

Florida Map with Cities

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Florida Political Chronicle

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Only the current issue is exclusively accessible via password and FPSA subscription until a new issue is printed!

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) essays for consideration:

- Essays must be sent in **Word as e-mail** not PDF.
- **Author’s Biography** at paper’s end (2-paragraphs, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.).
- **Do not use the First Person (“I”)**; instead use always the neutral “The study” or “This work”.
- Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1 inch margin (no landscape-size tables!).
- **No PDF** or Acrobat. If you have Acrobat you can use its selector and convert it into Word.
- Preferred style and footnoting (at end of each page) is in Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
- All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
- **Book-Reviews** are welcome on important topics! Submit any 2+ pages-long Book-Review in Word.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

New President's Introduction & FPSA News

by FPSA President Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D., Barry University-Miami

Greetings FPSA Members and All Interested Readers,

Welcome to the first issue of the 24th volume of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (2015), once again presented under the leadership and direction of our esteemed Editor, Dr. Marco Rimanelli of Saint Leo University. This edition features also the FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award from our 2015 Annual Conference and for the first time a Best Undergraduate Paper Award. What a great way to showcase the strength of Political Science scholarship in Florida as we begin another academic year!

It is my distinct privilege to serve as the newest President of FPSA and I hope to continue the tradition of great leadership under my predecessors. We had a successful conference in March 2015 at the University of Central Florida-Orlando, which could not have been achieved without the diligence and hard work of our Arrangements Chair, Aubrey Jewett and all of the Section Chairs. The FPSA Conference also grew in 2015—we had over 20 Panels and 120 presenters, representing 29 colleges and universities from around Florida and the United States.

We are pleased to announce the winner of the 2015 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award presented at our 2015 Annual Conference: "Absentee Voting: a Cross State Analysis" by Doctoral Candidate Thomas Just of Florida International University of Miami. And the first winner of a 2015 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award (sponsored by the Information & Policy Analysis Center/IPAC of the University of Central Florida-Orlando) is "Does the Separation of Powers Help or Hinder Efficiency in Foreign Policy and War?", by Mr. Gregory Lemrow of the University of Tampa. Both winning papers are posted on this current issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and also on the FPSA's web-site.

Looking ahead to 2016, the next Annual Meeting will take place at Florida Southern College in Lakeland on 2 April 2016. The U.S. Presidential Campaign season is here and Florida is already in the spotlight as Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders dominate the headlines. We will continue to watch them in the coming months and throughout the elections. Meanwhile, the Florida legislature is also capturing attention as they redraw district lines in time for the 2016 election cycle. We are lucky to count amongst our membership experts in both Florida and national politics whose work addresses these themes. Their work is not only of interest to us in FPSA but to scholars and experts on politics across the nation. I expect the 2016 Annual Conference will highlight both a high level of discussion and an even broader range of themes in contemporary politics beyond the U.S. Presidency.

Please visit www.fpsa.org to read all past and present *Florida Political Chronicle* volumes and to read the latest issues of the *Political Scientist*. With its fresh design and new content, our FPSA web-site is a great resource for scholars, members and students. You can conduct research, learn about upcoming annual conferences and Board Members, as well as peruse FPSA's by-laws and Constitution.

Sincerely,

Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D.

President FPSA

Assistant-Professor of Political Science

Barry University, Miami Shores

Editor's Introduction: 5 Essays & 2 Annual FPSA Awards!

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists, Fellow-Travelers and All Readers,

since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way that fully embodies the current U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Science and related Disciplines: American Government & Politics, Political Theory & Philosophy, Comparative Politics, International Affairs & Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, and International Law & Organizations (see submissions requirements on p.4 above).

This new *Florida Political Chronicle* first issue of Summer 2015 (vol.24, n.1, 2015) belatedly welcomes all readers to an "Introduction" from our new President of the Florida Political Science Association, Dr. Leah H. Blumenfeld from Barry University of Miami Shores, and showcases five scholarly essays that were presented at the 2015 FPSA Annual Conference, including both the 2015 FPSA Best Graduate Paper and for the first time also a 2015 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper.

The first essay is "Do Partisan Voters Trust Party-Switchers? Case-Study on the 2014 Florida Gubernatorial Election", by Dr. Michael D. Martinez of the University of Florida in Gainesville. This paper analyzes how the 2014 Gubernatorial Election in Florida provides an important context to understand the effects of party-switching by a major party candidate: ex-Florida Republican Governor Charlie Crist, who had switched party from Republican to No Party Affiliation and then to Democrat. By using data from a state-wide pre-election survey to examine awareness of Crist's change on perceptions of the candidates' character and voter preference, Democratic voters were aware and mostly supported positively Crist's party-switch, while the opposite was true among Republican voters. In an era of polarized parties, partisans appear to be forgiving of their new allies' partisan past in their hopes to win.

The second essay is "Banal Nationalism and Religious Rhetoric in America: How George W. Bush Used Religious Rhetoric to Sell the 2003 Second Gulf War ('Iraq War')", by Dr. Mark Grzegorzewski of the University of South Florida-Tampa. This paper studies how the terrorist attacks of "9/11" were an unforeseen and unexplainable national trauma to most American caused by a mysterious 'other' enemy. Even those who did not consider themselves deeply patriotic were stirred by this unexpected national threat and in this atmosphere the George W. Bush Administration was able to prey upon a sense of Americanness to launch a 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq by using nationalistic/religious rhetoric under threat. Dr. Grzegorzewski's research adds to the various explanation on how America went to war with Iraq, by asserting how an activation of a banal nationalist identity was one way in which the G.W. Bush Administration was able to gather public support for the 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq.

The third essay is "Market Failures: to Tax or Subsidize? That is the Question on Flood Policies..." by Dr. Gary W. Boulware of the University of Florida-DRS in Gainesville. This paper studies how the U.S. government's responds to perceived "market failures" using as preferred tools for correction either

taxes or subsidies, while evaluating their application in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Since 1967, the government public policy subsidizes flood insurance via the NFIP, but as it has finally accepted the contradictory result that NFIP subsidies had become an enabler of development in flood-prone areas, recently the government is trying to phase-out subsidies for flood insurance throughout the United States. Developers, builders, realtors and mortgage-brokers who benefited from guaranteed subsidized government-provided flood insurance lobby to keep the NFIP heavily subsidized as they receive benefits and have trumped the interests of tax payers generally oblivious to the NFIP costs.

The fourth essay is “Post-Communist Recovery and the State: Case-Studies on Poland and Ukraine”, by Doctoral Candidate Thomas Just of Florida International University of Miami, which also won the 2015 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award. This research paper compares as case-studies Poland and the Ukraine in the application of neo-Liberal and post-Communist transition since the 1990s. Despite the shared history and similarities between these two countries, each approached the systemic, financial and structural adjustment crises associated with post-Communist transition very differently. The study finds that employing free ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ mechanisms for firms is a crucial factor in producing economic efficiency and reducing the presence of a black market, while a competent state must maintain national unity in times of major economic pain.

The fifth essay is “Does the Separation of Powers Help or Hinder Efficiency in Foreign Policy and War?”, by Mr. Gregory Lemrow, who is a 2015 graduating B.A. student of the University of Tampa and also the first winner of the new 2015 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award. This Best Undergraduate Paper Award is generously sponsored by the Information & Policy Analysis Center-IPAC of the University of Central Florida-Orlando by IPAC President Dr. Houman Sadri (also ex-FPSA President in 2012-2013), who has confirmed that IPAC will continue to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards. Mr. Lemrow’s Senior research paper examines the effects of the separation of powers as defined in the U.S. Constitution in how the checks and balances between the two branches affects the use of War Powers and foreign policy by examining as case-studies the 110th, 111th and 113th Congresses to identify related cooperation or combativeness between the two branches and so understand how each branch’s actions affect the another’s, as well as overall national war efforts.

Finally, this issue’s Book-Review by Floridian Professor John J. Bertalan of Schiller International University strongly criticizes as deeply flawed and inconsistent the book of T.D. Allman, *Finding Florida: the True History of the Sunshine State*.

The Editor apologizes to the FPSA and the readership that the next issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* of Fall-Winter 2015 (vol.24, n.2, 2015) will be ready belatedly by Spring 2016. It will contain another strong and diversified collection of scholarly papers from the 2015 FPSA Annual Conference.

Best wishes to all for a productive 2016 FPSA Annual Conference at Florida Southern College-Lakeland!

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

Editor of Florida Political Chronicle, FPSA

2013-2014 Fulbright-Schuman Chair, E.U.graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Belgium & Professor of Politics & International Studies at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A.

Do Partisan Voters Trust Party-Switchers? Case-Study on the 2014 Florida Gubernatorial Election

by Michael D. Martinez, Ph.D., University of Florida-Gainesville

ABSTRACT: The 2014 Gubernatorial election in Florida provides an important context to understand the effects of party-switching by a major party candidate. In this election, the Democratic nominee, ex-Florida Republican Governor Charlie Crist, had recently changed his party affiliation from Republican to No Party Affiliation and finally to Democrat. This study uses data from a statewide pre-election survey to examine the effects of awareness of Crist's change on perceptions of the candidates' character and the structure of voter preference. For Democrats, awareness of Crist's party-switch was associated with more positive assessments of Crist and more negative assessments of his Republican opponent. The opposite was true among Republicans. Awareness of Crist's party-switch also amplified the direct effects of partisanship on voter preference. In an era of polarized parties, partisans appear to be forgiving of their new allies' partisan past.

There are rapidly evolving literatures on the motivations for party switching among élites, as well as the institutional and electoral consequences of those changes. Traditionally, élites are motivated to switch parties either to maximize their chances of election or re-election, or to realign with a party that is better suited to achieve their policy goals, though the costs and benefits for doing so varies significantly across parties and party systems. Party switching is more common in less cohesive parties (O'Brien & Shomer 2013), especially among legislators who are less dependent on the party organization for their electoral success (Desposato 2006, Thames 2007). While party switching in the United States is a "rare bird" in comparison to Brazil, Israel, Poland and some other electoral democracies, it is not unheard of, and most party switchers appear to show the sincerity of their change of partisan clothing by changing their votes in the direction of their adopted party's ideology (Nokken 2009). In other words, Democratic House members who switched their allegiance to the Republican Party showed their loyalty by becoming even more supportive of the Republican leadership on important amendment and procedural votes. This pattern suggests that U.S. politicians who defect do so in part to reconcile their party with their policy goals.

Party-switching among élites and activists also plays a role in legislative politics and in party system change. Changes in party allegiances among élites may both reflect the shifting ideological bases of the parties (Kweit 1986, Clark, et al. 1991, Stone 1991, Castle & Fett 2000), as well as accelerate the process of party system change among other activists and the party in the electorate (Carsey & Layman 1999). But some literature suggests that politicians who change their partisan feathers in order to boost their electoral prospects may face significant transaction costs in the form of legal or institutional restrictions on party-switching, a significant loss of party organization effort and financial resources, and a strong impact of partisanship on voter choice that results in a penalty at the ballot box, but those costs vary as well.

Desposato (2006) notes that the lack of any legal or institutional restrictions on party-switching, weak partisanship and a history of a strong personal vote generally facilitated party-switching among Brazilian deputies, but a few faced more significant costs among more ideological and committed partisan voters. In the contemporary United States, the institutional and legal barriers to switching are comparatively low, or in some cases, nonexistent, but resurgent partisanship in the American electorate (Bartels 2000, Levendusky 2010) could impose political costs on party-switchers. Indeed, there is evidence that party-switchers pay a price in short-term electoral support from both their former co-partisans and their new co-partisans (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003), suggesting that voters may be skeptical (or unaware) of the sincerity of their new fellow partisan's positions.

In a polarized political environment with in an election in which one candidate has switched parties, voters may face significant cross-pressures. On the one hand, partisanship may lead voters in one party to embrace their new ally with a congregation's enthusiasm for the return of a prodigal son, and may lead voters in the other party to brand their former co-partisan as a traitor to the cause. In other words, intense partisanship might be imbued with such animosity to the opposing party that the convert is almost immediately forgiven for his past sins by one side, and his prior good works are almost immediately forgotten or discounted by the other.

On the other hand, the convert's new co-partisans could view him or her with the suspicion one might have of a double-agent. Consistency is a significant antecedent to generalized trust in subordinates (Butler & Cantrell 1984), so inconsistency, manifest in party switching, may result in voters *in both parties* regarding a recent party switcher with some degree of wariness. In a Downsian sense, a candidate's inconsistent positions might be seen as "fuzzy" by some voters, which could allow more voters who might be favorably predisposed to the candidate to see themselves as aligned with the candidate on that issue. However, a candidate who has switched parties risks being branded as "wishy-washy" or worse, resulting in voters in both parties viewing him or her with uncertainty as they try to figure out who the candidate really is and what he or she stands for, with neither party's voters willing to give him or her the benefit of the doubt. (Brams 1985, 44-48)

The 2014 gubernatorial election in Florida provides an important context to understand the effects of party-switching on voter attitudes. In this race, the Democratic nominee was a former Republican Governor who unsuccessfully sought to unseat his controversial Republican successor. This context provides an opportunity to examine how both Democratic and Republican voters viewed the candidates, and specifically whether awareness of the candidate's party switch affected perceptions of candidate trust among both Democrats and Republicans. This study examines a statewide pre-election survey conducted during that campaign that sheds some light on those questions.

The Importance of Candidate Trust

While partisanship, issues and retrospective evaluations all shape voter preferences, elections are ultimately a choice between candidates (Campbell, 1960, Kelley & Mirer 1974, Miller 1986). Voters think of ideal candidates in terms of a collection of traits, with trustworthiness and honesty being among the most important. (Kinder, et al. 1980, Funk 1996, Hayes 2010) Most voters perceive candidate traits through a strong tint of partisan lenses (Hayes 2005, Kilburn 2005), but there is still some room for skillful candidates, their opponents, and the media to shape candidates' public persona, which in turn, affect their overall evaluation among the voters. Good candidates understand that building trust is an important part of developing a relationship with voters in an election and throughout a career, and that a reservoir of personal trust expands the opportunity for incumbents to explain their actions in

government (Kingdon 1973, Fenno 1978). While personal trust is in part shaped by more general attitudes about the political system (Parker & Parker 1993), candidates and incumbents may try to increase voters' trust in them as individuals by personal contact (Fenno 1978, Parker & Parker 1993) and advertising (Kaid & Chanslor 1995), but any hint of scandal can cause perceptions of trust to erode quickly among some voters (Stoker 1993, Funk 1996). Personal trust, in turn, increases the overall evaluation of the candidate. (Parker 1989, Pierce 1993, Hayes 2010)

In this context, party-switchers may risk some of the trust that they have built up over time. The salience of particular candidate traits varies across elections (Funk 1999), and when one candidate has switched parties, trustworthiness and honesty are likely to be highlighted by the opponent's campaign. A candidate who built his or her reputation as a member of one party with one set of issue positions, and perhaps benefitted from that party's campaign treasury, will likely be viewed as an opportunistic traitor by his former co-partisans. But more importantly, there is some question about how his or her new co-partisans will receive the new found ally. Perhaps years of siding with the partisan opposition will engender suspicion of the new convert among some of the party faithful, while others might welcome the previously lost soul who ultimately found his or her way and now champions their cause. Thus, the key questions for this study are whether partisans view a party-switcher as sincere or untrustworthy, and how voter choice is affected by awareness of party-switching.

The Partisan Context: Florida in 2014

We will examine these issues in the context of the Florida Gubernatorial election in 2014, which pitted incumbent Republican Governor Rick Scott against his predecessor Charlie Crist, a former Republican governor who had recently become first an Independent and lastly a Democrat.

Crist had won the 2006 Florida Gubernatorial Election as a Republican, defeating his Democratic opponent 52%-45%. Rather than seeking reelection in 2010, Crist announced his candidacy for an open U.S. Senate seat, first as a Republican. But after the pre-primary polls showed him trailing Tea Party favorite, Marco Rubio, among likely Republican primary voters, Crist switched to No Party Affiliation and mounted an independent campaign against Rubio and Democratic nominee, Kendrick Meek. Despite appeals to Democrats and Independents in the general election campaign, Crist lost the US Senate election to Rubio by a big margin (49%-30%, with Meek garnering 20%). In 2012, Crist endorsed President Obama's reelection and spoke at the Democratic National Convention, and in 2013, Crist announced that he planned to run as a Democrat in the 2014 gubernatorial election, seeking to unseat his Republican successor, Rick Scott.

In the August primary, Scott faced only token opposition, and easily won the Republican nomination for a second term. In the Democratic primary, Crist faced an unreconstructed liberal former State Senator, Nan Rich, who emphasized her credentials as a lifelong Democrat in standing up to conservative Republicans. During the primary campaign, a conservative group also mounted a massive "robocall" campaign (registered political phone messaging randomly dialed to voters' homes) highlighting the inconsistencies between Crist's former positions as a Republican and his more recent statements, raising the issue of whether Crist could be trusted. Ultimately, Crist handily defeated the underfinanced Rich in the August Democratic Primary.

Although important issue differences between the two major party candidates were evident in the campaign and in the three debates, the general election campaign was widely regarded as having been very negative, as both candidates worked to define the other in terms of failures in his previous term as governor. Scott narrowly defeated Crist in the November general election (48.1% to 47.1%).

In this context, the political literature on candidate trust raises the following questions.

1. How aware were Florida voters of Crist's change in partisanship?
2. How did awareness of Crist's change in partisanship affect evaluations of his trustworthiness and honesty?
3. How did awareness of Crist's change in partisanship affect voter choice in the election?

Data

In order to address these questions, we examine a statewide telephone survey of likely voters conducted by the University of Florida Bureau of Business and Economic Research August 27-31, 2014, just after the primary election. The sample was drawn from a list of registered voters provided by a commercial vendor, with likely voters defined as respondents who either:

- voted in *both* the previous Gubernatorial election (2010) and the previous Presidential election (2012), or
- voted in either 2010 *or* in 2012, *and* indicated a subjective probability of voting of at least 8 out of 10, or
- registered to vote after the 2012 Presidential election, *and* indicated a subjective probability of voting of at least 8 out of 10.

Voters in the sampling frame were contacted by either landline or cellphone, with at least one callback attempt, and the survey was offered in both English and Spanish. The RR3 response rate was 7.0%. After applying weights to reflect the statewide population in age-group, party registration and media market, our effective sample size is 916.52.

In this pre-election survey, respondents were asked about their interest in the election, gubernatorial candidate preference, awareness of which candidate used to have a different party affiliation, assessments of the major party candidates' traits ("can be trusted, understands the problems of people like me, provides leadership, intelligent, honest and ethical"), gubernatorial job approvals for both candidates, assessment of the state economy and whether the governor has the power to affect it, and positions on a variety of issues (Affordable Care Act, Medicaid expansion, federal immigration reform [including a path to citizenship], same-sex marriage, increase of minimum wage, and medicinal marijuana use), party identification, feeling thermometers for possible 2016 Presidential Candidates (Hillary Clinton, Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio, Rand Paul, Chris Christie, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders), positive and negative feelings toward each party and demographics (gender, age, marital status, Hispanic origin and race, education, employment status, religious affiliation and attendance and income).

Elaborating on the measurement of our key variables, awareness of Crist's party-switching was assessed by a question which asked respondents:

"Do you happen to know which candidate for governor used to have a different party affiliation than he has now? Rick Scott, Charlie Crist, Neither, or Both?"

Half of the sample was asked this question prior to the battery of questions about candidate traits, and half was asked this question after the traits battery.

As Table 1 shows, awareness of Crist as the party switcher was very high (at least 78%), regardless of question order.

Table 1
Awareness of Which Candidate Switched Parties by Question Order

	<u>Before Traits</u>	<u>After Traits</u>	<u>Total</u>
Crist (correct)	78.9%	78.3%	78.6%
Scott	3.4%	2.3%	2.9%
Neither	5.9%	5.2%	5.6%
Both	2.6%	2.1%	2.3%
Don't Know	9.2%	12.1%	10.7%
Weighted N	450.2	450.2	900.5

We also asked our sample to rate both major party gubernatorial candidates on a battery of traits, with a particular interest in the assessments of Crist’s trustworthiness and honesty, as a result of his party switch. Respondents were asked:

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures. For each, tell me whether the word or phrase describes the candidate that I name:

- First, with regard to Rick Scott. In your opinion, does the phrase 'can be trusted' describe Scott?
- In your opinion, does the phrase 'understands the problems of people like me' describe Scott?
- Does the phrase 'provides leadership' describe him?
- Does the word 'intelligent' describe Scott?
- Does the phrase 'honest and ethical' describe Scott?

Interviewers then asked the same set of questions about Crist. As Table 2 shows, both candidates were regarded as intelligent by a wide majority of the state electorate and as capable of providing leadership by a slim majority. But a majority of Floridians regarded neither candidate as trustworthy or as honest and ethical, and ranked Crist lower than Scott on those questions.

Table 2
Percent Agreeing that Trait Describes Candidate (Don't Know & Refused Excluded)

	<u>Wtd.</u>		<u>Wtd.</u>	
	<u>Scott</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Crist</u>	<u>N</u>
Can be trusted	47.8	807.9	40.0	814.4
Understands the problems of people like me	46.9	822.0	49.8	827.7
Provides leadership	56.8	844.7	50.3	838.6
Intelligent	74.4	850.3	75.5	843.8
Honest and Ethical	42.6	809.9	38.9	801.0

Awareness of Party Switching and Candidate Trust

We were interested whether Crist’s change of party loyalties affected his ratings of trustworthiness, in general and among both his former co-partisans (Republicans) and his current co-partisans (Democrats). Table 3 shows the contrast between respondents who correctly identified Crist as the party-switcher and those who didn’t (the latter including those who incorrectly identified Scott, neither, or both candidates as having switched,

as well as those who admitted not knowing which candidate had switched). Awareness of Crist’s party-switching was correlated with lower evaluations of Crist on the trust and honesty items, but it was also related to lower evaluations of Scott on the same traits. In fact, the largest effect of awareness on perception was with respect to Scott’s *honesty*, as those who knew that Crist was the party-switcher ranked Scott 17 points lower on that question than did those who were not.

Table 3
Evaluations of Candidate Traits by Awareness of Crist’s Party-Switching
(Percent Agreeing that Trait Describes Candidate)

	<u>Unaware</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Effect</u>
Crist: Can be trusted	44.2	39.5	-4.7
Crist: Honest and Ethical	42.9	37.7	-5.2
Scott: Can be trusted	49.2	46.9	-2.4
Scott: Honest and Ethical	53.3	36.7	-16.7

We were also interested in whether respondents who were primed to think about Crist’s party-switch were more likely to downgrade their assessments of his trust or honesty. Table 4 shows that they were not, or at least not by much. Among respondents who correctly identified Crist as the switcher, those who were asked about the candidates’ traits *after* the question about party-switching had only very slightly less positive assessments of Crist’s character than those who were asked about the candidates’ traits *before* the party switching question. To the extent that placement of the party-switching question effectively primed respondents to think about Crist’s partisan past, it did not have significant effects on respondents’ judgments of Crist.

Table 4
Evaluations of Candidate traits by Placement of Party-Switching Question
(Percent Agreeing that Trait Describes Candidate among Respondents
Who Identified Crist as Party-Switcher)

	<u>After traits</u>	<u>Before traits</u>	<u>Effect</u>
Crist: Can be trusted	39.6	38.8	-0.8
Crist: Honest and Ethical	38.7	36.7	-1.9
Scott: Can be trusted	46.3	47.4	1.1
Scott: Honest and Ethical	38.7	40.7	2.0

Tables 5a and 5b replicate the analysis in Table 3, controlling for partisanship. Table 5a shows that Democrats (strong, weak, and leaning partisans) who were aware of Crist’s party-switch ranked him significantly *higher* and rated Scott significantly lower on trustworthiness and honesty than those who were not aware. Similarly, Table 5b shows that strong, weak and leaning Republicans who were aware of Crist’s defection ranked him significantly lower on trustworthiness and honesty and ranked Scott significantly higher on trustworthiness than those who were unaware. In this election, partisanship colored perceptions of candidate trustworthiness, and awareness of Crist’s party-switching amplified that effect. Although it is impossible to rewrite history and determine how trustworthy Florida’s voters would have regarded Crist had he been a Democrat for all of his public life, these results suggest that awareness of which candidate switched parties in this race was not much of a pre-condition to lower

evaluations of that candidate’s trust and honesty, as Crist was perceived as more trustworthy by Democrats who remembered that he was once a Republican than by those who did not.

Table 5
Evaluations of Candidate Traits by Awareness of Party-Switching & Partisanship
(Percent Agreeing that Trait Describes Candidate)

Table 5a (Democrats Only)

	<u>Unaware</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Effect</u>
Crist: Can be trusted	55.2	75.6	20.4
Crist: Honest and Ethical	54.0	74.6	20.5
Scott: Can be trusted	40.1	18.6	-21.5
Scott: Honest and Ethical	41.8	7.3	-34.5

Table 5b (Democrats Only)

	<u>Unaware</u>	<u>Aware</u>	<u>Effect</u>
Crist: Can be trusted	33.1	11.3	-21.8
Crist: Honest and Ethical	33.2	12.1	-21.1
Scott: Can be trusted	62.3	73.8	11.5
Scott: Honest and Ethical	69.1	70.8	1.8


To better understand the joint effects of partisanship, trust, and awareness of party-switching on voter preference, the results of a logistic regression model are presented in Table 6. In this model, voter preference is a binary variable (1 = preference for Scott, 0 = preference for Crist), party identification is a seven point scale ranging from -3 (Strong Democrat) to +3 (Strong Republican), and awareness is a dichotomous variable (1= knew Crist was the candidate who had switched parties, 0= others). The trust variable indicates a relative rating of Crist and Scott on that trait evaluation, such that a respondent who believed that “can be trusted” described Crist but not Scott was scored as -1, a respondent who believed that “can be trusted” described Scott but not Crist was scored as 1, and a respondent who believed that “can be trusted” described neither Scott nor Crist, or less commonly, described both Scott and Crist, was scored as 0 on that trait evaluation. List-wise, deletion excludes respondents who were missing on any of these variables, including those who said that they would not vote for either candidate and those who identified with a third party.


Table 6
Logistic Regression of Vote Preference on Partisanship, Relative Trust & Awareness

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Coefficient</u>	<u>Std Err</u>	<u>p(z)</u>
Intercept	0.627	0.327	0.055
Party Identification	0.357	0.147	0.015
Relative Trust	3.002	0.642	0.000
Awareness	-0.826	0.389	0.034
Party Identification * Awareness	0.493	0.184	0.007
Relative Trust * Awareness	0.265	0.744	0.721
Number of cases	604		
AIC	233.58		

As expected, party identification and relative trust assessment are both significant predictors of voter preference, but somewhat unexpectedly, the main effect of awareness was negative. Thus, controlling for the effects of partisanship and trust, those who were aware of Crist’s party-switching were less supportive of Scott. More importantly, the interaction between awareness and party identification is significant, suggesting that awareness primed voters’ prior predispositions.

Because logistic regression coefficients are not readily interpretable, Figures 1 and 2 present the predicted probabilities of preferring Scott for unaware and aware voters, respectively. Both figures show a very strong direct effect of relative trust, controlling for partisanship, as the vertical distance between the lines in both figures is quite large. Pure independents who rated Scott more trustworthy than Crist were much more likely to vote for the incumbent (as the difference in probabilities was 89% for voters unaware of Crist’s switch, and 93% for those aware of the switch). Even among strong partisans at both ends of the spectrum, the effect of relative trust was very strong. By comparison, the direct effect of partisanship on voter preference (represented by the slopes of the lines), was relatively weak among those who were unaware of Crist’s party-switch but who could discern a difference in candidate trustworthiness. But partisanship had indirect effects by shaping voters’ perception of candidate traits, and it remained an important tie-breaker among voters who failed to discern a difference on candidate trust (see Markus & Converse 1979). Moreover, the slopes are steeper in Figure 2, indicating that the direct effects of partisanship on voter preference were stronger among those who were aware of Crist’s party-switch to the Democrats.





Taken together, these results indicate that awareness of Crist’s party change was a symptom of general political awareness and involvement, which activated other predispositions (in particular, party identification) that shaped voters’ perceptions. As a result, as we saw in Table 5, more aware Democrats rated Crist more highly on trust and honesty, and rated Scott lower on those traits, and more aware Republicans did the opposite. Table 6 and Figures 1 and 2 show that more aware partisans of both parties were slightly more likely to stay loyal to their partisan predispositions, and that partisanship was a more powerful tie-breaker among those who were aware of Crist’s switch.

Discussion

These results speak to the nature of polarized partisanship in the early-XXI Century: by September 2014 three-fourths of Florida’s voters were well aware of Charlie Crist’s change in partisanship. Many had lived through and may have remembered Crist’s long record of service as a Republican state legislator, Attorney General and Governor, before seeing his party-switch to No Party Affiliation and independent candidacy in 2010, his endorsement of President Obama in 2012, and finally his official affiliation as a Democrat in 2014.

Voters who were aware of Crist’s party-switch were generally more polarized in their attitudes about the Florida Gubernatorial race than those were not, suggesting that any suspicion by Democrats of Crist’s motives in his conversion were more than offset by the intensity of their disdain for his opponent. Republican voters who were aware of the switch, and who had once embraced Crist and speculated that he might be considered as a plausible U.S. Vice-Presidential candidate on their Republican ticket in 2008, now regarded their former torch-bearer as untrustworthy and dishonest. In short, Democrats who were aware of Crist’s “red” Republican past liked him better than those who were not, and Republicans who knew that Crist was once one of them liked him a lot less than those who did not. These results suggest that even when prominent candidates sort themselves in a polarized political

environment, partisanship shapes voters' perceptions of their trustworthiness. Thus, party-switchers (like Crist) can be accepted by the electorate in their adopted party on the basis of their newly found shared political interests. We suspect that laying the groundwork in establishing *bona fides* is important (such as Crist did with his physical and then political embrace of Democratic President Barak Obama), but that with that effort, partisans also seem to be willing to psychologically embrace a candidate who has found his way.

Still, our conclusions should be tempered by the recognition that we cannot know what might have been. We had hypothesized that any lingering distrust about Crist's former affiliation with the GOP among Democrats (or lingering positive attributions of Crist among Republicans) would only be manifest by those who were aware of Crist's prior partisan affiliation, but we found just the opposite. However, our awareness indicator also appears to be a coarse measure of more general knowledge about the gubernatorial race, and our cross-sectional survey does not permit us to isolate the effects of having known all along that Crist was the party-switcher from having learned that fact during the campaign. Had Nan Rich won the Democratic nomination, or had Charlie Crist been a lifelong Democrat, their knowledgeable co-partisans' assessments of their trustworthiness and honesty might have been even higher than what we observed among those who were aware of Crist's political transformation. An experimental research design may be able to disentangle those effects, albeit with a sacrifice of the realism that we have in the current research design.

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Banal Nationalism and Religious Rhetoric in America: how George W. Bush Used Religious Rhetoric to Sell the 2003 Second Gulf War ('Iraq War')

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ABSTRACT: The events of "9/11" were a national trauma to America. These events caused by a mysterious 'other' were unforeseen and unexplainable to most Americans. Even those who did not consider themselves deeply patriotic were stirred at the deepest levels of their identity. It was in this atmosphere that the G.W. Bush Administration was able to prey upon a sense of Americanness to launch a Second Gulf War against Iraq. This research shows how the Administration used nationalistic/religious rhetoric to activate a dormant sense of Americanness and frame it as under threat to launch a war against Iraq. While this research does not claim to be the only explanation on how America went to war with Iraq, it does assert that an activation of a banal nationalist identity as another way that the G.W. Bush Administration was able to invade Iraq in the 2003 Second Gulf War. This research aims to provide another explanation as to why America invaded Iraq.

Introduction: the Religious Experience of War

In the run-up to the 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq, the imagery and symbolism of democracy promotion and weapons of mass destruction framed the debate, and arguably legitimized such a Second Gulf War to the American public. Yet at a deeper level there was another narrative legitimizing the war. It was a banal theme that was so commonplace many took it for granted. The theme was America as a Christian nation battling the "Axis of Evil" (the "rogue-states" of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea). Indeed, since its inception America has been viewed as the "city on the hill," meaning the U.S.A. *is* God's county.¹ Thus, it is America's responsibility to influence the rest of the wayward world through the promotion of freedom.

This sense of being *the* nation chosen by God has deep historical roots. Starting with Saint Augustine is the dichotomy through which Americans have developed their understanding of the world. Augustine through his development of the conceptions of the "City of God" and the "City of Man," provided a blueprint for American self-identity and policy.² The world has been "falling apart" throughout American history just as it was during Augustine's time. For Augustine it was the dissolution of Rome, while for America it has been the constant warfare in Europe; followed by the communist scourge; and today the 'War on Terror.' As such, Americans, from the early Protestant settlers to today's

¹ See Stephen Zunes in http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FG08Ak01.html.

² David Knowles, "Church and State in Christian History" in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 2 (1967): p. 3-15; Micheal Loriaux, "The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology and Moral Action in International Relations Thought" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36 (1992): p. 401-420; Paul T. McCartney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119 (2004): p.399-423.

religious (Christian) majority have viewed themselves as belonging to this "City of God" as they watch the "City of Man" crumble around them. This extreme religiosity is confirmed by the Pew Global Attitudes Project which in 2010 found that six in ten Americans claim that "religion plays a very important role in their lives."

However, this information while interesting, is by itself analytically useless. As a consequence, we need to understand how elites channel this religious identity and utilize it to further their own politics. As such, through analyzing how the myth of common identity is framed, we can understand how politicians utilize religious sentiments to further their policies. Specifically, in attempting to understand U.S. foreign policy, I focus on the office of the executive. This office not only dominates other federal institutions, it also is constitutionally delegated to handle issues of foreign policy. Given the executive's powers over foreign affairs, and the ability to speak directly to the masses, it is only appropriate to analyze how this office has used religiosity to influence foreign policy goals.

This religious influence is especially acute with the historically recent Presidencies of Jimmy Carter (D), Ronald Reagan (R) and George W. Bush (R). Each of these former Presidents undeniably appealed to a religious base in order to win the presidency, and once in the executive position frequently and proudly exhibited their Christian faith. Yet, of these three presidents, George W. Bush most openly displayed his Christian faith. Whether speaking directly of God in his State of the Union address or invoked the satanic agents "Gog" and "Magog" when discussing the invasion of Iraq with former French President Jacques Chirac in 2003,³ the younger G.W. Bush consistently appealed to his deeply religious beliefs throughout his two-term Presidency.

That being said, the question is to what purpose are religious appeals invoked? Was G.W. Bush simply a "born-again Christian" espousing his religiosity out of gratitude for being 'saved' or was it something more subliminal? This is especially a pertinent question in that George W. Bush is an Evangelical Christian, meaning he believes in being active in reforming society. Therefore, the central question this study poses is how did George W. Bush successfully use Christian symbolism to promote the war with Iraq? This research shows that President George W. Bush used the Christian religion to bolster support for a war against Iraq,⁴ through framing Iraq as a land of biblical evil.

George W. Bush

The unit of analysis in this research is the person of George W. Bush. While it would have been advantageous to analyze the entire Bush administration including the Vice-President, National Security Adviser, Chief of Staff and Cabinet members, resource constraints do not allow the author to undertake this expanded research. Therefore, this study focused on the ability of the President to utilize the mass media during a time of national trauma in order to influence foreign policy. The author presupposes that this outwardly religious rhetoric was more readily accepted in the period after "9/11". During this time the President could use his role as leader and communicator to heal the nation through a series of unifying speeches in which he couched his religious beliefs.

³ Andrew Brown in <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2009/aug/10/religion-george-bush>.

⁴ Interestingly, despite President George W. Bush Jr.'s Christian beliefs, after the Iraq invasion in 2003, thousands of Christians were forced to emigrate from Iraq. Prior to this mass exodus, there were nearly a million Christians in Iraq. During the previous nearly 2,000 years Christians lived relatively peacefully in Iraq. In fact, during the reign of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Christians were treated as nearly identical to Sunni Muslims. These two groups, Christians and Sunnis, were in alignment against the Iraqi Shi'a. Demonstrating this alliance, Saddam's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was an Iraqi Christian.

Banal Nationalism

The crisis of September 11, 2001 (hereafter referred to as “9/11”) was a definitive moment for Americans. The emotional security of many Americans was breached. The myth of American exceptionalism was brought into question. Indeed, for most it was a religious experience where the battle lines of 'good' and 'evil' were clearly drawn.⁵

What resulted was a blurring of lines between civil religion and political religion. To be clear, civil religion is "a belief system or, a surrogate religion which expresses the self-identity of a collectivity"⁶. This differs from political religion which "attempts to force group identity and to legitimize an existing political order, by injecting a transcendental dimension or religious gloss on the justification"⁷. It is this study's argument that these spheres significantly overlapped following “9/11” and in the run-up to the Second Gulf War ('Iraq War'). This overlap was exploited through the religious rhetoric used by George W. Bush, as he catered to the latent religiosity of many Americans. Moreover, this religious appeal took the form of banal imagery, which was amplified by the mass media. G.W. Bush thus infused an already existent "banal nationalism" with religious significance, thereby making it more symbolic.

Following Eric Hobsbawm's works, this study treats nationalism as a creation by the state. In the first stage this creation of the nation is "cultural, literary and folkloric and [has] no particular political or even national implications." In the second phase, there arises a body of pioneers and militants of 'the national idea.' In this phase, the masses began to identify with the élites. This identification is due to the protections that the élite could bestow upon the masses. In the third and final phase, "nationalist programs acquire mass support, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent." At this stage, multiple élites campaign to the masses evoking symbols, as well as commonalities in religion, language, shared experience. In turn, the masses began to internalize these messages and become part of the nation.⁸

This is similar to other theories put forth by Rogers Brubaker and Benedict Anderson who argue that nationalism is a creation of the state. Anderson famously conceptualizes the nation as an 'imagined community,' meaning that even people who will never meet each other think of themselves as belonging to the same community. This belonging is facilitated through the media which creates books and newspapers for the masses. The consumption of this news media creates a 'mass ceremony'⁹ in which consumption of the news is part of nationalistic ritual. As such, by consuming this information it makes the community more tightly knit by exposing and broadening the national conception. Thus, Anderson shows how exposure to national symbols and concepts can bring a nation together.

Brubaker extends this discussion by demonstrating how nationalism is framed. This framing causes the group to interpret information in a particular way, thus transforming a particular event into whatever the elites make of it. The already complex social world is framed by elites in order to produce a common, simplified message for the masses. Most importantly, this elite framing informs the masses that they belong to the 'good' nation while others outside on their nation-state belong to the 'bad' nation.¹⁰

Complementing these theories on national identity is the work by Michael Billig and his work on banal nationalism. This concept holds that nationalism is all around us every day. It is so deeply embedded into American culture that we take it for granted. Yet since this national symbolism is so

⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim” in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104 (2002): p. 776-755.

⁶ Marcela Cristi, *From Civil to Political Religion: the Intersection of Culture, Religion and Politics* (Waterloo, ON: 2001).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York, 1992).

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: 1991).

¹⁰ Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, MA: 2004).

commonplace, it can trigger our identity into action to defend the nation when necessary. Billig states that since banal nationalism is so commonplace it is viewed as more stable than nationalism, and indeed, as a defensive identity. Further, this type of nationalism claims to represent a universal morality that is shared by all civilized people since it does not seek to challenge the *status quo*.¹¹

Religious Terminology and the Second Gulf War (or 'Iraq War')

The data needed to most efficiently prove my hypothesis is found with the religious terminology of George W. Bush. This study utilized contextual analysis to first locate and then situate the religious terminology from former President Bush. I then correlate this terminology with public support for the war on Iraq. Additionally, in order to refine the searches this study only utilized those quotations that are in the context of the 'War on Terrorism', Al Qaeda and the Second Gulf War as a 'war on Iraq.' This means that concepts utilized in the context of America being at war with Islam or religious dedications on national holidays were not included in my search.

To thicken this research explanation, this study provides a detailed historical analysis of American Evangelicals to explain the latent religiosity that is embedded in American identity and show how American religiosity and identity are susceptible to religious appeals.

Given that this research meets at the intersection of religion and politics, it utilizes the theological definition put forth by Jules Lobel for the 'War on Terror'. He defines it as a war "between good and evil, freedom versus barbarism and the 'fight of the free world against the forces of darkness.'"¹² As this 'War on Terror' resists any easy definition in common parlance, this conception allows me to focus on the dichotomies of what separates 'us' from 'them.' Put another way, it allows to define who belongs to the civilized nations of the world.

The war on Iraq is conceptualized as "preemptive action against a rogue state."¹³ Again, this conceptualization is chosen because it portrays the world in dualities. There are regular, banal states and there are the "rogue," states which are a threat to the international order. Additionally, it includes preemptive action, which in most cases is perceived as an offensive cause of war. In the case of the United States, however, preemptive action was grounds for a 'just war,' given that it was against a rogue state that had supposedly provided America with no other options short of war.

America, a Christian Nation

In interpreting the political rhetorics of George W. Bush, the author of this study must acknowledge his own biases as a white, lower-middle class, atheist from America that was part of the nation who experienced "9/11" and opposed the 2003 Iraq War. As such, the authors' background and beliefs, as well as witnessing the events of "9/11" affect how to interpret the quotes from George W. Bush. Had the author been a Muslim or an Arab, or for that matter had supported the Iraq War, certainly the quotes would be placed in a different context. It is my desire that through acknowledging these biases the author stresses his commitment to meet a minimum standard of validity, and accordingly of not being able to objectively interpret the facts.

The collection of data in this research shows that America is mostly a religious nation, susceptible to religious appeals by its leaders. While data on the entire American population is not presented in this

¹¹ Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

¹² Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism" in *Yale Law Review*, Vol. 98 (2001): p. 1385-1433.

¹³ Antony Anghie, "Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law" in *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, Vol. 5 (2009): p. 291-310.

essay, a significant proportion of the population known as 'Evangelicals' is examined. These individuals have tremendous religious convictions and have been a substantial force in American politics for at least the last 30 years. This is not to say that these individuals can, by themselves, alter American foreign policy. Nor, is it to say the rest of the American population does not exhibit or respond to religious expressions in the run-up to the Iraq War. In fact, this research does show that a large segment of the population is susceptible to these religious overtures by political élites.

The second source of evidence is the actual public rhetoric espoused by President George W. Bush. Using contextual analysis, this study correlate these utterances with a rise in public support for the Iraq war. This follows from the central objective of this research which is to show how these banal, implicit referrals to faith helped galvanize Evangelicals all over America to support war against Iraq.

To galvanize these evangelicals, the media was used to transmit and amplify religious symbols. This was particularly evident following "9/11" when the media attempted to inculcate a sense of civic religion. This was done through transmitting G.W. Bush holding the American flag outside the rubble of the Twin Towers or broadcasting his fight against the 'new evil.'¹⁴ Borrowing from Billig, Hjarvard labels these appeals to religion in the call of the nation as 'banal religion.' According to Hjarvard, it is the media that transmits these religious elements, making them common place, and in fact embedding them into our very social fabric¹⁵. Thus, when these images are activated, it calls the citizenry into action to defend the civil-religious identity of the state.¹⁶

Evidence for these civil-religious appeals was gathered through contextual analysis. The religious quotes by George W. Bush were retrieved from Georgetown University at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. These religious statements were then correlated with polling data about the Iraq War. The polling data was derived from the Pew Research Center. The question, or some variation thereof, that was utilized in this research is as follows: "Would you favor or oppose taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule?"

Finally, the time frame of this analysis is from 13 September 2001 to 19 March 2003. The first date is the day that Paul Wolfowitz and the Bush administration started planning the Iraq war. The latter date is the day before the Iraq war began. While George W. Bush used religious rhetoric and symbolism throughout his presidency, Pew only began asking questions about the possibility of an Iraq War on 13 January 2002. Therefore, I cannot correlate earlier religious quotes but provide them nonetheless as a baseline to display how George W. Bush appealed to religion after "9/11".

'Our' Christian Nation

The connection between the public's religious beliefs and the state's political action remains an underdeveloped topic in political science.¹⁷ This is due to scholars traditionally holding that the public is

¹⁴ Carolyn Kitch, "Mourning in America": Ritual, Redemption and Recovery In News Narrative after September 11" in *Journalism Studies*, Vol.4 (2003).

¹⁵ Stig Hjarvard, "The Mediatization of Religion: a Theory of the Media as an Agent of Religious Change" Presented at the 5th International Conference on Media, Religion and Culture, 2006.

¹⁶ Simon Cottle, "Mediatized Rituals: Beyond Manufacturing Consent" in *Media Culture Society*, Vol. 28 (2006): p.411-432.

¹⁷ Jeremy Mayer, "Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East" in *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 85 (2004): p. 695-712; Corwin E. Smidt, "Religion and American Attitudes toward Islam and an Invasion of Iraq" in *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 66 (2005): p. 243-261; Kenneth D. Wald & Clyde Wilcox, "Getting Religion: has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100 (2006): p. 523-529.

largely disinterested in foreign policy making.¹⁸ However, recent research has shown that foreign policy remains a salient topic when in regards to particular groups and issues.¹⁹

One such issue is the terrorist attacks of “9/11” 2001. On this day, American citizens grounded themselves in their religious and civic beliefs. Their rock, the United States, had been shown vulnerable by the attacks originating from the periphery. Yet religious understandings, whether civil or private, remained in the newly turbulent world. This religious anchoring was not a new phenomenon. As early as the 1967 Six-Day War, with Israel’s conquest of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the American Evangelicals started to take interest in foreign policy. Those newly interested in American foreign policy saw the founding of Israel, in conjunction with the capture of these new territories, as a sign of religious prophecy.²⁰ However, evangelical Christians would have to wait for the right politician to come along to accept their views. Richard Nixon was openly hostile to Israel, viewing the state in terms of *realpolitik*, while Jimmy Carter worked against the interests of the Christian Right by negotiating away the captured Sinai Peninsula.²¹

Then in 1980, Evangelical Christians found their man, Ronald Reagan. He was a man who fought the God-less communists while standing with Israel.²² Reagan openly courted the Religious Right, which lead to an alliance between the New Right, the Christian Right, Conservatives, and the pro-Israel lobby.²³ This alliance would ultimately win Reagan the Presidency, and then work to shape U.S. policy towards Israel. Accordingly, Presidents and Presidential contenders began to realize the power of this alliance.

Throughout the 1990's individuals identifying themselves as evangelicals continued to swell. By the late 1990's, Evangelical voters represented a quarter of all registered voters in the U.S. Moreover, these were not ordinary voters. They were better organized, easily mobilized, and staunch supporters of Israel.²⁴

Then in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, George W. Bush won the Presidency, primarily due to the turn-out of Christian voters, with 80% supporting him over the Democrat Vice-President Al Gore.²⁵ This support stemmed from G.W. Bush's explicit referrals to his faith. He was a born-again Christian who had no scruples with proselytizing. Moreover, G.W. Bush was not a man to separate his religion from politics. Religion guided his politics and his politics sought to spread his religious ideology.²⁶ This is reflected in his infamous "with us or against us" statement. The world was a Manichean place. Either 'others' would be with 'us' and our superior values or they were part of the evil 'other.' Put another way, G.W. "Bush believed that this evil must be resisted, defeated, and he and his country have been called by God to do it-to be freedom's champion."²⁷

¹⁸ Robert W. Oldendick & Barbara Ann Bardes, “Mass and Elite Foreign Policy” in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 46 (1982): p. 368-342.

¹⁹ Jon Krosnick & Shibley Telhami, “Public Attitudes toward Israel: a Study of the Attentive and Issue” in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39 (1995): p. 535-554; Joseph P. Daniels, Religious Affiliation and Individual International-Policy Preferences in the United States” in *International Interactions*, Vol. 31 (2005): p. 109-127.

²⁰ John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: 2007).

²¹ Jason D. Berggren & Nicol C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy & an Evangelical Presidential Style” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36 (2006): p. 606-632.

²² William Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy” in *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 114 (1999): p. 66-80.

²³ Clifford Kiracofe, *Dark Crusade: Christian Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: 2009).

²⁴ William Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy” in *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 114 (1999): p. 66-80.

²⁵ Steven Schier, *Ambition and Division: Legacies of the George W. Bush Presidency* (Pittsburgh, PA: 2009).

²⁶ Jason D. Berggren & Nicol C. Rae, “Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy and an Evangelical Presidential Style” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36 (2006): p. 606-632.

²⁷ Ibid.

Yet, G.W. Bush could not carry out this crusade by himself. He needed mass popular support to fight the evil which threatened the United States. He would have to tap into an already existing undercurrent of American identity. At its broadest level, civic nationalism serves to unify the United States and provide meaning to the national identity. This meaning in the U.S. is a reflection of America's dominant religious mainstream²⁸ as two-thirds of Americans see the U.S. as a Christian-nation²⁹. Consequently, the civic nationalism of the U.S. is that of a Christian nation. As such, when Americans legitimized the war it became not only a war against terror, but to some, a Christian war against Islam.³⁰

Religious Rhetoric and Selling the War

As a baseline to understanding the public's perception of Iraq as a threat, on 20 May 2001 the Pew Institute asked its polling group, "Do you think that... Saddam Hussein's continued rule in Iraq is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to the well-being of the United States?" Of the respondents who answered 58% viewed Iraq as a major threat, while 29% viewed him as a minor threat. This polling data indicates that the public threat perception of Iraq was elevated prior to the attacks on "9/11" and predated G.W. Bush's invocation of religious terminology.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, G.W. Bush began to cast the world in religious terms. For instance, in a speech three days after "9/11" G.W. Bush led the country in national day of prayer (which interestingly enough was held in a church). The President provided the following statement:

"On this national day of prayer and remembrance, we ask almighty God to watch over our nation, and grant us patience and resolve in all that is to come. We pray that He will comfort and console those who now walk in sorrow. We thank Him for each life we now must mourn, and the promise of a life to come. As we have been assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God's love. May He bless the souls of the departed. May He comfort our own. And may He always guide our country. God bless America"³¹.

This speech displays President G.W. Bush Jr. appealing to the raw emotions of Americans after "9/11". At such time when the nation felt vulnerable and in this state of shock, U.S. citizens were more open to religious rhetoric. Indeed, such rhetoric from a national leader served to sooth an uncertain public. On 8 November 2001, G.W. Bush Jr. again used religious rhetorics when discussing the anti-terror war against Al Qaeda:

"This new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education; the terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds; for the terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of

²⁸ Mariana Servin-Gonzales & Oscar Torres-Reyna, "Trends: Religion and Politics" in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 63 (1999): p. 592-621; Jeremy Brooke Straughn & Scott L. Feld, "America as a 'Christian Nation'? Understanding Religious Boundaries of National Identity in the United States" in *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 71 (2010): p. 280-306.

²⁹ Jeremy Brooke Straughn & Scott L. Feld, "America as a 'Christian Nation'?", *ibid*, p. 280-306.

³⁰ Paul T. McCartney, "American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119 (2004): p. 399-423; Jody C. Baum Baumgartner & Peter L. Francia, Jonathan S. Morris, "A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle-East" in *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61 (2008): p. 171-179.

³¹ Berkley Center, <http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/>.

all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims"³².

This speech sets up a clear dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them.' They are against modernity, we are for human 'progress.' They are apostates to their religion, our nation is a religiously tolerant nation. They come from the periphery to attack the center of civilization.

On 5 January 2002 as the whispers of an attack against Iraq became louder, Bush delivered another speech.

"We're taking action against evil people. Because this great nation of many religions understands, our war is not against Islam, or against faith practiced by the Muslim people. Our war is a war against evil. This is clearly a case of good versus evil, and make no mistake about it -- good will prevail"³³.

Here G.W. Bush Jr. clearly defined who is 'us' and who is 'them.' They, the unnamed, are 'evil' and we are the 'good.'

On 13 January 2002 the Pew Research center asked the following question: "If Saddam Hussein will not accept weapons inspections in exchange for lifting economic sanctions, would you favor or oppose using military force against Iraq?" Of those who responded, 67% favored an attack on Iraq, while 27% opposed any such attack. These statistics represented an increase of 9% favoring an attack from almost a year earlier. The U.S. had been attacked during this year leaving it vulnerable and open to religious rhetoric that cast the world into the dualities of 'good' and 'evil'. It is in this context that Americans began to view Iraq.

On 24 January 2002 G.W. Bush Jr. started to link religiosity with action:

"I bring up matters of the spirit because the enemy doesn't understand who they hit. They first thought they were hitting somebody, a nation which was soft, a nation which wouldn't – oh, we might respond but we wouldn't mean it. [...] They didn't understand that when you attack America and you murder innocent people, we're coming after you with full force and fury of a great nation and our allies"³⁴.

With this statement, G.W. Bush cast America as a religious nation that has divine provenance on its side. America, to G.W. Bush, was a great nation capable and willing to defend our innocence and spirituality. With this message G.W. Bush could not have been more clear: ours was a "just war".

On 15 April 2002, Pew asked its polling group: "Would you favor or oppose the U.S. and its allies – taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule as part of the war on terrorism?" Of those who responded 69% were in favor of military action against Iraq, while 29% were opposed. Again, the number of those favoring war with Iraq rose by 2%, this time over a three-month period.

The following year at G.W. Bush's State of the Union Address, and on the eve of the invasion of Iraq on 28 January 2003, religious references were plentiful:

"Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity. We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

loving God behind all of life and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America."

"We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America"³⁵.

These separate quotes illustrate the centrality of religion in America. Americans can trace direct lineage to God: "God gave us this great country in order to show the rest of the world what liberty means." "We are blessed and God loves us." And with these affirmations the U.S. public is ready to fight for freedom.

On 16 February 2003 Pew posed this question to its polling group: "Would you favor or oppose taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein's rule?" In this poll of those who responded 66% approved and 26% disapproved. On 16 March 2003 the same question was asked by Pew, and of those who responded 59% were in favor and 30% were opposed.

This data could mean that religious appeals only work to a certain degree. It may indicate that religious appeals have a better chance of being accepted when the nation feels itself under direct threat (i.e. after "9/11"). The data could also mean that religious appeals only work up until a certain level. After this point, a rate of diminishing returns lessens their impact. For example, as G.W. Bush increased his religious rhetoric people may have begun to question the aims of the war. Was it to protect ourselves from a dangerous adversary or was it to trigger a wider religious conflagration? Moreover, people may have begun to be simply turned off by the increase in religious talk. They were religious to a point, but past this point were offended by the religiosity of their President.

Conclusion

This paper does not argue that G.W. Bush's appeals to religious rhetoric were the only reason that the American public began to support a war against Iraq. Instead, what this study claims is that there is a religious undercurrent in America that is relatively understudied. It is this religious current that was one cause of the war with Iraq. This religious current is conceptualized as an acceptance by the masses and elites that America is a special nation defined by a common Christian heritage. This acceptance has not meant a confirmation of Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis. Rather this acceptance has created a separation of civilizations where outside of America's tolerant borders are those who wish to hurt us because they hate our freedoms. It is against these others that we are at war with.

This strategy shows how our political leaders keep the idea of our imagined community intact, through the continued construction of a dangerous 'other.' However, the current 'othering' that the élites now put forth does not bear as heavily on religious symbology as during the G.W. Bush Presidency. Instead the war today is cast using terms such as peace-loving, freedom, and democratic values. These values are pitted against those who would do us harm. In the current climate, religious nationalism has returned to a state of banality, waiting for the day when it again it will activated in an unholy alliance with the state.

³⁵ Ibid.

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Market Failures: to Tax or Subsidize? That is the Question on Flood Policies...

by Gary William Boulware, Ph.D., University of Florida, Gainesville

ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to observe how the U.S. government responds to perceived “market failures.” The U.S. government’s tools for correcting market failures are either to tax or to subsidize. This paper analyzes these two tools and evaluates their use with respect to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Since 1968, the government’s public policy is to subsidize flood insurance via the NFIP. This paper focuses on what drives public policy decisions; public policy economic tools; the impact of the government’s decision to subsidize; and finally, what is happening now that the government is trying to phase out the subsidy for flood insurance in the United States. By economic definition, a subsidy encourages the demand for a good or service. This means that the NFIP become an enabler of development in flood prone areas—the government’s policy toward flood insurance was the exact opposite of what an economist or public policy analyst might expect if the government’s intent was to decrease development in flood prone areas. Developers, builders, realtors and mortgage brokers who have benefited from guaranteed subsidized government-provided flood insurance are motivated to organize and lobby to keep the NFIP heavily subsidized as they receive peculiar benefits and have salient interests. Up to this point in time, these organized interests have trumped the interests of dispersed bill-payers (i.e., tax payers) who are generally oblivious to the cost of the NFIP.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to make observations about the government’s response to perceived “market failures.” In general, the government’s tools to correct market failures are either to tax or subsidize. This paper analyzes these two tools and evaluates the use of these tools with respect to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Since 1967, the government public policy is to subsidize flood insurance via the NFIP. The position of this paper is that the government employed the wrong policy tool which resulted in negative unintended consequences. The structure of this paper presents public policy and what drives public policy decisions; public policy economic tools; the impact of the government’s decision to subsidize; and finally, what is happening now that the government is trying to phase out the subsidy for flood insurance in the United States. Let’s begin by defining what public policy is and what drives public policy decisions.

Public Policy and What Drives Public Policy Decisions

A quintessential definition of “public policy” was coined by Thomas Dye. Dye’s parsimonious definition was that public policy was simply, “whatever government chooses to do or not to do” (Dye, 1972). We all believe that the government should choose to solve a variety of problems in the world—poverty, social injustice, racism, sexism, pollution, ignorance, health—problems that the free market does not adequately address.

When the free market does not provide for an efficient or socially optimal outcome, then a “market failure” is declared and a public policy is pursued to fix the failure. Therefore, a common justification for the government choosing to do something is the identification of a market failure. Market failures arise when the producers who supply, “under supply” and the consumers who demand, “under demand.” The textbook definition of a market failure is “a situation in which a market left on its own fails to allocate resources efficiently” (Mankiw, 2012).

The thorny part for government public policy is to determine if the market failure is actually a result of a negative externality or a positive externality as well as to factor in the precarious nature of the law of unintended consequences when the government “chooses to do” something to counteract a market failure.

Public Policy Economic Tools

One of the classic definitions of an externality is “the impact of one person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander” (Mankiw, 2012). If the impact on the bystander is negative, such as pollution, we deem the externality to be a “negative externality.” If the impact on the bystander is positive, such as vaccinating the populous to prevent the spread of a dreaded disease, then the externality is referred to as a “positive externality.” The government has tools (such as subsidizing or taxing) which might try to “internalize” or account for the externality. However, concern for government’s good intentions to correct for market failures is articulated by Nobel Laureate George Stigler.

For some, market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention. However, the fact that self-interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion. It is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions, and hence to analyze self-interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector. Our approach emphasizes this institutional structure—warts and all—and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance. We may tell the society to jump out of the market frying pan, but we have no basis for predicting whether it will land in the fire or a luxurious bed.


George Stigler, 1975

Stigler points to the law of unintended consequences—the action of the government to improve a market outcome may have other unexpected negative outcomes. The term “active government failure” also describes the problem of the unintended consequences of government action to solve a market failure. This term is attributed to Roland McKean as he points out that government action can result in a worse outcome than government inaction (McKean, 1965).

The original concept of government action to correct for an externality is attributed to Pigou (1920; 1932). He argued that the government could “internalize” (or account for) the externality by offering a tax (applied to discourage a negative externality) or subsidy (provided to promote more demand for a positive externality). The use of taxes and subsidies adjusts the price so that all social costs/benefits and private costs/benefits are accounted for.

The application of a tax to discourage or lower the supply of a good or service is shown below as it relates to the gasoline market (see Mankiw, 2012, for in-depth explanation).

Analysis of a Negative Externality




(Graph 1 Source: Mankiw, 2012)

In this example, if one assumes that gasoline consumption increases pollution (a negative externality), a tax on gasoline will decrease supply and shift the supply curve to the left—thus, raising the price of a gallon of gasoline. The higher price lowers the quantity demanded and less gasoline is consumed. This is also known as “internalizing the negative externality”—adding the private cost to the cost of pollution to arrive at a social cost.

Conversely, if there is a market failure due to a positive externality not being accounted for by the market, then we might look to the government to “internalize the positive externality” by subsidizing a good or service to encourage more consumption. Shown below is a graphic display of this concept as it relates to the market for flu shots.

Analysis of a Positive Externality



(Graph 2 Source: Mankiw, 2012)

Essentially, the government subsidizes a good or service to account for the external benefit to society above the private value. In this case, the demand curve shifts up and flu shots increase in demand because the government assumes some (or all) of the cost to the consumer. Therefore, the optimal social quantity consumed is realized. Perhaps, taxing gasoline and subsidizing flu shots seem intuitively obvious. So, what might the government policy be toward a complex situation such as flood insurance?

The Impact of the Government's Decision to Subsidize

Most people in the United States have never heard of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). However, this little known government program is one of the world's largest single line property insurance programs (Federal Insurance Administration, *Stakeholder Report*, 1996). In fact, it ranks as one of the largest government-run social insurance programs in the United States, surpassed only by Social Security and Medicaid (King, 2005). The NFIP was over \$19 billion in debt to the U.S. Treasury in 2009 (GAO-09-420R, 2009) and is widely reported as over \$24 billion in debt today (Wharton Center for Risk Management & Decision Processes, 2014).

The reason for the debt is rather simple: since 1968, the Federal Government has pursued a public policy which subsidizes flood insurance in the United States. Not too surprisingly, the various groups that would benefit from this government largess were highly supportive of the funding. A short list of those who lobbied for the increased funding include: the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC); Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of America (IIABA); American Bankers Association and subsidiary American Bankers Insurance Association; and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America (McMahon, 2013).

It is almost axiomatic in U.S. politics that once a government benefit is granted, it is very difficult to take the benefit away—or to even make what would seem to be a common sense modification. In February 2001, Congress rejected the George W. Bush Jr. Administration's proposal that "sought to eliminate insurance coverage for the reconstruction of buildings subject to repetitive flooding, an initiative similar to one proposed toward the end of the Clinton Administration" (Bea, 2002). "Repetitive loss" has been a major NFIP issue since the policy's inception.

Repetitive loss properties represent a substantial risk for the NFIP as they accounted for 25% of all claims and 40% of all payments from 1978 to 1995 (D.R. Anderson, 2000). Also, 90% of repetitive loss properties are also pre-FIRM properties eligible for subsidized premium (D.R. Anderson, 2000). One would suspect that without the availability of federally underwritten insurance, private companies would not want to expose themselves to that kind of repetitive loss, would cancel the policy, and people would not continue to live in these high risk structures.

Another, subtler subsidy embedded in the NFIP is the method by which risk, and therefore actuarial premiums, are calculated. FEMA bases its premium structure on "historical average loss year" versus the "full-risk" approach that would also account for "catastrophic loss year." This difference is explained in FEMA's 2002 annual "Actuarial Rate Review." In this document, the idea of raising premiums to full-risk, that would include catastrophic contingency, would hike pre-FIRM subsidized rates two and a half times their current premiums and the overall target level for premiums would raise by 50%-75% (Hayes, 2002). The difference between what policyholders currently pay for "historical average loss year" vs. the "catastrophic loss year" is paid for by supplemental appropriations by Congress at the time of the catastrophe in contrast to collecting premiums in advance and banking those premiums to make payouts during catastrophic flooding events. Therefore, the average taxpayer bears the cost of the catastrophic loss year rather than the policyholder. More directly stated, because the

premiums charged to the policy holder do not include the true costs, which include the potential for catastrophic loss years, the cost of the catastrophic loss is paid out of the U.S. Treasury, not through the collection of premiums from policy holders.

More clear quantification of the subsidized nature of the NFIP comes from the fact that the NFIP is “recapitalized” or given “loan forgiveness” by Congress. There have been numerous attempts to shift the NFIP’s outstanding debt to the U.S. Treasury. The Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate for the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007 recommended that the \$17.5 billion debt be forgiven. The bill also authorizes an additional \$2.4 billion for FEMA’s flood mapping program, \$190 million for the repetitive flood loss mitigation program, and \$1.6 billion to support “state-sponsored mediation programs” (*CBO Cost Estimate*, 2007). An example of a more recent attempt to wipe the now \$24 billion debt clean can be found in a FEMA issue paper published by Susan Shuback, FEMA’s Acting Chief Financial Officer (Shuback, 2014).

One might argue that for a taxpayer, this subsidy leads to a question of equity. Is it “fair” that the average taxpayer bears the burden of paying for those who, by choice, want to enjoy the view or easy access to water? In addition to the economic equity issue implied by this premium calculus, the development in flood plains, enabled by the NFIP, is a major concern to environmentalists because it harms the environment and also allows for the hidden costs associated with the externality of pollution.

If the NFIP is, in fact, facilitating harm to the environment, the hidden costs associated with this negative externality are surely distorted by myopic views and the social rate of time preference (concept in Weimer & Vining, 2004). During a 2003 visit to FEMA Headquarters in Washington D.C. to collect data for this paper, four senior leaders of the NFIP were interviewed. This group of civil servants had been with the program for 20 to 30 years. They were obviously proponents of the program and its many successes. However, they stressed that the NFIP was not established as an environmental program. In fact, it was unclear who in the NFIP was responsible for environmental policy and ensuring that the NFIP was in compliance with the NEPA, Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) laws and regulations, and specifically Executive Order (EO) 11988. Even more to the point, the staff interviewed could not identify who in the NFIP office was responsible for insuring the proper application of Executive Order 11988 which specifically calls for government organizations such as FEMA to provide for floodplain protection and conservation.

An important rationale for understanding the unintended consequences of government policies may be found in the earlier discussion of “rent seeking”—the ability of concentrated or organized interests to seek government preferences at the expense of diffused or disorganized interests. As stated earlier, a more formal definition of rent seeking is “lobbying the government for tax, spending or regulatory policies that benefit the lobbyists at the expense of taxpayers or consumers or some other rivals” (*Economist.com*, 2009). Essentially, those with a known self-interest tend to find it worth their while to spend time and resources to participate or support activities that further their policy positions on government action. It is not too surprising that the National Association of Realtors (*realtor.org*, 2013), the National Association of Professional Insurance Agents (*pianet.com*, 2014), the National Association of Home Builders (*NAHB Congressional Statement*, 2013), and the Mortgage Bankers Association (*MBA Issue Brief*, 2014) are continually lobbying Congress to delay the implementation of the Biggert-Waters Act.

As one might expect, the organized interests identified above all have an economic interest in furthering development in the floodplain. Private insurance companies actually write the homeowner’s flood insurance policy along with the homeowner’s normal policy through a NFIP program known as Write Your Own (WYO). Not well advertised outside organized interest circles is the fact that the private

insurance companies which collect the premiums are able to retain on average 31.8% of the annual premium in the form of a commission and covering company expenses. The private insurance company sends the balance of the premium (approximately 68.2%) to FEMA along with 100% of the liability. In the case of a claim, the WYO companies receive 3.3% of the value of the amount of that claim for servicing the flood loss (Financial Assistance/Subsidy Arrangement, 1 October 2005). Therefore, there is no incentive for insurance companies to control costs. In fact, the higher the claim, the larger the insurance company's service fee—all paid for by the U.S. government.

Based on this discussion, one might assume that the government policy toward building in a flood zone or flood prone area would result in a negative externality (increased pollution and environmental degradation). This would mean that the government tool to correct for this externality would be to tax those who want to live in flood zones to account for the cost to society. However, the government has pursued the exact opposite policy and subsidized flood insurance—thus increasing the demand for housing in flood prone areas that are also environmentally sensitive to development.

In 2012, the Congress tried to stop the subsidy and passed the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.

Phasing Out the Subsidy to the NFIP

The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 reauthorized the NFIP for 5 more years and required FEMA to phase out subsidies—charging actuarially sound rates to flood insurance policy holders (FEMA, <http://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance-reform-act-2012>, reviewed February 2014). The impact on the housing market for homes in flood zones was dramatic. The headline on 30 December 2013 for the *Tampa Bay Times* read: “Flood Home Sales Drop.” Desperate homeowners were interviewed and quoted. “The market dried up—it died” is an example of what homeowners said they were experiencing as they tried to sell their homes.

Approximately 438,000 policies are in the process of losing their subsidy and the “owners of policies... will see a 25% rate increase annually until rates reflect true flood risk (*FEMA Fact Sheet*, 2014).” There are an additional 715,000 subsidized policies that are being reviewed and the plan is for these policy owners to lose their subsidies. Additionally, if a property that was not originally in a flood zone but gets placed in a flood zone with the release of a new flood insurance rate map (FIRM), then its new rates will increase by 20% per year for five years (GAO Report GAO-13-607, 2013). Another major issue for the NFIP is that according to the GAO, FEMA does not actually have the data to determine what the rates should be to reflect the true flood risk (GAO Report GAO-13-607, 2013). Not too surprisingly, constituents are placing substantial pressure on policy makers to roll back the implementation of NFIP reforms.

Lawmakers have heard the cries from their constituents and states such as Mississippi and Florida have sued the Federal government in an effort to stop the NFIP rate hikes. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (Omnibus) actually prohibited FEMA from implementing Section 207 of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Re-form Act of 2012 through 30 September 2014. Section 207 focuses on the additional 715,000 policies that are not yet being raised to eliminate the subsidy (*FEMA Fact Sheet*, 2014). The Senate has also passed a bill delaying the NFIP rate increases for up to four years (Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014) and the House is considering similar legislation (pianet.com, February 2014).

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to make observations about the U.S. government's response to perceived “market failures” and specifically, to the government's response to a perceived specific

market failure. In this case, the perceived market failure was a lack of flood insurance provided by the free market. In 1968, the Federal government decided to use a political economy tool to correct for the perceived market failure. The government's choice of tool was to provide a subsidy to those who chose to live in a flood prone area. By economic definition, a subsidy encourages the demand for a good or service. The purpose of encouraging more demand is to correct for a positive externality. Correcting for a positive externality means that you are accounting for the increased value to society by more of a good or service being consumed. Vaccinations and education tend to be the classic examples of positive externalities that we want the government to subsidize.

However, previous research has clearly laid out the case for the NFIP being an enabler of development in flood prone areas (Boulware, 2009). There is also a great deal of research pointing to the negative environmental impacts due to development (homes/businesses) in flood prone areas (for a summary of these impacts, see Rosenbaum & Boulware, 2006). However, a negative environmental impact, such as pollution, is the quintessential example of a negative externality. In economic theory, the government can improve economic outcomes by taxing (not subsidizing) a good or service which creates a negative externality. The point of this paper is to suggest that the government's policy toward flood insurance was the exact opposite of what an economist might expect! The unintended consequence of the government pursuing the wrong policy has resulted in significant development in flood prone areas. As the excerpt from FEMA's website shown below makes clear, NFIP flood insurance is available to homeowners who choose to live in a high-flood-risk area and it is completely acceptable if their property is in a high-flood-risk area or if their property has been flooded before.

The NFIP urges consumers to remember the flood insurance basics:

- You *CAN* get flood insurance nationwide.
- You *CAN* get flood insurance if you live in a floodplain or high-flood-risk area.
- You *CAN* get flood insurance if you live outside a floodplain, or a low-to-moderate flood-risk area—and at lower cost.
- You *CAN* get flood insurance if your property has been flooded before.

(see: http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/media_resources/nfip_on_misconceptions.jsp)

Unfortunately, for the past 40 plus years, homeowners have chosen to build/purchase homes in flood prone areas with the expectation of having the government subsidized flood insurance. Much of that development would not have otherwise occurred, as previous studies have pointed out that developers, builders, realtors, mortgage providers and homeowners were influenced by the availability of relatively cheap, subsidized government-provided flood insurance (Boulware, 2009).

Now the government is proposing changing the calculus of owning property in flood prone areas. Many homeowners are going to see the value of their homes depreciate as the cost of ownership has the potential to dramatically increase due to rising premiums for flood insurance. Developers, builders, realtors, and mortgage brokers who have benefited from guaranteed subsidized government-provided flood insurance will be highly motivated to organize and lobby to keep the NFIP heavily subsidized. It will be interesting to see if those with peculiar benefits and salient interests (i.e., homeowners, builders, developers, realtors and mortgage brokers) will trump the interests of unsuspecting bill-payers (i.e., tax payers) who are oblivious as they have another beer.

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Post-Communist Recovery and the State: Case-Studies on Poland and Ukraine

by Thomas Just (Florida International University), FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2015

ABSTRACT: This analysis provides competing arguments of neo-liberal and critical scholars on post-Communist transition illuminated by a case study of Poland and Ukraine. Despite the shared history and similarities between these two countries, each approached the systemic, financial and structural adjustment crises associated with post-communist transition very differently. The study finds that employing free 'entry' and 'exit' mechanisms for firms is a crucial factor in producing economic efficiency and reducing the presence of a black market. Additionally, a competent and compliant state is needed to maintain national unity in times of economic pain.

Introduction

Poland and Ukraine, while neighbors with nearly equal populations and similar supplies of natural resources, experienced very different economic outcomes in the ten years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1990, Ukraine was actually more economically prosperous than their Polish neighbors with a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$90 billion (\$1,743 per capita), whereas Poland trailed with a GDP of \$65 billion (\$1,708 per capita) (*World Bank Database*, 2013). Thus, both countries began in similar positions at the time of the Soviet Union's dissolution with Ukraine holding the higher GDP. In fact, prior to both countries' borders shifting after World War II, much of today's Ukraine was part of Poland, and therefore both countries share a number of cultural and historical traits. However, it was Poland that experienced positive economic growth every year since 1991, whereas Ukraine experienced negative economic growth every year from 1990 until 2000—with its GDP in 2000 shrinking to nearly half of its 1990 level (*World Bank Database*, 2013). The research question for this project is: which factors account for this relatively painful post-Communist transition in Ukraine and smooth transition in Poland?

Many scholars criticize the implementation of rapid liberalization policies and blame them for rises in corruption, crime, and the presence of crony capitalism. However, the removal of the barriers to entry for small private service businesses is an often-overlooked aspect of market liberalization that can be an important component of sustained economic growth. The hypothesis of this analysis is that rapid market liberalization in Poland, while resulting in a short-term rise in unemployment, also removed barriers to entry and allowed for a rise in small private service businesses, previously suppressed by the Communist government, that allowed for a more flexible and diversified economy and led to sustained economic growth. Ukraine, on the other hand, was reluctant to implement market liberalization policies and political reforms, and consequently maintained a system of excessive regulation and barriers to small business entry that created conditions more conducive to a black market than long-term economic growth.

The theoretical framework for this project will use the competing perspectives from neoliberals and historical materialists regarding rapid market liberalization. Neo-Liberals, such as Jeffrey Sachs,

developed the Balcerowicz Plan (a.k.a. shock-therapy) as a decisive means to achieve long-term economic stability. Neo-Liberals allege that government intervention is often the cause of economic and monetary chaos and the sooner that policies such as price controls and state subsidies are removed, the better off the country's economy will be long-term. Neo-Liberals further argue that the consequent economic growth will in fact work to enhance and stabilize the economic and political institutions within the given country.

On the other hand, historical materialists, such as Robert W. Cox, tend to argue that measures like shock-therapy, enable a new crony capitalist class to emerge that sacrifices democracy and vulnerable elements of society over time, and consequently cause economic and political instability. Cox argues that the burden and immediate pain of rapid market liberalization falls on the less-skilled working class, while the more articulate and strategically placed segments of society disproportionately benefit. Cox and other historical materialists, does not necessarily deny that rapid liberalization policies may result in economic growth over the short term, but rather they argue that such growth is unsustainable, and indeed is likely to cause greater inequality, corruption, and consequent economic and political instability long-term.

It will be the purpose of this analysis to flesh out these competing arguments regarding rapid market liberalization policies and their effects, as well as provide empirical evidence from the cases of Poland and Ukraine to test our hypothesis. Post-communist transitions remain an important concept in international political economy with substantial academic and policy implications. Even as the Soviet Union disintegrated over twenty years ago, there remain great disparities between Eastern European countries and their relative levels of development, economic and political stability, and economic growth. There has been a great deal of literature dedicated to these topics; however, there has been a noticeable lack of works on cross-country analyses of rapid liberalization policies and their economic, political, and social effects. This is especially true with regard to the policies' effects on small business creation, economic growth, and political stability. Of course, the implementation of post-Communist transition policies has been relatively recent; nonetheless, the field of IPE is in need of a contemporary assessment.

Literature Review

Rapid market liberalization has been a cornerstone of neo-liberal thought and was arguably the most influential economic perspective in the 1980s and early 1990s. As a contrast, the historical materialist perspective tends to critique neo-Liberals and their proposed policies for what historical materialists consider adverse social consequences. Whereas neo-Liberals emphasize economic growth as a central aspect of economic recovery, historical materialists contend that the neo-Liberal approach does not account for normative concerns regarding inequality and social conditions. While these two perspectives may address and emphasize different concerns, such concerns are nonetheless related. Therefore, discussion of both perspectives is a necessary component for a comprehensive analysis of the Polish and Ukrainian cases. The literature review portion of this project will introduce some of the most influential neoliberal and historical materialist scholars and their arguments regarding market liberalization, as well as some other scholars who address related issues, but may not easily be categorized into either theoretical school of thought.

Neo-Liberals: Foremost among the influential neo-liberal scholars is Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs who played a direct role in implementing reforms in Poland and other post- Communist countries. Sachs argues that the most important goal for post-Communist countries' economies should be to integrate within the global economy. Sachs contends that, "For countries that have been cut off from the

world economy for decades, such as Poland and the other post-Communist countries, it makes special sense to deepen the new links with the global market economy as rapidly as possible” (Sachs, 1994: p.268). In a sense, he asserts that the goal of such transitions is to ‘normalize’ a previously backward or isolated economy to make it compatible with the general global economic framework.

Sachs argues that there are three distinct crises as part of a post-communist transition process, which can be classified as systemic, financial, and structural adjustment crises. The systemic crisis is characterized as the struggle between domestic actors who desire full market liberalization and those who seek to maintain extensive state ownership of industries (or market Socialism). The financial crisis is characterized by the presence of heavily indebted governments, increasing budget deficits, decreasing tax revenue, and rampant inflation. And finally, the structural adjustment crisis is defined by the problems associated with the failures of inefficient industries (often state-owned heavy industry) and the unemployment and other social problems that may result from such industries’ failures. Sachs argues that the challenge of market liberalization is to “address all three crises, recognizing that each poses a problem with a different time horizon for solution” (p.273). He goes on to say that, “If financial stabilization can be accomplished in the first year of radical reforms, and systemic transformation in the first five years, the structural change in the economy is a task of one to two decades” (p.274). Therefore, Sachs argues, some aspects of post-Communist transition can be accomplished more quickly than others, and is thus ultimately a gradual process even under ideal conditions.

Sachs also emphasizes the role of the domestic political institutions and society at large in the post-Communist transition process. He acknowledges that while outside economists and other experts may be influential in the early stages of post-Communist transitions, the long-term success of the policies and planning ultimately are the responsibility of domestic actors. Sachs writes that:

A successful economic advisor must chart out a feasible course of action that solves the acute economic problems. I viewed my work as short term, with a time horizon of a few years at most. I was not, and would not become, the long-term advisor to these economies. Long-term choices were for the society, through politics, not through an outside economic advisor. I was there to solve immediate problems (Sachs, 2012).

In other words, market liberalization must be complemented by a competent and compliant state in order to succeed. Therefore, issues such as corruption and political decision-making play important roles in the facilitation of post-communist economic development and growth.

Also coming from a neo-liberal perspective is Leszek Balcerowicz, who argues that employing free ‘Entry’ and free ‘Exit’ mechanisms for firms is the most important component of the post-Communist transition process, because emphasizing these mechanisms allows entrepreneurs to help increase economic efficiency and increase a country’s global competitiveness. Balcerowicz was in fact the Finance Minister of Poland during the earliest stages of the post-communist transition process—holding office from September 1989 until December 1991. He was also the architect of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan, which provided the blueprint for Poland’s transition to a market economy. Balcerowicz explains his position on free entry and exit mechanisms by writing:

Barriers to entry and exit influence the development of competitive conditions in established market economies, however, for economies in transition the freedom of entry and exit has an even more significant dimension. The reason for that are particular ‘initial conditions’ which the economies inherited from their Communist past: massive distortions of the economic structure, highly monopolistic and oligopolistic markets, and a large average firm size. With a collapse of the

old regime, transformation of the old economic structure had to take place through the entry of new, market-oriented firms particularly in the undeveloped sectors of the economy and the exit of inefficient and uncompetitive enterprises especially from the over-grown industrial sector (Balcerowicz, 1998: p.7).

This argument in many ways echoes Sachs's argument with regard to 'normalizing' post-communist economies and allowing them to be better integrated into the global economic framework. Balcerowicz asserts that in the early stages of post-communist transition and market liberalization, firm entries and exits will likely be very high – much higher than in more developed market economies – because of the substantial amount of inefficiencies under the old system. These changes, asserts Balcerowicz, while perhaps painful in the short-term are indeed a necessary correction for long-term stability and prosperity (Balcerowicz, 1998: p.9).

Martin Paldam and Gert Svendsen build upon Balcerowicz's argument by contending that the fall of communism led to the adverse consequence of an increase in black market activity due to high barriers to entry and a general lack of state institutions capable of policing such activity. They acknowledge that the Communist state apparatus did not explicitly allow the operation of the black market, but nonetheless did tolerate its existence in order to add flexibility and meet needs of citizens that the state was not able or willing to (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.6).

Moreover, once the communist state institutions and control mechanisms collapsed, such conditions allowed the black market to flourish. In fact, the authors estimate that in Ukraine and Russia the black market accounted for only 15% of transactions in 1990, but grew to nearly 40% by 2000 (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.1). Paldam and Svendsen contend that the growth of these illegal sectors of the economy led to a growth in organized crime that in fact slowed economic recovery and kept standards of living below what they would have otherwise been (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.11).

Paldam and Svendsen go on to argue that one must differentiate between "positive" and "negative" forms of enterprise to better understand the situation in post-communist Europe. They argue that, "Cooperation and networks come in positive and negative forms. People may cooperate about socially desirable goals [positive] or about goals decreasing aggregate welfare [negative]" (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.3). However, it is often difficult for social scientists to fully grasp the extent of negative enterprise, because, as the authors write, "Normally, such negative networks and organizations are secret, and hence are not recorded by polls or other methods of measurement, but it does not, of course, mean that they do not exist" (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.4). Black markets tend to be economically beneficial for those involved in the enterprise, but generally are not beneficial for the society at large.

Nonetheless, the authors assert that black market networks are indeed a form of enterprise, albeit a negative one. So in essence, they are arguing that the problem in post-Communist Europe is not necessarily a lack of people and networks willing to meet market demands, the problem is rather many forms of enterprise that exist are not of the positive, legal-type, that works towards socially desirable goals. They term this phenomenon the "problematic inheritance" (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.10). This is not to say that black markets do not exist in Western European economies as well, but rather the problem is far worse in the post-Communist countries and is limiting the space in which legal enterprise would otherwise grow. Paldam and Svendsen conclude by arguing that in order to solve these problems, governments must take stronger stands in ridding corruption, reducing barriers to entry for legal firms and "creating the proper enabling environment for [positive] social capital generation" (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.18).

Historical Materialists: Robert Cox takes a competing viewpoint coming from the historical materialist perspective. Cox takes the position that even though rapid market liberalization may result in economic growth and prosperity for some in the short-term, such policies will also result in long-term political and economic instability due to inequality and the consequent conflict. He argues that the pain of liberalization efforts often falls on the most vulnerable social groups, which may cause an upheaval of either the liberalized capitalist marketplace or democracy. Cox presents this dilemma by writing, “The beneficent mood of political liberalization is, however, vulnerable to the reality of unprecedented deprivation and collective humiliation. The choice then would become which to sacrifice, democracy or the free market” (Cox, 1993: p.281)? He goes on to argue that history suggests democracy tends to be sacrificed before the free market, and warns about the consequent formation of a dangerous form of corporatism.

Cox strongly criticizes Sachs’s assertion that Eastern Europe experienced a systemic crisis as the Soviet Union dissolved, and instead argued that market-Socialism was a more advisable alternative, as it would have caused less social pain among the populace, yet would have also helped to resolve many of the worst failures of the communist state. He argues, “‘Socialism’ has become an almost unpronounceable word in Eastern Europe, but the values of Socialism survive without the word and could give substance to the coming reaction against the socially devastating consequences of unbridled market behavior” (Cox, 1993: p.282). In essence, Cox contends that the rapid economic and political liberalization advocated by Sachs and Balcerowicz is likely to result in many problems, and replaces the Communist state with another inherently flawed system that results in similar social despair. Instead Cox advocates a system that he argues “could take the form of either producer self-management, or democratization of the central planning process, or conceivably of some combination of the two” (p.282). However, he claims that such a system would have been difficult to implement, due to a monopolization of the media by radical liberalization advocates and their focus on the ‘systemic crisis’ and resistance to market-Socialism.

Jiri Musil takes a similar position to Cox, albeit focusing on different social phenomena. Musil argues that in the post-Communist era there has been a mass restructuring of Central and Eastern European societies, in large part due to the restoration of the land market and removal of rent controls, that has led to more socially polarized neighborhoods, and these changes have reduced the involvement of particular social groups within the newly created political and economic systems. Thus, he contends that rapid market liberalization has increased inequality in the countries that employ such policies. He points out that the dissolution of the Communist economy has had substantial consequences in the daily lives of citizens of post-Communist countries, and contends that these changes must not be ignored. He focuses on the dynamics of urban development to explain how what he calls a “new pattern of social segregation” has developed (Musil, 1993: p.902).

The introduction of a market-based land economy has altered, and largely eliminated, the redistribution practices that occurred under communism. Consequently, the land values of central portions of cities have increased and Musil contends that, “many changes in the socio-economic differentiation of urban space can be expected. Low-income groups and probably old people will be pushed from the inner parts of cities” (Musil, 1993: p.902). Furthermore, Musil asserts that a likely result will be “the expansion of cities beyond the periphery—i.e. suburbanization” (Musil, 1993: p.902). He argues that such changes will likely inhibit, or at least delay, the ability of vulnerable social groups to adapt to the newly implemented system (p.904). In other words, the economic changes and uncertainty

created by the post-communist transition process have effectively inhibited citizens' ability to secure their own social and economic well-being and organize to benefit from the free market system.

Case-Studies

The case studies selected for this analysis will focus on three main points. The main purposes of each case-study will be to explain the post-Communist reforms implemented within both Poland and Ukraine and the results, the role of the state in each case's respective successes and failures, and finally provide an assessment of the resulting political and social conditions within each country. By examining these three points, we can develop a better understanding of how the neo-Liberal and historical materialist perspectives view the issue of market liberalization and perhaps challenge their respective assumptions when data contradicts what would otherwise be expected.

Poland – In 1990, after nearly forty-five years of communist rule, the Polish economy it can be argued was wholly unequipped for integration into the capitalist global economic framework. As Jeffrey Sachs pointed out, Poland was in the midst of three economic crises simultaneously: systemic, financial, and structural. The systemic crisis was perhaps the most visible to outsiders, as events such as the Roundtable Talks and 4 June 1989 elections clearly displayed public discontent and opposition to the state's performance in managing domestic economic institutions and activity. The financial crisis was quite pronounced as well, as the average inflation rate in Poland in 1990 reached a staggering 787% (Triami Media BV, 2013). The structural crisis, however, was at the time far less visible than the previous two, as state owned industries remained, but were nonetheless defined by numerous inefficiencies that would make them uncompetitive in a capitalist global economy.

In order to guide the transition to a market economy, Leszek Balcerowicz and Jeffrey Sachs were dispatched as two of the leading economists at the time and worked to lead a commission that developed what later became known as the Balcerowicz Plan. The Balcerowicz Plan was intended to address all three crises that Sachs described. The plan addressed the financial crisis by removing price controls, placing limits on the national budget deficit, and limiting wage increases for state-owned corporations in order to combat hyperinflation. The Balcerowicz Plan addressed the systemic crisis by emphasizing a full transition to a capitalist-market economy, rather than merely transitioning to market-socialism. Sachs explained that the reason behind such provisions was to place Poland more in line with the economic structures of Western Europe, in order to assure political commitment to the reforms and make clear that a mixed system such as market-socialism would not be a feasible option. Sachs writes, "I urged the Solidarity leadership to abandon visions of "market Socialism," and to go for a market-capitalist economy. My argument, in a nutshell was that Poland had a natural place as member of the Western European economic area. I believed that the slogan of Poland's revolution, "the Return to Europe," should also be the guidepost for economic reforms" (Sachs, 2012). Thus, Sachs's idea was to consolidate political and social desires for Poland to rejoin Europe with what he viewed as the necessary economic reforms. And finally, with regard to the structural adjustment crisis, the Balcerowicz Plan allowed for inefficient state-owned businesses to declare for bankruptcy rather than continue to exist without effectiveness and accountability—free 'Exit' policies. The plan also allowed for freer 'Entry' policies by allowing greater foreign investment, standardizing taxation rates, and removing controls on wages. Although the plan was widely supported by the newly elected Solidarity government, critics faulted the plan for removing protections for workers and predicted consequent social inequality and instability.

In the early stages of the Balcerowicz Plan's implementation, the economic pain was widely viewed as extremely high on the population. As explained previously, the financial crisis was the first target of the reforms, as this crisis was viewed by Sachs and Balcerowicz to have the quickest solution. In 1990, price controls were largely removed and the country's internal debt was drastically reduced by cutting subsidies to industries such as coal, petroleum, and electricity. As a result of these rapid changes, nearly 1.1 million people at state-owned firms lost their jobs (*World Bank Database*, 2013). The inflation rate also averaged 787% over the course of 1990, which depleted the savings for many ordinary citizens (Triami Media BV, 2013). At this time, structural changes were also taking place as bankruptcies at major state owned firms affected the incomes and employment status of nearly 20% of Poles (*World Bank Database*, 2013).

These conditions led to increased social concerns predicted by critical scholars, such as Robert Cox. Neo-Liberals, on the other hand, argued that free entry policies would allow for a greater presence of private service businesses that would help fill the employment gap left by the exit of large inefficient state-owned firms and would better adapt to a capitalist marketplace. Indeed from 1990-92, an estimated 600,000 small private service businesses were established that produced approximately 1.5 million new jobs (Groningen Growth & Development Center, 2013). Unemployment was reduced from approximately 20% in 1990 to about 12.2% by the beginning of 1992—although this number was relatively higher than most other post-Communist economies at the time (*World Bank Database*, 2013).

Nonetheless, Poland embarked on structural adjustment much quicker than most other post-Communist Eastern European countries, and a major factor in this process was an emphasis on free entry and exit policies. As has been mentioned, the Balcerowicz Plan had called for more liberal laws in allowing state-owned industries to exit the market and declare bankruptcy. However, the plan also did the same in liberalizing entrance into the marketplace. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced a report using data from 2003 that assessed a number of countries' policies regarding business creation and found that Poland had one of the simplest systems and least burdensome permit and license requirements of any post-communist country. The OECD developed an index of free entry policies within a country that takes into account the number of permits and licenses needed to start a business and the simplicity of the process. The average score across countries was a 2.5 out of 7; however, Poland came in with even greater ease than average with a score of 2.0 (OECD, 2007: p.94). This score puts Poland on par with other Western countries such as the United States and United Kingdom.

Such reforms have fundamentally altered the different sectors of Poland's economy and certain sectors have consequently been more responsible for economic growth than others. In 1995, nearly 60% of Poland's economy consisted of sectors relating to resource extraction (coal, minerals, wood, etc.) and approximately 10% of the overall economy were agricultural industries (Simoes, 2013). By 2005, resource extraction industries accounted for only 20% of the Polish economy, and agriculture only 3% (Simoes, 2013). As these industries were the most subsidized and controlled by the state during the Communist era, it would be expected that once such supports were rescinded and free exit policies were implemented, many of the inefficient industries would account for less of the economy. However, the decline and 'exit' of many of these businesses allowed more resources to be allocated toward the more competitive and growth driving industries. In 1995, small to medium-sized private businesses accounted for only about 20% of the Polish economy, and by 2005 this number grew to nearly 55% (Simoes, 2013). Thus, the long-term restructuring of the Polish economy has become quite visible.

The next important question to address is how such restructuring has affected economic growth and which sectors are most responsible for such growth. From 1992 until 2000, the Polish economy grew by approximately 45%--the highest of any post-communist country (Kornecki, 2003: p.4). However, 70% of such growth was driven by small and medium sized private businesses, despite the fact that such businesses only employed between 50% and 60% of the working population during the same time period (Kornecki, 2003: p.5). Lucyna Kornecki explains this phenomenon by writing, "Economic growth in the Polish economy seems to be a strong indicator of entrepreneurial activity. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that "entrepreneurial activity and economic growth are closely linked" (Kornecki, 2003: p.5). This assertion is consistent with Balcerowicz's argument that free entry and free exit mechanisms facilitate entrepreneurial activity and hence economic growth. Kornecki demonstrates a positive correlation between increases in private registered business firms and increases in economic growth (Kornecki, 2003: p.8). From 1991 to 2004, the number of small private service businesses in Poland grew from 1,200,000 to 4,736,000 (Kornecki, 2003: p.8), and the Balcerowicz Plan's emphasis on free entry policies, Poland's relative lack of permit and licensing requirements, and general lack of barriers to entry are the most evident explanations for this growth in small private service businesses. Moreover, Balcerowicz's argument regarding the importance of free entry and free exit mechanisms seems to hold, given the data regarding these factors and Poland's relatively high economic growth compared to other post-communist countries.

However, critics such as Robert Cox charge that these sorts of economic changes come at the expense of other important social and political factors. Cox asserted that rapid market liberalization is likely to result in a decline in democratic rule, increases in corruption, and increases in wealth inequality. Therefore, it is worth noting how Poland rates compared to other countries with regard to these issues. In terms of the strength of Poland's democracy, the *Economist* Intelligence Unit conducts annual research on countries' electoral process, the functioning of the given government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties, and creates an index of scores for each country based upon these factors. The overall index scores range from 10 to 0 with a score of 10 representing the most strengthened democracy. In the 2012 index, Poland scored a 7.12 out of 10 and is rated as a 'flawed democracy' (*Economist* Intelligence Unit, 2013: p.4). This categorization is given largely due to relatively low levels of political participation and weaker political culture. The lower levels of political participation may indeed provide some evidence to Musil's argument that the restoration of the land market and removal of rent controls lead to the exclusion of vulnerable social groups in political affairs. However, Poland's score also places it ahead of most other post-communist countries in democratic strength, and even on par with some Western European countries rated as 'flawed democracies,' such as Italy and Portugal (*Economist* Intelligence Unit, 2013: p.9). So while Poland may not be considered fully democratized, the sort of democratic decline predicted by Cox has not appeared to come to fruition in Poland as of 2012.

With regard to corruption, Poland has demonstrated the least corruption among post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Transparency International, an NGO that studies corruption issues globally, conducts annual research on public perceptions of domestic institutions in order to assess the extent and severity of corruption. The survey measures perception because of the sheer difficulty of measuring illegal activity, and measuring prosecutions is often more indicative of the competence and aggressiveness of prosecutors than how the general environment is affected by corruption. The 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index scores countries from 0 to 100 with 100 being the least corrupt countries. Poland scores a 58 on the index, which ranks 41st globally and the least corrupt

in post-Communist Europe (Transparency International, 2013). This score describes Poland as less corrupt than some Southern European countries, such as Greece and Italy. Thus, concerns of rapid market liberalization resulting in increased corruption have not shown to be the case in Poland. And in fact, Poland's relative lack of corruption can also be placed into context with the country's emphasis on reducing barriers to market entry. Corruption is indeed a barrier to entry, and corruption is often associated with such issues as permit and license procurement, and given Poland's relative lack of such barriers, there are consequently fewer opportunities for corruption. Therefore, arguments regarding rapid market liberalization and increases in corruption are not demonstrated in the case of Poland.

In terms of wealth inequality, the argument by many critical scholars that rapid market liberalizations are likely to result in greater wealth inequality does have some evidence to support such claims. The World Bank's Gini Index, which measures wealth inequality within countries on a scale from 0 to 100 with 100 being most unequal, scores Poland with a coefficient of 0.34. This score is higher than some other Eastern European countries that did not undergo rapid liberalization, such as Belarus' (0.272) and Ukraine (0.264). However, inequality in Poland is nonetheless on par with some other Western European countries, such as Italy (0.36) and Spain (0.347), and even well below the United States (0.45) (World Bank, 2013). Inequality, however, it must be noted is not necessarily an ideal indicator of living standards or social or political conflict. There is little, if any, evident correlation between such variables. The United Nations Human Development Index, in which scores range from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the most developed, scores Poland with a coefficient of 0.821 ranking 39th internationally. Belarus' (0.793) and Ukraine (0.74), on the other hand, rank 50th and 78th respectively (United Nations, 2013). So while Poland may have greater wealth inequality, this does not necessarily mean living standards are lower for average citizens or that social or political conflict will be increased. Furthermore, the extent of inequality resulting from rapid market liberalization does not appear to be as severe as scholars such as Cox had predicted, at least not in the case of Poland.

Ukraine – In 1990 Ukraine was actually more economically prosperous than their Polish neighbors with a GDP of \$90 billion (\$1,743 per capita), whereas Poland trailed with a GDP of \$65 billion (\$1,708 per capita) (*World Bank Database*, 2013). Thus, both countries began in similar positions at the time of the Soviet Union's dissolution with Ukraine holding the higher GDP. However, both countries took very different paths in the years following. Whereas Poland consulted with outside economists to help guide and plan for a rapid market transition and liberalization, Ukraine resisted such efforts and took arguably one of the most gradual approaches of any Eastern European country. Poland's Balcerowicz Plan had liberalization measures at its core that emphasized the removal of market manipulations, such as price controls and subsidies, the normalization of economic relations with Western Europe, and free entry and exit policies to allow for fundamental structural adjustments to the national economy. Ukraine, on the other hand, has tended to preserve many of the protections for state workers and corporations from the communist era, and consequently has experienced far less structural adjustment in its economy.

If we look at the three crises that Sachs discussed in the Polish case and examine the systemic, financial, and structural adjustment crises in Ukraine, we can better understand the contrast of how these two countries attempted to move forward after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In terms of the systemic crisis, Ukraine certainly did not have the same strength or vibrancy of grass roots movements or leaders pushing for market liberalization, as was the case in Poland. Whereas in Poland the factions pushing for market liberalization had risen to power in the semi-free 1989 elections, Ukraine largely maintained the Communist bureaucracy and leadership that had been leading the

country previously. In fact, survey results show that a majority of Ukrainians as of 2009 still did not support a full transition to a capitalist economic system. A 2009 survey conducted by Pew Research found that only 36% of all Ukrainians approved of a change to a capitalist economy, whereas 71% of Poles supported such a system (Pew Research, 2010). These results are a reflection of the fact that Ukraine did not attempt to convince the population or its political class to adopt free market reforms in the manner that Poland did, and consequently did not attempt to address what Sachs termed the “systemic crisis.” For this reason, Ukraine’s economy did not undergo the sort of changes that Poland did to ‘normalize’ their economy and make it more in line with those of Western Europe. Poland demonstrated greater social and political desires to join with the developed economies of Europe, whereas Ukraine seemed to lack such desires. Thus, the idea of the “systemic crisis” was not handled in Ukraine as it was in Poland, and the social and political desires of the populace demonstrate this particular aspect of each country’s divergent path in the post-Communist era.

A common characteristic of Eastern European post-communist transitions were rapidly increasing inflation rates due to price stabilization and debt reduction measures; however, Ukraine’s plan to deal with its financial crisis differed from Poland’s plan in two important ways.

First, whereas Poland attempted to normalize economic relations with Western Europe and consequently had many of its debts forgiven, Ukraine did not attempt such measures and thus its government did not receive the same debt forgiveness. Second, Ukraine was more hesitant than Poland in removing its price controls on consumer goods. Whereas Poland began removing its price controls in 1989 with the implementation of the Balcerowicz Plan and experienced a rapid rise in inflation to 787%, Ukraine largely kept its price controls until reforms implemented in 1992 and until that point kept inflation rates below 10%. However, while Poland had seen its inflation rate drop to 30% by 1993, Ukraine’s inflation rate skyrocketed to a staggering 10,000% in 1993 (Leheyda, 2005: p.3). Therefore, it can be argued that Ukraine’s delay in implementing financial reforms increased the long-term financial pain on its citizens.

With regard to the structural adjustment crisis, this is perhaps the area where Ukraine remains markedly behind their Polish neighbors. The structure of the Ukrainian economy remains largely as it was decades ago, and has not experienced a surge in new industries as Poland has. Resource extraction and agriculture made up approximately 85% of the Ukrainian economy in 1995, and in 2010 these same sectors continue to make up about 80% of Ukraine’s economy. By contrast, the Polish economy in 1995 consisted of about 60% resource extraction and agriculture, however, these sectors only made up about 15% of Poland’s economy by 2010 as new industries and private service businesses entered the economy (Simoes, 2013). These numbers are significant, because these sectors were the most controlled and protected by the state during the Communist era, and consequently inefficiencies in such sectors were often either overlooked or were met with state subsidies to keep the industries afloat.

Ukraine’s resistance to implementing reforms to make its economy more competitive globally can indeed be demonstrated through a further examination of the country’s economic growth, or lack thereof, in the period since 1990. The Ukrainian economy declined every year from 1990-2000 with its GDP being cut in half over that period. In fact, Ukraine’s economy has experienced a net decline of 3.6% from 1990 through 2013, whereas the Polish economy has experienced a net growth of 91.4% (*World Bank Database*, 2013). The contrast of results in these two cases is rather stark, and there are a few important explanations for and consequences of such a disparity.

One of the simplest explanations for this disparity is the relative difficulty of starting a business in Ukraine as compared to in Poland. Many such barriers are created with the intent to protect workers

and domestic companies. However, such policies may also result in less competition and a general lack of motivation for existing companies to reduce inefficiencies. According to the OECD index that measures the relative difficulty of obtaining the requisite permits and licenses to start a business, whereas Poland scored a 2.0 out of 7 (with 7 representing the most difficult conditions), Ukraine scored a 6.0—far higher than the international average of 2.5 (OECD, 2007: p.94). Furthermore, on the index representing the simplification and clarity of communication in the start-up process, Poland scored a 0.7 out of 3 (with 3 representing the most difficult) and Ukraine scored a 2.7—the most difficult of any country in Europe—once again, far higher than the international average of 0.5 (OECD, 2007: p.95). This has resulted in far less start-up enterprises in Ukraine compared to Poland. In fact, data has shown that for every business started in Ukraine, Poland creates five (OECD, 2007: p.96). This data demonstrates that the continuation of policies from the communist era intended to protect workers and existing domestic businesses may indeed stifle the growth of competition and a competitive marketplace, and one can further argue that such barriers to entry have been an important contributing factor to the disparity in economic growth between Poland and Ukraine.

A consequence of such difficult barriers to entry for firms, according to Paldam and Svendsen, is that conditions are created that tend to increase black market activity, as the costs and time of creating a legal business can oftentimes be too burdensome for many entrepreneurs. Consequently, Ukraine has experienced a surge in black market activity with estimates placing the value of the black market within the country to be equivalent to approximately 40% of the overall legal economy (Paldam & Svendsen, 2000: p.1). Such a phenomenon also tends to result in adverse social and political costs, such as increases in organized crime and corruption, and decreases in sources of tax revenue, public services and living-standards.

Robert Cox warned of the social consequences of rapid market liberalization and the potential for inequality, corruption, and loss of democracy. As was demonstrated in the previous case study, these warnings did not become reality in the case of Poland. So this begs the question of how the lack, or at least very slow, implementation of market liberalization policies has affected the social and political conditions within Ukraine. In terms of democracy, the gradual process implemented by Ukraine did not in fact aid its political process or improve its potential for democratic consolidation compared to other post-communist states. Whereas Poland scored a 7.12 out of 10 in the *Economist* Intelligence Unit's index of democratic strength (with 10 being the strongest democracies), Ukraine scored a mere 5.91 out of 10 putting it in the category of semi-authoritarian hybrid regimes (*Economist* Intelligence Unit, 2013: 5). In fact, Ukraine scored lower than Poland in each category measured, which included electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. Furthermore, Ukrainians have demonstrated a relatively low level of support for democracy with only 30% approving of a change to democracy, whereas in Poland the number rises to 70% (Pew Research, 2010). Therefore, at least in a comparison of Poland and Ukraine, there does not appear to be a democratic benefit to gradual market liberalization policies as opposed to rapid liberalization.

With regard to corruption, the gradual liberalization process in Ukraine has indeed demonstrated greater corruption compared to post-communist countries that liberalized more rapidly. In fact, the 2013 Global Corruption Perception Index has found Ukraine to be the most corrupt country in Europe. The index scored Ukraine with a 26 out of 100 (with 100 representing the least corrupt), while Poland's score of 58 represented far less corruption. Such data ranks Ukraine 123rd internationally in terms of preventing corruption (Transparency International, 2013). The high rates of corruption in Ukraine can be accounted for in part due to the high barriers to entry for firms—thus giving local

politicians greater power over entrepreneurs—and the high prevalence of black market activity and organized crime. Such conditions have made corruption a common occurrence in Ukrainian life.

However, as has been previously mentioned, Ukraine does indeed have a more equal distribution of income than many of the post-communist countries that liberalized more rapidly, such as Poland. Whereas Poland possesses a Gini coefficient of 0.34, Ukraine's Gini coefficient is 0.264—representing greater equality in Ukraine (World Bank, 2013). While this is the case, Ukraine also has a GDP per capita (PPP) only about a third of that in Poland. In 2012, Ukraine had a GDP per capita (PPP) of \$6,394 in real dollars, whereas in Poland the GDP per capita was \$18,297 (World Bank, 2013). These differences are rather telling considering that in 1990 the GDP per capita in both countries were nearly equal. However, since Poland's implementation of the rapidly liberalizing Balcerowicz Plan, GDP per capita in Poland has nearly tripled that in Ukraine. So while citizens in Ukraine may indeed have more equal incomes, they also tend to have much lower incomes than Polish citizens. Furthermore, inequality is not necessarily a very good indicator of living standards for average citizens. Instead, as was mentioned in the previous case, the United Nations Human Development Index measures the relative development in a country, services available to citizens, and quality of life. And once again, Poland's score of 0.821 ranks higher than Ukraine's score of 0.74—ranking 39th and 78rd respectively (United Nations, 2013). Thus, the historical materialist focus on inequality does not necessarily account for the overall living standards or services available to citizens within these two countries. Nor does a focus on inequality tend to explain Ukrainians' more averse attitudes toward democracy or the higher rates of corruption within the country. Instead the presence of high barriers to entry for enterprise appears to provide a more precise explanation as to why such problems are so prevalent in Ukraine, and far less prevalent in Poland.

Evaluation and Conclusions

As this project has explained, barriers to entry play an important role within countries undergoing a post-Communist transition. Poland and Ukraine, while beginning from very similar positions economically as the Soviet Union fell in 1990, took very different paths since and the consequences of these different policies can be seen through a close examination of the respective countries' economic, political, and social well-being. Neo-Liberals, such as Jeffery Sachs and Leszek Balcerowicz, emphasized the importance of solving Poland's financial, systemic, and structural adjustment crises rapidly in order to better position the economy within the global economic framework and increase efficiencies domestically. Ukraine, on the other hand, maintained many protections for workers and domestic corporations from the communist era, and was slow to remove such policies. Consequently, Poland experienced short-term economic pain that largely subsided by 1992 and saw tremendous changes in the make-up of its national economy while also experiencing rapid growth, whereas Ukraine's economy has not changed a great deal over the past two decades and has indeed seen a net 3% decline in economic growth since 1990 (*World Bank Database*, 2013). The contrast in these two cases is significant and telling as to the divergent paths countries can take in a post-Communist transition process.

The purpose of this project has been to examine the most fundamental aspects of market liberalization within Poland and Ukraine and how it has affected the economic, social, and political well-being of each country and whether neo-Liberal or historical materialist predictions regarding market liberalization have held in these cases. However, this analysis has only focused on a few factors in the post-Communist transition process, and there are certainly other variables that can be further explored. The role of international institutions and foreign investment are other factors that are worthy of further

analysis. But even before these factors can be considered, domestic policies play a role in creating an environment that is either ripe for cooperation or gives international actors reservations to invest economically or politically within a country. One of the goals of Poland's transition process was to make the country's economy more attractive to Western Europe and other developed countries, whereas the protection of existing domestic institutions and actors tended to be more emphasized within Ukraine. These have been the general tendencies in both countries, but it must also be noted that there have been some exceptions that have come with changes in political leadership in each country. This project has only examined these general trends that have indeed held between both countries and have defined the paths that each have taken in the post-Communist era, but a more detailed political analysis that goes beyond the scope of this project would provide a helpful supplement that captures many of the more nuanced changes in policy and attitudes within each country over time.

In all, it becomes apparent that the change from the communist era to the post-communist has had tremendous economic, political, and social impacts on the populations in Poland and Ukraine. Both countries took very different paths, although starting from a very similar position. The consequences of such policy choices have indeed played out in both countries and the differences are stark. Data has shown that many of the historical materialist concerns of rapid market liberalization leading to inequality and consequently increased political conflict and corruption, and lessened democratic prospects to be overstated in the case of Poland. In fact, such consequences have been more prevalent in Ukraine, which engaged in liberalization efforts far more slowly, and not at all in some respects. Given their common histories, cultures and economic starting points at the end of the Cold War, the contrasts between Poland and Ukraine's economic, political and social outcomes in the decades since provides a compelling argument that rapid market-liberalization can be a successful strategy for countries attempting to become more competitive and flexible in the global economy and reduce the pain of post-Communist transition.

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To What Extent does the Separation of Power Help or Hinder Efficiency in Foreign Policy and War?

by Gregory E. Lemrow, University of Tampa, FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award 2015 (funded by IPAC)

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this research paper is to examine the effects of the separation of powers as defined in the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, this paper seeks to examine how the checks and balances between the two branches affects the use of War-Powers and foreign policy through an examination of the 110th, 111th and 113th Congresses to look at how cooperation or combativeness between the two Branches affects the process. The intent of this study is to determine which leads to more positive and efficient results, to gain an understanding of how each Branch's actions affect those of another, as well as overall war efforts.

Introduction

The conventional wisdom of United States national security is that the President is in charge of everything, both in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces and as the highest authority on diplomatic relations. This comes about due to a combination of the language present in the constitution and the public image of the president meeting with leaders and ambassadors of other nations to discuss issues of foreign policy; whether they be threats to national security or discussions of mutual interest. However, within the language of the constitution, there are several points of inconsistency or vagueness that render this perception invalid and call into question the actual extent of power that the executive branch holds over U.S. foreign policy. The reality of the situation is that the Legislative Branch is able to exercise its own authority to aid or undermine the President's decisions through appropriations, or reduction of funds, or by refusing to vote a treaty into law. With that in mind, there are varying points throughout U.S. history in which one Congress might afford the Executive Branch more leeway, while others have pulled the reigns and asserted their authority on the matter.

The Founding Fathers created the separation of powers between the three Branches of government with the intent that each could balance one another out to prevent the rise of a singular power from rising up to control the nation. While this seemed like a reasonable response, given the colonists' experience with British imperial rule prior to the Revolutionary War, the Founding Fathers had no way of anticipating the rise of industrialized warfare, non-state actors or international bodies such as the United Nations. Thus, they did not draft the constitution with the need for a highly efficient, autonomous branch capable of maintaining foreign policy on such a grand scale, leaving the modern day Branches to balance their political interests with the necessities of foreign policy.

The question addressed in this research is to what extent does the separation of powers in the United States government affect its ability to respond to global issues? To expand upon that, we must examine as case-studies the 109th, 110th and 112th Congresses, and their interactions with the office of the Executive; in which there has been cooperation between the Legislative and Executive Branches alongside those in which the Branches have been more disharmonious in their policy-making. The reasoning behind

this is to compare government responses and analyze the effectiveness of their actions throughout modern operations in the Middle-East.

Literature Review

This paper focuses on the historical relation between the Executive and Legislative Branches, and how the cooperative or confrontational attitudes of each affect national security. Conventional wisdom would say that the Executive Branch, specifically the president, deals with this the most due to his constitutional powers over the military and diplomatic functions. However, this does not account for the powers of the Legislative Branch in funding and ratifying treaties, nor does it take account the Supreme Court rulings that provide interpretation of these constitutional powers. The literature focuses on:

- powers of the Executive in foreign policy,
- powers of the Legislative in the ratification of treaties or distribution of funds,
- discussions on how the separation of powers can work smoothly towards efficient national security policy.

This study examines these in combination with case studies on international issues that have been deemed national security risks of high enough priority to demand some form of these aforementioned actions. In particular, the paper examines the specific powers of each Branch as outlined in the constitution and discuss the way these powers aid or hinder the government's efficiency in dealing with issues of national security.

Power of the Executive

As stated above, the Executive Branch, or, more specifically, the President himself, is believed to have the authority to declare war, sign treaties into law and enter into international agreements with other nations or governing bodies. To a point, this is correct. The office of the Executive does indeed have the power to direct diplomacy with foreign governments and negotiate treaties; in fact, the power to negotiate the specifics of a treaty is a power exclusive to the office of the Executive. The administration sends orders to diplomats stationed in various countries to act as their representative and advocate to foreign governments, in this capacity they are charged with discussing the specifics of treaties or international resolutions (Jones; Sofaer, 2007; Yates, 1998).

However, the power to declare war is not explicitly reserved for the Executive Branch, the position of Commander-in-chief of the armed forces is given to the President. This gives him some leeway to order and control military operations – to an extent. However, the President cannot unilaterally issue a declaration of war without the approval of Congress (Sofaer, 2007). The President can request that the Senate vote to declare war, but that is as far as he may go on that matter. Similarly, any treaties that are negotiated by the Executive Branch must pass through the Senate with a two-thirds majority before it becomes law. So, while the treaty power is reserved for the executive, it must take into account the expectations of Congress as well as those of the cosigning nation or nations.

Additionally, the President, in his capacity as head of the administrative bureaucracy of the nation, can direct the agencies under his jurisdiction to focus more on implementing certain programs or enforcing specific laws while leaving others on the backburner; this is often referred to as the President exercising his administrative authority (King, 1999). With respect to foreign policy, this power can be used to direct military programs, to further develop technology for national security, to direct intelligence agencies such as the CIA to bring pertinent information regarding individuals or

organizations of interest to national security, and giving orders for the military to focus attention on regions in which American interests are at risk (King, 1999).

Powers of Congress

With the power to negotiate treaties, command armies and direct agencies reserved for the Executive Branch, it would seem that Congress' hands are tied in matters of foreign policy and national security. This perception is incorrect: the literature has shown that Congress does indeed hold significant influence in these areas, even enough to check the power of the President himself. As discussed above, the President cannot declare war unilaterally; he can only request that the Senate meet to debate on a declaration of war. From there, war can only be declared if two-thirds of the Senate votes in favor (Boylan, 2004; Gardini, 2010; Jones; Rosati, 1984).

Furthermore, the Senate can also decide whether or not to declare a war over, as was recently shown when President Barack Obama's request to have the "War on Terror" ended was denied. In that sense, Congress holds control over the President's war power due to the time limitations put in place to prevent prolonged military operations. Currently, the President is only permitted to have boots on the ground for a period of 30 days without a formal declaration of war from the Senate; this serves to check the Executive Branch's war power so that a President not enter into a war based on flight of fancy (Boylan, 2004; Gardini, 2010; Jones; Rosati, 1984).

Furthermore, Congress also holds exclusive rights to appropriating funds for the Federal budget. The readings show that, while it is true that the president can decide which laws deserve the most focus, Congress can exercise its control over the Federal budget to direct money to certain agencies. Utilizing this, Congress is granted the ability to help or hinder the President's interests through simple increases or decreases in the budgets of certain Federal agencies (Ackerman, 2000; Boylan, 2004; Cox, 1984; Gardini, 2010; Kaiser; Linday, 1994). To that end, these agencies will often compete to show their value to both Congress and the president in order to show that they serve a much-needed purpose to the nation regardless of the politics involved. In terms of the relationship between the Branches, this is a means by which Congress can enact its own form of a 'veto' power by going against the President's agenda and funding areas that may go against his stated interest (Ackerman, 2000; Boylan, 2004; Cox, 1984; Gardini, 2010; Kaiser; Linday, 1994).

In terms of international politics, the Executive Branch clearly has the most leeway with its authority to make treaties and establish alliances with foreign nations. But the Founding Fathers did not frame the Constitution so that one Branch would have absolute dominion over any one area of governance. While Congress does not have the authority to negotiate or sign treaties with other nations, all treaties must be passed and ratified before it can become the law of the land (Ackerman, 2000; Christopher; Cox, 1984; Gardini, 2010; Hamilton; Kaiser; Lindsay, 1994; Zelikow). The readings state that this can effectively cripple any treaty signed by the president, as it would then hold no legal grounds in American law. For example, if the President were to sign a treaty with several nations lowering carbon emissions, it would first have to pass through Congress before it is enforced as law in the United States.

Should Congress vote against ratification, the treaty lacks any power domestically and, as a result, tacitly removes the United States from participating in the details contained. Through this action, Congress possesses its own form of the President's 'veto power' over international treaties (Ackerman, 2000; Christopher; Cox, 1984; Gardini, 2010; Hamilton; Kaiser; Lindsay, 1994; Zelikow).

Theory

The theory developed in this research paper is that the separation of powers in the United States government has a direct and quantifiable impact on the efficiency of its response to national security issues. Most research covering the branches' respective powers focuses on the ways they are able to 'check' the powers of other Branches. While these studies are useful and necessary to provide an accurate understanding of the constitutional powers and how they are applied in matters of national security, they fail to provide an accurate picture of how these powers help or hinder the government's ability to respond in times of crisis.

The Founding Fathers framed the U.S. Constitution in this manner so that no one Branch would be able to assume complete control over international affairs. This was intentional due to the common fear that the President might use the war power to declare war without the approval of Congress, contrary to the interests or needs of the nation as a whole. Their cautious approach and framing of the powers of each branch was done with their position as a newly formed, regional nation in mind. With that considered, they did not envision that the United States would become a global power or that the lines of national security would be so blurred. Each branch's powers were, therefore, given in terms of the minimal influence the United States held in international politics during that time and deliberately limited by the other branches so no single entity gained too much influence.

The literature on U.S. national security policy focuses mostly on each Branch's power in terms of how they are able to 'check' those of other branches. It did well in outlining the specific powers and their relationships in these terms. The power of the Executive to dictate the international policy to be championed by diplomats was illustrated to show the reach that the office of the President holds (Jones; Sofaer, 2007; Yates, 1998). It was explained well that the Executive branch has exclusive control over this function, meaning that the president is able to set the agenda of international policy that his diplomats will spread to other nations. Diplomats, in effect, act as carriers of the President's goals. Likewise, the literature on Congress' powers, specifically those pertaining to its ability to negate Executive action through rerouting of funds or through voting against international treaties and declaration of war (Ackerman, 2000; Boylan, 2004; Christopher; Cox, 1984; Gardini, 2010; Hamilton; Jones; Kaiser; Lindsay, 1994 Rosati, 1984; Zelikow). While the President holds exclusive dominion over matters of diplomacy, Congress is able to check his power through their control over funding and Legislative action.

However, the literature fails to put these powers into terms of the effect they hold on the government's ability to react to crises in a timely and efficient manner. It doesn't analyze specific incidents to show how the separation of powers effects in the U.S. government may impact the actions taken. While general information on what each branch *can* do to check power is necessary to provide understanding, context is needed to show the manner in which they are implemented. The argument on the matter is that the separation of powers leaves the U.S. government inefficient to provide rapid response to international issues.

In addition, response is often less effective due to the time spent on debates between branches as to what manner of action is appropriate. By the time a decision is reached, it is either too late to help the individuals in need or enemy combatants have learned of whatever action has been agreed upon. This is a product of the deliberate way the founding fathers framed the constitution to make it so discussion would be slow and thorough before allowing for anything to proceed. Democracy, by its very nature, is slow because of this. But with the system of checks and balances in place, each branch has the ability to negate the actions of another due to contrasting ideology or party agenda.

To test this theory, two hypotheses were developed for the examination of three cases: one in which the government branches cooperate, two in which they do not. These two hypotheses are:

- H1: During times in which the opposition party controls Congress, there will be greater chance for inefficiency due to frequent use of aforementioned powers to stall Executive action.
- H2: Cooperation between the branches will make for a more effective government in implementing foreign policy or war-time decisions, while combativeness will have the inverse effect.

What the author planned to do with this research is to examine the interactions between Congress and the office of the Executive in order to gain an understanding of how the checks and balances granted to each branch by the U.S. Constitution affect foreign policy and war-time decisions in the modern world. Additionally, the author hoped to gain an understanding of how cooperation and combativeness affect foreign policy in combination with the aforementioned powers of each Branch. Thus, the author examined recent conflicts in the Middle-East, such as the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War and negotiations with Syria regarding their nuclear program.

Methodology

The paper's task is to determine effectiveness of the American government—specifically, whether or not cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches makes for better implementation of policy and measures with respect to war and foreign affairs. To test for this, the author will examine the level of cooperation, the actions taken, and the effectiveness of the actions taken. Each of these areas will be examined with respect to how events played out during the 109th, 110th and 112th Congresses. By examining three Congresses and their interactions with the executive in such a close time period, the author is able to compare the actions taken in modern time and focus on a common incident: the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War. These should provide an applicable research model, especially given that the topic is still relevant to American interests.

Based on the areas mentioned, the analysis will determine whether or not my hypotheses hold water on the effects of the relationship between the Branches. In order to examine how cooperation or combativeness effects our government, the author shall look at how each Congress interacts with the office of the executive and determine whether or not they came together in agreement or in compromise in order to move forward with their decisions. Again, cooperation will also be rated on the success and effectiveness of the measures chosen. The author will also test the notion that, when the President's opposition is in control of Congress, it is more likely for conflict to occur and make the process inefficient. The standard of effectiveness and success will be the standard of measurement, in combination with evidence of cooperation or conflict.

Case-Studies

While learning the specific powers of each branch helps to indicate areas in which conflict and cooperation occur when an issue of national security arises, observing specific incidents in which show how they occur in the real world. An example of conflict between the Branches was seen midway through President George W. Bush Jr.'s term, specifically with respect to 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War. At the beginning, the two Branches were shown to cooperate, largely due to the Republican Party holding both the presidency and majority control in both chambers.

109th Congress

In 2002, Republicans enjoyed a 20-point lead in public confidence polls on how they would handle the war effort (Goble, p.218) and felt that support would continue throughout the conflict. For that reason, President Bush Jr. found that most of his uses of War-Powers were approved and put into practice with regularity.

One of the earliest actions taken was a joint air strike conducted with the United Kingdom. "In the aftermath of strikes, members of Congress raised no constitutional objections. Since the Democrats raised few constitutional objections to Clinton's military strikes, it would have been especially hypocritical and partisan to raise constitutional qualms at this point. Moreover, Bush Jr. received no negative backlash from the public for his military conduct" (Hendrickson, p.16). While there were several areas in which Congress would have been right to raise objections, public opinion and partisan politics made it seem unpatriotic to show a lack of support for the war. And while some Democrats did voice concern, they opted to approve President Bush Jr.'s actions in order to avoid being seen as weak on Iraq. Even in spite of rising casualties, Congress was shown to back his decisions as far as April 2004 – which saw the highest number of American casualties (Hendrickson, p.19). While it made little sense to continue along the same course of action from a logistics standpoint, Congress maintained its support for President Bush Jr.'s agenda. War powers were exercised more smoothly because of this continued support; so while the results may not have been quite what the administration projected, they were able to move forward and proceed with their war plan. However, this would change with the Congressional elections in 2006, which saw the Democrats retake majority control.

110th Congress

With the Democrats in charge of the legislature, President Bush Jr. found it more difficult to pass resolutions, largely in part due to their previous inefficiency and the casualty count. Additionally, new details being brought to the American public's attention led to more scrutiny of the administration's practices. One notable example was the discovery of torture of Iraqi prisoners. "It is only in recent days, with the revelation of the inhumane treatment of Iraqi prisoners that more vocal congressional opposition has surfaced. Members of Congress have been quite vocal in their disappointment with this issue, as a number of Democrats have called for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation" (Hendrickson, 19). The revelation of torture cast a dark light on the morality of the war itself, as it showed that the U.S. military in a negative light on the world stage. This was damaging to the government's international reputation, due to the contradiction in actions and the moral message that American diplomats use in negotiations. Naturally, this reflected poorly on Congress' image at home, so they were forced to take action in response for rising public concerns with human rights violations. In response, they took a more confrontational stance, demanding that the administration provide justification for requests for troop surges or funding, which had not been the norm up to this point in the war. The previous Congress had cooperated with the Bush Jr. Administration as long as their war powers were respected and they were consulted properly, save for the incidents with the joint air strike. The shift from cooperation to confrontation is an example of the effects of partisanship and public opinion on the legislative branch: as the Democrats were the opposition party to the administration, who had enacted the policy, they were expected to stay true to this and oppose such actions by their constituents. The divide became more evident in 2007, when the Democrat-controlled Congress moved to end the war.

Democrats in Congress took note of public disapproval for the war effort and moved to pass a resolution to end the war by Summer 2007. The measure itself was defeated by a 50-48 vote in the Senate, but it is important to note that the administration threatened to veto the bill should it pass (Branigin). In the same article, this action is contradictory to the House Appropriations Committee decision. "The vote came hours after the House Appropriations Committee approved a plan to withdraw most U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of August 2008. The provision was part of a \$124 billion emergency spending bill that includes \$95.5 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan this year. More than 140,000 U.S. troops are currently deployed in Iraq, and the Bush administration plans to send in thousands more to help quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and battle insurgents and foreign fighters in the western province of Anbar." Both the threat of veto for the previous bill and the administration's plan for a troop surge go directly against the House Appropriation Committee's decision for a defined exit date. Around the same time, several Republican senators began raising objections to the administration's war policies, despite previous support and votes against withdraw. "We cannot continue asking our troops to sacrifice indefinitely while the Iraqi government is not making measurable progress," Domenici said. "I do not support an immediate withdrawal from Iraq or a reduction in funding for our troops. But I do support a new strategy that will move our troops out of combat operations and on the path to coming home" (Murray & Kane). Other key members, such as Senator Richard Lugar and Senator Norm Coleman, heavily criticized the Bush Jr. administration's plan and spoke out in support of measures to phase the American military out of Iraq. Most of the reasons cited involved the high casualty count and disappointment in the newly installed Iraqi government's ineptitude in maintaining order. With key Republicans joining the Democratic opposition, the Bush Jr. administration found it increasingly difficult to pass newer measures through Congress. Instead, they were forced to provide more thorough justification for the necessity of funding or additional troops into Iraq, slowing the process considerably.

112th Congress

Conflict between the two Branches has carried over into President Barack Obama's term in office, despite the Democratic majority held in the first two years. Congressional Republicans have used their authority to deny funding for the President's policy changes. An example of this occurred when President Obama closed Guantanamo Bay prison through use of executive order. "For instance, when President Barack Obama issued an executive order to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay in March 2011, lawmakers banned the use of federal dollars for the transfer by attaching language to a spending bill that was too critical for Obama to veto" (Johnson). By adding this wording to the bill, Congress effectively crippled one of the goals that the president campaigned on. This was done as a means of damaging his image and setting precedent that action without their consultation would be met with harsh resistance.

Similar conflict has arisen concerning the Iran's nuclear program. While President Obama has expressed willingness to hold talks and offer some concessions, the Republican bloc prefers a harsher approach:

"According to a Senate aide informed about the legislation being drafted, the senators are looking to add the measure as an amendment to the Senate's fiscal 2013 defense authorization bill ([S 3254](#)), which could come to the floor as early as Friday. Some of the most draconian measures in the bill are likely to face resistance from the White House, which is eyeing a renewed round of talks with Tehran over its nuclear enrichment program and, reportedly, considering offering to

ease some sanctions if Iran agrees to halt enrichment. A vote by Congress to ratchet up sanctions again would muddy those waters. Efforts to restrict Iranian imports could also anger allies in Europe and Asia.” (Cadel)

Given Islamic Iran’s history of animosity towards the United States, it is logical to view the development of their nuclear program as a threat to national security. However, by taking a contradictory stance to the president, and speaking of their desire for harsher restrictions in plain view of the Iranian government, Congress has actually made it more difficult for any negotiations to take place. Speaking in a manner that suggests unwillingness to compromise in these talks is damaging to any progress that had been made or, more importantly, the progression of talks. With that in mind, it makes no sense for Iran’s government to agree to any talks on restricting their nuclear program. The conflict between the legislative and executive branches means that it would be less likely that an agreement favorable to Iran’s interests would be made. Divisive rhetoric is damaging to diplomacy, as it gives a feeling that the President cannot guarantee anything when taking part in these talks.

Analysis

Listing the events that transpired over the terms of the past two Congresses and current legislative body can provide an accurate picture of the root causes of the international political climate. However, a closer examination is necessary in order to determine the impact these actions, or inactions, have had on United States international policy. Specifically, I will examine the effects they had on the immediate situation as well as where these decisions led in the long run.

109th Congress

As discussed previously, President George W. Bush (Jr.)’s first term in office was characterized predominantly by cooperation with Congress on foreign policy issues. This seems to have come as a direct result of Republican control over both Chambers, however, it did have one restriction: the Republicans were happy to offer their support as long as President Bush consulted them before exercising his War-Powers, or those that were not expressly granted in the Constitution. One such example mentioned was the joint airstrike conducted with the Royal Air Force. While this was noted to be a point in which Congress could have made a case against the president for overreach, no action was ever taken against him on the matter. In fact, this would be the start of a pattern in which the administration saw almost unprecedented cooperation from Congress. With that in mind, one can infer that the legislative branch did not take action to disrupt the war powers. In that vein, one can infer that Congress’ cooperation with the administration should have made for a more efficient war effort and allowed the operation to run more smoothly. Indeed, most, if not all, requests for funding and troops were approved, so it can be said that the ease with which these motions were passed suggests for a more efficient war effort when the branches cooperate. However, as efficient as the process was with respects to actions being approved, the overall results of these actions suggests that some opposition or questioning may be beneficial to the process.

As noted in the case-study section, the quick approval of the administration’s chosen actions gave hopes that the war ended swiftly and with minimal American casualties or collateral damage. During the early months, the effort seemed to be progressing relatively well, as the American military dispatched the Iraqi military seemingly with ease. With that in mind, it looked as if predictions of a quick, relatively painless war would come true and conflict would come to a close within a year of beginning. The rise of Iraqi insurgency, however, was not taken into account. Their presence had the effect of

dragging the American military into a prolonged conflict, which was not the original intent. Given the military focus was already being directed to Afghanistan, as the United States sought out Osama Bin Laden for his part in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, an extended Iraqi conflict meant that forces would be split between two ongoing conflicts in the same region. The U.S. government sought to answer for this new development with troop surges and additional funding directed to the war effort, but the conflict showed no signs of slowing down. In fact, by the time the 2006 mid-term elections came around, public opinion on the conflict had soured due to the number of American casualties, the amount of money being spent on what seemed to be a modern Vietnam War, and the discovery of the use of torture on Iraqi prisoners. Taking these factors into account, the early events of the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War can be described as successful in terms of cooperation, but failed in terms of efficiency. While the branches did work together in order to implement war policy, their failure in policy implementation is notable as it led to a more prolonged war, a loss of power for the Republican Party, and began a downward trend of President Bush Jr.'s approval ratings. More to the point, these policies failed to achieve a quick victory in Iraq, which results in a failing grade in how these policies were conceived and implemented by those in charge. Perhaps, taking into consideration both such failures and the level of cooperation, one might say that it is better to have more opposition between the Branches to ensure that the specific details of these policies are questioned and more heavily considered.

Given the level of cooperation seen between the two Branches, the author felt it necessary to look into particulars as to why the Democrat opposition in Congress did not raise objections to the Iraq War itself as well as the measures that went into it. In the days leading up to the war, Democrat leadership came forward to provide support rather than offer any critique, using rhetoric that seemed to put pressure on the United Nations. John Kerry, at the time a Democrat Senator and future opponent to President Bush Jr.'s reelection campaign in 2008, went as far as to say "It's about doing what's right for the country. I'm worried about the national security of our nation and doing what's correct. I want the President to continue to work through the multilateral structure, and I'd like to see us get the support of other countries, but I've always recognized that you need to face up to the threat of weapons of mass destruction" (Walsh). The way Senator Kerry words his statement suggests that there is a sort of assumption that weapons of mass destruction were being developed in Iraq. To their credit, most information given by the Bush administration was that Saddam Hussein had ordered the revival of its former nuclear program, despite CIA information that contradicted such claims. However, by looking back to the 1990-91 First Gulf War, there is some information that provides insight as to why Democrat opposition would be seemingly non-existent. In 1991, Congress voted in favor of military action in the war between Iraq and Kuwait, but with a much slimmer margin: in the Senate, the vote was 52 to 47 while the House vote went 250 to 183 (Eaton & Fritz). In the case of the First Gulf War, Democrats who voted against the war were forced to admit that they had been mistaken to oppose it, as there were clear violations of Kuwait's sovereignty as well as human rights violations by the Iraqis. Given the history of violence and oppression evident in Hussein's government, it seemed rational to believe that he would try to revive his nation's old nuclear proliferation program and Democrats did not want to end up opposing war with a dictator who had been seen as a past violator of human rights.

In comparing the results of the decisions and actions taken by the 109th Congress to the author's hypotheses, the second hypothesis fails in this case. While the Republicans dominated Congress, we did see cooperation between the Branches during the early stages of the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War. However, this cooperation did not result in reaching the overall goal: decisive victory in Iraq coupled with the discovery of nuclear weapons. While the Iraqi army was defeated, this war played a major part

in destabilizing the region and allowing for insurgents to enter the nation and maintain the conflict. Therefore, the second hypothesis fails. The first hypothesis, however, is null, as the opposition party was not in power during this time.

110th Congress

Naturally, the American public responded to this perceived failure by placing their faith in the Democratic Party in the 2006 midterm elections. Since near total cooperation between the legislative and executive branches only served to leave the military spinning its tires in Iraq, opposition to President Bush Jr.'s agenda was seen as a means of balancing out the war policy. Indeed, the Democrats addressed concerns in prisoner treatment, which had come into the forefront of public interest. The Democratic-controlled Congress sought to repair the damage done to U.S. prestige in foreign relations, which had been negatively impacted by the manner with which the Bush administration began the war and information regarding prisoner treatment. Objections raised regarding the situation called for closer examination of prisoner treatment and the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who infamously defended the use of "enhanced interrogation methods" (torture) on Iraqi prisoners (Hendrickson, 19). In a sense, it seemed as though the Democrats wished to do away with anything that held connection or support with the actions or actors who led to the unsatisfactory war-effort.

As noted, Democrats in Congress did make an attempt to bring the war to a close in 2007, in accordance with the loss of public support. The divide between branches was highlighted when the White House publically stated that President Bush would veto any such measure that made it to his desk. Instead, the administration pushed for a troop surge and openly ignored the House Appropriation Committee's decision that a definitive exit date be planned out and taken into account. In fact, the Committee voted to withdraw as early as August 2008, but this was never enacted. The administration's decisions to go against the Committee and ignore public opinion data had the effect of both weakening its image abroad, by giving the impression that the government would ignore its own people in favor of pursuing an agenda that had reached historic levels of unpopularity, and that the divide between the branches had grown to the point that cooperation between the branches was no longer an option.

If anything, this Congress showed that abject opposition between the branches did nothing to help the situation in Iraq. The combative nature of both prolonged the conflict, through constant debate over appropriate strategy, open defiance of Committee resolutions and funding appropriations, and threats to veto legislation only served to worsen the overall issue: without a definitive exit strategy, the American military was effectively bound to an unending war. Taking this into consideration with the Bush administration's promise to veto any legislation that might define such a date for the complete withdraw of troops, it seemed as though both parties were more concerned with exercising their power over foreign affairs and checking those of the other branch rather than cooperating to find compromise on their respective positions. Had they worked together, the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War may have come to an end sooner, rather than drawing out the conflict, wasting more taxpayer dollars, and losing more soldiers to an unpopular war. Instead, the infighting led to the conflict becoming more entrenched and drawn out. In this respect, both branches of the government failed to act in a manner that helped to improve the situation.

In this case, hypothesis one is validated. The Democrat opposition used its power to increase oversight on the president and slow the process. Whether or not this was done in order to ensure that proper steps were taken, these actions had the effect of slowing the process and delaying important funding or resolutions. Additionally, it should be noted that the White House played a large hand in this

with their promises to veto any resolution that set a definitive withdraw date. Hypothesis two is validated – this period saw an incredible lack of cooperation, both branches were more in favor of acting in an antagonistic manner.

112th Congress

During President Obama's first term in office, the American people sent a significant number of Republicans to Washington, just enough to prevent the newly elected president's agenda from being rubber stamped by a Democratically controlled Congress. This was, initially, in response to President Obama's seemingly radical reformation policies (most notably, his proposed healthcare reform) as well as his declaration to gradually phase American troops out of the Middle-East and close Guantanamo Bay. Critics of his foreign policy moves claimed that closing Guantanamo Bay prison would allow high threat level individuals walk free, giving them the chance to threaten American lives again. Additionally, allowing prisoners to walk free was seen as letting a chance of intelligence gathering slip away. This point was hammered home quite effectively, using rhetoric to suggest that these prisoners were a supply of valuable information, relevant to national security.

President Obama's steady withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq drew heavy criticism and staunch opposition, however, the initial decision was not his. In fact, the Bush Jr. Administration had set 31 December 2011 as their withdraw date for the 2003 Second Gulf (Iraq) War. While the Obama Administration did not keep the exact date, they did attempt to achieve withdraw from Iraq by December 2012 (Muskal). In a rather incredible example of partisan politics, the Republicans in the 112th Congress attempted to paint actions that ended previous wars or rhetoric that avoided open warfare with the notion that President Obama was "too soft". It is true, the Obama Administration openly declared their goal to be the avoidance of new wars, but that came with an increase in drone airstrikes and the ever-famous Seal Team Six raid on Osama Bin Laden's secret hide-away in Pakistan.

A prime example of the 112th Congress' combative nature was evident throughout negotiations with the Iranian government on the subject of their nuclear enrichment program. The administration was prepared to offer a deal that made some concessions to allow minimal enrichment of uranium, but at a level below the requirements to make nuclear weapons. Republicans in Congress objected and demanded that additional sanctions be placed on the Iranian government, while simultaneously giving less concessions. In short, they wanted to offer Iran no incentive to even entertain the notion of compromise.

The contradictory rhetoric damaged the image of unity and, quite possibly, made the Iranian government more wary of engaging in negotiations with American diplomats. This was an example of where Congress's check against the President's power to negotiate and sign treaties can be a detriment to American foreign policy and its efficiency: when foreign negotiators see Congress's open opposition to giving any concessions or willingness to take the development of other nations into their decision making, they realize that there is little chance that nation will be open to working with American diplomats on the matter. Thus, the overly combative, confrontational relationship between the two Branches has a negative impact on foreign policy.

In this case, the first hypothesis is supported. The Republican opposition made it increasingly difficult for the President to move forward on his agenda, thus delaying or even halting action on key matters. The second hypothesis is also upheld, as the lack of cooperation between Branches worsened the situation and caused more tension on both sides. This, in turn, has since led to further division on matters of foreign policy.

Conclusion

Based on these cases-studies, it can be determined that the first hypothesis is well supported: in both cases in which the opposition controlled the legislative branch, cooperation was brought to a halt along with the legislative process in regards to foreign policy. While the Republicans controlled both branches, cooperation was almost a guarantee, though they did imply that this was contingent on the President first consulting them before utilizing his War-Powers. The second hypothesis was supported by its second and third case, but nullified in the first study. The greater the lack of cooperation was, the more likely it was for difficulty in passing legislation, let alone effective legislation. However, it is partially nullified because the cooperation between the president and the 109th Congress did not yield effective results. Further study on the matter may be required to give a more in depth look into this relationship, however, as past examples of cooperation may have yielded better results.

One of the limitations encountered on this project was time. With only a few months to conduct this research, this paper could not provide a truly comprehensive analysis that more professional level studies are able to. For possible future studies, it is strongly recommended to compare these recent groups against the Congresses of the past, preferably those who also dealt with a common issue or region of interest.

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AUTHOR

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
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BOOK-REVIEW



T.D. Allman, *Finding Florida: the True History of the Sunshine State* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press & Grove Press, 2013-2014), p.556, ISBN 978-0-8021-2076-2

The inside cover page of *Finding Florida: the True History of the Sunshine State* is covered with praise from news magazine editors, various authors of other books, and book publishing houses for the contents of the 500+ page book. It took T.D. Allman 10 years to write the true and correct, all-encompassing political, ecological and sociological history of the State Florida. His stated purpose is to correct all the historical misrepresentations of the last 600 years. Likewise, the back cover is smattered with praise for the author's direct and to the point correction of the history of the nation's 4th most populous state.

After ploughing through the book, the reviewer had several concerns about the accuracy of some of the facts as well as the severe (nasty) tone he takes with several of the previous authors of texts covering Florida history and politics. The Internet was searched to determine if there were any other less glowing reviews. It was noted that the *Tampa Bay Times* ran an article in 2013 noting some factual discrepancies in the book, and readers were asked to submit inaccuracies in the text to both the *Times* and Mr. Allman. Also, the *Times* mentioned another reviewer (Gary Mormino of the University of South Florida), noted that Mr. Allman's book "is engaging, passionate and ambitious, but the tone was mean-spirited and arrogant" towards other historians.

The reviewer has served on the editorial boards of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Tampa Bay History*, as well as edited a *Brief Introduction to Florida Government*. Further, the reviewer is an avid avocational Florida paleontologist and Florida archaeologist. It was delightful to see the opening chapters of the book discussing the geology and hydrology of Florida, as well as Mr. Allman relying on, and citing data compiled from trusted archaeological findings.

Enlightenment

With the above preface in mind, in no particular order, what follows are some of the historical/political events the reviewer learned from reading Mr. Allman's tome.

- In March 1813 nine men rowed across the St. Mary's River from Georgia to Fernandina, Florida and signed a Declaration of Independence from Spain and declared the East Florida Republic territory for the United States, and then rowed back across the river.
- In 1816 a massacre was ordered by U.S. commanders 50 miles across the United State border into Spanish Florida, where U.S. troops bombed a free, non-white community, at "Negro Fort."
- If local residents check the facts stated in this book, the name-sakes associated with their forts, cities, towns, streets and counties (such as Broward, Duval, Bragg, Clinch, Jackson, Dade, Yulee, Gaines and Gadsden), responsible citizens may initiate a referendum to change the jurisdiction's name.
- Most, if not all, Confederate Monuments were initially erected by private funds to glorify the "Rebels" and not paint an unbiased picture of the actual events that occurred.
- During the U.S. Civil War most Florida troops were ordered to fight outside of Florida to defend and protect more important Southern States.
- During the course of the U.S. Civil War, escaped slaves all throughout Florida, gathered to geographic areas controlled and governed as a military U.S. Territory under Federal troops.

- The “Old Town” in St. Augustine is one of the first man-made tourist concoctions in Florida. The Old Town idea was invented and assembled on the basis of myths. The old buildings, school, jail and fountains cannot be substantiated by any historical or archaeological facts. In fact, most of the buildings have been found to be dated to hundreds of years later than purported.
- When he creating the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT) a deceased Walt Disney was able to secure special legislation from the Florida State legislature that secured for the Disney Corporation virtual total control of all of its facilities, grounds and theme parks, including zoning, security and other regulatory processes normally granted to a municipality, without local residential electoral representation.

Not So Enlightened

The reviewer was hoping to learn more about of the French occupation of Florida, but this information was lacking in the text.

There are over 400 numbered footnotes in the rear of the text, but no matching numbers can be found in the body of the book.

An exhaustive bibliography (with the author’s critique of each) includes books, movies and TV shows appears in the rear of the text. However, the movie list cannot be complete since the film, *Doc Hollywood*, has been left-out; purported to be shot in rural Grady, South Carolina, it was actually filmed in Micanopy, Florida.

Reader Be the Judge!!!!

Below is just an example of the many interpretive conflicts that run throughout the book as discovered by the reviewer.

A 2015 brochure from the City of Tarpon Springs states that Hamilton Disston was the founder of the town. He saved Florida from bankruptcy by buying 4,000,000 acres of land from the state in 1881. *Wikipedia* paints an even more glamorous picture of Disston and his accomplishments. In *Finding Florida*, Mr. Allman calls the Disston purchase “the land scandal of 1881.” He states that not one penny of the purchase price of the land went into the state coffers. Rather, the purchase price was used by the Governor to pay out-of-state creditors the debts accumulated by Senator Yulee for his private railroad project.

Once again, the readers will have to judge for themselves *The True History of Florida!*

John J. Bertalan,

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