on TI’s CPI for Jamaica for the years 2000 and 2001. Additionally, the Table commence at 1998 in spite of TI’s CPI start in 1995 because Jamaica only started receiving a ranking on the CPI in 1998.

depreciated by \$2.40. For 2008 to 2009, when the CPI ranking worsened by 1 aggregated position, also the Jamaican Dollar weakened by \$16.75 (the highest change in a year-period).

Overall the aggregated position in regards to changes in TI CPI rank does not correlate with changes in the value of the JMD for the corresponding period. In that, whether the CPI rank improves or worsen it generally does not correlate with the degree of change in the Jamaican Dollar. In fact the only year where an improvement in the country's ranking on the CPI and the Jamaican Dollar strengthening was 2010. In other years it did not matter whether the CPI rank improved or fell, the trend in the Jamaican Dollar value continued to weaken. Subsequently, while the value of the Jamaican Dollar depreciated every year minus 2010, the value change was significantly higher in some years compared to others.

Conclusions

Jamaica is one of the most highly indebted countries in the world, ranking 7th globally in public debt as percentage of GDP; 157th/210 in terms of national government revenues and expenditures, as a percentage of GDP; and 84th/203 for external debt. A country whose import bill in 2011 stood at \$6,356,000,000 and exports at \$1,650,000,000 ranked 115th/221 in terms of imports and 145th/222 for exports in the world. The GDP- real growth rate placed it at 171st/216 at 1.50% for 2011.³⁶ Jamaica has been burdened by heavy debt servicing costs, due to both the size of its debt and very high interest rates. Jamaica is a country with a history of chronic indebtedness, hence it can be safely estimated that due to the country's trajectory the market will and has already factored in the changes in the economy.

Based on FDI inflow, bond rating, Standard & Poor's Credit-Rating, and Exchange-rate correlation with TI's CPI there seems to be indications that there is no significant correlation. Additionally, one should be cautious of the statistical tests as the limited observations $n=12$ might enhance a type II error as indicated in the large standard errors. The deficiencies in the data are compounded by several factors; the CPI started in 1995, Jamaica's debut was 1998 and even then, there was no CPI for two years 2000 and 2001. Thus, the limited amount of data might have some effect on the statistical findings. In light of the deficits in the data, such as very few observations and the lack of any statistical significance findings, it does not mean there are no correlations. Instead, it could possibly be explained that the findings do not rise to the level of statistical significance.

While the analyses on world's economic responses do not rise to the level of statistical significance, perceptions are a powerful tool. The lack of data could also mean that while statistically there is no significant correlation, economic policy-makers could very well be paying attention to the CPI. Noting that corruption is often regarded as an added cost to business and the competitiveness of the global economy drives firms in ventures where it is more profitable. Thus, if a country is perceived to be highly corrupt when compared to another, which of the countries compared is more attractive to investors? It is likely that the investor will venture to where he will get more return on his investments.

³⁶ All figures were taken from the CIA's *World Factbook* estimates, see: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ades, Alberto & Rafael di Tella, "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: a Review of Recent Empirical Contributions" in *IDS Bulletin*, v.27, n.2 (1996).
- Bardhan, Pranab, "Corruption and Development: a Review of Issues" in *Journal of Economic Literature*, v.35, n.3 (September 1997): p.1320-1346.
- Baughn, Christopher, et alia, "Bribery in International Business Transactions" in *Journal of Business Ethics*, 92 (2010): p.15-32.
- C.I.A., *World Factbook* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2014): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html>
- Haque, Nadeem Ul & Ratna Sahay, "Do Government Wages Cuts Close Budget Deficits? The Cost of Corruption" in *IMF Staff Papers*, Vol. 43, no 4 (January 1996): p.754-778.
- Jerram, Richard, Chief Economist of Bank of Singapore, "Economics Research Honesty, Growth and Markets" (Bank of Singapore: 13 February 2012).
- Kaufmann, Daniel, "Corruption: the Facts" in *Foreign Policy*, n.107 (Summer 1997): p.114-131.
- Mauro, Paolo, "Corruption and Growth" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, v.110, n.3 (August 1995): p.681-712.
- Mauro, Paolo, "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure" in *IMF Working Paper* (September 1996).
- Mauro, Paolo, "Why Worry About Corruption?" in *Economic Issues*, 6 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997).
- Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: an Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968).
- Standard & Poor's, *Credit Week* (17 November 1999).
- Tanzi, Vito, "Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures" in *IMF Staff Papers*, n.45 (1998): p.559-594.
- Tanzi, Vito & Hamid Davoodi, "Corruption, Public Investment and Growth" in *IMF Working Paper*, WP/97/139 (1997).
- Tornell, Aaron and Andres Velasco, "Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides More Fiscal Discipline?," *NBER Working Paper*, n.5108 (May 1995).
- Wei, Shang-Jin, "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investment" in *NBER Working Paper*, n.6030 (1997) www.nber.org/papers/w6030
- World Bank, "Fraud & Corruption: what is the World Bank doing to Fight Corruption?" <http://go.worldbank.org/JF938Z5CU0>
- World Bank, *World Development Indicator* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011).
- Zhao, John Hongxin, Seung H. Kim & Jainjun Du, "The Impact of Corruption and Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment: an Empirical Analysis" in *Management International Review*, v.43, n.1 (2003): p.41-46.

AUTHOR

Omar E. Hawthorne, Ph.D. is a Lecturer at the Department of Government and Senior Research Fellow for the Centre of Leadership and Governance at the University of West Indies-Mona in Kingston, Jamaica. Dr. Hawthorne holds a Doctorate in International Studies at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia as a Fulbright Scholar. She also holds both a Master's Degree (M.Sc. in Government–International Relations) and a First Degree (History and International Relations Major, with First Class Honours) from the University of West Indies-Mona in Kingston, Jamaica. Dr. Hawthorne's primary research areas include: anti-corruption policies and reform, U.S. Foreign Policy and International Relations, Political and Economic Development, Global Governance, and Foreign Assistance. Dr. Hawthorne is currently working on the following: "The Jamaica Anti-Corruption Assessment Study", "Jamaica: Sun, Sand and Extra-Judicial Killings", "Contract Bidding: Let the Games Begin" and a number of other works.

ABSENTEE VOTING: A CROSS-STATE ANALYSIS

by Enrijeta Shino (University of Florida), FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2014

Abstract. Early voting is a complex process; it is important to maintain separate analysis of in-person early voting and absentee voting in the U.S. electoral cycles, due to the different theoretical implications, which arise from each analysis. This study limits its focus to the vote-by-mail practice, also known as absentee voting, so as to provide an aggregate level analysis of absentee voting using the Election Assistance Commission's (EAC) 2008 and 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, Census Bureau data, and U.S. Election Projects. The primary purpose of this study is to identify the importance of the institutional environment over the casting of absentee ballots in any given election year. The second objective is to discern that absentee voting (including both "excused" and "no-excuse" absentee), even when implemented alone, positively impacts the general turnout. As expected, states that have liberal absentee rules have also high proportion rates of absentee ballots counted, and this result is consistent for both 2008 and 2012 U.S. Presidential elections. While the proportion of absentee ballots counted in the 2008 Presidential election has increased general turnout, this effect is not yet visible in the 2012 Presidential elections.

Since the 1960s, concerns over the declining turnout of the American electorate, as well as the struggle to extend voting rights to minorities have led to many electoral reforms to further expand early voting (also referred to as convenience-voting). Especially in the last 10 years, the institution of voting has undergone major transformations in the evolutionary process of voting in United States. Electoral reforms generally and early voting specifically, have transformed Election Day confined to a single day in November into a historical relic, by stretching the only legal period for voting into almost a full month (Gronke, 2008). What does this imply for the success of electoral reforms in boosting overall U.S. electoral turnout?¹

Early voting is often used broadly by scholars and pundits to describe voter turnout before Election Day. There are two forms of early voting, namely in-person early voting and vote-by mail, also known as Absentee voting. This study focuses on voting-by-mail. It is important to maintain a separate analysis of in-person early voting and absentee voting, because different theoretical and practical implications arise from each analysis. Herron and Smith (2013) highlight the necessity to isolate the analysis of early in-person and absentee voting, because states have different regulations for each voting modes, thus: "absentee voters are able to request ballots in person, by phone and on-line, and then return them in person or by mail at their leisure. In this way absentee-voters can avoid the hassles of casting regular ballots during early voting or on Election Day" (p.31, 2012). In addition, Rosenfield (1994) identifies other distinctions between in-person early voting and absentee voting, such as who is eligible to vote early, whether or not an application to vote early is necessary, when does the voting take place, and with what available publicity on early voting opportunities.

¹ This question is revisited in the Analysis section of this study.

The 2000 U.S. general election signaled the turning point, easing legal requirements for absentee voting. State governments have tried to ease the voting process for voters, but not the same effort was made across all state governments. This paper addresses the existence of these discrepancies by developing a measurement system, how they affect absentee voting turnout, and the impact that absentee voting on general elections total voting tallies. The existing literature pays attention to individual level explanations of absentee voting focusing on the socio-economic status model, but less has been done to understand this issue in the aggregate.

This study provides an aggregate level analysis of the absentee voting majorly relying on data provided by Election Assistance Commission's (EAC) 2008 and 2012 Election Administration and Voting Surveys, Census Bureau, and U.S. Election Projects. Using data from the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections the main purpose of this study is to identify the importance that institutional environment has over the proportion of absentee ballots cast in a given election year. Stated differently, what contributes toward having a high or low number of absentee ballots cast? The second objective is to discern that absentee voting (including both excuse and no-excuse absentee), even when implemented alone, might slightly increase the general electoral turnout. To account for the institutional variations within the same group (i.e. excuse and no-excuse absentee) this study has developed a ranking system of the states based on their predisposition to facilitate the absentee voting for voters relying on the absentee voting rules that states have in place.

Historical-Institutional Evolution of Absentee Voting

Through a historical perspective, absentee voting cannot be considered as a contemporary phenomenon in the American electoral system: absentee voting was first implemented in the 1861-65 U.S. Civil War as a process to facilitate soldiers' voting in the field (Benton, 1915). Thus, at that time it was a right reserved only for soldiers fighting away from their homes who could not exercise their civil rights otherwise. During the U.S. Civil War most Union states (except Indiana, Illinois, Delaware, New Jersey, Oregon and Massachusetts) provided some form of absentee balloting for their soldiers. Also, most Confederacy states (excluding Texas, Arkansas and Mississippi), extended absentee voting to their C.S.A. military personnel (Benton, 1915). It is important to note that this institutional variation regarding absentee voting rules remains present today across the states.²

Later, the U.S. voting reform of the 1980s increased voting convenience by expanding the right to apply for absentee voting to the general electorate, rather than only to the military, augmented by special provisions for disabled, students and travelers (Gronke et al., 2007). By the 1990s no less than 20 states had implemented at least one form of convenience voting. The infamous Florida case during the 2000s Presidential election led to the implementation of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which stimulated the number of early voters (Gronke et al., 2007). The main requirement of HAVA (2002) was that by 2006 all American states had to establish their own state-wide voter registration system and guarantee full poll access to all disabled voters.³

Additionally, military ballots would be counted in a timely manner and alternative language would be available to minorities (with California reaching the height of posting multiple foreign language

² To identify these electoral differences this study has developed a ranking system based on the absentee voting rules implemented by each state during the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections.

³ This is the main reason why this analysis is focused on the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections to capture the institutional changes, which occurred up to 2006 and discern how they influenced general electoral turnout.

instructions per ballot). Table 1 shows the evolution of absentee voting over time. The number of states with no-excuse absentee voting has increased at the expense of states which have a traditional absentee voting system. In the 1980s only three states offered no-excuse absentee voting to their voters. In 2013 the number increased significantly to 27 states and the District of Columbia (Gronke et al., 2007; ncls.org, 2013).

Table 1. Evolution of Absentee Voting, 1980-2013

Types of Absentee Voting	1980s	1990s	2000-06	2013
Traditional Absentee Voting	47	45	27	21
No Excuse Absentee	3	7	10	27 + DC
No Excuse Absentee & Permanent Absentee Status	0	2	5	7
Voting by Mail	0	1	1	2

*1980-2006 data received from Gronke, Rosenbaum, & Miller (2007)

*2013 data received from National Conference of State Legislatures

Karp and Banducci (2001) argue that relaxed absentee voting laws provide a greater incentive for voters to cast an early ballot if going to the polls is inconvenient for them. Table 1 show that absentee voting laws have been liberalized significantly since the 1980s. Oliver (1996, p.498) argues that “in the 1992 Presidential elections, over 7% of American voters cast their ballots without going to the polls, more than twice the level in 1972”. In addition, Field and Dicamillo (1995) show that in 1978 only 4.4% of California’s voters voted absentee, but this percentage increased significantly by 1994 with 22% of voters. In 2004 the percentage climbed over 32% (Alvarez et al., 2008). These data clearly show that the liberalization of absentee voting laws has increased the number of early voters. But what does this mean in terms of total turnout tallies?

U.S. Electoral Reform and Voter Profile: Who Votes Early?

Total U.S. electoral turnout rates have been in a continuous decline since 1960s (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982) and policy-makers tried to find ways to overcome this concerning issue for democratic values. The primary objective of the electoral reform was to increase the pool of voters and boost the turnout rates. According to Berinsky (2005, p.472), “reforms are designed to lower or erase the barriers to voting, making it easier for all citizens to vote, regardless of their personal circumstances”. However, the question that arises in this case is whether electoral reforms have fulfilled their objective or not. Taking into consideration the absentee institutional setting disparity across states, Gronke and Toffey (2008) argue that absentee law liberalization has not really expanded the national pool of voters sociologically, because “the heavenly choir [still] sings with a strong upper-class accent” (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35). The likely early voters still have the same “face and personality” as Election-Day voters; meaning that such voters tend to be more concentrated among the better educated, wealthier, older and more politically-oriented ones (Verba et al., 1995; Highton, 1997; Oliver, 1996; Patterson & Caldeira, 1985; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Gronke & Toffey, 2008; Neeley & Richardson, 2001).

Also according to Alvarez et al. (p.256, 2012), “the probability of early voting is greater among liberal, well-educated, older, male and strong partisan voters.” The reason why older, more-educated and partisan voters are willing to use a new way of voting in order to fulfill their civic duty is because

they are the likely voters and voting is an important activity for them (Alvarez et. al, 2012; Blais, 2000; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997, p.668) argue that in Texas during the Presidential elections of 1992 early voting “turn out voters who would not have voted on Election Day”. In other words, relaxed absentee voting laws would not enlarge the pool of voters by appeasing infrequent voters, but will make voting easier for likely voters.

Moreover, Brody (1978) highlights the fact that individuals in the highest income quintile are more likely to perceive ideological differences between the major party Presidential candidates, while individuals in the lowest quintile are least likely to see these differences. Aligning with Brody’s (1978) logic, Berinsky (2005) is skeptical about the success of the electoral reform arguing that it, instead, has “perverse outcomes”. Indeed, U.S. electoral reforms have increased the general turnout, with more people voting absentee, but at the same time it has reinforced the composition inequality of the voters (Berinsky, 2005). In other words, all these electoral reform did not change the composition of the electorate as it was hoped for; instead it continues to bring the “cream of the crop” to the polls in a more convenient individualized way (Southwell & Burchett, 2000).

Several studies show that conservative voters are more likely to vote in-person on Election Day and voters self-identified as liberals are more likely to vote absentee (Alvarez et al., 2012; Barreto et al., 2006). However, Oliver (1996, p. 511) disagrees arguing that, “the absentee electorate has become more up-scale and Republican than the general electorate”. Furthermore, Karp and Banducci (2001) argue that absentee voters are not only more educated and active in politics, but also have a low level of political uncertainty. Partisans are more likely to vote early because they already know who they will vote for and the last minute information that they may receive from the media will not change their opinion (Karp & Banducci, 2001; Gronke, 2008). Early voters are “more politically aware, more partisan, and more ideologically extreme” (Gronke et al., 2008). Partisanship translates into political activism and that is one of the major forces that makes voters vote absentee (Karp & Banducci, 2001).

In addition, Patterson and Caldeira (1985, p.784), emphasize that also “partisan candidates are more likely to harvest absentee votes in the very localities where their party is otherwise strong”. In other words, voters’ political partisanship and party mobilization should not be disregarded when analyzing the influence of absentee voting. Stein (1998) argues that early voters have a higher interest in politics, identify themselves with a political party and have a strong ideology compared to Election Day general voters. However, Stein (1998) did not find any partisan advantage among early voters. Both Republican and Democrat voters are equally likely to vote early (Stein, 1998). In other words, partisanship is stronger than ideology when it comes to a voter’s decision to vote early (despite Republican fears of the opposite, since President Barack Obama’s success in galvanizing Democratic voters turnout in 2008 and 2012, and appealing to them to also vote early to maximize their impact).

Do absentee voters have distinctive characteristics different than Election Day voters? This is an important question for all political campaigners who are eager to distinguish between early voters and Election Day voters: there are no major differences between the two groups, except that their own absentee voters are older and better educated (Barreto et al., 2006; Karp & Banducci, 2001; Dubin & Kalsow, 1996). The striking result derived from the Barreto et al. (2006) study is that even in California (where absentee laws are extremely liberal) voters’ socio-economic characteristics do not exert any determining impacts on voters’ choice of voting mode. This conclusion contradicts the basics of the socio-economic model characteristics of likely voters that Verba et al. (1995) and other

scholars have developed to identify likely voters. Absentee voters' biggest motivation to cast an early ballot is solely due to the "ease and convenience that it provides" (Barreto et al., 2006, p.229).

Dubin and Kalsow (1996) emphasize that the liberalization of absentee regulations that took place in California since 1977 had a great impact significantly increasing the number of voters casting absentee ballots, when liberal absentee laws are enacted. However, Oliver (1996) asserts that voters' political mobilization is more important than a state's legal context when it comes to deciding whether to cast an absentee ballot or not. Liberal absentee laws have an impact on the turnout only when accompanied by parties' mobilization efforts and voters' self-motivation to participate in states' politics under President Obama in 2012 (Oliver, 1996).

On the other hand, Neeley and Richardson (2001, p.381) find little support for the mobilization thesis in their study and they argue that early voting "merely conveniences those who would have voted anyway". Burden et al. (2014, p. 95) argues instead that early voting has reduced turnout because it has reduced the "civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization" (except recently in 2008 and 2012 under the influence of President Obama's campaigning among grass-root Democrats, and Republican counter-campaigning in 2012). This debate is at the cornerstone of this study: liberal absentee voting laws accommodate voters' availability to cast absentee ballot. However, on the aggregate level party mobilization may not be as effective mobilizing early voters compared to Election Day voters because the former have already decided which party they will support and who they will vote for.

Data and Methods

This study recognizes that there is a relationship between the states' institutional regulations and absentee voting: both excuse and no-excuse absentee voting states are included in the analysis. Recent literature on convenience voting focuses more on the impact that no-excuse absentee voting has on general turnout (Burden et al., 2014), excluding from the analysis excuse absentee states. Arbitrarily excluding excuse absentee voters from the equation may lead to skewed results and only a partial explanation of this process.

The main purpose of this study is to identify how the variation in absentee voting regulations has affected the number of absentee ballots cast in the Presidential elections of 2008 and 2012. Data used in this study is collected from different sources, such as the Election Assistance Commission, Census Bureau, Federal Election Commission and U.S. Elections Project. The dependent variable in the first model is calculated as the proportion of the absentee ballots counted, given the total number of ballots counted in a given election.⁴ The data for the number of absentee ballots counted in a state at a given year is collected from the Election Assistance Commission 2008 and 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey, and the data for the general turnout in the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012 are retrieved from the U.S. Elections Project.

To control for the variation of absentee voting regulations across states, across time, and within the same group (i.e. no-excuse vs. excuse absentee states) this study has developed an index for the existent absentee voting laws across states.⁵ The information used to construct the index is collected

⁴ EAC does not report the UOCAVA absentee votes counted for 2012 Presidential elections and the regression for 2012 is calculated as the proportion of civilian absentee votes counted given the total turnout.

⁵ Unlike other states, Oregon and Washington use an all-mail voting system. Since voters in Oregon and Washington have no other choice but to cast an all-mail vote, both states are excluded from the analysis.

from the Long-Distance Voter.⁶ Long-Distance Voter provides information and assistance for voters on how to get absentee ballots and if they are eligible to cast an absentee ballot in their state. The first step toward developing the index is to identify and weight the absentee voting rules that exist in the United States. Referring to Table 2 below, there are 22 different absentee voting rules across states for 2008 and 2012. In addition, each rule is given a weight of one.

Table 2. Weighted Absentee Voting Rules

Absentee Voting Rules	Weight
Work at the poll	1
Work/ shifts- 10 hours or more	1
Religious justification	1
First time voter ID request	1
War veteran/ ill	1
Law enforcing officer	1
Member of the Board of Elections	1
Being part of state's confidentiality program	1
Political representative/ candidate	1
Residing outside state/ county but eligible to vote	1
Moved out the county within 30 days/ prior election	1
Death in family 3 days before the elections	1
Polling place inaccessible	1
Ill/ physical disability	1
Living outside county/ student, spouse, military	1
Incarcerated/ felon	1
Incarcerated/ not a felon	1
65 years or older	1
Student or spouse living away your county	1
Absent from your county on ED	1
Voting is inconvenient on ED	1
Permanent absentee status	1
Total	22

States with the most restrictive absentee voting rules have a value of 1, while states with the most liberal absentee voting rules have a value of 22. Furthermore, Table 3 (next page) shows the number of states that already had implemented these rules in 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections.

The main conclusion derived from the information displayed in Table 3 is that there has been a tendency across states to ease the absentee voting rules and make voting more convenient for the eligible voters. From the 2008 to 2012 Presidential elections, nine states extended the right to vote absentee to felons, six states made it easier to cast an absentee ballot for voters that have to work for ten or more hours during the Election Day, and six states accommodated the religious needs of their

⁶ This web-site is accessible at: http://www.longdistancevoter.org/absentee_voting_rules#.U1RIAvIdWSo

voters and extended them the right to vote absentee if they cannot cast ballots on the Election Day, due to religious observation.

Furthermore, Table 4 (next page) shows the ranking of states that required an excuse from their voters to in order to extend them the right to vote absentee in an election.

Table 3. Number of States that have Implemented Each Absentee Voting Rule

Absentee Voting Rules	Number of States 2008	Number of States 2012
Work at the poll	37	38
Work/ shifts- 10 hours or more *	34	40
Religious justification *	35	41
First time voter ID request	26	30
War veteran/ ill	27	32
Law enforcing officer	27	30
Member of the Board of Elections	32	34
Being part of state's confidentiality program	26	31
Political representative/ candidate	26	31
Residing outside state/ county but eligible to vote	27	31
Moved out the county within 30 days/ prior election	27	30
Death in family 3 days before the elections	26	30
Polling place inaccessible	26	30
Ill/ physical disability	48	49
Living outside county/ student, spouse, military	39	43
Incarcerated/ felon *	27	36
Incarcerated/ not a felon	37	33
65 years or older	32	37
Student or spouse living away your county	31	33
Absent	44	45
Voting is inconvenient on ED	28	30
Permanent absentee status	5	6

Table 4 (next page) shows that the states which made it more difficult for their voters to cast an absentee ballot in the 2008 Presidential elections are Arkansas, Iowa, Massachusetts and Mississippi. These four states have the lowest value of three in the index, which means that these states, by 2008 have implemented only three out of 22 absentee voting rules to facilitate the absentee voting process for their voters. Nevertheless, in the course of four years (2008 to 2012) many electoral changes have come to pass in these states regarding the absentee voting process.

Referring to the 2012 index ranking it is obvious that states such as Iowa, Rhode Island, Illinois and the District of Columbia have significantly eased the absentee voting rules by extending the right to cast an absentee ballot to all the registered voters in their state. The states that have slightly liberalized their absentee voting rules in 2012 compared to 2008 Presidential elections are Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Louisiana and Virginia. In addition, states such as Arkansas, New York, Texas, Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Indiana, West Virginia, Tennessee and South Carolina have not made any attempts to change the absentee voting rules applied to their territories

from 2008 to 2012 Presidential elections. Interestingly, the only two states that have made absentee voting rules slightly more restrictive from the 2008 to 2012 elections are Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

Table 4. Ranking of Restrictive (Excuse) Absentee Voting States, 2008-2012

Restrictive States		
<i>State</i>	<i>Index 2008</i>	<i>Index 2012</i>
Arkansas	3	3
Iowa	3	21
Massachusetts	3	4
Mississippi	3	6
New York	4	4
Texas	4	4
Alabama	5	5
Missouri	5	7
New Hampshire	5	5
Connecticut	6	5
D.C.	6	22
Delaware	6	6
Kentucky	6	6
Michigan	6	6
Minnesota	6	6
Rhode Island	6	21
Illinois	7	21
Indiana	7	7
Louisiana	7	9
Virginia	7	10
Pennsylvania	8	6
West Virginia	8	8
Tennessee	9	9
South Carolina	10	10

Table 5 below ranks states shows the extent to which voters are able to cast absentee ballots.

Table 5. Ranking of the Liberal (No-Excuse) Absentee Voting States, 2008-2012

Liberal States		
<i>State</i>	<i>Index 2008</i>	<i>Index 2012</i>
Alaska	21	21
Colorado	21	21
Florida	21	21
Georgia	21	21
Idaho	21	21
Illinois	7	21
Iowa	3	21
Kansas	21	21
Maine	21	21
Maryland	21	21
Montana	21	21
Nebraska	21	21
Nevada	21	21
New Jersey	21	21
New Mexico	21	21
North Carolina	21	21
North Dakota	21	21
Ohio	21	21
Oklahoma	21	21
Rhode Island	6	21
South Dakota	21	21
Vermont	21	21
Wisconsin	21	21
Wyoming	21	22
Arizona	21	22
California	22	22
D.C.	6	22
Hawaii	21	22
Utah	21	22

As mentioned earlier, there is not much variance among states that have liberal absentee voting rules, except for states such as Iowa, Illinois, Rhode Island and District of Columbia. States that used no-excuse absentee voting in 2008 continued the same process for the 2012 Presidential elections as well. Nonetheless, states like Wyoming, Arizona, Hawaii and Utah in 2012 allowed their registered voters to ask for a permanent absentee ballot.

In order to better understand the importance of each absentee voting rule on the turnout rate for the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections, this study ran a factor analysis model, which is a set of techniques that does an exploratory analysis to see if there are clusters of items that go together (Acock, 2010). This method is important when constructing a scale because we would expect that all items included in the scale form one principal component (Acock, 2010).

Table 6. Factor Analysis: Loading of Absentee Voting Rules

Variable	Loading 2008	Loading 2012
Absent from your county on ED	0.5997	
Living outside county/ student, spouse, military		0.891
Work at the poll	0.5811	0.3417
Work/ shifts- 10 hours or more		0.8424
Religious justification	0.6166	
First time voter ID request	0.7957	0.8178
War veteran/ ill	0.6648	0.8408
Incarcerated/ felon	0.6767	0.5677
Incarcerated/ not a felon	0.3612	0.881
65 years or older	0.4829	0.7528
Law enforcing officer	0.754	0.8686
Member of the Board of Elections	0.4377	0.7209
Political representative/ candidate	0.7143	0.8533
Being part of state's confidentiality program	0.7613	0.8253
Residing outside state/ county but eligible to vote	0.682	0.9083
Moved out the county within 30 days/ prior election	0.7685	0.7933
Student or spouse living away your county	0.3243	0.8981
Death in family 3 days before the elections	0.6487	0.8992
Polling place inaccessible	0.7957	0.9319
Voting is inconvenient on ED	0.5538	0.9319

Referring to the results presented in Table 6, the variable having the highest loading in 2008 is being absent from the county on Election Day. This variable loads at 0.599. In other words, in 2008 states that accommodated voters for being absent from the county on Election Day had the tendency to accommodate for other rules also. However, in 2008 states did not accommodate voters for living outside the county and working long hours during the Election Day. Moreover, in 2012 the most important variable that loads higher (0.891) is working at the poll. In 2012 states that had the motivation to accommodate voters for voting at the poll tried to accommodate for other rules too. In 2012 the variable's loading is comparatively higher compared to their loading in 2008.

Data for the socio-economic variables used in this study are collected from the Census Bureau data source. State level data is reported which led to the decision to use census data, as it is helpful for the scope of this study. The socio-economic regressors used in this study are the state GDP per capita, the percentage of Hispanic, African-American and Asian ethnic populations in any given state, the percentage of people having a college degree or more, percentage of people being 20 to 34 years old, the percentage of people being 65 years old or older, plus party mobilization.⁷

⁷ This study uses the Holbrook and McClurg's (2005) measurement of party mobilization in a given state, calculated as the per-capita (voting age population) Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic National Committee (DNC) transfers to state and local party committees. The party's

The second objective of this study is to identify the impact that the proportion of absentee ballots counted have on the general turnout. The regressant for the second model is calculated as the total turnout given the number of the voting eligible people in a state. This study also controls for the importance that the SES variables and party mobilization have on turnout rates. The following section provides a detailed description of the statistical analysis using the ordinary least square analysis in order to discern the validity of the theory that is described in the previous sections.

Analysis

Does it matter when we vote? Does it matter that we do not vote all together on the same day? How does the opportunity to vote prior to the Election Day affect turnout? Burden et al. (2014) would say, yes it absolutely matters when we vote, and it matters most that we do not vote all together on the same day: these two factors have produced the *unanticipated* negative impact of early voting on the general voter turnout. Burden et al.(2014) along with Fortier (2006) and Thompson (2004) believe that the vanishing “civic day of election” has decreased voter turnout because there is no more face-to-face interaction during Election Day that may indirectly mobilize voters.

Thus, extending the Election Day to an Election Month has diminished the mobilization or stimulating effect that Election Day could exert on infrequent voters (while political controversies continue over ID requirements and total number of days of early voting allowed vs. overcrowding at the polls on Election Day and during limited early voting days, especially in Florida during the 2012 Presidential election, with each party trying to control the electoral outcomes by changing the number of days allowed for early voting).

What does this imply for the success of the electoral reform? Burden et al. (2014) argue that early voting reform has failed its’ primary objective to increase turnout, if implemented by itself and not accompanied by Election Day and same-day registration. Referring to Burden et al. (2014), during the 2004 and 2008 Presidential elections the early voting (when implemented alone) was associated with low turnout. However, Burden et al. (2014) only include in the analysis states that have Election Day registration, same-day registration and “no-excuse” absentee voting only, leaving the “excuse absentee” states outside of the equation. Omitting “excuse absentee” voting states Burden et al. (2014) automatically excludes from calculation the 6,064,857 absentee ballots cast in these states in the 2008 Presidential elections and 4,283,513 absentee ballots in the 2012 Presidential elections.⁸

The first assumption tested in this study claims that states with relaxed absentee voting laws will have a higher proportion of absentee ballots counted. This study uses the ordinary least squares method to test this hypothesis using data from 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. Table 7 (next page) shows the regression output for the model in 2008 and 2012.⁹

transfer data represents the amount of money transferred in a calendar year. This data was collected from the Federal Election Commission. Data is only available for transfers during 2008 Presidential elections. Data for 2012 Presidential elections are not available yet and this limits this study’s analysis.

⁸ The amount of absentee votes counted in 2012 seems relatively low compared to 2008 Presidential election because EAC has not reported the UOCAVA absentee votes counted in the 2012 Presidential elections. The number of absentee ballots represented for the 2012 Presidential elections only includes civilian absentee ballots counted.

⁹ Testing for the Gauss-Markov assumptions for the first model (2008 Presidential election), there are no correlation issues among the variables. Florida is an influential point so this observation was dropped from the analysis. The data does not suffer from multi-collinearity issues. Residuals and standardized residuals are normally distributed. However, the dataset has heteroskedasticity issues. To account for this problem this study reports the robust regression coefficients. In addition, referring to the 2012 model, there are no correlation issues among variables. Colorado is an influential point, so this study drops such observation from the analysis. The data does not suffer from multi-collinearity issues. Residuals and standardized residuals are normally distributed. However, the dataset has heteroskedasticity issues, and to account for this problem this study reports the robust regression coefficients.

Table 7. OLS Estimates of the Proportion of Absentee Turnout on the Index, SES Model and Party Mobilization

Variable	Robust Coefficient			
	β (2008)	s.e	β (2012)	s.e
Index	0.01**	0.002	0.01***	0.003
GDP per capita	0.000000771	0.0000016	-0.00000391***	0.00000119
Percentage Hispanic	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.003
Percentage African-America	-0.003**	0.001	-0.002	0.002
Percentage Asian	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
College degree or more	0.01	0.005	0.003	0.003
Age (20-34 years old)	1.45	2.27	2.3***	0.69
Age (65 or older)	1.5	1.57	2.2*	1.38
Party mobilization	0.04	0.04		
Model Summary				
R-square (2008)	0.38		R-square (2012)	0.38
N	48		N	48
p-value	0.000		p-value	0.000

*p<0.100. **p<0.050. ***p<0.001.

The regression coefficients, reported in Table 7, show that *ceteris paribus* states with liberal absentee voting rules are more likely to have a higher proportion of absentee ballots counted in both 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. In other words, the institutional rules matter. This result indicates that relaxed absentee rules make early voting more convenient and therefore provide a higher incentive for voters to cast an absentee ballot compared to states with excuse absentee voting. Therefore, the less restrictive absentee laws are, the more voters will prefer to vote absentee than in-person on the Election Day (Alvarez et al., 2012). Also, states with a higher percentage of African-Americans are more likely to have a lower proportion of absentee ballots counted. These results confirm Gronke and Toffey’s (2008), plus Karp and Banducci’s (2001) arguments that liberal absentee laws would not enhance overall minorities voting, because they are less politically active and less politically knowledgeable. In 2012 states that had a higher percentage of young and old people were more likely to have a high rate of absentee ballots counted. Even though the state’s GDP per capita is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the proportion of the absentee ballots counted in the 2012 Presidential election, the coefficient is significantly small and it does not imply any real impact on the proportion of absentee ballots.

The second hypothesis tested, argues that the proportion of absentee ballots counted in a given election year positively influence the proportion of total turnout.¹⁰ This model also controls for the SES variables and party mobilization for the 2008 Presidential election, while dropping the party mobilization variable from the 2012 analysis, due to data unavailability. The regression output is in Table 8.¹¹

¹⁰ The dependent variable in this model is the proportion of general turnout given the number of voting eligible population (VEP) at a given year.

¹¹ There are no correlation issues among the variables in testing for the Gauss-Markov assumptions for the first model (2008 presidential election). Mississippi is an influential point, so I dropped this observation from the analysis. The data does not suffer from multi-collinearity issues. Residuals and standardized residuals are normally distributed. However, the dataset has heteroskedasticity issues. To account for this problem I report the robust regression coefficients. Regarding the second model of the 2008 presidential election, there are no correlation issues among the variables. Alabama is an influential point, so I dropped this observation from the analysis. The data does not suffer from multi-collinearity issues. Residuals and standardized residuals are normally distributed. However, the dataset has heteroskedasticity issues. To account for this problem I report the robust regression coefficients.

Unlike Burden's et al. (2014) conclusion that early voting, standing alone, decreases turnout, results reported in Table 8 tell a different story for 2008 Presidential election turnout. *Ceteris paribus*, a proportion increase in the absentee ballots counted will cause a 0.071 proportion increase in the proportion of general turnout for the 2008 Presidential elections. State's GDP per capita is statistically significant as well, but the impact that it has over the turnout is almost unidentifiable. In addition, the higher the percentage of Hispanics and Asians in a state the lower the turnout becomes. This is not a surprising outcome because, as explained above, minorities are less likely to vote and this result supports Karp and Banducci's (2001) argument. Also, the younger the population of a state is, the lower the turnout becomes, because young people tend to vote less (Verba et al., 1995). Moreover, party mobilization is statistically significant, which means that the more money state parties receive from the National Party Committees, the more they spend on the campaign, and thus greater the turnout becomes.

Different from the 2008 model, the 2012 regression analysis shows that the proportion of absentee ballots counted did not affect the proportion of the general turnout. There might be two possible explanations for this result. The first explanation might be a measurement issue because the UOCAVA absentee ballots cast in 2012 are not included in the analysis because the data is not available yet. And the second possible explanation might be what Giammo and Brox (2010) argue, that early voting produces a "short-lived increase in turnout that disappears by the second Presidential election" (p.295). However, this is a question that require careful consideration in future research. The same as in 2008, the higher the percentage of minorities in a state the lower the turnout is going to be. As Verba et al. (1995) claim, education matters when it comes to turnout rates. Table 8 shows that an increase in the percentage of the people holding a college degree is positively correlated with the general turnout. The positive impact of high education on the percentage of general turnout has been consistent in both the 2008 and 2012 models (see Table 8).

Conclusion

This analysis aimed to provide a better understanding of absentee voting, specifically, in the early voting literature, while also trying to theorize outside of a single case-study context by using aggregate level data. As expected, the states' institutional laws and regulations regarding absentee voting are very important in understanding the percentage of absentee ballots cast across states. The statistical analysis provided in this study confirms the importance that the institutional environment has on the elections. States that have liberal absentee rules have proportionally higher rates of absentee ballots counted, and this result is consistent for the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. It is interesting that education does not matter when it comes to predicting the rate of absentee ballots counted, but it remains a highly significant factor affecting the total turnout. States that have a high percentage of young and old voters are more likely to have a high proportion of absentee ballots counted. Moreover, states' GDP per capita is a significant factor explaining the rates of absentee ballots counted, but in this analysis its impact is minuscule.

The proportion of absentee ballots counted in the 2008 Presidential election has increased the general turnout of such Presidential elections. However, this result applies only to the 2008 elections because in 2012 the impact of absentee ballots counted on the election turnout disappears. This is an issue that needs further consideration. In addition, states that have a higher percentage of minorities (Hispanic and Asians) and younger voters will have a low turnout rate, due to their traditional lower mobilization rate (despite grass-roots and youth mobilizations for President Obama).

Instead, states with a high percentage of college graduates are more likely to have a higher contribution towards increasing the turnout rate. Party mobilization is also important when it comes to increasing the general turnout rates, but it does not appear to significantly absentee voting rates.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ades, Alberto & Rafael di Tella, "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: a Review of Recent Empirical Contributions" in *IDS Bulletin*, v.27, n.2 (1996).
- Absentee Voting Rules, retrieved from http://www.longdistancevoter.org/absentee_voting_rules#.Up_2xcRDuSq
- Acock, A.C., *A Gentle Introduction to Stata* (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 2010).
- Alvarez, R.M., Hall, T.E. & Sinclair, B., "Whose Absentee Voters are Returned and Counted: the Variety and Use of Absentee Ballots in California" in *Electoral Studies*, 27 (2008): p.673-683
- Alvarez, R.M., Levin, I. & Sinclair, J.A., "Making Voting Easier: Convenience Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election" in *Political Research Quarterly*, 65, 2 (2012): p.248-262.
- Barreto, M.A., Streb, M.J., Marks, M. & Guerra, F., "Do Absentee Voters Differ from Polling Place Voters? New Evidence from California" in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 70, 2 (2006): p.224-234.
- Benton, J.H., *Voting in the Field: a Forgotten Chapter of the Civil War* (New York: Nabu Press, 1915).
- Berinsky, A.J., "The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the United States" in *American Politics Research*, 33 (2005): p.471-491.
- Blais, A., *To Vote or Not to Vote: Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
- Burden, B.C., Canon, D.T., Mayer, K.R. & Moynihan, D.P., "Election Laws, Mobilization and Turnout: the Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform" in *American Journal of Political Science*, 58, 1 (2014): p.95-109.
- Dubin, J.A., & Kalsow, G.A., "Comparing Absentee and Precinct Voters: a View Over Time" in *Political Behavior*, 18, 4 (1996): p.369-392.
- Field, M. & DiCamillo, M., *A Summary Analysis of Voting in the 1994 General Election* (California Opinion Index, 1995), from <http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/COI-94-95-Jan-Election.pdf>
- Fortier, J.C., *Absentee and Early Voting: Trends, Promises and Perils* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2006).
- Giammo, J.D. & Brox, B.J., "Reducing the Costs of Participation: are States Getting a Return on Early Voting?" in *Political Research Quarterly*, 63 (2010): p.295-303.
- Gronke, P., "Early Voting Reforms and American Elections" in *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal*, 17 (2 (2008)) p.423-451.
- Gronke, P. & Toffey, D.K., "The Psychological and Institutional Determinants of Early Voting" in *Journal of Social Issues*, 64, 3 (2008): p.503-524.
- Gronke, P., Galanes-Rosenbaum, E. & Miller, P.A., "Early Voting and Turnout" in *PS Online* (2007): from www.apsanet.org
- Gronke, P., Galanes-Rosenbaum, E., Miller, P.A. & Toffey, D., "Convenience Voting" in *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11 (2008): p.437-455.
- "Help America Vote Act of 2002", 42 U.S.C 15301-15545.
- Herron, M.C. & Smith, D.A., "Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the Aftermath of House Bill 1355" in *Election Law Journal*, 11, 3 (2012): p.331-347.
- Holbrook, T. M. & McClurg, S.D., "The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential Elections" in *American Journal of Political Science*, 49, 4 (2005): p.689-703.
- Karp, J.A. & Banducci, S.A., "Absentee Voting, Mobilization and Participation" in *American Political Research*, 29 (2001): p.183-195.
- Kettleborough, C., "Absent Voting" in *American Political Science Review*, 11 (1917): p.320-322.
- Neeley, G.W. & Richardson, L.R., "Who is Early Voting? An Individual Level Examination" in *The Social Science Journal*, 38 (2001): p.381-392.

- Oliver, E., "The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and Party Activity on Absentee Voting and Overall Turnout" in *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 2 (1996): p.498-513.
- Patterson, S.C. & Caldeira, G.A., "Mailing in the Vote: Correlates and Consequences of Absentee Voting" in *American Journal of Political Science*, 29, 4 (1985): p.766-788.
- Ray, P.O., "Absent Voting Legislation, 1924-1925" in *American Political Science Review*, 20 (1926): p.347-349.
- Riker, W. & Ordeshook, P., "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" in *American Political Science Review*, 62, 1 (1968): p.25-42.
- Rosenfield, M., *Innovations in Election Administration: Early Voting* (Washington, D.C.: National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, Federal Election Commission, 1994).
- Schattschneider, E.E., *The Semi-Sovereign People: a Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1960).
- Southwell, P. & Burchett, J., "Does Changing the Rules Change the Players? The Effect of All-Mail Elections on the Composition of the Electorate" in *Social Science Quarterly*, 81 (2000): p.837-845.
- Stein, R.M., "Introduction: Early Voting" in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 62 (1998): p.57-69.
- Stein, R.M. & Garcia- Monet, P.A., "Voting Early, but not Often" in *Social Science Quarterly*, 78, 3 (1997): p.654-671.
- Stein, R.M. & Vonnahme, G., *Early, Absentee and Mail-in Voting* (Oxford Handbook of American Elections & Political Behavior, Oxford University Press, 1997).
- Thompson, D.F., "Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States" in *American Political Science Review*, 98, 1 (2004): p.51-63.
- United States Census Bureau (2010), from <http://www.census.gov/>
- United States Election Assistance Commission, "2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey and Data Sets" [2008 Datasets-Excel], from: http://www.eac.gov/research/election_administration_and_voting_survey.aspx
- United States Election Assistance Commission, "2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey" [2012 Datasets-Excel], from http://www.eac.gov/research/election_administration_and_voting_survey.aspx
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L. & Brady, H.E., *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

AUTHOR

Enrijeta Shino is a Doctoral Candidate in Politics at the Department of Government of the University of Florida.

FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION



Our Mission: The Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) is committed to promoting Political Science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our board of officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. Spanning from the University of West Florida-Pensacola, to Central Florida University-Orlando and Barry University, to Flagler College, to Florida International University and University of Miami, etc., our regional scholarly association spans the “Sunshine State” bringing together Political Scientists and International Affairs professionals from public and private institutions to network, to collaborate on research and to discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

Join FPSA!

To join as a member the Florida Political Science Association (**Plan A or Plan B**):

please go to FPSA web-site: <http://www.fpsanet.org/>
then at bottom of page click on: [Join FPSA/Conference Registration](#)

Any problems contact FPSA Treasurer Dr. Aubrey Jewett
at e-mail: Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

Plan A—FPSA Simple Annual Membership (no annual Conference registration): \$40
includes Membership & Subscription to *Florida Political Chronicle*

Plan B—Annual FPSA Conference Membership & Registration: \$85 on-site (\$75 pre-registration),
students \$40 on-site (\$35 pre-registration), includes FPSA Conference Registration, Annual
Membership and Subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal.

See on the next page the Announcement details for the 2015 FPSA Annual Conference in Orlando.



Call for Papers

Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting

Saturday, 28 March 2015

University of Central Florida-Orlando, Florida

Program Chair: Leah H. Blumenfeld
 Barry University
 Phone: 305-899-3386
l Blumenfeld@barry.edu

Arrangements Chair: Aubrey Jewett
 University of Central Florida
 Phone: 407-823-2608
Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

The 2015 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at the **University of Central Florida-Orlando, Florida**. Information on directions, parking and hotels will be sent in **January 2015**.

Pre-registration before the conference day is \$75 for Faculty and \$35 for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants are asked to pre-register. **Registration on-site at the conference is \$85 for Faculty and \$40 for students.** Registration includes lunch, refreshments and subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*.

To pre-register, please go to www.fpsanet.org

Faculty, talented undergraduates, and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. A \$250 award is given to the Best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference, and new this year a \$200 award will be given to the Best Undergraduate Student Paper (both awardees will have their papers published in the *Florida Political Chronicle*). **Please send paper proposals to the related Section Chairs by 15 January 2015. Accepted papers will be notified by 31 January 2015.**

Section	Section Chair	Contact Information
American National Politics	Will Miller Flagler College	wmler@flagler.edu 904-819-6322
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	kupferb@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-9951
Public Policy/Public Administration	Jonathan West University of Miami	jwest@miami.edu 305-284-2500
State & Local Government	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations	Giselle Jamison St. Thomas University	Gjamison@stu.edu 305-628-6579
Comparative Politics	Denis Rey University of Tampa	Denis.rey@ut.edu 813-257-1729
Round-Table on Teaching Political Science	Richard Murgó Tallahassee Community College	MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-8145
Roundtable on Media & Politics	Mark Logas Valencia College	mlogas@valenciacollege.edu 407-582-2028

Call for Submissions to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal. Scholarly articles from past FPSA Conferences are welcome as well as other papers that have not been previously published. Please contact and submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the peer-review process.

Call for Submissions for *The Political Scientist* newsletter: announcements, book-reviews, short articles on teaching or research, job openings and more. Please contact Editor Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan at jsm2@usfsp.edu. See our web-site www.fpsanet.org for conference information and archives of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist*.

FPSA: 1972-2015



Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting

Saturday, 28 March 2015

**University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida**

All FPSA panels and events will take place at the Burnett Honors College on the UCF campus

*****All participants must register for the meeting*****

Pre-registration before Conference day is \$75 for faculty and \$35 for students. All paper presenters, panel Chairs and Discussants are asked to pre-register. Registration at the meeting is \$85 for faculty and \$40 for students. Registration includes lunch, refreshments and subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*.

Pre-register at: <http://www.fpsanet.org/join-fpsa.html>



**FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
2014-15 Officers and Council Members**

Kathryn DePalo, President

Florida International University, depalok@fiu.edu

Leah Blumenfeld, 1st Vice-President

Barry University, l Blumenfeld@barry.edu

Denis Rey, 2nd Vice President

University of Tampa, denis.rey@ut.edu

Will Miller, Secretary

Flagler College, wmiller@flagler.edu

Aubrey Jewett, Treasurer

University of Central Florida, aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu

Marco Rimaneli, Florida Political Chronicle, Editor

Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimaneli@saintleo.edu

Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, The Political Scientist Newsletter Editor

University of South Florida-St. Petersburg, jsm2@stpt.usf.edu

Executive Council (staggered three-years terms)

Mark Logas (2012-15)

Valencia College
mlogas@valenciacollege.edu

Joseph Uscinski (2012-15)

University of Miami
uscinski@miami.edu

Richard Murgor (2012-15)

Tallahassee Community College
murgor@tcc.fl.edu

Mirya Holman (2013-16)

Florida Atlantic University
mholman5@fau.edu

David Hill (2014-16)*

Stetson University
dhill@stetson.edu

Giselle Jamison (2013-16)

St. Thomas University
gjamison@stu.edu

Manuel DeLeon (2014-17)

Bethune-Cookman University
deleonm@cookman.edu

Sean Foreman (2014-17)

Barry University
sforeman@barry.edu

Brian Kupfer (2014-17)

Tallahassee Community College
bkupfer@tcc.fl.edu

Kevin Wagner, Ex-Officio, Past President

Florida Atlantic University, kwagne15@fau.edu

*filling remainder of Denis Rey's term (2013-16)

**Florida Political Science Association
2015 Annual Meeting**

Arrangements Chair: Aubrey Jewett
University of Central Florida
aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu 407-823-2608

Program Chair: Leah Blumenfeld
Barry University
lblumenfeld@barry.edu 305-899-3386

Section	Section Chair	Contact Information
American National Politics	Will Miller Flagler College	wmiller@flagler.edu 904-819-6322
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	kupferb@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-9951
Public Policy/Public Administration	Jonathan West University of Miami	jwest@miami.edu 305-284-2500
State & Local Government	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations	Giselle Jamison St. Thomas University	Gjamison@stu.edu 305-628-6579
Comparative Politics	Denis Rey University of Tampa	Denis.rey@ut.edu 813-257-1729
Roundtable on Teaching Political Science	Richard Murgo Tallahassee Community College	MURGOR@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-8145

Program Schedule

Registration	8:00 AM to 4:00 PM
Session 1	8:30 AM to 10:00 AM
Break	10:00 AM to 10:15 AM
Session 2	10:15 AM to 11:45 AM
Lunch/Meeting	11:45 AM to 1:45 PM
Session 3	1:45 PM to 3:15 PM
Break	3:15 PM to 3:30 PM
Session 4	3:30 PM to 5:00 PM

**FPSA 2015 Annual Meeting Travel Information Location/Date: UCF Burnett Honors College, Saturday March 28
Directions, Parking, Hotels, and Restaurants**

Directions to UCF:

UCF Address: University of Central Florida 4000 Central Florida Blvd, Orlando, FL 32816

Campus Map: <http://cdn.ucf.edu/map/printable/UCF-Campus-Map-2014.pdf>

From Orlando International Airport:

Go east on 528 to 417 north. Take 417 North to University Blvd. Exit east onto University Blvd. Continue east on University Blvd. for two miles and it will take you to the main UCF entrance.

From The North:

Option 1 – Take the Florida Turnpike South to 408 east. Take 408 east to 417 North toward Sanford. Exit off of 417 to University Blvd. East. Take University Blvd 2 to the main UCF entrance.

Option 2 – Take I-95 South to SR 50 West. Take SR 50 to Alafaya Trail. Make a right hand turn on Alafaya Trail. Continue on Alafaya Trail to University Blvd. Make a right turn on University Blvd. and you are on campus

From The South and Melbourne Area:

Option 1 – Take the Florida Turnpike north and exit onto I-4 East. Continue until you reach 408 east. Take 408 east to 417 North toward Sanford. Exit off of 417 to University Blvd East. Continue on University Blvd. for 2 miles and it will take you to the main UCF entrance.

Option 2 – Take I-95 north to 520 West. Continue West and the road will merge with SR 50. Take SR 50 West to Alafaya Trail. Make a right turn on Alafaya Trail. Continue for 2 miles to University Blvd. Make a right turn on University Blvd. and you will be on campus.

From The East, Titusville and Daytona:

Option 1 – Take Highway 50 West to Alafaya Trail. Turn right on Alafaya Trail, go north for two miles. Turn right onto University Blvd. and you are on campus.

Option 2 – Take I-4 West to 417 South. Exit off of 417 at University Blvd. East. Continue on University Blvd East and it will take you to the main UCF entrance.

From The Tampa Area:

Take I-4 east to 408 east toward Titusville. Take 408 to 417 North toward Sanford. Exit off of 417 at University Blvd. East. Take University Blvd 2 to the main UCF entrance.

Directions to and Parking for Burnett Honors College after Arriving at UCF

Burnett Honors College: Enter the campus on University Blvd (the main entrance). Take an immediate left at the light onto Gemini Blvd. Go through the first light and take a right at the stop sign onto Aquarius Agora Drive. Then take the first right into the H4 parking lot. Take a quick left, then quick right, and then a quick left as you pass the Visual Arts Building (these 3 quick turns all happen within 100ft of entering the parking lot) into the H2 parking lot. You will see the Burnett Honors College in front of you at the far end of the H2 parking lot. We have arranged for free parking on Saturday March 28th in the H2 lot only. If you park elsewhere on campus without paying for a visitor's parking pass you may get ticketed.

Lodging - Official Conference Hotel:

We have made arrangements with the Radisson Hotel Orlando-UCF to be the official conference hotel and they are offering group rates for FPSA members (just 2 miles from UCF). They have set aside 25 rooms for only \$79 per night and are available for the evenings of 3/27 and 3/28. You can also get a breakfast coupon for just \$5 more. Rooms must be booked by 3/13/15 to get this discounted rate. The Radisson UCF has newly remodeled rooms (completed just this winter) and this is a great price for a high quality hotel (normal rates are \$119 a night). Call the hotel directly and ask for the FPSA rate.

Radisson Hotel Orlando-UCF Area - 1724 N. Alafaya Trail Orlando, FL 32826
Phone: (407) 658-9008, Fax (407) 658-9008 Price: Special FPSA Meeting Rate: \$79

In addition these 4 hotels are also nearby. All prices are from hotels.com for 1 room, 2 adults, for Friday March 27 to Saturday March 28.

- 1) Double Tree by Hilton Orlando East- UCF - 12125 High Tech Ave. Orlando, FL 32817
Phone: (407) 275-9000 Fax: (407) 381-0019 Price: \$159
- 2) Comfort Suites UCF/Research Park - 12101 Challenger Pkwy Orlando, FL US, 32826
Phone: (407) 737-7303 Fax: (407) 737-7304 Price \$119
- 3) La Quinta Inn & Suites Orlando UCF - 11805 Research Pkwy. Orlando, FL 32826
Phone: (407)737-6075 Fax: (407)737-7562 Price: \$129
- 4) Crestwood Suites Orlando UCF - 11424 University Blvd. Orlando, FL 32817
Phone: (407) 249-0044 Fax: (407) 249-9911 Price: \$69

Nearby Restaurants: All these restaurants are on, or within sight of, University Blvd (the main road leading to the university) within a mile or so of campus. There are many others.

Applebee's 12103 Collegiate Way Orlando, FL 32817, 407-282-2055
Azteca Mexican Restaurant 11633 University Blvd Orlando, FL 32817 407-737-8388
Four Rivers BBQ 11764 University Blvd Orlando FL 32817
Logins Roadhouse 11674 University Drive Orlando, FL 32817, 407-384-1745
Perkins 11662 University Blvd Orlando, FL 32817, 407-384-3383
Steak & Shake 11700 University Blvd Orlando, FL 32817, 407-382-2121
Ruby Tuesdays 11401 University Blvd Orlando, FL 32817, 407-249-5497

There are also many fast food restaurants and sandwich shops on University Blvd within a mile of the main UCF entrance including: Burger King, Firehouse Subs, Chipotle, Dunkin Donuts, Backyard Burger, Panera Bread, Chick Fil-A, Wendy's and others. There is also a McDonalds on Alafaya Trail (take a right as you are exiting the UCF campus at the main University Blvd entrance and it is two hundred yards down on the left).

SESSION 1: 8:30 AM to 10:00 AM



Roundtable on Teaching Political Science: BHC Reading Room Facilitating Globally Oriented Learning - Panelists will explore innovative ways of teaching political science and address such topics as student preparation for university study, strategies for global learning and statutory changes in developmental education in Florida.

Moderator: Richard Murgor, Tallahassee Community College, murgor@tcc.fl.edu

Panelists: Aubrey Jewett, University of Central Florida, Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu
Brian Kupfer, Tallahassee Community College, kupferb@tcc.fl.edu
Houman Sadri, University of Central Florida, houman.sadri@ucf.edu
Will Miller, Flagler College, wmiller@flagler.edu
Judithanne Scourfield McLaughlan, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg, jsm2@stpt.usf.edu
Charles Gleek, Lynn University, cgleek@mac.com

Comparative Politics: *An Eastern European Focus*, BHC 126

Chair & Discussant: Gary Boulware, University of Florida, gboulware@pky.ufl.edu

Post-Communism Recovery and the State: The Case Studies of Poland and Ukraine
Thomas Just, Florida International University, tjust004@fiu.edu

Determining Factors of Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe and the Former USSR
Deniz Dolun, Florida Atlantic University, ddolun@my.fau.edu

Symbolic Political Speech (Political Art) in the Czech Republic
Gary Boulware, University of Florida, gboulware@pky.ufl.edu

State and Local Government: *The National View*, BHC 127

Chair and Discussant: Sean Foreman, Barry University - sforeman@barry.edu

Federalism looks different from the bottom up: Local option policies and state marijuana laws in Washington
Leah H. Blumenfeld, Barry University, lblumenfeld@barry.edu

National Security Threatened by Global Warming: Local Impacts?
David Twigg, Florida International University, twiggd@fiu.edu

Lessons Learned From the Bankruptcy of Detroit
Robert Robertson, University of Phoenix, Central Florida Campus, rroberts905@gmail.com

International Relations: U.S. Foreign Policy, BHC 128

Chair & Discussant: *Stephen Magu, Hampton University, Stephen.magu@hamptonu.edu*

U.S Exceptionalism: How U.S Interests are Defined through the Spectrum of U.S Exceptionalism

Arianna Mendez, Florida International University, amendez1956@icloud.com

From Bush to Bush: the Resurgence of American Militarism and the War on Terror

Zachary A. Karasia, Florida International University, zkara002@fiu.edu

Debating U.S. Intervention in the Arab Spring: Examining Conflict between the Executive and Legislative Branches

Kelly McHugh, Florida Southern College, kmchugh@fلسouthern.edu

A Realist Perspective on Humanitarian Aid in US Foreign Policy

Nicholas Lanier, Saint Leo University, nicholas.lanier@email.saintleo.edu

Anatomy of failure in regulating Global Affairs: The US, Hegemony and Perils of Armed Intervention

Stephen Magu, Hampton University, Stephen.magu@hamptonu.edu

PhD Students Panel: Local-Global Connections, BHC 129

Chair & Discussant: *Annabelle Conroy, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), Resident Scholar, annabelle.conroy@fulbrightmail.org*

Examining the Impact of Long-Term Conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Yara Asi, UCF, yara.asi@Knights.ucf.edu

When the Rich Wage War: Analyzing Social Environment Factors Versus Economic Drivers in Motivating Extremist Affiliations in the greater Middle East

Brandon Curran, UCF, bmc13000@Knights.ucf.edu

Iraqi Kurds, Ansar al-Islam, and the effects of Nationalism

Rebecca Kaiser, UCF, rebeccakaiser@Knights.ucf.edu

Can China Rise Peacefully?"

Xiongwei Cao, Valencia College, caoxiongwei@Knights.ucf.edu

State Sanctioned Violence and Terrorism: Establishing a Causal Relationship

Rebecca Schiel, UCF, Rebecca.Schiel@Knights.ucf.edu

This panel is sponsored by the IPAC Foundation for FPSA 2015.

M.A. Graduate Students Panel: *An Analysis of the Political & Security Issues from around the World*, BHC 130

Co-Chairs & Discussants: *Kari Williams, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), Research Project Manager, williams.kari@gmail.com & Tatiana Devia, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), Research Project Manager, tatianadevia@yahoo.com*

ISIS: Who Joins?

Leah Delaney, UCF, leah.delaney@knights.ucf.edu

Analyzing the Threat of a Nuclear Iran: A Future of Peril or Peace?"

Matthew Doerting, UCF, matthew.doerting@knights.ucf.edu

Saudi Arabia: The Causes of Extremism

Kelsey Gilbert, UCF, kelseyostyn@knights.ucf.edu

The Black Knights of Iranian Sanction Busting

Ryan Rilea, Valencia College, ryan.rilea@gmail.com

This panel is sponsored by the IPAC Foundation for FPSA 2015.

American Politics: *Social Capital and Political Sociology in America*, BHC 131

Chair & Discussant: *Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu*

Poverty and Helplessness in America Today

Aori Nyambati, University College London, nyambatiaori@yahoo.com

Opinions that Should Not Exist: Investigating the Role of Deception, Hot Cognition, and Social Capital

Peter Licari, University of North Florida, n00776729@ospreys.unf.edu

The Citizens of Tomorrow

Alex Banks, Flagler College, ABanks210@flagler.edu

Growth of South Florida Muslim Community, with African-Americans and Immigrants, but No Latinos

Mirsad Krijestorac, Florida International University, mkrij001@fiu.edu

A Diamond Hidden in Fry-Bread

Andrea Lanzone, Emilia Cianci, Gabriele Cotronei and Arianna Pavoncello, John Cabot University, Rome, alanzone@johncabot.edu

SESSION 2: 10:15 AM to 11:45 AM

Undergraduate Panel: *Determinants of Conflict*, BHC 126

Chair & Discussant: Leah H. Blumenfeld, Barry University, l Blumenfeld@barry.edu

Female Foreign Leaders and the Use of Hard and Soft Power

Maria White, University of Tampa, maria.white@spartans.ut.edu

Globalization and the Escalation of Conflict

Anna Horvath, University of Tampa, anna.horvath@spartans.ut.edu

Overconsumption: A Potential Driving Factor of International Conflict

Cori Roach, University of Tampa, cori.roach@spartans.ut.edu

Renewables and China's Roadmap to Global Supremacy or Developing Countries

Aori Nyambati, University College London, Nyambatiaori@yahoo.com

An Empirical Analysis on the Correction of War Casualties and Birth Rate

Rebecca Leppert, Barry University, Rebecca.leppert@mymail.barry.edu

International Relations: *Security*, BHC 127

Chair & Discussant: Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

Kazakhstan Foreign Strategies & Major Sources of Threats

Houman A. Sadri, University of Central Florida, houman.sadri@ucf.edu

Securitizing Geopolitical Projects, the Imagination of Turkish Elites

Onur Erpul, Florida International University, oepru001@fiu.edu

Military Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia

Phillip Guerreiro, Florida International University, phillip.guerreiro@gmail.com

Turkmenistan: the New Silk Road

Cherie J. Farrell, Florida International University, cfarr017@fiu.edu

Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism and Hatred of the West from Al-Qaeda to ISIL

Marco Rimanelli & Jack McTague, Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

Comparative Politics: *Gender and Comparative Politics*, BHC 128

Chair & Discussant: Jonathan Knuckey, University of Central Florida, jonathan.knuckey@ucf.edu

Northern Ghana: A Study of Political Participation between Men & Women Concerning Local Government

Rachel Baranowski, University of Tampa, rachel.baranowski@spartans.ut.edu

The Development Theory of the Gender Gap: An Update

Tiffany Quick, University of Central Florida, tiffany.quick@knights.ucf.edu

Jonathan Knuckey, University of Central Florida, jonathan.knuckey@ucf.edu

Dependent on Gender: Partisan Alignment and Gender in the US, Great Britain, and Germany

David Shabat-Love, University of Central Florida, sl.david.s@gmail.com

International Relations: *Foreign Policy Issues*, BHC 129

Chair & Discussant: Manuel De Leon, Bethune-Cookman University, deleonm@cookman.edu

Efficacy of Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Foreign Policy (Case Study of International Economic Sanctions against Iran between 2000 and 2010)

Hassan Vaezi, Florida International University, hvaez001@fiu.edu

Mismanagement of Objectives of a Sanctions-Regime as an Independent Variable: The Case of Iran

Manuel De Leon & Douglas Rivero, Bethune-Cookman University, deleonm@cookman.edu & riverod@cookman.edu

Anonymity as Resistance to Sovereignty

Eric J. Lake, University of Florida, lakeej@ufl.edu

Bang for the Buck: Is US Investment in the Fight Against Terrorism Paying Dividends?

Christopher M. Faulkner, University of Central Florida, faulknerc@knights.ucf.edu

American Politics: *Conflict and Challenge in American Politics*, BHC 130

Chair & Discussant: Will Miller, Flagler College, wmiller@flagler.edu

Rise of the One-Sided Argument

Uriah Jones, University of North Florida, n00864626@ospreys.unf.edu

It's Not About the Guns: It's About the Violence

Timothy Lenz, Florida Atlantic University, lenz@fau.edu

Challenges in the Implementation of State Wide Proficiency Testing in Florida

Patrick Webb, Florida Southern College, pwebb2@mocs.flsouthern.edu

Examining the Progression of Authoritarian Practices in the Public vs. Private Sectors: Issues of Legitimacy in Applications of Surveillance Technology

Daniel Baracsckay, Valdosta State University, dbaracsckay@valdosta.edu

Public Policy/Public Administration: *Public Policy and Management Issues in Public Administration (1)*, BHC 131

Chair & Discussant: *Richard Brumback, University of Miami, rplankbrum@aol.com*

The Obama “War on Drugs” Rhetoric: Just Shift in Tone or Actual Policy?

Maria Gabryszewska, Florida International University, mgabr009@fiu.edu

Water be Dammed: Examining Whether Federal Intervention is Necessary to Resolve the Tri-State Water Wars

Michael J. Strykowski, University of Central Florida, mjstrynk@hotmail.com

NPO Policy on Board Member Giving

Brian Burns and John Azzaretto, University of West Florida, brian_burns04@yahoo.com &

Quantitative Evidence of Collaborative Governance of Broward and Palm Beach Counties HIV Health Services Planning Councils in Two Different Legislative Cycles

James K. Agbodzakey, Nova Southeastern University, jagbodzakey@nova.edu

Lunch, Business Meeting and Roundtable on Florida Politics:
11:45 AM to 1:45 PM

FPSA Business Meeting

Kathryn DePalo, President

Florida International University

depalok@fiu.edu

Roundtable on Florida Politics (12:30 – 1:30)

The roundtable will examine the state of Florida politics and upcoming election and political battles. Dr. MacManus, whose honors and distinctions include awards from NBC and the Department of State, has an extensive record of research and writing on Florida politics.

Moderator: Susan MacManus, University of South Florida, samacmanus@aol.com

Panelists: Scott Powers, senior political reporter, *Orlando Sentinel*

Greg Fox, political reporter, WESH-TV (NBC)

Aubrey Jewett, UCF

Kathryn DePalo, Florida International University

SESSION 3: 1:45 PM to 3:15 PM

M.A. Students Panel: *An Analysis of Iranian Political Affairs*, BHC 126

Chair & Discussant: *Dr. Shiva Jahani, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), Special Assistant to the IPAC President, Shiva.Jahani@ucf.edu*

The Effect of Leadership on Revolutionary Results

Candace Compton, UCF, candace.compton@Knights.ucf.edu

Between Tradition and Modernity: A Generational Analysis of the History of Modern Iran

Greg McDowall, IPAC, Research Project Manager, legalos4@yahoo.com

Iran and the International Monetary Order: Strategies and Consequences

Ryan Rilea, Valencia College, ryan.rilea@gmail.com

Women's Rights in Iran - The Role of NGOs

Bailey Robb, UCF, brobb@knights.ucf.edu

This panel is sponsored by the IPAC Foundation for FPSA 2015.

Public Policy/Public Administration: *Public Policy and Management Issues in Public Administration (2)*, BHC 127

Chair & Discussant: *Richard Brumback, University of Miami, rplankbrum@aol.com*

Examining the Impact of Local Collaborative Tools on Urban Sustainability Efforts: Does the Managerial Environment Matter?

William L. Swann, Florida State University, wls12b@my.fsu.edu

Explaining Energy and Sustainable Policy Choice in Florida Cities

Ruowen Shen and Richard Feiock, Florida State University, rs13r@my.fsu.edu

Public-Private Partnerships for Transportation Infrastructure: Challenges for State and Local Government Public Procurement in the United States

Joe Slaviak, Flagler College, Lawrence Martin and Wendell Lawther, University of Central Florida, JSaviak@flagler.edu

International Relations: *Human Security and Civil Society Issues*, BHC 128

Chair & Discussant: *Giselle Jamison, St. Thomas University, gjamison@stu.edu*

The Effectiveness of Revolutionary Aid

Caterine Aquilina and Saga Moss Lundstrom, Florida Southern College, caquilina1@icloud.com
& saga.ml@hotmail.com

Cuban Intervention in Angola: A Surprised System, Meaning, and Legacy

Fiacre Bienvenu, Florida International University, fbien001@fiu.edu

Bringing Order into the Drug Trade: The Causes and Consequences of the Illicit Narcotics Industry

Nicolas Beckmann, Florida International University, nbeck010@fiu.edu

Women Gone Wild? Examining the Role of the Female Members of the Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS)

Judith Cruz, Florida Southern College, jcc4btr@gmail.com

Understanding the security crisis in Central America from a pluralist perspective

Jeanne Caroline Espinal, Florida International University, jespi074@fiu.edu

Undergraduate Panel: *US Foreign Policy*, BHC 129

Chair & Discussant: *Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu*

How Does Foreign Aid Affect the Societal Reintegration and Infrastructure Reconstruction Process of a Country Suffering the Aftermath of Ethnic Conflict?

Brady Frautten, University of Tampa, brady.frautten@spartans.ut.edu

Regime Change: Necessities for a Successful Change

William Lloyd, University of Tampa, william.lloyd@spartans.ut.edu

To What Extent does the Separation of Power Help or Hinder Efficiency in Foreign Policy and War?

Greg Lemrow, University of Tampa, gregory.lemrow@spartans.ut.edu

International Relations: *Theory and International Relations*, BHC 130

Chair & Discussant: *Kelly A. McHugh, Florida Southern College, kmchugh@flsouthern.edu*

Nuclear Proliferation from the Perspectives of Niccoló Machiavelli and Immanuel Kant

Brianna Turbeville and Mark Lacey, Florida Southern College, briannapolisci@gmail.com &
laceytmark@gmail.com

Do We Really Need An African Theory of International Relations?

Ejikeme Nonso, University of Victoria, ejikemenonso@yahoo.com

Physical environment and identity formation of urban and rural perpetrators

Alexander James Banks, Flagler College, abanks210@flagler.edu

How Neoliberalism is New: Ideology and Instrumental State

Michael Wartenbe, Florida International University, mwart001@fiu.edu

Comparative Politics: Identity & Populism in Comparative Perspective, BHC 130

Chair & Discussant: Alfred G. Cuzan, University of West Florida, acuzan@uwf.edu

First Nationalism then Desired identity: Statistical Analysis of the US Bosniak Diaspora Survey Data

Mirsad Krijestorac, Florida International University, mkrij001@fiu.edu

Islam Between Religion and Ideology: The Emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham-A Comparative Study

Pamela Khawam, University of South Florida, pkhawam@mail.usf.edu &
Stephen Strenges, University of South Florida, sstrenges@mail.usf.edu

Politics of Populism in Erdogan's Turkey and Correa's Ecuador

Orcun Selcuk, Florida International University, oselc001@fiu.edu

SESSION 4: 3:30 PM to 5:00 PM

Undergraduate Panel: New Developments in the Globe, BHC 126

Chair & Discussant: Houman Sadri, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), President, sadrihouman@hotmail.com

Perspectives on the German Reaction to the Eurozone Crisis

Caitlyn Myerson, UCF, caitlynmyerson@Knights.ucf.edu

Kazakhstan and Central Asia: The advent of a Regional Hegemon

Guillermo Nardone, UCF, manya101@Knights.ucf.edu

Globalization in Iran: the New Fight for Women's Rights

Lindsey Russell, UCF, Lindsey.R@Knights.ucf.edu

Political Violence and Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan

Emily Stowers, UCF, emily.r.stowers@knights.ucf.edu

China and Central Asia's Transnational Problems Require Multilateral Solutions

Blake Tobin, UCF, Blake.tobin@knights.ucf.edu

This panel is sponsored by the IPAC Foundation for FPSA 2015.

International Relations: *Political Economy*, BHC 127

Chair & Discussant: *Douglas Rivero, Bethune-Cookman University, riverod@cookman.edu*

The Democratic Peace: Achieving Liberalization and Stability in the Post-Soviet Space through Eastern E.U. Enlargement

Marissa Wyant, University of South Florida, mwyant@mail.usf.edu

Certainty and Self Sufficiency: Russia and China Energy Relationship

Kevin Modlin, Florida International University, kevinmodlin@hotmail.com

The Scales of Power: A Balance Between Democracy & Economy of the European Union

Alexander Bambula, Florida Atlantic University, abambula@my.fau.edu

Trade Deficit between the U.S. and PRC

Donn Matthew Garby, Flagler College, dgarby300@flagler.edu

The Developmental State in East Asia and the Challenge of Globalization

Zenel Garcia, Florida International University, zgarc001@fiu.edu

American Politics: *Politics, Processes & Personalities of American Politics*, BHC 128

Chair & Discussant: *Will Miller, Flagler College, wmiller@flagler.edu*

Nuclear Option

Stephen Phillips, University of Florida, scphillips@ufl.edu

Divided Turnout: The Influence of Divided Government

Heidi Beck, University of Central Florida, hbeck@knights.ucf.edu

Cheney's Legacy So Far

(Ted) Edward Duggan, Tallahassee Community College, duggane@tcc.fl.edu

A Case Study to Examine the Poverty Rate in the United States

Hailey Jenkins and Nathan Willin, Florida Southern College, haileyj13@hotmail.com

Comparative Politics: *The Politics of Latin America*, BHC 129

Chair & Discussant: *Denis Rey, University of Tampa, denis.rey@ut.edu*

Contested Claims: Evaluating Indigenous Legislative Reservations in Bolivia and Ecuador

Adam Howe, Florida International University, ahowe015@fiu.edu

How Would Cuban Communist Party Fare in Free Elections

Alfred G. Cuzan, University of West Florida, acuzan@uwf.edu

Cuba and the United States: a New Beginning?

Giselle D. Jamison, St. Thomas University, gjamison@stu.edu

Political Theory, BHC 130

Chair & Discussant: *Brian Kupfer, Tallahassee Community College, kupferb@tcc.fl.edu*

Neoconned: The Origin of the Neoconservatives

Edward Duggan, Tallahassee Community College, duggane@tcc.fl.edu

Wanderers of Anomie's Cultural Logic – A Critique of Deconstruction's Possibilities

Lucas Miranda, Florida International University, lmira031@fiu.edu

Two-Party System Have We the People Chosen the Best Number of Candidates?

Gerardo Casteleiro & Bradley Trager, Lynn University, GCasteleiro@email.lynn.edu

Democratizing Ontology: Ephemeral Points of Democratic Being

Dean Caivano, York University, dcc12@yorku.ca

Undergraduate Panel: Arab & Muslim World Affairs, BHC 131

Chair & Discussant: *Greg McDowall, Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC), Research Project Manager, legalos4@yahoo.com*

Microfinance in Algeria

Elaine Chamberlain, UCF, Elaine.chamberlain@knights.ucf.edu

Unions and Armies: Institutional Pervasiveness in Arab Transition

Dominic Martin, UCF, dmartinucf@knights.ucf.edu

Women's Economic Empowerment in Jordan and Palestine: A Comparative Analysis

Hanady Nabut, UCF, hnabut@knights.ucf.edu

Turkmenistan: The result of positive Neutrality and the future of the sultanate in the 21st century

Guillermo Nardone, UCF, manya101@Knights.ucf.edu

This panel is sponsored by the IPAC Foundation for FPSA 2015.

State and Local Government: The Florida View, BHC Reading Room

Chair and Discussant: *Robert Robertson, University of Phoenix-Central Florida, rroberts905@gmail.com*

The Changing Florida Executive Branch

Aubrey Jewett, UCF - Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

Sunshine State Dilemma: Voting for the 2014 Governor of Florida

M. V. (Trey) Hood III, University of Georgia, th@uga.edu & Seth C. McKee, Texas Tech University, sc.mckee@ttu.edu

Walt Disney World: The Ultimate Public Private Partnership

Tamara Dimitrijevska-Markoski, tamara.dm@Knights.ucf.edu, Meldin Graziani-Califano, Isaac Ray Caputo & Mehmet Yesilbas, University of Central Florida

COCKTAIL RECEPTION: 5:00 PM to 6:30 PM—BHC Library

Please join fellow FPSA members for a cocktail reception with hors-d'oeuvres and open bar (beer, wine, and soda) at the Burnett Honors College library and grounds. Special thanks to at UCF for hosting this event.

Institutions and Organizations Participating in the 2015 FPSA Program

Barry University
Bethune-Cookman University
Flagler College
Florida Atlantic University
Florida International University
Florida Southern College
Florida State University
Hampton University
John Cabot University
Information & Policy Analysis Center
Lynn University
Saint Leo University
St. Thomas University
Stetson University
Tallahassee Community College
University College London
University of Central Florida
University of Florida
University of Georgia
University of Miami
University of North Florida
University of Phoenix – Central Florida Campus
University of South Florida
University of Tampa
University of Victoria
University of West Florida
Valdosta State University
Valencia College
York University



Save the Date!

Florida Political Science Association

2016 Annual Meeting at Florida Southern University

Lakeland, Florida

Date: Saturday 2 April 2016

2016 Arrangements Chair: Kelly A. McHugh, kmchugh@flsouthern.edu

2016 Program Chair: Denis Rey, University of Tampa, denis.rey@ut.edu

Look for the Call for Papers in October 2015

Please check the FPSA website for the latest information: www.fpsanet.org



FPSA Awards

- Manning J. Dauer Award
- Best Graduate Paper Award
- Best Undergraduate Paper Award

Manning J. Dauer Award

Manning J. Dauer was a distinguished professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida for over half a century. When he passed away in 1986, he left a legacy that is unparalleled in the State of Florida. He had served as both a formal and an informal advisor to scores of governors, the state legislature, mayors, county commissioners, and city councilpersons. Indeed, it is said that he left his imprint on many public policies at both the state and local level. He is perhaps best known for leading a team of scholars and public officials that devised a reapportionment scheme for the State in the aftermath of the famous *Baker v. Carr* and *Reynolds v. Sims* cases. As an academic, he wrote numerous articles and books on state and local government and politics, and his work was frequently cited by other scholars. He also edited a well-received book on government and politics in Florida in 1980. Upon his death, Professor Robert J. Huckshorn (Florida Atlantic University) carried the book into two additional editions. The book is now edited by Professor J. Edwin Benton (University of South Florida). Moreover, Professor Dauer was a well-known figure within the political science and public administration communities and served in numerous capacities in national and regional associations of both disciplines. But, his heart and loyalty were perhaps tied closest to the organization that he helped to co-found—the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA).

In the late 1990s, the FPSA decided that it was time to establish a lasting and fitting tribute to the person who had breathed life into our Association and devoted so much of his time and energy to the FPSA and the state he loved. To that end, the Association's officers, Executive Council, and membership in 2000 created the Manning J. Dauer Award that would be given every three years to a faculty member at a Florida institution. The purpose of the award was to honor a scholar, like Professor Dauer, who had unequivocally distinguished herself/himself nationally and internationally in both basic and applied research. Like Professor Dauer, this person would be someone whose research would be read by not only other scholars but also would have practical value to public officials and the public at-large in the quest to encourage and facilitate informed decision-making. Furthermore, it was expected that the recipient would possess an exemplary record in research pertinent to Florida government and politics and, as a result, be recognized as a foremost authority and quoted source in this area. Since its inception, the award has been bestowed on **Thomas R. Dye** (Florida State University), **Susan A. MacManus** (University of South Florida), **Joan Carver** (Jacksonville University), **J. Edwin Benton** (University of South Florida) and **Richard C. Feiock** (Florida State University).



Best Graduate Paper Award

Best Undergraduate Paper Award

The FPSA recognizes the Best Graduate Paper presented at the annual meeting. The recipient of the award is recognized at the following meeting with a plaque and a \$250 check from the association. In addition, the paper is considered for inclusion in the next volume of the association's journal, the *Florida Political Chronicle*.

This year FPSA has added an award to recognize the Best Undergraduate Paper presented at the annual meeting. The recipient of this award is recognized at the following meeting with a plaque and a \$200 check from the association. In addition, the paper is considered for inclusion in the next volume of the association's journal, the *Florida Political Chronicle*.

Graduate students who present a paper at the annual meeting are encouraged to **submit their paper for the Best Graduate Student Paper Award by May 1st**. Please email your paper as an attachment (MS Word or PDF) to the Chair of the Best Graduate Student Paper Award Selection Committee: Sean Foreman, sforeman@barry.edu

Undergraduate students who present a paper at the annual meeting are encouraged to **submit their paper for the Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award by May 1st**. Please e-mail your paper as an attachment (MS Word or PDF) to the Chair of the Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award Selection Committee: Denis Rey, denis.rey@ut.edu

A Special Thanks to our Arrangements Chairs

Aubrey Jewett

Martin Dupuis

and to the University of Central Florida, Burnett Honors College.

Publications of the Florida Political Science Association

Florida Political Chronicle

<http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html>

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is an annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association and encourages submissions from all disciplinary subfields. *Please contact journal Editor Marco Rimanelli, marco.Rimanelli@saitleo.edu, for more information about submission guidelines.*

The Political Scientist:

The Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association


<http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html>

The Political Scientist is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact **Editor Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg, jsm2@stpt.usf.edu**, for more information about submission guidelines.

website: www.fpsanet.org



BOOK-REVIEW



Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama* (New York: Knopf, 2014), p.416, ISBN 978-0-30-726817-4.

Those of us who exercise the craft of professor of foreign policy and international relations, but who also have had the occasion to actually move around in the world of diplomats, strategists and military leaders, can only be impressed by a history of recent U.S. foreign policy that successfully bridges the outlooks of book learning and practice—each informing the other. Stephen Sestanovich, now in New York at the Council of Foreign Relations and as Professor at Columbia University, accomplishes this with a thoroughly documented and engaging interpretation of the foreign policies of the last 12 U.S. Presidents since World War II from Harry Truman to Barrack Obama. Besides demonstrating a mastery of the academic secondary literature, Sestanovich also digs into memoirs, speeches, and declassified documents. But above all, his hands-on experience

as an ex-career diplomat from the Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton years (having worked under both parties) sharpens his vision in the service of a large perspective covering 70 years of U.S. relations in the world.

The author places his analysis in a cyclical view of the waxing and waning of American power in the world, what he describes as alternating policies of “maximalism” and “retrenchment”. “Maximalist” Presidents have consistently used power to shape the international system in a Liberal-capitalist direction, so as to bend it to American interests, both material and ideological. “Retrenchment” Presidents have viewed this as an over-reaching that places excessive burdens on national capabilities and public support, as well as the unwelcome strategic consequences of actually weakening the American position via over-extension and undermining its image. In the view of “maximalists”, however, it is the “retrenchers” who have weakened the U.S. global standing, leaving Washington and its allies subject to a merciless battering by hostile Powers who challenge the Liberal international order fashioned under the leadership of the United States. So, the ebb and flow of diplomacy becomes a story of “retrenchers” bringing under control the over-extension of “maximalists”, who are then called back into power, usually in reaction to an external crisis created by the negative consequences of a vacuum of power left by “retrenchment: itself.

In weaving his account, Sestanovich sees Cold War Democratic Presidents engaging in vigorous policies of “maximalism”—Harry Truman (Korean War), John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (Viet-Nam War). On the other hand, Republican Presidents like Dwight Eisenhower (warning of the influence of the military-industrial complex), and Richard Nixon (*détente* toward both the Soviet Union and Red China), carried out policies of “retrenchment”. Nevertheless, also strong “maximalists” can be found among Republican Presidents, like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, who both oversaw the dramatic increase in American muscle (the former following the Soviet First Afghan War, and the latter one as reaction to the “9/11” terrorist attacks on America). However, since the real world of power remains vast, complex and in constant movement, no simple linear narrative of flux and reflux is actually sufficient in its analytical grasp. Indeed, several occupants of the White House began their Presidencies with clear “retrenchment” proclivities, only to be forced back into “maximalist” policies by unexpected international crises that threatened U.S. interests and position.

In the view of Sestanovich, the dilemmas facing Harry Truman are indicative of those facing all Presidents up to and including Barack Obama. With the end of World War II and the onset of the new distribution of power in its wake, the Truman White House was faced with making the epochal decisions regarding the future peace-time role

of the United States, the country that emerged from the war in the strongest position. Would the Americans opt for a leading role in the world in order to build a Second Post-war Liberal order that would confront the rising threat of the USSR and Communism? Of course we know that international leadership was indeed chosen, but Sestanovich points out that the resulting “Containment” option was taken only after great hesitation and a vigorous debate that engaged the foreign policy establishment, as well as the Congress. For the author, three imperatives had to be balanced. Quoting from a speech given by Dean Acheson in late-1945, the future Secretary of State reduced the American people’s views about foreign policy to three short and simple policy provisions: “1. Bring the boys home. 2. Don’t be Santa Claus. 3. Don’t be pushed around.” These three imperatives of the U.S. public opinion had to be skillfully blended with three inter-locking anxieties of the Washington foreign policy leadership: worries about Europe’s post-war viability, the aims of the Soviet Union, and America’s fitness and firmness. Truman, as would be the case with many U.S. Presidents who succeeded him, did not want the United States to be pushed around—but also did not want this to cost too much. Truman’s efforts to reduce the defense budget regularly came up against international crises that prompted the White House and Congress to increase spending, in particular the 1948 Communist Czech Coup and especially the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, or most significantly the U.S. military intervention in Korea. The Korean War became the high point of “maximalism” even though it eventually led to an overly-confident over-extension when Containment gave way to a stab at complete “liberation” of Communist North Korea, which in turn provoked a massive Chinese military riposte. This first example of “maximalism” led to a sharp rise in criticism for what came to be seen as the incompetent use of American power abroad, while creating a domestic political environment for the election of Republican rival Dwight Eisenhower, whose promise to end the war if elected led to a swing to “retrenchment”.

In time, the former general warned that the United States risked becoming an “armed camp,” a “garrison state” or even a “police state” after suffering national “bankruptcy.” The United States had to cut costs or risk losing what John Foster Dulles called “the stamina needed for permanent security”. The flinging of such epithets would find more sober expression in Eisenhower’s own farewell address in which he warned his fellow citizens of the dangers of an unrestrained “military-industrial complex.” However, Eisenhower also strove to exercise American power on the cheap: he openly advocated relying on nuclear weapons more often, and in response to a wider range of problems, than any other U.S. President. Although cheaper than conventional forces, nuclear weapons cast a greater burden on popular anxiety in the face of cataclysmic weapons. On the other hand, Ike also probed the possibility of a ban on nuclear tests and limited arms control. For Sestanovich, as for other historians, Eisenhower still remains a puzzle: “He always qualified his readiness to use American power with so many limits and conditions—some sensible, some all but impossible to meet,” says the author, “that his true aims were usually known only to him.” At the end of the chapter on Ike’s Presidency, we read that Americans “began to think that policies designed for the long haul were blind to the needs and opportunities of the moment. They became more receptive to the argument that they had to, and could, do better.” The young and vigorous Democratic President John F. Kennedy became their new man.

Sestanovich sees Kennedy’s strategy as virtually the opposite of Eisenhower’s one. A President preoccupied with stability over the long-haul had been replaced by one committed to a burst of game-changing efforts. America was back into a confident “maximalist” mode, although the new team was committed both to boldness and to minimizing the risks of such boldness. Kennedy and his advisors wanted to make “maximalism” safe, “to increase U.S. power and, at the same time to discipline it as strictly as possible.” The final, rather laudatory judgment of the author is that “John Kennedy conducted a foreign policy based on the active use of unparalleled American power, managed with exquisite care, but poorly understood.” The foreign policy of this Presidency, cut tragically short in 1963, would be picked up by his Vice-President and successor Johnson in the same spirit, but in the end pruned back by the limits of another war in Asia.

For Sestanovich, the foreign policy of Lyndon Johnson is instead a story of caution, where this President regularly gave into the advice of his national security team and his generals, even against his own instincts to avoid a quagmire, and always in fear of making momentous decisions that closed down other options. Whenever considering deeper American involvement in the Viet-Nam War, Johnson played the skeptic throughout, a president inhabited by “agonizing reluctance.” Such is the judgment we find in *Maximalist*: Johnson had taken office hoping for a breathing space from costly foreign commitments, with the goal to be a “retrenchment” President, yet he wanted to retrench from success, when American power was at its peak. But for his advisors the urge to retrench made no sense and they saw no reason to curtail the global role of the United States. Johnson may have resisted his national security team urging for more commitment, even stubbornly resisting, but always in the end he did yield. For the author, Johnson let the war in Viet-Nam deteriorate, while trying to build a record of domestic achievement that he wanted to be his true claim to greatness (War on Poverty, and Civil Rights). Finally, with military and foreign policy disaster at the doorstep, “maximalism” shunts aside entrenchment.

The foreign policy legacy that Johnson left would be vigorously tackled by Republican President Nixon (who had earlier served as Eisenhower Vice-President, but had been bested at the elections by his rival Kennedy). The United States would henceforth serve as “*a weight—not the weight—in the scale of international power*”. For Sestanovich, every element of the Nixon Administration’s global strategy reflected a balancing with down-sizing. He points out that between 1969 and 1972, total military personnel dropped from 3.4 million to 2.3 million, the lowest level since before the Korean War. The U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea were cut by a third, in the Philippines by half. It was also Nixon who brought home most of the half a million troops in Vietnam and enunciated a new minimalist doctrine that would carry his name: the United States would now support allies with funding, weapons, training and intelligence, but would not engage American troops, and if necessary it would be with air power first. Nevertheless, while bringing Americans home, Nixon also escalated the shooting war in Viet-Nam, but without succeeding in the end in really weakening the enemy. This policy did, however, strengthen domestic opposition to the war.

To cover their planned U.S. retreat from Viet-Nam, while keeping the USSR off-balance says Sestanovich, Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made a dramatic opening to China to diplomatically play it against the USSR and isolate the Vietnamese Communists. In the view of the author, this move and the ensuing U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangular diplomacy also gave the USSR stronger incentives to pursue *détente* with Washington and created a foundation for friendly Sino-American relations that has endured for decades. It also, in the view of the author, gave both Nixon and Kissinger life-long reputations as strategic sages and masters of *realpolitik*. The United States would not aim for world leadership; it would be just one Power in a renewed Realist balance of power that would keep world peace. Nixon knew that “retrenchment” was unavoidable, says Sestanovich. During the four-year exit from Viet-Nam, his brief, severe and dramatic bursts of military power never once led him to suspend, or even slow-down, the troop cuts. The author’s final judgment is that in the end Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy aimed to blunt the impact of “retrenchment” after Viet-Nam and to make any such future U.S. “retrenchments” unnecessary.

However, the Nixon episode of “retrenchment” led to what was becoming a classic cycle: the debate turned from whether or not the United States was too strong and over-ambitious to a concern over decline and weakness. Sestanovich points out that during the Nixon (R), Gerry Ford (R) and Jimmy Carter (D) Administrations, the U.S. economy was in recession almost one-fourth of the time, hit by chronic inflation and a weakened Dollar on international markets. Also, because the Pentagon’s budget was under pressure throughout the decade, the growth of Soviet military capabilities seemed even more frightening than it really was. This did not, however, diminish the activism and energy of Nixon’s and Ford’s Secretary of State Kissinger, whose diplomacy in the Middle East, in particular the challenge of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and its ensuing “Step-by-Step”. The established *détente* with the Soviets allowed the Secretary of State to muscle aside the Kremlin, although it

proved impossible to count on either European solidarity, or on Japan. Congress also intervened to clip the White House wings, from cutting the military budget during the waning Viet-Nam War, to the War Powers Act, to control of nuclear weapons treaties. Domestic critics of Secretary of State “Super K” believed he had become so wedded to the international process of arms control that he was indifferent to any emergent American weakness. In the view of Kissinger, says Sestanovich, the debate over his policies was a contest between prudent centrism and America’s irresponsible extremes. But, concludes the author, thinking that his own approach was sustainable in the long-run was perhaps his biggest mistake.

So, when Democratic Jimmy Carter was elected President in 1976 in a seemingly popular rejection of both Nixon’s Watergate scandal (Presidential abuse of domestic powers) and *Realpolitik* (Presidential global activism), Carter and his advisors had to choose between foreign policy continuity and the opportunity to strike out in new directions: Carter, says the author, made clear that he accepted much of existing policy, even though he wanted to take the same road in a more transparent fashion. However, the break with previous policy was marked by his integration of the pursuit of human rights in American foreign policy. We read that “Carter wanted to put foreign policy on a more promising activist course, and some of his efforts produced landmark results. The Panama Canal Treaty that he made... eliminated a potent anti-Yankee rallying cry in Latin American politics. The Camp David agreements that he mediated in 1978 quieted relations between Egypt and Israel for decades.” He also encouraged Moscow dissidents in an open challenge to Soviet legitimacy. “With his support, Polish trade unionists and Afghan freedom fighters began to shake the Soviet empire.” For the author, these achievements were significant.

However, once again “retrenchment” would dissolve in the face of yet another international crisis, this time the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (or First Afghan War). The invasion, according the Sestanovich, pushed Carter into putting aside his earlier clumsy diplomatic East-West ambivalence. First came the diplomatic protest via the hotline. Then he asked the U.S. Senate to suspend action on the SALT II arms control Treaty, stopped U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union, and called for a U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. “Retrenchment” gave way when he also authorized increased military supplies to the anti-Soviet Afghan *mujahedeen*. In 1980 the Carter Doctrine, labeled the security of the (Persian) Gulf region and its international energy trade networks a vital American interest, pledging military action if needed. Thereafter, his administration sought to revive the draft, asked Congress for an interim increase in the Pentagon budget, and completed a revision of U.S. nuclear strategy. Sestanovich remarks that the Gallup Poll’s Presidential-approval rating showed the biggest upward jump in its history, from 32% to 61%. The author judges that Carter’s new strategy toward the Soviet Union positioned him as a stronger leader than in the past, and it might have saved him politically, but for his parallel fumbling of the Iranian hostage crisis. We read that “Presidents rarely change direction in office, even when problems mount. Jimmy Carter was an exception. Many of the measures for which his rival Republican Ronald Reagan was later praised, were in fact initiated by Carter. So, we read in *Maximalist* that America’s second experience with “retrenchment” ended in much the same way the first one did. *Détente* in the 1970s evoked the same criticisms and dissatisfactions as Eisenhower’s attempt to put foreign policy on a sustainable footing in the 1950s. A strategy that was supposed to be sustainable over the long-haul commanded strong support, ironically, only as an interim measure. When new problems and opportunities appeared, Americans demanded new responses to them. In 1980, the same sort of “maximalist” transformation was about to begin.

In the first year of the Reagan Presidency “maximalism” was clearly the choice. The new President believed that the Soviet system was rickety and he was determined to knock it down with huge defense expenditures in a new U.S.-Soviet arms race. As well as upping the military pressure, he also upped the hostile rhetoric and put pressure on European and NATO Allies to get on board. The new administration continued arms control initiatives, but the aim changed—it was no longer to build stability, but a way of putting the Soviets on the defensive. We read in *Maximalism* that “The so-called zero-option that Reagan proposed in November 1981 contained the seeds of his

later nuclear abolitionism. In exchange for cancellation of the proposed American deployment in Europe, the Soviet Union would have to give up every single one of its intermediate-range missiles.” To the surprise of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachëv, Reagan was able to hold together the NATO Alliance around this strategy and the Soviets suffered a clear defeat on the 1977-88 Euromissiles crisis. For Sestanovich, apart from deep East-West nuclear arms reductions backed by unprecedented bilateral on-site inspections, nothing defined Reagan’s foreign policy legacy more than his support for peoples and movements trying to escape Communist rule. During the Reagan Presidency, the United States offered significant assistance to anti-Soviet groups in Poland, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere. American national security policy blended old Containment, plus a good dose of “Liberation” when occasions presented themselves. For Sestanovich, this did not mean that the clear goal of Reagan, ending the Cold War by winning it, entailed coherent steps to that end. Indeed, there was the usual lurching from one crisis to another in foreign policy, and Congress was not always on board, it not outright hostile when it discovered that the White House had at times deceived it, by example attempting to get around legislation that prohibited aid to the anti-Communists Contras in Nicaragua, while ambiguously trading with enemy Islamic Iran (this Iran-Contra Scandal precipitated a failed Presidential Impeachment). In general, Sestanovich sees Reagan foreign policy as a mixture of confrontation and conciliation, especially vis-à-vis the Soviets. In all of this, the Reagan years saw no major military intervention. The author also claims that Reagan had the advantage of a personal communication style (perhaps connected to his previous career as an actor) that was able to get others to see things through his eyes. Reagan left the White House declaring that the Cold War was over, the economy was strong and it was “Morning again in America”! No President in the second half of the Twentieth Century left office with such a high popular rating.

But Reagan’s own hand-picked successor, his Vice-President George H.W. Bush, did not believe the Cold War was completely over, nor did he believe the time for “retrenchment” had arrived. In fact, Sestanovich says, Bush “the Elder” thought Reagan’s diplomacy had been too passive in responding to several Soviet initiatives. For the new team, in order to protect its global position the U.S. had to throw Moscow clearly on the defensive. As the author quotes Bush, “If we don’t regain the lead, things will fall apart.” This was the challenge in managing the reunification of Germany on terms congenial to America, which the author agrees was a true masterpiece of diplomacy. It was also the challenge when Bush decided to defend Saudi Arabia against the predation of Saddam Hussein, whose first move was the invasion and annexation of Kuwait. We learn, however, that this President was at first non-committal about a military response and that it took a “Churchillian” speech to the National Security Council by his NSC Advisor General Brent Scowcroft, a “spine-stiffener”, to clarify that letting any dictator swallow-up a friendly state in such vital oil-rich geo-strategic region would be too great a blow to American credibility, regional stability and energy security. But unlike in the strategic Gulf region vital to U.S. interests as proven by his victory in the ensuing 1990-91 First Gulf War, Bush remained more cautious about giving support to break-away components of the former-USSR and Yugoslavia. During the 1992 Presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration for standing by while the breakup of Yugoslavia turned into genocide. Nevertheless, the Bush team, if not always the President himself, pushed for a robust American presence in the world. To limit conflict in the post-Cold War world, the United States had to remain the principle source of global security in cooperation with the U.N. and NATO.

When candidate Clinton became President he complained that the United States had “traded in one big problem for a whole bunch of little ones.” So, despite the candidate’s criticism of Bush regarding Yugoslavia, President Clinton became extremely prudent in dealing with the Balkans. However, when diplomacy led nowhere, the U.S. Air Force was used against the Serbs in an escalating “Humanitarian Intervention”, which for Sestanovich created the turning point that led to the Dayton Peace Conference—but also to a belief now entrenched in the White House that diplomacy had to be supported by force. For example, in 1996 when Beijing attempted to intimidate Taiwan by means of naval exercises and missile firings, Clinton moved two aircraft carriers into position near the Taiwan Strait and warned the Chinese that further action would have grave consequences. Sestanovich declares

that “This show of force—gunboat diplomacy, really—was as confrontational as any American action against China since Eisenhower.” Overall, he sees Clinton foreign policy as hyperactive: “The Clinton administration’s steady revival of an activist U.S. role was based on policy premises that were identical to those on which policy-makers of the Truman administration began to wage the Cold War. Their actions presumed that other governments were not really able to provide for their own security, and even less able to meet the requirements of true international leadership.” This was the case for managing the new “dual containment” of Saddam’s Iraq and Islamic Iran, as well as dealing with emerging global terrorist threat of Al-Qaeda. The U.S.A. had become the “indispensable nation” that would lead international economic globalization, in fact stay ahead of it. This, however, did lead to what was called at the State Department the “hegemon problem”—generalized hostility kicked-up by ubiquitous global activism. The next President, Bush’s own son “W” would inherit this and even deeply aggravate it.

Victory in the Cold War had vindicated U.S. “maximalism”, while the post-Cold War “peace-dividend” that led to a defense budget that was a smaller share of GDP was in the eyes of Sestanovich “more of a breather than a real retrenchment, a stutter-step pause to take stock of the new world that was then emerging. Doing less abroad was one of Republican candidate George W. Bush’s themes, even though in his inaugural address he made the usual obligatory nod to international duty. For the author, “While many early moves by the Bush team were seen as unilateral, they were marked as much by disengagement as by self-assertion. The new administration scaled back efforts to promote an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, discouraged reconciliation talks between the Koreans, and reversed Clinton’s support for both the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions and the International Criminal Court.” Terrorism was another problem that the younger Bush administration treated less urgently than its predecessor had. Instead, this new Bush Presidency was focused first on domestic affairs. Then came “9/11”. We read that “The Bush team’s thinking about how to respond to terrorism led it back to Saddam Hussein. The process was half strategic logic, half utter speculation. Yet 9/11 had given utter speculation new respectability.” Having responded to “9/11” with a fast vanquishing of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in a distant Second Afghan War in 2001-02, was not enough. The effort directed at Saddam was tied to an even greater effort to reform the Middle East, and in this it should be noted that Bush “the Younger” had the early support of prominent Democrats. The world instead, increasingly saw American unilateral combat operations as another example of American arrogance, unfortunately framed as a crusade against an “Axis of Evil”. Sestanovich reminds the reader that critics later charged that Bush took up the cause of democracy only when WMD were not found in Iraq, when in fact the President had paired the two themes from the very beginning, “treating them as complementary halves of the same policy.” And when military power was to be used, it was to be quick and as small as possible, a light footprint. It would also leverage America’s partners. This turned out to be sufficient to undo an army like Saddam’s, but not to stabilize through international peacekeeping the local situation over the long-term. When the situation then became desperate, a surge of U.S. ground forces into Iraq was needed and successful. But as the U.S. public and international support for such bloody Coalitions peacekeeping stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan dissipated, also this most recent episode of U.S. “retrenchment” crashed and burned.

Of course, Democrat President Barack Obama is obviously another “retrenchment” President and so far has not been tempted by any major turn towards “maximalism”. The cut-backs in defense spending are a clear marker of this, as well as his reticence to be drawn into the forefront of international crises. This does not rule out that once again in the future tenacious cuts in defense spending could be inundated by the rapid bloating of spending brought on by unexpected crises. Sestanovich issues a warning to Obama: “Retrenchment was easy in your first term—it almost always is. It gets harder once the wars you were elected to conclude are over. When that happens, don’t expect your problems with Congress, or with the media, or with foreign policy experts, to come mainly from Rand Paul, John Bolton, Fox News, or the Heritage Foundation. Watch out even for your centrist supporters—for Bill and Hillary Clinton, the *New York Times*, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”

The author's account does not explicitly engage the academic literature and its debates on long cycles, although its time frame is situated in the *moyenne durée* of several decades explored by the great French historian Fernand Braudel, who bracketed alliance systems and Great Power arrangements in a multi-decade time-span. Nor does Sestanovich evoke the constraints and imperatives of geography posed by geo-strategists. However, in its own new way, *Maximalist* does come to grips with the Isolationist/Internationalist (not to mention the cruder imperialist/anti-imperialist) contrasts, but giving it much greater nuance and sophistication. Sestanovich's account also gets us past the Idealism/Realism dichotomy, as all Presidents have brewed their own concoction of the two, given the American public opinion's penchant for "Moralism". Although the cyclical scheme presented here is pushed to the limit, looking something like an inexorable dialectical teleology, it remains mostly credible under the author's prudent pen and gives us an innovative way of arranging the big picture in terms of greater vs. lesser efforts in foreign policy decision-making.

This cyclical movement of diplomatic history is proffered to us without an overt preference by the author for one phase or the other, but by the end of the book there does seem to be at least a slight "maximalist" penchant. "A careful look at American policy since the Second World War," the author says, "suggests an answer that many will find awkward: the United States achieved a great deal precisely by being uncompromising and confrontational." On the other hand, he admits that the same "maximalism" that can be credited with so many successes also played a decisive part in foreign policy disasters like in Korea, Viet-Nam and Iraq. When Washington swings back to "maximalism" it has frequently overdone it. He points out that "maximalist" Presidents who get into long stalemated conflicts end-up paying a heavy political price for their failure. Their successors, "the presidents who come in to clean up the mess," receive strong domestic support and get re-elected, such are the cases of Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Barack Obama. Only George H.W. Bush, a President who initiated a process of "retrenchment", failed to win a second term. In any case, as the Sestanovich concludes his work by evoking a theme that holds his thesis together: "Almost seven decades ago Harry Truman and his colleagues concluded that a satisfactory global order—secure, prosperous and democratic—was not possible unless the United States somehow called the shots. For all the differences between Truman's times and ours—and they are fundamental, Washington policy-makers have surprisingly similar views today."

Steven Ekovich,

Steven Ekovich, Ph.D.
Associate-Professor of International Politics
Department of International & Comparative Politics
American University of Paris, France




ISSN: 1549-1323

Editing & Design: Marco Rimanelli

E-printed: Winter 2014-2015

Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: Flagler College-St. Augustine



FLAGLER COLLEGE

BE PART OF THE LEGACY



The College's International Studies Program features tracks in Anthropology, Latin American Studies, Political Science and Economics. Students also have the opportunity to study abroad through faculty-led trips to countries such as Costa Rica, Italy, Belize and Russia.



Flagler students have presented papers at conferences across the country. But research also reaches outside the classroom through programs like the coastal environmental science major that takes advantage of Flagler's access to the Florida coastline.



With Flagler located in St. Augustine, the Nation's Oldest City, students have access to many local resources. Flagler works with the community through programs such as the major in Public History and an archaeology field school held just blocks from campus.

