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Illustrated Florida Cover Table of Contents -	1
Table of Contents	2
Officers—Florida Political Science Association 2016-2018	4
Essays Submission Requirements to <i>Florida Political Chronicle</i>	5
Call for Papers: Florida Political Science Conference, Valencia College, 1 April 2017	6
* President’s Address & FPSA News	
by FPSA President Denis Ray, Ph.D. (University of Tampa)	7
* Editor’s Introduction: International Politics in Focus—2nd “Thematic” View!	
by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair E.U. College of Europe-Bruges)	8
* From the Origins of World War I to Global Conflict Today: World War I, World War II to World War III???	
by Hall Gardner, Ph.D. (Chair, American University of Paris, France)	12
* Chinese Think Tanks’ Influence on Foreign Policy-Making: Case-Study on CIIS and SIIS Roles in China’s Policy towards Europe	
by XIN Hua, Ph.D. (Deputy-Director, Center E.U. Studies of Shanghai International Studies University, China)	33
* Contemporary Praetorians in the Middle East: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia’s National Guard	
by Jaroslaw Jarzabek, Ph.D. (University of Wrocław, Poland & Fulbright Scholar at University of Central Florida-Orlando)	51
* Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism & Hatred of the West from Al-Qaeda to ISIL	
by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. & John J. McTague, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University)	63
* The Arctic Frontier in International Relations	
by Kern William Craig, Ph.D. (Troy University, Alabama)	81

- * **The Political Stability of Kazakhstan: the Gift and the Curse**
by Danny Krikorian, M.A. (University of Central Florida—Orlando) 102
- * **Russia-China Energy Relationship: a Contemporary Analysis to 2014**
by Kevin Modlin, M.A. (Florida International University—Miami) 122
- * **The Imagery of Political Extremism**
by Thomas Just, M.A., *Alternate 2017 Best Graduate Paper* (Florida International University) 135

Announcements:

- ❖ **FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION—Membership** (www.fpsanet.org) 149
- FPSA Publications: *Florida Political Chronicle & The Political Scientist* 150
- ❖ **Book-Review: History of U.S.-Chinese Immigration in Meredith Oyen’s *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War***
by Dan DuBois (Saint Leo University) 151
- ❖ **Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: IPAC/University of Central Florida-Orlando** 156



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Florida Political Chronicle

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Past issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, like the “2012 Presidential Elections” (v.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) and on-line Archive of older issues are **FREE** for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Science Association’s Website either: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>
Current issue is only accessible via password & FPSA subscription until made free when a new issue is printed!

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) all essays for consideration:

1. **Essays in Word** not PDF.
2. **Author’s Biography** at paper’s very end (2-paragraphs, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.).
3. **Abstract** and **Bibliography** required.
4. **Do not use the First Person (“I”)**; instead use the neutral “The author”, “The study” or “This work”.
5. Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1-inch margin (**no landscape-size Tables!**).
6. **Footnotes** preferred style (at end of each page) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
7. All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
8. **Book-Reviews** are welcome on any related topic! Submit 2-to-7+ pages-long Book-Reviews **in Word**.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.



Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting: Saturday, 1 April 2017 Valencia College-Orlando, Florida

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The 2017 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at **Valencia College** in **Orlando, Florida**. All information on directions, parking and hotels will be sent in **January**.

Pre-registration before the conference day is **\$75** for faculty and **\$35** for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants are asked to pre-register. **Registration at the meeting** is **\$85** for faculty and **\$40** for students. Registration includes lunch, refreshments and a subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*. For pre-registration, please go to www.fpsanet.org

Faculty, talented undergraduates and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. A \$250 award is given to the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference and a \$200 award will be given to the FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper. **Please send paper proposals to the following Section Chairs by 27 January 2016. Accepted papers will be notified by 15 February 2017.** All proposals must include: name, institution, rank (faculty, graduate student, undergraduate student, or public), contact information, paper title and an abstract of between 150 and 250 words.

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Roundtable on Media & Politics	Denis Rey University of	denis.rey@ut.edu 813-257-1729

Call for Submissions to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal. Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome as well as other papers that have not been previously published. Please contact and submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the peer review process.

Please see our website for the latest conference information and archives of the *Chronicle* and *Political Scientist*: www.fpsanet.org

President's Address & FPSA News

by FPSA President Denis Ray, Ph.D. University of Tampa

Dear FPSA members and all interested readers:

As the outgoing President of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA), I am thrilled about the prospects for the coming year. Through the excellent leadership of those who have served in this capacity in past years, the FPSA is well-poised to continue as the premiere political science organization in the state of Florida. My goal for the past year has been to maintain this steady course. The first order of business was to maintain continuity and stability by securing a venue for the upcoming FPSA conference sooner rather than later. With this end in mind, I would like to announce that the FPSA is now accepting bids from Florida colleges and universities interested in hosting us in the next years.

Since my initial involvement with the FPSA many years ago, the association has experienced an increase in the number of participants at its annual conferences. This is a healthy sign indicative of a thriving organization. With this increase in membership we can plan for a bigger tomorrow. Perhaps the time has come to envision us hosting a destination conference at one of Florida's many beautiful resorts. From the emerald waters of the Panhandle to the liveliness of Key West, the possible settings for such a conference appear endless.

Another important area that merits attention is how to better automate the FPSA website so that proposals, submittals and registration can all occur on-line. Equally important would be the development of a paper database so that the Association can maintain a bank of all the great scholarship presented at our conferences. These are conversations that I would like to see initiated in coming years.

In closing, I would like to thank the dedicated FPSA officers who take on extra responsibilities and set aside time during their busy lives to ensure the continued success of the association. We should all be grateful for the exemplary work done by Aubrey Jewett and Sean Foreman, both of whom have provided outstanding leadership throughout the years. Marco Rimaneli and Judithanne Scourfield McLaughlan deserve our gratitude for editing the *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist Newsletter*, respectively. This year Will Miller and Kelly McHugh will assume responsibility for organizing the FPSA conference in their respective positions. The section chairs also deserve praise for their great service. We are also greatly indebted to Leah Blumenfeld, ex-officio President, for providing outstanding guidance in the past. Finally, I would like to thank the FPSA board for their hard work and strong commitment. These individuals, and many before them, have made the FPSA what it is today.

Sincerely,

Denis Ray, Ph.D.

**Dr. Denis Ray, Ph.D.
President FPSA
University of Tampa**

Editor's Introduction: International Politics in Focus—2nd “Thematic” View!

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and “Fellow-Travelers”,

welcome to another edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, the regional journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA), which has been published on-line and in color, with back issues available free on the FPSA website (www.fpsanet.org) as a great resource for members, scholars, students and the public interested in research on domestic and international affairs, as well as in the work of the FPSA board, its by-laws and constitution.

This new *Florida Political Chronicle* issue (vol.25, n.1, 2016-2017) has been regrettably delayed to allow the presentation to our readers the journal under an occasional “thematic” approach, this time addressing international politics. Likewise, the imminent follow-up future issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (vol.25, n.2, 2016-2017) focuses exclusively on Florida’s government and U.S. politics.

This current 156-pages maxi-issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* welcomes our readers to an “Introduction” from our exiting President of the Florida Political Science Association, Dr. Denis Ray of the University of Tampa, who is succeeded by Dr. Will Miller, Assistant Vice-President of Campus Adoptions of Campus Lab. We also announce that the 2017 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award was given to Christopher Faulkner & Joshua Lambert, “Contracting Private Military and Security Companies in African Civil Wars” (University of Central Florida-Orlando). This current issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle* showcases eight scholarly essays and a lengthy book-review, selected from the 2015 FPSA Annual Conference at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, the 2016 FPSA Annual Conference at Florida Southern College in Lakeland, and 2017 FPSA Annual Conference at Valencia College in Orlando. This issue also showcases the 2017 FPSA Alternate Best Graduate Finalist by Thomas Just, “The Imagery of Political Extremism” (Florida International University).

Among the international essays are for the first time three papers from distinguished colleagues around the world: Chair Hall Gardner’s “From the Origins of World War I to Global Conflict Today: World War I, World War II to World War III???” (Department of International & Comparative Politics of the American University of Paris in France); Deputy-Director XIN Hua’s “Chinese Think Tanks’ Influence on Foreign Policy-Making: Case-Study on CIIS and SIIS Roles in China’s Policy towards Europe” (Center E.U. Studies of Shanghai International Studies University in China); and Dr. Jaroslaw Jarzabek’s “Contemporary Praetorians in the Middle East: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia’s National Guard” (University of Wrocław, Poland & 2016 Fulbright Scholar at the University of Central Florida in Orlando).

The first essay on p.12-32 is: “From the Origins of World War I to Global Conflict Today: World War I, World War II to World War III???” by Chair and Professor Hall Gardner, Ph.D., from the Department of International & Comparative Politics of the American University of Paris in France. This extensive paper provides a challenging multi-level comparative historical analysis of the geo-strategic and diplomatic causes behind international rivalries and alliance-formation among key Great Powers during four related periods: pre-World War I (1892-1914), the pre-World War II (1919-1939), Cold War (1946-1990) and Post-Cold War (1990-now). The interesting similarities in geo-political circumstances among these same rival Great Powers through four time periods (i.e.: regional rivalries, hegemony, encirclement, alliance-formations and cyclical threats of devastating international wars) are however off-set by the actual differences between these four related periods, based on major differences in the diplomacy, geo-strategy, political-economy, military-technology and socio-cultural-ideological differences among Great Powers.

The second essay on p.33-50 is: “Chinese Think Tanks’ Influence on Foreign Policy-Making: Case-Study on CIIS and SIIS Roles in China’s Policy towards Europe” by Deputy-Director and Research Professor XIN Hua, Ph.D., of the Center E.U. Studies at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) and Director of Academic Research of the Shanghai Institute for European Studies (SIES) both in China, and 2013-2014 Scholar on China at the E.U. College of Europe-Bruges, Flanders/Belgium. This paper offers an interpretative comparison of China’s foreign policy decision-makers who increasingly rely on think tanks as a kind of “external brain” offering vital practical policy advice in an increasingly volatile external environment. After using three sets of theoretic paradigms to review the political influence of Chinese foreign policy think tanks, this paper adopts the paradigm of the “central space of the four fields of power” to summarize the policy role the two élite think tanks: the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) vs. the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS).

The third essay on p.51-62 is: “Contemporary Praetorians in the Middle East: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia’s National Guard” by Jaroslaw Jarzabek, Ph.D., from the University of Wrocław, Poland & 2016 Fulbright Scholar at the University of Central Florida in Orlando. This paper compares two rival religious-ideological paramilitary forces, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or *Pasdaran*) and Saudi Arabia’s National Guard (SANG), that work as an autonomous branch of their respective armies and outside national military chains-of-command. The *Pasdaran* and SANG ensure the security of their respective enemy states (Iran’s Shi’a clerical theocracy vs. Saudi Arabia’s Royal theocracy) and political interests from any internal or external threat. This comparative study also investigates the informal influences of both paramilitary services in domestic politics, economy, society and foreign affairs to assess their actual power in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The fourth essay on p.63-80 is: “Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism and Hatred of the West from Al-Qaeda to ISIL” by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. & Jack McTague, Ph.D., both from Saint Leo University, north of Tampa, Florida. The co-authors analyze Islamic fundamentalism as a rejection to Western modernism and moderate Islamic views, while spurring since late-1970s also local revolutions (Iran, Afghanistan) and international terrorism by skilled merciless groups (al-Qaeda, ISIL) to undermine key Western institutions and impose a resurgent “Caliphate” in the Middle East based on the most brutal interpretation of Islam. Thus, Al-Qaeda’s international campaign of terrorism culminated in the “9/11” attacks in America, Spain, Great Britain, Morocco and Turkey, while its affiliate regional groups wage parallel insurgencies in the greater Middle East (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Mali, Libya) and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Worse has been the regional jihadist insurgency of the splinter group Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now called the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL or also ISIS/IS or *Da’esh*), which created a short-lived rival “Caliphate” over one-third of both Iraq and Syria (2013-2017) with affiliated groups in Egypt’s Sinai, Libya and Afghanistan.

The fifth essay on p.81-101 is: “The Arctic Frontier in International Relations” by Kern William Craig, Ph.D., from Troy University, Alabama, analyzes the North Pole and Arctic Ocean from international political and legal viewpoints between competing Arctic nations (“Arctic 5”, or Arctic Council as “Arctic 8-to-12”). The paper also examines rival sovereignty claims and treaties, freedom of navigation, business, regional pollution and Arctic relations among littoral and regional states from the Cold War to post-Cold War.

The sixth essay on p.102-121 is: “The Political Stability of Kazakhstan: the Gift and the Curse” by Danny Krikorian, M.A. from the University of Central Florida-Orlando. This graduate research paper compares as case-study the political stability of the ex-Soviet Central Asian state of Kazakhstan along eight independent variables, although the majority of these variables make Kazakhstan less politically stable and resistant to democratic reform, while reducing opportunities for domestic political development. Moreover, *foreign policy* is in fact the most significant variable in the political stability of Kazakhstan by

balancing the renewed international tug-of-war, or “New Great Game” to influence Central Asia between external Powers (U.S., Russia and China).

The seventh essay on p.122-134 is “Russia-China Energy Relationship: a Contemporary Analysis to 2014” by Kevin Modlin, A.B.D. from Florida International University, Miami. This research paper compares as case-studies the energy relationship between Russia and China, whose anti-Western interests converged in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, close voting behavior on the U.N. Security Council, and a \$400 Billion gas deal in May 2014. Since the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between the communist Soviet Union (now succeeded by Russia) and communist China, the two Powers have seen interests converge, while broader relations between the two have waxed and waned from the Cold War to today’s post-Cold War. However, cooperation between these now non-communist, but dictatorial Powers does not entail a permanent military alliance against the West, like in 1950-63. Instead, cooperation remains opportunistic to accelerate their respective economic self-sufficiency from a Western-dominated world.

The eighth essay on p. 135-148 is the *Alternate 2017 Best FPSA Graduate Paper: “The Imagery of Political Extremism”* by Thomas Just, M.A., from Florida International University in Miami. This graduate research paper compares as case-studies how political extremist movements use symbols and images to create a brand strategy that attracts new followers. By analyzing the branding strategy by two prominent political extremist movements—Nazism and the Islamic State of Iraq & Levant (ISIL)—the essay show how extremist groups use these methods to promote their violent agendas. The paper’s theoretical framework explains branding strategy in selling political ideas and obtaining the loyalty of followers, while comparing Nazism’s propaganda of ideas and values to the public (anti-Semitism and the roles of women and youth within the country) with similar themes concerning ISIL (Islamic fundamentalism, lifestyle within the movement, role of children, and modern technology used to reach potential supporters).

Lastly, this issue’s lengthy Book-Review on p.151-155 by Dr. Daniel DuBois, Ph.D., of Saint Leo University provides a compelling overview of Meredith Oyen’s book, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold World*, which is steeped in both American and Chinese sources, and personal papers, gives a valuable contribution to the study of the United States and East Asia from 1885 to the Cold War through the history of Chinese migration and trans-Pacific relations.

As in past years, the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida-Orlando led by President Houman Sadri, Ph.D. (also previous FPSA President in 2012-2013) has generously funded the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to a meritorious candidate in 2015 and 2017, but not in 2016 (the selection committee did not find an equally meritorious candidate). IPAC President Sadri has confirmed that IPAC will continue to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards and the FPSA looks forward to continuing this selection process after the up-coming 2017 FPSA Annual Conference.

Finally, the Back-Cover on p.156 of this *Florida Political Chronicle* issue traditionally highlights the institutional profile of a current FPSA University Member, which in this case showcases IPAC’s role at the University of Central Florida in Orlando.

Our Mission: since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association’s and U.S. Department of Education’s requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-

Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; and International Law & Organizations (submissions requirements on p.5 above). Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from both standing and past FPSA members, as well as from domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference, or as unaffiliated still support our organization's mission.

Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle*, and best wishes to all for preparing very productive FPSA Annual Conferences.

Sincerely,

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

**Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA's regional scholarly journal,
Professor of Politics & International Studies at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A. &
2013-2014 Fulbright-Schuman Chair at E.U. graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Belgium.**

From the Origins of World War I to Global Conflict Today: World War I, World War II to World War III???

by Hall Gardner, Ph.D., Chair International & Comparative Politics Department,
American University of Paris, France

ABSTRACT: This essay provides a comparative historical analysis of geo-strategic and diplomatic causes behind international rivalries and alliance-formation during the Cold War (1946-1990) and Post-Cold War (1990-now), by examining the rising contrasts between the same key Powers through significant analogies (regional rivalries, hegemony, encirclement, alliance-formations and cyclical threats of devastating international wars) to similar global clashes during the pre-World War I (1892-1914) and pre-World War II periods (1919-1939). However, the actual differences between these four related periods outweigh similarities in geo-political circumstances among the same Great Powers through time, given significant geo-strategic, political-economic, military-technological and socio-cultural-ideological differences, not to overlook major differences in the quality of leadership and diplomacy among Great Powers in differing historical eras. This work advocates that comparative historical analysis needs to thoroughly compare *and* contrast the differing socio-political structures and ideological factors in addition to analyzing international strategic relationships and alliances.

Section I.

During the 1946-1990 Cold War, frequent references were made to this pre-World War I analogy: that the Soviet Union (USSR) as a SuperPower appeared to replay the role of the encircled old Imperial Germany in 1892-1918. Yet despite these apparent similarities, the USSR collapsed in 1991 in a relatively peaceful whimper, rather than in a nuclear bang and World War III as the analogy to Germany since the pre-World War I era appeared to imply. It has subsequently become clear that not only the differences between the two periods outweighed the similarities, but that comparative historical analysis needs to thoroughly compare *and* contrast the differing socio-political structures and ideological factors in addition to international strategic relationships and alliances. Given the significant geo-strategic, political-economic, military-technological and socio-cultural-ideological differences, not to overlook major differences in the quality of leadership and of diplomacy among states in differing historical eras, comparative historical analysis as a development of Diplomatic History and Realism Theories has a huge task before it.

Nevertheless, despite the relatively peaceful Soviet collapse after the Cold War, it can still be argued that the disaggregation of the Warsaw Pact and USSR has, over time, ushered in a new global constellation of major regional Powers that *appears* to represent an explosive mix of the InterWars (1919-1939) and pre-World War I (1892-1914) periods. At the same time, and without reference to systemic historical analogies, it can also be argued—based on empirical observation—that political-economic instability throughout Eurasia and abroad has already begun to raise the possibility of wider regional wars, if not major conflicts among the Great Powers as well.

The question remains as to whether these widening conflicts can be managed in such a way so as to avert the apparently increasing possibility of a major international conflict between all the Great Powers—as both the analogies from pre-World War I (1892-1914) and InterWars Era before World War II (1919-1939) do imply. Another question also remains as to whether diplomatic history possesses any clues as to how to prevent or ameliorate conflicts in new historical situations, with new weapons and involving differing states, irredentist socio-political movements and conflicting populations.¹

¹ This essay is a reworked and extended version of the author's presentation at the Joint Conference by the American University of Paris & Saint Leo University "World War I and World War II International Repercussions" (March 2016). A more elaborate comparative historical methodology on this topic appears in: Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), Chapters 5-6.

On one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Communist “empire” resembles the Post-World War I disaggregation of both the German and Tsarist Russian Empires, as well as also the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman-Turkish Empires. In effect, Soviet disaggregation has created a “shatterbelt” of actually and potentially conflicting states and irredentist socio-political movements throughout Eurasia and abroad that is, in many ways, more extensive than the “shatterbelt” region of previous eras.

On the other hand, the U.S.-NATO-E.U. strategic relationship in relationship to the new Russian Federation best parallels the Anglo-French *entente* of the pre-World War I period in relationship to Imperial Germany (II Reich), more so than the Anglo-French relationship towards Weimar Germany, and then Nazi Germany (III Reich) prior to World War II. This is true in that the pre-World War II Anglo-French alliance did not possess U.S. hegemonic backing and supports, due to the American decision to withdraw into neo-Isolationism after World War I once the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty and U.S.-led League of Nations organization for world peace, as well as rejecting permanent defense treaties between the U.S. with Great Britain and France.

Moreover, the key difference between the U.S., as an extroverted insular-core SuperPower since the end of the Cold War, and a more introverted Great Britain, as an insular-core Great Power in relationship to Europe during the InterWars period, is that the U.S. has, thus far, played a much stronger and expansive role as a “hegemonic” SuperPower in regard to Europe through three Enlargements of NATO in 1999, 2002-2004 and 2008 into the Central-Eastern European “shatterbelt” that was created after the 1991-1992 Soviet disaggregation.

Moreover, in relationship with lesser Powers in the ostensibly “developing” world, a more extroverted U.S. has not been playing the same geo-political game as did a more introverted London before World War II when the British Empire was still recovering from the global conflict. Instead, U.S. interventions abroad best parallel the late-Nineteenth Century British interventions: the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and Iraq in 2003 parallel the earlier British interventions in Afghanistan in 1878 and Egypt in 1882 respectively. Both pre-World War I Great Britain and post-Cold War America appeared to be engaging in a quest to sustain their overseas global hegemonies in these eras, but largely playing down or ignoring hegemonic rivalries on the Eurasian continent at their own risk.¹

¹ In this essay, the term “hegemony” is used as an intermediate position between “primacy” and “dominance”—in that all major Powers engage in a mix of tools that can often be characterized as either primacy, hegemony or dominance depending on the geo-strategic, political-economic and socio-cultural/ideological context, as also stressed in, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.214-215. Yet rather than focusing on the use of force alone as a means to define the above terms, as Hedley Bull does, one could argue that, through differing tools—or rather differing forms of strategic leveraging—major Powers seek to “balance” as much as possible, complex and interconnected geo-strategic, military-technological, political-economic and socio-cultural/ideological motives, interests and other possible considerations, for sustaining their global, regional or local preponderance. In this perspective, actions of major Powers that choose dominance tend to be heavy handed and not balanced; actions of major Powers that choose primacy tend to rule with greater finesse *with consensus-building and differing degrees of power-sharing*, while those leaderships that choose hegemony act in-between intermittent heavy-handedness and finesse, as ‘imperialism with relatively less brutal manners. Moreover, positions of hegemony and primacy often evolve from initial positions of imperialism and dominance—much as the U.S.-West German position during the Cold War evolved from dominance to hegemony to primacy. And finally, the definition of dominance as a lesser form of imperialism still needs further clarification in that the concept of dominance does not describe the *competitive process* between rival major and regional powers in building formal or informal empires involving regional, if not global, systems of infrastructure, markets, military bases and cultural outreach. While it is often stated that the United States (U.S.) did not create a major overseas empire (after establishing a continental one and halting its colonial ventures after annexing the Philippines in 1899), the U.S. has nevertheless succeeded in superimposing its global hegemony and economic dominance (neo-colonialism) over the ex-colonial empires in the Americas of Spain, Portugal, Great Britain and France, as well as world-wide. Instead, Moscow during the Cold War superimposed its counter-hegemony upon the ex-Spanish and ex-Portuguese territories of Cuba, Mozambique and Angola, as well as few ex-French colonies, such as Vietnam and Syria. See: Hall Gardner, “Three Faces of U.S., NATO and Soviet/Russian Relations: Primacy, Hegemony and Dominance” (Draft: October 2015).

By contrast with the U.S. today, Great Britain, at least in the more "multipolar" Nineteenth Century, tended to play a role as so-called "holder of the balance" between Republican France, Imperial Germany and Czarist Russia. Yet as the dynamics of interstate rivalry unfolded, London found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to "hold the balance"—particularly after the creation of the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance in 1892-94. In many ways, French manipulations of the Franco-Russian alliance were able to pressure Great Britain into the formation of the Anglo-French-Russian *Entente* of 1904-07. The latter was then seen by Berlin as "encircling" Imperial Germany and subsequently as provoking the German leadership into a two-fronts war in 1914, in support of its pluri-national Austria-Hungarian ally, which appeared to be in the process of disaggregation, given its ongoing clash with the pan-Serb movement (backed by Tsarist Russia), among other significant domestic irredentist conflicts, which were also often supported by external Powers.¹

Even though geo-historical circumstances are quite different today, the nature of hegemonic rivalries and alliance formation can be compared and contrasted with those of the pre-World War I and pre-World War II periods. In this perspective, the post-Cold War multiple and parallel U.S./NATO-European/German-Russian and Indian-Sino-Japanese rivalries emerged out of the Cold War parallel to the U.S./NATO vs. Soviet/Warsaw Pact and the Indian-Sino-Japanese rivalries. These contemporary rivalries can be also compared and contrasted with the earlier pre-World War II intertwined Anglo-Franco-Weimar/Nazi German-Italo-Soviet-Japanese-U.S. rivalries, as they in turn emerged from the equally intertwined pre-World War I Anglo-Franco-Imperial German-Austro-Hungarian-Italo-Tsarist Russian-Japanese-U.S. rivalries. The interaction between the Great Powers and lesser ones, and socio-political movements in their respective eras, can likewise be compared and contrasted.²

Section II.

In contemporary post-Cold War European strategic context, the uncoordinated "double enlargement" of NATO and European Union (E.U.) has begun to clash, particularly over Ukraine and Georgia, with the counter-claims of the Russian Federation and Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to control Russia's post-1992 "near-abroad" region. For Moscow, the "near-abroad" incorporates: the ex-Soviet states of Belarus' (in which Minsk in turn opposes Russian efforts to assert its hegemony over the country), a torn Ukraine (in which Russia has annexed Crimea and is engaging in political-military interference in Eastern Ukraine), a divided Moldova (in which the Transnistria is occupied/protected by Russian forces), Georgia (in which Russian forces are occupying/protecting South Ossetia and Abkhazia), plus Azerbaijan and Armenia which are in conflict with each other over Nagorno-Karabakh (a conflict impacting Turkey as well). In addition, there are the Central Asia countries, which fear Russian hegemony, particularly Uzbekistan. Of these post-Soviet countries, Belarus', Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are currently members of the Russian-led CSTO.

In response to the non-coordinated NATO-E.U. double Enlargements during 1999-2007 (in which NATO and E.U. both promised eventually to bring Ukraine and Georgia into a closer relationship), Russia reacted by attempting to preclude any future NATO or E.U. expansion into the region in the midst of the Maidan Movement that overthrew the former "pro-Russian" kleptocratic leadership of President Viktor Yanukovich by surreptitious military intervention in Crimea, through the deployment of "little green men" without military insignias, and then in Eastern Ukraine in early-2014. This act of *preclusive imperialism* had followed the 2008 Georgia-Russia clash after which Moscow supported the independence demands of

¹ See author's argument detailed in: Hall Gardner, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the Unexpected Armageddon* (New York & London: Ashgate, 2015).

² To examine how geo-strategic rivalries evolved in somewhat similar ways in differing epochs would require a study of both the forces of globalization and how differing states with highly uneven power-capacities sought to manipulate their Power-potential and geo-strategic positioning relative to other major Powers and lesser states.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a tit-for-tat response to U.S. support for Kosovo's independence from Serbia.

While Moscow has begun to assert its interests in the Ukrainian "near-abroad", in an effort to counter perceived NATO-E.U. hegemonic aspirations, the U.S.-NATO-E.U. strategic partnership coupled with the U.S.-Japanese alliance, has additionally been pressing both Russia and China into a closer political-economic and defense cooperation. For its part, China has continued to pressure Taiwan and to assert its hegemony over South and East China Seas in outlining its "Nine-Dash Line" map. Beijing has also remained extremely ambiguous as to whether it would fully back a nuclear North Korea in case of conflict with South Korea. Beijing has wanted to prevent the Pyongyang régime from collapsing: it has opposed the possibility that North Korea could eventually be unified with South Korea, backed by the U.S., as was the case for West German unification with ex-Communist East Germany.¹

Concurrently, the U.S. and European quasi-alliances with the Arab Gulf states have been seen as supporting and financing differing pan-Islamist movements beneath and within the soft Russian underbelly in the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, not to overlook China's own Turkic and Muslim Xinjiang/Sinkiang province (previously called in the 1800s-1960s as Eastern Turkestan). These forces, plus those of feared secessionist movements within both Russia and China, represent additional factors that appear thus far to be pushing Moscow and Beijing into closer collaboration in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the formation of a larger Eurasian Union.

The fact that Iran has been moving closer to both Russia and China in the post-Cold War era also raises questions as to whether the three countries could forge a new Eurasian Alliance. This appears plausible, given the fact that Iran has been considered for membership in both the defense-oriented CSTO and also in the economic and security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), even though it has not yet joined either. But Teheran has recently also become closely aligned with Moscow and Damascus in the civil wars raging in both Syria and Iraq. Closer Russo-Iranian security ties came in early-2017 after U.S. President Donald Trump's strikes in April against a Syrian air-base from where illegal gas attacks had been launched against anti-Syrian rebels and in May against pro-Iranian/pro-Syrian militia threatening a U.S.-British Special Forces' base aiding anti-Syrian rebels.²

Also, both India and Pakistan have been rumored to join the SCO sometime by 2017, raising questions as to whether India might leave its relative neutrality (balanced by closer defense ties with the U.S. and Japan) for closer ties with a Russo-Chinese Eurasian proto-alliance (despite its disputes with Pakistan and China).

Section III.

Let us now look in greater detail how today's global geo-strategic constellation of major Powers involving the U.S., key European states and Japan in relationship to Russia, China and an ambiguously neutral (so far) India, represents a mix of the geo-strategic constellations that evolved in the periods before World War I and World War II.

¹ Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010); Hall Gardner, *NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).

² Michael R. Gordon, Helene Cooper & Michael D. Shear, "Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria" in *New York Times* (6 April 2017), see: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html>; Ryan Browne, "U.S.-led Coalition Airstrikes Targeted Pro-Syrian Regime Forces" in *CNN* (18 May 2017), see: <http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/politics/us-airstrikes-syrian-regime-forces/index.html>; Ann Barnard, "Russia and Syria Denounce U.S. Airstrike on Pro-Assad Militia" in *New York Times* (19 May 2017), see: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/world/middleeast/syria-russia-us-convoy.html>; Clément Therme, "Russia and Iran's Cooperation Hints at a New Middle East" in *U.S. News & World Report* (27 March 2017), see: <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-03-27/russia-and-irans-growing-cooperation-hints-at-a-new-middle-east>.

In the contemporary post-Cold War the disaggregation of the Soviet Union (USSR) appears to parallel the collapse of four empires following World War I: Tsarist Russia (in Eastern Europe), Imperial Germany linked to the Austro-Hungarian Empire (in Central and Eastern Europe) and the Ottoman-Turkish Empire (“Middle East”).

In many ways, during the Cold War the global geo-strategic position of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian SuperPower has tended to parallel that of Imperial Germany before World War I, as a continental European Great Power: both were major land-Powers with huge armies confronting rival Great Powers and lesser states of their respective eras of influence, while also becoming late Sea-Powers with a global naval capacity and counter-hegemonic outreach that challenged the continental European Great Powers and the global political-economic overseas interests of both Great Britain and United States.

But after World War I, Weimar Germany (successor to Imperial Germany) had lost all its overseas outreach as a result of wartime losses and the Versailles Treaty. Instead, very slowly during the post-Cold War, the Russian Federation (successor to the USSR) has sought to reestablish a presence in some of the former overseas Soviet “empire”, mostly in Syria, while concurrently seeking closer ties to China and Iran as a way to stabilize Russian hegemony throughout Eurasia, if possible. This close Sino-Russian relationship can be compared and contrasted with the older Weimar German and then Nazi German efforts to forge a counter-balance to hostile Western Powers through closer political-economic and secret military ties to Stalin’s USSR, despite their ostensible ideological hatred.

From today’s Russian perspective, the three NATO-E.U. enlargements of 1999-2008 into the Central and Eastern European “shatterbelt” can accordingly be compared and contrasted with the InterWars’ Polish efforts to forge a European confederation or *Intermarium* after the break-up of the Tsarist Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in 1918-21, before the USSR was able to re-absorb most of Belarus’ and Ukraine. In today’s Russian view, NATO, backed by American hegemony, has been attempting to fulfill that old InterWars era project by Polish President Józef Pilsudski for a potential East European federation/*Intermarium* based on the even older Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 1400s-1600s. Warsaw not only saw this project as a means to build an Eastern European confederation between Germany and the USSR in the InterWars period, while also seeking to prompt the break-up of the communist USSR under the complementary project, “Prometheism”. And given today’s efforts by “Westernized” (members now of both NATO and EU.) East European states to forge closer ties with ex-Soviet Southern Caucasus states (backed by NATO as they are also its Partners), Moscow has more recently condemned this nebulous project as an anti-Russia “Baltic-Black Sea alliance”.

In effect, since the second NATO Enlargement of 2000-04, and particularly with respect to the post-2006 U.S. promises of eventually bringing Georgia and Ukraine into NATO in the near-future, NATO has appeared to be backing Pilsudski’s old project in have Poland lead a European federation inclusive of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus’, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine and the ex-Yugoslavia.¹ Of these latter states, only Belarus’, Ukraine and Finland have not joined NATO as full Allies while being its Partners, although NATO has not yet officially excluded the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian future full membership (an issue resurrected in mid-2017 by the Trump Administration), while Finland and Sweden are currently debating full membership in NATO against Russia’s 2014 aggression in Crimea and Ukraine. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined NATO (1999 and 2002-04) after the 1993 break-up of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia too broke-up in 1990, with Slovenia and Croatia eventually joining NATO (2002-04 and 2008)

¹ See discussion of present day efforts to achieve an “Intermarium”: T. Urbanskaya & K. Honcharov, “Intermarium Alliance—Will the Idea Become Reality?” in *UNIAN* (8 August 2015), see <http://www.unian.info/politics/1110820-intermarium-alliance-will-the-idea-become-reality.html> For a Russian critique, see: Olivier Berlanda, “La Bataille de l’Intermarium entre Russie et Occident: l’Europe des Nationalistes de l’Est” in *La Voix de la Russie* (13 November 2015), in http://fr.sputniknews.com/french.ruvr.ru/2013_11_15/La-bataille-de-lintermarium-entre-Russie-et-Occident-lEurope-des-nationalistes-de-lEst-9052/

alongside Albania (2008). Ironically, if conflict erupts, the latter three states as NATO members, plus Montenegro, a recent Partner also seeking since 2015 full NATO membership, could potentially “encircle” a politically-divided Serbia, still not into NATO or the E.U. and with historic and post-1990 ties to Russia. In such a way, Serbia could once again become the catalyst of a major inter-Powers war; but unlike the situation before World War I a century ago, it is not the Balkans, but the “wider Middle East” instead that most likely could become the fulcrum of any such new conflict.

During the 1917-21 Russian Revolution, the Soviet annexation of parts of Belarus’ and Ukraine had been intended to check the further dismemberment of the ex-Tsarist Empire against Polish efforts to secure hegemony over that devastated region. Somewhat similarly, since 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and political-military interference in Eastern Ukraine represents an act of *preclusive imperialism* to check perceived NATO and E.U. efforts to manipulate Kiev against Moscow, and prevent any fears of a further dismemberment of Russia’s Federation, while regaining complete control over Ukraine’s half portion of the obsolescent ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet headquartered alongside the Russian half at Sevastopol’ in Crimea.

Thus, as an act of preclusion, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and political-military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, appear to be more comparable Lenin’s actions during Russia’s 1917 Bolshevik Revolution *in terms of geo-strategic intent* than the abused *cliché* to Hitler’s 1938 annexation from Czechoslovakia of the ethnic German Sudetenland (Kharkov, for example, which is an area in which Russophone “autonomists” have been clashing with Ukrainian “centralists”, was the old seat of Lenin’s Congress of Soviets in Ukraine during the Russian Revolution).

In sum, Germany’s 1990 Re-Unification, followed by the uncoordinated triple expansion of NATO and E.U. (1999-2008) into ex-Tsarist/Soviet/Russia declared “buffer zones” in East Europe, has fostered a significant Russian backlash since the 1999 War “over” Kosovo and more severely under President Putin. Such victorious 1999 U.S.-NATO Kosovo War against Serbia, despite the lack of a U.N. Security Council mandate (Russo-Chinese veto threats countered the very broad U.N. members support for NATO’s intervention), took place just prior to Russia’s victory in the 1999 Second Chechen War—where Arab Gulf states, allied to the U.S., were seen by Moscow as backing pan-Islamist anti-Russian forces, much as they did during the 1979-89 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹

Section IV.

In looking to the countries flanking Russia to the east, the contemporary Russia-China relationship can be compared and contrasted with the 1888-1892 Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty, but perhaps more pertinently with the 1922 Rapallo Pact that eventually led to the 1939 Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact. Both the Russo-German Reinsurance Pact and Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact broke apart after 2-4 years, but a break-up of a closer Russian Chinese relationship may not prove to be so simple a case in the contemporary geopolitical constellation of major Power relationships—that is, if both Russia and China continue to see themselves as “encircled” by the NATO-E.U. enlargements to the East, plus the U.S. alliance with a “militarizing” Japan in the Far-East and Arab Gulf states supporting pan-Islamist movements against Russia’s new allies: Syria and Iran.

These pan-Islamist movements, Moscow fears, could impact from Afghanistan Russian-influenced northern Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the soft Islamic underbelly of the Russian Federation, while Beijing has also opposed the parallel rise of pan-Islamist secessionist movements in China’s Xinjiang province, which she fears could eventually spread to other potentially secessionist provinces (Tibet, inner-Mongolia, as well as Taiwan). Much like the historical Russo-German pacts, closer Sino-Russian political

¹ On the 1999 NATO War «over» Kosovo and its impact on Russia and Putin, see: Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). On the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, see: Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the ‘War on Terrorism’* (New York: Ashgate, 2005).

economic and defense ties are intended to prevent either country from eventually aligning with the U.S. and its allies.

Japanese, Chinese and Russian rivalries in Asia appear to best parallel the period of China's "Self-Strengthening" movement between 1861 and 1894 prior to the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, and prior to the entrance of Japan into World War I against Imperial Germany, but in seeking to obtain Japanese hegemony over a China-in-revolution by claiming German concessions and by hoping to counter Russian territorial claims in southern Manchuria, Siberia and Korea. During the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, Tokyo had hoped to take not only Korea and Manchuria, but also most of Siberia as far as Lake Baikal, while Tsarist Russia hoped it could still defeat Japan and hold onto Manchuria—so both blamed their shortcomings on their erstwhile U.S. ally, whose mediated peace under U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt left all discontented and all-too ready to blame as excuse to their public opinions the nefarious American interference.

Again, at the end of World War I, the 1917 Bolshevik/Communist Revolution and Russian Civil War allowed Japan to briefly occupy eastern Siberia as far as Lake Baikal, but this in turn spurred U.S., British and French anti-Soviet military intervention in Russia and to control Japanese ambitions as well, but the ultimate failure of the Allies to repress the Bolshevik/Communist Revolution led to the Western Allies' eventual 1922 withdrawal from Russia, while forcing also a parallel Japanese evacuation from Eastern Siberia. The result was the Soviet occupation of Siberia and Japan's unending hostility to the West, which culminated in its vicious World War II offensives in Asia. From the Russian perspective, the historical fear of a potential break-off of the Russian Far-East, backed by either Japan, or China, or even the U.S., has represented a major rationale for Putin's contemporary version of a strategic "pivot to Asia" in the effort to counter America's own "pivot" or "re-balancing to Asia."¹

In addition to China's irredentist claims and military pressures on Taiwan and over all of the mineral-rich South China Sea, Russia continues to hold onto the Kurili Islands (or Northern Territories) annexed from Japan after 1945. In addition, tensions over the Korean peninsula (in which communist North Korea has intermittently threatened to set the entire peninsula on fire, or else raised fears that this decaying Stalinist-communist country could collapse altogether with millions of desperate refugees streaming into South Korea and China) appear to parallel late-Nineteenth Century Sino-Japanese-Russian disputes. These tensions could once again resurrect themselves, albeit in new forms of conflict over strategic islands, seas and resources. Yet, today, it is largely China that has begun to play the role as a more assertive Power in striving for hegemony over resources and islands in the South China Sea.

In this respect, in addition to forging the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing has begun to develop its "String of Pearls" and "Silk Road" strategies with parallel military aspects, in greater apparent collaboration with Moscow, at least so far. In response, Japan has looked to the formation of a "democratic security diamond" anchored on the U.S. (Hawaii), Japan, Australia and India to counter Chinese pressures, with external support from Great Britain and France.²

Here, the post-World War II U.S.-Japanese alliance appears to parallel the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. Yet in the Chinese view, Japanese "militarism" has begun to break out of the U.S.-supplied eggshell in that Washington has permitted Japan to augment military spending and expand its defense perimeter beyond its needs for strict territorial defense. Ostensibly, in revising the Article 9 "pacifist" clause of the Japanese Constitution in 2014, Tokyo now claims that it would only engage its military in cooperation with the United Nations (U.N.) or with its Allies—not unilaterally. But there is little trust of contemporary Japan by either the Chinese or Russians.

¹ Hall Gardner, *NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).

² Shinzo Abe, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond" in *Project Syndicate* (27 December 2012), see: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>

Soviet/Russian ties to India in South Asia and outreach to the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean during and after the Cold War appear to parallel historical ties between Imperial German and Italy with respect to the Adriatic and Mediterranean. In part as a diplomatic response to Al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S., Europeans and Japanese have all been reaching out to a still neutral, yet nuclear India as a means to counter pan-Islamist terrorist movements (backed in part by Pakistan). The U.S., Europeans and Japanese also hope to preserve their traditional shared control and protection over international sea-lines-of-communication (SLOCs) from the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and Pacific from piracy or attacks.

The trend is for the U.S., Europe and Japan to strive to wean India away from its old close ties to Russia, while "counter-balancing" the rise of a more assertive China, as revealed in Japan's "democratic security diamond". Somewhat like Liberal Italy before World War I, India now plays the role of the key pivot state, which could potentially swing to either side if it does hold to her traditional policy of neutrality. How India's equally possible membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai-6 Cooperation Organization or partnership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union might impact its relations with both Russia and China remains a big unknown, given old Sino-Indian enmities and post-1990s closer U.S.-Indian ties.

Section V.

In the pre-World War I era, the primary "shatterbelt" was the Balkans and North Africa, after Ottoman retrenchments in 1690s-1850s from failed attempts to conquer Europe, followed by the European Great Powers' colonial expansionisms in Turkey's Near East and Greater Middle East: France from Algeria to Tunisia in 1840s-1881 and Great Britain in Egypt in 1882, plus Austria-Hungary's dual annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 and 1908, and the 1912-14 three Balkan Wars which forced the Ottoman-Turks to finally abandon virtually all of its last Balkan lands, while raising a rival pan-Serb nationalist threat backed by Tsarist Russia over all Southern Slavs (Yugoslavs) and Albanians. Italy's 1911-12 intervention to conquer Libya in the Italo-Turkish War took place almost exactly 100 years prior to the 2011 U.S.-Franco-British-NATO intervention against Muammar Qaddafi's dictatorship in Libya. Yet deeper in Africa, Great Britain and France had nearly precipitated a major Great Powers international war in 1898 over Fashoda along the Nile River in Sudan. Concurrently, the object of Anglo-German imperial rivalry was primarily Southern Africa's routes to Asia, as manifest in the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War, which sharpened the already deepening Anglo-German commercial, colonial and naval antagonism.

In the contemporary crisis, intermittent U.S., French and Israeli military interventions by air-power in the Syrian Civil War in 2011-17 have been intended to stun and destroy differing pan-Islamist movements (mostly the rival Islamic State of Iraq and Levant-ISIL vs. Al-Qaeda's Nusra Front allies), but in the process of engaging in régime change in Syria. By contrast, Moscow began to engage in airstrikes in October 2015 in support of the Bashir Al-Assad government, which at that time appeared close to collapse given its battle with the Islamic State, Al-Nusra, the rebel Syrian Free Army and the Army of Conquest, among other militias.

Both Russian and Iranian military intervention is largely designed to safeguard the Syrian régime, which has protected the *Hizb'allah* militia and pro-Syrian Palestinian movements from the Iranian perspective, while Russian military intervention has been intended to prevent the further dismemberment of what remains of Soviet overseas hegemony. Moscow has hoped to hang onto its remaining overseas pressure points and bases that it had obtained during the Cold War. In this respect, the current Syrian Civil War plays a role very close to that of the Two Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 that resulted in further isolating Imperial Germany.

Yet while Berlin in the pre-World War I epoch had hoped to assert its interests in Morocco to thwart France's rival colonial aspirations, and possibly obtain a naval base at Agadir, for example, by supporting

Ottoman-Turkish and pan-Sunni Islamist interests at the time, Moscow today, by contrast, has been fighting to hold onto its Syrian sphere of interest and to prevent its isolation throughout the region, while preserving its old Soviet warm-waters naval base of Tartus in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. Moscow has in effect forged an alliance with Iran, Syria, *Hizb'allah* and other pan-Shi'a interests as a means to counter the predominant, yet divided, pan-Sunni Arab movements aligned with the Kurds and the U.S..

While a disintegrating Ottoman-Turkish Empire played a major indirect role in the causes of World War I, in today's situation, Turkey now finds itself caught between a Russian military build-up in Crimea after the latter's annexation in 2014, and the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq with its spill-over of hundreds of thousand refugees. Unlike other NATO countries, Turkey did not support U.S.-NATO-E.U. economic sanctions against Moscow after Crime's annexation. At the same time, as a NATO Ally and due to its geographic position, Turkey cannot ignore Moscow's threatened conventional and nuclear military build-up in Crimea, its pro-Russian secessionist civil war in Eastern Ukraine, plus Russian efforts to dominate again the Black Sea.

Turkey's all-consuming primary concern has not been Russia or the Islamic State (ISIL), but to prevent the eventual rise of a secessionist pan-Kurdish state, or step-by-step expansion by the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds with Iraqi Kurds financial support to gain control over northern Syria, that could in-turn galvanize Kurdish independence movements inside Turkey. The fact that the Islamic State has been able to engage in significant cross-border trafficking in oil, raw materials, ancient relics and other lucrative activities, while purportedly engaging in acts of terrorism, has raised U.S. and European concerns over Turkish management of the crisis along its borders, even if that border is not easy to patrol, as Ankara claims, while causing a socio-political backlash of xenophobic and anti-immigrant movements in most countries in Europe where many refugees have hoped to transit through Turkey and the Balkans northwards. The difficulties confronted by Ankara in handling the massive refugee crisis, stem in large part from the twin civil wars in Syria and Iraq, and have raised fears of Turkey's own socio-political destabilization, particularly after alternating terrorist attacks by either the PKK or the Islamic State of Iraq & Levant (ISIL), not to overlook the alleged "Gülenist" coup attempt in October 2016, which resulted in massive crack-down and arbitrary arrests by the Turkish state to eliminate any internal opposition to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's authoritarianism.

From this perspective, Turkey continues to clash with U.S. policy that has hoped to strengthen supports for Kurdish fighters against the Syrian régime. Concurrently, Turkey has also clashed with Russia, which has opposed the so-called moderate forces, such as the Syrian Free Army (and Moslem Brotherhood political leadership) and which has been allied with Turkey, at least from 2011 until 2016. Initially, with the rise of the Arab Spring movement, Ankara began to support pan-Islamist movements against the Assad régime despite its previously positive relations with the latter. Yet fears that the break-up of Syria would also lead to a Kurdish independent state that could support the PKK inside Turkey represented a major factor leading Turkey to suddenly shift toward Russia. The Kurdish independence question, in addition to Putin's promise of Russian natural gas cooperation in a Turkish Stream (bypassing Ukraine), plus guaranteed cash inflows from tourism and trade help explain why Turkey flipped so suddenly back to a close entente with Moscow in June 2016 when Turkish president Erdogan had so unexpectedly apologized to Russian President Vladimir Putin for the fact that Turkey had shot down a Russian fighter jet when it was leaving Turkish airspace after completing its mission in Syria near Turkey's border in November 2015.

Another one of the reasons for Moscow's intervention in Syria has been its opposition to purported Arab Gulf state support for Islamist movements within the Russian "Inner Abroad" of the Northern Caucasus. Moscow fears that a number of pan-Islamist movements will be able to take advantage of a collapse of the Assad régime to migrate north to provide greater support for Islamist movements in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Northern Caucasus and Central Asia—in effect undermining Russian hegemony over these regions. There is consequently a real danger that competing hegemonies could draw

regional and major Powers into war as the U.S., France, the Arab Gulf countries and Israel have all been engaging in air strikes or else in support for surrogate forces against the Syrian régime only backed by Russia, Iran and *Hizb'allah*. Moscow's decision to strike rebel Syrian targets by cruise missile strikes in October 2015 from the Caspian Sea across Iranian and Iraqi aerospace is also intended to send Washington a very strong warning, given the latter's use of "cruise missile diplomacy" in a number of post-Cold War military interventions since Bosnia in 1995.¹

The pre-World War I specter of Anarchist and Socialist revolutionary movements, combined with the pan-Serb "Black Hand" terrorists that assassinated Austria-Hungary's heir to the throne, Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of Habsburg, had haunted both the Austro-Hungarian and Imperial Germany élites. These fears of terrorism and revolutionary change (whether peaceful or not) have now been replaced in the West by the pan-Islamist threat posed by differing groups. At the same time, much like the monarchist élites prior to World War I, Moscow today sees these "terrorist" threats as being combined with the threat of democratic "color revolutions"—which overthrew Russian allies, such as the dictators Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine by pro-Western "democracy engineering". To Putin's Russia, the latter "Colours Revolutions" in Georgia, Serbia and Ukraine represent a new form of pro-democratic populist *coup d'état* against Moscow's regional dictatorial allies.²

These "democratizing" threats now haunt both the Russian and Chinese leaderships, given the latter's crushing of its nascent democracy movement in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square. Chinese hardliners have regarded U.S. support for multi-party democracy as an act of war in undermining China's Communist Party leadership and legitimacy through its "hegemonic" democratic propaganda. For its part, Moscow undertook "reverse democracy engineering" in Ukraine succeeding for the short-term to roll-back the grassroots pro-democracy "Orange Revolution" by bringing back into power pro-Russian leader Yanukovich in 2010-14. Yet, he was ultimately expelled from Ukraine in Spring 2014 by the new grassroots pro-democracy "Maidan Revolution" against Yanukovich's and Russia's veto of an impending E.U.-Ukrainian Free Trade accord, which Moscow feared would "Westernize" too much its neighbour. In response, Moscow condemned such "Maidan Coup" and seized from Ukraine the Russian-majority Crimea peninsula, including the local Ukrainian navy, by hastily setting-up twin secessionist popular "democratic votes" first to legitimize Crimea's pro-Russian secession from the Ukraine, then to legitimize Moscow's annexation of the same—another form of hasty, but effective reverse democracy engineering to consolidate nationalist support within Russia and cower the Ukraine through further border instabilities in its heavily-populated Russian industrial belt of the Donbas' region of Eastern Ukraine.

Section VI.

President Putin's fears of the further destabilization and disaggregation of the Russian Federation, particularly in the Russian Far East (even before the impact of U.S. and European sanctions after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea), represent a major rationale why Moscow has begun to tighten its political economic and military ties with China—in addition to supporting joint Russian-Chinese efforts to counter the U.S. alliance with a militarily stronger Japan, which, in effect, parallels the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance. Here Russia has continued to oppose Japanese demands to reclaim all four of Northern or Kurili Islands annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

¹ Anne Barnard & Andrew Kramer, "Russian Cruise Missiles Help Syrians Go on the Offensive" in *New York Times* (7 October 2015), in http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/middleeast/russia-syria-conflict.html?_r=0

² See Hall Gardner, «General Introduction» in Hall Gardner & Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., *Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention* (New York: Ashgate, 2012). On techniques of revolutionary democratic change, see Gene Sharp's non-violent manifesto, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Albert Einstein Institute (2010) <http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf>

Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has also been concerned with the eventual rise of a Germany/Europe bloc, as well as Japan, and recently China as well, as Powers that could eventually challenge Russia in political-economic, if not military, terms. In effect, despite their own ongoing nuclear and conventional force rivalry during the Cold War, both the U.S. and Soviet Union had jointly restrained, or at least limited by means of “counter-balancing” the potential political-economic and military capabilities of Germany/Europe, Japan and China, if not much of the post-colonial “Developing World”.¹ During the Cold War, Moscow saw itself as being in a position of “co-hegemony” particularly in keeping Germany (and indirectly, Europe) “down” in accord with the “Four-Powers” (U.S., Great Britain, France and USSR) controls.

In addition to Moscow’s fears of the eventual rise of Germany/Europe and of Japan as political-economic, if not relatively independent military Powers backed by the U.S., Moscow has also been concerned with the political-economic and military rise of China as a potential hegemonic Power as well. But starting with Mikhail Gorbachëv, whose pro-Chinese policies were then boosted by Boris Yel’tsin and Vladimir Putin, Moscow has sought to *channel* Beijing’s rise by entering into a close Sino-Russian political-economic relationship by resolving territorial disputes. Closer Sino-Russian ties have increasingly looked like a proto-military alliance from 2005 to 2017, especially to corner a weakened U.S. under both the rival Presidencies of Barack Obama (Democrat) and Donald Trump (Republican).

In effect, since 1986 it was Soviet Premier Gorbachëv’s re-opening to China that represented Moscow’s renewed effort to break the U.S.-NATO-Japanese-Chinese (and Arab Gulf state) “encirclement” that the Kremlin had experienced during the First Afghan War of 1979-89. Gorbachëv’s reopening to China, plus his miscalculation in unilateral Soviet retrenchment in Central-Eastern Europe which unexpectedly unleashed the rapid dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, represented one of the primary reasons that international tensions did not continue to spiral, possibly resulting in a Soviet explosion in a two-fronts East-West war as expected by the pre-WW I analogy. A possible East-West nuclear World War III had appeared plausible, particularly in the early-1980s in the first term of the Ronald Reagan arch-conservative Republican administration.

Moscow’s efforts to achieve closer ties with China, which is also pressing its regional claims in the Indo-Pacific, has accordingly represented an effort to stabilize, if not restore, Russian hegemonic influence in Eurasia and abroad—even if it means that Moscow risks ending as the junior partner of a rising China with its regional Road and Belt Initiative. This Sino-Russian re-alignment has been symbolized by joint Russian-Chinese naval maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean in May 2015—truly an unprecedented historical step for both Russia and China (and symbolical of the equally unprecedented 1894 Franco-Russian naval visit in the Mediterranean, which ushered their pre-World War I bilateral alliance against Germany).²

In the present constellation of forces, a proto-Sino-Russian alliance best parallels the InterWars period’s 1922 Rapallo Pact between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia that led to the 1939 Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact, as previously argued. But in pre-World War I terms, the efforts to establish a Eurasian Union and a new Silk Road through the Chinese Road and Belt Initiative stretching across Eurasia to Egypt and the Suez Canal resembles the similar role of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway since 1904 to widen Germany’s Mitteleuropean economic area from the North and Baltic Seas to the Persian Gulf. The Berlin-to-Baghdad railway, which was almost completed before World War I, was intended to represent a land bridge that would compete with the British-controlled Suez Canal as sea access to Asia. The Suez Canal had been controlled by the British since 1882 in their effort to achieve global overseas hegemony—an effort that alienated both friends (France, Germany and Italy) and enemies alike (particularly among the rival pan-Arab and pan-Islamist movements of the late-Nineteenth Century).

¹ See my arguments detailed in: Hall Gardner, *Surviving the Millennium* (Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1994).

² Hall Gardner, *NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia* (New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013); Franz-Stefan Gady, “China and Russia Conclude Naval Drill in Mediterranean” in *The Diplomat* (22 May 2015), in <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-and-russia-conclude-naval-drill-in-mediterranean/>

Section VII.

Great Britain's unilateral intervention in Egypt in 1882 (without French supports as Paris withdrew its fleet from the attack at the last minute) would draw England into a long term occupation of Egypt. The occupation and extension of British controls from Cairo to the Cape would result in a suppression of pan-Arab and pan-Islamist forces, not to overlook Constitutional Democratic forces which also sought to put an end to the British occupation, albeit by more peaceful means. These opposition forces included the pan-Islamist Mahdi uprising in Sudan (1881-99) against Anglo-Egyptian rule. Ironically, the rise of a number of anti-British socio-political movements had benefitted from the greater communications within the Arab-Islamic world that followed the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869.

Much as Great Britain had made the leap to a formal empire in India since the 1850s and Egypt in 1882, and was then forced to engage militarily in Sudan against pan-Islamist movements, for example, the U.S. has been drawn deeper into the quagmire of Iraq since its Two Gulf Wars in 1990-91 and 2003, than it previously had expected.¹ On the one hand, the new pro-U.S. Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government had been infiltrated by Iran since the 2003 U.S.-led intervention. On the other hand, the same new Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government has been confronted with the rise of a number of revanchist Sunni militias whose most powerful representative is now the Islamic State of Iraq & Levant (ISIL), which is commanded by many ex-leaders of Saddam Hussein's military. Largely in rivalry with a now less powerful al-Qaeda and its affiliated al-Nusra militia, among other ones, it is ISIL that has been seeking to implement an anti-democratic pan-Sunni state by force in linking Sunni-claimed territories in both Iraq and Syria—if not beyond through its purported new Islamic “Caliphate”.

Section VIII.

In the long-term during the late-Nineteenth Century, British colonial expansion in Egypt and Africa began to alter Great Britain's global strategy in such a way that London would become more and more concerned with its overseas empire and less and less concerned with the burgeoning naval and arms race on the European continent between France, Italy, Russia and Germany in the aftermath of the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. The major Powers at the time—France, Italy, Germany and Russia—had all opposed Great Britain's quest for hegemony in controlling world trade and dominating Africa from the Cape to Cairo. Von Bismarck's Germany had played the *bâton égyptienne* as a means to counter British hegemony by attempting to play French and Russian political economic and financial interests against those of Great Britain when Egypt was under “rule of the bankers.”

Here is the key point as the British occupation of the Suez and Egypt impacted British strategy in the Eurasian continent: It was largely in response to the Franco-Russian alliance—and in particular Russian naval pressures on the Ottoman Straits—that Great Britain began to gradually withdraw its naval supports for the relatively weaker German allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy, which had initially been intended to counter-balance Russia by means of the 1887 Mediterranean Accords. Great Britain's tacit alliance with Germany through a defense relationship with German allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy, began alienating Berlin once London withdrew from the 1887 Mediterranean Accords in 1894-97—largely in the effort to secure the Suez Canal. Joint Franco-Russian pressures then led London to turn away from a possible

¹ Much as Great Britain had promised to leave Egypt 66 times between 1882 and 1922—when finally Great Britain declared, at least initially, Egypt “independent” (but without formal negotiations), the U.S. has acted in a similar fashion, by pulling troops out of Iraq in December 2011 (but maintaining a strong naval and military presence in the Gulf), but then reengaging its air-power against the ISIL. See the classic A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.90. I first warned that any U.S. presence will prove to be long-term, ironically enough on September 11, 1990. See *Scripta Politica* (American University of Paris) Vol. VII, n. IV (March 1991). Historian Niall Ferguson, by the way, made the exact same analogy in 2003, but 13 years later. See Niall Ferguson, “Lessons from the British Empire: True Lies” in *The New Republic* (27 May 2003); Niall Ferguson, *Colossus* (New York: Penguin, 2004), p.220.

entente or alliance with Imperial Germany and toward France and Russia once Anglo-German alliance talks had failed completely by 1902.

In other words, it was estimated that the British Navy would *not* hold-up in a battle to protect the Ottoman Straits against Russian naval power, potentially backed by France, and that London's quasi-alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary (the 1887-97 Mediterranean Accords) would prove too weak against a Franco-Russian naval combination as well. Something had to give: either London had to move more decisively toward Imperial Germany and its allies as they hoped—or else toward France and Russia.¹

The year of the Anglo-German estrangement, when London and Berlin really began to suspect each other's motives, was 1894: Germany started to fear that Great Britain might seek a *rapprochement* with Tsarist Russia to possibly end the Anglo-Russian "Great Game" in Asia, which in turn might threaten a future "encirclement" of Germany by a Franco-Russian-British security realignment as had been forewarned by Chancellor von Bismarck himself before he fell from power. At that time, London and Berlin also had significant disputes over how to deal with the decaying Ottoman-Turkish Empire and how to divide the Congo between them.² The year of alienation—1894—consequently took place *before* Berlin began to build its navy in 1897 *as a later political power factor* to press London into a closer and formal Anglo-German relationship against the new Franco-Russian Alliance.

Then as Anglo-German tensions continued to mount over the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War, disputes in Asia, not to overlook U.S.-German disputes, as well as the Dreadnought naval program for state-of-the-art battleships, London and Berlin found it impossible to come to terms. This led London to look toward France by the end of 1902 and in 1903-04 Great Britain and France conspired to keep Germany out of Morocco by exchanging French recognition of British controls over Egypt for British recognition of French controls over Morocco—the basis for the 1904 Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*. This Anglo-French *entente* then represented the first step toward the "isolation" and "encirclement" of Imperial Germany, before the formation of the larger Anglo-Franco-Russian *Entente* of 1907. By 1908, Berlin screamed "encirclement" but it was too late.

Although both democratic, France and Great Britain had continued to prepare for a possible war against each other until 1902, yet France could not go to war with Great Britain, as Georges Clemenceau had believed possible since 1882, when Great Britain had seized Egypt without French military support.³ Instead, London would unexpectedly align with France and Russia, and then go to war against Germany in 1914—primarily in the effort to safeguard the English Channel and North Sea after Germany attacked France through Belgium. And it would be Clemenceau himself who would be one of the major actors to lead the charge of *revanche* in the effort to regain Alsace-Lorraine against Germany...

In sum, *it was not initially the rise of Imperial Germany that would challenge global British hegemony, but the French-led alliance with Russia*. In fact, it was France and Russia who were actually the stronger naval and land powers, at least on paper, in the years just before Germany substantially built-up

¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Marco Rimanelli, *Italy between Europe and Mediterranean: Diplomacy and Naval Strategy from Unification to NATO, 1800s-2000* (New York: P. Lang, 1997).

² Hall Gardner, *The Failure to Prevent World War I: the Unexpected Armageddon* (New York: Ashgate, 2015).

³ The Deputy George Clemenceau led the opposition to French military intervention alongside Great Britain: "Have you taken safeguards? Have you made with your allies a plan for entering, for intervening, and then exiting? I want to know how you will go into Egypt, what you will do there, and under what conditions you will exercise your actions, and most importantly how you will exit! It is much easier to enter than to exit!... I demand that that you do not let yourselves follow behind England, which has only two special interests, its creditors and the Suez Canal. We cannot go into Egypt merely to serve the interests of the English. If you are going to let yourselves follow England in order to reestablish the *status quo*, it will result in an indefinite occupation, and for me, an inevitable war with England. I do not want to take such risks, I absolutely refuse, in such conditions, to authorize such an intervention in Egypt." Quote of George Clemenceau, Chamber of Deputies, 20 July 1882. Much the same position would be held by France and Germany in their opposition to the 2003 U.S.-led military intervention and then peacekeeping occupation of Iraq in 2003-2011!

its land and naval forces on the long eve to the First World War. In effect, Germany had largely become Great Britain's enemy by default. And of all the major Powers of that time, Great Britain was the least prepared or willing to be drawn into a major Powers war. The key point is that Great Britain's efforts to achieve and sustain overseas global hegemony, as epitomized by its seizure and imperialist occupation of Egypt, would not have prevented World War I.

Section IX.

The long-term forces leading to World War I were primarily generated when Prussia had seized Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 in an effort to assert its own hegemony over German states, while likewise countering French efforts to sustain French hegemony over Prussia and over the German states as a whole. France would then engage in a long-term policy of *revanche* in seeking alliances with whatever state, most importantly first Tsarist Russia and then Great Britain, that could help counter Germany's military pressures and burgeoning political-economic influence.

The French policy of *revanche* was intended to regain Alsace-Lorraine, by diplomatic means if possible, or by means of exchange for a French colony for Alsace-Lorraine, for example. But France was also prepared to use of force if necessary. «Alsace, speak of it never, think of it always...» was the mantra of the French élites.

But this parallel is the key danger today as the U.S. and Europeans confront a more militant Russia, which has begun to press its claims in the Black Sea region much like Lenin in the Russian Revolution, but perhaps even more like Tsarist Russia in asserting its hegemony over the Black Sea region since the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War and then in alliance with France: will the pre-World War I French mantra be replaced in contemporary circumstances with the NATO-European Union mantra «Crimea, speak of it never, think of it always»?

In the pre-World War I decades, Great Britain had become over-engaged in Afghanistan and Egypt and elsewhere overseas and largely ignored the growing rivalries among the continental Powers in Europe. In the present period, after having engaged militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, and even though NATO has expanded to Russia's borders, the U.S. has been unable to check, at least by diplomatic means, Russian intervention in Crimea and its clandestine political-military intervention in Eastern Ukraine. Washington did not take into account how Moscow would react to the post-2006 prospects of an eventual NATO membership for Ukraine supported by the U.S., or to how Moscow would react to the 2008-13 E.U. economic trade proposals that did not fully incorporate Russian interests given the close political-economic dependency between Kiev and Moscow. Here, Moscow interpreted the 2008-09 European Partnership offered to Kiev by the E.U. and European Commission¹ as a hidden means to isolate Russian economic interests. Thus, once again, Moscow engaged in an act of *preclusive imperialism* in the effort to check Kiev from entering into political-economic accords with the E.U. that could impact Russian interests in Eastern Ukraine—and to prevent any anti-Russian Kiev government from ever contemplating evicting the Russian Black Sea fleet from Crimea and then inviting NATO forces to take its place.

The danger is that the dispute over the Crimea could soon become the predominant issue that drives NATO and European security and defense policy, that is, if a deal with Moscow cannot be arranged within the near-future. As Ukraine is neither a member of NATO nor of the European Union, despite being a Partner in both organizations, the revanchist Ukrainian cause to regain Crimea does not hold for Europeans the same “existential” symbolism as Alsace-Lorraine had for France after the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. This might ultimately make more plausible a *Realpolitik* deal on Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

¹ The E.U.'s Eastern Partners in its European Neighborhood Policy are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus', Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The goal is to establish a comprehensive free-trade area (DCFTA) with each Partner country, while fostering regional stability. See: European Union Commission, *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council* (Brussels: E.U. Commission 3.12.2008 COM, 2008), in http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf

At the same time, however, the Russian military build-up and confrontation with NATO and E.U. make the “illegal” Russian annexation of Crimea symbolic of rising geo-strategic and political economic tensions. In effect, much as Imperial Germany feared that the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, combined with French pressures to regain Alsace-Lorraine through its alignment with Tsarist Russia, would destabilize Imperial Germany itself, a similar effect exists now with Moscow’s fear that NATO and the E.U. will back Ukrainian claims to Crimea, while threatening to break up the Russian Federation by augmenting political-economic sanctions, in addition to backing a “militarized” Japan in Asia.

The Ukraine crisis is further combined with more immediate Russian fears that Arab Gulf states’ support for pan-Islamist movements in the Caucasus and Central Asia will destabilize the soft underbelly of the Russian Federation, which has been further exposed after the Soviet collapse. In part in the effort to deflect the U.S., E.U. and NATO away from their focus on Russian destabilization of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Moscow has engaged in a major military intervention in Syria. Moscow has argued that the U.S., NATO and Arab Gulf States have been in alliance at least since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Unless it can begin to co-opt some Sunni movements (such as the Afghan Talibani), Moscow now risks facing a new pan-Sunni *jihad* against Russian military intervention to save the Assad régime, in alliance with Shi’a Iran and *Hizb’allah*, much as was the case for international resistance to the old Soviet intervention in the First Afghan War of 1979-89. Thus, it comes with foreboding that in late-March 2017, the U.S. government has revealed emerging Russian-Talibani ties on arms shipments to strengthen anti-Western Taliban insurgency and isolate rival local ISIL fighters in Afghanistan.

Section X.

In the pre-World War I era, the Anglo-French-Russian-Japanese alliance encircled a military-strong (but socially unstable) Imperial Germany and a collapsing Austria-Hungarian Empire. Berlin then used its new economic ties through the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway to stage a sort of *coup d’état* by pressing the collapsing Ottoman-Turkish Empire against British and French interests throughout the Islamic world. German support for the Ottoman-Turks would then be countered during World War I by Arab nationalism backed by the British (Lawrence of Arabia) in support of an independent Arabia under Hashemite rulers, for example, which helped shatter Ottoman rule by late-1918.

Since the mid-1890s, Berlin had been unable to check or break-up the French-Russian Alliance, and had also failed to forge a counter-alliance with London before 1902. While Great Britain had initially begun to modernize its navy, primarily against France and Russia in 1893, Germany since 1897 sought to use its own naval build-up as a tool of strategic leverage in the effort to coerce Great Britain into an alliance with Germany under the threat of an expensive Anglo-German naval race and even war. This German strategic gambit was, in part, based on the belief that American naval threats had forced Great Britain to «appease» the U.S. in permitting the latter to assert its hegemony over the Western hemisphere and Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine, followed by its Theodore Roosevelt Corollary. By 1902 mutual fears of what I call the «insecurity-security dialectic» then began to militarize and polarize the policy approach of all statesmen as socio-political and inter-state tensions augmented both *within* and *among* rival states and societies.¹

As opposed to the hardline policy that Berlin used in an attempt to *impel* London into alliance, Paris used a much more subtle diplomatic strategy to *coax* London over to its side against Imperial Germany. In the period 1901-1907, London engaged in the formation of three *ententes* with former rivals that shocked the world: the U.S., France and Russia. This was also the time when London formally broke out of its “Splendid Isolation” by aligning with Japan in 1902. As tensions mounted before 1914, London’s *entente* with France and Russia gradually tightened into closer alliances.

¹ Hall Gardner, «Alienation» in Hall Gardner & Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., *Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention* (New York: Ashgate, 2012).

London soon found itself entangled in threats of encirclement against Imperial Germany and its collapsing Austro-Hungarian ally even though London had initially believed itself to be playing a clever game of «balance of power». And it was precisely French efforts, then backed by Great Britain, to prevent Germany from forging a last-ditch alliance with Tsarist Russia (1898 Bjórskoe Accord) that helped to tighten the vise of Anglo-French-Russian encirclement that led Berlin to explode into a two-fronts World War I.

Section XI.

While the geo-historical configuration is significantly different today, and while the geo-strategic constellations are not quite the same, there nevertheless appears to be a U.S.-led alliance in the process of formation that links the U.S./NATO, Europeans and Japan, plus a number of Arab Gulf states against Russia, the CSTO and China. Such an alliance could possibly include India (given its closer defense ties with the U.S. and Japan under the ruling nationalist Hindu Barata Party, rival of the neutralist and anti-Western Indian National Congress) if New Delhi does openly shift farther away from China and Russia. In addition to further isolating Moscow and alienating Beijing, there is a real danger that such an alliance could also be used to support Ukraine in an effort to pressure Russia out of the Crimea (and Eastern Ukraine), much as France in 1892-1914, aligned first with Russia and then Great Britain, sought to pressure Germany out of Alsace-Lorraine short of war.

Thus, the combination of NATO-E.U. enlargements in the West and the U.S. alliance with a stronger Japan (and Taiwan) in the east, coupled with Arab states' support for Sunni pan-Islamist movements in the South, seem to be pushing Russia and China closer together toward greater political economic and defense cooperation. And much as Imperial Germany hoped to pressure Great Britain into alliance by naval threats, it appears that Putin, who seems to be acting more like Bernard von Bülow than von Bismarck, has been playing much the same game, but now coupled by the threat to use tactical nuclear weapons.¹ In addition, perhaps somewhat alike Imperial Germany that was able to influence Ottoman-Turkish policies by the beginning of World War I, again since June 2016 Moscow has been able to flip Atlanticist Turkey closer to Russian interests, despite their previous dispute over Syria after the 2011 Arab Spring movement. How renewed Russian ties with Turkey will impact U.S./NATO-Turkish relations remains to be seen, given Ankara's virulent nationalist rhetoric.

Much as the crisis before World War I resulted in the failure to resolve the 1870-71 Franco-German clash over Alsace-Lorraine, as realized by British Prime Minister William Gladstone at the time, the contemporary global crisis is largely a consequence of the failure in the 1990s to establish a new system of Euro-Atlantic security from Vancouver to Vladivostok as proposed by Mikhail Gorbachëv and George Bush Sr. to be co-led by Washington and Moscow. This proposed system of Euro-Atlantic security had been intended to incorporate the U.S., Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia, and bring both Russia and Eastern Europe into a reformed NATO or alternative system of security.

Yet by not finding any way to build an all-inclusive new system of security in Eastern Europe that would include Russian interests and that would separate German and Russian interests—much as British geo-politics theorist Halford MacKinder had argued was absolutely necessary in order to prevent renewed conflict between Germany and Russia in the aftermath of World War I—NATO has, in effect, created a self-fulfilling prophecy: a Russian backlash, which began at the time of NATO's "exceptional" intervention with the 1999 Kosovo War and which has recently manifested itself with the Russian outright annexation of Crimea and Russian clandestine political-military interference in Eastern Ukraine.²

¹ Zachary Keck, "Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes over Crimea" in *The Diplomat* (11 July 2014), in <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/russia-threatens-nuclear-strikes-over-crimea/> Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Heletey pledged to retake Crimea: "Ukraine's New Defence Minister Promises Crimea Victory" in *Kiev Ukraine News Blog* (4 July 2014), in <http://news.kievukraine.info/2014/07/ukraines-new-defence-minister-promises.html>

² Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2015).

Moscow has interpreted the largely uncoordinated double Enlargement of NATO and the European Union (E.U.) into the ex-Tsarist Russia and ex-Soviet spheres of influence and security (Moscow's "near-abroad") as a quest for NATO to achieve hegemony, if not imperial predominance, in the aftermath of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union. The expansion of NATO as an integrated military alliance, represents a "reversal of power relations" between the U.S., Europe and Russia in the terms of traditional Realist Hans Morgenthau.¹ This reversal of power relations is seen as an act of major Power imperialism from the Russian perspective, due to the fact that the Soviet Union and the U.S./NATO bloc had previously divided Europe between themselves under the post-World War II system of Four-Powers controls that "legitimized" Moscow's position of "co-hegemony" over Germany/Europe, plus veto right in the U.N. Security Council. Thus, from Moscow's viewpoints, following the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union it is NATO Eastward enlargements that represent an act of "hegemony", if not "imperialism", even if all Eastern European states had joined NATO and the E.U. "voluntarily" without any coercion to join the U.S.-NATO-E.U. primacy (given elements of power-sharing and consensus-building within NATO and E.U., despite U.S. preponderance).²

Much as Imperial Germany had been alienated by British efforts to reach out to Russia in 1894, the Russian Federation was initially alienated in the 1999 War "over" Kosovo by the U.S.-NATO intervention without a clear U.N. mandate (given the threat of a Russian veto supported by China in the U.N. Security Council) against Russia's ally, Serbia, combined with the fact that three ex-Soviet Satellites Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had also just joined NATO in 1999. The U.S.-led NATO War in Kosovo, plus NATO's three post-Cold War Enlargements to the East (1999, 2002-04, 2008), along with Russia's ongoing civil war in Chechnya (itself seen as backed by U.S. allies among Arab Gulf states), were among the primary external factors leading a week Russian President Boris Yel'tsin to step-down on behalf of his successor Vladimir Putin's unexpected rise to power.

Concurrently, Russia (with its CSTO) and China (co-leading with Russia the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) could potentially align with other states (Iran, and least likely India) and also socio-political movements overseas seeking to forge in the near-future an alliance of convenience against their perception of the dominant U.S.-European-Japanese "co-hegemony". And already in 2014-17, Moscow

¹ For the great Realist theorist, Professor Hans Morgenthau, imperialism is «a policy that aims at the overthrow of the *status quo*, at a reversal of power relations between two or more nations. A policy seeking only adjustment, leaving the essence of these power relations intact, still operates within the general framework of a policy of the *status quo*», see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948, reprinted until 2006 by McGraw Hill), Chapter 5, p.37, in http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/Valissuhted/ERASMUS/Morgenthau_A_Realist_theory_of_international_politics.pdf For Morgenthau, the tools of imperialism include: military, economic and cultural. I have combined this definition with that of Doyle's: "Imperialism is simply the process, or policy of establishing, or maintaining an empire" quoted from Michael Doyle, *Empire* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1986). In this dynamic conception, imperialism can be seen as a reversal of power relations among two or more states and as an effort to sustain the new, yet altered, *status quo* after the reversal of power relations.

² The fact that the U.S. does not seek to «dominate» NATO members and always seeks consensus through primacy can be seen clearly proven by the uncharacteristic open opposition by NATO members France and Germany (plus Belgium and Greece) to the 2003 Second Gulf War. And NATO membership was not imposed on its member-states in 1949 and later: NATO was initially proposed as a TransAtlantic alliance by Great Britain and Canada in 1948, *but on conditions of American dominance and the need to continue to jointly occupy defeated Germany after World War II in a form of power-sharing (along with the Soviet Union as well, despite Soviet threats to the West)*. At the same time, however, the reality of U.S. hegemony can be seen in the fact that the U.S. could largely circumvent the NATO military apparatus to intervene militarily in Iraq in 2003 with limited Allied support, despite French and German opposed that intervention. The «real» question remains as to whether all NATO members will necessarily perceive a future threat or action against a NATO member as necessarily an Article V contingency. For its part, Moscow continues to denounce NATO as seeking hegemony, if not dominance, while expanding into the Russian-defined «near-abroad» (despite the fact that Russia, Ukraine and the ex-Soviet successor states have been NATO Partners since the 1990s). Like the Soviet Union before, contemporary Russia will continue to probe for weak links in NATO's chain and try to find its Achilles heel to unravel the Alliance as a tool of U.S. domination—unless, and if, NATO and Russia might eventually reach new mutually-agreed political-security accords formalizing a different relationship based on U.S.-Russian parity and mutual trust.

has been forging a tighter alliance with Iran in Syria and even hosting joint naval exercises with China in the East Mediterranean.

Section XII.

While it may be comforting to think that U.S. hegemony is «here to stay»,¹ America's relatively superior position globally in most military, economic and cultural domains will not necessarily prevent wider regional wars in areas that are largely outside U.S. spheres of influence and security, nor will American hegemonic preponderance necessarily prevent the U.S. from stumbling into significant conflicts with revanchist regional states, or even against a counter-alliance of major Powers. It should be remembered that Ancient Athens' «hegemony» under Pericles as first depicted by Thucydides in his masterful book *The Peloponnesian War* did not prevent that devastating war with rival Sparta, but instead was the main factor in precipitating it. Likewise, nor did British naval hegemony prevent the 1799-1815 French Revolution/Napoleonic Wars (after Great Britain had already twice defeated French efforts to achieve global hegemony in the Spanish Succession War of 1700-1713 and the Seven Years/French & Indians War of 1754-1763), nor did British overseas hegemony as the largest colonial empire prevent either World War I in 1914-1918 or World War II in 1939-1945.

What is needed in the effort to prevent an even wider and more intensive conflict is a major coordinated U.S., European and Japanese diplomatic offensive toward both Russia and China. In Europe, this means seeking to establish new confidence-building measures and regional systems of security to resolve the simmering conflict between Moscow and Kiev over the pro-Russian secessionism in Eastern Ukraine through full implementation of the 2015 Minsk II Accord, while seeking at the same time a parallel new joint understanding on Crimea, possibly as an «internationalized» free-trade zone, but still under Russian sovereignty. Another option to consider is a mutual U.S.-European-Russian-Ukrainian recognition of a more decentralized and neutral Ukraine (notwithstanding Kiev's anti-Russia ultra-nationalist stance since 2014 after the Maidan Revolution), while the European Union could reshape its E.U.-Ukraine free-trade accord (which Moscow vetoed in 2013-14 sparking the Maidan Revolution that ultimately overthrew the pro-Russian Ukrainian government and replaced it with a vehemently pro-Western and anti-Russian one) into a joint E.U.-Ukrainian-Russian political-economic accord with face-saving diplomatic advantages for all.²

In the Indo-Pacific, this means seeking to quell tensions by implementing joint development projects and systems of joint sovereignty between China, Japan and other regional Powers over uninhabited islands and resources in dispute throughout the South China Sea (unilaterally claimed and militarily-occupied by Beijing as the «Nine-Dash Line»). In the wider Middle East, this also means as absolutely crucial to find a common approach through the formation of a new Contact Group (inclusive of Russia) to overcome the ongoing civil wars and Islamist terrorism in Iraq and Syria, while seeking to end proxy warfare regionally (between Sunni Arab Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Shi'a Iran, a tottering Shi'a-led Iraq, a collapsed and divided Syria, Russia, U.S.A. and Israel). This could allow bringing both regional Gulf enemies, Iran and a highly unpredictable Saudi Arabia, into seeking some political cooperation, while likewise trying, as much as possible, to quell the old Israeli-Palestinian conflict and keep Palestinians from drifting into a third *intifada*.³

¹ Salvatore Babones, «American Hegemony is Here to Stay» in *National Interest* (11 June 2015), see <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=5>

² Nicolai Petro, «Bringing Ukraine Back into Focus: How to End the New Cold War and Provide Effective Political Assistance to Ukraine» in *Carnegie Council* (19 August 2015), see https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/742 See also Hall Gardner, «The Reset Was Never Reset» in *NATO Watch*, 49 (3 April 2014), in http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/briefing_paper_no_49_-_ukraine_russia_crimea.pdf

³ Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Hall Gardner, *NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Without a serious and concerted diplomatic engagement on all three fronts, the chances of a wider regional conflicts, if not new forms of hybrid warfare between regional and major Powers, will continue to worsen. This irenic approach is not intended to engage in a policy of appeasement in its Twentieth Century meaning of «capitulation», but in its Nineteenth Century sense of a policy of «mutual compromises». At the same time, both losses and gains can be expected, due to the fact that major and regional Powers, as well as local actors which could attempt to resist accords reached by rival hegemonies, will continue to engage in tough power-based bargaining and strategic leveraging—despite the risks and dangers of escalating warfare.

One of the ironies of the pre-World War I era, which is still relevant today, is that while Great Britain was not able to forge a lasting peaceful global accommodation with Imperial Germany prior to the spark of the 1914-1918 Great War, it was nevertheless able to forge an uneasy one with Tsarist Russia over Tibet, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, as well as a condominium over Iran in the formation of the 1907 Anglo-Russian *entente*, which was spurred by the France which had just resolved its own complex disputes over Africa with Great Britain in 1902-1904 culminating with the 1904 Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*.¹

In the contemporary situation, perhaps the U.S. and Europeans could examine British *entente* policy toward Russia before World War I, even if the geo-strategic context and constellation of major and regional Powers is not exactly the same as today, given the fact that Moscow remains a potential geo-strategic nuclear challenger to the U.S. and Europe and as the E.U.-NATO-Russian rivalry over Ukraine was not a key issue in the period before World War I or even during the InterWars Era (1919-39) after the Soviet Union took control of that region since 1920. The point remains that the British proved that a mutually-advantageous accord with a weakened Russian bear was possible...

At the same time in the current geo-strategic situation, reaching out for an accord with Moscow requires that the U.S., Europe and Japan must not concurrently alienate China, given the many tense trade relationships and Beijing's expanding global economic presence. And it is still uncertain what role a rising India could play given Indo-Chinese-Pakistani rivalries over Kashmir and elsewhere in the region, plus balancing its recent closer defense ties with the U.S. and Japan on the one hand, and the possibility of an Indian membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as possible partnership in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union on the other. Conflict in the Indo-Pacific could thus be sparked over a number of issues, including disputes over Taiwan, resources-rich uninhabited islands in the South and East China Seas, plus a disintegrating but nuclear-ambitious North Korea in a divided Korean peninsula—unless also here Washington and Pyongyang might eventually come to terms over North Korea's nuclear program, much as the U.S. secured in 2015, after years of trying, an international denuclearization accord with Iran over its nuclear enrichment program.

The key dilemma from a comparative historical standpoint is that neither the pre-World War I era nor the pre-World War II era, provides any concrete advice as to how to manage the rise of new Powers, in the most recent case China and India. Neither does the pre-World War I nor pre-World War II era, offer much advice as how to deal with the ongoing and horrific civil wars (Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq) now taking place in the “wider Middle East”—which are perhaps most reminiscent of the Balkan conflicts before World War I.

In the few years before the so-called Great War, from 1912 to June 1914, the key Great Powers did attempt to develop a concerted policy toward the horrific conflicts in the Balkans, and it even appeared that Great Britain, France and Germany were on the verge of reaching some common accords over African colonies and the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. Hawkish French President Raymond Poincaré had even dined in the German Embassy in Paris in January 1914, and it looked like France and the Ottoman-Turkish Empire had begun to settle the Syrian question. As late as 27 June 1914, the British and German fleets paraded side-

¹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Random, 1990); Marco Rimaneli, *Italy between Europe and Mediterranean: Diplomacy and Naval Strategy from Unification to NATO, 1800s-2000* (New York: P. Lang, 1997).

by-side at the Kiel Naval Review. That was the day before Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of Habsburg, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was assassinated by Serb terrorists tied to Belgrade, precipitating the 1914 July Crisis when the European Great Powers could not reach any accord over the acrimonious regional clash between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which in turn precipitated the Great War by August 1914.

Notwithstanding belated steps towards stabilizing a volatile international system in the first six months of 1914, Great Powers diplomacy failed to bring Great Britain, France and Germany into greater cooperation before the unexpected outbreak of Armageddon in August 1914. Not a promising omen a hundred years after World War I for the post-Obama U.S. administration, or maverick Republican President Donald Trump—particularly given Trump’s already highly criticized promises to seek some *rapprochement* with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

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Chinese Think Tanks' Influence on Foreign Policy-Making: Case-Study on CIIS and SIIS Roles in China's Policy towards Europe

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ABSTRACT: Faced with a volatile external environment and forced to handle foreign policy issues beyond their knowledge bases and analyzing capacities, China's foreign policy decision-makers increasingly rely on think tanks as a kind of "external brain" offering practical policy advice. After categorizing China's overall think tank system and methods to exert policy influence, this paper analyzes two elite Chinese foreign policy think tanks as a case-study, namely, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), and their role in China's policy towards the Europe. This paper determines that the CIIS and SIIS play a key role in shaping China's three major policy issues in its relations with Europe. Further, this paper depicts their long-term indirect influence by observing their research projects, their short-term influence through a survey on their high-level forums and symposia, as well as small-scale bilateral meetings, while elaborating their long-term influence through their unique Chinese-style "revolving door" mechanisms. Finally, after a review on three sets of theoretic paradigms for explaining think tanks' policy influence, this paper adopts the paradigm of the "central space of the four fields of power" to summarize the role of the CIIS and SIIS in China's foreign policy-making.

Introduction

China's continuous economic development in the past three decades has led the country into an increasingly integrated global and regional network of inter-dependency. As China's political leaders are facing an unpredictably volatile international environment and are forced to handle a variety of unprecedented complicated issues, often far beyond their knowledge bases and capabilities of analysis, they inevitably turn to external expertise for professionalized support to their foreign policy decision-making. Under such circumstances, Chinese foreign policy think tanks have been emerging as an important and influential sector in China's policy community and policy-making process ever since the early-1990s. In a hierarchical semi-authoritarian régime with a lack of open policy debates by competing interests and with a tradition of concentrating policy consultations within an inner circle of élites, Chinese think tanks may not play an obvious or significant role in government decision-makings over domestic economic or public policies. However, Chinese foreign policy think tanks, particularly those which are highly specialized foreign policy research institutes, are now playing an undeniable and outstanding role in shaping China's foreign policy-making. Their clout can be explicitly felt in China's foreign policy community. Therefore, they deserve a systematic and profound scrutiny in the researches related to China's foreign policy.

¹ This essay combines views from three think tank research projects supported respectively by the Education Commission of the Shanghai Municipal Government, the Shanghai Municipal Office for Planning of Philosophy and Social Sciences, and China's Education Ministry (the registration numbers of these three projects are: 13YJCGJW013, 2012FGJ001 and KB1591210). It also combines some of a post-Doctorate research project of the Shanghai International Studies University on the role of think-tanks in foreign policy-making.

I. Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks in the Current Political and Bureaucratic System

China's political system is vastly different from those of Liberal democracies in the West. On one hand, in China, most think tanks are exclusively or mostly funded by the government and very few of them can achieve real financial and institutional independence. Nevertheless, just like any substantially separate policy research institution evolving in a complex policy community and fluid international environment, China's foreign policy think tanks have gradually developed a series of characteristics that are similar to their counterparts in the West:

1. Chinese policy-makers increasingly view national think tanks as an indispensable component of an "external brain" trust that can generate reliable and professional policy advice. In an official document jointly issued by the General Offices of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China's State Council on January 2015, Beijing's top leadership regards think tanks as an important source of state governance capacity and even values them as a starting point to shape China's international competitiveness.¹
2. Among Chinese think tanks, the most developed ones are the élite foreign policy research institutions, which have already established relatively clear structures of governance and a full complement of analysts and experts. Their research teams and standards for enrolling experts are very similar to their counterparts in the U.S., Europe and Japan, while their governance structures are more or less differentiated, which are shaped by China's unique social and political environment.
3. There is an "evolving door" mechanism taking shape in several élite foreign policy research institutions with the top national administration, which adds more credit to their influence on China's foreign policy-making.
4. Some leading experts in key élite foreign policy research institutions, such as the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and China Institute of Contemporary International Studies (CICIR), were nominated as Chinese ambassadors, while in-turn some senior leaders from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) became executive officers in key Chinese foreign policy think tanks in ways reminiscent of their Western counterparts.

On the other hand, the current Chinese political and social system has inherited some structural continuities from its past communist totalitarianism, which still largely shapes China's foreign policy process and the role of its think tanks. More specifically, the following *two continuities have the largest effect on Chinese foreign policy think tanks*:

1. *The dominant "stove-piping" structure of bureaucracy*: China's foreign policy decision-making bureaucracy still remains compartmentalized into several parallel top-to-bottom vertical hierarchy systems with enormous organizational resistance to building any horizontal connections. This is a very prominent feature of the old Leninist communist political command structure, summarized by some scholars as "stove-piping".² Inside this structure, China's foreign policy research institutions are positioned as specific professional policy advice providers affiliated to different vertical hierarchical bureaucratic systems (or *xitong* in Chinese) and with different bureaucratic ranks (or *xingzheng jibie* in Chinese). Thus, they are allocated different sources of funds and resources in relation to the specific vertical bureaucratic hierarchies they belong to. Furthermore, their ability to make their voices heard and their ideas adopted by Beijing's top leadership is also determined by the political importance and

¹ "Viewpoints on How to Strengthen the Constructions of the New-Type Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics", Official Document issued by the General Offices of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and China's State Council (21 January 2015), see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2015-01/21/c_133934292.htm

² David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process" in *China Quarterly* (September 2002): p. 580; Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and the Practice of Influence" in Gilbert Rozman ed., *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes It, and How Is It Made?* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012), p. 125-149. Some Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese researchers mentioned this point without using the term of "stove-piping".

competence of the specific vertical bureaucratic hierarchy they belong to. For example, China's Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is directly affiliated to the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with its resources and influence relatively confined within the MFA own system and its area of competence mainly focused on standard diplomacy. Therefore, the CIIS can do little to influence either military-related security policy, which is largely the domain of the General Staff Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), and its influence and research capacity on foreign economic policy, which is also relatively weak and the domain of the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).

2. *The lack of a public sphere for policy debates and policy advocacy.* China still lacks a cultural and institutional environment for open public debates on foreign policy: any harsh criticism, or over-active campaigning against the national leadership's major foreign policy decisions are unacceptable by the government élite. Therefore, upwardly, Chinese foreign policy research institutions remain passive in their interactions with top leadership and often act as interpreters of the foreign policy orientations of China's paramount leaders in the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Downwardly, Chinese foreign policy research institutions do not have substantial connections with the country's nascent non-official organizations that nurture the embryo of civil society. Even though some Chinese economic think tanks may occasionally send bold signals to the top élites in Beijing in defense of specific social groups on some economic and public policy issues, mostly on few issues related to rural areas, it is safe to say that Chinese foreign policy think tanks do not have the political ability or structural conditions to play any organized advocacy or lobbying role within China's foreign policy.

II. A Review of Current Literature on Chinese Think Tanks

Both Chinese and foreign scholars have already noticed and analyzed these think tanks' unique role within the Chinese social and political system. Among Chinese scholars, ZHU Xufeng has conducted the most systematic and detailed statistical surveys over his country's think tanks, dividing them into three types: official, semi-official and non-official. Applying Johan Galtung's "social structure" paradigm that divides the policy process into such three circles as "decision-making nucleus", "center" and "periphery",¹ he analyzes Chinese think tanks influence transmitted through their networks within China's administrative system, social élite circles and media, with special focus on the Chinese think tanks' administrative ranks that may determine the levels and distributions of resources and prestige among them. However, he mainly concentrates on China's economic think tanks, without any case-study or specific analysis on any Chinese foreign policy think tank, and he does not draw a definite conclusion on the actual degree of influence of Chinese think tanks over policy-making.²

Among foreign scholars, the CSIS analyst Bonnie S. Glaser may have made the sharpest observation on Chinese think tanks, particularly foreign policy ones and their policy influences, with two articles in 2002 and 2012. Covering 10 years, her articles indicate that her evaluation over this topic evolved in step with the actual development of China's foreign policy think tanks. She not only identified the key persistent characteristics of Chinese think tanks' organizational environment, such as the dominant "stove-piping" and the pivot roles of the General Offices of the State Council and CCP's Central Committee, but she also elaborated on several bureaucratic operational details, such as the unique role of the secretaries of such decision-making élites.³ In brief, her research captures most of the true nature of China's think tanks and political system.

¹ Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace & Peace Research" in *Journal of Peace Research* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1969), see: <http://academic.regis.edu/bplumley/Galtung1969JPRViolencePeacePeaceResearch.pdf>; "Galtung-and-Peace-Research" in *PB Works* (2017), in: <http://peacewiki.pbworks.com/w/page/15294892/Galtung-and-Peace-Research>

² Xufeng Zhu, *The Rise of Think Tanks in China* (London & New York: Routledge, 2013).

³ Bonnie S. Glaser & Philip C. Saunders, "Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence" in *China Quarterly* (August 2002): p. 597-616; B.S. Glaser, "Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and Practice of Influence", *ibid*, p. 125-149.

These two scholars' research are the most systematic and impressive ones, but other experts also contributed their own analyses to this growing body of specialized literature. Among them, Lu Ning provided the earliest description of the role of China's foreign policy research institutions in the mid-1990s. But at that time, he assessed that they had "little relevance to policy process" and had only a "cosmetic" function. He even disclosed that for a long time in the past, the CIIS had been "used by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a place to dispose of the undesirable and untrustworthy elements from the MFA in a thinly veiled 'internal exile'".¹

Since the end of the 1990s, experts of Chinese studies have gradually paid much more attentions to think tanks and recognized their slow growing importance compared to the past. David Shambaugh made a case-by-case survey over the organizational structures of seven élite foreign policy think tanks, established and officially supported by China's central government.² He Li pointed out that the "copy-cat" effect might be a major force to propel the organizational and operational streamlining of Chinese foreign policy think tanks.³ Barry Naughton reviewed the origins and evolutions of top Chinese economic think tanks, before and after the 1992 launching of China's reform towards a market economy.⁴ ZHAO Quansheng also expounded on changes and trends in Chinese think tanks through an analytical framework of information and expertise exchanges between "inner circles" and "outer circles", which is based on his core idea that China's political structure has been converted from Mao's "vertical authoritarianism" to Deng's "horizontal authoritarianism".⁵ LIAO Xuanli forged the concept of "pluralistic élitism" approach to analyze China's foreign policy think tanks influence to the making of Sino-Japanese relations, by arguing that think tanks are now a unique, integral part of all the pluralistic policy inputs that are filtered into a top-level exclusive inner circle of decision-makers.⁶ Actually LIAO's "pluralistic élitism" paradigm is similar to the concept of "fragmented authoritarianism" also presented by Kenneth Lieberthal.⁷

All these scholars have observed Chinese foreign policy think tanks and their role in national foreign policy-making, but their research do not provide detailed case-studies on specific Chinese foreign policy think tanks or relevant diplomatic areas. Further, their categorizations of Chinese think tanks are generalized. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide a more detailed and accurate picture of China's foreign policy research institutions, their positions within China's foreign policy community and their role in shaping or influencing China's foreign policy decision-makings.

III. Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes within China's Think Tanks System

To get a clearer understanding on the role of Chinese foreign policy research institutions within its national foreign policy decision-making structure, it is necessary to establish a precise and comprehensive categorization of the whole complex system of Chinese think tanks. *The following three factors add to the complexity of this system:*

1. In China's past, policy advice, talent training and academic research were not clearly differentiated or sharply divided from each other, so a variety of teaching-styles and research institutions became involved in policy advice.

¹ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy-making in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), p. 130-131.

² D. Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process", *ibid*, p. 575-596.

³ He Li, "The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy" in *Problems of Post-Communism*, v.49, N.2 (March-April 2002): p. 33-43.

⁴ Barry Naughton, "China's Economic Think Tanks: Changing Role in the 1990s" in *China Quarterly* (September 2002): p. 625-635.

⁵ Quansheng Zhao, "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: from Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism", *the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, n. 519 (January 1992): p. 159-176; Quansheng Zhao, "Moving between the 'Inner Circle' and 'Outer Circle': Limited Impact of Think Tanks on Policy Making in China" in Gilbert Rozman ed., *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes It, and How Is It Made?* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan: 2012), p. 125-149.

⁶ Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), p. 3-7.

⁷ Kenneth Lieberthal, "Introduction: 'Fragmented Authoritarianism' Model and Its limitations" in Kenneth Lieberthal & David Lampton eds., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).

2. China's communist ruling élites in the 1950s copied the whole organizational structure of academic research from the Soviet Union (USSR), including the academy of Social Sciences system and the party school system, which form an integral part of the core of Beijing's policy-related academic research centers.
3. Moreover, because China's communist ruling élites are pragmatic-oriented and traditionally prefer short-term analyses and case-by-case problem-solving to long-term strategic research, they entrust a large part of the work of policy research to the in-house small policy advice organs of the Communist Party's committees and governments at various levels, which can be directly controlled and operated by the national policy élites. These internal organs are akin to a special type of think tanks that have similar functions to those performed by such institutions as the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Thus, the current Chinese think tank system is characterized by its unique complexity, which has yet to be accurately described in existing literature.

From the point of view of this essay, at the present time *Chinese think tanks can be categorized and ranked into five major types in accordance with their proximity to the core of top-level decision makers and their access to information:*

1. *In-house research organs of the Party and government* rank first in the category as closest to the decision-makers and with the most direct influence. They have the most convenient access to largely confidential information and operate a system of daily contacts with all political and policy élites.
2. *Specialized foreign policy research institutions* rank second, because they maintain regular and intimate communications with top-level leaders on major foreign policy issues, due to their professional expertise and skills in foreign policy analysis.
3. *Communist Party Schools* rank third in policy advice based on their privileged access to the inner circle of policy élites through their core function of training high-ranking cadres prior to their internal promotion to senior levels.
4. *Academy of Social Sciences System (CASS)* ranks fourth. This national association of university-affiliated research institutions is the farthest from the center of political power and has the weakest links to decision-makers.
5. *University-affiliated Research Institutions* rank fifth. Like the previous Academy of Social Sciences, also university-affiliated research institutions are the farthest from the center of political power and has the weakest links to decision-makers. The marginalization of both the fourth and fifth categories is due to the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing tradition of innate distrust of all intellectuals and by the routine communist bureaucratic pattern of significantly decreasing the amount of policy-related information distributed downwardly.

Indeed, think tanks within these five categories are not only differentiated in their relative positions to the political power center and their connections to decision-makers, but also distinctively varied in terms of their levels of professional expertise and policy advice capacities. For example, the Academies of Social Sciences have more expertise and are more professionally skillful to conduct policy researches and offer advice than party schools on the same administrative levels, although the later may be much closer to the core of decision-makers than the former. Even within the same category, think tanks on different geographical administrative levels are differentiated because of the exponential imbalances of the distributions of resources and information between the center and periphery of China's communist bureaucracy. One typical case is the system of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which is on the Central-level, is progressively closer to and more influential towards China's top political leadership than Provincial-level Academies of Social Sciences (SASS). The system of Party Schools is the same case.


These five categories ranking China's think tanks and their distribution throughout various administrative levels are listed in Table 1 below.

**Table 1:
China’s Overall System of Think Tanks**

Category \ Level	Central-Level	Provincial-Level	Below-Provincial-Level
I: In-House Research Organs of the Party and Governments	Policy Research Offices of CCP’s Central Committee and State Council; DRC of the State Council ¹	Policy Research Offices of CCP’s Provincial Committees and Provincial Governments; DRC of Provincial Governments	Policy Research Offices of City-Level and County-Level Governments
II: Specialized Foreign Policy Research Institutes	CIRIR, CIIS, CISS & CCIEE ²	SIIS ³	none
III: Communist Party Schools Think Tanks	Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP; China National School of Administration; Four Major Central-Level Cadre Schools ⁴	Party Schools at CCP’s Provincial Committees	Party Schools at City and County Levels
IV: Academy of Social Sciences System	CASS ⁵	Provincial Level Academies of Social Sciences ⁶	none
V: Research Institutes affiliated to Universities	Research Institutes affiliated to Universities of the “985 List” & “211 List”	Research Institutes affiliated to Universities controlled by Provincial Governments, or Ministries other than the Education Ministry	none

Therefore, Chinese think tanks within the above five categories can be reorganized into the coordinated system illustrated in Table 2 below, which is structured in two dimensions: one is the “expertise-ideology orientation” continuum, while the other is the “center-periphery” continuum.

**Table 2:
Two-Dimensional Division of China’s Think Tank System**



¹ DRC refers to the Development Research Center.

² CICIR refers to the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; CIIS refers to the China Institute of International Studies; CISS refers to the China Institute for International Strategic Studies; CCIEE refers to the China Center for International Economic Exchanges.

³ SIIS is the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, which is the only Province-level specialized foreign policy research institute.


⁴ The four major Central-level cadre schools are located in Shanghai, Yan’an, Jingangshan and Dalian. Their official Chinese names are “Cadre School”, but their official English names are the “China Executive Leadership Academy”. All of the Central-level Party Schools, including Central-level Cadre Schools, contain research centers of international studies with strong functions of foreign policy research and advice, while the provincial and below-provincial level party schools do not have any functions of foreign policy advice, because they are solely concentrated on domestic policy advice and ideological educations.

⁵ CASS refers to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

⁶ SASS refers to the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

However, Table 2 above provides a panoramic, but static picture of China’s think tanks through this two-dimensional framework. It does not tell how Chinese think tanks exert their influences over the national policy-making system. In the field of think tank studies, Western scholars have been exploring U.S. and Canadian think tanks’ operating strategies for quite some time and have developed a fairly clarified typology on this issue.¹ Some Western experts on China, like Bonnie S. Glaser have contributed to a rough division of the channels and methods that Chinese think tanks may adopt to transmit their influence, but it still lacks enough analytical precision.²

**Table 3:
Chinese Think Tanks’ Methods to Exert Policy Influence: A Two-Dimensional Framework**



As a long-time Chinese practitioner, the author of this essay has developed his own two-dimensional coordinate system in Table 3 below, which divides the various methods employed by Chinese think tanks to exert their influence in accordance with a “Short- vs. Long-Term” continuum and a “Direct vs. Indirect” continuum. All these 14 methods (or strategies) of China’s think tanks are put into this two-dimensional structure. Some of these are unique to Chinese think tanks, with effective ways developed from and adapted to China’s largely authoritarian and centralized political system, such as the personal links of think tank executives and researchers with some trusted aides (or in another word, “henchmen”) of the most supreme leaders, particularly the secretaries serving these leaders, or think tanks’ personal links with some leaders through teacher-student relations formed during the early years of these leaders’ careers.

¹ Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Donald E. Abelson, *A Capital Idea: Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006); Murray Weidenbaum, *Competition of Ideas: the World of Washington Think Tanks* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009).

² B.S. Glaser, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and the Practice of Influence”, *ibid*, p. 125-149.

All the above are culturally-unique Chinese ways promote the policy influence of think tanks into the heart of national political power. But, given this case, it remains difficult to observe and document some of these methods in action through scientific research.

IV. Case-Study: Role of CIIS and SIIS in Shaping China's Policy towards Europe

The categorization in Tables 2 and 3 distinctively clarify the position of Chinese foreign policy research institutes inside China's think tank research system and their methods for disseminating policy influence nationally. Now a more in-depth study is necessary to reveal in details their activities to try to shape China's foreign policy-making. The following case-studies focus on two typical examples of China's specialized foreign policy research institutes: the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), who compete to influence China's policy making towards Europe (E.U. and its member states). As two of the most professionalized and resourceful foreign policy research institutes in China, both CIIS and SIIS are affiliated respectively with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Shanghai's Municipal Government as examples of foreign policy think tanks controlled by China's Central- and Provincial-level governments. Furthermore, this author has been engaged in research on Sino-European relations for a long time and is familiar with the major issues of China's policy towards Europe, and on the national style of collection and analysis of relevant information by both CIIS and SIIS.

IV-1. General Effects of CIIS and SIIS Policy Influence on China's Decision-Making on Europe

Like most think tank-related research, the first issue that this author sought to explore is how effective these two key think tanks are in shaping China's policy-making towards Europe. Similar to other scholars' efforts to define and evaluate think tanks' policy influence, it is difficult to locate as an exact smoking gun a linear relationship between any CIIS or SIIS proposal and any related new policy initiative by China's top political leaders. Moreover, the difficulty of this research is aggravated by the opaqueness of China's policy-making process and the lack of public access to documents and records of the country's top-level political initiatives.

Nevertheless, traces between policy ideas of CIIS and SIIS and new points of Chinese top leadership policy initiatives can still be located. Since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010, several issues have emerged as the central focus of Chinese policy-makers and China's relations towards Europe have become more precarious. After scrutinizing official and media records of these major issues, this author collected open research publications of CIIS and SIIS on major policy issues related to China's official relations with Europe, including:

- 1) media comments and remarks,
- 2) dispatches and newsletters,
- 3) published academic papers and books.

When the viewpoints proposed by CIIS and SIIS respectively are compared to the points of changes of Chinese leadership's policy initiatives within the same field, it could be identified that in three key issues of China's policy towards Europe there is a relatively clear perceptual link and time-sequence between CIIS' and SIIS' existing analytical literature and the Chinese leaders' new policy initiatives (see Table 4 below). In other words, it can be clearly identified that policy viewpoints and recommendations by CIIS and SIIS appeared first in print, and then Chinese policy-makers initiated new policy lines that highly resembled the same viewpoints previously proposed by CIIS and SIIS.

In consideration of the regular and institutionalized channels of information exchanges between the CIIS and SIIS as two of the elite foreign policy research institutes on one side, and China's top foreign policy-makers in the joint Party-Government organ of Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group on the other hand, it is almost certain that CIIS and SIIS provided some kind of influence on the Chinese leadership's new policy issues in three cases depicted in Table 4 below.

Table 4:
Perception Links and Time-Sequences between CIIS and SIIS and Chinese Policy-Makers on Three Major Issues Related to China’s Policy towards Europe

Policy Issue		China’s Policy towards European Sovereign Debt Crisis	China’s Stands on the E.U.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Negotiations	China’s Proper Measures to let Europe accept the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) Initiative
Specific Policy Point of the Issues		China may increase its purchase of E.U.’s debt bonds and participate in European Stability Mechanism (ESM).	China shall regard E.U.-China BIT as the founding framework for China’s economic growth in next 10 years.	China may consider to get “One Belt One Road” Initiative integrated to the “European Strategic Investment Fund” Plan
Proposals of Policy Points by CIIS	Time	13 May & 18 July 2011	November 2011 & June 2012	February, March & Early June 2015
	Form	Blue-Book and Speech on Symposium ¹	Published Monographs & Newspaper Comment ²	Published Articles and Newspaper Comment ³
Proposals of Policy Points by SIIS	Time	10 November 2011	March 2013	March & April 2015
	Form	Newspaper Comment ⁴	Article published on Academic Journal ⁵	Published Articles and Newspaper Comments ⁶
Chinese Policy-Makers’ Endorsement of Policy Points	Time	15 February 2012	21 November 2013	May & June 2015
	Form	Chinese Premier WEN Jiabao’s press declaration ⁷	Joint Statement of 16 th China-E.U. Summit: E.U.-China 2020 Strategic Agenda ⁸	Joint Statements for the 2015 China-E.U. Strategic Dialogue and 17 th China-E.U. Summit ⁹

IV-2. CIIS’ and SIIS’ Long-Term and Indirect Influence: Relevant Research Projects

In Table 3, research projects are ranked as long-term and indirect methods for Chinese think tanks to exert their policy influence. So it is useful to survey these research projects relevant to European studies and China-E.U. relations. Table 5 below lists the major research projects of CIIS that are focused on European studies and E.U.-China relations. Of all the four projects, three of them were funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and launched since 2010 against the background of the European debt

¹ China Institute of International Studies, *The International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs, 2010-2011* (Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing, 2011), p. 210-211; Qu Xing, Remarks made on the Second Global Think Tank Summit: “Global Economic Governance: Common Responsibilities”, sponsored by the China Center for International Economic Exchanges (25-26 June 2011).

² Chengde Yin, “Achievements and Challenges of China’s Diplomacy in 2012” in *New Trends and Situations of International Security and the New Responses of China’s Diplomacy* (Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing, May 2013), p.25-40; Hongjian Cui, “Perspective on China-E.U. Relations against the European Debt Crisis” in *People’s Daily* (28 November, 2012).

³ Gong Ting, “‘One Belt One Road’: Responses of the Press and Public Opinions of the International Community and Policy Advice”, *External Communication*, 3 (2015); “Leading not Directing: China leads the Era of ‘Win-Win’ Pattern”, Overseas Edition of *People’s Daily* (22 June 2015).

⁴ Chuanying Lu, “How Should China Respond to the European Debt Crisis?” in *Jiafang Daily* (10 November 2011).

⁵ Haibing Zhang, “New Trends of Global Economic Governance from the Perspective of the European Debt Crisis” in *European Studies* (April 2013).

⁶ Haibing Zhang, “‘One Belt One Road Blueprint and Action’ Indicates China’s Grand Measure for Its Opening Strategy”, SIIS (30 March 2015), see: <http://www.siis.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=22&id=617>; Yingzhong Jin, “‘One Belt One Road’ is the Common Development Strategy for Europe, Asia and Africa”, in *Global Review* (March/April 2015).

⁷ Jiabao Wen, “China has been Prepared to Increase its Intensity to Participate into the Effort to Resolve the European Debt Crisis” (14 February 2012), see: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-02-14/220923933304.shtml>

⁸ E.U.-China Summit Joint-Statement of the 16th E.U.-China Summit: “E.U.-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation”, see: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20131123_en.htm

⁹ E.U. High Representative Federica Mogherini’s Joint-Press Point with Chinese State Councillor YANG Jiechi, Beijing (5 May 2015), see: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150505_01_en.htm; E.U.-China Summit Joint-Statement: “The Way Forward after Forty Years of E.U.-China Cooperation” (Brussels: 29 June 2015), see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/06/29/>

crisis. This demonstrates the close ties between CIIS and the MFA system. As the resources for policy-related researches flow from the MFA, the reports and papers produced by this project are inevitably submitted to and noticed by the top MFA leaders, although it is usually a long and perhaps slow process. Needless to say, through these projects, the CIIS has played an indispensable role in shaping the agenda-setting and option-making of MFA’s policy formulation both during and after the European debt crisis. Through MFA’s organizational mechanisms, the research achievements of these four projects conducted by CIIS may have some influence on China’s top leadership (see Table 5 below).

**Table 5:
CIIS’ Major Research Projects on E.U.-China Relations**

Project Titles	Funding Source	Person in Charge of the Project	Funding Period	Form of Achievements
E.U.’s Adjustment of Its Africa Policy and Its Influence on China	China’s National Fund for Social Sciences	Jin Ling, Researcher of the European Studies Section	2008-2011	Papers published on CSSCI Journals
European Public Opinion towards China	China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs	CUI Hongjian, Head of the European Studies Section	2010-2011	Special Reports
E.U. Reform against Its Debt Crisis	China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Jin Ling, Researcher of the European Studies Section	2011-2012	Published Papers and Special Reports
Post-Crisis Public Debt Issues of Developed Countries	China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs	HU Dawei, Researchers in the European Studies Section	2011-now	Special Reports and printed Papers

IV-3. CIIS’ vs. SIIS’ Short-Term & Direct Influence: High-level Forums, Symposia & Small-Scale Bilateral Meetings

In Table 3, the high level forums and symposia that are attended by policy-makers are listed as Chinese think tanks’ methods to put forward short-term and direct policy influence. In practice, some high level forums and symposia have been turned into fairly regular or institutionalized mechanisms to link themselves with top leadership. Even for China’s elite foreign policy research institutes, such as the CIIS and SIIS, which enjoy some non-open regular channels to submit their policy analytical achievements to and get research commissions from top foreign policy-makers, the high-level forums and symposia are still important because they are the major carriers and embodiments of China’s public diplomacy or “Track-II Diplomacy”. In recent years, Chinese leaders have come to realize that it is far more efficient to transmit diplomatic signals or collect policy-related information through the occasions of “Track-II Diplomacy” than through official and formal diplomatic channels, particularly on some highly confrontational and controversial issues. As Table 6 below indicates, CIIS and SIIS operate a series of institutionalized and regular high level forums and symposia for academic, diplomatic, economic and political exchanges between Chinese institutions and their European counterparts, which have become major and semi-official connecting channels between China and Europe.

Particularly, the majority of these forums and symposia are jointly organized with elite European think tanks and government institutions, so they become important channels to understand the politics, policy trends and perceptions of the E.U. and its member states. It is because of this that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental institutions are actively involved as well. In these forums and symposia, CIIS and SIIS experts provide interpretations of European experts’ and officials’ speeches, statements and remarks. Consequently, interpretations by CIIS and SIIS experts will become a key source of information for China’s top foreign policy-makers.

**Table 6:
CIIS' and SIIS' Institutionalized High Level China-Europe Forums and Symposia**

Items Titles	Regularity	Chinese Organizers	European Joint Organizers	Chinese Government Participants and Supporters
Symposium on “Sino-E.U. Relations and the Taiwan Question”	Annual	SIIS	FES, SWP ¹	MFA, Taiwan Affairs Offices of the State Council and Provincial Governments
Stockholm China Forum	Every Half a Year	SIIS, CIIS	Swedish Foreign Ministry, USGMF ²	MFA, PLA Officers from Military academy and Institutes
High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks from China and Central-East European Countries	Annual	SIIS, CIIS, CFISS ³	Central-East European Political Leaders	MFA, Ministry of Commerce, China’s Semi-Official Business Interest Groups
China-France Roundtable	Annual	CIIS	Victor Segalen Foundation	MFA
China-Europe Think Tanks Roundtable	Annual	CIIS	EPC, E.U.-Asia Centre, KAS ⁴	MFA
Workshop for European Diplomats	Annual	CIIS	None	MFA, Provincial Governments
NATO Studies Project Team Field-Research Meetings	Annual	CIIS	European Think Tanks	Chinese Military Establishments

Regular high-level forums and symposia always attract the media spotlight and most attention from the general public. But in the normal practices of think tanks, it is the small-scale bilateral meetings with policy-makers and politicians, particularly internal bilateral policy briefings with key decision-makers, which can exert the most direct and most substantial influence over policy-making. The number, frequency and bureaucratic level of these small-scale bilateral meetings by a think tank within a certain timeframe can reveal the true importance of that think tank in the policy community and the real degree of its policy influence. The open records of CIIS activities do not keep a close track of these meetings, but the SIIS’ publicized information about their own bilateral meetings are detailed and explicit.

Based on that information, Table 7 below lists the bilateral small-scale meetings of SIIS in a descending order of these meetings’ policy influence level. It reveals the daily structural links of SIIS with China’s political system and administrative bureaucracy, and displays the specific position of SIIS in China’s foreign policy-making towards Europe.

¹ FES refers to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, while SWP refers to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
² USGMF refers to the U.S. German Marshall Foundation.
³ CFIS refers to the China Foundation for International Studies, an elite Chinese think tank closely connected to China’s military establishment.
⁴ KAS refers to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Table 7:
Small-Scale Bilateral Meetings by SIIS during September 2014-September 2015

Types of Small-Scale Bilateral Meetings by SIIS	Number
Bilateral Meetings with Central-Level Chinese Officials Outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Institutions of CCP's Central Committee and State Council)	9
Bilateral Meetings with Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) ¹	9
Bilateral Meetings with China's Military Officers	2
Bilateral Meetings with Officials of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and Government	13
Bilateral Meetings with Other Provincial-Level Party and Government Officials	2
Bilateral Meetings with Chinese Domestic Business Circle (Chamber of Commerce, Trade Associations, Corporations)	4
Bilateral Meetings with Other Chinese Think Tanks and Universities	10
Bilateral Meetings with Delegates from the E.U. and Its Member States	14
Bilateral Meetings with Diplomats of the E.U. and Its Member States stationed in China	10
Bilateral Meetings with Scholars of European Think Tanks and Universities	17

Source of Data: Calculation by the author himself based on interviews and information on SIIS official website.

IV-4. CIIS' and SIIS' Long-Term and Direct Influence: the "Revolving Door" Mechanism

As early as 2002, some experts of Chinese studies already noticed that there existed a Chinese "revolving door" mechanism between diplomats and élite think tank researchers.² Nevertheless, the continuing prevalent vertical compartmentalization of China's bureaucratic hierarchy determines that the personnel exchanges between specific Chinese foreign policy research institutes and China's huge and complex bureaucratic policy-making systems are concentrated in very narrow sectors. In other words, "the revolving door" of European and U.S. think tanks may open in several directions rotationally or even simultaneously, whereas "the revolving door" of Chinese foreign policy think tanks only opens in a single direction most of the time. Tables 8 and 9 present a full list of the institutions of China's formal bureaucratic system, where executives and researchers of CIIS and SIIS worked in the past, or hold concurrent posts at present.

The total number of the executives and researchers at CIIS is 85, including 20 formal senior professional "researchers", 23 associate researchers, 32 assistant researchers and 10 research assistants. Just as Table 8 shows, the three largest sources of past work experience or present concurrent part-time posts are: the system of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), other Chinese think tanks and international organizations. The system of MFA occupies a very outstanding position in the "revolving door" mechanism and overall external personnel connections of CIIS, with 41.2% of its team of experts coming from or holding concurrent posts in it. The CIIS has an especially-invited senior advisory board of around 11 advisors, all of whom are retired ambassadors from the MFA.

Therefore, nearly half of the total researchers of CIIS are closely associated with the MFA system. Specifically, 9 of the 12 experts of the European studies section of CIIS, in other words, three-fourth of the total experts of this section, have experiences of working as diplomats for the MFA. On some occasions, CIIS may present itself as a separate and independent policy research institute, but in the bureaucratic organizational chart of the State Council, the CIIS is a subsidiary institution of the MFA and enjoys the bureaucratic rank of "bureau". The data in Table 8 below largely confirms this point.

¹ Among these nine meetings, three were meetings with important MFA officials in charge of European affairs.

² H. Li, "The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy", *ibid*, p. 33-43.

Table 8:
“Revolving Door” Mechanism for CIIS: Official Institutions of China’s Bureaucratic System that Provide Past Work or Present Concurrent Posts to Employees of CIIS

Types and Numbers of Employees Institutions offering past work or present concurrent posts	Executives	Researchers		Associate and Assistant Researchers		Percent of CIIS Total
		Total	Specialized in European Studies	Total	Specialized in European Studies	
Institutions of CCP’s Central Committee		1				1.2%
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	5	10	3	20	6	41.2%
Other Ministry Level Institutions of China’s State Council	1					1.1%
China’s Military System		1		1		2.3%
State-owned Corporations & Banks				1		1.2%
Chinese Media	2			1		3.5%
Other Chinese Think Tanks		2		10	4	14.1%
Chinese Universities				1	1	1.2%
International Organizations (U.N., IMF, World Bank)	1	3	2	3		8.2%

Source of Data: Calculation by the author himself based on interviews and information on CIIS official website.

Thus, the most institutionalized and reliable channel for CIIS to influence the top level foreign policy decision-makers is its close and complex connections to the MFA, and leaders of MFA are the major targets of its influence on specific foreign policy issues, particularly on China’s policy towards Europe. On the other hand, the Table 8 also reveals that the CIIS as a central-level elite think tank has very weak connections to universities, confirming the rather peripheral position of universities within China’s policy advice system. Nor does the CIIS have substantial links with the Party’s Central Committee, or the military establishment, or the systems of other ministries of China’s State Council, depicting the continuity of the “Stove-Piping” bureaucratic structure, a prominent feature of Leninist political power structure.

Table 9 below shows that the story about SIIS is somewhat different from that of CIIS. Just like any institution within the system of a Province-level government, the SIIS is actually under a “dual leadership” (or *shuangchong lingdao* in Chinese). Specifically, it is under both the direct control of the Shanghai Municipal Government for financing and personnel appointments (termed as “horizontal leadership” in Chinese bureaucratic jargon) and the strong guidance of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on its professional work (termed as “vertical leadership” in Chinese bureaucratic jargon). In the bureaucratic organizational chart, SIIS is both a subsidiary of the Shanghai Municipal Government with the administrative bureaucratic rank of “bureau” and a knot on a line extending from the top-level pivotal juncture of the MFA in Beijing.¹

¹ The bureaucrats in charge of practical work in provincial-level governments know this “dual leadership” far too well. But it is astonishing that most of the academic works on China’s bureaucratic system, English or Chinese, do not mention this point. As a rarity, John Bryan Starr mentioned this point explicitly and termed it as a “power gird”. His description can be found in: John Bryan Starr, *Understanding China: a Guide to China’s Economy, History and Political Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York: Hill & Wang, 2010), p. 60.

**Table 9:
“Revolving Door” Mechanism for SIIS: Official Institutions of China’s Bureaucratic System that Provide Past Work or Present Concurrent Posts to Employees of SIIS**

Types and Numbers of Employees Institutions offering past work or present concurrent posts	Executives	Researchers		Associate and Assistant Researchers		Percent of SIIS Total
		Total	Specialized in European Studies	Total	Specialized in European Studies	
Institutions of CCP’s Central Committee		1				1.4%
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	2	3				6.76%
Other Ministry Level Institutions of China’s State Council	1					1.35%
Shanghai Municipal Government	1	4	1	5	2	13.5%
China’s Military System		1				1.35%
International Organizations (U.N., IMF, World Bank)		2				2.7%
Chinese Media		1	1	2		4.1%
Other Chinese Think Tanks		4	3	1		6.76%
Chinese Universities		4	2	3		9.5%

Source of Data: Calculation by the author himself based on interviews and information on SIIS official website.

Under such circumstances, it is inevitable and understandable that the Shanghai Municipal Government and the MFA in Beijing rank as the first and second source of working experience and concurrent posts respectively for SIIS experts. SIIS researchers are regularly dispatched to some full-time posts of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Shanghai Municipal Government for a period of one to two years. And a more detailed survey reveals that SIIS researchers who worked for the MFA in the past are mostly senior ones, while those with working experience for the Foreign Affairs Office of the Shanghai Municipal Government are from the younger generation.

This means that the “revolving door” between SIIS and the MFA has become narrower in recent years for young researchers. The SIIS connections with universities are much stronger than those of CIIS. Furthermore, at least one-third of all SIIS researchers do not have past working experience, or present concurrent posts in any other institution of the Chinese bureaucratic system. These two points can be interpreted as an indication that SIIS is more oriented towards long-term specialized academic research. But they also mean that SIIS holds a relatively more peripheral position in China’s foreign policy decision-making system than CIIS.

V. Conclusions

Scholars have attempted to adopted several theoretical paradigms to elaborate the role of think tanks in policy-making and their relations with the overall political system. The following three sets of theoretical paradigms are most frequently used or quoted by scholars:

1) *Élitism vs. Pluralism*. Scholars have used elitism as a framework to emphasize that think tanks, particularly foreign policy research institutes, are especially professional in policy research and highly capable of offering effective advice, so they are included in the most inner circle of policy decision-making

as part of the ruling élites.¹ Whereas scholars who use the pluralist approach noticed the complexity of the policy process and the multiple forces that shape the Chinese policy-makers' perceptions and affect the agenda-setting. Furthermore, the Chinese foreign policy think tanks' unique position in its political system is conceptualized into the theoretic framework of "pluralized élitism" by LIAO Xuanli.²

2) *The Network, System, or Institutional Paradigms.*³ Élitist or Pluralist approaches may be able to offer an overall understanding framework, but they are unable to display the details of the interactive relations of various forces in the policy process, or the links and channels through which think tanks may exert their influence. Therefore, the term of "epistemic community" invented by Peter Hass became a frequently quoted term in the researches of think tanks' policy influence. Starting out this concept and similar concepts such as "policy network", "policy community" or "advocacy coalition", scholars are able to construct a clearer picture.

3) *"Social Space" and "Field of Power" Paradigm.* Based on Pierre Bourdieu's term of "social space" that converge different social forces in the evolution of the political system, Thomas Medvetz argued that think tanks can be viewed as a central space in the center of a society that is overlapped by four fields of power: the political and bureaucratic field, the economic field, the cultural production field and the media field.⁴ The methods and frequencies of think tanks' contacts with these four fields of power determine their role and position in the policy-making system.

After analyzing the Chinese think tank system and evaluating the influence of foreign policy research institutes on China's foreign policy making, **this third paradigm might be particularly useful** to theorize and summarize this issue. Concepts as "élitism", "pluralism", or "epistemic community" are derived from typical liberal democratic systems, like those of the U.S. and Great Britain, while China remains an authoritarian and unitary state with its civil society still not grown out of its embryo. More specifically, the political activities that are summarized by Western political scientists through terms such as "policy debates" or "interest representation" are either non-existent, or confined within a very small and non-open circle in China. Whereas the paradigm that defines think tank as the central space of the four major "fields of power", can capture some common features in any social and political system.

The analyses of this paper depict the position of Chinese foreign policy research institutes within China's overall think tank system, with Table 1 showing that, among the five major categories of Chinese think tanks, the foreign policy research institutes rank second in terms of their proximity to the center of political power and key policy-makers. A more specific analysis of two of the most élite foreign policy research institutes, the Central-level China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the Province-level Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), *reveal several salient features of these two institutes as part of the central space in the four major fields of power inside China's social and political system:*

¹ G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America? Power, Policy and Social Change* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2006); Laurence H. Shoup & William Minter, *Imperial Rain Trust: the Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977); Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Steven Lukes, *Power: a Radical View*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2004); Frank Fischer, *Technocracy and the Politics of Experience* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990); David B. Truman, *Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

² Xuanli Liao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006), p. 3-7.

³ Thomas Teichler, "Think Tanks as an Epistemic Community: the Case of European Armaments Cooperation", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 2007); Peter M. Hass, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" *International Organization*, vol. 46, No.1 (Winter 1992), p. 1-35; Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications", in Paul A. Sabatier, *Theories of the Policy Process* (London: Westview Press, 2007); R.A.W. Rhodes, *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability* (Buckingham: Open University Press); M. J. Smith, "From Policy Community to Issue Networks: Salmonella in Eggs and the New Politics of Food" in *Public Administration*, 69 (Summer), p.234-255.

⁴ Thomas Medvetz, *Think Tanks in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

1) After comparing the publications of their policy researches and records of the new points of Chinese top leaders' policy initiatives, it can be safely concluded that they both play a role in shaping the opinions and attitudes of Chinese top political leaders in their formulations of China's policy towards Europe. Interpreting this feature through the analytical frame of the "central space in the fields of power" paradigm, it can be concluded that both the CIIS and SIIS form an integral part of this "central space" that strongly affects the surrounding "fields of power".

2) A further survey of the meetings and symposiums of the CIIS and SIIS reveals that these two institutes are not located right at the geometrical center of the general system of the four major "fields of power". In other words, as part of the "central space", they are not at an equal distance from these "fields". Apparently they are both closest to the "political and bureaucratic field" and most distant from the "economic field". As a matter of fact, for lack of open and regular mechanism of interest representation and policy debates, the various social and business interest groups in China cannot rely on think tanks as an effective channel to convey to the top-level political leadership their demands and appeals on foreign policy issues. Indeed, Chinese think tanks do not have the capacity to conduct any policy advocacy.

3) The CIIS has stronger and closer connections to the top-level of political power in China compared to the SIIS. At the same time, Table 8 and 9, as well as other records, demonstrate that the CIIS is more substantially linked to the "media field", but much less connected to the "cultural production field" than SIIS. More specifically, compared to SIIS, the CIIS enjoys much stronger connections to the most inner circle of China's political power and has more media exposure, but has much weaker connections to national universities. These features not only reflect the relative marginal position of Chinese universities in the country's political and policy-making system, but also disclose the political power dominance over the media in China.

Generally speaking, elite foreign policy research institutes in China, such as the CIIS and SIIS, have dramatically uplifted their relative position and strengthened their importance in China's foreign policy-making system, particularly since the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, on pace with the waves of overseas investments by Chinese businesses propelled by the "going abroad" strategy of the Chinese government since 1999-2000. In the most recent global think tank ranking lists issued on 4 February 2015 by the "Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program" of the University of Pennsylvania, the CIIS and SIIS rank as 33rd and 64th respectively in the list of the "Top 100 Non-U.S. Think Tanks Worldwide". However, both the roles and positions of Chinese think tanks in the country's political and bureaucratic system, and the mutual relations between the different categories of think tanks, remain insufficiently researched both inside and outside China.

Therefore, more efforts in this research field will be meaningful and enlightening.

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Contemporary Praetorians in the Middle East: Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia's National Guard

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ABSTRACT: This paper compares two rival para-military forces, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or *Pasdaran*) and Saudi Arabia's National Guard (SANG). In both countries these armed formations exist parallel to their regular armies, performing similar tasks ensuring the security of their states, but are not part of their national military chains-of-command. Next to their formal duties as a branch of the armed forces, they both play also a crucial role in securing their respective political régimes own interests and safety from any internal or external threat. This essay analyzes the historical background of both forces, their formal roles and duties, as well as their military strength, potential and capabilities. As ideological paramilitary guards, the IRGC serves Iran's Shi'a clerics theocratic régime and the SANG the Saudi Royal theocracy, enjoying special privileges, which allowed them to gather much more power and influence than originally intended. This comparative study also investigates the informal influences of both paramilitary services in politics, economy, society and foreign affairs to assess their real power in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

1. Historical Background of Iran's IRGC and Saudi Arabia's SANG

a) Rise and Development of the IRGC

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or *Pasdaran*) was created on 5 May 1979 by a decree of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as a paramilitary formation to protect the Islamic revolution in Iran, fight its enemies and secure its religious-ideological achievements. Another goal was to subordinate under the IRGC joint command many different Shi'a revolutionary armed groups in order to restrict their lawlessness and freedom of action. Since then, however, the *Pasdaran* experienced numerous changes to become not only the most important armed formation in contemporary Iran, but also a powerful religious-ideological force with multi-dimensional influence on Iranian society, economy and politics. Formally, it is still an institution which protects the Islamic character of the state and its theocratic politico-religious system from any external and internal threat. There is no doubt, however, that today's importance and role of the *Pasdaran* far exceeds the original purpose envisaged by the Grand-Ayatollah Khomeini.

The former's full name of the organization is *Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi* (Persian: سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی), which literally means Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. In the literature, its more commonly used name is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), while in Iran it is more popular to use its various shortened names: *Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e* (Corps of Guardians), *Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb-e* (Guardians of the Revolution), *Sepāh* (Corps), or more commonly *Pāsdārān* (Guardians). Next to the Iranian Army (*Artesh*) the IRGC constitutes the main part of Iranian armed forces. At the same time, besides the Supreme Leader of Iran (*Wilajet-e Fakih* or *Rahbar*), senior representatives of Shi'a clergy, the President and government, the IRGC is one of the key political actors in today's Iran.²

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² Ali Alfoneh, *Iran Unveiled. How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship* (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 2013), p. 79-128.

b) Origins and development of the SANG

The Saudi Arabian National Guard dates back to just after World War I, when Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, founder and first king of the Saudi Arabian state, lead his tribal Bedouin forces to the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula against his rival pro-British Hashemite King of Arabia, who had battled alongside British intelligence architect Lawrence of Arabia to secure in 1918 Arab independence from its Ottoman-Turkish overlords. Instead, the Saudi religious militia, the *Ikhwan* (Brethren) or also “White Army”, consisted of tribesmen loyal to both the House as-Saud and Wahhabi religious zealots, who played a key role in fighting against Ottoman-Turkish rule and then in the early-1920s civil war which overthrew the Hashemite Kingdom and established the rival Saudi one.

It was not, however, until 1954 when the *Ikhwan* tribal militia serving under the office of *Jihad & Mujahidin* was renamed as *Al-Waṭanī al-Ḥaras as-Su’ūdīya al-‘Arabīyah* or Saudi Arabian National Guard (Arabic: العربية السعودية الحرس الوطني). A Saudi Royal decree regulated its duties and independent budget. It took still few more years before the SANG started to function as a regular armed force.¹ The Saudi National Guard owes its reform and modernization to Prince Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz (then King in 2005-2015), who took command of it since 1963. He started to attract more Bedouins into the SANG ranks by paying them a monthly salary to participate in exercises few days each month.² Although this alone could not turn the SANG into a truly competent military force, it did foster closer ties and increased loyalty of all local Bedouin tribes to the Saudi Royal family.

Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz led the Saudi National Guard for over 50 years, until May 2013 when he turned the SANG into a separate Ministry of National Guard and transferred command to his third son, Mutaib bin Abdullah. The real and rapid modernization of the force came since 1970, when the Oil Boom and Two Oil Shocks of 1973-74 and 1979 gave the country a windfall of immense financial resources. Thus, in 1973 Prince Abdullah signed an agreement with the U.S. Government, starting a multi-billion Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program. The Office of the Program Manager (OPM-SANG) was overviewed by the U.S. Army, while the program itself was sub-contracted to the private firm, Vinnell Corporation, as subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corporation³. This American assistance allowed the SANG to develop over the next several years into a respectable military force and to start playing an important role in both the security and politics in Saudi Arabia.

2. Formal Roles and Duties

a) IRGC under Iran’s Legal System and Formal Role

The *Pasdarān* (IRGC) is one of few services responsible for the security of Iran’s Revolutionary State, with outlined, but not specified competencies (other main institutions include the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Army, Navy, Air Force, Ministry of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior and Law Enforcement Forces). The Commander-in-Chief of all Iranian armed forces is the Supreme Leader (currently the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). The Iranian armed forces have, since the Islamic Revolution, a dual structure that consist of both the regular Army (*Artesh*) and IRGC (*Pasdarān*). The Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics formally controls both the *Artesh* and *Pasdarān* in organizational matters (planning, finances, logistic). In operational activities competencies belong to the Armed Forces General Command Headquarters⁴. The main task of the Army is to defend the independence and

¹ “History of the Saudi National Guard” in: *Asharq Al-Awsat* (11 September 2006), available at: <http://english.aawsat.com/2006/09/article55265322> (14 June 2016).

² Sarah Yizraeli, *Politics and Society in Saudi Arabia: the Crucial Years of Development, 1960-1982* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 176-177 & 294.

³ Anthony Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia. National Security in a Troubled Region* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009), p. 175-176.

⁴ Steven Ward, *Immortal. A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), p.299-329.

territorial integrity of the country, and the domestic order of the Islamic Republic. The IRGC, according to the constitution, protects the Islamic Revolution and its achievements.¹

The Iranian Army, which during the previous reign of the Pahlavi dynasty was the pride and joy of the monarchy, but after the victory of the Islamic Revolution lost the trust of the new religious-political authorities of the Islamic Republic. Especially the officer corps was seen as a relic of the old régime as mainstay of loyalty to the Shah and a potential source of counter-revolution. The Grand Ayatollah Khomeini planned the complete dissolution for the Army, which, however, was stopped by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, when the army became once again indispensable to stop and reverse the invasion by Saddam Hussein's Iraq and deter any future aggression from western neighbors.² Today the old enmity and distrust between the Army and the religious leaders of the Iranian state belongs to the past, but the principle of non-interference of the Army in the internal affairs of the country is still strongly respected.

The opposite is true with the *Pasdaran* (IRGC). Being the guardian of the Islamic character and political system of the state, and protecting them against external and internal threats, the *Pasdaran* inevitably is a heavily politicized institution. Competencies of the Guard Corps are very broad, but also not fully defined: both the areas of internal and external security, guarding the Islamic Revolution at home with its achievements, spreading the Islamic Revolution abroad, defending the country against hostile forces, maintaining domestic order and security in the country, prosecuting counter-revolutionary elements, gathering intelligence, supporting other law enforcement institutions and providing assistance against natural disasters.³ The *Pasdaran* therefore, combines the competencies of the armed forces with those of the police, and at the same time it is also very closely linked to the official religious ideology of the state. This means that the *Pasdaran* is a specific politico-military structure, whose main task is to fight against all types of threats and opposition against Iran's politico-religious régime.⁴

Historical conditions and the specific structure of Iran's armed forces and institutions responsible for national security, cause the occurrence of a natural rivalry between individual services and paramilitary formations. This is particularly evident in relations between the Guard Corps and the Army. This rivalry already emerged during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War when *Pasdaran* units were assigned more prestigious tasks and also received the national praise as homeland defenders. Instead, Army troops performed the majority of the "donkey work" and despite the enormous sacrifice in soldiers and officers, the Army was often treated with suspicion.⁵ Despite the passage of decades the rivalry between the *Artesh* and *Pasdaran* continues, fueled partly by the religious authorities of the state, which have become totally dependent on the support of the IRGC, while still treating the Army with a certain level of distrust. As a result, the Guard Corps receive more and wider powers as well as the delivery of the latest, most advanced military equipment, while the Army's needs are satisfied only subsequently.⁶

b) SANG's Role in Saudi Arabia's Politics of Security

Saudi Arabia's armed forces also have a dual structure that consist of the regular Army and the National Guard (SANG). However, unlike Iran, in the rival Desert Kingdom this security duality is formalized and both military forces' chain-of-command is fully separated (besides of course the King, who remains the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces). Thus, the regular armed forces consist of the Royal Saudi

¹ *The Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution*, Articles 143-151, available at: <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html> (14 June 2016).

² S. Ward, op. cit., p. 242-298.

³ A. Alfoneh, op. cit., p. 17-19.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 79-128.

⁵ S. Ward, op. cit., p. 242-298.

⁶ International Institute for Security Studies, *Military Balance*, 2013 (London: IISS, 2013), p. 358-363, International Institute for Security Studies, *Military Balance*, 2016 (London: IISS, 2016), p. 307-309.

Land Force (RSLF), Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), Royal Saudi Navy (RSN) and Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF), which are all subject to the Ministry of Defense and Aviation.

Whereas the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) is under the separate Ministry of National Guard, with its Commander holding the rank of Minister, a separate chain-of-command, budget and communication network. Other elements of Saudi Arabian security apparatus are the General Intelligence Presidency (reporting directly to the King), Royal Guard (protecting the King and reporting directly to him, despite once being part of the SANG) and various forces under the Ministry of Interior, including regular Police forces, General Directorate of Intelligence (domestic intelligence), border and coastal guards, Facility Security Force (protects oil infrastructure), Special Emergency Force and Special Security Force (anti-terrorism and riot-control units), as well as the Al-Haya (religious police).¹

The SANG had been originally established in troublesome times, when Saudi Arabia was torn by internal unrest and disputes for power between different factions of the Royal family.² Thus, an important part of its original mission was to protect the reigning Monarch, counter-balance the influence of other armed forces and security services, as well as thwart any coup attempts. Most of those tasks remain valid today: maintaining security and stability in the Kingdom, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency operations, defending key facilities (oil, ports, religious, etc.), border protection, military operations, as well as protection of the King and members of the Royal family.³ It is easy to see, that most of these tasks overlap with the tasks of other national security services and military units.

More recently, the SANG has increasingly been involved in military operations abroad (intervention in Bahrain in 2011 as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council/GCC Screening Shield forces; involvement in Yemen's Civil War since 2015 as part of operations "Decisive Storm" and "Restoring Hope"). The use of SANG units, instead of the regular Royal Saudi Land Force (RSLF), in this important and prestigious operations may indicate, that the role of the National Guard is increasing at the expense of the national Army (RSLF). It can also mean that the authorities of the Saudi Kingdom recognize the Guards as a more competent armed force than its regular Army.

As the tasks and competencies of the Saudi National Guard are not precisely defined, it possesses a great freedom of action, which may be both an advantage and disadvantage. On the one hand, it may allow the SANG to supplement gaps in the security system and work where it is most needed and effective. On the other hand, however, it may cause conflicts of competence with other security structures, introduce confusion and lead to damaging internal rivalries between different services. The role and importance of the National Guard rose undoubtedly during the 20 years of the reign of Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz as King of Saudi Arabia (indeed, as Crown Prince he *de facto* ruled the country since 1995, when then-King Fahd incapacitated by a stroke, and formally ascended the throne after his death in 2005).

With the death of Saudi King Abdullah in January 2015, the SANG lost its creator and most ardent promoter, but before his death, Abdullah secured the interests of the SANG by raising its rank to Ministerial level and entrusting its command to his son Mutaib. So far it seems that the Saudi National Guard enjoys full trust and support from the present King Salman ibn Abdul Aziz. However, the fact that the SANG was a structure so strongly associated with one man as past King, and so heavily dependent on his vision, decisions and support, may become a source of future problems under different less-sympathetic Monarchs, unless the regional tensions with enemy Islamic Iran and combat in Yemen require long-term reliance on the SANG as national protector.

¹ A. Cordesman, op. cit., p. 117-127.

² S. Yizraeli, op. cit., p. 180-186.

³ A. Cordesman, op. cit., p. 176.

3. Military Strength, Potential and Capabilities

a) Strengths and Weaknesses of IRGC

The IRGC military structure itself is quite complicated. The *Pasdaran* Ground Forces since the reform in 2008 have a territorial organization. They are composed of 31 provincial corps HQ (two in Teheran and one in each of 29 Iranian provinces), commanding 2 armored divisions and 3 armored brigades, 8 light divisions and 5 light brigades, plus 1 airborne brigade. These paramilitary units are not fully manned in peacetime and have a character as light-maneuver units, and as such is not supposed to have heavy equipment. The recent appearance of armored divisional and brigade HQs suggest, however that this is subject to change based on the worsening regional security situation.¹ Nevertheless, in the case of an armed conflict, the SANG main task remains to wage mostly asymmetric warfare. Thus, it is mainly equipped with large number of light and portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, as well as armored infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers of various types, to ensure mobility.

The number of soldiers in Iran's *Pasdaran* (IRGC) is estimated at 100,000 and is significantly smaller than the Iranian Army, which has 350,000 soldiers (130,000 professional soldiers plus 220,000 conscripts). Additionally, the Commander of IRGC Ground Forces supervises the *Basij* paramilitary organization (*Sâzmân-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin*, or Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed). Each provincial HQ commands 10 *Basij* battalions, though due to their limited training and problems with recruiting new members, the *Basij* military capability remains questionable.² A separate squad of *Pasdaran* Ground Force is the so-called *Quds* Force—special forces numbering around 15,000 soldiers, whose task is to carry out special operations outside Iran³. The activities of these force arouse great controversy, as they are accused of carrying out terrorist attacks, targeted killings of political opponents, as well as logistical and training support for different armed factions and terrorist groups in the Middle East (including the Lebanese *Hezbollah*, Palestinian *Hamas*, *Houthi* forces in Yemen, Basher al-Assad loyalists in Syria and Shi'a militias supporting the Iraqi government).

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces, like its Ground Forces, are designed to wage asymmetric warfare, rather than classic naval combat in open seas. Hence, they are equipped with mostly small coastal defense ships and patrol boats with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, as well as midget submarines. In 2007 the Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decreed that IRGC Naval Forces and regular Iranian Navy be divided geographically in areas of operations: IRGC Naval Forces operate in the whole Persian Gulf, while the Iranian Navy patrols in the lower Caspian Sea and open-sea naval operations beyond the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy has 20,000 men (including a brigade of Marines).

Finally, Iran's IRGC Air Forces have two primary roles. The first one is air-combat support for ground forces and to this end, they operate an unknown number of attack helicopters, airplanes and drones (UAVs).⁴ The second one is a strategic defense of Iran and the IRGC Air Forces have full responsibility of Iranian strategic missile force with medium-range ballistic missiles (*Shahab-3/Ghadr-1* and *Sajjil-2*), short-range ballistic missiles (*Fatah-110* and *Shahab-1/2*) and newly-developed medium-range cruise missiles (*SoumarII*).⁵

¹ International Institute for Security Studies, *Military Balance, 2015* (London: IISS, 2015), p. 327; *Military Balance 2016*, p. 328.

² *Military Balance 2016*, p. 328-330.

³ Anthony Cordesman & Khalid al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, Volume 1 (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 2007), p. 337.

⁴ Previously some sources claimed, that IRGC Air Forces were not comparable to a regular air force nor operated any aircraft, but only controlled Iran's strategic missile force. However, recent reports from the IRGC state otherwise: "Iran's Army Ground Force Unveils New Achievements" in *Kayhan* (14 April 2016), see <http://kayhan.ir/en/news/25578/iran%E2%80%99s-army-ground-force-unveils-new-achievements>

⁵ *Military Balance 2016*, p. 327-330.

b) Strengths and Weaknesses of the SANG

The Saudi Arabian National Guard forces consist of regular, full-time guards, as well as units of tribal levies, known as *Fouj*, but those two forces differ significantly when it comes to their level of training and fighting capabilities. SANG regular forces are organized into 4 mechanized brigades (each consisting of 3 mechanized infantry battalions, 1 self-propelled artillery battalion, 1 reconnaissance company, 1 combat engineer company, 1 signals company and 1 logistic battalion) and 5 light infantry brigades (each with 3 combined arms battalions, 1 artillery battalion, 1 logistic battalion), which constitute its main fighting force. It also has one Military Police battalion and one ceremonial cavalry squadron.¹ The SANG's National Headquarter is in Riyadh with two regional headquarters: Eastern HQ in Dammam and Western HQ in Jeddah. Under the direct control of the National Headquarter are 3 mechanized brigades, one light infantry brigade, military police battalion, ceremonial cavalry squadron, as well as the King Khalid Military College. Eastern Headquarter controls one mechanized brigade and one light infantry brigade, while Western Headquarter has three light infantry brigades under its command. Each regional headquarters also formally controls *Fouj* units in its area of responsibility. These units resemble XIX Century tribal militia, have little or no regular military training, are inactive most of the time and many tribesmen are on the roster only because of its social benefits (e.g. healthcare) provided to them by the SANG.² This stays in a sharp contrast to the well-trained, equipped and organized regular SANG forces.

The SANG regular forces number 75,000 while the *Fouj* tribal levies are around 25,000. The manpower of the National Guard, excluding the tribal levies, equals those of the Saudi Arabian Land Forces also assessed at 75,000 soldiers. Unlike Saudi Land Forces equipped with heavy armored and mechanized brigades (armed with tanks and tracked armored fighting vehicles), the SANG prefers lighter, wheeled fighting vehicles, giving them better mobility and maneuverability. This fits well with the role the National Guard plays in Saudi Arabian security system as a mobile, multi-role, fast-striking, versatile force, which can be used against any internal or external foe that the king declares a threat. Thus, their main combat equipment is the LAV wheeled armored fighting vehicles, a licensed version of the Swiss MOWAG Piranha produced by General Dynamics Land Systems Canada. The Saudi National Guard has 1450 LAVs in various versions, including armed with 90mm and 25mm guns, command vehicles, anti-tank, mortar turrets, combat recovery vehicles and others. In 2014, the SANG signed a multi-billion contract for an unknown number of new LAV AFVs. Some SANG units are still equipped with older V-150 Commando armored fighting vehicles, which are slowly been withdrawn from service and put into storage. Artillery support is provided by French made 155mm. CAESAR self-propelled guns and a number of towed guns and mortars, as well as their own anti-tank and air defense systems. Unlike Iran's IRGC, the SANG does not have its own independent naval or air component. The latter may however soon change, as the recent purchases for the Saudi National Guard include a number of AH-64E Apache Guardian attack-helicopters and AH-6i Little Bird multi-role light-helicopters.³

Four decades of strict cooperation with U.S. Army and Vinnell Corporation has made the SANG a modern, well-trained, well-armed and equipped fighting force. Combined with high loyalty and reliability, this makes the Saudi National Guard a formidable fighting force and the backbone of Saudi national security system. The SANG however, still has some serious problems and deficiencies that reduce its combat value. One of the most important is the questionable quality of command and poor level of training of officers.⁴ The officer corps also consist in a large part of senior commanders of the older generation, who are often neither able to change their way of thinking of military matters, nor adapt to the needs of the modern field of battle. At the same time, they are politically-important Tribal leaders and

¹ *Military Balance 2016*, p. 352-353.

² A. Cordesman, op. cit., p. 177-180.

³ *Military Balance 2016*, p. 353, 364.

⁴ Personal interviews with military officials speaking on the condition of anonymity, made by author during his stay in Amman, Jordan, April 2015.

their removal from the Saudi National Guard rolls could undermine the loyalty of their tribes. Another constant problem is the integration of command and communication system, as well as improved cooperation between the Saudi National Guard and other national armed forces.¹ Given the growing activity of the SANG in out-of-area operations and the fact that in terms of transport on longer distances, it has to rely on the Saudi Air Force and Navy, this could adversely affect its force deployment ability.

4. Informal Political, Economic and Societal Influences

a) Informal Role of IRGC in Iranian Politics, Economy and Society

The huge and ever-growing influence of the *Pasdaran* (IRGC) in Iran are extended in a rather informal way throughout society, due to the formal acquisition of new competencies. They focus mainly on three interrelated areas: society, economy and politics. Thanks to the carefully nurtured myth of the *Pasdaran's* blood sacrifice during 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and the role they played in the subsequent reconstruction of the country from the war damages, the *Pasdaran* enjoys genuine support among a large part of the population of Iran, especially in the more traditional countryside. It is also there, that the *Basij* organization has its own greatest influence, with the task to train society to defend the country in case of foreign invasion and form a mass popular militia, able to conduct extensive guerrilla warfare.²

Today the *Basij* has become more than a paramilitary Shi'a organization supporting the *Pasdaran*. Its main tasks include also ideological indoctrination in the sphere of public education to foster the religious fundamentalist spirit of the Islamic Revolution, filling in the security gaps where other services are not able to provide it, preserving revolutionary vigilance and exposing all forms of political opposition. Theoretically, the *Basij* is still a paramilitary organization with a mass membership officially declared over 12 million. However, it appears to most observers that the *Basij* revolutionary zeal had long since died-off and its influence as an organization is also shrinking. More and more Iranians join the *Basij*, not out of ideological motivation, but for purely economic reasons since membership gives them access to various social assistance and profits—loans, scholarships, university grants, discounts on fuel, etc.³

To maintain and improve its image and influence, the *Pasdaran* is also trying as much as possible to control the educational system and media. The IRGC has, among other things, its own educational centers, which work on ideological, political and religious indoctrination of both their own *Pasdaran* members and *Basij* alike. In addition, through their influence in the ministries responsible for education and directly at universities, the *Pasdaran* try to influence the curricula and educational programs.⁴ Equally important for maintaining and expanding IRGC influence in Iranian society is its control over the media. Both the *Pasdaran* and *Basij* have their own extensive network of websites and web-portals. They control a significant part of the Iranian press market, and their flagship titles are published in Persian, English and Arabic (*Kayhan* daily and weekly *Sobh-e Sadeh*). For many years, ex-IRGC officers occupied key positions in the Iranian state broadcaster IRIB, which broadcasts five national and several local programs, as well as the propaganda English-language news program *Press TV*. IRGC has also the capability to censor coverage in other Iranian media (especially the Internet) when it considers its content politically harmful to the régime.⁵

Another very important IRGC sphere of influence is the Iranian economy. The beginnings of economic influence of the *Pasdaran* dates back to the end of Iran-Iraq War, when they established construction units to help reconstruction of war damage. In 1990, by decree of President Rafsanjani, these units were transformed into *Gharargah Sazandegi-je Khatam al-Anbia* (Construction Headquarters "Seal of the Prophet"), the company known today mostly as GHORB or Khatam al-Anbia.⁶ Since then the company has

¹ A. Cordesman, op. cit., p. 184-185.

² Frederic Wehrey, et al., *The Rise of Pasdaran. Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps* (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 25-29.

³ Ibidem, p. 28-29.

⁴ A. Alfoneh, op. cit., p. 150-160.

⁵ F. Wehrey, op. cit., p. 49-54.

⁶ Emanuele Ottolenghi, *The Pasdaran. Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps* (Washington, D.C.: F.D.D. Press, 2011), p. 42-43.

grown and expanded its range of activities, including energy, mining and many others. In subsequent years the IRGC created and acquired numerous other companies and firms from virtually all sectors of the economy, gradually taking control of a large part of Iran's defense industry, production of consumer goods, trade, construction, engineering, telecommunications, banking and financial sector, oil and gas, and even illegal activities and smuggling.¹ The Economic influence of the *Pasdaran* also extends to the social assistance sector through control of huge foundations (eg. *Bonyad-e Mostazafan* or *Bonyad-e Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan*), whose mission is to help the poor, victims, families of victims and war veterans.

Due to the complexity of public and private relationships and a huge number of economic agents and legal entities, it is extremely difficult to determine the exact value of economic resources of IRGC. However, according to various estimates the *Pasdaran* and its subordinate companies and institutions control between 25% and 40% of Iranian GDP². Commanders of the *Pasdaran* utilize available funds both to ensure an adequate standard of living for themselves and their trusted companions, as well as to "buy" loyalty of some politicians and decision-makers, who in turn ensure that the broad stream of public funds still flows to their principals in the IRGC. This leads to an increasing marginalization of the private sector and the development of corrupt state corporatism in the Iranian economy, a phenomenon well known in the Middle East for functioning in many authoritarian Presidential Republics. The long-term effects of this systemic corrupt system certainly cannot be positive for the country, its citizens and economy.

Such rapid and a significant increase in the economic power of the IRGC would not have been possible without direct political support. Particularly important here is the role of the *Pasdaran* as a kind of a breeding ground for human resources, which opens the way to many other career paths. As the ruling members of the Iranian Shi'a clergy are not competent in many areas of state governance, they often rely on outside help. In this regard, however, they have the actually trust only in the members of their "Praetorian Guard", the IRGC. As a result, many former officers of the *Pasdaran* become members of parliament, cabinet ministers, state and local administration officials, advisers and experts in governmental institutions, or managers in state companies, foundations and institutions³.

Such a bold and open involvement in politico-administrative positions of power by people related to the national military and paramilitary structures raises growing concerns and protests in Iran, both among civilians and clergy. This is also in a sharp contrast with the original views of the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini on the role of the IRGC, as he believed that the *Pasdaran* must remain a completely apolitical institution. His successor, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not having the authority enjoyed by the historical leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has relied on IRGC to a much greater extent to exercise his power nationwide.

In the first period after Khamenei became Supreme Leader, when the President was Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani (1987-1997), the political influences of the IRGC was still limited. They began to increase faster during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, whose reformist policies led as reaction to closer links between conservative factions: the Supreme Leader and IRGC. The largest increase in the political influence of the *Pasdaran* took place during the more recent Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013).⁴ Currently, President Hasan Rouhani so far strives to balance the influences of IRGC with other political alliances, the results of his policies are, however, yet to be seen.

b) Informal Influences of SANG in Saudi Arabia

¹ A. Alfoneh, op. cit., p. 165-190.

² E. Ottolenghi, op. cit., p. 43.

³ F. Wehrey, op. cit., p. 103-107.

⁴ Idem, p. 77-91.

The type of informal influence of the Saudi Arabian National Guard differs significantly from that of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While the IRGC as an institution rose to the position of an independent and powerful political actor in Iran, the SANG remains merely a tool, however powerful, in the hands of the key political actors of Saudi Arabia. As such, it may play a vital role in domestic politics and power struggles as already happened in late-1970 and 1980, when Prince Abdullah's control of the Saudi National Guard helped him to withstand pressure from King Fahd and a group of his full-brothers known as "Sudairi Seven", and thus keep the position of Crown Prince.¹ After the death of King Abdullah in 2015 and Grand Ayatollah the ascension to the throne of King Salman, one of the original "Sudairi Seven" brothers, the control of the SANG remained in the hands of Abdullah's own son, Mutaib, who had become its Commanded once Crown Prince Abdullah rose to the throne. The relationship between the various factions and members of the family of Saud, however, are far from friendly. In subsequent years, we may expect further struggles for power, plots, conspiracies and backroom deals. Control of the SANG can be an extremely important factor in this political puzzle. In this context, the very dislocation of the SANG units, unchanged from the days when then Prince Abdullah took over the command of it in 1960, is quite significant. Half of its forces, including 3 of 4 mechanized brigades, is stationed in and around the capital, Riyadh, being at any time ready to help the king. Or not...

The specific political culture of Saudi Arabia affects the functioning of institutions on all levels of political power, ranging from the Royal Family to the positions in the local administration. Cultural and fundamentalist religious values of Islam, compartmentalization and personalization of behaviours, a strong sense of honor and a high degree of ethno-centricity, all play a major role in shaping the political and institutional behaviors in Saudi Arabia. Combined with strong Tribal bonds and clan structures, which have not disappeared despite the slow modernization of society, it creates an extremely complex and difficult to manage mixture.² Also, the SANG remains an institution, where tribal affiliations still play a vital role in recruitment, as well as furthering careers and promotion opportunities. This definitely does not make a good model of national management, as individual family ties and tribal origin are often more important than actual skills and abilities.³ Thus, it is not unlikely, especially in the *Fouj* force that entire squads and units consist of cousins and close relatives.

Another important feature of the Saudi National Guard, which should not be underestimated, is its social role. Under Abdullah's command, the SANG became not only a competent and loyal military force, but also a center of social, infrastructural and educational development for Bedouin tribes. In fact, it seemed to be a mission of at least equal importance to him, to educate and improve living conditions of the tribes and he used his command of Saudi National Guard for this purpose.

As a result, the places of the stationing of SANG troops are much more than mere barracks. They are well planned and constructed living centers with numerous facilities and amenities, including houses, hospitals, schools, training centers, etc.⁴ The National Guard provides its soldiers and their families with healthcare, social benefits, living quarters, education, opportunities for cultural development and many other amenities. This on the other hand significantly improves the popular image of the SANG in Saudi society, which is seen as a trustworthy institution caring for its members. It also strengthens ties between the SANG as a paramilitary organization and its individual Guards, making them more loyal and dedicated to the service and its cause.

Conclusions

¹ May Yamani, "From Fragility to Stability: A Survival Strategy for the Saudi Monarchy" in *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, v.2, n.1 (2009): p. 90-105.

² Sebastian Maisel, "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" in Mark Gasiorowski, ed., *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2014), p. 107-113.

³ S. Yizraeli, op. cit., p. 294.

⁴ Robert Lacey, *Inside the Kingdom. Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 183-185.

The numerous military coups in the Middle East over the past decades prove that huge and well-developed national armed forces could be easily turned against their creators and used to defeat them, rather than to protect their power. The rulers being aware of this potential risk, use many different methods to help them maintain power. One such method by leaders in Iran and Saudi Arabia alike, is to create parallel fully armed paramilitary formations composed of people of unquestionable loyalty. Such solution allows them to check and balance the power of the regular military, giving them faithful and committed paramilitary armed forces of equal strength to the national army, which can be used both to deal with internal and external threats. Like the Ancient Roman Praetorian Guard, these IRGC and SANG forces are considered élite forces, with the possibility to enter the service only available to selected groups of people. But at the same time, and exactly as in the case of the Praetorians, their service is associated with high costs and brings to the country and their rulers new, often unaware threats. To constantly assure the trust and loyalty of their Guard units, Saudi Arabian and Iranian political leaders are forced to also cater to these paramilitary forces' particular needs and wishes, strengthening their position at the expense of the other armed formations and sometimes at the cost of limiting the scope of their own powers. This is particularly evident in the case of Iran, where the *Pasdarán* try to overwhelm the political system, which may potentially disrupt the balance of power in the country. The informal influence of the SANG is much smaller than its Iranian counterpart, and so far it has not yet grown into the role of an independent political actor. However, a combination of increasing military capabilities and military activities by the SANG, with the power-struggles within the Saudi Royal Family, as well as the potentially deteriorating economic situation of the Kingdom, may change this in the coming years.

These two rival paramilitary forces have very similar sets of tasks, which come down primarily to defend their régimes against all internal threats and to act as supports to the regular armies in the event of a full-scale war against foreign threats (Islamic Iran for Saudi Arabia vs. U.S.A. and Saudi Arabia for Islamic Iran). They are also increasingly entrusted, as the most loyal troops their régimes may rely upon, to perform important and responsible missions abroad. The formal tasks and competencies of both the IRGC and SANG are not strictly defined, which in both cases is rather a deliberate action and promotes flexible use of them in different situations, both at home and abroad. In terms of military capabilities, both formations have similar combat characters as light, mobile units of mechanized infantry. However, the *Pasdarán* are more versatile with its own naval component and control of Iran's strategic missile forces. The SANG so far has only had land units and only in recent years has started to develop its own air force component, purchasing attack- and multi-role helicopters for close air-combat. The other difference in military nature is the role and position of both forces within their own countries' national strategic doctrines and domestic politics affecting security. The IRGC developed capabilities of asymmetric warfare and control of strategic forces as a well-designed integral component of Iran's national security system. Meanwhile, the SANG performs various tasks, which overlap with those of numerous other national security services and military units, and apparently is still in the process of finding its own place within the Saudi security system.

Regarding the place of both formations in the social structures of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the IRGC seems to have a stronger social and historical base. It relies on the myth of heroes and martyrs of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, enjoys the genuine support of a large section of society, and through the control of the public media and educational system may, to some extent, shape public opinion. The SANG has no such historical military achievements,¹ and its public support is limited to pro-monarchical tribes. Thus, Saudi Nation Guard opportunities to gain the support of other social groups are also limited. On the other hand, the SANG has had until recently much larger financial resources and provides its members and supporters with a much greater range of social benefits and services, thus strengthening their dedication and commitment.

¹ The achievements and fights of the *Ikhwan* against the Ottoman-Turkish Empire are not a good example, as it happened a long time ago, and is obscured by the subsequent *Ikhwan* rebellions of the late-1920s and 1930s against King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud.

The same factor plays an important role when it comes to the chances of expanding military capabilities. Despite Iran's IRGC's priority in the procurement of equipment and technology, the SANG has even larger financial capabilities and ability to acquire modern weapons-systems and top-notch military technologies. However, this may slowly start to change over the next few years, due to the recent abolition of international sanctions on Iran, and low global oil prices hitting hard both the Saudi economy and other oil producers (including Saudi Arabia's enemy Iran). The Saudi Arabian National Guard struggles also with problems of poor discipline and questionable skills of commanders in their formations, the problems which are unknown to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Despite years of U.S. assistance in the construction of appropriate structures, transfer of knowledge and intensive training, the SANG did not cope with those issues. As a result, tribal loyalty is still often more important in filling key Saudi military positions than the actual skills of the officers, compared to the Iranian *Pasdaran*/IRGC's combat-training.

Thus, if the *Pasdaran*/IRGC as a paramilitary force is both loyal to the Iranian régime and has major combat skills, instead the challenge for Saudi Arabia is that its SANG still has not chosen between ensuring the competing loyalty of Saudi tribal élites and increasing the combat capability of Saudi forces vs. its enemy Iran.

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Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism and Hatred of the West from Al-Qaeda to ISIL

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ABSTRACT: Islamic fundamentalism emerged in the Twentieth Century as a rejection of Western modernism and moderate Islamic cultural and religious views in many Muslim countries. Since the late-1970s however, Islamic fundamentalism has also spurred revolutions (Iran, Afghanistan) and international terrorism waged by skilled merciless groups (al-Qaeda and ISIL) seeking to undermine key Western institutions and impose within the Middle East a resurgent “Caliphate” based on the most brutal interpretation of Islam. Thus, on one hand al-Qaeda since the 1990s has waged an international campaign of terrorism culminating with the “9/11” attacks in America and follow-up attacks in Madrid and London. On the other hand, al-Qaeda has also promoted through its affiliate regional groups a series of parallel insurgencies in the greater Middle East (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Mali and possibly Libya and Lebanon), as well as supporting Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This regional jihadist insurgency has been hijacked by the even more extremist splinter group of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, rebranded since 2013 as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL or ISIS/IS or *Da’esh*), which has succeeded in creating a rival “Caliphate” over one-third of both Iraq and Syria in 2014-17. This study analyzes why Islamic fundamentalist hatred persists against the West and various U.S.-Coalitions, whose strategies have been constantly revised to defeat such persistent global terrorist threat by both Al-Qaeda and ISIL.

Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a reformist socio-religious and political movement since the early Twentieth Century, becoming increasingly more exclusionary and violent in rejecting Western secular modernism and moderate Islamic cultural and religious views among many Muslim countries. But only since the shocking terrorist attacks of “9/11” in September 2001 against New York and Washington D.C., has the American public finally taken an unprecedented interest in the politics and culture of the interlinked Islamic regions of the Greater Middle East (North Africa, Middle East and Gulf) and Central Asia. More directly, Americans have been trying to answer the key question: “Why do they hate us so much that they would carry out such horrific acts against us?” This essay seeks to provide some answers.¹

Islam as a religion was founded by Mohammed during the Seventh Century A.D. in Arabia (today’s country of Saudi Arabia). After his death, his followers swept out of the desert and in roughly one hundred years conquered an empire that extended in the West to Morocco, Spain and Portugal, while in the East it reached the borders of India and Afghanistan. Over time, the people in the conquered regions (except for Spain, Portugal and most of the Balkans) converted to Islam, and the religion continued to spread into Central Asia, Black Africa and as far as the islands of modern Indonesia. From 750-to-1200 A.D. the Muslim Arabs built a glorious civilization, centered in great cities such as Baghdad (Iraq), Cairo (Egypt) and Cordoba (Spain), that for a while far surpassed those of Europe, which was still trying to recover from the fall of Rome and the Dark Ages. During this period (Islam’s Golden Age), Arabs became the world leaders in science, mathematics, philosophy and architecture. This aspect of their history is one in which modern Arabs take great pride, for it reminds them that there was a time when the rest of the world both feared and looked up to them.²

But this magnificent Arab civilization (the Omayyad and Abbasid Empires, 700s-1200s) gradually fell apart, beset by civil wars and foreign invasions. One of those invasions came from Europe—the Crusades—

¹ Fareed Zakaria, “Why They Still Hate Us, 13 Years Later”, in *Washington Post* (4 September 2014), p.A-35.

² Arthur Goldsmith Jr. & Aomar Boum, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 11th. Ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016).

which lasted off and on for two hundred years to “liberate” the Holy Land from “infidel” Muslim control. While today most people in America and Europe know little of the Crusades, they are still remembered vividly by those in the Middle East as the first long-term attempts by the West to take their land away from them as European retribution for centuries of Muslim raids and invasions of Christian lands (in 700s-1490 the lands of today’s Spain, Portugal and Sicily). Though the Crusades failed in the end with the Muslims reconquest of Jerusalem and Holy Lands, these religious wars weakened the Arab peoples so much that they were unable to fend-off later foreign invasions from Asia by the Mongols and later the Ottoman-Turks.¹

The Ottomans as fellow Muslims, but ethnically Turks who followed the Mongols, migrated from Central Asia, soon built another large Islamic empire (Caliphate) that ruled the Greater Middle East from the 1400s to the end of World War I, with renewed cyclical invasions of Europe in 1400s-1913 through Greece, Balkans, Russia-Ukraine and Caucasus. When the Ottoman-Turkish Empire finally collapsed in 1918, the Arab world looked forward towards independence under a unitary greater Arabia state over the Middle East, as promised by British wartime propaganda under the joint-leadership of the self-proclaimed King of Arabia Sharif Hussein of the Hashemites and British intelligence officer Lawrence of Arabia. Instead, after the Great War this successful pro-Allied Arab revolt and joint conquest of Turkish Palestine and Syria, was immediately overtaken by the British and French empires, first secretly through the 1915 London and Sykes-Picot Treaties to partition the region, then through the legalistic mechanism of the League of Nations’ Mandates A, which guaranteed that the ex-Ottoman Arab provinces would finally become independent only within 15-20 years. At this point, the whole Christian West began to be seen as an enemy of the Arabs, because it was setting-up road-blocks to the fulfillment of their dreams, while repressing scattered regional anti-colonial revolts (from Morocco to India). However, the end of World War II in 1945 brought another opportunity as both the Anglo-French Powers were greatly weakened by the war and became unable to stop the slow decolonization of their empires in the 1940s-1970s.²

From the mid-1930s to mid-1950s, independence came to states such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, but these positive developments were overshadowed by the creation of the Jewish state of Israel in 1948 after 70 years of incremental returns of Jewish settlers to their ancestral lands. Hailed as a great achievement in the West and an appropriate symbolical form of “restitution” after the horrors of the Holocaust, this new Jewish nation was immediately condemned by the Arabs as another example of Western imperialism, since most Israelis were of European origin and the land they had claimed had been long populated by Palestinian-Arabs (who were resentful of both their Ottoman-Turks lords and then of Great Britain as Mandatory colonial Power that granted immigration rights to tens of thousands of European Jews). The existence of Israel, but not that of a parallel independent Arab-Palestinian state has ever since been a major ideological grievance in the Arab world’s relationship with the West, as it is regarded as a terrible injustice by all Arabs and most Muslims. This grievance was further exacerbated by Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, in which she humiliated Egypt, Syria and Jordan by capturing East Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Sinai peninsula.³

In the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt’s military President Gamal Abdul Nasser became a champion of Arab unity, but the Arabs defeat in the 1967 Six-Days War and his premature death from a heart attack in 1970 ended those dreams and increased Arab frustration. The success of OPEC during the 1973 Yom Kippur War in pressuring the West via the oil weapon (by blackmailing Europe and America not to support Israel during the Yom Kippur War) brought a temporary feeling of global power to the Arab oil-rich states, but

¹ A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.23-91.

² Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.92-198.

³ Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945*, 9th Ed. (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2009) , Chps.21-23; A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, p.164-307.

as oil prices declined throughout the 1980s, that power faded along with them. In that decade, Libya's dictator Muammar Qaddafi tweaked America's nose, while in Iran the fundamentalist Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini forged a revolutionary Islamic republic that humbled the U.S. during the 1979-80 hostage crisis in Tehran, but his Shi'a Islamist fanaticism worried more moderate Arabs, who mostly belong to the Sunni branch of Islam (the two denominations split apart 30 years after the death of the "Prophet" Mohammed over disputes on how to select the next Muslim leaders).¹

In the 1980s, many Arabs saw in Iraq's Saddam Hussein their own pan-Arab nationalist savior and supported his long, bloody war with Iran (1980-88), as well as his ruthless invasion of Kuwait (1990-91). While other Arab and Muslim leaders condemned the latter action, many in the "Arab street" cheered Saddam, hoping he would become the next Nasser and be able to unite the Arabs against both the U.S.-led West and Islamic Iran. Those dreams were finally shattered by his crushing defeat in the First Gulf War of 1990-91 and later his overthrow following his defeat in the 2003 Second Gulf War.²

When Arabs and Muslims juxtapose American policies toward Iraq and Israel from the Cold War to today, they see blatant double-standard hypocrisy. Iraq under Saddam Hussein seized Kuwait and was punished by the U.N. and the might of the U.S. army in the First Gulf War who dismantled Saddam's growing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) arsenals. Yet Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 with only perfunctory protest from Washington, which instead continues to provide the Jewish state with \$3 billion in annual aid and state-of-the-art weapons (some of which also used against Palestinians in retaliation for Hamas' recurrent missile strikes during three Gaza-Israel Conflicts in 2008, 2010 and 2015). Moreover, the U.S. invaded Iraq again in the 2003 Second Gulf War, partially because of the fear of Saddam secretly redeveloping a new WMD arsenal, but embarrassingly none were found in 2003 compared to the thorough U.N.-led WMD disarmament of Iraq after its defeat in the First Gulf War and again in the early-1990. Furthermore, U.S.-backed Israel has never permitted any outside U.N. inspections of its Dimona nuclear facility underneath the Negev desert, without any U.S. administration uttering the least complaint. The big difference here is that while Iraq had willingly signed and then violated the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that prevents military nuclear weapons in exchange for offering civilian nuclear energy technology, Israel had never signed the NPT and never admitted to having nuclear weapons despite intelligence revelations through the years. However, while these are very important and valid *distinguos* between these policies, to many Arabs and Muslims, all are irrelevant in light of their own self-perceived sense of humiliating marginalization.³

Still another source of anger towards America and the West has been U.S. support of corrupt, undemocratic régimes in the Greater Middle East (and historically elsewhere too), as long as they support the West internationally and economically. As the self-styled global champion of democracy, the U.S. has been quite vocal in condemning Iran and Libya for their authoritarian systems, yet it remains silent on any criticism of pro-Western autocratic governments in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Indeed, the Saudi royal family has ruled with an iron hand since the 1930s, but as long as it keeps oil prices at a reasonable level, Washington and the West avert their eyes. On America's part, the fear is that if these countries were democratized, anti-Western Islamic militants might suddenly rise to power, as happened during the bloody "Arab Spring" protests in Egypt when the overthrow of pro-U.S. dictator Hosni Mubarak led to the rise to power of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, who "stole" the success of the "Arab Spring" grass-roots reformists by summersaulting into power via the nation's first free election. The Muslim Brotherhood's removal a year later in a popular-supported military coup has been only very reluctantly accepted by the Obama administration, reinforcing initially the "Arab street" belief in American hypocrisy, although fresh vindication of the U.S. marginalization of General Al-Sissi's repressive

¹ A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, p.286-363 & 400-406; P. Calvocoressi, *World Politics*, idem, Chps.21-23.

² Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm* (London: Harpers Collins, 1992); John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Vintage, 2005); A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.364-385.

³ A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.286-415; P. Calvocoressi, *World Politics*, idem, Chp.23.

military government was displayed in March 2015 by Cairo's displeasure during its surprising open celebration of Putin's Russia as a minor alternate partner to rebalance Egypt's long and continuing dependency on massive U.S. military and civilian aid since President Anwar al-Sadat had ended Egypt's alliance with the USSR.¹

Combined with these specific grievances—U.S. support of Israel vs. the Palestinians, the invasion of Iraq and support for corrupt Muslim régimes—is a general unease about the ubiquity of flashy materialist and sexually-hyped Western and American cultures in the region. This complaint is not unique to the Arab or Muslim Worlds, but it is strongly felt there among the more conservative religious *strata*: American and Western movies, music, TV, food, culture, Internet and Globalization appear to be taking over at an even faster pace through the post-Cold War economic Globalization, subverting local traditionalist cultures and values all over the globe. For Arabs and Muslims, with the great pride in the Arab Islamic civilization of the Golden Age (700s-1200s A.D.), this trend is very worrisome as it further exposes how marginalized economically, technologically and socially the violent-prone Greater Middle East has fallen behind compared to some fast developing Muslim states in South-East Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia), or oil/gas-rich Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Oman), or oil-rich ex-Soviet Central Asian ones (like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan).²

And yet this trend too, while ubiquitous is also quite ambiguous in the Post-Cold War as it reflects a more modern version of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations", where the blamed invasion of Western cultural values globally are also challenged by the pervasive ascent in the Third World of "Bollywood" film culture out of India, or the massive flows of cheap Chinese goods with "neo-colonialist"-style investments in raw materials extraction to feed China's economy. Thus, in many parts of the Muslim World the usual condemnation of U.S. and Western "imperialism" and cultural materialism will continue as a traditional rhetorical political tool to deflect internal socio-politico-economic turmoil and regional crises, but such old rhetorical justification sounds more and more hollow vs. the reality of the last decade of U.S. and NATO combat peacekeeping draw-down from Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2016) together with a "light-foot" global military involvement in anti-terrorist campaigns under the Barack Obama administration from Asia to Africa.

All of this now exposes the beehive of local and regional crises that can no longer be easily imputable to the nefarious consequences of "well-minded" U.S. interventions. It also exposed the Greater Middle East's cross-currents of Islamic fundamentalist extremists pursuing bloody Jihadist terrorist dreams of conquest and building an anti-Western "Caliphate" as advocated in the post-Cold War first by the global terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (under Osama bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri) and then by ISIS/ISIL (or Islamic State of Iraq & Syria/Levant under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the fearsome successor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's original Al-Qaeda in Iraq) when it seized in 2014-17 one-third of Syria and Iraq.³

As the most pervasive global threat to both the West and moderate Muslim countries, Islamic fundamentalism has developed since the 1920s as a religious-based socio-politico-cultural movement of traditionalist renewal, rejecting Western modernism/materialism and local Westernized colonial Muslim élites (Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Algeria), as well as moderate Islamic cultural and religious views (Hashemite Arabia before it fell in the 1920s under the rival Islamist Saudi Arabs). Its turn towards violence

¹ Mark L. Haas & David W. Lesch, eds., *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012); A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.364-443.

² P. Calvocoressi, *World Politics*, idem, Chps.21-23; F. Zakaria, "Why They Still Hate Us", idem, p.A-35; A. Goldsmith Jr. & A. Boum, *Concise History of Middle East*, idem, p.364-443; Frédérick Volpi, Ed., *Political Islam: a Critical Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

³ Marco Rimanelli, "NATO's Security Transformation, Partnerships & Post-Cold War Peacekeeping" in *Florida Political Chronicle*, v.22, n.1-2 (2011-2013): p.19-43; Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues*, 6th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Sage, 2017); Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism and Homeland Security*, 9th Ed. (New York: Wadsworth, 2017); Larry Diamond, "What went Wrong in Iraq?" in *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2004), in <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60095/larry-diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq>; William McCants, "The Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" in *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2011): p.20-32; Melvyn Leffler, "The War on Terror in Retrospect" in *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2011): p.33-44.

and terrorism started with both popular revolutions (1954-63 Algerian War against colonial France; the 1979 Islamic Revolutions in Iran against the pro-U.S. Shah régime) and/or widespread religious insurgency (like in Afghanistan against its local pro-Soviet communist régime and later Soviet invasion in the 1979-89 First Afghan War). In these cases, Islamic fundamentalism was one virulent strain among others complex domestic up-risings, but soon became the dominant politico-religious force in Iran and Afghanistan by filling the local vacuum of power, while Algeria's more secular Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) succeeded in securing political predominance and sniffing-out the Islamist radicals from its revolutionary midst.¹

According to Fawaz Gerges, since 1979 Islamist revolutionary movement spurred also a rise in Islamist international terrorism in three waves of Jihadism (1980s, 1990s and post-2013) waged by skilled merciless groups (Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, ISIL) seeking to undermine both dictatorial Muslim régimes and moderate Muslim governments (Islamic Jihad in Egypt assassinating President Sadat, the 1970s Syrian repression of Islamic revolts, Islamic Iran against the Shah, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Talibans in Afghanistan and Pakistan), or the arch-enemy Israel (Hamas, Hezbollah), or key U.S.-Western institutions. The most influential religious-intellectual Islamist terrorists of the 1980s first Jihadist wave were Egypt's Islamic Jihad radical leaders Sayyid Qutb and al-Zawahiri who extolled terrorist fighting against the "near-enemy" of pro-Western moderate Muslim governments (condemned as "apostate"), proselytizing in religious-political pamphlets their domestic terrorist goals and deeds (1981 assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat), while denying they intentionally targeted civilians. Moreover, many Arab and Muslim radicals from various countries were attracted and radicalized in combat by an international jihadist mission to join the Mujahideens' guerrilla fight in the First Afghan War against the "infidel" USSR and its local Communist Afghan régime. This first jihadi guerrilla insurgency in Afghanistan was nurtured theologically also by Saudi Arabia's global preaching of its ultra-conservative Wahabi interpretation of Islam. After a decade of civil war, with funds and arms from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and the U.S., the Afghan Mujahideens finally forced the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, followed by further civil war against the local Communist Afghan régime besieged in its Kabul stronghold until final victory in the early-1990s.²

In the post-Cold War (1990-today), Islamic fundamentalist terrorism has reached a higher level of effectiveness and religious-ideological proselytism (second and third Jihadist waves in the 1990s and post-2013), turning its pent-up list of anti-Western grievances and perceived wrong-doings into a devastating blend of local and international jihadi insurgency against the West (U.S.A., Europe, Australia) and moderate Muslim governments, while also promoting an alluring new political image of a resurgent "Caliphate" over the Greater Middle-East, based on the most brutal interpretation of Islam. Initially, the first Jihadist guerrilla insurgency in Afghanistan upon its successful expulsion of the invading Soviet forces and their satellite communist Afghan régime, ended-up unleashing in the 1990s a second global Jihadist wave once many returning "Afghan veterans" formed radical politico-religious Islamic fundamentalist movements in their own countries, and even waged locally their combat experiences against paradoxically their earlier revolutionary antecedents, turned into corrupt Muslim dictatorships, now condemned as new "near-enemies": the post-FLN Algerian dictatorship (the Islamic Salvation Front/FIS' 1990s failed bloody revolt), or the post-guerrilla Mujahideen strife-riven Afghan government (later toppled by the late-1990s seizure of power by Pakistan-based Talibani insurgents), or Islamist political strife in Indonesia and Malaysia.³

Yet more importantly world-wide, was the parallel rise of Osama bin-Laden's Al-Qaeda's terrorist group focused on waging an international jihadist terrorist campaign against the Western "far-enemy" (U.S.A. and Europe). An engineer from one of Saudi Arabia's wealthiest families, Osama had abandoned everything

¹ Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" in *Current History* (December 2014): p.339-343; J.R. White, *Terrorism & Homeland Security*, idem, Chps.8-11; P. Calvocoressi, *World Politics*, idem, Chps.21-23; F. Volpi, Ed., *Political Islam*, idem, p.9-385 & 409-427.

² F. Volpi, Ed., *Political Islam*, idem, p.9-385 & 409-427; J.R. White, *Terrorism & Homeland Security*, idem, Chps.8-11.

³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 2nd Ed. (London: Tauris, 2010); F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" idem, p.339-343; Lawrence Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda & Road to 9/11*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Vintage, 2007).

to join the Afghan jihadist resistance to the USSR, then after the war reorganized with al-Zawahiri their followers into the Al-Qaeda terrorist group since the 1990s (“Al-Qaeda Central”), through the alliance between Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism (once al-Zawahiri broke all ties with his more tame brethren of the Muslim Brotherhood). Al-Qaeda has waged an international campaign of terrorism culminating with the “9/11” attacks in America and follow-up attacks in Europe and Moderate Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, Jordan), as well as promoting as a terrorist “umbrella” organization a network of affiliated regional terrorist groups spreading parallel insurgencies within the Greater Middle East (Al-Qaeda in Arabia out of Yemen and Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaeda in Iraq until 2013; Al-Nusra in Syria; Abu-Shabaaz in Somalia, Al-Qaeda in Maghreb from Mali to Algeria; Boko Haram in Nigeria; smaller affiliates in Indonesia, Philippines, Libya, etc.), while supporting Talibani insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan in reaction to the U.S./NATO/U.N. 2001-02 Second Afghan War against terrorism.¹

Al-Qaeda’s 4-pronged jihadist mission was waged through intense terrorist campaigns using surprise and shock suicide-bomber attacks (individual bomb-vests, car-bombs, truck-bombs, boat-bombs and hijacked planes):

- 1) to infiltrate and undermine from within the “near-enemy” (Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan), while helping the Taliban Islamist régime of Afghanistan against the ex-Mujahideens, like the September 2001 suicide-bombing of the Northern Alliance (ex-Mujahideens) leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, or against U.S./NATO peacekeepers with the joint Al-Qaeda/Taliban Battle of Wanat on 13 July 2008;²
- 2) to wage a vicious international terrorist campaign based on suicide-bombers against the U.S. and Western “far-enemies” as depicted in this partial list of terrorist attacks world-wide:

- anti-U.S. attacks: December 1992 car-bombings of 2 hotels in Aden, Yemen with 2 dead;
- 1995 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia car-bomb with 7 dead and 60 wounded;
- 1996 suicide truck-bombing of Saudi Arabia’s Khobar Towers in Dhahran with 19 U.S. military dead and 350 wounded (initially wrongfully imputed by Saudi Arabia and the FBI on Islamic Iran as a Saudi government cover-up to dismiss the large Saudi contingent of Al-Qaeda’s terrorists);
- August 1998 twin suicide truck-bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania with 200 dead and 5,000 wounded;
- October 2000 boat suicide-bombing against *USS Cole* missile-destroyer in Aden, Yemen with 17 dead and 39 wounded;
- September 2001 “9/11” Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C. by a teams of 19 (mostly Saudis) suicide terrorists who hi-jacked 4 passenger planes, leaving 3,000 dead, hundreds wounded, \$10 billions in damages and all air-traffic in and to the U.S.A. suspended for 2 days (with an 17,500 people at the World Trade Center alone, most were safely evacuated, but for weeks the death-toll was feared at 6,000);
- December 2001 failed suicide-bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner by “Shoe-bomber” British Richard Reid, the first-known European convert to Islam as a trained Al-Qaeda terrorist;
- April 2002 suicide truck-bombing of Tunisia’s Ghriba Synagogue with 19 dead (mostly German tourists) and 30 wounded;
- 6 October 2002 suicide boat-bombing of the *Limburg* oil-tanker at Aden, Yemen, with 1 dead and 12 wounded, plus destruction by fire of the ship and massive oil-spill of 90,000 barrels;
- 8 October 2002 Faylaka Island attack in Kuwait on U.S. Marines with 1 dead and 1 injured;
- 12 October 2002 suicide-bombings at nightclubs in Bali, Indonesia, with 202 Western and Australian tourists dead and 209 wounded, by local terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda (Osama bin-

¹ Wikipedia, “September 11 Attacks” (2017) in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks; Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); J.R. White, *Terrorism*, idem, Chps.8-11; L. Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda*, idem, p.9-408.

² W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, idem, p.128-142 & 207-247; L. Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda*, idem, p.9-408; Wikipedia, “Battle of Wanat” (2017) in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat

Laden praised the bombing as retaliation for the Western “War on Terror” and the Australian-led U.N. liberation of Catholic East Timor from Muslim Indonesia);

- 28 November 2002 terrorist suicide car-bombing of an Israeli hotel and attacks of an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya, with 13 dead and 80 wounded;
 - 12 May 2003 suicide car-bombing of the Riyadh Compound in Saudi Arabia, with 39 dead and 160 wounded;
 - 8 November 2003 suicide truck-bombing of the Al-Mohaya housing compound near Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with 18 dead and 122 wounded;
 - 16 May 2003 attack by 12 suicide-bombers in Casablanca, Morocco, with 45 dead (33 victims);
 - 5 August 2003 suicide car-bombing of Marriott Hotel of Jakarta, Indonesia, with 12 dead and 150 wounded;
 - 20 November 2003 4 suicide truck-bombs in Istanbul, Turkey, with 57 dead and 700 wounded;
 - 29 May 2004 attack on the Al-Khobar oil complex in Saudi Arabia, with 22 dead and 25 wounded;
 - 19 March 2005 suicide car-bombing of Doha Players Theater in Qatar, with 1 British dead and 15 wounded;
 - 1 October 2005 suicide-bombings in Bali, Indonesia, with 20 dead and 100 wounded;¹
 - 7 October 2007 failed car-bomb assassination of ex-Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Karachi, Pakistan, with 140 dead and 450 wounded;
 - 27 December 2007 suicide-bombing assassination of ex-Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto at Liaquat National Bagh in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, with 24 dead and untold wounded, plus 100 dead country-wide;
 - 2 June 2008 car-bombing of Denmark’s Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, with 6 dead and untold wounded;
 - 13 July 2008 joint large-scale combat attack by 300-500 Al-Qaeda and Talibani in the Battle of Wanat near Quam, Afghanistan, against 60+ U.S./NATO/Afghan garrison in a forward-base, repelled with 9 U.S. killed and 31 wounded vs. 50 terrorists killed and 45 wounded;
 - 20 September 2008 suicide truck-bombing of Marriott Hotel, Islamabad, Pakistan, with 54 dead and 266 wounded;
 - 25 December 2009 failed suicide-bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner by “Underwear-bomber” Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, trained in Yemen by Al-Qaeda in Arabia leader Anwar al-Awlaki;
 - 30 December 2009 at U.S. Camp Chapman in Afghanistan a Jordanian Al-Qaeda double-agent killed with a bomb-vest the top 7 CIA counter-terrorism officers hunting Osama bin-Laden and wounding 7 others;
 - 15 June 2010 bombing of a German Bakery in Pune, India, with 17 dead and 60 wounded;
 - 29 October 2010 failed remote-bombing of 2 U.S.-bound cargo planes from Yemen, planned by Al-Qaeda in Arabia leader Anwar al-Awlaki and bombing-expert Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri;
 - 16 January 2013 attack and seizure of Tigantourine Gas Plant near Amenas, Algeria, by Al-Qaeda in Maghreb led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar with 800 foreign and local hostages, with 40 foreigner technicians dead and 29 terrorists killed;
 - Al-Qaeda Central trains and interconnects as a terrorist umbrella organization local terrorist “affiliates”, while promoting their kidnapping for ransom of non-U.S. Western hostages;
 - Al-Qaeda-affiliate Nusra Front fighting dictator Bahir Assad in the Syrian Civil War in 2012-17.²
- 3) to promote an anti-Western message of Muslim revenge in a “defensive jihad” against past “wrongdoings” by the U.S. and West (re-labelled as both “infidels” and “Crusaders”) by relying on Internet messages, videos, propaganda and recruitment of new converts to violence and sympathetic “Lone Wolves”, while issuing official pseudo-religious edicts/*Fatwas* in 1996 (against U.S./Western military presence on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia as a provocation against the entire Muslim world, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia’s King had called for Western combat protection in the First Gulf War against Iraq’s

¹ J.R. White, *Terrorism*, idem, Chps.8-11; W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; L. Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda*, idem, p.9-408; Wikipedia, “Khobar Towers Bombing” (2017) in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khobar_Towers_bombing; Wikipedia, “September 11 Attacks” (2017) in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks; Wikipedia, “Timeline of al-Qaeda Attacks” (2017) in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_al-Qaeda_attacks; M. Leffler, “War on Terror in Retrospect” idem, p.33-44.

² J.R. White, *Terrorism*, idem, Chp.11; L. Wright, *Looming Tower*, idem, p.9-408; W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; Stanford University, “Jabhat al-Nusra” in <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493>

Saddam Hussein), in 1998 (against U.S. support of Israel, despite the repression of Muslim Palestinians), his November 2002 “Letter to America” and 2004 audio-tapes (condemning the U.S. and calling for killing Western civilians as well for the support of Israel; “attacks against Muslims” in Somalia; support of Russian atrocities “against Muslims” in Chechnya; sanctions against Iraq due to the First Gulf War; support of authoritarian Muslim régimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen);

- 4) finally, to advocate creating a future revived Islamist “Caliphate” over the Muslim world as a militant theologico-political appeal to the Sunni Muslim majority to revolt and reject the rival examples of functioning Islamic fundamentalist states both the traditional Islamist claim of leadership over the Sunni Muslim world by the corrupt Saudi Arabia theocratic monarchy as “keeper of Islam’s Holy Sites”, and on sectarian grounds also Iran’s Islamist Shi’a theocratic republic.¹

More recently, Al-Qaeda’s organizational strength and regional and international jihadist insurgency has fizzled out after a decade of U.S.-NATO-Western anti-terrorist military-intelligence cooperation abroad and in the U.S. (Homeland Security) to prevent further attacks. Additionally, both U.S. Presidents George Bush Jr. and Barack Obama have relied significantly on the widespread use of intelligence and U.S. remote-flying drone strikes to decimate Al-Qaeda and Talibani leaderships. Finally, the clamorous U.S. assassination of Osama bin-Laden on 1 May 2011 in his hide-out at Abbottabad inside Pakistan, has weakened “Al-Qaeda Central” capability to control and direct its global organization, a problem that persists under the more cautious and less charismatic leadership of his aged successor al-Zawahiri.²

Thereafter, Al-Qaeda’ organizational strength and virulent jihadist message has been hijacked by even “more extremist” splinter groups as evident (*post-facto*) by captured communications between “Al-Qaeda Central” with its more loyal allies (Taliban) and “affiliates” (Al-Qaeda in Arabia; Al-Nusra in Syria; other groups world-wide) vs. its more unruly “affiliates” (Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Boko Haram in Nigeria). All “affiliates” have copied Al-Qaeda’s trademark suicide-bombers as main weapon of terror and on Osama’s pseudo-theological dreams of a Caliphate, in time the three more unruly “affiliates” have also emerged as most extreme in their use of widespread mass violence, especially against innocent civilians and increasingly of the same Muslim faith, rather than against governments or U.S./Coalition forces, in hope of fostering civil wars or regional secession for an even speedier governmental collapse. At the same time, these ultra-violent “affiliates” have become totally “unruly” and autonomous concerning directions, orders and strategic coordination from “Al-Qaeda Central”, as well as being unwilling to share their spoils from lucrative ransoms of non-U.S. Western kidnapped victims. Paradoxically, the more extreme in their blind violence these unruly “affiliates” became against moderate and Westernized Muslims (now re-labeled as “non-Muslims”), the more “Al-Qaeda Central” became worried that these “extremists” would create such a counter-productive cleavage within the Muslim world that it would undermine Al-Qaeda’s own recruitment and revolutionary appeal. But as U.S.-Western counter-strikes weakened “Al-Qaeda Central”, its hold weakened on more extremely violent “affiliates”.³

The most dangerous jihadist evolution of Al-Qaeda, has been its ex-affiliate Al-Qaeda in Iraq, now re-branded and morphed since 2013 as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL or ISIS/IS or *Daesh*). It is ISIL’s indiscriminate terror campaign in the Middle-East, not “Al-Qaeda Central”, that by lightning since 2014 has finally succeeded in creating a rival “Caliphate” over one-third of both Iraq and Syria. Yet, although ISIL is bot part and parcel of the global jihadist movement coordinated by Al-Qaeda, it is also uniquely local to the

¹ W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; L. Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda*, idem, p.9-408; J.R. White, *Terrorism & Homeland Security*, idem, Chps.8-11; M. Leffler, “War on Terror in Retrospect” idem, p.33-44.

² Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism, from Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005); W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; L. Wright, *Looming Tower: Al Qaeda*, idem, p.9-408; Bob Woodward, *Obama’s Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Samuel Brantley, *Zero Dark Thirty* (Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2002).

³ B. Woodward, *Obama’s Wars*, idem, p.8-405; W. McCants, “Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda” idem, p.20-32; M. Leffler, “War on Terror in Retrospect” idem, p.33-44; L. Wright, *Looming Tower*, idem, p.9-408; F.A. Gerges, “ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism” idem, p.339-343.

Middle-East as the most violent outgrowth of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's Iraq after the U.S.-led 2003 Second Gulf War wiped out its infamous totalitarian Ba'athist state and sectarian control by its Sunni Arab minority over both Shi'a Arabs and Sunni Kurds. Thus, the U.S./Coalition's military victory and outright destruction of Saddam's oppressive Iraqi state institutions (Ba'ath Party, Special Republican Guards and Army), far from returning Iraq to the family of nations as a "liberated" and democratized neo-Western state, completely fragmented the national body politic and society, already weakened by decades of savage totalitarian oppression, three foreign wars and crushing U.N. sanctions.

Blinded by its own democratization ideology and theory of "liberation", the U.S./Coalition swiftly dismantled the oppressive Ba'ath state institutions under the monopoly of Saddam's Sunni Arabs minority (which had destroyed the national social fabric, but kept its rival ethnicities tenuously together), while refusing to practically coopt politico-administratively back into power the majority of existing Ba'athist civil service and army personnel under the flags of a new pro-U.S. Iraqi government. Thus, with hundreds of thousands of embittered unemployed Sunni Arab Ba'athists, army and ex-government personnel let loose, the country's fragile society collapsed completely into several rival nationalist and sectarian insurgencies fighting between themselves (in sectarian cycles of covert revenge killings between the ex-dominant Sunni Arab minority vs. the long-oppressed Shi'a brethren majority and the Sunni Kurd ethnic minority), as well as against the U.S./Coalition peacekeepers and weak new Shi'a-dominated Iraqi government (and secretly leaning towards anti-U.S. Islamic Iran).¹

In this political maelstrom of bitter grievances, sectarian violence and multiple insurgencies competing in a fierce power-struggle to control the fractured country after the expected future withdrawal of the U.S./Coalition, also Osama bin-Laden's message of Islamic fundamentalist terror quickly developed among the embittered Sunni Arab minority, forming al-Qaeda in Iraq under al-Zarqawi's bloody leadership who unleashed waves of suicide-bombers against Muslim crowds in his relentless quest to spark a sectarian Sunni-Shi'a civil war as key terrorist recruitment tool, while focusing on local "near-enemies" (the new pro-U.S. Iraqi government, pro-Western Sunni and Kurd Muslims, moderate Muslims, hostile Sunni tribal leaders and religious clerics). At the same time, the defiant extreme leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (from al-Zarqawi to al-Baghdadi), always remained openly committed to waging a "genocidal" sectarian civil war on Muslim civilians and bombing Shi'a mosques (re-branding Shi'as as "infidels" and seeking either their forced conversion to Sunni Islam or outright extermination), despite repeated strong pressures from "Al-Qaeda Central" (under Osama bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri) to focus instead on its concerted international terrorist campaign against "far-enemies" (U.S.A. and Europe) troops and Western civilians, as well as the traditional Muslim allegiance to the Palestinian fight against Israel.²

In time, the impact of U.S. counter-strikes, the "Surge" of U.S. troops in Iraq and the politico-military coopting under U.S. protection of many "repented" Sunni Arab ex-rebels in Western Iraq ("Awakening" in Anbar Province) within a national Sunni-Shi'a reconciliation government campaign finally succeeded in temporarily weakening all insurgencies, while turning these pro-U.S. Sunni Arab ex-rebels against al-Qaeda in Iraq's sectarian terror. Concerted U.S. strikes cyclically dismantled al-Qaeda in Iraq's terrorist infrastructures and even repeatedly decapitated its leadership with the 2006 killing of al-Zarqawi and rapidly in few years also his three successors, until the 2010 emergence of al-Baghdadi as the more effective and ruthless new leader. In such complex national and international terror context, and seeking

¹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Bob Woodward, *The War Within* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); B. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, idem, p.8-405; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003-05* (New York: Penguin, 2006); M. Leffler, "War on Terror in Retrospect" idem, p.33-44; F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" idem, p.339-343.

² T.E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, idem, p.35-277; F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" idem, p.339-343; Fouad Ajami, "For Iraq the Ties that Bind" in *U.S. News & World Report* (7-14 July 2008): p.28; J.R. White, *Terrorism & Homeland Security*, idem, Chps.8-11; W. McCants, "Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" idem, p.20-35; William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: History, Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015).

to exploit the 2011 timed withdrawal of U.S./Coalition forces from Iraq (after the new U.S. President Barack Obama's declared his opposition to continuing Western anti-insurgency peacekeeping), al-Baghdadi was able to quickly resurrect al-Qaeda in Iraq by rebuilding its social base as the champion of Arab Sunni resentment, while restructuring its terrorist militant structures and forging a secret "unholy" strategic alliance with many trained ex-Ba'athists army and Republican Guards insurgents from Saddam's dissolved military.

Their common goal is to "liberate" Iraq from all pro-Western and Shi'a local forces aligned with the nominally pro-U.S. Shi'a-dominated government, which has always been challenged by many revanchist Sunni militias, while secretly unbeknownst to Washington it was also infiltrated by Iran since the 2003 U.S.-led intervention. Thus, once the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists were neutralized by U.S. counter-insurgency, the Baghdad government waited until the impending December 2011 U.S./Coalition withdrawal from Iraq (a slower conditional policy originally developed by Bush Jr. in conjunction with a follow-up U.S.-Iraqi military treaty keeping 50,000 U.S. troops to assist in stabilizing the country, but his ideological rival and successor President Barack Obama had rushed the U.S. withdrawal) to suddenly refuse signing the follow-up U.S.-Iraqi military treaty, while openly cozying-up also to Iran.¹

As Iraq's inept and sectarian Shi'a government of Nuri al-Maliki quickly shifted international allegiance from the U.S. to Islamic Iran, it also publicly reneged on his earlier promise to Washington to politically integrate the pro-U.S. Sunni "Awakening" ex-fighters into the Iraqi Army, while later sacking many U.S.-trained officers. Thus, al-Qaeda in Iraq was able to quickly capitalize on the domestic Sunni Arabs reactions against Baghdad's Shi'a government betrayal by expanding terrorist recruitments and renewing its bloody attacks country-wide.

At the same time, al-Baghdadi expanded Al-Qaeda in Iraq's political reach and training across the border by covertly joining the parallel bloody civil war in Syria. That pitted since 2011 the local Ba'athist dictatorship of the Al-Assad family and its dominant Alawite/Shi'a minority against widespread domestic reformist protests ("Arab Spring") turned into another hopelessly fragmented weak Sunni Arab insurgency (the pro-Western Syrian National Army), backed by disparate Sunni Islamic fundamentalist jihadists filtering-in from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and as far as Libya (where another bloody civil war had finally toppled local dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi) and even the West (attracting hundreds of local marginalized and "self-radicalized" European and U.S. Muslim youths). Al-Baghdadi after exploiting the Syrian Civil War to seize the local city of Raqqa as his power-base forged a strategic plan to ultimately coopt into al-Qaeda in Iraq all Syrian jihadist fighters as a trans-national terrorist Sunni Arab force to topple both despised Shi'a-led Arab governments and create under his own leadership Osama bin-Laden's long cherished vision of a renewed "Caliphate" in the Middle-East.²

Despite the 2011 U.S. killing of both bin-Laden and his chosen successor (maverick U.S. Iman and terrorist leader Anwar Al-Awlaki leader of al-Qaeda in Arabia/Yemen, who had planned many surprise suicide-bombings against the U.S., like the suicide-boat against the destroyer USS Cole, the "Shoe-Bomber", the "Underwear-Bomber", the FAX cartridges bomb), "al-Qaeda Central" survived under the weaker leadership of aged al-Zawahiri. Without a new, bold international campaign of terror, nor the resources in funds and men, he still refused to embrace politically al-Baghdadi's own geo-strategic plan to fight also the "near-enemy", either within the international terrorist organization (al-Zawahiri continued al-Qaeda's original strategy against Western "far-enemies"), or even in Syria (where the local al-Qaeda's "affiliate" al-Nusra rejected al-Baghdadi's offers to merge and remained loyal to "al-Qaeda Central" leadership).

¹ T.E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, idem, p.35-277; F. Ajami, "For Iraq Ties that Bind", idem, p.28; B. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, idem, p.8-405; W. McCants, "Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" idem, p.20-35; W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105; F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" idem, p.339-343.

² J. McTague, "Book Review: *Arab Spring*", idem, p.67-67; F. Volpi, Ed., *Political Islam*, idem, p.9-385 & 409-427; F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism", idem, p.339-343; W. McCants, "Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" idem, p.20-35; W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105.

By 2013 al-Baghdadi officially broke with both “Al-Qaeda Central” and Al-Nusra to form his transnational ISIL terrorist group by blending Al-Qaeda in Iraq with sympathetic local Syrian and international jihadist allies. He then consolidated control from ar-Raqqah over all Eastern Syria, capturing the border with Iraq and deeply penetrating in Central/North Syria by overwhelming smaller Syrian jihadist and reformist insurgent areas. Finally, in early-2014 ISIL exploited collapsing Sunni morale in Shi’a-controlled Iraq (U.S.-trained Iraqi officers and pro-U.S. ex-insurgent Sunni “Awakening” militias had been dismissed after the U.S. 2011 withdrawal) to unleash a massive offensive in the North-West, routing the demoralized Shi’a-led Iraqi army and police, capturing oil-rich Mosul and most Sunni Arab lands (including Anbar Province) driving to the outskirts of Baghdad against its weakened Shi’a régime, while striking in the north also against the pro-U.S. semi-independent Kurdistan. ISIL merged its Sunni-dominant territories in both Syria and Iraq into the terrorist “Islamic State”, with claims to expand it regionally as a new Islamic “Caliphate”, while al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself “Caliph”. Despite only 15% of Arabs backing terrorism, ISIL expanded through terror-tactics and “rational savagery” to undermine all its regional opponents.¹

On one hand, in 2014-17 ISIL became briefly the world’s wealthiest terrorist group (currency from the Mosul Bank, oil-revenues, “protection”-funds and ransom-revenues), attracting over 10,000 foreign fighters and controlling an estimate 30,000+ local jihadists (18,000 core members, plus other affiliated and foreign fighters). ISIL organized its new terrorist “state” in a pyramidal administrative shadow-government (from the transnational to provincial- and city-levels), based on four inter-connected ruling councils: a Political Council dominated by al-Baghdadi’s loyalist ex-al-Qaeda in Iraq commanders; a Military Council of 8-13 ex-Saddam officers; a Shar’ia Council; and an Administrative Council.

On the other, ISIL continued to expand and wage savage and shocking terror-tactics to demoralize its enemies, expand territorial control and recruit more foreign fighters by displacing “al-Qaeda Central” as the most “popular” international jihadi terrorist organization. ISIL imposed Shar’ia law and female veils over previously mostly-secular societies; mass-executed several hundreds captured Syrian and Iraqi soldiers and police; assassinated anti-ISIL Sunni Tribal leaders and their families; destroyed Shi’a mosques and shrines; ethnic-cleansed local minorities (Christians, Turkmeni, Yazidis and Kurds); rape and forced conversion of captured Christian women then sold as “sex-slaves” or “wives” to ISIL jihadi local and foreign fighters; harvested and sold organs from captured civilians for transplants; imposed wholesale “protection” taxes on local businesses to raise funds; had a brisk contraband sale of captured oil (international market, Turkey and even Assad’s Syrian régime); captured Western hostages (aid-workers and journalists) to ransom most in exchange for hundreds of millions of Euros, while filming for Internet recruitment the gruesome slaying of U.S., British and Japanese hostages; burned alive a downed Jordanian pilot and many other prisoners; and since 2014 used the Internet to convert and recruit to its cause thousands of sympathetic foreign “fighters” in an international jihadist migration to Syria through Turkey’s porous borders; and since May 2014 used the Internet to help self-radicalize many sympathetic terrorist “Lone-Wolves” in Europe and U.S. who staged autonomous local attacks against “soft” civilian targets.²

ISIL’s successful third wave of jihadism is highly localized in the Middle-East through rural, poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities with little intellectual or theologico-Islamic depth, compared to the previous two waves of jihadism that relied on local middle-class recruits and theologico-Islamist roots. However, all Al-Qaeda and ISIL Sunni jihadi terrorist leaders (bin-Laden, al-Zawahiri, al-Zarkawi, al-Awlaki and al-Baghdadi) lack any official theologico-Islamic appointment and education, despite their claims to the “Caliphate” and *fatwas*, compared instead to the King of Saudi Arabia as unofficial religious leader of

¹ Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants” in *The Atlantic* (March 2015): p.1-43; W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.24-267; Jared Malsin, “Iraq’s Fight for Survival” in *Time* (4 July 2016): p.34-41; Audrey Kurth-Cronin, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group” in *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2015), in <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-a-terrorist-group>; Stanford University, “Jabhat al-Nusra” in <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493>

² J. Malsin, “Iraq’s Fight for Survival”, idem, p.34-41; G. Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants”, idem, p.1-43; W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.24-267; A. Kurth-Cronin, “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group”, idem; J.R. White, *Terrorism*, idem, Chps.8-11.

the Sunni Muslim community, or the religious Shi'a arch-enemies (Iran's Shi'a Grand Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei, or Iraq's revered Shi'a Ayatollah al-Sistani).

ISIL instead justifies its terror campaigns by simplistic instrumentalization of its theological interpretation of Islam through the Internet and video recruitment of "self-radicalized" foreign jihadists, total war and savage terror-tactics aimed at shocking the world and rejecting any compromise or negotiation with both its "near-enemies" and "far-enemies". Al-Baghdadi's ISIL has continued to grow in popularity and politico-military reach (even forging allegiances and alliances of his own with Al-Nusra and other pro-ISIL jihadist groups in lawless Libya and Egypt's Sinai). All this despite condemnations of local Muslim governments and Islamic clerics, as well as even Salafi jihadist terrorists (like "Al-Qaeda Central") that ISIL's interpretation of Islam, statements, creation of the new "Caliphate" and viciously mass-atrocities against Muslims and Shi'a populations are both "sacrilegious" and "smear the reputation" of the global jihadist terrorist movements.¹

ISIL terrorism and jihadi combatants have threatened to destroy the entire Levant (Middle East) region by exploiting the inept and corrupt weak Iraqi Shi'a army, the near-impossibility of any political settlement of Syria's Civil War, the comatose state of Syria's Assad régime's hold on the country's south-west, and the open unwillingness of the U.S., NATO and Europe to resend any large ground forces back into Iraq or Syria. Despite ISIL's constant terror-spree, public executions of prisoners in 2014-17 and attracting many thousands of willing international foreign jihadists, its terror strategy ultimately backfired politically in the region by reluctantly convincing many apathetic local Sunni populations (only 15% of them support terrorism) to support the Western efforts to contain fellow-Sunni ISIL terrorism, once local Arab national pride was insulted by publicly televised killings of their citizens (Jordan and Egypt in 2015).

Slowly ISIL's growth was contained and reversed by the U.S.-led Coalition's triple anti-ISIL strategy of expanding anti-terrorist drone air-strikes, augmented by constant air-bombing since December 2014 in Syria and Iraq of terrorist oil assets and jihadi forces, while arming and supporting anti-ISIL regional land forces: Iraqi Kurdish fighters (supporting their besieged brethren and other minorities in North-East Syria), the Shi'a government of Iraq (despite its controversial Iranian-trained militias) and a weakening odd-coalition of reformist Syrian insurgents (SNA). The U.S.-led Coalition is based on a core of 10+ fighting states, although it nominally counts in 2015 over 50 states, including 9 Middle-Eastern states (Bahrein, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) of which two are locals (Jordan and Egypt) and others are Gulf states, with the external training and intelligence support of NATO (through its Mediterranean and Istanbul/Gulf Partners) and Japan, as well as the unlikely parallel cooperation of Turkey, Iran, Lebanon and even Russia against their common enemy (yet Russia is pursuing a pro-Syria and anti-West policy as part of her opposition to U.S. global leadership and NATO-E.U. enlargements). Further, Saudi Arabia has fortified its borders with Iraq, Turkey with Syria and engaged in a parallel air-ground war in Yemen (against pro-Iranian Houthi rebels), while Lebanon and Jordan have fought border skirmishes against ISIL incursions.²

The U.S.-Coalition's targeted air-strikes to decapitate ISIL's leadership and seek to kill al-Baghdadi weakened but did not stop the jihadi terror-machine. Indeed, shorn of any theologico-Islamic legacy, ISIL's jihadists and "Caliphate" remain closely dominated by the alliance-of-convenience with Iraq's ex-Ba'athist cadres. Both ISIL's leadership and the ex-Ba'athists had likely banked on Western irresolution and a tacit international acceptance that a terrorized and weakened Shi'a government in Baghdad would have to ultimately relinquish nominal control over their entire country on behalf of the "Caliphate" confessional

¹ B. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, idem, p.8-405; W. McCants, "Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" idem, p.20-35; W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105; Stanford University, "Jabhat al-Nusra", idem; F.A. Gerges, "ISIS & Third Wave of Jihadism" idem, p.339-343.

² W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105; J. Malsin, "Iraq's Fight for Survival", idem, p.34-41; Bernie Schechterman, "Tomorrow's Warfare is being Fought Today" in *Florida Political Chronicle*, v.22, n.1-2 (2011-13): p.10-18; Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy & War on Terrorism* (London: Ashgate, 2005); Hall Gardner, *Dangerous Crossroads Europe, Russia & Future of NATO* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

unchallenged rule in northern Iraq and eastern Syria balancing Iranian and U.S. rival influences. However, although the ex-followers of Saddam are now openly Islamist, it is hard to see to what extent this is a convenient politico-religious mask until ISIL's jihadi leadership and cadres be decimated by the U.S.-Coalition, to then allow the ex-Ba'athists back into power through their control of the ISIL terror-state machinery. This would allow the surviving ex-Ba'athists to keep a lasting Sunni Arab-dominated new state in both Iraq and Syria, no longer as a savage international terrorist jihadist group forging a "Caliphate" for all Muslims, but only locally as a savagely-brutal, practical, neo-nationalist, Sunni Arab dictatorship.

Throughout 2015-2017 it proved difficult to quickly destroy ISIL, given to the U.S. and European public rejection of sending any large-scale combat forces in Iraq and Syria, while Obama remained reluctant to take any decisive leadership in the Syrian Civil War against either ISIL or Syria's dictator Bashar Assad. Instead, the U.S.-Coalition continued to wage increasingly heavy air-strikes against ISIL forces and infrastructures picking the "Caliphate" apart piece-by-piece, while relying on the ground in Syria on the slow offensive of a motley-coalition of U.S. Special forces working along semi-secular Syrian rebels and mixed Kurdish forces (Northern Iraqi Kurdish *Pashmerga* with Syrian YPJ Kurdish rebels), as well as in Iraq on U.S.-Kurdish forces working with their rival Shi'a government forces and even Iranian troops, while in Syria and Iraq both U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and his rival successor Donald Trump kept U.S. ground forces to a minimum.¹

However, in 2017 the concerted air-land attacks against ISIL from both the large U.S.-led Coalition (U.S., NATO, Arab states, Iraq, Kurds and Syrian rebels) and from the rival Russo-Syrian-Iranian coalition finally led to the incremental military-territorial collapse of ISIL's terrorist state, despite continued disorganized fighting on the ground and in other nearby regional areas (Sinai, Libya) and uncertainty over al-Baghdadi's fate. ISIL's last strategy since 2016 has been to multiply its disorganized and on-line recruitment of inspired-"Lone Wolves" terrorist attacks against Western countries to kill large numbers of unsuspecting civilians at crowded public events with either small-scale knives attacks (London, Jerusalem) or explosives (Boston Marathon bombing, Manhattan, etc.) on "soft"-urban target (like the rock concerts attacks in Paris and U.S., and mass-vehicles attacks against crowds (Jerusalem, Nice, Berlin and London).²

ISIL's impending final territorial collapse under the rival offensives by the U.S.-led Coalition (U.S., NATO, Arab states, Iraq, Kurds and Syrian rebels) in Syria and Iraq, and by the Russo-Syrian-Iranian coalition in Syria will not lead to lasting regional peace. Despite the impending demise of ISIL's "Caliphate", it will likely continue its disorganized terrorist attacks in the West and Arab world by surviving foreign jihadists sneaking back to their birth-countries, despite the loss of their terror state and its Internet propaganda machine to recruit more delusional violent cadres. Likewise, ISIL's fully separate violent branches in Egypt's Sinai and in Libya will keep their terrorist struggle to the end until regional forces will be able to finally crush them. But the main source of concern over the long-run remains the ability of the once near-defunct Al-Qaeda to rise from its comatose stage and retake leadership of international Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism from the failing grip of ISIL, because none of the underlying socio-economic-political conditions that brew Islamist terror has faded. Al-Qaeda still remains limited in its immediate terrorist threat at the moment, given the low-profile and frailty of its reclusive current leader Al-Zawahiri, and the intense U.S.-led international counter-terrorist campaign. However, things will change fast within few years once a new, more dynamic younger leadership accedes to power, although the loss of the rival ISIL "Caliphate" will weaken the recruitment effort of every Islamist terrorist group, confined now to the vagaries of disorganized international terrorist strikes.³

Moreover, regional peace in the Middle East remains elusive in the wake of declining U.S. involvement and rising regional chaos. Having once reveled in its global sole SuperPower status since the 1990-91 end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR, the U.S. in the post-Cold War first embraced world policing together with the United Nations and NATO to preserve peace and prosperity against terrorism and rogue regional dictators, while

¹ W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105; A. Kurth-Cronin, "ISIS is not a Terrorist Group", idem; J.R. White, *Terrorism*, idem, Chp.11.

² A. Kurth-Cronin, "ISIS is not a Terrorist Group", idem; J.R. White, *Terrorism & Homeland Security*, idem, Chp.11.

³ W. McCants, *ISIS Apocalypse*, idem, p.23-105; W. McCants, "Rise & Fall of Al Qaeda" idem, p.20-35; F. Zakaria, "Why They Still Hate Us", idem.

finally under President George Bush Jr. it sequentially fought triple wars against global terrorism (2001-current), Afghanistan (2001-02) and Iraq (2003), while feeling tantalizingly close to its grip the dream of an imminent American global imperial power and responsibility to lead. And yet, all this was suddenly abandoned since 2008 following anti-war criticism in the U.S. and NATO in the wake of the rising cost of the Iraqi and Afghan peacekeeping fiascos against Al-Qaeda, ISIL and Talibani insurgencies, as well as the post-2008 U.S./international economic recession that robbed every Western country of its economic base. Thereafter, the U.S. has suffered a sharp decline in its strategico-military and diplomatic footprint in the Greater Middle East and globally following U.S. President Obama's 2011 withdrawal of U.S./NATO peacekeepers from Iraq (without forcing a reluctant and secretly pro-Iranian Baghdad to sign the mutually-agreed binding bilateral security treaty), and slowly cutting forces to a minimum in Afghanistan (despite succeeding in getting Kabul to sign a similar security treaty), while continuing the widespread use of Special Forces and individualized drone air-strikes against terrorist targets.¹

Moreover, both Presidents Obama and his rival Trump have kept at a minimum U.S. ground forces in Syria and Iraq, while refusing to support with heavy weapons and politically the ethno-independentist aspirations of their Kurdish allies (the Iraqi-Kurdish *Pashmerga* and the Syrian-Kurdish YPJ) for fear of further undermining America's fleeting influence in Iraq and Turkey as well. As feared, in January 2018 the Kurds' hope that their alliance with the U.S. would allow them to turn their hard-fought ethnic lands into a truly independent state collapsed disastrously once the Iraqi Kurds held an independence referendum, which led to the Iraqi Shi'a and their Iranian allies to seize both oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk, while afterwards Turkey invaded a swath of Kurdish-liberated Northern Syria to reverse the YPJ Kurds territorial controls of border crossings and the potential threat to arm their secessionist Kurdish brethren (PKK) in Turkey. Thus, U.S. non-involvement to support its allies has dispirited the Kurds and emboldened the rival Russo-Iranian and Turkish cooperation and influence over both Iraq's Shi'a government and Syria's Assad Alawite Shi'a, while U.S. influence in Asia is also challenged by the rising economic giant China now inching ever closer to Russia and Iran against the West.²

Yet this will not automatically allow Assad to seize all lost territory to ISIL compared to the rival hold of pro-U.S. Syrian and Kurdish fighters, who will probably remain in control of their areas in Northern Syria, while Syria, Russia and Iran focus on eliminating both pro-Western rebels and ISIL areas. In the end, the most important regional threat to peace and stability will not be any longer Islamic terrorism of either the ISIL or Al-Qaeda stripe, but Islamic Iran's rising interference in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and against key U.S. allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Gulf states), as well as America's shrinking since 2008 into inconsequential inaction under both Presidents Obama (out of economico-diplomatic weakness and anti-war ideological conviction) and Trump (out of semi-isolationist ideological conviction). Yet, this slow whittling away of America's once dominant global power, and regional influence in the Greater Middle East, will continue to embolden rivals and enemies, but they too will not be able to reverse to their permanent advantage this rising regional geo-strategic chaos in the post-Cold War.³

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards Diplomacy in Twenty-First Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with American Military* (New York: Penguin, 2005); M. Rimanelli, "NATO's Security Transformation, Partnerships & Post-Cold War Peacekeeping" idem, p.19-43; B. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, idem, p.213-340.

² Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography* (New York: Random House, 2012); Adam S. Posen, "The Post-American World Economy" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.28-38; Kurt M. Campbell & Ely Ratner, "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.60-70; Jennifer Lind, "Life in China's Asia: What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.71-82; J. Malsin, "Iraq's Fight for Survival", idem, p.34-41; B. Schechterman, "Tomorrow's Warfare is being Fought Today" idem, p.10-18; Vali Nasr, "Iran among the Ruins: Teheran's Advantage in a Turbulent Middle East" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.108-118.

³ Robert D. Kaplan, *Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random, 2018); Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2015); Barry, R. Posen, "The Rise of Illiberal Hegemony: Trump's Surprising Grand Strategy" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.20-28; Eliot A. Cohen, "Trump's Lucky Year: Why the Chaos can't Last" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.2-9; Jake Sullivan, "The World After Trump: How the System can Endure" in *Foreign Affairs*, v.97, n.2 (March-April 2018): p.10-19; V. Nasr, "Iran among the Ruins" idem, p.108-118.

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
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MIDDLE EAST



Source: CIA, *World Factbook* (2017): <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html>

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ & SYRIA (ISIL/ISIS) REGIONAL MILITARY MAP 2014-2018




Military situation against ISIL/ISIS in Iraq and Syria (LEFT 16 February 2015 vs. 31 January 2018 RIGHT)


- GREY: Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq & Levant (ISIL/ISIS/IS)
- WHITE: Controlled by *Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda)*
- LIME GREEN: Controlled by other Syrian rebels (SNA)
- PINK: Controlled by Syrian government (Assad régime)
- RED: Controlled by Iraqi government (Shi'a-dominated)
- YELLOW 1: Controlled by Syrian Kurds (YPJ)-& Iraqi Kurds (*Pashmerga*)
- YELLOW 2: Controlled by Iraqi Kurds (*Pashmerga*)

Source: Wikipedia, "Islamic State of Iraq & Levant" (2015 & 2018) in: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant

U.S.-COALITION AGAINST ISIL (50 COUNTRIES OF WHICH 9 ARABS, NATO-27 & PARTNERS-15)




U.S.-COALITION AIR-STRIKES AGAINST ISIL WITHIN SYRIA



Air strikes in Iraq and Syria


Iraq 1,212 Syria 932



Figs are up to 10 February 2015

Source: US Central Command

Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq



Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included

Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

The Arctic Frontier in International Relations

by Kern William Craig, Ph.D., Troy University, AL

Abstract: This essay provides the reader and practitioner key political and International Law information about the Arctic region and Arctic Ocean in particular, focusing on the interplay between competing Arctic nations (“Arctic 5”, or the Arctic Council as “Arctic 8-to-12”), their legal sovereignty claims and treaties, pending legal claims, navigation, Arctic business, regional pollution and Arctic relations among littoral and regional states from the Cold War to today’s post-Cold War. Together this information serves also as basis for a College course on Arctic Affairs.

Introduction

The Arctic Ocean is the smallest, shallowest and coldest of all oceans (Zuhlke, 2016). Yet it has become the center of international attention, due to Global Warming and the consequent melting of its ice cap that is facilitating in-turn regional fishing, drilling and mining, as well as shipping, both to points within the Arctic and trans-Arctic. Thus, coastal nations are now extending their own national claims toward the North Pole not only to promote economic development, but also to prevent environmental degradation.

The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world. Higher temperature will adversely impact the region in terms of insect infestations, as well as forest fires (Hassol, 2004, p.10 & 14). And with economic expansion regionally the greater human activity will increase pollution of the Arctic air, waters, seabed and coastlines. Entire ecosystems will be affected, including the food chain from life on the seabed (the benthos) to invertebrates, fish, birds and marine mammals (Arctic List, 2013, p.9).

Arctic warming also poses new economic threats particularly in terms of transportation and construction. Shipping will be affected as more icebergs break into the ocean. Trucking will be affected as Winter ice bridges across rivers melt unpredictably. And building, including the maintenance and construction of airports, will be affected as permafrost melts on land making it unstable and sinking.

Although the perennial ice-pack in the Arctic Ocean is shrinking, first-year Winter sea-ice is growing (Melling et al, 2012, p.105). But it is freezing later and thawing sooner. So there is actually less sea-ice during the rest of the year, while coastal storms become more destructive when there is less sea-ice to insulate the shorelines (*Economist*, 2015, p.36). The Arctic region is experiencing significant environmental change (Charron, 2015, p.222). But not all effects of boreal climate change will be negative: both forests and fish are expected to proliferate in a warmer Arctic and the range of many plant and animal species is projected to shift toward the north on land, as well as at sea (Hassol, 2004, p.10). And most of the economic effects of Arctic warming will be positive not only with respect to forestry and fishing, but also with respect to access for shipping, drilling and mining. At present the Arctic is sparsely populated with indigenous native people and other permanent residents (Broderstad, 2011, p.893). Indigenous natives account for a mere 10% of the total Arctic population, but are 50% in the Canadian Arctic and a larger majority in Greenland (Hassol, 2004, p.6).

Above the Arctic Circle at 66 degrees latitude north, the three largest cities are Russian: Murmansk on the Barents Sea and the inland cities of Vorkuta and Norilsk. But, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, their populations have decreased by almost a third (Parfitt, 2009). The fourth largest city is Tromso in Norway, a vibrant community warmed by waters of the Gulf Stream (Gonorway, 2016). And the people who live in the Arctic obviously have both the most to lose and most to gain from Arctic warming. The magazine *Nature* (2011) provides three maps depicting the “New” Arctic North at: <http://www.nature.com/news/2011/111012/full/478172a.html>

The length of day and night is the most extreme at latitude 90 degrees N (the Arctic or North Pole), as well as at 90 latitude S (the Antarctic or South Pole). But both Summer and Winter are reversed in the Southern Hemisphere. And the Arctic and Antarctic are poles apart in other ways too: the Arctic is water surrounded by land, whereas the Antarctica is land surrounded by water.

There is also a “polar paradox” since Antarctic land is considered under International Law as international domain, whereas the frozen Arctic waters are generally considered national. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty “set aside Antarctica as scientific reserve and suspended all future territorial claims in order to focus on research” (Australian Antarctic Division, 2015), while national claims to Arctic waters are still being made under the 1982 U.N. Third Law of the Seas, with Canada and Russia controlling most of the Arctic sea region.

Arctic Nations

The coastal nations of the Arctic Ocean are known as the “Arctic 5”, and listed clockwise from the Bering Strait are: Russia (with the longest coastline), Norway (including its Svalbard Archipelago), Denmark (by virtue of Greenland, the largest island in the world or the smallest continent after Australia), Canada (including its vast Arctic archipelago) and the United States (by virtue of Alaska).


The coastline of the Arctic Ocean is 45,389 Km. (23,203 Statute Miles) according to the C.I.A.’s *World Factbook* (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Although it is difficult to measure the coastlines of the “Arctic 5” with certainty, due to its numerous islands and inlets, it is easy to compare their exposure to the Arctic Ocean using “sectors” in approximate degrees of longitude. Russia clearly has the greatest exposure (160 degrees), followed by Canada (80 degrees), Denmark with Greenland (60 degrees), Norway with Svalbard (30 degrees) and the U.S. with Alaska (30 degrees).

This in turn, has led to the emergence of the “Sector Theory” as possible international geo-legal tool to extend national sovereignty from the “Arctic 5” nations all the way to the North Pole. “The Arctic sector theory was first publicly propounded by Pascal Porter, a Canadian Senator, in 1907” (Head, 1963, p.203), who suggested partitioning the Arctic into five sectors extending to the North Pole based upon “the territory of a nation lying immediately below the Arctic Circle.” Porter advocated this method as “the most natural” since it was simply “geographical.”

“During the Cold War ... the Arctic Ocean (was) portrayed as an ‘Arctic Mediterranean’ using a novel map projection that placed the Arctic Ocean in the center of the five littoral states ... (but) an expansion of this view to ... a broader set of actors took place after the Cold War” (Keskitalo, 2012, p.156). The circle of interest widened from the shores of the Arctic Ocean to the Arctic Circle and beyond.

Thus, in the post-Cold War the “Arctic 5” have formed the “Arctic Council” or “Arctic 8” to encompass all eight states with territory above the Arctic Circle, including three with no coastline on the Arctic Ocean: Iceland (with water, but no land above the Arctic Circle), plus Finland and Sweden (with land, but no water above the Arctic Circle) (Brigham, 2014, p.5). Today the Arctic Council appears on paper as an enlarged “Arctic 8-to-12” in its infancy, including also non-Arctic Observer states, 9 inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary Observers, as well as 11 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Observers.

There is talk of an “Arctic land-grab” as the “Arctic 8” “race to map their claims to a new energy frontier” by extending their respective Continental Shelves beyond the internationally-allowed 200 Miles from the coastline (Funk, 2009). But “concerns about the growing ‘internationalization’ of this new Arctic governance, the potential hidden agendas of non-Arctic states, and the possible dilution of Arctic states’ and indigenous peoples’ ... influence continue to circulate” as well (Lackenbauer, 2014, p.24). There are “those who tend to view with suspicion the scientific rationale” of observer status, given that “fossil fuels ...are among the key catalysts for international geopolitical interest” (Chaturvedi, 2014, p.77 & 73). Mining, shipping and fishing are also key economic factors.



* In 2013, South Korea became the first among non-Arctic nations to issue an Arctic policy master plan, because South Koreans are interested in shipping and port construction along Russia’s Northern Sea Route (Park, 2014, p.63). Other non-Arctic nations are China, India, Japan and the Philippines, who are also interested in both Arctic shipping and fishing (Palosaari, 2012, p.7 or “Group of 77 is the largest inter-governmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests” (G-77, 2016). The G-77 name remains unchanged although its membership has now increased to 134 Third World countries representing a numeric, but political feeble majority of the U.N.’s 193 member-states (U.N. Department of Public Information, 2016).

The G-77 bloc encompass all Third World’s Less-Developed Countries (LDCs), especially the landlocked ones, and generally oppose the idea of an Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean. The G-77 want the “international seabed to be as large as possible ... (since) coastal states are required to make monetary payments or payments in kind through the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for distribution to all state parties to the LOS Convention with respect to the exploitation of non-living seabed resources” (Riddell-Dixon, 2011, p.377).

This rent-seeking activity includes all “the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (International Seabed Authority, 2016). In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan opposed such “redistribution of U.S. wealth to developing world” and refused to sign the U.N. Third Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) after it was adopted in 1982, due to “its provisions on deep seabed mining” (Heritage Foundation, 2016).

But it is possible that navigation rights in the Arctic Ocean might be even more divisive than resource rights (Dodds, 2013, p. 52). The “Arctic 5” 2008 meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, issued the Ilulissat Declaration “to position themselves as coastal states who enjoyed ... (not only) sovereign rights over exclusive economic zones and outer continental shelves ... (but also) the rights of coastal states to ... insure higher standards of shipping safety and environmental protection” under Article 234 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas (Dodds, 2013, p.50-51). Article 234 is also known as the “Arctic exception” inasmuch as it “recognizes more far-reaching powers for the coastal state than the regimes of innocent and transit passage” (Bartenstein, 2011, p.23 & 45). It “authorizes coastal states to develop and administer special regulations dealing with human activities in ice-covered waters ... (and) seeks to upgrade coastal state authority, without abrogating the rights of others to innocent or transit passage” (Arctic Governance Project, 2016).

The Russians already police shipping along their Northern Sea Route and charge “escort fees to international vessels” (Smith & Stephenson, 2013, p.1192). But the “temporal nature” of Article 234 dealing with “ice-covered waters” is currently being debated (Bartenstein, 2011, p. 24, 28 & 30). And the argument could become more heated as the ice continues to melt. The following political map of the Arctic Region, provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (2012), is found at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/arctic_region_pol_2012.pdf

Claims and Agreements

Among the “Arctic 5”, Canada since 1880 had established its claim to the Arctic when her last Arctic territory was transferred from the United Kingdom. In 1909, Canadian explorer Bernier deposited a plaque on Melville Island “taking possession for the Dominion of Canada of the whole Arctic Archipelago lying to the north of America from longitude 60 W to 141 W up to latitude 90 N” (Rothwell, 1993, p.336). Finally, in 1925 Canadian Minister of the Interior, “Honorable Charles Stewart, told the House of Commons that Canada claimed the territory to the pole” between longitude 60 W and 141 W (Head, 1963, p.207).

In 1926, the U.S.S.R also “formally declared its claim to ... territory ... in the Arctic North of the coast of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the North Pole” (ibid, p. 206). In 1957, Norway and the Soviet Union agreed on a delimitation line in the Varangerfjörd (Variag Gulf) off the Barents Sea (Tanaka, 2011, p. 461).

The U.S. claim to the Arctic is geographically-connected to the territory of Alaska. In 1825, a treaty between the United Kingdom and Russia established longitude 141 degrees W, as their border in North America “in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean” (Baker & Byers, 2012, p.71-71), which is now melting! In 1867, this meridian line was recognized by the United States as the eastern border of Alaska when it was purchased from Russia.

Then in 1945, U.S. President Truman issued Proclamation 2667 that “extends the U.S. claim to submerged lands and offshore resources of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the interest of conservation and prudent development of the natural resources of the seabed” (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2009). In 1945, President Truman also issued Proclamation 2668 that protects “fishery resources ... (with) conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States” (Peters and Woolley, 2016).

In 1958, the United Nations concluded four treaties: the Convention on the High Seas which took effect in 1962; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which took effect in 1964; the Convention on the Continental Shelf which took effect in 1964; and, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas which took effect in 1966 (U.N. Diplomatic Conferences, 2016). In 1972, the U.S proclaimed a contiguous zone extending from three to 12 nautical Miles offshore (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2016a).

In 1973, Canada and Denmark agreed on a delimitation line between the Canadian archipelago and Greenland (Tanaka, 2011, p. 461). In 1980, Iceland and Norway agreed on a continental shelf boundary. It was revised by a U.N. Conciliation Commission in 1981 (U.N. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1981), followed by an Additional Protocol in 1997 (U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, 2011).

In 1982, the United Nations concluded the Convention on the Law of the Sea replacing the four U.N. treaties of 1958. But the UNCLOS did not become effective until 1994. Implementation was left to other organizations including the International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Whaling Commission (IWC) and International Seabed Authority (ISA) (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 2013), while enforcement was left to member-states. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan proclaimed a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016a).

In 1986, "Canada claimed straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic Archipelago" (Rothwell, 1993, p.331-332) using a well-known legal method to increase territorial seas where the coastline was deeply indented (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, 2013). And these straight baselines enclosed the Northwest Passage as historical "internal waters of Canada over which it had complete sovereignty and jurisdiction" (Rothwell, 1993, p. 344).

In 1988, U.S. President Reagan claimed a 12 nautical Miles Territorial Sea (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2016a). Then in 1990, the USSR and U.S. agreed upon their maritime boundary in the North Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea and Arctic Ocean. They used 168 degrees, 58 minutes and 37 seconds longitude W. as the western limit of Alaskan waters through the Bering Strait "into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted by international law" (Baker & Byers, 2012, p. 75 & 88).

This agreement covered Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves (U.S. Department of State, 1990). It was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1991, but never ratified by the Russian Parliament. In 1999, U.S. President Bill Clinton proclaimed a Contiguous Zone extending from 12 to 24 nautical Miles offshore (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2016). In 2001, Russia submitted a claim to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) with respect to the Arctic Ocean (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Seas, 2015), as reflected in the Russian map: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/RUS_CLCS_01_2001_LOS_2.jpg

Thereafter, by 2007 Russia used a submersible craft to plant a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed at a depth of 4,261 meters (13,980 feet) of water below the frozen North Pole (Derbyshire, 2009). President Vladimir Putin indicated that "should be the basis of Russia's position in settling the matter of that part of the Arctic shelf" (Shestak, 2015, p.170). In 2010, also Norway and Russia signed a treaty on maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean (Kingdom of Norway, 2010). And, in 2015, Russia submitted a revised claim to the CLCS with respect to the Arctic Ocean (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 2015).

In 1995, Denmark and Norway agreed to a maritime boundary with respect to Greenland and Jan Mayen Island between Iceland and the Svalbard Archipelago (Tanaka, 2011, p.464). Then in 1997, Denmark and Iceland agreed on a maritime boundary line between Greenland and Iceland (U.N. Food & Agriculture Organization, 2016). In 2006, Denmark and Norway agreed to a maritime boundary with respect to Greenland and Svalbard Archipelago (Tanaka, 2011, p.464). In 2013, Denmark submitted a claim to the CLCS over the North-Eastern Continental Shelf of Greenland, and in 2014 submitted another claim to the CLCS over the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Seas, 2015). These cases are still pending.

In 2006, Norway submitted a claim to the CLCS in respect of the Arctic Ocean (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Sea, 2015). The Norwegian claim included the Western Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean, as well as the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Seas, 2009).

International Law

The UNCLOS is fairly straightforward with regard to Territorial Seas, Contiguous Zones and Exclusive Economic Zones. But it is extremely confusing with regard to Continental Shelves and Extended Continental Shelves (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, 2013).

Territorial Sea (12 Miles)

According to the UNCLOS Article 2: “The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.”

According to Article 3: “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical Miles (13.8 statute Miles or 22.2 Kilometers), measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”

According to Article 5: “Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”

Contiguous Zone (24 Miles)

According to the UNCLOS Article 33 (1): “In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary:

(a) to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or Territorial Seas;

(b) to punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or Territorial Sea.” According to Article 33 (2): “The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical Miles (27.6 statute Miles or 44.4 Kilometers) from the baselines from which the breadth of the Territorial Sea is measured.”

Continental Shelf (200 Miles)

According to the UNCLOS Article 77 (1): “The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.” Article 77 (2) states that: “The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.” And for Article 77 (3): “The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.”

According to Article 76 (1): “The Continental Shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical Miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”

Extended Continental Shelf

The Continental Shelf beyond 200 nautical Miles is known as the Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) or the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) (Canada Foreign Affairs Trade & Development, 2015b). It is typically measured from the low-tide mark on the shoreline (Gamble, 2009) and is generally “what scientists refer to as the continental margin” (Allain, 2011, p.14) although “geophysics uses the concept of the ‘continental margin’ to cover the Continental Shelf, continental slope and continental rise” (Koivurova, 2011, p. 214).

According to Article 4 of Annex II, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: “Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical Miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.”

According to Article 76 (4) (a): “The coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 M (NM, nautical Miles) from the baselines from which the breadth of the Territorial Sea is measured by either:

- I. a line delineated ... by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 percent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or
- II. a line delineated ... by reference to fixed points not more than 60 Miles (69 statute Miles or 111 Kilometers) from the foot of the continental slope.”

According to Article 76 (5): “The fixed points ... either shall not exceed 350 Miles (403 statute Miles or 648 Kilometers) from the baselines from which the breadth of the Territorial Sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 Miles (115 statute Miles or 185 Kilometers) from the 2,500 Meters isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 Meters (8,202 Feet).”

According to Article 76 (6): “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of the Continental Shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical Miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.” Based on a submarine elevation claim, a coastal state “can extend its Continental Shelf beyond what is possible following the 350 nautical Mile claim or the 2,500 Meters isobaths + 100 nautical Miles” (Basaran, 2015, p.7). And, as previously indicated in Article 76 (1): “The Continental Shelf of a coastal State comprises ... submarine areas ... throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory.” But the UNCLOS is extremely confusing with respect to both the Continental Shelf up to 200 Miles and claims on an Extended Continental Shelf beyond 200 Miles.

Much is open to interpretation not only about the delimitation of claims, but also about the distribution of wealth to non-littoral states, mostly Third World less-developed ones who are the most vocal claimants for “redistribution” of all new sources of wealth. According to Article 82: “The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect to the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical Miles ... annually ... after the first five years ... for the sixth year, the rate ... shall be 1% of the value or volume of production ... (and) increase by 1% for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and shall remain at 7% thereafter ... through the Authority, which shall distribute them to States Parties to this Convention.”

Exclusive Economic Zone (200 Miles)

According to the UNCLOS Article 56: “In the Exclusive Economic Zone, the coastal State has: sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.” According to Article 57: “The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical Miles (230 statute Miles or 370 Kilometers) from the baselines from which the breadth of the Territorial Sea is measured.”

Pending Claims

“The Eurasian and North American continental margins extend into the deep-water part of the Arctic Ocean” (Laverov et al, 2013, p. 26). And the Arctic Ocean is bisected by the Lomonosov Ridge which extends across the North Pole. Three coastal states have claimed this ridge under Article 76 (1) as a “natural prolongation” of their sovereign territory: Russia, Canada, and Denmark with regard to Greenland (Basaran, 2015, p.1). The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (2014) provides a map showing all Arctic claims at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309>

Russia has made a claim to its northern Continental Shelf in 2001, followed by a revised claim in 2015. Denmark made a claim to the north-eastern Continental Shelf of Greenland in 2013 and another to the northern continental shelf of Greenland in 2014 (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Seas, 2015). And Canada is still working to define the outer limits of its own Continental Shelf within the Arctic Ocean (Global Affairs Canada, 2015).

Neither Norway nor the United States have a geologic (crustal) basis for extending their territorial waters all the way to the North Pole. But Norway made a claim to a portion of the Arctic Ocean in 2006 (U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs & Law of the Seas, 2009).

The ongoing boundary disputes among the “Arctic 5” littoral Polar states include one between Canada and Denmark with respect to the Lincoln Sea and another between Canada and the U.S. with respect to the Beaufort Sea. There are also differences of opinion between Canada and the U.S. with respect to the Northwest Passage and between Russia and the U.S. with respect to the Northern Sea Route (or Northeast Passage). Generally speaking, the claims of Canada and Russia are based on internal waters and restricted passage whereas the claims of the U.S. are based on international waters and unrestricted passage.

But, by in large, “these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defense challenges” (Government of Canada, 2015a, p. 13). And the same can be said about the dispute between Russia and the United States over their respective maritime boundary from the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea to the Chukchi Sea and Arctic Ocean. It was settled *de facto* if not *de jure* in 1990.

Furthermore, no new U.S. claims have been made under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas since President Regan refused to sign that treaty in 1982 and since the Senate refused to ratify the revised treaty signed by President Clinton in 1994. The U.S. can however “rely upon customary international practice to obtain many of the benefits of these treaties without subjecting itself to the risks of joining them” (Meese, Spring & Schaefer, 2007). And it “will be in an advantageous position compared to the other Arctic states, as it will not subject its assertion of the outer-limits of the U.S. continental shelf to the scrutiny” of the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Golitsyn, 2009, p. 405).

The United States is cooperating with the other members of the Arctic 5 to meet challenges from outside the region. Outsiders want a slice of the Arctic pie. And their emphasis will be on the exploitation rather than the stewardship of natural resources. So it is in the interest of the A5 to regulate access. And such regulation is possible if the A-5 act in concert. “Since the Arctic Ocean is a relatively shallow basin “compared with the Earth’s other oceans ... about 90% will ultimately be carved up” by coastal nations (Funk, 2009). “Only the deep basins on either side of the disputed Lomonosov Ridge are likely to remain part of the Arctic Ocean Commons” (Gamble, 2009).

Claims to extended continental shelves by the A5 under Article 76 depend on one of “three parameters: the shape of the seabed, the depth of the water and the thickness of the underlying sedimentary material” (MacNab, 2004, p.3). But Russia and Canada also use straight baselines, as do over eighty other nations, to extend claims along their coastlines (Pedrozo, 2011, p.494-496). And this method encompasses Russia’s North Sea Route and Canada’s Northwest Passage.

According to Article 7 of the UNCLOS: “In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of

the territorial sea is measured.” And this like many other articles in the UNCLOS is open to considerable interpretation. The International Boundaries Research Unit (2015) provides a map of “Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region” at: <https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic/>

Arctic Relations

“Arctic 2”

“For the entire length of the Cold War (1946-1990), the Arctic Ocean remained a critically important and dangerous theater of operation” (Huebert, 2011, p.818). The world was bipolar not only in terms of its North and South Poles, but especially in terms of international security dominated by its East and West SuperPowers, the USSR and U.S., both with extensive coastlines on the Arctic Ocean and military forces on the ready for combat (be it any localized incursions or a catastrophic World War III).

So what has changed since the end of the Cold War in June 1990 and the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991? Today, Russians (successors to the USSR) and Americans still play war-games of cat and mouse with planes above the ice, ships around the ice, and submarines below the ice. And because of their mutually assured destruction (MAD) nuclear capabilities, they continue to avoid nuclear war, as well as any other form of direct military conflict. But many other nations now have the capability to operate militarily in the Arctic.

Greater cooperation between Russia and United States, at least in the Arctic region as the “Arctic 2” or A-2, might be occasionally attempted in the future as mutual ideological rivalry between the two Powers wanes and in terms of political economy Russia has become more capitalist (albeit predatory). Moreover, joint measures in defense of Arctic waters would bolster both Powers’ declining global status in relation to increased competition from new rising regional Powers (China and India), but also against increased terrorism from jihadist groups (Al-Qaeda and ISIL). Although secrecy, mutual suspicion and rivalry still prevails, possible future Russo-American cooperation in the Arctic would inevitably focus on:

- I. to discourage any foreign military operations including terrorism in the region;
- II. to regulate all foreign commercial operations especially those involving environmental pollution and resource extraction. “Based on a series of reports suggesting that more ice will melt ... (it is safe to) assume that more vessels will venture into the Arctic, resulting in more threats” (Charron, 2015, p.219-220).

It is however important to remember that both the United States and Russia are still the world’s dominant nuclear SuperPowers among the five nuclear-weapons states (NWS) officially recognized in the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): by 2015 the United States has 1,597 strategic nuclear warheads, Russia has 1,582, France has 300, Great Britain has 120, and China now has 260 (Arms Control Association, 2015).

Russia and the United States remain clearly the most formidable military Powers and able to counter any external threat to the Arctic region, while both Powers “are closely cooperating in the framework of the Arctic Council” (Seliverstova, 2015). Thus, any economic conflict between the two Powers over oil and gas resources beneath the Arctic Ocean seems unlikely, despite their growing rivalry in other areas of the world (Ukraine, Middle-East, or Europe/NATO) and the unprecedented long-term global collapse of oil prices since 2015. The Arctic region moreover is “divided into thirds with one-third onshore, one-third continental shelf, and one-third deep ocean basin ... (and) the deep ocean basin areas—areas over which there are border disagreements—contain few hydrocarbon resources” (Johnston, 2012, p.23).

“Arctic 3”

As world median temperature rises and ice melts, the Arctic Ocean is “enmeshed increasingly in high politics ... a fact that has led some to call for cooperation among Canada, Russia and the United States” as the “Arctic 3” or A-3 (Young, 2012, p. 171). Together, they account for three-quarters of the total Arctic area or two-thirds using the Polar Sector method (Bonikowsky, 2012). Among the “Arctic 3”, Russia has by

far the longest Arctic coastline (virtually unchanged since the old Soviet days), followed evenly by Canada with its equally extensive coasts and massive archipelagos stretching from Baffin Island almost to the North Pole. Likewise, the U.S. remains influential beyond its relatively smaller Alaskan Polar coastline, thanks to its leadership of the Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance, which includes among its Allied member-states both the other Western Arctic states (Canada, Norway, Denmark) and two neighbouring Allies (Iceland, Great Britain), who together with another couple of NATO Partners share Polar aspirations (Sweden, Finland). Finally, the U.S. retains its full economic and military SuperPower status, compared to an enfeebled but unpredictably aggressive Russia (Pedersen, 2012, p.148).

“Arctic 5”

A more frequent venue of regional forum for Polar action is the “Arctic 5” or A-5 bloc, which includes the A-3, plus the other two remaining littoral Polar nations, Denmark and Norway (now superseded by the “Arctic 8” or Arctic Council). The claims on the North Pole of these five Arctic states are based mostly on land, both shoreline and seabed, whereas the claims of all other nations are based exclusively on water. The A-5 clearly have the most coastal “skin in the game” economically, environmentally and militarily. So “there is a dichotomy of interests in the Arctic Ocean” between both coastal and adjacent nations asserting their rights to regulate access to this inner ocean through Territorial Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Extended Continental Shelves vs. more distant nations seeking to assert competing claims to open Polar access through international straits and high seas (Berkman, 2012, p.150-151).

The A-5 have nonetheless “adhered to the LOS Convention ... to draw the outer limits of their continental shelves ... (given) extensive flexibility in the LOS Convention regarding those limits ... (and given) there will not be much ocean floor ... left for the ISA (International Seabed Authority) to administer in the Arctic Ocean” (Koivurova, 2011, p. 217). “The Arctic is an unusual Ocean in that shelves shallower than 500 Meters (1,640 Feet) underlie more than half of its area” (Melling et al, 2012, p. 97). And Article 76 (5) of the UNCLOS extends Territorial Sea 100 nautical Miles (115 statute Miles or 185 Kilometers) beyond the 2,500 Meters isobaths, a line connecting points 2,500 Meters (8,202 Feet) deep.

“Whether one views increased development in the Arctic as an opportunity, a threat, or both, there will be a need for sustainable and coordinated management by Arctic countries” (Arctic Alliance, 2015). There is “no need to develop a new comprehensive legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean”, given the existing framework of cooperative management among the five littoral nations (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008). But the A-5 may wish to consider a more formal regional security and arms control arrangement, such as a possible Arctic Treaty Organization (ATO), along the lines of NATO.

In 2008, the “Arctic 5” adopted the Ilulissat Declaration emphasizing their “sovereign rights” under international law including the “national implementation ... of relevant provisions.” They also acknowledged their “stewardship role” in the Arctic Ocean and indicated their willingness to “work together ... through bilateral and multilateral arrangements” (OceanLaw, 2008).

In 2015, the A-5 “taking a precautionary approach” signed a Declaration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (U.S. Department of State, 2015b). They stressed that the “high seas” of the Arctic Ocean are “entirely surrounded by waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark in respect of Greenland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America” (Government of Norway, 2015).

Geographic proximity is also a crucial factor in emergency response. And “Arctic states ... employ ... port state control arrangements that have ... potential to impose costly responses to rule violations” (Stokke, 2013, p. 81). The “Arctic 5” have a greater ability as well as a greater interest when it comes to governing Arctic waters than any other international organization whether regional or global.

Membership in the “Arctic 5” is limited to only the littoral nations of the Arctic Ocean and “Denmark’s Arctic credentials would thus be challenged if ... Greenland were to ... opt for full independence” (Lunde,

2014, p. 41). And the same could be said about the United States, should Alaska ever secede—an unlikely scenario, just as for any secession of the Svalbard Islands from Norway. Instead, Denmark had granted self-governance to Greenland in 2009, although political matters relating to foreign policy and national defense are shared between the two. And although “in the Arctic Council, it is Denmark who officially has a seat at the table, but in practice it is Greenland who is most active” (Smits, van Tatenhove & van Leeuwen, 2014, p. 341). It may not be a marriage based on love, but it is one based on convenience since Denmark has the money and Greenland has the land.

“Arctic 8” or Arctic Council

Three other nations with territory above the Arctic Circle collaborate with the A-5 in the Arctic Council as the “Arctic 8” or A-8: Finland, Sweden and Iceland (U.S. Department of State, 2015a). Although this new Arctic “[C]ouncil is ... precluded from addressing issues related to security ... this leaves open three major areas that touch on both economics and the environment: fishing, mining and oil drilling” (Wanerman, 2015, p.449-450).

“Finland had a small stretch of shore on the Arctic Ocean in Petsamo, but ... that area was lost to the Soviet Union” after World War II (Lankinen, 2013). “Sweden does not have an Arctic coastline ... (and) only a small portion of its northern region lies above the Arctic Circle” (Bonikowsky, 2012). The island of “Iceland is a small and marginal player ... in the Arctic region ... (and) resides just south of the Arctic Circle” (Lunde, 2014, p. 42).

“A unique feature of the Arctic Council is the involvement of six international Indigenous peoples’ organizations as Permanent Participants” (Canada Foreign Affairs Trade & Development, 2015a): the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Gwich’in Council International, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council.

In 2011, the Arctic Council reached an Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR). The scope of SAR extends north from the shorelines of the A-5, across the Arctic Ocean, all the way to the North Pole. But “the delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to ... any boundary between states or their sovereignty” (Arctic Portal, 2011).

In 2013, the Arctic Council adopted an Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. And each of the “Arctic 8” states agreed to “undertake monitoring activities in order to identify oil pollution incidents in areas under its jurisdiction and, to the extent possible, in adjacent areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state” (U.S. Department of State, 2013).

The Arctic Council also created the Arctic Economic Council, which met for the first time in 2014 (Arctic Economic Council, 2016). The AEC is organized as an “independent forum of business representatives to ... promote responsible economic development” (Arctic Council, 2015a). It is designed to facilitate “Arctic-to-Arctic business opportunities, trade and investment in the North, which will ultimately benefit Northern families and communities” (Government of Canada, 2015b).

In 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State appointed a Special Representative for the Arctic. And, in 2015, “the United States assumed the two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council” (U.S. Department of State, 2015d). U.S. priorities included search and rescue operations, marine protected areas, ocean acidification, and oil pollution in the Arctic Ocean and the impact of pollution from outside the Arctic especially soot (black carbon) and methane.

The United States has also organized a conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience (GLACIER), which brought together the foreign ministers of all Arctic nations and other interested parties. The GLACIER conference was launched during the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, but was not a Council sponsored event (U.S. Department of State, 2015c). The focus of the conference was not only on the impact of global climate change in the North, but also on the impact of Arctic climate change in the South.

The “Arctic 8” are acting in “a concerted manner in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to convert the non-binding ... Polar Code ... to a legally binding one ... to protect the Arctic marine environment from shipping” pollution, even where vessels have rights of innocent passage under the Law of the Sea (Koivurova, 2012, p.138-139). The focus of both the Arctic Council and the IMO is on “Safe Arctic Shipping” (ShipArc, 2015). And such Polar Code becomes effective in 2017 (International Maritime Organization, 2016a) by building upon the Arctic Council’s “enactment of a search and rescue agreement” in 2011 (Wanerman, 2015, p.431).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also contribute their expertise. The Arctic Research Consortium of the U.S. is a non-profit organization of “educational and scientific institutions that have a substantial commitment to arctic research ... (and it) pairs K-12 teachers with researchers” (ARCUS, 2015). And the International Arctic Science Committee is another NGO that facilitates scientific cooperation by “all countries engaged in Arctic research” (International Arctic Science Committee, 2016).

“Arctic 12” or not?

Six other more distant Polar claimant states also participate to a lesser extent in the Arctic Council (“Arctic 8”) as observers since 2013, bringing its total members to 12: France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, China, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and India (UArctic, 2015; Arctic Council, 2015b). But this recent change does not yet indicate that a future “Arctic 12” bloc will soon take-over and share equal control of the Arctic Council from the current “Arctic 8”. Indeed, “Russia along with Canada, was apparently among the leading states behind the ‘Observer Manual’ ... (that) spelled out limitations on financial contributions and levels of participation” in the Arctic Council (Zysk, 2014, p.33). And, given the length of their Arctic coastlines, Russian and Canadian interest in limiting the influence of all non-Arctic nations beyond the “Arctic 5” to “Arctic 8” groups is hardly surprising.

But outside interest is a two-way street. It could result in a loss of focus or even a reversal of focus if the interests of non-Arctic nations take precedence. This happened with both NATO and the European Union (E.U.) as they became increasingly involved with the security of nations in the Greater Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Arctic Business

Fishing

Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States held a 2014 Meeting on Arctic Fisheries in Nuuk, Greenland. The “Arctic 5” concluded that “commercial fishing in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean is unlikely to occur in the near future ... (but) agreed on the desirability of developing interim measures to deter unregulated fishing” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014).

The “accord would regulate commercial harvests ... in the so-called doughnut hole of the Arctic Ocean ... international water that includes the North Pole and is encircled by the exclusive economic zones of the coastal countries” (Kramer, 2015, May 19). This is an exceptional international agreement, given not only its preemptive nature, but also given the on-going disputes between the U.S.-led Western Arctic states vs. Russia’s post-2014 aggressive actions in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria.

Shipping

“The points of access to the Arctic Ocean are through different bodies of water, all of which are referred to as straits, but which have varying legal status under the law of the sea ... (and) Part III of the LOS Convention, titled ‘Straits Used for International Navigation’ ... suggests both a geographical and functional element” (Rothwell, 2012, p. 270).

So it is not surprising that Arctic coastal nations interpret the LOS differently. And the United States, even though not a party to the Convention, nevertheless remains a straitlaced advocate of both “innocent passage” and “transit passage” as set forth in its Freedom of Navigation Program of 1979 (Oral, 2012).

But, the rights of passage should be tempered with the responsibilities of safe passage. And according to Article 19 (1) of the UNCLOS: "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State."

"The Arctic Ocean is distinctive from the world's other oceans in that ... there is only one major high seas point of access" (Rothwell, 2012, p. 271). This is west of Russia through the Norwegian and Greenland Seas and is referred to as the Barents Sea Opening or less accurately as the Barents Strait (O'Dwyer, Kasajima & Nost, 2001).

Chokepoints to the Atlantic Ocean include the Fram Strait between the Svalbard Archipelago (Norway) and Greenland (Denmark), the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland, the Davis Strait between Greenland and Baffin Island (Canada), and the Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island (Canada). West of Alaska (U.S.A.) and east of Siberia (Russia), there is a single route from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean: the Bering Strait, which is only 53 nautical Miles wide (61 statute Miles or 98 Kilometers) (Rothwell, 2012, p. 272). And it is choked with ice-flows for two-thirds of the year (Ricci, 2012).

The Arctic Ocean is also distinctive from the world's other oceans in terms of its two southern shipping routes: the North-West Passage (NWP) through Canadian waters and the Northern Sea Route or Northeast Passage (NSR) through Russian waters. And, despite much evidence to the contrary, the U.S. maintains that both the NWP and the NSR are "international waters" (Charron, 2006, p. 45).

The historic North-West Passage through the Canadian southern Archipelago (explored at immense peril since the early-1800s) includes numerous straits, like the narrow McClure Strait (east of the Beaufort Sea between Melville Island to the north and Banks Island to the south). It is only 37 nautical Miles wide (43 statute Miles or 69 Kilometers) and it is choked with ice year-round (Martin, 2010, p. 58). Furthermore, there is "no dispute over Canada's ownership and title to the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago" (Rothwell, 1993, p. 333-334).

The equally historic Northern Sea Route or Northeast Passage along Russia's Siberian Coast "passes through some straits which are less than 10 Meters deep" (Kendrick, 2014), while its parts most suitable for year-round navigation (constantly kept open in Winter by first the Soviet Union's and now Russia's fleet of ice-breakers) lie in "the internal sea waters, the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation" (Northern Sea Route Information Office, 2016).

Due to rapid loss of sea ice, it is becoming possible for ships to circumnavigate the Arctic Ocean during relatively ice-free Summers. Russia's NSR shortens the distance from East Asia to Western Europe by 8,200 Kilometers (4,428 nautical Miles) compared to the Suez Canal. And the Canadian NWP shortens the distance by 10,400 Kilometers (5,616 nautical Miles) compared to the Panama Canal (Rodrigue, 2016).

Section 8 of Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas already permits "coastal states ... to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone" 200 nautical Miles from shore (Arctic Governance Project, 2016).

"Shipping lanes must be determined and speed and staggering requirements set in order to minimize shipping's footprint in this vital ecosystem" (Lajeunesse, 2012, p.529). And local pilots must be employed not only at ports, but throughout the Arctic Ocean to prevent collisions with icebergs broken-off from ice-shelves and glaciers, as well as with smaller but equally dangerous "bergy bits" or "growlers" broken-off from icebergs (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2014).

Drilling and Mining

"The Arctic holds an estimated 13% ... of the world's undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30% of its undiscovered conventional natural gas resources, according to the U.S. Geological Survey" (U.S. Energy

Information Administration, 2012). And “apart from oil and gas, the Arctic abounds in other mineral resources, including diamonds, gold, silver, tin, iron ore, zinc, uranium and nickel” (Ruel, 2011, p.827).

Although “the Arctic Ocean centers on an area of ‘high seas’ ... that falls outside all national boundaries” (*New Scientist*, 2009), these high seas are relatively small part of a relatively small and shallow ocean. The Arctic Ocean is 15.6 million square Kilometers (almost 10 million square Miles) (U.S. National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, 2016b), but only 2.8 million square Kilometers (1.1 million square miles), or roughly 18%, are beyond Exclusive Economic Zones (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016).

Also the Arctic “donought hole” may not be all that important anyway: this area of central high seas holds less promise in terms of fishing, drilling and mining than areas closer to shore. “No more than five percent of the natural resources are to be found outside the exclusive economic zones ... of one or another Arctic state” (Ruel, 2011, p.827). And access to the “donought hole” through the waters of littoral nations will no doubt remain restricted.

Roughly 50% of the shallow floor of the Arctic Ocean is Continental Shelf (the highest percentage of any ocean) and the remainder is interrupted by three submarine ridges: the Alpha Cordillera, the Nansen Cordillera and the Lomonosov Ridge (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). And coastal nations are now seeking to extend their national boundaries based on the shape and composition of the seabed, as well as the depth of the ocean.

“Russia ... lays claim to the largest portion of the Arctic ... (and) the right to defend the territory with its military might” (Ostrow, 2013, p.57-58). Canada could claim the second largest based on its northern exposure, followed by Denmark (Greenland), Norway (including the Svalbard Archipelago) and the United States (Alaska). And the Sector claims of all “Arctic 5” coastal nations would converge at the North Pole.

If most or all of the Arctic Ocean is claimed by the “Arctic 5”, fishing and shipping could be in turn regulated, policed and taxed to maximize safety, minimize pollution and prevent over-fishing of endangered species. This could be done on any basis, e.g., the type and tonnage of the catch, as well as the route, tonnage and seaworthiness of the vessel. Similarly, mining and drilling could be regulated, policed and taxed to maximize safety, minimize pollution and prevent under-reporting of actual production. And this could also be done on any basis, e.g., blocks of territory leased, as well as royalties on resources extracted.

Both private companies and state-owned enterprises (Russia) could be thoroughly vetted before entering the Arctic Ocean. And, even if they are deemed to be both operationally and financially sound, Third-Party performance bonds and liability insurance could be required. In addition, wilderness areas could be set aside to prohibit some or all business activity.

Such action on the part of the “Arctic 5” is preferable to any “existing civil liability regime established globally” (Ebinger, Banks & Schackmann, 2014, p.39). It would be easier to obtain an actionable consensus among the coastal nations than among the United Nations. A regional Arctic regime would also be stricter in terms of regulation and enforcement, as well as it would be better funded.

Arctic Pollution

In order to fly their planes, sail ships and drive vehicles, the people of the world have made a Faustian bargain to sell their souls to the devil of pollution. Regionally, this manifests itself as the “Arctic paradox” since the combustion of hydrocarbons contributes to Arctic warming which facilitates the production of Arctic hydrocarbons (Palosaari, 2012, p. 24). And the United Nations will have as much trouble dealing with this growing dilemma in the Arctic, as it has already dealing with the pollution devil throughout the rest of the world. But the emission of pollutants is declining in North America and Europe (except Russia), whereas it is increasing in eastern and southern Asia (Law et al, 2014). The U.N. needs to implement its Environmental Program by establishing one “speed limit” for all “drivers” as opposed to

double standards. “In the name of universal progress as well as equal treatment, all nations should be held accountable for both their actions and their inactions” (Craig, 2011, p. 48).

Modeling indicates that “rerouting most cross-polar aircraft flights around the Arctic Circle ... increased fuel use and total pollution emissions by 0.56%, but ... also reduced emissions within the Arctic Circle by 83%, and ... the reduction in pollutants, particularly black carbon ... decreased Arctic and global temperatures and Arctic sea ice loss” (Jacobson et al, 2012, p. 723). The U.N. should therefore consider rewriting the “rules of the road” through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and enforcing them uniformly.

If the U.N. is not up to the task, one should expect the Arctic coastal nations to eventually act unilaterally or cooperatively based on the Precautionary Principle. This could be accomplished in conjunction with Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs). Although ADIZs exist beyond sovereign territory, they operate in the interest of national security. And “such a concept has never been challenged as being inconsistent with existing law” (Abeyratne, 2011).

Due to rapid loss of sea ice, it is becoming possible for ships to circumnavigate the Arctic Ocean in Summer saving both time and fuel: Russia’s NSR shortens the distance from East Asia to Western Europe by 8,200 Kilometers (4,428 nautical Miles) compared to the Suez Canal, while the Canadian NWP shortens the distance by 10,400 Kilometers (5,616 nautical Miles) compared to the Panama Canal (Rodrigue, 2016). But Arctic sea-routes and shipping increase the risk of environmental contamination whether from deliberate dumping (common in Russia since Soviet times) or accidental sinking. The International Maritime Organization has adopted the Polar Code, but its “regulations depend on flag state enforcement” (Wanerman, 2015, p.437). And enforcement may be particularly lax if it is based on Third-Party flags of convenience.

Given the shortcomings of the U.N., it is up to the “Arctic 5” or an enlarged Arctic Council (“Arctic 8-to-12”) to regulate traffic across the region, as well as fishing, drilling and mining. Arctic nations have the most to lose if other nations exploit Arctic resources for economic benefit without regard to environmental cost. Many nations have signed regional trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), due to the shortcomings of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Likewise, many coastal nations should sign regional security agreements to protect their coastal waters. And, if the “Arctic 5” or an enlarged Arctic Council (“Arctic 8-to-12”) act in unison, they have the wherewithal to both minimize pollution and maximize production. But that is a big if.

Mercury is an especially dangerous pollutant for people and other animals in the Arctic, due to their mostly marine diet. “Asia is the major anthropogenic source ... and this is independent of the climate” (Hansen, Christensen & Brandt, 2015, p.112-154). Most of the mercury is going into the Arctic Ocean via the major Russian rivers in Siberia: the Lena, Ob and Yenisei as “run-off from gold, silver and mercury mines in Siberia” (Harvard School of Public Health, 2012).

The bi-products of atomic energy are also dangerous. The 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes & Other Matters, “represents a major change of approach to the question of how to regulate the use of the sea as a depository for waste materials in that, in essence, dumping is prohibited, except for materials on an approved list” (International Maritime Organization, 2016b). Since radioactive waste is omitted, it is prohibited. But it still dumped covertly (mostly in Russia). And, once dumped, it remains radioactive for “hundreds of thousands of years” (Greenpeace, 2015). Unfortunately, neither Russia nor the United States “support any discussion of nuclear contamination in the Arctic” (Pedersen, 2012, p. 149).

“From 1946 through 1993, thirteen nuclear capable countries used the ocean ... to dispose of nuclear/radioactive waste ... (and) the United States alone dumped vast quantities of nuclear material off its coasts between 1946 and 1970” (Kozakiewicz, 2014). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, Russia admitted to the disposal of radioactive waste in the Arctic Ocean. The Yablokov Report of 1993 indicated that

16 reactors from nuclear vessels were dumped in the adjacent Kara Sea. But three reprocessing plants in Western Europe (one in France and two in Great Britain) dumped even more “radwaste” in the Atlantic Ocean. And it was transported to the Arctic Ocean via the Gulf Stream (Krupnick, 2001, p.35).

Conclusion

“The oceans once belonged to everyone and to no one ... (and) freedom of the seas served the world well for ages. But this anarchic principle is now hopelessly inadequate given the present environmental crisis involving massive water pollution and widespread extinction of marine species” (Craig, 2010a, p. 15).

“The ocean’s resources, a single ecosystem, which transcend artificially created national boundaries, require a management system” (Epstein, 2011, p.762). But what system? Perhaps the choice is between global capitalism and global socialism, between private property and public property, between market freedom and government control? If a single global system is not desirable or possible, then perhaps the choice is between regional, national or local systems.

Overall, there seem to be three main possibilities with respect to oceanic regimes. Two are global in scope although both are based on national interest: richer countries tend to favor capitalism with its emphasis on production, whereas poorer countries tend to favor socialism with its emphasis on distribution. But neither greater production nor wider distribution lessens the tragedy of the oceanic commons. The third possibility is national in scope and based on national interest. Yet it operates regionally and serves globally. Coastal countries tend to favor the extension of Territorial Waters. But, since they are opposed by landlocked countries, they tend to collaborate with their coastal neighbors. And, since they have more to gain from aqua-enterprise and more to lose from marine pollution, they tend to favor both economic production and environmental protection.

Both the “Arctic 5” and “Arctic 8” as developed industrialized nations, face opposition from less-developed nations, including the rising India and China (recently added as Observers on the Arctic Council). This is not however an insurmountable problem: America and Russia are older SuperPowers who control the Arctic Ocean, while the two rising new Powers, India and China, have extensive coastlines of their own to exploit and protect, while being distracted by their own border disputes over land.

Thus, India is far more concerned about the activities of China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean than about the activities of the “Arctic-5” or Arctic Council (“Arctic 8”). And India is not only traditionally aligned with Russia since the Cold War, it is also newly aligned with America in the Post-Cold War. India is also becoming more capitalistic and democratic, richer and freer. Its government is thus becoming more preoccupied with consumers and voters at home.

Likewise, China is far more concerned about waters of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea than about waters of the Arctic Ocean controlled by the “Arctic-5” or Arctic Council (“Arctic 8”). Chinese “decision-making processes ... remain obscure” (Jakobson & Peng, 2012, p.22). But “because China is a staunch proponent of the need to respect sovereignty, it will not question the mineral and territorial rights of the Arctic states” (Hallgren, 2012).

The extension of Territorial Waters by the “Arctic 5” littoral nations of the Arctic Ocean will be the best way to promote economic development and insure environmental protection in the short-term. In the long-run, “deconstruction of the nation-state” and “disaggregation of the mixed political economy” will be even better (Craig, 2010b, p.414). Eventually government power will shift upwards to macro-regional levels and global organizations as socialist uniformity and regulation are used to alleviate the pollution of both water and air. And eventually market power will shift downwards to micro-regional levels and local governments as capitalist diversity and freedom are used to alleviate the poverty of “landlubbers”.

But, in the meantime, neither the United Nations nor the indigenous population can simultaneously exploit and protect the Arctic Ocean. It is therefore up to coastal nations to extend their sovereign rights

over all Territorial Seas, Contiguous Zones, Exclusive Economic Zones, Continental Shelves, Outer Continental Shelves and contiguous high seas.

Regional economic opportunities will stimulate cooperative economic enterprise including fishing, shipping, drilling and mining. And regional environmental threats will stimulate cooperative environmental stewardship. The “Arctic 5” or an enlarging Arctic Council (“Arctic 8-to-12”) have the proximate incentive, as well as the immediate ability to simultaneously exploit and protect the waters and seabed of the Arctic Ocean, as well as to develop “best practices” as good examples in other regions of the world.

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The Political Stability of Kazakhstan: the Gift and the Curse

by Danny Krikorian, M.A.

Abstract: Kazakhstan resides in one of the most volatile regions in the world, Central Asia. Various characteristics of the region make this a reality. Some of these characteristics, or variables, help to explain the *unconventional* history of development in Kazakhstan, and perhaps explains why the country has lagged in terms of democratic reform. The purpose of this research is to dissect the political stability of the Central Asian country of Kazakhstan. Eight independent variables determine the political stability of Kazakhstan, four of which serve as the primary influences. In this case, the political stability of Kazakhstan is the dependent variable. Of these eight variables, six share a negative relationship with political stability, while the remaining two share a positive relationship with political stability and demonstrate how this reality has largely shaped the modern state of Kazakhstan today. In other words, the majority of these variables make Kazakhstan less politically stable. To analyze these variables, this paper is divided into three sections: First, a brief introduction with some background information about Kazakhstan. Secondly, the literature on stability in Kazakhstan within the framework of the eight variables. Finally research demonstrates *why foreign policy* is in fact the most significant variable in determining the political stability of Kazakhstan. Indeed, threats to Kazakhstan's stability can only be mitigated by proper foreign policy measures that reduce attempts at exploiting the country's sovereignty. This foreign tug-of-war, or "New Great Game" rather, whose main external players are the U.S., Russia and China, has evolved over the years, depending on the international political landscape. Today, foreign pressures come in numerous and diverse forms. As a result of these foreign pressures, prospects for domestic political development are reduced. The conclusion analyzes the future of Kazakhstan and why these findings are important in today's world, both in theory and policy.

I. Introduction and Background Information

Most literature in the Western scholarly tradition presumes that democracy is universal. Perhaps this is why the majority of the focus is on issues such as corruption, institutional underdevelopment, resource curse and rentier-states. However more and more scholars are beginning to address other forces contributing to instability outside the realm of political reform, such as geo-politics, colonialism and cultural relativism. With regards to Kazakhstan, most scholars have echoed the former approach, often ignoring the complexities of the country and region's nature. This research attempts to demonstrate how an unconventional combination of variables such as different forms of leadership, as well as collective cultural decisions often dictate the stability of a nation as much as the political or economic compositions of that state. It shows how, variables such as foreign relations, security conditions, socio-cultural fabric and the resource-curse often outweigh the significance of the internal politics of a nation. This is not to suggest that political reform is futile or unnecessary, but rather, that too much focus on this element is intellectually irresponsible. The purpose of this research is to isolate the main cause of instability in Kazakhstan, which is based on four primary and four minor variables. In fact, foreign policy is the greatest challenge to the region's security and stability, especially in Kazakhstan, and that proper manipulation of its foreign relations is in direct correlation with its ability to maintain stability.

This paper's analysis challenges previous literature, which has seen the analysis of non-Western countries largely dominated by a culturally-relative perspective, misunderstanding the complexity of

regions like Central Asia.¹ It challenges the notion that democratic reform is the only recipe for stability, that is, outside of the Western world. That Western democracies have often sided with and funded the most authoritarian regimes in the region and in the rest of the world, as well as, perhaps indirectly, allowing for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, makes the prospects for democracy in the region dimmer. Perhaps one of the greatest tools in this situation has been pragmatic leadership, which has been exhibited most by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev himself.

What this means for the universalism of democracy has broad implications as it could suggest that, much like the USSR's crusade for communism, the West's neo-conservative crusade for democracy in the post-Soviet world has in fact threatened international security and has destabilized societies. Perhaps what we are witnessing in the modern world is what will become the "containment" of Western neo-conservatism. Whether or not democracy is compatible with Central Asia remains questionable, but what is less vague, is that foreign Powers are little concerned with the genuine interests of the region.

In the heart of this research study, are listed eight independent variables influencing the political stability of Kazakhstan. The majority of these variables share a *negative relationship* with political stability—in other words, they make Kazakhstan unstable. The others, despite being the minority, serve as resilient forces for stability. Nonetheless, the overall nature of Kazakhstan is one of instability since its earliest history.

However Kazakhstan's recent history leaves a window for opportunity, given its cunning leadership, resilient economy, relatively healthy population, strong centralized state and comparatively lower threat of terrorism. This paper further argues that the greatest threat, even historically, has emanated from the foreign relations dimension of Kazakhstan's politics, with special regards to the so-called "New Great Game" by international Powers. In totality, the aim of this research is to explain why Kazakhstan is relatively unstable; it seeks to isolate the primary force of instability and finally, it resolves to suggest prospects for its future amidst an array of chaos.²

II. Literature Review of the Eight Variables

1. Political Development

The political stability of Kazakhstan cannot be understood without analysis of its political structure and process. In this section the internal politics of Kazakhstan, while negatively affecting its stability, due to corruption, fraudulent elections and opposition suppression, is also a source of stability with regards to the strength of the state and its overall legislative structure. Of the eight variables, only political development and economic conditions pose a challenge in analysis. In a sense, both the endurance of the state, and the vast endowment of petrol are a "gift and a curse". While the political development of Kazakhstan shares a negative relationship with its political stability, it arguably serves as a window of hope for its future, noting its resilience in the face of radicalism and foreign pressures. Still, recent legislation passed by its parliament has abolished executive term-limits for President Nursultan Nazarbayev, securing his role as leader-for-life of Kazakhstan. This dims the hopes for local democratic reform and underscores the urgency of an impending succession crisis.

Kazakhstan is a centralized republic, with President Nazarbayev as head of state. Legislative powers reside in a bicameral parliament with the lower-house Majlis and upper-house Senate. Political parties are allowed to compete, but the authenticity of the election process is challenged by internal and external sources.³ Some parties however are deemed illegal, wholly banned and actively suppressed. Neither of the opposition parties possesses enough support, or power to pose a significant threat in the

¹ Sultangalieva, Gulmira & Paul W. Werth, "The Place of Kazakhstan in the Study of Central Asia" in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 16, 2 (2015): p.345-358.

² Ivanov, Igor & Vadim Volovoj, "Geopolitics of Kazakhstan: Theory and Practice" in *The Russian Academic Journal*, 29 (2014).

³ Isaacs, Rico, "Party System Formation in Kazakhstan: Between Formal and Informal Politics", 26 (Routledge, 2011); Vries, Michiel S. & Iwona Sobis, "Reluctant reforms: The case of Kazakhstan" in *Public Organization Review*, 14, 2 (2014): p.139-157.

election process. Furthermore, the private media is largely suppressed, with the majority of remaining publications being in support of the current administration.¹ This is telling of the credibility and reputation of the constitution of Kazakhstan, which only nominally protects private media.

Kazakhstan's leadership under President Nazarbayev has been remarkably effective in stabilizing the country.² It has endured less attacks and Nazarbayev has been successful in smearing his opponents as "gangsters and criminals".³ He has displayed his effectiveness in maintaining a steady economy, while appeasing both his Russia, American and Chinese counterparts, in what has been deemed a "multi-vector foreign policy".⁴

Kazakhstan has made many strides with regards to political reform, but it has also been guilty of backpedaling.⁵ Nonetheless, with careful consideration of the diverse forces forming the political fabric of Kazakhstan, there is reason to believe that its successes are equally worthy of attention as are its shortcomings.⁶ Key points must be considered in order to clearly understand why the country's progress towards democracy has lagged and been the subject of criticism.

Kazakhstan has been independent for barely 30 years. To compare the status of its political institutions to those of the West, where independence and democracy have hailed for centuries, would be premature.⁷ In context, compared to its neighbors, especially Uzbekistan, it has undoubtedly surpassed them in terms of stability and progress.⁸ Research indicates unprecedented civic activism and voter turnout rates in Kazakhstan's Presidential elections.⁹ That being said, opposition parties are largely disenfranchised and discouraged from participating in the political process, often echoing accusations of fraudulent elections.¹⁰ In this regard, Kazakhstan's leadership has been able to deploy the rentier mechanism by which political reform is substituted with public services funded by oil-wealth. The immense importance of the role played by oil in shaping the political dynamic of Kazakhstan can thus not be ignored, for they have been the pretext for tension between the various domestic and foreign political forces influencing Kazakhstan's political stability.¹¹

The persistence of the authoritarian model of governance in Kazakhstan is arguably a product of President Nazarbayev's initiative to secure his power for life. Both houses of the parliament voted to abolish his executive term-limits, thus sidestepping the 2017 Presidential election—but this exception is explicitly made only for Nazarbayev. Future leaders would have to abide by the original two-term-limits. Despite Kazakhstan's embrace of modernity, this law is largely considered another step away from democracy. Furthermore, it underscores the impending succession-crisis faced in the country. How can Nazarbayev's reputation as a stabilizer, modernizer and developer be reconciled with his tainted legacy of crackdowns,

¹ M. S. Vries & I. Sobis, "Reluctant reforms: The case of Kazakhstan", *ibid*, p.139-157; I. Rico, "Party System Formation in Kazakhstan: Between Formal and Informal Politics", *ibid*.

² Spechler, Martin C., "Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects" in *Central Asian Survey*. 26, 2 (2007): p.185-202.

³ Rorlich, Azade-Ayse, "Islam, Identity and Politics: Kazakhstan, 1990-2000" in *Nationalities Paper*, 31, 2 (2003): p.157-176.

⁴ Willerton, William & Mishler John P., "The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity in Post-Communist Russia: Cultural Imperative versus Neo-Institutional Choice?" in *Journal of Politics*, 65, 1 (2003): p.111-141.

⁵ Knox, Colin, "Kazakhstan: Modernizing Government in the Context of Political Inertia" in *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 74, 3 (2008): p.477-496.

⁶ Witt, Daniel, "Kazakhstan Presidential Election Shows Progress" in *The World Post* (2011). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-witt/kazakhstans-presidential-_b_847612.html

⁷ Tokaev, Kassymzhomart, "Kazakhstan: from renouncing nuclear weapons to building democracy" in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26, 2 (2004): p.93-98.

⁸ Melvin, Neil, "Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan." *Democracy and Pluralism in Central Eurasia* (London: Frank Cass, Cummings Center, 2004): p.127-128.

⁹ D. Witt, Daniel, "Kazakhstan Presidential Election Shows Progress", *ibid*.

¹⁰ B.B.C., "Kazakh Poll Fairness Questioned" (2007), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6952452.stm>

¹¹ Yeager, Matthew G., "The CIA Made Me Do It: Understanding the Political Economy of Corruption in Kazakhstan" in *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 57, 4 (2012): p.441-457.

corruption scandals and cult-like rule? In reality it cannot, but the presence of rival foreign Powers in the region, as well as the early stages of political development within which Kazakhstan currently finds itself in a post-Soviet world, should make critics of Nazarbayev more considerate of the overall political dynamic. There is reason to believe that while Kazakhstan has been characterized by relative stability, Nazarbayev's policies might incite terror and conflict in the long-run, as is evidenced by sporadic cases of violence today.

The presence of a robust, internationally-supported security apparatus has perpetuated political under-development, but the hand played by the West, in its oxymoronic mission of simultaneously promoting security and democracy, cannot be overlooked. Therefore another likely scenario might trace Kazakhstan's reluctance towards democracy to the stubbornness on the part of both domestic political elites and global Powers, like Russia, the U.S., Europe and China. Further, how can the promotion of democracy and a robust regional security initiative be reconciled if the strategy is contradictory and counter-intuitive? It appears that prospects for democracy are threatened equally by Nazarbayev's grip on power, as much as by foreign meddling and terrorism.

From this regard, Nazarbayev appears to be more of a pragmatic ruler, who compared to his peers, performed effectively in ensuring Kazakhstan's independence, national stability and economic development. This is an impressive feat as it was accomplished in the face of competing forces for power. It suggests that Nazarbayev's power-hunger might have more to do with resisting subjugation to foreign Powers, which might be detrimental to Kazakhstan as a whole, than it does with his own self. Seeing that foreign Powers in fact benefit from the persistence of authoritarianism, it appears that promoting democracy is not in their best interests, which raises the question of legitimacy of both the West's double-standards, as well as the institution of democracy itself.

Both Kazakhis and non-Kazakhis have viewed Nazarbayev as the harbinger of Kazakhstan's sovereignty, which has propped him up politically. Perhaps if foreign Powers exercised less coercive influence over the region, democratic movements might be more possible, reducing the allure of both authoritarianism and radicalism. Equally if Kazakhstan exhibited democratic institutions like term-limits, free speech, political competitiveness, fair elections and civil liberties wholly, the country might be less imbalanced politically, socially and economically.

More importantly, it might be less subservient to foreign pressures because in democracy a leader draws legitimacy from his constituents, not by accommodating foreign Powers, as exhibited in Kyrgyzstan following the civil war and the institution of democracy.¹ In revealing the complicity of the U.S., as leader of the democratic world, in helping authoritarianism, raises questions about the West's intention, but also about the nature of democracy itself. It might be a stretch to suggest that democracy is either slipping, or unattained in the U.S. even. Authoritarianism is not entirely absent from American history, therefore allying with foreign autocrats is not completely surprising, whether it is cooperating with authoritarian governments of Russia or Kazakhstan.

Tensions in Kazakhstan's domestic politics—whether they are between members of the political élite, or between the political élite and the masses—have often been the subject of exploitation by global Powers, using the fragility of the region to their own advantage. This leads us directly to the next variable.

2. Foreign Policy and Relations

In the realm of foreign politics, Kazakhstan is a key player in the "New Great Game".² Russia is arguably the greatest threat to Kazakhstan's political stability. Managing the longest contiguous border in the world, Kazakhstan's leadership perpetually fends itself against the threat of Russian impositions.³

¹ McGlinchey, Eric, "Foreign Policy and Aging Central Asian Autocrats" in *Demokratizatsiya*, 20, 3 (2012): p.262.

² Laruelle, Marlene, "Kazakhstan, New Country of Immigration for Central Asian Workers" in *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*. 10, 9 (2008).

³ Braw, Elisabeth, "Bully in the Baltics: The Kremlin's Provocations" in *World Affairs* 177, 6 (2015): p.31-38.

However the U.S. has also played an influential role in this regard. As global hegemonies play tug-of-war over the region, it becomes more apparent that its foreign relations share a negative relationship with Kazakhstan's political stability.

Statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Selinger Youth Camp in 2014 reveal Kazakhstan's vulnerability to Russian domination, especially with its significant Russian population living mainly in Northern Kazakhstan. Russia's post-Soviet neo-imperialist tradition as displayed in the 2008 Georgian and 2013-to-now Ukrainian crises, have done nothing to mitigate Kazakhi fears of Russian influence in their own country.¹ The threat of Russian separatism emanates from the Northern Kazakhstan Province.² For this reason, Nazarbayev moved the capital of Kazakhstan from Almaty to Astana, which is along the Northern border, closer to Russia, to consolidate his own national power, and as an act of defiance against Russian hegemony, Nazarbayev further proved himself a key player in the "Great Game".³

Russia's proximity to Kazakhstan has served as somewhat of a double-edged sword. Despite the constant fear of Russian imposition, President Nazarbayev has used his close relationship with Russia as a means of resisting Western influence, namely pressure from the U.S. for democratic reform. Nazarbayev has lifted term-limits on his own executive leadership, while a lack of mature political development prevents power-sharing and encourages corruption. In another sense however this close relationship with Russia is a way of preserving both Kazakhstan's national sovereignty in the face of what is portrayed as Western imperialism. Not only does this nationalist rhetoric help to keep Nazarbayev in power, it prevents the West from being the sole arbiter of the East. Equally, Nazarbayev's flirtatious relationship with Russia can be viewed as an attempt to consolidate his rule through a regionally-acceptable (to Moscow) so-called pro-Russian nationalist dictatorship-for-life. Criticism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a co-dominated Russo-Chinese multi-national means of preserving anti-Western autocracy in the region echoes this sentiment.

On the other end of the foreign political dynamic rests Kazakhstan's intimate economic relationship with the U.S. and its international security commitment as Partner of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nonetheless, by associating demands for democracy with neo-colonialism, Nazarbayev has legitimized his anti-democratic nationalist ideology. By balancing the priorities of autonomy, growth and stability, he has solidified what has been coined as his "multi-vector-foreign policy".⁴ That he has maintained Kazakhstan's independence, autonomy and economic progress, has further legitimized his position regionally. But the constant pressure of Russian hegemony is nothing new to this aspiring Central Asian giant; as the stains of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (USSR) surely remain engrained in the memories of Kazakhis.⁵ Certainly, the USSR's demise in 1991 essentially opened a vacuum of power in the world, with the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar political dynamic, consolidating the U.S. SuperPower hold on global power and influence the Central Asian region's vulnerability and economic appeal.

Like its Eastern counterparts, the West, namely the U.S., has simultaneously played an inconsistent role in this region; often indirectly propping up extremists, neglecting delayed reforms and dipping hands in scandalous oil politics.⁶ Despite pro-democratic rhetoric, it seems neither hegemony, Russia, China or

¹ Kleveman, Lutz, "The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Grove Press, 2004).

² Brietlich, Samantha, "The Crimea Model: Will Russia Annex the Northern Region of Kazakhstan?" (2014), http://www.moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=420:the-crimea-model-will-russia-annex-the-northern-region-of-kazakhstan&Itemid=480

³ M. Laruelle, Marlene, "Kazakhstan, the New Country of Immigration for Central Asian Workers", *ibid.*

⁴ S. Brietlich, Samantha, "The Crimea Model: Will Russia Annex the Northern Region of Kazakhstan?" *ibid.*

⁵ German, Tracey, "Securing the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy towards the Region since 2008" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64, 9 (2012): p.1650-1666.

⁶ M. Laruelle, "Kazakhstan, the New Country of Immigration for Central Asian Workers", *ibid.*

the U.S. are genuinely committed to advocating a “democratic process” in Kazakhstan.¹ This factor is perhaps the most overlooked in current literature on political stability in Central Asia.

With regards to its regional and local allies, Kazakhstan has maintained a positive relationship for the most part. The greatest threat to its stability comes from its dependent interrelationship with the global Powers of Russia, China, the U.S. and E.U., who have engaged in double-dealings, policy inconsistency and moral negligence. Kazakhstan enjoys a positive reputation among international organizations, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which it was a founding member, alongside putative co-leaders Russia and China.² Nonetheless, despite being an active member of the United Nations, Kazakhstan faces continued criticism over the process of its elections and corruption from the U.N. and various international organizations.³

The SCO however plays a more direct role in the Central Asian region. On one hand, it has served as a stabilizing force, enabling coordinated security efforts, economic fluidity and legal migration. Furthermore, it has counter-balanced U.S., European and NATO influence in Central Asia, which may or may not serve the overall security interests of the region.⁴ But considering sovereignty as a crucial variable for stability, it would appear that the SCO serves this purpose effectively. On the other hand, the SCO has strengthened the grasp of regional autocratic regimes, raising the question as to whether international organizations promote or discourage democratization. Equally so, such criticism may be premature considering the region is still in its early stages of post-Soviet political development.⁵

In 2008, Russia annexed the pro-Russian secessionist South Ossetia region from Georgia, prompting international condemnation and fears of a reemerging Cold War. When in 2014 Russia annexed pro-Russian secessionist Crimea and Abkhazia, and then covertly invaded Eastern Ukraine under the guise of local pro-Russian secessionist insurgents (Donetsk and Luhansk areas), these fears seemed almost perfectly vindicated. While such aggression by Russia should not be surprising to the international community and particularly the West—if one looks through the lens of Moscow’s leadership. Expanding NATO global operations, as well as increased U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, prompted fears of a Western encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence. From this angle, it might be less difficult to grasp the motives for Russia’s behavior in the past five years.

This research segment is of particular importance as the paper argues it is the most crucial variable in the relationship with political stability.

3. Security/Military Conditions

The threat of Islamic fundamentalism is perhaps the greatest security issue for Kazakhstan. The threat of Russian separatism, though very real, especially following the 2008 Georgian and post-2013 Ukrainian Crises, has been thus far contained. In this section the paper demonstrates how the security and military condition of Kazakhstan has made it less stable.

National security poses a very unique challenge for Kazakhstan. However Kazakhstan has been essentially able to mitigate the threat relative to its neighbors. The threat is both foreign and domestic, with large swaths of ideological fanaticism being imported from abroad, mainly from Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, in the form of Wahhabism.⁶ Kazakhstan has remained stable despite the rise of Islamic

¹ Rashid, Ahmed, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia” in *Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic* (2003).

² Chung, Chien-peng, “The Shanghai Co-operation organization: China’s changing influence in Central Asia” in *China Quarterly*. 180 (2004): p.989-1009.

³ Rywkin, Michael, “What Is Central Asia to Us?” in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 33, 5 (2011): p.222-229.

⁴ Lukin, Alexander, “The Shanghai Cooperation: What Next?” in *Russia in Global Affairs*, 5 (2007): p.3; Germanovich, Gene, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 6, No. 1 (2008), p. 19-38.

⁵ Ambrosio, Thomas, “Catching the Shanghai Spirit: How SCO Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia” in *Europe-Asia Studies*. 60 (2008): p.8.

⁶ Rashid, Ahmed, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia” in *Recording for the Blind and Dyslexic* (2003).

fundamentalism in Central Asia. Repressive retaliation by Central Asian governments has only aggravated the situation.¹ Various influential terrorist and extremist networks operate in the region, such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Soldiers of the Caliphate, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.² There also exists a threat from Uyghur separatist groups within Kazakhstan, as well as a threat from external sources of radicalization emanating primarily from the Middle East.³ These forces altogether represent obstacles to Kazakhstan's national security, which is evidently a significant factor of consideration in the political stability of Kazakhstan. They suggest another reason why democratic reform has lagged. Furthermore, they focus attention on the authoritarian nature of the regime, and the relationship of that authoritarianism with the rise of dissenting groups of radical Islamic persuasion.

On the other hand, the existence of these extremist networks is perhaps another reason why Nazarbayev has been able to maintain power—by portraying himself as a champion of the cause against terrorism, he has garnered immense support from the U.S. and has replaced Uzbekistan as Central Asia's primary force against Islamic fundamentalism. These forces also underscore the immense responsibility bestowed on the government of Kazakhstan in balancing the agendas of all power players and potential threats to Kazakh stability and autonomy. Since the inception of the post 9/11 era, and the ensuing "War on Terror" as led by the U.S., there has been little success in mitigating the overall threat of terrorism in the region, further underscoring the need for reconsidering policy measures.⁴

It becomes uniquely difficult to isolate the security threat from the other variables. There have been instances in which groups like the IMU have engaged with global hegemonies directly and indirectly. If this is true, it could be argued that religious radicalism is exploited by foreign powers as means of destabilization.⁵

In sum, there is a negative relationship between the security conditions of Kazakhstan and its overall political stability. Despite its leader's attempts to mitigate the threat compared to his neighbors, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the threat remains. Since 2011, there has yet to be an attack. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's military has been relatively dormant in terms of full-fledged combat. This is a signal of its relative stability compared to its Central Asian neighbors.⁶

4. Economic Conditions

It is impossible to understand the complexity of Kazakhstan's politics without considering the implications of its enormous oil wealth. For this reason, this section analyses the negative relationship between Kazakhstan's economy and its political stability, focusing primarily on the country's rich oil fields in the Caspian Sea.

The economy of Kazakhstan is complex and rich. This reality has complicated its political atmosphere, often fueling tensions between various entities; élites, the general public, political activists and insurgent movements.⁷ This segment shows how Kazakhstan's economy has negatively impacted its political stability by making it the focal point of global hegemonies competing for control. Nonetheless, the vast wealth resulting from oil has allowed Kazakhstan to continue as a so-called "rentier-state",

¹ Cage, Graham, "The Caspian Sea Region's Key Position in the Rise of the Militant Islam" (University of Central Florida-Orlando, 2008).

² Baizakova, Zhulduz & Roger N. McDermott, *Reassessing the Barriers to Islamic Radicalization in Kazakhstan* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).

³ S. Brietlich, "The Crimea Model: Will Russia Annex the Northern Region of Kazakhstan?" *ibid.*

⁴ Azizian, Rouben, "Islamic Radicalism in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: Implications for the Global War on Terrorism" (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2005); Turkey, Faruk, "Prickly Uzbekistan Comes Closer to Russia" in *Transitions Online* (2003).

⁵ M. Laruelle, Marlene, "Kazakhstan, the New Country of Immigration for Central Asian Workers", *ibid.*

⁶ Karagiannis, Emmanuel, "The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*. 13. 2 (2007): p.297-322.

⁷ Xi, Chen, "Energy Resources Impact on Economy Development and International Relations in Kazakhstan" (2007).

keeping its citizens at least minimally satisfied without actually initiating reforms that might threaten the political élite's grip on the economy, and subsequently, power.

Kazakhstan possesses the eleventh largest oil-reserves in the world.¹ This serves as a tremendous asset in Kazakhstan's politics, often wielded as a political weapon to gain concessions from or secure relations with foreign actors. Kazakhstan's economy is largely dependent on its oil exports. While this has allowed for economic growth, it has certainly underscored the country's political volatility, serving as somewhat of a double-edged sword; a gift and a curse rather. In political science, this phenomenon is referred to as the "resource-curse", in which natural resource endowment serves as a substitute for tax and political reform through rents.²

But it has also allowed for a degree of self-sustainable autonomy for Kazakhstan. Still, the country remains dependent on foreign investment and technology for the maintenance and development of oil pipelines in the Tengiz and Kashagan oil fields. The existence of these oil fields had essentially deemed Kazakhstan a central focus of the new "Great Game". Kazakhstan's overall economic performance has been positive and has improved significantly over the years. With a GINI index score of 39, Kazakhstan boasts a relatively low-income disparity.³

These are further indicators of Kazakhstan's potential to prosper. Only 8.5% of the population is living on less than \$2 a day, compared to 27.2% in Kyrgyzstan, the second lowest, and a disturbing 77.5% in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan also boasts an unemployment rate of 8%, compared to 18% in Kyrgyzstan and 60% in Turkmenistan.⁴ All of these economic indicators suggest why Kazakhstan has maintained a politically stable climate, compared to its neighbors, where Islamic repression is severe, insurgency is rampant and economies are stagnant.

In an effort to preserve its sphere of influence and furthermore to encourage trade as well as regional sustainability, Russia established the Eurasian Economic Union, which has had both positive and negative effects on regional economic development.⁵ While it has facilitated and increased trade between the Eurasian states, it has arguably reduced prospects for liberalization by isolated the region from other markets by emphasizing regional development. Contrarily such a perspective ignores the timeline of political development in the region as well as the cultural and economic distinctions which render it relatively unstable and thus unwelcoming towards liberalism.⁶ Since the membership count of the EEU remains low, there are reasons to believe that its lifeline will be short-lived, however rising security threats in the region however might prompt increased incentives for cooperation and unity.

In many parts of the world where oil wealth is vast, democratic reform is scarce. There could be a strong correlation, but nonetheless, it is a question of theory. Oil has impacted Kazakhstan immensely. It has increased competition between elites, spurred corruption, bribery and greed, all of which have fueled dissent, fanatical or not. Still, Nazarbayev has managed the politics and economics relatively well compared to his neighbors. Thus, Kazakhstan has enjoyed lower rates of unemployment, higher GDP per capita, less income disparity and more political freedom than all other Central Asian states.⁷

The history of economic development of Central Asia is not much different from most regions endowed with natural resource wealth and geopolitical significance. These two attributes have served as

¹ International Crisis Group: Kazakhstan (ICG, 2015). <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/kazakhstan.aspx>

² Basedau, Matthias & Wolfram Lacher, "A Paradox of Plenty? Rent Distribution and Political Stability in Oil States" (2006).

³ M. B. Olcott & Martha Brill, "Central Asia's Second Chance" in *Carnegie Endowment* (2005).

⁴ M. B. Olcott & Martha Brill, "Central Asia's Second Chance", *ibid*.

⁵ Blockmans, Steven, Kostayan, Hrant & Ievgen Boroviov, "Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The Challenge of Integration and Unity" in *Center for European Policy Studies*. 75 (2012).

⁶ S. Blockmans, H. Kostayan & I. Boroviov, "Towards a Eurasian Economic Union, *ibid*.

⁷ Spechler, Martin C., "Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects" in *Central Asian Survey*, 26. 2 (2007): p.185-202.

a double-edged sword to the region's economy, resulting in major booms or, on the contrary, incidents of upheaval and economic uncertainty.

The "multifaceted institutional weaknesses" of regions like Central Asia symbolize the complexity of the relationship between illegality, crime, and human security. Nonetheless, the authors here echo the sentiments of many in the Western tradition. This begs the question: is the western academic tradition of analysis largely negligent of its own perhaps indirect complicity in enabling the socio-economic dynamic that is described in Central Asia, and more specifically in this case, in Kazakhstan? In these contexts, names such as Edward Said, and his philosophy of "Orientalism", are of significance, because it helps to illuminate the biases inherent in the study of indigenous populations by non-indigenous sources.

After the most recent terrorist attack in Kazakhstan, the President blamed organized crime instead of radical militants, which could be true—but it could very well be a political tactic to undermine the opposition. Nonetheless, that Kazakhstan is the least vulnerable to attacks, and that it has enjoyed a relatively secure atmosphere complemented by a robust economy, altogether could perhaps challenge the legitimacy of insurgent movements.

The presence of oil, terrorist threats, radical Islam, organized crime, the drug trade—the overall illicit economy—combined with the geopolitical reality of the region, underscore the volatility of the region. This has a tremendous impact on the economy of the Central Asian region. Not only are markets often held hostage to the political dynamic, either through competitive limits or foreign exploitation; they are completely vulnerable to violent disruption, a common characteristic of countries with vast natural resource wealth. Perhaps it is this dynamic which produces overbearing political systems that run contrary to the conventional "democratic" models of the West.¹

The majority of Central Asian economies exhibit the predictable characteristics of non-democratic nations, with regards to economic performance. High income disparities between the elite and the poor; relatively low GDP per capita income; and high restrictions on competition, with national governments controlling much of the economies. The exception to this dynamic is Kazakhstan. The cunning of President Nazarbayev has secured the country politically, allowing noticeable economic mobility and competition. It is no surprise that his country enjoys the lowest income disparity between the rich and poor, with a GINI index of 28.² That Kazakhstan does possess the vastest oil deposits in the region, among the top 15 in the entire world, should not be overlooked.³

Overall, the literature suggests a prevalence of two major perspectives; *externalist* and *internalist*, in terms of trying to adequately attribute the blame for instability in the region, be it in the form of organized crime or violent insurgency. Unfortunately, this dichotomous tradition excludes the possibility of a third (or fourth or fifth) perspective. While in some cases, it seems national governments are more responsible for violence and general discontent, other cases suggest otherwise, that foreign elements are playing a huge hand in destabilizing the region. That the dynamic is so complex perhaps means that the oversimplification of the matter plays right into the hands of foreign powers seeking to exploit the region's mineral resources.

In this explanation, concepts such as "choice" and "ideology" play a bigger role in determining the overall dynamic of each country; that is, the leader's choices in managing the situation at hand; and the prevailing ideologies of the region, imported, such as Wahhabism on one end or "Westernization" on the other, and exported, such as the Hanafi demographic. This reality calls into the question the motives of Western democracies, as much as it challenges the abuse of power of particular autocrats in the region,

¹ Franke, Anja, Andrea Gawrich & Gurban Alakbarov. "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as post-Soviet rentier states: resource incomes and autocracy as a double 'curse' in post-Soviet regimes" in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61 (2009): p.109-140.

² GINI Index: Kazakhstan (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2014), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

³ Yeager, Matthew G. "The CIA Made Me Do It: Understanding the Political Economy of Corruption in Kazakhstan" in *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 57. 4 (2012): p.441-457.

blaming both, but acquitting neither.¹ It further underscores the complexity of the political dynamic, as emphasized by Williams.

5. Historical Evolution

The history of Kazakhstan is rather unique. Its interactions with the outside world have historically influenced the political dynamic of the region. This portion of the research paper will demonstrate why history is a crucial variable in the political stability of Kazakhstan. Firstly comes an overview of Kazakhstan's early history. This will be followed by the arrival of Islam, a period of autonomy. The final historical segment will cover the period from Tsarist Russian Imperialism, USSR integration, and the eventual collapse of the USSR leading to the modern independent Kazakh republic. The purpose of this segment is to demonstrate how these historical incidents reflect in Kazakhstan's distinctively diverse nature.

The history of Kazakhs as a nomadic, tribal people with clan-based hierarchies greatly reflects in its political structure. There is an immense respect for the "way of the elders" which suggests that Kazakhs are willing to making certain, though perhaps temporary compromises in the realm of political competitiveness for the sake of long term stability, and sovereignty. This tradition is symbolic of Kazakh culture. The word Kazakh itself means "free spirit; nomad", perhaps an allusion to Kazakhs' longing for independence, autonomy and stability; a struggle balanced and juggled pragmatically by President Nazarbayev.

Nomadism has played a huge role in the history of Kazakhstan. In modern times, this is expressed through informal social institutions such as nepotism and patronage. That Kazakh culture embraces informality arguably induces corruption. Nonetheless, since its early history, Kazakhstan never thoroughly experienced autonomy, that is, until the 15th Century, when the first Turkic-Kazakh Khanate was established. It endured until the 19th Century, when Kazakhstan fell to the Russian Empire. The period of the Kazakh Khanate is generally accepted as the ethno-genesis of Kazakh statehood and national identity. It would be interrupted nonetheless, by a series of new empires mimicking its past of domineering hordes and conquerors.

Despite a rugged mountain terrain that almost isolates the region, Kazakhstan was historically vulnerable to domination by various conquerors and civilizations. With these empires came new cultures, religions, customs and languages that have shaped Kazakhstan's national identity, all of which are still visible today. The country boasts of its ethnic diversity, with claims of an existing 120 different ethnic groups in the country. Traditionally, the influx of ideas, religions and cultures came along what is now called the Silk Route, connecting the east and west through trade networks and other forms of cultural interaction. Prior to the introduction of Islam by Arab warriors into the region in the 8th Century, Kazakhstan exhibited a diverse religious demography, including the mystical Shamanism, Tengrianism and Buddhism.² This legacy has impacted Kazakhstan in forming its national identity in modern times as it struggles to balance the tenets of Islam with its rich religious history. Furthermore, extremists have often used religion to ostracize or vilify unconventional religious customs. This has only further polarized conservative Islamic movements, thereby contributing to the regions instability. Simultaneously, the leadership has used its ethno-religious diversity as a mechanism for unity among the moderate social groups. For this reason, among many others, Nazarbayev has maintained control, by associating himself and his administration with Kazakh's diverse national identity, stoking paranoias of Islamic radicalism.

Kazakhstan's integration into the USSR only reinforced the tradition of authoritarianism and the centralization of power. They have carried on even into the post-Soviet era—Nazarbayev was former-First

¹ Vries, Michiel S. & Iwona Sobis, "Reluctant Reforms: Case of Kazakhstan" in *Public Organization Review*, 14, 2 (2014): p.139-157.

² Edelbay, Saniya, "Traditional Kazakh Culture and Islam" in *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3 (2012): p.11.

Secretary of the Communist Kazakh SSR. Thus, void a history of liberalism, the political condition of Kazakhstan becomes more comprehensible.¹

The disintegration of the USSR produced the exact opposite result, opening a vacuum of power. This vacuum was either to be filled by extremists or a continued legacy of authoritarianism. Kazakhstan, like the rest of the Central Asian states, chose the latter. The Politburo was replaced with Nazarbayev's state. Similar security measures were adopted nonetheless, a continued legacy of Soviet-inspired statism which Nazarbayev carried with him after transitioning from his post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan to its President. The only difference was that Moscow had essentially less control over the fate of the nation it once easily swallowed up.

Kazakhstan has been independent for barely 30 years. Perhaps this helps to explain why democracy has lagged, and the relatively unstable and vulnerable nature of the region. Still struggling to form a national identity amidst a barrage of violations of national sovereignty and autonomy, Kazakhstan has become prey to the global hegemonies at play in the new "Great Game".²

6. Geographic Setting

Kazakhstan's geography is a crucial variable to its political stability. Below is both the support for the assertion that geography plays a central role in determining the overall political stability of Kazakhstan. The section will be divided into two categories. First will be the topographic aspect of Kazakhstan's geography. Second will be the demography.

A. Topography

Kazakhstan is the world's largest landlocked country by area and the ninth largest country in the world. It is larger than Western Europe. It borders Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as well as a significantly large portion of the Caspian Sea. The terrain includes flatlands, steppe, taiga, rock, canyons, hills, deltas, snow-capped mountains as well as deserts. This suggests immense topographical variation within the country's borders. While Kazakhstan's topographical variation may have provided a natural form of security through isolation and rugged terrain, its proximity to Russia seems to have overshadowed this sense of security. Perhaps then Kazakhstan's most crucial geographic feature is its border with Russia, the longest and most contiguous border in the world.³ That this border-relationship with Russia has adversely contributed to the political stability of Kazakhstan, is without question. It would then be safe to suggest that Kazakhstan's geographic dynamic has a negative relationship with political stability. Perhaps it was this reality, which inspired President Nazarbayev to relocate the capital city from Almaty to Astana, which is much further north, closer to Russia and inhabited largely by Russians.

B. Demography

This brings us to the second aspect of Kazakhstan's geographic dynamic; its demographics. The total population of Kazakhstan is approximately 17.5 million. Kazakhstan boasts an unprecedented variety of ethnic groups (about 120), often celebrated as one of its most dignifying characteristics.⁴ Nonetheless, the country is generally homogenous, with the majority of ethnic Kazakh background making up 74% of the population. The second most significant ethnic group is Russian, accounting for 13% of the population. The population of Russians was larger prior to achieving Kazakh statehood. Moreover, the president's

¹ Tokaev, Kassymzhomart, "Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy" in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26, 2 (2004): p.93-98.

² K. Tokaev, ""Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy ", *ibid*, p.93-98.

³ Xi, Chen, "Energy Resources Impact on Economy Development and International Relations in Kazakhstan", *ibid*.

⁴ Oka, Natsuko, "Nationalities policy in Kazakhstan: Interviewing political and cultural elites" in *The Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan* (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, 2002): p.109-147.

policy of “Kazakhization” which is aimed at reviving Kazakh nationalism, has established Kazakh as the nation’s official language. While Russian and other ethnic groups generally enjoy a level of security, these changes in policy, as well as the establishment of Astana as the new capital, signaled a shift in the political and cultural dynamic of Kazakhstan.¹ As a result, despite a modest level of security, Russians found less benefits to remain in Kazakhstan relative to their socio-economic position prior to President Nazarbayev’s “Kazakhization” policy. Unlike other Central Asian countries and post-Soviet states however Kazakhstan has developed fortified economic and political ties with Moscow, despite these nationalist policies. This is likely due to Russia’s immense stake in Kazakhstan’s oil pipelines. Geopolitically its proximity to Russia makes this relationship a more pragmatic approach on both sides. Finally, Kazakh nationalism can be seen as an ally in the struggle against what is perceived as Western aggression by Russia. All of these reasons might explain why the Russo-Kazakh relationship has prospered in the face of these policy changes.

Other prominent ethnic groups include Uzbeks, Tatars, Uyghurs, Chechens, Koreans, Turkic, Azeris and Germans.² It is important to note that the Russian population is the second largest. Before independence, Kazakhstan’s own national ethnic group, the Kazakhs was less than 40% of the total population. During this time Russian was more widely spoken. Following independence however, Kazakh was nationalized as the official language. Furthermore, quite recently, Kazakh’s became the official ethnic majority within their own national boundaries for the first time in their history.³ This reflects in Kazakhstan’s ongoing struggle for national sovereignty in the face of foreign and internal threats to power. This dynamic serves as a major political dilemma for President Nazarbayev and future leaders who struggle with balancing the pressures of major powers, namely Russia. The conflict in Ukraine—especially Moscow’s assertion of its self-proclaimed right to intervene in foreign countries on behalf of Russian speakers—has focused Astana’s attention on interethnic relations.

Kazakhstan has avoided major ethnic clashes, although occasional incidents reveal boiling tensions. Azamat, a Kazakh born in Bostandyk, is quoted saying: “We’ve always lived in peace with the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Russians”.⁴ To highlight the significance of demography, the presence of Uzbeks in southern Kazakhstan provide insight into the assertion that modern Central Asia is an artificial creation traced back to the initial “cutting up” of the region by USSR leaders. It is likely that the environment and conditions created by these “partitions” created much of the imbalance and instability in the region today. Despite being Uzbek by ethnicity, Kazakh Uzbeks are loyal to the soil in which they have inhabited for centuries. That ethnic irredentism really highlights the role of the New “Great Game” in determining the overall demographic structure and dynamic of Kazakhstan, and Central Asia altogether.⁵

Another key component of demography in Kazakhstan that should be of note is that more than a fourth of Kazakhstan’s population is under the age of 30. This creates a volatile situation and an unpredictable future as it is likely more youth will grow intolerant of the corrupt practices of their government. Foreign elements as well as extremist groups do nothing but exacerbate the situation by exploiting the otherwise legitimate grievances of the population — especially the youth. That President Nazarbayev has established a Youth Policy Program to address the growing needs of his young constituency, six million of which were born during independence, underscores the important role youth development plays in securing the stability of Kazakhstan.⁶ Kazakhstan enjoys a better system of education

¹ Karin, Erlan & Andrei Chebotarev, "The Policy of Kazakhization in State and Government Institutions in Kazakhstan" (2002).

² Nyussupova, Gulnara & Irina Rodionova, "Demographic situation and the level of human development of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Regional Aspects" in *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series*, 16 (2011): p.78-87.

³ K. Erlan & A. Chebotarev, "The Policy of Kazakhization in State and Government Institutions in Kazakhstan", *ibid*.

⁴ Lillis, Joanna, "Local Ethnic Conflicts Exposes National Fault Lines." *Eurasia Net* (2008), <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72006>

⁵ M. Laruelle, Marlene, "Kazakhstan, the New Country of Immigration for Central Asian Workers" *ibid*; N. Oka, "Nationalities Policy in Kazakhstan: Interviewing Political and Cultural Elites", *ibid.*, p.109-147.

⁶ Zhansulu, Makazhanova, "Youth Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan" in *European Scientific Journal*, 9, 19 (2013).

than its neighbors despite a shortage of educational facilities. It has an impressively high literacy rate of 98% and a Human Development Index score of 73 out of 177. All these points are indicators of Kazakhstan’s relatively successful performance, especially when put into context as a newly emerging post-soviet, autonomous state.¹

In the religious dimension, almost half the Kazakh population is Sunni Muslim (47%), while Russian Orthodox makes up the second majority of 44%, which isn’t very much less. This is an important dynamic. Like many other countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan exhibits a moderate religious tradition.²

These points are important to note as there could be a correlation between countries exhibiting bipolar religious heterogeneity and authoritarianism, as well as the rise of fundamentalist movements and separatism in the region, often incited by actors on both angles of the global spectrum, the U.S. and Russia.

Together, the complex topographic nature of Kazakhstan, coupled with its unique demographic dynamic make it easier to comprehend the political condition of the country, as well as the government’s behavior. It further challenges universal understanding of political philosophy, through cultural relativism and geopolitical anomalies. Its positioning on the map has exposed Kazakhstan vulnerability as another victim of an age long tug-of-war match between Eastern and Western political giants, deeming this variable negatively related to its overall political stability.³

While the overall geographic characteristics of Kazakhstan offer mechanisms for stability, especially in the realm of its demographics, its proximity to Russia takes precedence as the greatest influence, and therein renders the relationship to be negative.

7. Quality of Life

One of the more difficult to measure, the quality of life in Kazakhstan helps paint a vivid picture of the reality at hand, going beyond the mundaneness of statistical and empirical analysis. Overall, it appears the quality of life in Kazakhstan has served a force of stability, showing a sense of loyalty and unity among its citizens.⁴

Compared to the rest of Central Asia, the quality of life in Kazakhstan is rather positive. The literacy rate in Kazakhstan is quite high. With the majority of its population educated, it gives hope for a more stable future. The average Kazakh has managed to enjoy a relatively high income compared to his neighbors.⁵ This is likely due to the country’s vast oil wealth, as well as Nazarbayev’s multi-vector policies. In terms of freedom, Kazakhstan’s rather liberal social fabric allows for relative freedom of expression. However this freedom becomes more limited when intertwined with political expression, as many opposition groups and parties are either banned, suppressed or discouraged.

Generally, the quality of life has improved in Kazakhstan, allowing for levels of modernization that surpass its neighbors. Increased urbanization in Kazakhstan is also evident, implying its ability to integrate into today’s international political economy. This suggests that the quality of life is among the few variables that provide stability in Kazakhstan.⁶

8. Socio-Cultural Setting

¹ Country Watch, *Country Watch Review: Kazakhstan* (London: 2011), <http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/pdfs/reviews/B3LMQQ45.01c.pdf>

² Country Watch in *Country Watch Review: Kazakhstan*, ibid.

³ Ivanov, Igor & Vadim Volovoj, "Geopolitics of Kazakhstan: Theory and Practice" in *Russian Academic Journal*, 29 (2014).

⁴ Sultangalieva, Gulmira & Paul W. Werth, "The Place of Kazakhstan in the Study of Central Asia" in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 16, 2 (2015): p.345-358.

⁵ Nyussupova, Gulnara & Irina Rodionova, "Demographic situation and the level of human development of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Regional Aspects" in *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series*, 16 (2011): p.78-87.

⁶ Lillis, Joanna, "Local Ethnic Conflicts Exposes National Fault Lines" in *Eurasia Net* (2008), <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72006>

Kazakhstan's social fabric is intricately woven. As mentioned in the history section, Kazakhstan's location along the Silk Route made it vulnerable to various conquerors, who often brought with them their religions and cultures. This includes but is not limited to Shamanism, Tengrianism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Communism and Islam.¹ Sufism is claimed to have its origins in this region, which underscores the rather liberal tradition of religion in Kazakhstan. The socio-cultural setting is one of the two variables bringing stability to Kazakhstan.

Most of Kazakhstan adheres to the Hanafi branch of Islam, which is of the Sunni sect, and is known to be the more liberal of the bunch. This strange amalgam of ideas, cultures and religions has likely contributed to the unconventional development of Kazakhstan over the ages. The country's roots in tribalism, nomadism and mystical religion perhaps helps to explain its resistance to full-fledged westernization, modernization and democratic reform.² In a sense, this rich cultural history, which enables Kazakhstan to boast some 120 ethnic groups within its borders, makes Kazakhstan's interactions with various political actors, both internally and externally, rather complex. Perhaps this also explains why Kazakhstan and the Central Asian region at large finds more solace in its neighbors in the East, like China and Russia, who have been most significant in countering western expansionism. The less the outside world is willing to acknowledge the significance of Kazakhstan's cultural distinctiveness, the more likely that tensions will rise between Western nation's seeking to secure economic interests and Kazakhstan's leadership. Furthermore, Kazakhstan's cultural dynamic shows how ostracized, disenfranchised and "foreign" Islamic fundamentalism, as an ideology, really is to the Kazakh people. It is not surprising that most fundamentalist movements receive their support from outside of the region, namely from Saudi Arabia, where fundamentalism is rampant.³

The status of women in Kazakhstan is generally regarded positively, considering the liberal Islamic tradition, which permeates the country.⁴ Unlike some other Islamic countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Kazakhstan exhibits no constraints on women's rights. This could be said generally of the Central Asian region broadly. The greatest threat perhaps to women's rights as well as children's safety is Islamic fundamentalism, which, perhaps arbitrarily, refutes women's rights.⁵ Nonetheless, it could be said that Kazakhstan secures the rights of women. An example of this is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which essentially forbids all forms of institutional discrimination on the basis of gender.⁶

Kazakhstan boasts 120 ethnic nationalities within its borders. This is symbolic of its rich history of interaction with external societies, whose cultures and religions they often imported. One of the most important values in Kazakhstan is the struggle for national autonomy. Culturally, this struggle is deeply rooted, as Kazakhs have scarcely endured autonomy. Perhaps this is why in their modern setting, Kazakhs are willing to compromise their urge for democratic reform for the sake of preserving national autonomy, given the presence of endless threats to Kazakhstan's stability, internal and external. Another important factor to consider in explaining the lag for democratic reform outside the resource curse is Islam's

¹ Liu, Xinru, "A Silk Road Legacy: The Spread of Buddhism and Islam" in *Journal of World History*, 22, 1 (2011): p.55-81; Azad, Arezou, "Female Mystics in Mediaeval Islam: The Quiet Legacy" in *Journal of the Economic & Social History of the Orient*, 56 (2013): p.53-88.

² Edelbay, Saniya, "Traditional Kazakh Culture and Islam" in *International Journal of Business & Social Science*, 3 (2012): p.11.

³ E. Karagiannis, Emmanuel, "The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami", *ibid.* p.297-322.

⁴ Omelicheva, Mariya Y., "Islam in Kazakhstan: a Survey of Contemporary Trends and Sources of Securitization" in *Central Asian Survey*, 30, 2 (2011): p.243-256.

⁵ Schwab, Wendell, "Establishing an Islamic Niche in Kazakhstan: Musyلمان Publishing House and its Publications" in *Central Asian Survey*, 30, 2 (2011): p.227-242.

⁶ Kapsysheva, Aizhan, "The Analysis of Women's Rights in Kazakhstan: Challenges of Gender Equality" (Nazarbayev University, 2014): p.1-9.

compatibility with democracy.¹ While Kazakhstan exhibits a relatively tolerant Islamic society, that does not necessarily mean that secularism or diversity ensures democratic development. This might help to explain why coercive efforts at democratization on an international scale are detrimental to global security, especially in countries like Kazakhstan, where a tradition of authoritarian government is more recognizable than democracy. Still there are many cases of Islamic societies that enjoy democratic norms, such as Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia to varying degrees. For this reason, Islam's possible incompatibility with democracy remains elusive.

IV. Implications and Conclusion

The overall analysis, including previous literature and the data gathered on my own, suggests many implications for Kazakhstan. Since the beginning of its history, much before it even existed in the form of state, Kazakhstan has faced the challenge of balancing the variables that seem to directly affect its political stability. Kazakhstan, like the rest of Central Asia, is an anomaly, in a sense. Like many regions of the world where indigenous populations struggle to sustain their national identity while simultaneously trying to embrace modernization, tensions are prevalent, and often produce political systems foreign to the traditional mode of governance in the West. A tradition of tribalism, a history of colonialism, and its complex geography, including the vast amount of oil it possesses, make it the target of aggressive political actors, both domestic, in the form of opposition, dissent and extremism, and foreign, in the form of competing interests between global powers, namely the U.S., Russia and China, as mentioned earlier in the paper.

That Kazakhstan has outdone most of its neighbors politically and economically could be attributed to both its immense oil wealth as well as the cunning leadership of President Nazarbayev, compared to his peer from Uzbekistan for example, Islam Karimov, who has been "less pragmatic" to put it mildly. Kazakhstan has managed to acquiesce any mass-dissent more than any of its neighbors, a reality often overlooked in the literature. The low level of democracy is often the reason for this oversight. While it cannot be argued that authoritarianism has fueled violence and instability in Kazakhstan, so has pressure from foreign Powers and their ideologies, be they democratic, communist or colonial in nature. The insistence for democracy has often produced disastrous results in regions like Central Asia, for example, in the Middle East. Whether or not democracy is universal, due to variables such as the four mentioned here, is in question. This could be described as cultural relativism, the idea that there may be no universal standard for societies globally. It could also suggest something less extreme, that democracy could unfold, but with perhaps less intervention from foreign powers seeking their own interests. Western actions in Central Asia and abroad have been contrary to democratic principles. It is furthermore without question that the West, namely the U.S., has turned a blind eye to authoritarianism in the region.

For Kazakhstan, the road ahead is paved with uncertainty. Balancing its internal politics, the threat of militants, foreign hegemonies, as well as its intricate geography, will not be easy for future leaders by any means. Perhaps that is why Nazarbayev has stayed in power for so long—there is a succession crisis. With various candidates offered as potential incumbents, his daughter being one of them, the question of how future leaders will play the "Great game" will surely determine the country's fate. Based on the research, the future of Kazakhstan's political stability rests mainly on the leadership's ability to balance the threats of Russia and the U.S., and the internal forces of opposition, from political élites, parties and the average constituent, to insurgent groups. A steady transition to political reform could help mitigate the threats posed by these variables to instability, but whether that means full-fledged democracy, a hybrid-democracy, or neither, is mainly up to Kazakhs to decide for themselves.

¹ Ross, Michael L., "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse" in *World Politics*, 51, 2 (1999): p.297-322; Bellin, Eva, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective" in *Comparative Politics* (2004): p.139-157.

The idea that Western democracies promote this sort of reform or solution in Kazakhstan is premature, based on the U.S. and Europe's history of negligence and double-dealings. Furthermore, Russia's more recent expansiveness poses a threat to the possibility of reform in Kazakhstan. That is why it becomes difficult to associate reform with democracy, because the "bad neighborhood" theory—in a landscape of competing hegemonies and security threats, could a fragile democracy survive—would it better serve the people of Kazakhstan? For now, Kazakhstan enjoys the most stable political atmosphere in Central Asia.

Aside from its geography, history, and economy, this research suggests the greatest threats to stability in Kazakhstan to be "political" in nature. The more power the indigenous populations of Kazakhstan and elsewhere in the world are able to wield using the natural resources and geopolitical positioning as leverage, the better chance the country has at mitigating foreign exploitation. This would in turn provide greater political stability to Kazakhstan, and could essentially induce a more prosperous future. It could possibly usher more accountability in governance that could more appropriately address all aspects of Kazakh livelihood; whatever "form" that mechanism for accountability may take. But besides all the analysis which seems often to blind us from the more tangible realities that reflect the cultural sensitivities of Kazakh society, it is important to note that among the greatest grievances of the population is the immense frustration towards Western hypocrisy in simultaneously promoting democracy while destabilizing the region. This has given credence to extremist movements and has further blurred the lines between nationalists and foreign forces.

The stubbornness of the West has furthermore strengthened the resolve of authoritarian governments, and has furthermore increased public support for the incumbents, deeming Western initiatives of promoting peace or democracy suspicious. All these realities have certainly been considered and managed by the current leadership. Critics would certainly dismiss the possibility that Kazakhstan has maintained its stability by the Machiavellian pragmatism of the leadership. But this possibility cannot be overlooked, especially when trying to predict the future of Kazakhstan. That the current model of politics in Kazakhstan has performed relatively well compared to its neighbors gives analysts reasons to believe that the future leadership will be not much different from the incumbent, that is, if the stability of Kazakhstan is to be maintained.

The common thread in the literature is negligent of distinctions in global political culture. Furthermore it is rather dismissive of the West's hand in global destabilization. Since the West has been historically dominant in the international political arena, it is unsurprising that the literature is biased in its favor, manifested through the promotion of democracy and relative political norms and thereby ignoring the differences in culture and politics between nations. Not to mention many democracies exhibit the same injustices as authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, democracies have often engaged with authoritarian regimes, making them complicit in crimes against humanity, a reality that is often shoved beneath the roundtable. The U.S. criticizes non-democratic countries as though we are infallible, despite its own democratic shortcomings. The political hubris of foreign powers is manifesting in nationalist movements as well as radical insurgent movements. But historically, empires that have grown too proud have collapsed. Internationally security is also at stake. Stability and prosperity are only possible if foreign hegemonies contain their own exploitations and expansive-hunger.

But if the trend continues as is, it is unlikely that the U.S., Europe, China, Russia or the regional powers of Iran and Turkey, will stay out of the sovereign affairs of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, prompting more authoritarianism, heightened security threats, and greater instability for the region, and the international community at large. As a result, radical Islam was become more appealing to the region's underprivileged. Whether democratic reform would solve these ills is debatable. It is also up to the Kazakh people to decide. Foreign hegemonies are quick to speak for Kazakhs. The light of justice will be dimmed

by foreign powers meddling in the sovereign affairs of Kazakhstan, making both prosperity and reform very unlikely.

The quality of life in Kazakhstan, as well as the socio-cultural setting, the two perhaps most difficult variables to measure, are the only variables that share a positive relationship with Kazakhstan. This is an interesting dynamic because these two variables are non-empirical in nature—such variables are determined by collective choices, which are not necessarily based on cost-benefit analysis, like the other variables of political development and economic conditions. In the West, democracy is presumed as the rational form of government—the product of a series of failures of non-populist government forms, which led to the enlightenment, and the French Revolution. While democracy has prevailed in the West—it has not in other regions, like Central Asia. Kazakhstan is great example of it, where democratic reform continues to lag. It could be too early to dim the lights on democracy for Kazakhstan entirely, but as the research indicates, the country’s historical development is significantly distinct from those countries, which are in today’s world described as “Western democracies”.

The greatest hope for Kazakhstan and the region at large is that foreign hegemonies will learn to contain their ambitions for the sake of international security and genuine political reform, whatever direction it takes. Meanwhile, if Central Asian states could learn to settle their differences, this could serve as the greatest threat to exploitative global hegemonies. Perhaps what it feared is a united, sovereign and self-reliant Central Asia. Perhaps it is this possibility which has driven global Powers, like the U.S. and Russia to be negligent of the threat of radical forces in the region, while simultaneously working actively against the more moderate forces of Central Asian society. If the United States continues to follow the trend of the current administration, there is reason to believe that the ineffectiveness of the “war on terror” as well as previous traditions of meddling in the sovereign affairs of Central Asian states will be further realized. Given the contentious tone of ongoing political conversation in the U.S., the influential SuperPower of the world, as well as Russia’s interventions in Georgia and the Ukraine, a future of further instability is equally possible.¹ It is a question of whether or not Central Asian states, like Kazakhstan, will manage to fend for their selves, or surrender to a relationship of dependency.

If further democratic development is in fact possible in Kazakhstan, there is reason to understand its skepticism towards American genuineness in this effort. This is because America has often worked closely with autocrats, as well as insurgencies. Russia’s behavior is even more elusive, but enjoys a more secure position in Kazakhstan, arguably because its leader Nazarbayev’s dependence on foreign legitimacy for security, but also to counter breaches on spheres of influence, particularly by the West. The intricate web of entanglement between variables of foreign presence, autocracy and instability makes it difficult to discern whether focusing on one variable of democracy, like régime-change, is an oversimplified solution to a complex problem. In some instances, democratic elections have produced radical régimes, as exhibited in Egypt after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, and in Turkey, as Tayyip Erdogan clamps down on dissent.

In both cases, elections and popular consent led to a rejection of secularism, a crucial variable in the development of democracy, particularly in the West. Who knows which is the most just or efficient resistance against these forces, democratic development, autocratic sovereignty, or both? The argument here is that both democratic development and stability are prevented by violations of sovereignty by foreign Powers. If democracy is not compatible in regions like Kazakhstan, it is likely because of the fact that foreign Powers are bent on violating its sovereignty, a necessary precondition for political development. As a result, autocracy becomes a secure form of resistance, since public trust in democracy is reduced by constant foreign involvement. A similar case is Iran, where even secular forces rally behind the current theocracy to spite foreign Powers who have historically violated Iranian sovereignty. But since the democratic evolution

¹ S. Brietlich, “The Crimea Model: Will Russia Annex the Northern Region of Kazakhstan?” *ibid.*

in Kyrgyzstan, that country has seen a decrease in positive relations with other democracies, like the U.S. and in increase instead, in Russian interference. This entertains the assertion that democratic reform is not necessarily in the interests of Powers, like the U.S.¹

The greatest dilemma posing Kazakhstan is the future—the so-called succession crisis. Nazarbayev's daughter is seen as the likely candidate as the hereditary trend goes with autocrats, but Nazarbayev has himself expressed the need for political evolution towards a democratic society that prepares Kazakhstan for new leadership. The stability enjoyed under Nazarbayev, and the country's overall youth make national reluctance towards change understandable, as political élites struggle for power.²

Ultimately Nazarbayev's decision to maintain his grasp on power beyond his term-limits will determine the course of Kazakhstan's future and whether or not it will dissent into chaos. It is likely that the combination of security initiatives, resource abundance, foreign presence, radicalism and elitist competition all contribute to the overall persistence of authoritarianism. Nazarbayev's legacy of stability and development has further secured his position and the system he has kept in place, unlike his authoritarian counterpart, Islam Karimov. As a result there is reason to believe that sovereignty, stability, development and social justice will be more likely to unfold in Kazakhstan than they are in other authoritarian states in the region and around the world. Nazarbayev's ability to wield this double-edged sword against the influence of foreign Powers have undoubtedly gained him esteem in the international community, even among his critics. Kazakhstan's dualistic nature of modernism and tribalism represents a sort of national gift and a curse, which—if managed improperly—may pave the road to its ultimate destruction; or in the ideal scenario, towards a more prosperous future for not only some, but all Kazakhs. What is made evident by this research is the inextricable link between the foreign and domestic political dynamic. Isolating one from the other ignores the complexity of the country's politics and threatens to undermine its potential for continued development. Ultimately Kazakhstan's political evolution depends mostly on the nation's ability to resist foreign pressures without complete disengagement, so as to preserve sovereignty, stability and political development for its future generations. How this plays out is up to Kazakhs themselves to decide.

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Russia-China Energy Relationship: a Contemporary Analysis to 2014

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Abstract: The natural gas deal reached by Russia and China in May 2014 provides a timely breakpoint to examine the recent history of the energy relationship between two major Powers, whose interests converged in a \$400 Billion agreement. The paper also asks if the deal is emblematic of expanding relations between Russia and China, given the formation of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, close voting behavior on the U.N. Security Council, and evolving political and economic systems as both countries move away from Marxism. The paper concludes these are important trends, but it is also important to remember the history of each state's complex relationship with the other. Since the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, signed in Moscow by Stalin and Mao, the Soviet Union (and its successor Russia) has sought certainty in its exchanges with China. In a complementary and conflictual way China has embraced some of these desires in order to facilitate technology transfer to accelerate its economic self-sufficiency. The 2014 natural gas deal is just the latest in a series of agreements where Russia and China have seen interests converge, while broader relations between the two have waxed and waned. This paper updates the literature concerning the energy relationship between Russia and China and contribute a decision framework that shows the intersection of International Relations and Economics.

"Changes in relative power, which ultimately derive from long-term variations in economic growth, are a mainspring of international political conflict. Economic change redistributes relative power over time, creating a natural tendency for divergences to emerge between power and privilege in world politics, which encourages rising states to challenge the status quo." Jonathan Kirshner²

Introduction:

On 20 May 2014, the international press, including the *New York Times*, announced that a natural gas deal between Russia and China had failed to materialize. The report said, "Commercial concerns continued to dominate—specifically, the price of the gas, which China and Russia have been haggling over for nearly a decade."³ The outlook quickly changed on the next day, when both countries agreed to a \$400 billion, thirty year, natural gas deal. According to the reported terms, Russia will provide China with 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually at a price of \$350 per thousand cubic meters. The press exchange is just one illustration of the complexities of the energy relationship between Russia and China. This paper explores the China and Russia energy dynamic through economic, political, international and historic perspectives to help understand this energy relationship.

¹ In Memoriam: Dr. Stephen Lile (1943-2012) of Western Kentucky University's Economics Department, who first sparked my interest in the intersection between economics and politics. He always cared deeply about his students and provided insightful guidance. Special thank you to Dr. Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution for kindly providing me a copy of Putin's Dissertation. Also my sincerest appreciation to Bryan Barber, Nicholas Beckmann, Michael Dodge, Onur Erpul, Alex Lebedinsky, Dan Modlin, Richard Rubright and Diego Zambrano for their substantive insights and critiques.

² Kirshner, J., "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China" in *European Journal of International Relations*: p.53-75.

³ Perlez, Jane, "China and Russia Fail to Reach Deal on Gas Plan" in *New York Times*: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/world/asia/china-russia.html?_r=0

When examining the recent energy relationship between Russia and China, what economic and political factors contributed to the 2014 natural gas deal? Historically and more recently, Russia and China have been involved in other significant energy exchanges, including petroleum, coal and hydroelectric.

Due to the nature of the recent agreement, which involves a prolonged commitment between the two sides, understanding the context of the energy relationship is imperative in order to determine its origins and durability. Also, because this agreement is not transpiring in a vacuum, observing the international ramifications is also important. Many analysts have pointed to the E.U.-U.S. sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow's annexation of Crimea as part of the impetus for the agreement. In addition, the gas sold to China will have lower transport costs than to other sites because of its source in Siberia. This creates another layer of complexities, as possible routes will pass through territory of disaffected peoples, including the Uighurs (or Eastern Turkic Muslim populations) in China, as well as the intersections of other politically contested territories in the Pacific. This paper illustrates that domestic political conditions and constraints played a role in influencing decision makers in Russia and China.

In November 2014, Russian and Chinese stakeholders signed an additional non-binding accord at a time when petroleum and natural gas prices were low. The parties also agreed the natural gas would be purchased in the Chinese Renminbi currency. This is particularly important because, it is believed that the terms of the agreement assess the value of the Russian natural gas relative to global petroleum prices. The gas will flow from Siberian natural gas fields across the eastern route, as agreed to from the previous terms, and along the western route under the new accord. The pipeline, which is expected to take years to complete, will only take longer with the delays that seem likely because of lower revenue for Russia. With lower natural gas prices, Russia may be less motivated, while China may be even more motivated to buy natural gas. This will possibly accelerate its comparative shift from petroleum to natural gas, which in the long-run may make China still dependent on Russia. In addition, the price is likely to influence how China decides to develop its own shale reserves, which may have more of a lasting influence in the Russia-China energy relationship.

The current energy market, if it continues, may also slow China's interest in developing extraction capabilities. In weighing the costs and benefits of self-sufficiency versus efficiency, if China picks the latter, it will help illuminate the level of trust between the two countries. In addition, under these lower prices, it will be important to consider how Russia will act where sanctions have already proven costly. Does a sluggish bear react to a poke the same way as one who is well fed? These are all second and third degree calculations that are subject to error and should be made modestly. Therefore, the time horizon of these considerations is limited to the next two to three years. No doubt, Russian and Chinese leaders will be thinking along similar lines, in part due to the temporal element of the arrangement. As with most long-term projections, large variations in outcomes are possible to keep in mind for Russia and China as they develop intertwined relations and hedge against anticipated and unanticipated challenges.

Accordingly, long-term delays in the project may jeopardize its status with China looking to Central Asia, especially the Caspian Sea and coastal drilling in the South China Sea. In fact, an expression of China's concerns about energy security may manifest itself most abruptly in its east with Japan and the South China Sea, and in the west with the ex-Soviet Central Asian states. For Russia, with these circumstances in mind, building the necessary infrastructure will be critical. While financial resources are tighter, there are few alternatives available for an economy that sustains itself on fuel exports. Part of Russia's difficulty is the liquidity preference, where firms or states have a desire to hold resources during times of turbulence and uncertainty, but at the same time have greater needs.¹

Russia is facing also financial difficulties, especially when its leaders in November 2014, decided to no longer allocate resources to support its Ruble currency. This shows diminished financial resources in

¹ Tobin, J., "Liquidity Preference as Behavior towards Risk" in *Review of Economic Studies*: p.65.

an environment where the country needs access to liquidity for flexibility to address numerous obligations, including military spending and pensions. Russia's reserve fund may be sustainable for one to two years.¹ Therefore, it is more difficult for Russia to invest in gas delivery infrastructure. However, from a state power system perspective, Russia may have few alternatives, other than to invest in the natural gas infrastructure. Therefore, China, as seen in the natural gas deal, has stronger leverage, but because of its own energy needs there is an asymmetric reliance in the energy relationship between the two countries. Before examining this relationship in detail, it is important to look at how natural gas as an energy source has risen in prominence so quickly.

Natural Gas Trends

A clearer understanding of the development of current natural gas technologies requires an historic examination of the Chinese experience of extracting this valuable energy resource. Mark Kurlansky in *Salt* draws an insightful account of how Li Bing,² around the Second Century A.D., drilled hundreds of feet beneath the surface in China to extract salt brine used in food preservation and preparation. It is believed that natural gas was discovered while the brine was being extracted.³ The brine was gathered by directing water beneath the surface and bringing it to ground level. The population in the Sechuan region also developed techniques to pipe the gas through bamboo and established a way to burn the gas to accelerate the evaporation of the brine. In fact, when employing slightly more modern techniques, the current energy revolution is driven by directing pressurized water beneath the surface to draw-out pockets of another resource: natural gas. Just as the early discoverers of this gas fell victim to the odorless, invisible force, the world is reacting to the opportunities of a readily available and less expensive fuel source. Earlier peoples attributed this force to evil spirits, but today it is developing due to what Adam Smith described as the "invisible hand" of international competition. This account provides a helpful illustration of self-sufficiency as well as the influence of the invisible hand, which is pushing the current global demand for natural gas.

Since the time of Li Bing natural gas demand has increased globally. Global natural gas production from 2007 to 2012 grew by 16% to 3,354 billion cubic meters for 2012.⁴ In the same period, the United States saw an increase in production by 20%.⁵ Much of this expanded production is attributed to hydraulic fractured drilling. Not totally dissimilar to Li Bing's methods, drilling goes thousands of feet vertically and horizontally below the surface. Water, with a mix of sand and chemicals is pressurized beneath the surface to expose pockets of gas, which are released and rise to the surface. This process has resulted in what has been characterized as an energy revolution in the production of petroleum and natural gas. China, Argentina, Algeria, United States and Canada are the leading potential producers of shale gas according to a report from June 2013 by the United States Energy Information Administration.⁶

These innovations, along with the continued growth of pipelines across the Eurasian continent and developments a few years earlier in liquidized natural gas (LNG), have both increased the global supply of natural gas and the avenues to reach various customers. When natural gas is liquefied, it takes up about 1/600 the size, thus allowing greater transport of gas and less sole reliance on pipelines. The natural gas system interacts and overlays the international state system notably where each country is drawing resources internally and externally. However, in an anarchic system future growth depends on resources,

¹ Korsunskaya, Darya & Elena Fabrichnaya, "As Oil Falls, Russia Choked by Military, Social Spending" in *Reuters* (30 December 2014): <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/30/us-russia-crisis-budget-idUSKBN0K80EK20141230>

² Kurlansky, Mark, *Salt: A World History* (New York: Walker, 2002), p. 25-26.

⁴ "Natural Gas Production" in *Oil and Energy Trends*, 38, n. 5 (2013).

⁵ "U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals (Million Cubic Feet)." Accessed November 24, 2014: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9010us2a.htm>

⁶ "U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Accessed November 24, 2014: <http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/>

which are in greater demand as the state's influence strengthens at the same time interests can become more intertwined. These points form a system, which is of interest to academics and policy makers. Many of the Liberal brand of scholars would conclude that this interconnectedness of economies means their national interests should interconnect as well. This essay asserts this assumption may not always be true.

Continuing with an examination of the nature of natural gas, Reymond believes that the relatively low cost of natural gas from 1985 to 2000 spurred long-term contracts and pipelines networks, thus providing much of the global natural gas infrastructure.¹ The natural gas boom has benefited from the reality that other energy sources such as petroleum, nuclear and coal are controversial and have been less favored by many countries. "Australia is emerging as a new LNG powerhouse,"² in response to many Asian states possessing re-gasification terminals, including Japan with 32, China with 11, South Korea with four and Taiwan with two. As regularly portrayed in the news, natural gas is prominent in European-Russian relations, U.S. States-Canadian relations, Latin America dynamics, issues in North Africa, changes in politics within the Middle East and the world, and Russia-China relations. These regional dynamics underscore the point from Bobo Lo, "Energy, perhaps more than any other single factor, has come to symbolize the new geopolitics of the twenty-first century."³

Kumar, Kwon, Choi, Cho, Lim and Moon in their work in *Energy Policy* estimate that the global gas demand will increase by 1.4% annually from 2008 to 2035.⁴ The natural gas explosion in development and technology leads to questions about whether natural gas politics are similar to the politics that surround other resources. If the demand and supply curves are similar to historic points for petroleum, global circumstances may turn out similarly, or the political environment may produce a different outcome. It will next be useful to examine the recent energy relationship between China and Russia within the context of a framework that examines why the parties agreed to the natural gas deal.

A Conceptual Framework:

China's demand for natural gas is growing more rapidly than that of other sources of energy and natural gas is expected to grow from 2% of China's energy consumption in 1996 to 11% in 2020.⁵ Also, according to Daniel Yergin, "As China continues to grow, so will its oil demand. Sometime around 2020 it could pull ahead of the United States as the world's largest oil consumer."⁶ Post-Communist Russia also emerged from its lost decade, the 1990s, with a new leader, Vladimir Putin, who sought to utilize its natural assets through exports of petroleum and natural gas. During this lost decade, energy sales from Russia to China and the broader trade of goods were negligible, with an uptick in the latter part of the final decade of the Twentieth Century.

Around the same time, during Putin's tenure in the Mayor's Office in St. Petersburg he learned the importance of the influence of resources. He also recognized the need for controlling, "business networks and physical infrastructure needed to purchase, transport and sell."⁷ By 2003, Russian and Chinese companies endorsed an oil pipeline agreement to link the East Siberian to the Pacific Oil pipeline. Months after the agreement was developing, leadership started a shift as Putin asserted dominance over the Russian energy giant, Yukos, by arresting its CEO, Khodorkovsky, who was an outspoken Kremlin critic. The final breaking point for Putin's involvement in the energy economy came when Japan offered a counter-proposal. The terms would allow Russia to diversify its suppliers, including Japan, as well as

¹ Reymond, *ibid*, p. 4172.

² Yergin, Daniel, *The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. 332.

³ Lo, Bobo, *Axis of Convenience Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2008), p.132.

⁴ Kumar, Satish, Hyouk-Tae Kwon, Kwang-Ho Choi, Jae Hyun Cho, Wonsub Lim & Il Moon, "Current Status and Future Projections of LNG Demand and Supplies: A Global Prospective" in *Energy Policy*: p.4097-4104.

⁵ Downs, Erica Strecker, *China's Quest for Energy Security* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000) p. 5.

⁶ Yergin, Daniel, *ibid*, p. 192.

⁷ Hill, Fiona & Clifford G. Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*, p.225.

granting access to Asian markets, due to the pipeline's coastal end point. Putin's move also further consolidated his position against the oligarchs who learned by example not to challenge him directly.

By the time the 2014 natural gas deal was completed between both parties, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin were in much stronger domestic political positions to negotiate internationally than their own predecessors had been. For both Powers, long-term deals seem more likely in environments where other sources, or lines of supply are less stable. This includes the efforts by China to diversify access to the Middle East. To help understand the agreement there will be an examination of the constituent parts of the deal and a conceptual framework. This outline assumes that Russia and China are self-interested actors, and the framework will help to picture the elements of the deal, while recognizing, like most models, it is not fully explanatory.

The more dependent a country is on a resource, the more inelastic the demand for the good, and the more instability of sources and routes that exist: the likelihood of international agreements and contracts increases. It has been widely reported China's demand for resources continues to grow to support its expansive economy. As a result, China draws energy from coal, petroleum, nuclear, hydroelectric and increasingly natural gas.

With a strong national demand for energy, economists have measured energy demand as inelastic and therefore increasing the likelihood that China would seek a natural gas deal.¹ Goods that have highly or somewhat inelastic demand or supply are more likely to have state control. Thus, China's demand for energy, including natural gas, is highly inelastic.² Due to this inelasticity in many countries where goods are not easily substituted like energy, health care and transportation, there is often more state involvement in these sectors. In 2014, China responded to these demand pressures by implementing price controls on goods including tobacco and natural gas.³ As a result, there is a closer relationship between the economic and political actors in decision-making, but this paper illustrates that the actors are not simply one and the same.

Not only are the perceptions an influence on the present, but China likely incorporated its expectations of future natural gas prices into its thinking. At the same time, China, like all states, desires a stable environment for accessing resources. When there are no certainties of reliability or unexpected events, a deal helps mitigate, but not fully alleviate, this uncertainty. Furthermore, the risk of interrupting supply along various access routes for natural gas is increasingly possible. As the volatility of these two elements increases, China would be more inclined to reach a long-term commitment. Keohane also talks about the costs of uncertainty being a motivator for agreements, "since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable."⁴

International Political Economy scholars, like Robert Gilpin, believe it is appropriate to bring these key points together. Gilpin argues, "Both economic and political analyses are necessary for an understanding of the workings of the international economy."⁵ This conceptual framework is helpful for explaining the natural gas deal, but may not be perfectly explanatory due to the nuances of politics, markets and the elements of the deal, which may not be known.

Secrecy is not an uncommon factor in international events, but International Relations scholars are still left with the task of seeking to understand the international system. "In Russia everything is a secret, but there is no secrecy."⁶ Massie's quote could apply to many state agreements where there are

¹ Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia & Jieyin (Jean) Zeng, "The Elasticity of Demand for Gasoline in China" in *Energy Policy*: p.189-197.

² Elasticity= percentage change in quantity/percentage change in price.

³ "China." Regulatory/market Assessment. Accessed March 14, 2015. <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=572942241&Country=China&topic=Regulation&subtopic=Regulatory/market assessment>

⁴ Keohane, Robert O., *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002. 30.

⁵ Gilpin, Robert & Jean M. Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 4.

⁶ Massie, Robert K., *The Romanovs: Final Chapter* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 73.

key factors that can be interpreted through events, interests and history. It is also appropriate to match the factors in this logic, because while China and Russia display elements of differing economic systems, the principal actors concerning the deal have strong command over both the economic and political factors in each state.

When applying a similar logic for looking at Russia's perspective for the natural gas deal, it is useful to examine the resource supply factors within Russia. Moscow's supply of natural gas is also inelastic. As previously explained, Russia's economy is heavily reliant on energy production. In other words, regardless of the global price of energy, Russia is in a precarious position that forces it to produce even when it is less profitable to do so. A recent example of this can be seen in decisions by Russia (and OPEC countries who accepted independently) to continue petroleum production even though global prices have fallen in 2014, "40% since June."¹

These economic factors explain part of Russia's decision to reach the natural gas deal. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the political elements of this agreement, because when just considering elasticity, Russia may have had more leverage in the deal-making. However, with lower energy prices Russia currently faces deeper constraints, as a report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration outlines, "Oil and gas revenues accounted for 52% of federal budget revenues and over 70% of total exports in 2012."² Looking at the political sphere, two important elements are in play: the increase of available competitors to Russian natural gas and the expected frequency of negative events that could constrain Russia politically, like international economic sanctions.

Before examining how each state converged, it is important to note that for framing purposes, there are distinctions made between economic and political elements. There is constant interaction between the two. For example, issues related to stability for either Russia or China would likely have an effect on natural gas prices, while the price of natural gas influences domestic and international relations.

After examining each of the parts, the conceptual summation of the interaction between the states can be noticed. In this circumstance where the interests intersected, a deal was reached in May 2014. Applying this conceptual model indicates how, in previous negotiating rounds, neither party found the right convergence of economic and political factors to reach a compromise. For example, China was in a political position to agree to a natural gas deal, but the price Russia was probably offering may have been too expensive. Likewise, Russia, reacted to political factors that marginalized its access to markets.

Given these factors and the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to conclude this deal was a forgone conclusion. However it was, in fact, complicated and there were factors for years which kept a deal from being reached. Can we be certain, knowing we never can in a counterfactual framework, that the needs for both states would have been met by the other at some point? This is likely the case, especially when considering China's energy demand. This, though, assumes constants in a dynamic world. A decade ago, natural gas was not positioned as a major energy source, but this changed as the result of the expansion of new resource extraction technologies. As this paper examines, there are important factors that may complicate the implementation of the agreement. If Russia shifts to a much more passive posture as interpreted by its neighbors, especially in Europe, it may have less interest in upholding the agreement with China. Also, the possibility of China's economy slowing down below her annual records of 10%-to-8% growth and the resulting decrease in energy demand could complicate the relationship and the 2014 agreement. Next, comes an examination of each country's position that propelled them to support this agreement, as well as factors that could influence the implementation of the natural gas deal.

¹ Matlack, Carol, "Why Russia Said 'No Deal' to OPEC on Cutting Oil Production" in *Bloomberg Business Week* (26 November 2014): <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-11-26/russia-wont-cut-oil-production>

² "U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." Russia. Accessed March 14, 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=RS>

China:

According to Sutter, "China today depends fundamentally on a healthy world economy in which Chinese entrepreneurs promote economic development."¹ This invites reoccurring friction and cooperation, depending on China's economic need. This is all derived from what political commentators have asserted is China's principal political concern: domestic stability. This change, however, can create its own instability as China undergoes changes in the Chinese- Marxist economic system to move to a Chinese-market economic system. In both cases to maintain stability, Chinese nationalism is a constant, though troubling element, to its neighbors. To aid in this transition, Sutter points to efforts to build, "cooperation and partnerships with all states around China's periphery."² One area of particular note is the need for energy resources to support the transition from foreign to domestic consumption of goods. Many Chinese view natural gas as a way to diversify and therefore are prepared for supply shocks to ensure energy security, or at least lessen exposure to instability. This is because, "Domestic resources will not be able to meet China's rising demand for energy."³

China is the world's largest producer and consumer of coal, for about 70% of its energy supply. This large energy share has sparked interest in developing clean coal technologies. China continues to seek both increases in energy sources and increases in available energy, while also focusing on environmental concerns. These distresses have contributed to domestic unrest, which has increased in recent years and become a top issue for the Chinese population.⁴ One possible solution is shifting towards natural gas. As Yu, Zheng and Han point out, China has been increasing its natural gas demand in recent years. They note that in China from 2010-2011, gas demand increased 15%.⁵

China's reliance on external sources is shown in one, "key variable in the world economy that the Chinese leadership does not control, including the scarcity of energy."⁶ In addition, China's leaders cannot be certain of other countries' trade policies and the global environment. As a result, China's leaders, "eschew major risks."⁷ This is no easy task, as China's economy remains enmeshed with the rest of the globe. China's use of direct resource contracts shows an uneasiness with commodity markets and a desire for greater certainty for China and trading partners.

China, like some developing countries, has solved this dependency dilemma before by inviting new technology and quickly adopting it in a manner that is efficient, and equally important, self-sufficient. This follows Deng Xiaoping's interest in, "economic interchange with the outside world."⁸ Interestingly, Russia has played a major role in supporting the development of oil for China, and the technology was quickly adopted. In addition, in the 1950s, Russia helped finance the advancement of dam building technology. In retrospect, this transfer, while not the top item in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, was of greatest lasting influence. Under follow on agreements, China agreed to assist with dam and water construction projects including on the Amur River in Eastern Russia.

Today, Ian Bremmer sees China as the largest builder of dams in the world: it has constructed the largest dam in the world, Three Gorges, but has even built more dams than all of the other countries of the world combined.⁹ What is equally amazing is that hydroelectricity still only accounts for 6% of China's total energy consumption. This shows the magnitude of China's energy needs at a time when China's

¹ Sutter, Robert G., *Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p.2.

² Sutter, Robert G., *ibid.*

³ Downs, Erica Strecker. *China's Quest for Energy Security*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000. 6.

⁴ Xu, Beina, "China's Environmental Crisis." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed November 30, 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608>

⁵ Yu, Yihua, Xinye Zheng & Yi Han, "On the Demand for Natural Gas in Urban China" in *Energy Policy*, n. 70: p.57.

⁶ Sutter, Robert G., *ibid.*, p. 69.

⁷ Sutter, Robert G., *ibid.*

⁸ Sutter, Robert G, *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁹ Bremmer, Ian, *Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012), p. 105.

current oil fields have matured. This in turn is crucial for domestic stability as, “Experts say that the electricity crisis of 2003-2004, during which areas of China suffered from shortages and blackouts, surprised Beijing and drove a new approach to managing China’s energy security.”¹ To satiate this demand, China is aiming to expand the number of nuclear energy reactors with European assistance from 11 to 30 by 2020.

Before China can get to a stage of self-sufficiency, it needs partners to provide for its near-term energy needs and long-term goals. A key objective is the development of new technology to extract shale, particularly from Tarim in Yangtze, and the area where gas was stumbled upon in the Second Century, Sichuan. A Rand study from 2000 said China’s infrastructure for well development and reserves was insufficient.² As a result, in recent decades, China has signed agreements with Central Asian countries to boost its supply of energy. China and Kazakhstan have signed agreements worth nearly \$10 billion to develop two oil and gas fields, as well as the construction of pipelines in Kazakhstan.

Rail is also an important tie and element in the regional agreements that can be utilized for energy transport when necessary. Relations with ex-Soviet Central Asia are part of a broader strategy to demilitarize borders and encourage regional stability through energy trade. China receives a share of its gas from the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border through Kazakhstan into the Xinjiang province. With the cultural ties of the local Muslim Turkic Uighurs, which are a significant minority population in Western China, the deals draw the Uighurs in neighboring states closer to China, thus tempering the potential for domestic unrest and feared secessionism. The ex-Soviet Turkic Central Asian states therefore now have a stake in not encouraging any Uighur dissent because of their regional energy dependence on China.

In fact, it could be argued that Russia and China have a shared stake through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of increasing communication between each other and Central Asian partners, allowing China to make better decisions with more information. It is also more difficult for the Central Asian states to play the major Powers off each other, which lowers costs for China and Russia. In addition, the recent islands disputes in the South China Sea are part of a broader effort for China to get natural gas and petroleum reserves. Estimates show the South China Sea as energy rich, with a possible 11 billion barrels of petroleum and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.³

China is also looking beyond its periphery as it seeks to meet its energy demand. As Daniel Yergin has noted, “Chinese companies have negotiated at least on paper, tens of billions of dollars of contracts for investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry that would provide access to substantial oil and gas resources, but they are not moving fast.”⁴ The China –Iran gas relationship is fueled by a \$3 billion deal to develop a natural gas field and may explain the reluctance of China and Russia to impose sanctions on Iran as a result of its nuclear program. Chinese ports and gas pipelines from Kyaukpyu in Burma are also a reflection of China’s concerns about access, where unforeseen events could lead to the blocking of naval choke points like the Straits of Malacca, which would disrupt China’s access to raw materials and energy. China to her chagrin, remains not immune from the influence of unforeseen global events and crises.

China also saw a stronger recovery to the 2008 Financial Crisis, though the events highlighted China’s dependence on international exports. The Chinese leadership has worked to insulate the country by encouraging more domestic demand, therefore developing a deeper form of self-sufficiency. Of course, whether the consumers of Chinese products are domestic or foreign, energy will be of great concern for modes of production and the shift to consumption needs. In a recent paper by Pritchett and

¹ Erica Downs, *Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China* (December 2006).

² Downs, Erica Strecker, *China’s Quest for Energy Security* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), p. 34.

³ “U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis.” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Accessed December 2, 2014. <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>.

⁴ Yergin, Daniel, *ibid*, p. 222.

Summers, "Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean,"¹ they expect growth for China to slow in the future due to the concept of regression to the mean. While no doubt a state's economic growth moving to an average number is compelling, it is not clear when this may happen or what the economic growth mean is for China. In the paper, the authors give a broad timeframe for this change to happen and acknowledge it is, "on very weak scientific footing."² Though they do expect growth to slow to 6.3% by the end of the decade, consumption of energy will still be very significant.³ In fact, as shown by Jin Zeng,⁴ localized decisions in Chinese firms may allow more flexibility. This provides a more accommodating environment, which could allow more robust economic growth rates than predicted by Summers and Pritchett.

Nevertheless, to promote domestic growth and deeper international ties China announced the establishment of a \$40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund.⁵ It will be practically useful to consider if this development is a challenge to the World Bank or more of a rejection of the BRICS bank where two of the countries are struggling economically. Reymond pointed out in 2007, that Russia possessed 27% of the world's natural gas reserves and seeks a market in Asia. The Eastern Siberia field's close proximity to China would be a natural connection.⁶ Furthermore, if Russia continues to face challenges, due to lower natural gas prices and liquidity strains, they may find themselves visiting the Chinese Bank for a loan with natural gas as collateral with terms possibly similar to loans between China and Venezuela.

Russia:

In *Axis of Convenience*, Lo illustrates how Russia is focused on the security of demand, due to its dependence on energy exports, and China is concerned with the security of supply, as it is increasingly dependent on outside sources of energy.⁷ Furthermore, Khudoley and Tkachenko point out that Russia's share of the global economy has dropped from 10% to 1%.⁸ In the mid-1960s, natural gas was discovered in Northwestern Siberia, thus making permanent Russia's interests in the region. Despite its vast territorial presence in Asia, little more than a quarter of Russia's population resides in Asia.

Around the middle of the last decade, a shift occurred internationally when many developing and developed states could not meet internal needs through domestic production; at this point Russian natural gas filled much of the global demand. For example in 2009, 26% of primary energy consumption for Europe was from natural gas. "Europe's growing dependency on natural gas from more distant sources may also impact its future policies to ensure security of energy supplies,"⁹ says Kumar et al. Russia, while a leading energy producing state, has to be concerned with the political flexibility other states have through LNG technology. More Western European countries including Italy, Spain and France are significant users of LNG. This share alone diminishes Russian leverage and may have contributed to Putin and Russia's leaders constraints in its arrangement with China.

¹ Pritchett, Lant & Lawrence H. Summers, *Asiaphoria Meets Regression to the Mean* (2013).

² Pritchett, Lant, and Lawrence H. Summers. *Ib.* 2.

³ While regression to the mean has a very compelling logic if employed in examining future growth in either the 90s or 00s estimates would have clearly missed their mark. Pritchett and Summers need to present a compelling case for why a new mean in China's growth will happen other than saying it just happens.

⁴ Zeng, Jin, *State-Led Privatization in China* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 40.

⁵ Carsten, Paul & Ben Blanchard, "China to Establish \$40 Billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund" (8 November 2014): <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/08/us-china-diplomacy-idUSKBN0IS0BQ20141108>

⁶ Reymond, Mathias, "European Key Issues Concerning Natural Gas: Dependence and Vulnerability" in *Energy Policy*: p.4170.

⁷ Lo, Bobo, *Axis of Convenience Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2008), p. 133.

⁸ Khudoley, Konstantin & Stanislav Tkachenko, *Imagining Asia in 2030: Trends, Scenarios and Alternatives*. Edited by Ajey Lele & Namrata Goswami (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2011), p. 494.

⁹ Kumar, Satish, Hyouk-Tae Kwon, Kwang-Ho Choi, Jae Hyun Cho, Wonsub Lim & Il Moon, "Current Status and Future Projections of LNG Demand and Supplies: a Global Prospective" in *Energy Policy*, 39, no. 7 (2011): p.4097-4104.

Gvosdev and Marsh have characterized Russian foreign policy interests as intertwined with business to form a, “state capitalist” system.¹ Hill and Gaddy in *Mr. Putin* often characterize the Russian leader as a Survivalist who is prepared for various cataclysmic events. No doubt, he has developed the skills of a survivor by learning from his own and others’, mistakes in informing his major energy dealings. His first two presidential terms were largely driven by oil but his current, and possibly successive, terms will be much more driven by natural gas. According to Gvosdev and Marsh, for Russia it is, “through economic means that foreign policy objectives can be met.”²

Putin borrowed liberally from a business book by King and Cleland *Strategic Planning and Policy*, in writing his own dissertation on resource development and the elements of state power. As Gaddy and Hill explain, Putin was influenced by the book and concepts like hierarchy of decision-making, market share percentage, time of development, costs and goals.³ King and Cleland also explain how all these concepts intersect and interact. By Putin’s behavior, it can be assumed that he prefers to be the point of intersection for economic and political decisions. In fact, Putin’s dissertation focuses on Russia’s economic growth as a source of its national power.⁴ Therefore, a key role for the state is the development of its natural resources. He also believes that when the state played a passive role in natural resource development it resulted in a low point for the Russian economic system. Further, Putin’s elimination of rival business challengers is a way to control agency costs where the business may not have behaved as he wished. In addition, due to the high price of oil and natural gas, Russia was able to capitalize on, “rents generated by oil and gas [that] were leveraged by other Russian economic sectors.”⁵ Nevertheless, Kaplan believes Russia’s future empire will be weaker due to the relative increase in strength of its neighbors.⁶

The Russo-German relationship, a key determinant in Russo-European relations, has declined from closer ties under the previous German Social-Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Under him closer coordination included pipeline routes that would bypass Central and Eastern Europe through the Nord Stream pipeline. Also, the Russian South Stream project went forward with support from Italy, Germany and France. One event that may have influenced Russian decision-making and contributed to the deal with China is the U.S.-supported natural gas pipeline that bypasses Russia and runs through the Caucasus and Anatolia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline connects the natural gas rich Caspian to the Mediterranean with the possibility of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline extending to Europe.

Furthermore, Russia objects to a proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline that would allow the West greater access to natural gas. There continues to be a stand-off, in which Russia plays a part, between the countries bordering the Caspian on drilling rights. This dispute serves to magnify Russia’s comparative advantage through marginalizing competitors, extracting political concessions from neighbors, and keeping the global supply of natural gas and petroleum down, thus keeping the market price higher. This region should get renewed recognition as Mackinder’s Pivot Area. It is inaccessible to sea power and this area around the Caspian and Central Asia will alter power arrangements, as Colin Gray points out, with the coming of, “railroads and air routes.”⁷ No doubt, natural resources will fuel this transition. Russia is also sought certainty with its long-term contracts and pipeline plans, including the completion of the Norway-Barents Sea gas deal. In addition, the European Union (E.U.) strives to collectively negotiate

¹ Gvosdev, Nikolas K. & Christopher Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors* (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), p.39.

² Gvosdev, Nikolas K. & Christopher Marsh, *Ibid*, p.39.

³ King, William Richard & David I. Cleland, *Strategic Planning and Policy* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978), p. 198.

⁴ Putin, Vladimir, "Strategic Planning of the Reproduction of the Mineral Resource Base of a Region under Conditions of the Formation of Market Relations" (Leningrad State University, 1997).

⁵ Hill, Fiona & Clifford G. Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*, p.90.

⁶ Kaplan, Robert D., *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 184.

⁷ Gray, Colin S., *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 21.

natural gas deals with Russia to secure a lower price and minimize Russia's attempts at political influence over the E.U.'s Eastern European states.

Russia also has to address sanctions from the United States and European Union that are in response to Russian annexation of Crimea, Russian influence in Ukraine, and the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in Eastern Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists. In July 2014, U.S. President Obama announced sanctions on Russian finances and energy sectors that have incrementally expanded in response to Russian action. According to a recent report from the Congressional Research Service in, "2013, just 0.71% of U.S. exports of goods went to Russia and 1.19% of U.S. imports of goods came from Russia. Less than 0.5% of U.S. overseas investment was in Russia in 2012. At the end of 2013, Russia accounted for 1.1% of outstanding U.S. bank loans overseas."¹ The effects throughout Europe may be more significant, "In 2013, more than 50% of Russia's exports of goods went to EU countries, and Russia purchased 46% of its imports of goods from EU countries." Of particular exposure to the Russian economy, is the financial sector that is closely linked to European banks and one of the areas of the targeted sanctions. These sanctions, though, have not fully hindered Russia's access to the European continent as the continued work on the pipeline through Turkey and recent Russian natural gas contracts with Greece show. As a result, the commercial relationship with Turkey will complicate initiatives from some figures in Washington who want to sell LNG to Ukraine. Turkey may be less inclined to allow passage through the Bosphorus if that would influence relations with Moscow and effect the pipeline. Russia may have less flexibility since the annexation of Crimea, but the global demand for energy ensures Russia has a market, although a portion of that market is shrinking. As Lo explains, "While political agendas are important, the Russian government and major energy concerns," are, "aware of profit for its own sake."²

Profit and international politics also motivated the actors when considering the joint consortium in the Sakhalin I energy enterprise with partners from Russia, India, and Japan, which shows some durability of such ventures. Under the agreement, natural gas goes to Russia's market while the petroleum is sold on Asian markets. By extension, the Sakhalin II arrangement allowed Russia to create its first LNG port, where countries including Japan, South Korea, and the United States are customers. While the enterprise is interesting to examine, it is important to consider the larger share of gas within Russia. Much of Russia's natural gas comes from the Kovykta field in the eastern Siberian region of Irkutsk. Some estimates of Siberia's natural gas reserves are 1,680 trillion cubic feet, while for comparison the Sakhalin Island project is about 96 trillion cubic feet. The estimated number of natural gas reserves in Siberia is about 17 times the size of Sakhalin.

Conclusion:

According to Gvosdev and Marsh, a December 2012, agreement between Russia and China set the goal of developing the eastern route for the natural gas pipeline as well as building a nuclear power plant and oil refinery in China. This agreement was one of the final steps in the journey to the natural gas agreement of 2014. Further questions deserving exploration include how this deal will effect non-energy elements of the Russia - China Relationship. Under the Carter Doctrine, U.S., interests were expanded to include stability in the Persian Gulf.³ Access to petroleum was of paramount importance and was broadly accepted as U.S. policy for decades. Could a similar framing of interests and ties occur between Russia and China? Is the dependence as great? As Keohane notes the, "economic interests of liberal states make

¹ CRS Insights U.S.-Russia Economic Relations, Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance (rnelson@crs.loc.gov, 7-6819) August 1, 2014 (IN10119).

² Lo, Bobo, *Axis of Convenience Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2008), p.135.

³ Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 344.

them vulnerable to threats to their access to raw materials and to markets.”¹ Are states that partially adopt tenants of Capitalism like Russia and China as susceptible to market shocks? It would seem this deal is an effort to make each less susceptible.

While this text shows how there has been a history of cooperation regarding energy matters, Lorenz Luthi in *The Sino-Soviet Split* reveals the divisions between Russia and China because of ideological, national interest, and personal differences. No doubt, this was the case, but examining a different relationship at a different time reveals similar divisions. In fact, it could be argued that the past elements of shared political and economic ideology and common perception of Western threats would have galvanized a relationship in previous decades. Tracing this relationship between Russia and China through the lens of energy reveals a business relationship at the strongest points of intersection, which seems to quickly deviate when examining other subjects. As explained, this energy relationship may not be as enduring as the terms of the agreement construe.

It is decidedly probable China will find alternative sources, domestically and regionally, which would be a great loss to Russia. Also, Russia was the party at the negotiating table that had the right hand but not enough trump cards. Current events, which are subject to change, only make Russia’s position worse and therefore China’s comparative position is better. According to the conceptual framework presented in this paper, many more interceding events would have to occur in order to break loose the agreement in order to outweigh the considerable investment each has made in this deal. As Russia desires an environment with greater certainty and China strives for greater self-sufficiency, there will be points of convergence, as with the 2014 natural gas agreement and possible divergence in energy relations in the future.

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¹ Keohane, Robert O., *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002), p.55.

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The Imagery of Political Extremism

by Thomas Just, M.A., *Alternate 2017 Best Graduate Paper*, Florida International University

ABSTRACT: How do political extremist movements use symbols and images to create a brand and develop the attraction of potential followers? This project analyzes the use of images and branding strategy by two prominent political extremist movements – Nazism and contemporary Islamism, specifically the Islamic State. The paper begins with a theoretical framework that explains the importance of branding strategy and its usefulness in selling political ideas and obtaining the loyalty of followers. The second section examines the branding of Nazism and the ways in which images were used by the Nazis to sell certain ideas and values to the public, such as anti-Semitism and the roles of women and youth within the movement. The third section analyzes similar themes with regard to contemporary Islamism, such as the lifestyle within the movement, the role of children, and also pays special attention to the ways in which modern technology is used to reach potential supporters. This study is intended to demonstrate how these particular movements have been able to gain support and conveys the central importance of branding and imagery in the marketplace of ideas. The ultimate goal of this project is to provide a greater understanding of how extremist groups use these methods to promote their violent agendas, in the hope that this understanding will help in the development of ways to counter these groups' influence.

Introduction

Images are one of the most powerful tools in human interaction and serve as a central component of branding—a strategy used by both political and non-political organizations across the globe. However, images and branding can be used for a variety of purposes. The motivations and intentions of those using images can therefore play a major role in directing the trajectory of world history and events. This paper focuses on the branding strategies of extremist groups and seeks to answer the research question: how do political extremist movements use symbols and images to create a brand and develop the attraction of potential followers? This essay seeks to answer this question by employing a descriptive research methodology and analyzing the branding strategies and use of images by two prominent extremist movements—Nazism and contemporary Islamism. Through this study, one will develop a greater understanding of the power of images and branding strategy in the development of political extremist movements.

Theoretical Framework

Oftentimes when people think of the term “branding,” they associate the term with commercial enterprises, such as Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Mercedes Benz, etc. However, scholars have increasingly begun to investigate the use of branding in a political context. The very essence of branding is to distinguish one’s product from the competition and sell it to others. Consequently, the branding strategies of commercial and political organizations are very similar—the main difference is that while commercial enterprises attempt to sell a tangible product, political organizations attempt to sell an idea.

Whereas individuals and organizations are tangible, a brand is intangible and psychological. Brands are intended to evoke particular feelings, impressions, associations, or images from an audience. In this way, brands help to create an identity and reputation. Brands enable audiences to quickly distinguish one product or organization from all others with the ultimate goals being to create attraction and develop a specific loyalty.

In the political context, developing a cohesive brand can often be the determining factor in terms of which movements will have the greatest potential influence and support. Just as in the commercial marketplace, there is great competition in the marketplace of ideas. Therefore, it is essential for any successful movement to create the necessary attraction and build the loyalty of their followers.

One of the most effective means of creating this necessary attraction and support is by creating a brand that promises an improved lifestyle. Successful political brands tend to convey the message that joining and supporting the movement will improve one's life in some way. Improving one's life is essentially the motivation for a person to purchase any product or join any movement. Kevin Roberts argues that effective brands "should focus on telling stories that inspire and captivate consumers. These stories must demonstrate a genuine understanding of consumers' lifestyles, dreams, and goals and compellingly represent how the brand can enrich their lives" (Roberts, 2004). In other words, brands must understand and appeal to the particular circumstances of their intended audience in order to connect and persuade. This is especially the case with regard to political movements and their efforts to brand ideas to potential constituencies.

The process of creating attraction often begins with demonstrating an understanding of the audience and empathy for their situation and concerns. This is particularly true in turbulent economic or political environments. By demonstrating such understanding and empathy, audiences are able to develop an emotional connection with the brand that forges a bond between the consumer/supporter and the product/movement. As Marc Gobe writes, "consumers today not only want to be romanced by the brands they choose to bring into their lives, they absolutely want to establish a multifaceted holistic relationship with that brand, and this means they expect the brand to play a positive, proactive role in their lives" (Gobe, 2002: p. XXI). Therefore, successful brands tend to emphasize the very close relationship between their product/idea and the audience's lifestyle.

When considering the attraction that particular individuals may have to a brand, cultural and social context are essential to understand. Values, institutions, and symbols can have vastly different meanings across cultures, and therefore there is no universal formula for effective branding. For example, brands defined by individualism that tend to develop attraction in many Western cultures may not develop similar attraction in some Eastern cultures that tend to put greater emphasis on communitarianism. Therefore, the analysis of a particular brand cannot be done in isolation. One must also take into account the attitudes, circumstances and culture of the audience to which the brand is attempting to appeal.

It is important to remember, however, that branding is a value neutral concept and therefore can be used to promote tolerance and peace, or hatred and violence. Virtually all political movements use symbols and images to represent their ideas and sell them to the public. This is true for both democratic political parties and extremist movements. Both types of movements attempt to sell an ideal to which the movement aspires. Nonetheless, one must remember that branding is concerned with emphasizing a product, or idea's uniqueness, and therefore it is problematic to generalize branding strategies and techniques across all movements and ideologies. There are, however, certain trends that can be identified between movements with similar ideals. Therefore, it is the purpose of this study to focus on the common elements of branding strategy across two particular political extremist movements – Nazism and contemporary Islamism.

Extremism is, of course, difficult to define, and is indeed a subjective term. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term as a "belief in and support for ideas that are very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable" ('Extremism', 2015). Such a definition is indeed vague and reflects the subjectivity with which the term is commonly used. Nonetheless, there are certain elements to particular movements that help to distinguish such movements as extremist. For the purpose of this analysis, the essay defines extremism as all political movements that consistently advocate violence as a means of political, social, or religious intimidation. This use of violence as a political tool would most likely be

considered “very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable”, thus meeting the dictionary definition of the term. Nazism and contemporary Islamism are both movements to which such a characteristic applies, and therefore it becomes increasingly important to understand what attracts certain individuals to support and invest in such movements and how these movements attempt to appeal to their target audiences.

One of the first important aspects of extremist branding to understand is the nature and motivations of individuals to join such movements. There are a variety of theories as to why extremist ideologies and their branding appeal to certain audiences. Arno Gruen argues that extremism is a pathological illness by writing, “The lack of identity associated with extremists is the result of self-destructive self-hatred that leads to feelings of revenge toward life itself, and a compulsion to kill one’s own humanness” (Gruen, 2003). Others argue that extremism is an emotional outlet for severe feelings due to “persistent experiences of oppression, insecurity, humiliation, resentment, loss and rage” (Coleman & Bartoli, 2004: p.3). Meanwhile, other social scientists, such as Eli Berman, contend that extremism is adopted as a “rational strategy in a game over power” (Coleman & Bartoli, 2004: p.4). As one can see, there is no universal explanation as to why extremist ideologies appeal to certain audiences. Consequently, the brands of extremist ideologies often vary, but nonetheless attempt to appeal to audiences that are likely to have some particular grievances against society.

One of the more counterintuitive aspects of extremist group branding is the ways in which such movements attempt to appeal to the ordinary aspects of the lives of potential followers. Yes, many of these movements indeed use violence as a means to attract potential followers, and particularly those with passionate grievances and high degrees of anger. However, violence alone is typically not the only selling point of such brands. Extremist movements also commonly depict positive elements or aspirations that many have with regard to family, children, camaraderie, health and leisure. Extremist groups often emphasize the camaraderie among their followers, the material comforts that one may enjoy by joining, and the idea of an improved lifestyle as part of the utopic vision that the movement projects for the future. So while violent tendencies and intimidation may be the major factors defining such movements as extreme, the branding of these movements often emphasize more ordinary, quality of life issues as well.

The concept of branding has nonetheless evolved with time, in large part due to advances in technology and the ability of organizations to reach wider audiences in shorter periods of time. The rise of mass media and technology are commonly cited as enabling forces for the rise of Nazi-Fascism and totalitarianism in the 1920s and 1930s, for without such technology these movements would have been less likely to grow support, project images, and control messaging to the extent they were able.

Technology has, however, continued to advance, and as a result the branding strategies of contemporary extremist groups, while containing similar themes to those of the past, now have to adapt to a far greater amount of communications channels. Whereas early extremist/Fascist/totalitarian movements were able to influence and eventually control the small number of communications channels available, similar movements today have needed to adapt to a time where far more individuals have access to media through which they can broadcast their views. As many media experts point out, “Recent developments in Internet technology and mobile communications have further contributed to customers’ ability to express their identity by allowing customized media content 24 hours a day, seven days a week” (Chernev et al., 2011: p. 66). Consequently, the rise of new technologies has impacted the means by which movements engage their supporters and use them as a recruiting mechanism.

While branding has long been a central concept in the study of business, it remains just as important a concept in the political realm. Developing the attraction of supporters and building their loyalty is an essential part to the survival and growth of any organization. Connecting with audiences through the use of images, stories, emotions, or other associations are often what enables corporations/movements to gain traction and sell their product or idea. One must remember, however,


that branding is a value neutral term, and while branding can be used by those seeking tolerance and peace, it can also be used by those seeking to spread hatred and violence. Many of the extremist movements that have been able to grow their support base and acquire power and influence have indeed used branding effectively to achieve their goals. This has certainly been the case with Nazism and contemporary Islamism, and as one will see through the following case studies, these movements have been able to successfully distinguish themselves and reach audiences with their message through the use of branding strategies and images.

Nazism as a Case-Study

The first section presented the theoretical framework of the study by explaining the essence of branding and examining the different purposes for which it can be used. As was mentioned, branding is not only restricted to the commercial arena. It can also be used as a political instrument to rally the audience around a certain political figure, organization or movement. This section will apply this political approach to one of the extremist movements well-known throughout history—Nazism. In considering two of the multiple themes in Nazi propaganda, this part will demonstrate how Nazis used images in order to sell their ideas and gain the loyalty and support of their followers.

The Merriam-Webster definition of Nazism suggests that it is “the body of political and economic doctrines held and put into effect by the Nazis in Germany from 1933 to 1945 including the totalitarian principle of government, predominance of especially Germanic groups assumed to be racially superior, and supremacy of the Führer” (‘Nazism’, 2015). It is important to note that, for the purpose of this study, Nazism is strictly classified as an extremist group that uses violence as a means to enforce its doctrines and maintain power and supremacy.

Anti-Semitism: After their ascendance to power in 1933, Nazis relied heavily upon visual propaganda through which they depicted themselves as leaders of the "national revolution" and saviors of the German people from the claws of the Weimar Republic. Nazis further used visual propaganda to advocate their anti-Semitic ideology and promote the 'stab in the back legend' which attributes German defeat in World War I (1914-1918) to the betrayal of unpatriotic civilians at home, including Republicans and Socialists who overthrew the monarchy, Bolsheviks and especially Jews.



The “Stab in the Back” Legend (1942), German Propaganda Archive.

This image depicts a German soldier being stabbed in the back by a giant Jewish hand while he is fighting in the battlefield. The image promotes the ‘stab-in-the-back myth,’ which blames Jews, alongside other groups of the German society, for the loss of the war. This myth was one of the various stereotypes of Jews that was developed in the period following World War I. The myth was initially created and propagated to the public by German military leaders as a means to justify defeat and avoid responsibility

for personal mistakes. This anti-Semitic cartoon represents a typical example of the negative stereotypes and prejudices developed about the Jews in post-World War I Germany, associating them with hostile behaviors and classifying them as instinctively disloyal citizens.

Not only have Jews been stereotyped as scapegoats for the loss of the war, but also for the huge economic downfall which struck Germany during the 1930s. The Economic Depression of the inter-war period in Germany had devastating effects on the nation's economy, causing starvation, impoverishment and a high rate of unemployment. As Germans were searching for someone to blame for their misfortune, Hitler used visual propaganda to depict Jews as a scapegoat for the economic recession.



Anti-Semitic image, Germany, circa 1938

This image shows Germany's working class feeding the greedy Jew who grows giant and overwhelming. The image depicts Jews as usurpers of German resources and as parasites who prosper and thrive at the expense of the German society. Prior to the depression, many Jews had been wealthy business owners and directors of large companies. Hence, Jews were directly accused of having had a direct connection with the global capitalist network and of having plotted the destruction of the German economy. Being considered as unpatriotic and "globally organized" (Roseman, 2015: p. 9), Jews were defined as a primary target for Nazi propaganda, aiming first at their demonization, and then at their ultimate elimination through the initiation of the Final Solution: "at a time of extreme domestic and international stress, an internal group was identified as extremely dangerous because it was somehow connected to external threats" (Roseman, 2015: p. 9). Nazis succeeded in using anti-Semitic visual propaganda as a means to mobilize their followers against Jews and ultimately facilitate the enactment of the Final Solution's Holocaust of 6 million of Europe's Jewry.

Recruitment of the Youth: Alongside anti-Semitism, recruitment of the youth was another recurring theme in Nazi visual propaganda. It served to develop loyalty at an early age and instill certain values in young boys and girls aged above ten, mainly racial superiority, anti-Semitism, allegiance to state authority and love for Hitler.

The Nazi propaganda image below portrays an Aryan-looking male member of the Hitler Youth wearing his military suit with a resolved look in his eyes and with the Swastika flag wrapped around his arm. In the same way as commercial enterprises use brands in order to sell their products, political movements use symbols and slogans in order to represent their ideas and sell them to the public. In order to distinguish their party from mainstream political movements and create a common bond among their followers, Nazis used the Swastika as a symbol of the Aryan race (Blanchetta, 1941: p 47). Members of the *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth) were indoctrinated into Nazi ideology. They were taught how to be loyal to the Nazi party and how to fight fearlessly and faithfully for the Third Reich.



Hitler Youth Poster, circa 1936, World History Archive.

Not only did the Nazi policy of recruiting the youth target boys but also girls aged above 10. They were equally targeted as a special audience for Nazi visual propaganda. Nazi leaders used appealing posters and photographs in order to encourage young female citizens to join the girls' wing of the Hitler Youth. Most of the photographs used tended to reflect the exciting side of girls' life in training camps such as those that display entertainment activities like campfire romanticism, music and sports. This was Hitler's way of appealing to girls' feelings and seducing them into joining the party youth league: "The art of propaganda consists precisely in being able to awaken the imagination of the public through an appeal to their feelings", said Hitler, "in finding the appropriate psychological form that will arrest the attention and appeal to the hearts of the national masses" (Heidenreich, 2001: p. 117).



Dresden, Germany, December 1936, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

This propaganda photo displays members of the Nazi girls' organization, commonly known as the League of German Girls, undertaking a group activity. The girls, who are wearing miniskirts and sleeveless shirts, look cheerful and dynamic. This photograph speaks to German girls aged between 10 and 21 and

seeks to convey the message that if they join and support this female organization, their life will become more exciting and amusing. In fact, in 1936 the year in which this photograph was taken, Germany was immersed into an appalling state of widespread misery and deflated national spirit. As Germans were looking for any solution that would alleviate their scourge and make their life less monotonous, Hitler seized the opportunity to present himself as the long-awaited savior and made use of visual propaganda in order to create attraction and develop support. Such an understanding of the audience's situation is actually the very essence of branding as it helps create an emotional bond between the brand (the Nazi movement) and potential supporters. By portraying these female members of the Nazi girls' organization as delighted and energetic, potential female followers will feel that once joining them, their monotonous lives will somehow acquire purpose and meaningfulness. For Hitler, recruitment of the youth was a basic tool to perpetuate the values of the Nazi Party and maintain the survival of the Third Reich.

Through the use of visual propaganda, Nazis aimed at branding their ideas and doctrines to make them attractive and appealing to others. They believed in the power of the image and its ability to control the minds of the public and deeply influence their views and attitudes in such a way as to make them perceive extremism as the ideal option for the nation. Anti-Semitism and recruitment of the youth were two of the multiple themes addressed by Nazi propagandists. They aimed to create hatred for the Jews and rally young members of the population around the ideals of the Nazi movement. The following part will show how, even though adopting an ideology which is different from the Nazi belief, contemporary Islamist movements are using similar branding techniques in order to gain supporters and propagate their extremist ideas. With the development of new forms of mass media and the propagation of images, man in the contemporary society is being placed against new threats of indoctrination and brain-washing that threaten to turn him into a mere instrument of mobilization in the hands of globally powerful political movements.

Contemporary Islamism as a Case-Study: ISIS

The previous section shed light on the use of branding and visual propaganda by the Nazis to sell the idea that their anti-Semitism was justifiable, and that Nazism was the only savior of Aryan Germany and true representative of its values and principles. Fast-forward to more than seven decades later, and another different—albeit equally monstrous—extremist group has taken the globe by shock: ISIS; the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Levant). While the group did not appear to be making any major headlines before the overt takeover of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on 10 June 2014, the bases of ISIS have been quietly yet rapidly cementing for over a decade as the “idea” of using religiously justified violence as a means to defeat “the imperial crusaders of the west” began gaining traction and support from different strands of the Muslim society worldwide. It is important to note that this support, when compared to the overall number of Muslims across the globe, remains minimal, yet it has been powerful enough to sustain this group financially and morally for the past two years in addition to other factors such as global inaction and local disorder and corruption.

How has contemporary violent Islamism become mainstream? With the successful use of branding. Unlike the Nazis of Twentieth Century Europe, ISIS is a “hybrid” group that blends its own selective interpretation of Islamic theocracy and jurisprudence with the exploitation of non-religious grievances such as class, social, political and religious injustices. Thus, we find the use of branding in ISIS multi-leveled: a balanced mix of religious propaganda and improved lifestyle perceptions. ISIS sells the following idea: “Join us and you may achieve both the satisfaction of divinity and a guaranteed entrance to Paradise in the Hereafter, AND a quality earthly life for you and your family”.

The first part of the ISIS propaganda is conceptual and perceptive; in other words not represented by images or material elements since it revolves around the narrative of “the exceptional, indescribable perfection and luxury of a utopic Paradise that exceeds the boundaries of human imagination” (Al-Tamimi,

2014). This narrative is found heavily in religious sermons, *Nasheeds* (sung tune similar to Psalm), booklets, and other written or oral material produced and distributed by the group. Since our project explores branding with focus on visual propaganda, we will neglect this part of ISIS propaganda. In this day and age, the traditional means of propaganda such as posters, billboards and newspapers are marginal advertising tools for extremist groups. With easy access to the internet and social media world-wide, visual propaganda is mostly produced with video cameras and processed on personal computers and later distributed to the world via cyberspace.

Creating the Brand Logo: The first step in branding is to create a logo that distinguishes the product from other competitors. We all immediately recognize famous logos like those of Pepsi, Coca Cola, Nike, etc. Violent religious groups design specific banners that portray specific religious writings. This has helped experts tell certain groups apart from others and helped with the verification and authenticity of the propaganda released. But creating a “flag” plays on historic and cultural sensibilities as it revives nostalgia to the early “glorious” days of Islam; a core theme in the ISIS message. The Islamic State’s design of the flag makes use of the Muslim profession “No God but God; Mohammed is the Messenger of God” in a unique manner: It samples a seal of which Prophet Mohammed allegedly used on letters written on his behalf. The idea of this careful selection is to boldly claim that the Islamic State is the legitimate heirs to Mohammed’s seal just as the early Caliphs were (Jackson, 2007: p. 66).

ISIS leaders chose a design that sends out a clear message and markets a very specific brand. The colors of the flag are black and white; a departure from Islamic tradition that usually reported the colors green and red in early Islamic banners. The idea here is that the Islamic State “knows no gray areas between their binaries of right and wrong, believer and unbeliever” (McCants, 2015: p. 21).



The ISIS Flag

Lifestyle Propaganda: While extreme Islamic groups have been around for several decades, ISIS remains unique in the sense that its objective is to establish a state that governs its people under harsh interpretation of Sharia Law, or what it declares to be “the righteous path”. Most extremist groups classify as “terrorist groups” which use “hit and run” forms of violence. They welcome new fighters and volunteers to carry out their horrific deeds, however, no extreme group has so quickly announced the establishment of a religiously anchored “Caliphate” which is, according to ISIS branding, a Utopia for all Muslims.

With the rise of technology and the ever-expansion of globalization, ISIS identified the need to utilize both the digital revolution and Capitalism to its own advantage. Completely relying on religious themes can only guarantee support from the extremely religiously devoted. To establish a state, political support—or at least approval—is required from different social strands. Thus, ISIS set out for a modern-

day propaganda campaign shamelessly re-appropriating existing Western conveniences to portray the Islamic State as one that not only appreciates small luxuries, but can also provide them to its people.



The use of fireworks and balloons during the opening of “Al-Warithin” Hotel in Mosul. Images from ISIS-released documentary on the opening ceremony of the hotel.



Brochure style images released on ISIS affiliated media showing the town of “Al-Bab” in Syria enjoying what appears to be a peaceful, modern lifestyle (TerrorMonitor.org, 2015).

These images convey not only the sense of relatively modern towns, but also the idea which claims ISIS “rules to serve” the people living in its controlled territories. Sanitation, construction, running water and electricity are scarce in fragile states such as Iraq and Syria which makes this message certainly appealing to those who have been marginalized or suffer from poverty. For ISIS-sympathizers living in the more comfortable West, these images counter whatever hesitations concerning the quality of life they might have when considering traveling to join the group.

Recruitment of Youth and Children: Like Nazis, ISIS have also resorted to recruiting the younger demography in the lands they control. ISIS propaganda towards the youth aims at promoting the idea of a “righteous upbringing” that offers children education, entertainment and military discipline. ISIS media platforms have released horrendous documentaries and videos of underage children performing executions, however, the propaganda involving children initiates in a rather more “civilized” way, as the following the images show.



Both images above released during the religious celebration of Eid Al-Fitr this year (Winter, 2015) show children in Mosul and Raqqa gleefully playing in what appear to be amusement parks. The message here promotes the idea that children under ISIS rule do indeed enjoy playtime as children everywhere in the world and that the group, contrary to popular belief, allows its people to celebrate life. Another aspect of their propaganda in regard to children is schools, which ISIS promotes as a complete and optimal education system that guarantees a solid scientific and religious foundation.



Source: Images taken from documentary on schools in “Wilayat Ninevah- the State of Ninevah”. Authentication of video was confirmed and released by the Clarion Project via an official twitter account.

Both images above are from Mosul and show modern looking classrooms that contrast with the poor standards of many public schools in Iraq which the government failed to improve over the years.



New ISIS published school curriculum that emphasizes themes of jihad, violence, and hatred for any religion, sect, or ideology that conflicts with ISIS (Rudaw, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, ISIS carefully balance their brand between enjoying a quality life and holy jihad, and children are not exempt. Education and entertainment represent the lifestyle aspect ISIS children enjoy, whereas military discipline entails full commitment to the jihad cause. The term “Cubs of the Caliphate” refers to children mostly under the age of 16 who carry arms and fight for the Islamic State

(Bloom, 2015) and help defend the Caliphate. News reports and ISIS media alike stress that several children below age 18 have carried out suicide missions, while videos show children as young as 10 years of age killing victims execution style from close range.



With a school curriculum, outdoor activities and military training, ISIS is programming new generations of youth into becoming violent ideological-driven jihadists. The longer the terrorist group remains intact, the more innocent children will fall victims to their brain-washing methods.

Welfare Propaganda: As the world witnessed the heartbreaking images of refugees escaping the horrors of Syria and Iraq, ISIS released a video showing their “humanitarian side” with images showing displaced people fleeing armed conflict between military groups and the governments being welcomed and protected by the Islamic State. This propaganda serves to brand ISIS as the only safe-haven Muslims can resort to. The following images are collected from various ISIS released documentaries:



Welfare in general has been a recurrent theme in ISIS propaganda since the fall of Mosul. Exploiting the economic struggles of families marginalized by their governments, ISIS documentaries on welfare often build around one message: no Muslim will go hungry in the land of the Caliphate. This statement could not be further from the truth, as ISIS have imposed massive taxes on the populations they rule in addition to confiscating property and items, however, ISIS sympathizers from all over the worldview this propaganda as proof that the Islamic State is indeed a better option for Muslims than their failing states.



Cinematic Imagery: ISIS media and propaganda productions use HD technology and advanced programs to obtain modern Hollywood-like results. Whether the ultra-violent films which show the gory executions of victims or more the footage oriented towards civil life, the images taken are shot carefully and are captivating enough to an international buzz that lasts long enough before the next image surfaces. Following are random images released in the online edition of *Dabiq* magazine and several other verified documentaries and releases. All images appear in Charlie Winter’s remarkable account “Fishing and ultraviolence”:



Serenity and nature combined in this image above of a young man harnessing grapes in an orchard somewhere in an ISIS-ruled town in Syria.



Moments before the horrifying executions of the Egyptian Copt workers on Libyan shores. The image is shot and processed to make it appear like a movie poster.



Young smiling foreign fighters from Belgium. This image shows content and happy youth who deliberately left their comfortable lives in Europe to join the Caliphate. New reports from international intelligence state that some 20,000 new fighters have joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria since last year (Swanson, 2015). This proves that the ISIS branding works and the ideas are being successfully sold.

Conclusion

Nazism and contemporary Islamism represent two of the most violent extremist movements of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and while the world still attempts to cope with the destruction and Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis decades ago, contemporary Islamism threatens to carry out similar devastation and a modern day Holocaust. For this reason, it is crucial that the world understand how these groups attempt to sell their ideas through branding and images, so that counter-measures may be developed that weaken the influence of these movements and their violent agendas. Extremist movements use branding and images to build an emotional connection and convince audiences that joining the movement will ensure one an improved lifestyle. Effective counter-measures must be implemented to undermine this narrative and demonstrate within the marketplace of ideas that violence and hatred do not lead one on a path to a better life. In order to truly curtail the growth of extremism, civilized societies must expand their efforts beyond military campaigns and into the realm of the ideological campaign, for it is through ideas, however destructive they may be, that extremism grows. The sooner that the civilized world can develop effective measures that counter the appeal of extremist imagery and branding strategy, the sooner these movements will cease to grow and commit the mass atrocities that they seek to carry out.

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
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**History of U.S.-Chinese Immigration:
Meredith Oyen's *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives
and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War*
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2016)**

by Daniel M. DuBois, Ph.D., Saint Leo University



One of the newest entries in Columbia University Press' "America in the World" series is Meredith Oyen's *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold World*, which addresses a major historiographical gap in the story of U.S.-Chinese immigration policy. Oyen's research—one of the immediate strengths of the monograph – is steeped in both American and Chinese sources, and includes official government documents and personal papers of individual immigrants themselves. As such, it is a model work of international and transnational scholarship, and indicative of what is now the new norm for Twenty-First Century diplomatic historians. By positioning her work in that often ignored era in U.S.-Chinese relations, in the years after the Second World War and before Nixon's 1972 China visit, Oyen has delivered a much-needed and penetrating contribution to the long history of immigration policy between the United States and China.

Students of U.S.-Chinese relations have been analyzing the modulations and long-term implications of immigration, and the policies that define it, since the early-Twentieth Century. Some of the most important of those early scholars were the Chinese who had earlier personally navigated the murky waters of U.S. immigration policy during the Exclusion Era (1882-1943). One of the earliest examples is the famous *Outlook* essay by the Chinese writer Fu Chi Hao in 1907. Hao's personal recollections and criticism of U.S. border policies were later elaborated on by other Chinese who came to America, and it was these Chinese who as earliest and most vociferously pointed out the deleterious effects that America's anti-Chinese exclusion laws were having on what many Americans (and Chinese) nevertheless believed was a burgeoning "special relationship" between the two countries.¹

There were, to be sure, plenty of Americans who decried the decision by the United States to deny entry to Chinese migrants during the late-Nineteenth and early-Twentieth Centuries, but a sustained critique of U.S. immigration policy by American scholars only truly began in the late-1960s. In that decade, however, some of America's most influential diplomatic historians began calling out the iniquity and hypocrisy driving American immigration policy towards China before World War II.² A decade later, Delber McKee's *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door, 1900-1906*, refined these "New Left" criticisms by even more directly exposing both the human suffering caused by the Exclusion laws and the disservice they did to America's economic goals in China. By juxtaposing Exclusion with the famous 1900 Open Door Policy –

1. Fu Chi Hao, "My Reception in America" in *The Outlook* 80 (10 August 1907). For later analyses on U.S. immigration policy from Chinese writers, see Wu T'ing-fang, *America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1914); Mingchien Joshua Bau, *The Open Door Policy in Relation to China* (New York: MacMillan Press, 1923); En Tsung Yen, *The Open Door Policy* (Boston, MA: Stratford CO., Publishers, 1923).

2. Thomas McCormick, *The China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901* (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Paul A. Varg, *The Making of a Myth: the United States and China, 1897-1912* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968); Marilyn Blatt Young, *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

which sought to liberalize world economics by engineering free trade in China – McKee reminded his readers that non-economic policies (like the Exclusion Era) can have unintended economic consequences. The Chinese state was humiliated by Exclusion and embarrassed further when Theodore Roosevelt’s administration agreed to a less odious immigration formula for Japan. In response, Chinese students and businessmen orchestrated a boycott of American goods. Their efforts, McKee showed, demonstrated that the Chinese, more than Americans, recognized the connections between immigration and economic policies, and used what tools they had to make an impact on both.¹

In his landmark 1983 book, *The Making of a Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914*, the great historian Michael Hunt pulled together these earlier studies on U.S.-Chinese immigration and weaved them brilliantly into an overarching framework for understanding the motivations that guided America’s China policy during the Exclusion era.² Hunt argued that whether it was in the case of immigration, or economics, or politics, or religion, an unbending sense of paternalism compelled Americans to treat Chinese as child-like inferiors in desperate need of an arms-length reeducation about what constituted “civilized” and “modern” in the Twentieth Century. Hunt’s book, which remains the authority on this period of U.S.-Chinese relations and also set the standard for what multi-lingual and truly international research should look like, brought to bear political, diplomatic, economic and social analyses to help explain how the United States could pursue the seemingly incompatible policies of opening up China’s shores for American goods and closing America’s borders to Chinese migrants. Ultimately, the majority of Americans – particularly policy-makers – were never prepared or interested in treating Chinese as equals. China needed the United States – economically, politically and spiritually – but conversion on any scale should only occur within China’s own borders. With the exception of Chinese students, diplomats and few merchants, there were no tangible benefits to America by allowing these semi-barbarous Asians from crossing onto America’s shores, polluting its society and clogging its labor market. For Hunt, what made U.S.-Chinese relations “special” was, for the most part, a fantasy among Americans that they could lift up an ancient people from centuries of antiquated behavior and policies, and always from a distance remake the Middle Kingdom in the image of America as the world’s newest and greatest SuperPower.

Hunt’s analysis of the political, diplomatic and social machinations that went into the making of the Exclusion laws as well as the other components of American China policy still provides the baseline for any new study on Twentieth-Century Sino-American relations. The studies that have come after – many of them great and seminal in their own right – have largely refined and refocused what Hunt first touched on in the 1980s, or in other cases, moved the chronology forward. Adam McKeown’s *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* is an example of a deeper dive into the mechanics of border policies, though one that still fits in the general framework provided by Hunt. McKeown is especially attentive to the contingent nature of things like passports and visas, and also the dehumanizing effects that exclusionary immigration policies can have on the world’s migrants.³ An even more developed analysis on the human costs of American immigration policy towards China comes from Madeline Hsu. Hsu’s *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882-1943*, and most recently, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority*, are arguably the two best single treatments on the experiences of Chinese migrants and Chinese Americans during the first-half of the Twentieth Century. Like others who have come after Hunt, Hsu highlights America’s sense of paternalism, which drove the competing forces of xenophobia and benevolence behind America’s China policy. Hsu, however, is far more interested in the individual Chinese experience with immigration. Her newest book is especially fascinating, as it traces how Asians have used various vehicles of assimilation – perhaps most importantly, education – to transform their ethnic communities from the targets of Exclusion-era policies to what many white Americans eventually viewed as the “model minority.”

1. Delber McKee, *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900-1906: Clashes over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era* (Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1977).

2. Michael Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

3. Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

Hsu's *The Good Immigrants* carries its analysis through the 1940s, which allows her to address U.S. immigration policy towards Asians after Exclusion formally ended in 1924. Doing so, she builds on the seminal work of the historian Mae Ngai. Indeed, for those interested in the making of America's modern immigration policies, Ngai's book, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*, is perhaps the most important book on the subject written in the Twenty-First Century. While Ngai is largely focused on the immigrant experience for Central and South Americans, she also addresses the major changes in America's border policies towards Asians. Specifically, her analysis of the landmark 1924 Johnson-Reed Act (commonly referred to as the National Origins Act), underscores how racial and nativist impulses generated a new standard for American immigration that explicitly, even gleefully, privileged immigration from Northern and Western Europe. American policy-makers simultaneously siphoned off immigration from Central and Eastern Europe. And although they did theoretically repeal Exclusion, U.S. officials continued the practice of prohibiting immigrants from China by labeling them, along with Japanese and others from that part of the world, as "Asian" and, thus, without national origin. Ngai's study concludes by taking up the 1965 Immigration and Nationalization Act, which recalculated the way that immigration quotas were determined and achieved some semblance of liberalization of U.S. immigration policy.

It is to this rich and complex historiographical landscape that Meredith Oyen has made an impressive and much-needed contribution with her recent study, *The Diplomacy of Migration*. Whereas so many other scholars have focused and revealed important insights on the history of U.S.-Asian immigration either before World War II or after Nixon's 1972 visit to China, Oyen rightly argues that there is still much to learn from those years in between – when the U.S. and the People's Republic of China maintained only the thinnest lines of communication. To explain the significance of those 30 years of tension, *The Diplomacy of Migration*, "identifies and explains the role that 'migration diplomacy' – the process of using migration policy for diplomatic ends – played in managing the larger, complex relations between the United States and its Chinese ally [Republic of China-ROC or Taiwan] and Chinese enemy [People's Republic of China-PRC or "Mainland"] from the formation of the Cold War during World War II until the start of its denouement in Asia."¹

Oyen's book is divided into thirds: Part I chronicles the permutations in U.S.-Chinese relations from the Exclusion Era to the end of World War II; Part II describes how "Chinese migrants acted as 'Cold Warriors' – influencing international relations both voluntarily and involuntarily"; and Part III concludes by demonstrating "how migration policy became a means of easing the Cold War in Asia."² One of the strengths of the book (and a characteristic of her gift as a historian) is Oyen's ability to investigate well-known episodes in the history of U.S.-Chinese relations and to harvest fresh and sometimes novel lessons from the sources. Soong May-ling, the famous wife of Chiang Kai-shek and her tour of the United States during World War II stands, as a well-known episode in this history. Yet, Oyen's emphasis on Soong's quiet but steady efforts to bring down the exclusionist immigration policies favored by American officials is a reminder not only of the importance of Soong's powerful (and often gendered) influence on U.S. policy-makers – it also demonstrates the important correlation between major shifts in international events and relations and, in this case, bilateral migration policies. By stressing (and exaggerating) the long-standing friendship between the United States and Nationalist China, as well as the important potential of maintaining those friendly relations in the aftermath of Japan's defeat during World War II, Soong convinced U.S. officials to modify and repeal aspects of the exclusion laws. Although Oyen is critical of some of the particulars of the repeal measures, she notes that "what repeal did do was reveal the ways in which the Chinese government could use such low-level issues to test the waters of Sino-American equality, to promote the interests of Chinese in the United States and assert rights in the postwar world."³

1. Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016), p.4.

2. *Ibid.*, p.6 & 10.

3. *Ibid.*, p.39.

As Oyen's analysis moves into the post-World War II years, her emphasis shifts from the mechanics and legacy of exclusion to new problems in U.S.-Chinese migration policies – problems specifically tied to the emerging realities of the Cold War. Again, while the breakdown in U.S.-PRC relations – punctuated by the famous “loss of China” to Mao's communist forces during the Truman Administration – and America's persistent support of the Taiwan-based Nationalist government, the Republic of China, are familiar episodes in the history of these two countries, Oyen shifts the focus to the roles and experiences of Chinese migrants. By doing so, she discovers that “Chinese migrants found themselves caught between opposing governments as the new, Communist China and the United States endeavored to isolate each other from allies and competitors.”¹ As the Red Scare enveloped American society in the mid-1950s, Chinese migrants both in and outside the United States found themselves in nearly impossible situations. The FBI and INS tried to target “undesirable” migrants whose communist sympathies were not immediately clear. However, as Oyen points out, the vitriol of American anti-communism put the U.S. government in an awkward position regarding those Chinese migrants. If they were allowed to enter and stay in the United States, the government might look weak or even complicit in the context of a growing communist threat. But if Chinese migrants were deported back to the PRC, the American government “impugned its own reports about the cruelty and illegitimacy of the Chinese Communist régime.”²

The United States was sometimes successful in convincing the ROC, or other allies in East Asia (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) to accept these problematic migrants, but such efforts were just as likely to trigger indignation and tension among these other government who, as Oyen points out, “were no less sensitive to the threat of subversion and infiltration via immigrants or deportees than was the United States, and that meant that all three [countries] often refused to accept even legitimate nationals.”³ A similar dynamic played out for Americans who remained in China after the PRC consolidated power on the mainland. Beijing officials, according to Oyen, “suspected most if not all of the Americans it held were spies, and that the United States had blocked the departure of thousands of China's own citizens through intimidation, force, and harassment and refused to account for lost or missing citizens or even drove some to insanity through ill-treatment.”⁴ Yet Oyen also points that out that these tense disputes over migrants – most importantly, the question of repatriation – also helped build fragile channels of communications between Beijing People's Republic and the United States. These channels grew by small measures through the 1960s, as the U.S. lifted bans on travel to Beijing and by permitting American travels to purchase and bring back to the United States items made in Communist China. These kind of changes to migration diplomacy offered “a small and safe step that could signal interest without causing undue alarm in Taipei or in the capitals of other American allies, but which would still encourage increasing contact that would include scholarly research, the exchange of journalists, and eventually tourist travel, all of which might help to put the Sino-American relationship on a standing more akin to the tentative contact the United States sustained with Eastern Europe.”⁵

By taking on a period in U.S.-Chinese relations that is often overlooked or over-shadowed by the events leading up to World War II, as well as those following Nixon's 1972 historic visit to Beijing, Oyen's, *The Diplomacy of Migration*, delivers a valuable contribution to the study of the United States and East Asia. Thanks to its impressive and multilingual source base, as well as Oyen's own skill as a writer, it is also an enjoyable book to read. For scholars interested in U.S. foreign policy, the history of Chinese migration and trans-Pacific relations, this is a must read.

1. Ibid., p.99.

2. Ibid., p.118.

3. Ibid., p.120.

4. Ibid., p.214.

5. Ibid., p.241.

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