

Journal of Florida Political Science Association -

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Florida Political Chronicle

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Any problems e-mail the Treasurer:
Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

Past issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, like the “2012 Presidential Elections” (v.20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) and on-line Archive of older issues are **FREE** for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Science Association’s Website either: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>
Current issue is only accessible via password & FPSA subscription until made free when a new issue is printed!

– ESSAYS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) all essays for consideration:

1. **Essays in Word** not PDF.
2. **Author’s Biography** at paper’s very end (2-paragraphs, with years of Ph.D. and M.A.).
3. **Abstract** and **Bibliography** required.
4. **Do not use the First Person (“I”)**; instead use the neutral “The author”, “The study” or “This work”.
5. Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or as appendixes must fit a 1-inch margin (**no landscape-size Tables!**).
6. **Footnotes** preferred style (at end of each page) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
7. All essays are selected based on a “3 Blind Reviews” process (yes, I have 3 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
8. **Book-Reviews** are welcome on any related topic! Submit 2-to-7+ pages-long Book-Reviews **in Word**.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.



Call for Papers

Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting

Saturday, 24 March 2018

Florida Gulf Coast University–Fort Myers, Florida

Program Chair: Kelly McHugh

Florida Southern College

Phone: 863-680-4113

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Arrangements Chair: Richard Coughlin

Florida Gulf Coast University

Phone: 239-590-7177

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The 2018 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at **Florida Gulf Coast University** in **Fort Myers, Florida**. Information on directions, parking and hotels will be sent in **January 2018**.

Preregistration before the conference day is \$75 for faculty and \$35 for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs, and discussants are asked to preregister. **Registration at the meeting** is \$85 for faculty and \$40 for students. Registration includes lunch, refreshments and a subscription to *The Florida Political Chronicle*. For preregistration, please go to www.fpsanet.org

Faculty, graduate students and talented undergraduates students are encouraged to submit papers. A \$250 award is given to the best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference, and a \$200 award will be given to the best Undergraduate Student Paper. **Please send paper proposals to the following Section Chairs by 15 December 2017. Accepted papers will be notified by 30 December 2017.**

All proposals must include: name, institution, rank (faculty, graduate student, undergraduate student), contact information, paper title, and an abstract of between 150 and 250 words.

Sections	Section Chairs	Contact Information
American National Politics	Gary Boulware University of Florida	gboulware@pkv.ufl.edu 352-392-1554, x-243
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	kupferb@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-9951
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State & Local Government	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations	Giselle Jamison St. Thomas University	Gjamison@stu.edu 305-628-6579
Comparative Politics	Houman Sadri University of Central Florida	houman.sadri@ucf.edu 407-823-6023
Roundtable on Teaching Political Science	Kelly McHugh Florida Southern College	mchugh.kellyann@gmail.com 863-680-4111
American National Politics	Gary Boulware University of Florida	gboulware@pkv.ufl.edu 352-392-1554, x-243

Call for Submissions to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal. Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome and other papers not previously published. Please submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the peer review process. Please see our website: www.fpsanet.org

President's Address & FPSA Latest News **by FPSA President Will Miller, Ph.D., Campus Labs**

Dear FPSA Members and All Interested Readers,

Welcome to the second issue of the 25th edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*. Under the direction of Marco Rimanelli of Saint Leo University, our wonderful editor, we have continued the tradition of scholarship and excellence with the publication found here.

FPSA has enjoyed another successful conference at Florida Gulf Coast with colleges and universities from across the country sending faculty and students to study each of the major subfields of our discipline: American Politics, International Relations, Comparative Politics, Political Theory, Public Administration, and State and Local Government. As always, our opportunities to engage in meaningful dialogues on these topics enhances our research and our teaching. Thanks to Richard Coughlin for handling local arrangements and Kelly McHugh of Florida Southern for putting together a tremendous program of panels and speakers.

Be sure to save the date as our 2019 Annual Conference will be held at the University of Tampa on Saturday 2 March with Denis Rey serving as Arrangements Chair and Mark Logas from Valencia serving as Program Chair. The Call for Papers will be distributed in October 2018 and we hope you will attend.

Having left the academy for the consulting sector more than a year ago, the opportunities I have had to remain active with the Florida Political Science Association have kept me involved with my favorite parts of higher education—dedicated faculty, curious students and institutions aiming to assure student success. And what a time it has been to oversee the FPSA. From anticipated political battles within the state to unanticipated tragedies (of both the natural and man-made variety), every day presents opportunities to demonstrate what makes Political Science such a valuable field. My hope is that on our campuses and in our communities we are using these opportunities to show the practical significance of what we study and teach.

Thanks to the previous leadership of Denis Rey and Kathryn DePalo, FPSA is well-positioned to continue to grow and succeed. My role this year has been to maintain our strengths and target new areas for improvement. Some of these improvements will become visible in the coming months, including the rebirth of our Newsletter and enhancements to this very publication to assure research is timely and relevant. Hopefully through these changes we will see increased numbers of contributions from scholars and students across the state.

As we await what is to come with the midterm elections and an increasingly polarized electorate, it is important to remember that FPSA is the preeminent place to talk local politics given the number of experts we have on our Board and in our membership. My hope for the next year is a continued fight for civic education to help prepare an electorate capable of making difficult choices that help path us all toward a better future.

Thank you to everyone who makes FPSA such a strong and vital organization.

Sincerely,

Will Miller, Ph.D.

Dr. Will Miller, Ph.D.

President FPSA

Assistant Vice-President Campus Adoptions

Campus Labs

Editor's Introduction:

Why We Need to Teach Florida Government & Political Sciences!

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and "Fellow-Travelers",

welcome to another edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, the regional journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA), which has been published on-line and in color, with back issues available free on the FPSA website (www.fpsanet.org) as a great resource for members, scholars, students and the public interested in research on domestic and international affairs.

This new *Florida Political Chronicle* issue (vol.25, n.2, 2017-2018) was delayed to allow the presentation to our readers of the journal under an occasional "thematic" approach, this time addressing exclusively Florida's government, U.S. politics and the role of Political Science studies in American universities and high schools where the discipline is fast becoming a thing of the past. Because the Florida Political Science Association is non-profit, we provide educators with **free use in classes** of this issue as an additional resource on American government and Florida politics.

This second maxi-issue at a record 230-pages of the *Florida Political Chronicle* welcomes our readers to an "Introduction" from our current President of the Florida Political Science Association, Dr. Will Miller, Assistant Vice-President of Campus Adoptions at Campus Labs. This current issue showcases nine essays, of which the first is "A Brief Manual on Florida Government" compiled by John Bertalan and the second a poignant *Je accuse!* Research essay by Mark Logas against the national drift in reducing courses on Introductory U.S. Government taught in the American higher education system. All these scholarly essays and book-review, were selected from the 2016 FPSA Annual Conference at Florida Southern College in Lakeland and the 2017 FPSA Annual Conference at Valencia College in Orlando.

The first maxi-essay on p.12-64 is: "A Brief Introduction to Florida Government" (4th Edition) by John J. Bertalan, Ph.D., who teaches at the University of South Florida-Tampa and developed this work at its Florida Institute of Government. This 50-page work is actually an easy to use concise student manual on Florida government, compiled from many sources as a companion to introductory classes on Florida and State and Local Politics. It has many interesting charts on state powers, electoral districts and law-making, plus key overviews of the Florida Constitution that could be used to stimulate student responses and engagement in their state. What this is not, is a detailed 300+ page on Florida politics, which is better suited for university-level courses. But in its 4th edition (the first one came out in 1999 as a Special Issue for the *Florida Political Chronicle*) Bertalan's manual is very useful for high schools and introductory university courses to start the conversation on the local role of state politics and state government powers in Florida.

The second essay on p.65-87 is: "POS 2041 U.S. Government: Who Needs It?" by Mark Logas, Professor of Political Science at Valencia College-Orlando. As I mentioned it is a great research project that exposes the damning state of disrepair in Florida and across the nation concerning teaching courses in U.S. government and introductory Political Sciences to high school and university students, who nowadays show a total lack of knowledge about the most basic issues regarding the U.S. Constitution, the powers of the Federal government, the history of their country, and their own political and civil rights as citizens. Logas' research reveals the astonishing decline of commitment by Colleges and Universities, and their Counselors to require as mandatory an introductory U.S. Government class for all

Associate Degree (A.A.) students, as well as high schools nation-wide. This long-standing commitment is instead shun by many students today and their families, who consider superfluous and uninteresting any knowledge of national and local politics given their more pressing desire to secure “real” jobs in Business, Sciences, Accounting, Medicine and the Law. Making the teaching of Political Sciences and U.S. government optional in higher education, is another dagger (after the decline of teaching History and International Affairs) towards a shrinking of traditional Liberal Arts studies vs. the insularity of plain career concerns. Logas rightly shares the alarm of the Florida Political Science Association and our colleagues across the discipline that this trend remains both unchecked politically by local state governments (see in Appendix the letter of Florida Governor Rick Scott (R)), and dangerous in leaving students “un-educating” on how real politics work within their state and in Washington. The alternative for the youth in America today is to remain prisoners of their own microcosm of mundane materialistic interests, and prey to cyclical rises in easy passions and demagoguery, without the patience to turn verbal criticism into much needed constructive laws, reforms and civic engagement.

The third essay on p.88-118 is: “A Political History of Florida Elections, 1866-2016”, co-authored by Seth C. McKee, Ph.D., Associate-Professor at Texas Tech University in Lubbock and Stephen C. Craig, Ph.D., Professor at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Their tour-de-force essay details the political history of Florida elections (Presidential, Federal and Gubernatorial) from the time of the post-U.S. Civil War and monopoly by the Democratic “Solid South” up to Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, followed by the Republican surge since Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George Bush “Sr.”, George Bush “Jr.” to today’s Donald Trump. Drs. McKee and Craig systematically highlight the partisan breakdown in state legislative races along four key voter blocks (Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Others) and high-profile Presidential elections seeking to win over Florida’s constantly growing and mixed ethnic electorate, which might indicate a slowly waning of the Republican dominance over the Sunshine State and the emergence of a permanently Purple uncertainty.

The fourth essay on p.119-137 focuses on Presidential electioneering with: “Election Daze: Voting Modes and Voter Preferences in the 2016 Presidential Election” co-authored by Professor Daniel A. Smith, Ph.D. of the University of Florida in Gainesville, Associate-Professor Seth C. McKee, Ph.D. at Texas Tech University in Lubbock and Professor M. V. “Trey” Hood III, Ph.D. of the University of Georgia in Athens. The authors examine why the 2016 Presidential Election was a surprise to many political experts, polling institutions and pundits because most predicted the dynamics of voter choice as a crowning exercise for consummate politician Democrat Hillary Clinton (who was expected to monopolize the youth, liberals, professionals, Wall Street, Blacks and Hispanic votes) vs. the shocking rise and victory of brash and controversial businessman Donald Trump (who high-jacked the Republican Party establishment through skillful grassroots neo-conservative surge). By using aggregate- and individual-level data from Florida the authors examined voting across racial/ethnic groups, distinguishing between votes cast on Election Day vs. votes cast earlier through early-voting and by mail to then compare voting variations in the 2016 and 2012 Presidential Elections. Trump’s historic Presidential victory hinged on the support from voters who showed in droves the final days of voting compared to Hillary’s early-voting lead and misleading polls of likely voters.

The fifth comparative essay on p.138-155 is: “The Comparative Effects of Electoral Laws on Voter Rationality: Plurality vs. Proportional Election Rules” co-authored by Professor Donald L. Davison, Ph.D. and B.A. Senior Margaret Lewicki of Rollins College in Orlando. The authors explore the relatively uncharted waters of the interaction between electoral rules that structure the development of party systems and encourage or discourage voting based on the characteristics of individuals. The authors investigate whether plurality and proportional electoral rules influence citizens’ political knowledge,

sophistication and the likelihood to vote by comparing elections in the United States (plurality rules), Australia (alternative vote with compulsory voting) and Ireland (single transferable vote). This paper finds that plurality electoral rules produce consistently lower levels of political knowledge, voter sophistication reduced turn-out, especially among individuals with the lowest levels of political knowledge in the U.S., while turn-out among the highest-educated citizens in the U.S. is still lower than voting by the least educated in Ireland or Australia. This topic is very current in the aftermath of the surprise controversial 2016 Presidential Election of Republican businessman Donald Trump who won the majority of electoral delegates and states compared to Hillary Clinton's dismal show, despite her getting 4 million more votes (mostly in Democrat California).

The sixth essay on p.156-179 is: "The Strong State and Governing through Crime in the United States" by Associate-Professor Richard W. Coughlin, Ph.D. of Florida Gulf Coast University-Fort Myers. This essay blends I.R. Theory and international Political Economy to focus on Neo-liberalism, not as an anti-state doctrine as incorrectly perceived by many, but as a theory that requires a strong state to stabilize a free-wheeling market society. Dr. Coughlin analyzes how the emergence of contemporary neo-liberal societies have necessitated an overarching governance of society. In the United States this meant governing through crime on the basis of racial conflicts that were deeply etched into the post-New Deal social order in the United States. In addition, the essay touches upon current contrasts on immigration, police violence and mass incarceration as either a break with the strong state or its recalibration.

The seventh essay on p.180-197 is the *2016 Best FPSA Graduate Paper: "Legislative Gridlock, Partisanship and Trust in Government"* by Jennifer L. Hudson, M.A. at the University of Central Florida-Orlando. This graduate research paper fills a gap in the lack of works on determining the variables that contribute to varying levels of trust in government. While trust in the U.S. government has declined dramatically in the past decades as legislative gridlock has increased to historic records, this paper explores whether legislative gridlock is a contributing factor of such loss of trust. By using survey responses for partisan identification and trust in government from 1984-2012, along with measurements of legislative gridlock levels, the author's multivariate regressions and tests find evidence that legislative gridlock has a significant, but small, negative effect on trust in government, with effects most pronounced among Pure Independents and Strong Republicans.

The eighth essay on p. 198-217 is the *2017 Best FPSA Undergraduate Paper: "Regional Political Power in Florida"* by Bradley J. Caouette, B.A., from the University of Central Florida-Orlando. This undergraduate research paper explores how much does political influence in the Florida Legislature affect the amount of tax dollars appropriated to Florida's 67 counties, 10 media markets and three geographic regions (North, Central and South)? The research finds that the legislative power of a county in terms of legislative power had no statistically-significant effect on per-capita allocations compared to the positive presence of a state university and miles of roadways in a county. The findings suggest an unexpected impact of rational criteria in local government allocations, rather than political power.

Lastly, this issue's lengthy Book-Review on p.220-226 by Dr. Kathryn A. DePalo, Senior Instructor at Florida International University in Miami provides a compelling overview of the latest lengthy work of Susan A. MacManus, *Florida's Minority Trailblazers: the Men and Women who Changed the Face of Florida Government* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2017, p.640). Professor MacManus from the University of South Florida-Tampa, looks at modern politics in the Sunshine State over the past 50 years, with major institutional changes and political movements since the 1960s creating previously unheard of political opportunities for minority representation at all levels of state government. MacManus sees Florida's richness of diversity as a "trailblazer incubator" for minority pathbreakers blazing a trail of success

in all levels of government positions, with others following their lead. Once again, MacManus provides an original and lengthy overview of data, personal interviews and famous family histories that both reevaluate the triumph of minorities in Florida and their contribution. Her latest book is a gem of Florida history with an extensive bibliography, news clippings, archival info, and extensive interview data from a total of 15 different nationalities/ethnicities and women, including Spanish, Chinese, Cuban, Puerto Rican, African-American, Korean, Bahamian, Haitian, Mexican, Colombian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Nicaraguan, Ecuadorian, Indian and Syrian from politicians to educators, business people, political activists and military.

As in past years, the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida-Orlando led by President Houman Sadri, Ph.D. (also previous FPSA President in 2012-2013) has generously funded the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award in 2015 and 2017 (no winner was selected in 2016). Thus, the Back-Cover on p.228 of this *Florida Political Chronicle* issue traditionally highlights the institutional profile of FPSA University Members, showcases IPAC's role at the University of Central Florida in Orlando.

Additionally, space is now provided for paid-advertisement of books in the discipline from publishers.

Our Mission: since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association's and U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; and International Law & Organizations (submissions requirements on p.5 above). Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from both standing and past FPSA members, as well as from domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference, or as unaffiliated still support our organization's mission.

Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle*, and best wishes to both our Drs. Kelly McHugh of Florida Southern College and Richard Coughlin of Florida Gulf Coast University for preparing the next 2018 FPSA Annual Conference at Florida Gulf Coast University in Fort Myers.

Sincerely,

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

**Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA's regional scholarly journal,
Professor of Politics & International Studies at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A. &
2013-2014 Fulbright-Schuman Chair at E.U. graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Belgium.**

A Brief Introduction to Florida Government

4th Edition

Compiled by John J. Bertalan, Ph.D., Florida Institute of Government,
University of South Florida-Tampa



FLORIDA
INSTITUTE OF
GOVERNMENT
at the University of South Florida

University of South Florida-Tampa



A publication of the Florida Political Science Association (2017)

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Acknowledgements



The compiler would like to thank three individuals without whose help this 4th edition of *A Brief Introduction to Florida Government* would never have gone into print. First, J. Edwin (“Ed”) Benton, Ph.D., Professor and Managing Editor, *State and Local Government Review*, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida in Tampa, for his timely comments, critique, suggestions and valuable insights into the content of the publication. Second, to Patricia McGee, Copyright and Permissions manager, at Pro-Copy, for her excellent assistance in formatting, editing, reassurance and document capture that helped turn a rough draft into a final document. Third, to Adriana Padilla, Student Assistant in the College of Interdisciplinary Global Studies at USF who converted amateurish charts into works of graphic art.

Introduction

It is seemingly difficult to find information about the Florida state government in one concise format. The Florida House and Senate publish booklets about their respective Houses and the executive branch published a list of helpful phone numbers. Information is available electronically, but it seems to be scattered all around. The author knows of two books on Florida Government and they are complete works both in the neighborhood of 400 pages each: *The Florida Handbook*, published by the Clerk of the Florida House of Representatives, and *Politics in Florida*, 4th ed. by Susan A. MacManus et. al. An attempt has been made in this work to incorporate basic governing principles of the state of Florida within a self-imposed limitation of fifty pages.



This 4th edition of *A Brief Introduction to Florida Government* (2017) is now compiled mostly from government, political and Wikipedia internet web-sites, and is designed with two main purposes in mind: a) to be a supplement to college or advanced placement courses in State and Local government and/or American government and to give a localized value added to each of those courses; b) this compilation could also be beneficial for the concerned citizen who would like to know a little more about the structure of the Florida Government. It is hoped that this booklet serves these audiences.

Demographics


To start to the study of Florida government, below are a few charts that help illustrate the composition of the Florida populace according to the 2010 census. Hispanics made up over 22% of the population and those individuals over the age of 65 accounted for 17% of the population. Since the 2010 census it has been estimated that over 1,000 people a week move to the Sunshine State so these numbers are expected to change drastically by 2020.


**Figure 1:
Florida Demographic Statistics**

Total Population 18,801,310 100%



Race






Source: 2010 United States Census


As of October 2016, Floridians have registered to vote by political party as listed in Figure 2. Please note the large number (over three million) of voters who claim no political preference, nearly 25% of the voting public.

Figure 2: Political Party Registration: October 2016



Source: Florida Department of State

**Figure 3:
Florida Brief Historic Timeline**



Source: The author and Wikipedia, free encyclopedia

Brief History

The history of Florida can be traced back to when the first Native Americans began to inhabit the peninsula as early as 14,000 years ago. They left behind artifacts and archeological evidence. Written history begins with the arrival of Europeans to Florida; the Spanish explorer Juan Ponce de León in 1513 made the first textual records. The state was the first mainland realm of the United States to be settled by Europeans. Thus, 1513 marked the beginning of the American Frontier. St. Augustine on Florida's North-East Atlantic coast is considered to be the oldest permanent European settlement in the United States.

From that time of contact, Florida has had many waves of immigration, including French and Spanish settlement during the 16th Century, as well as entry of new Native American groups migrating from elsewhere in the South, and free blacks and fugitive slaves, who became known as Black Seminoles. Florida was under colonial rule by Spain and Great Britain during the 18th and 19th Centuries before becoming a territory of the United States in 1821. Two decades later in 1845, Florida was admitted to the union as the 27th U.S. state. Since the 19th Century, immigrants have arrived from Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Florida is nicknamed the "Sunshine State" due to its warm climate and days of sunshine, which have attracted northern migrants and vacationers since the 1920s. The completion of railroads down both coasts of Florida and the invention of air-conditioning also contributed to rapid growth. A diverse population and urbanized economy have developed.

At the outbreak of World War II thousands of troops were sent to Florida to train and wait for debarkation to battle. Air strips were built, dockyards deepened and soldiers were quartered. Some soldiers returned after the war to make Florida their permanent residence. In the 1960s President Kennedy announced the American goal to land a man on the moon by the end of the decade. The rockets were to take off from a space exploration base in Cape Canaveral on Florida's east coast. In the 1970s Walt Disney World opened near Orlando as Disney's second world-wide attraction bringing tens of millions of visitors to Florida since its opening. Not long after Sea World and MGM studios (both also located near Orlando) brought additional domestic and foreign visitors to the Sunshine State as well as major expansions to all of their theme parks

In 2011, Florida reached over 19 million people and surpassed New York to become the third largest U.S. state in population.

The economy has developed over time, starting with natural resource exploitation in logging, mining, fishing and sponge diving; as well as cattle ranching, farming and citrus growing. The tourism, real-estate, trade, banking and retirement destination businesses followed.

Source: Wikipedia and the editor

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Brief Facts

Florida has had six constitutions, three of them clustered around the Civil War and Reconstruction, which in turn led to the 1885 constitution which was a reaction to the last reconstruction constitution, which had a strong executive. Consequently, the 1885 document diffused executive authority in several Cabinet agencies, among other changes. That lasted until the 1968 rewrite.

Since the 1968 constitution, (and not counting the Article V rewrite which was left undone until 1972), there have been over a hundred amendments proposed to the Florida Constitution. Of those, a majority has passed, and three were removed by the Florida Supreme Court for infirmities in the ballot language or other problems. Figure 4 below was gathered from information provided by the Secretary of State's office and the tables document the success of various amendment proposals since 1978.

There are five ways to amend the state charter. One is a constitutional convention, which hasn't been used in recent times. The second is the legislature can send an amendment to voters by a three-fifths vote of both chambers. Then there's a citizen initiative method, the Constitution Revision Commission, which is appointed by state leaders and meets every 20 years, and the Tax and Budget Reform Commission, which meets between the CRC meetings and is limited to fiscal matters. Appendix III gives a more detailed statement about the state's liberal amendment policy.

The Florida Legislature leads the way in the state's amendment sweepstakes, having proposed 80 amendments since 1978, of which 67 have been adopted, and 13 have been rejected. Thirty-four amendments have reached the ballot by initiative, of which 27 have been approved.

The Constitution Revision Commission has had an almost all or nothing record. The 1977-78 CRC proposed eight amendments, all rejected by voters, although some of its proposals were incorporated in later amendments which were approved. The 1997-98 CRC proposed nine amendments, eight of which were adopted.


The Tax and Budget Reform Commission has proposed seven amendments, of which five passed and two were rejected.

There are around 50 citizen initiative constitutional amendment petitions currently circulating in Florida, although historically, most won't gather enough signatures to make the ballot. Once again, please see Appendix III for a more in-depth look at the amending process.


Source: <https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnnews01.nsf/Articles/32C14170D9E65067852570C70054EB39>

Figure 4: Amendment Success Rate by Method since 1978

Florida Legislature - State's Amendment Success Rate Since 1978




Amendments by Initiative




Tax and Budget Reform Commission



Constitution Revision Commission



Total Constitutional Amendments



Executive Branch

The executive branch of the government of Florida consists of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Florida Cabinet (which includes the Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture and Chief Financial Officer) and several executive departments. Each office term is limited for two four-year terms.

Governor

The Governor of Florida is the chief executive of the government of Florida and the chief administrative officer of the state responsible for the planning and budgeting for the state, and serves as chair when the Governor and the Florida Cabinet sit as a decision-making body in various constitutional roles. The Governor has the power to execute Florida's laws and to call out the state militia to preserve the public peace, being Commander-in-Chief of the state's military forces that are not in active service of the United States. At least once every legislative session, the Governor is required to deliver the "State of the State Address" to the Florida Legislature regarding the condition and operation of the state government and to suggest new legislation.

The Governor of Florida must share executive duties with the other members of the cabinet and a variety of boards and commissions. In addition to the duties mentioned above, the Florida *Constitution* does grant the governor some strong administrative powers (see *Florida Constitution* in Appendix 1).

The Governor, for cause and by statute, can suspend state and local officials and, if necessary, replace them until the next election. He can also fill county and municipal that are vacated by resignation until the next scheduled election. The Governor appoints members to a variety of state and regional boards and commissions including fifteen members of the constitutional revision commission every twenty years. The Governor can initiate judicial proceeding against state and local officials for failure to enforce state laws and regulations.

The Governor may also request the opinion, in writing, of the state Supreme Court as to the interpretation of the State Constitution in relation to the Governor's executive and administrative duties. Likewise, the governor can request the opinion of state, local and municipal officers with respect to their duties and obligations.

Lieutenant Governor

The Lieutenant Governor is a constitutionally elected officer of the state elected every four years on the same partisan ballot as the Governor. The Lieutenant Governor may serve up to two consecutive four year terms and must meet the same age and residency requirements as the Governor. His constitutional mandates are to fill the office of the Governor when a vacancy occurs and to perform duties assigned to him/her by the Governor.

Cabinet

Florida is unique among U.S. states in having a strong cabinet-style government. Members of the Florida Cabinet are independently elected, and have equal footing with the Governor on issues under the Cabinet's jurisdiction. The Cabinet consists of the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Agriculture and the Chief Financial Officer. (In the recent past, there has been as many as six independently elected cabinet officers). Along with the Governor, each member carries one vote in the decision-making process. In the event of a tie, the side of the Governor is the prevailing side. Cabinet elections are held every four years, on even numbered years not divisible by four (such as 2010, 2014, etc.). Some have likened this system to a "Board of Directors" for the departments under the control and supervision of the Governor and the cabinet.

The Florida Attorney General is the state's chief legal officer. As defined in the Florida Constitution, the Attorney General appoints a statewide prosecutor who may prosecute violations of criminal law occurring in or affecting two or more judicial circuits. The Attorney General is responsible for the Department of Legal Affairs. The Attorney General is head of the Florida Department of Legal Affairs.

The Florida Chief Financial Officer's duties include monitoring the state's finances and fiscal well-being, auditing and assuring that state programs are properly spending money and overseeing the proper management of the revenue and spending of the state. The Chief Financial Officer is the head of the Florida Department of Financial Services (FDFS).

The Florida Commissioner of Agriculture is the head of the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS). The Commissioner of Agriculture has many divisions including inspections and management of fruits, dairy, vegetables, meats, pesticides, food safety forestry and aquaculture.


Agencies and departments

The purpose of agencies is to promulgate rules to implement legislation. In April 2014, there were 25,362 administrative rules, and eight agencies have over 1,000 rules each, of which the most heavily regulated agencies are the Department of Financial Services and Department of Health. The *Florida Administrative Register* (FAR) is the daily publication containing proposed rules and notices of state agencies. The regulations are codified in the *Florida Administrative Code* (FAC). There are also numerous decisions, opinions and rulings of state agencies.

The state had about 122,000 employees in 2010.


Source: Wikipedia

Figure 5:
*Salaries of Key State Office Holders



Source: https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_state_government_salary

Figure 6: Florida Executive Branch



1. The Public Service Commission is an arm of the legislative branch of government (s. 300.001, Florida Statutes).
2. The Administration Commission and the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission are composed of the Governor and the Cabinet (ss. 14.202 and 300.07, Florida Statutes).
3. Chapter 2014-191, Laws of Florida, renamed the Parole Commission as the Florida Commission on Offender Review.
4. The Commissioner of Agriculture is not a member of the State Board of Administration (Article IV, Section 4(e), Constitution of the State of Florida).
5. Chapter 2014-221, Laws of Florida, created the Agency for State Technology within the Department of Management Services. The agency is a separate budget program and is not subject to control, supervision, or direction by the Department of Management Services.
6. The Division of Administrative Hearings is created as a division of the Department of Management Services, but the district chief administrative law judge, who is appointed by the Administration Commission, is the agency head for all purposes. The division is a separate budget entity and is not subject to control, supervision, or direction by the Department of Management Services (s. 120.655(1), Florida Statutes).
7. County health departments have a contractual relationship with the Florida Department of Health (s. 194.01(3), Florida Statutes).
8. Water management districts have individual governing boards but the Department of Environmental Protection may exercise general supervisory authority over water management districts (s. 373.026(7), Florida Statutes).

Office of the Secretary of the Senate

Prepared by the

Florida Executive Branch Explanation

Legislative Branch



Chamber of the Florida Senate

The Florida Constitution mandates a bicameral state legislature, consisting of a Florida Senate of 40 members and a Florida House of Representatives of 120 members. The two bodies meet in the Florida State Capitol. The Florida House of Representative members serve for two-year terms, while Florida Senate members serve staggered four-year terms, with 20 Senators up for election every two years. Members of both houses are term limited to serve a maximum of eight years.

Terms and qualifications

State representatives are elected to two-year terms during even-numbered years. A representative must be at least 21 years of age, a resident of the district in which he or she will serve, and a resident of Florida for at least two years before being qualified to run for election. Once elected, representatives are limited to four consecutive terms but can run again after sitting out one election.

State senators must be at least 21 years of age, an elector and resident of their electoral district, and a Florida resident for at least two years prior to election. They take office upon election.

The Florida Constitution requires state senators to be elected to staggered, four-year terms. Senators in odd-numbered districts are elected in U.S. Presidential Election years, while Senators in even-numbered districts are elected in midterm election years. However, to reflect the results of the U.S. Census and the redrawing of district boundaries, all seats are up for election in redistricting years, with some terms truncated as a result. Thus, senators in even-numbered districts were elected to two-year terms in 2012 (following the 2010 Census), and senators in odd-numbered districts will be elected to two-year terms in 2022 (following the 2020 Census).

Sessions

The entire Florida Legislature meets every year in a session beginning on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March and lasting 60 calendar days. Special sessions may be called either by the Governor or by the leaders of both chambers acting jointly. The Speaker of the House is elected by the representatives for a two-year term. The Speaker has the power to preside over the chamber during a session, to appoint committee members and chairs of committees, to influence the placement of bills on the calendar, and to rule on procedural motions. The Speaker pro tempore presides if the Speaker leaves the Chair or if there is a vacancy.

The legislature's session is part-time, meeting for 60-day regular sessions annually. The regular session of the Florida Legislature commences on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March with the Governor's State of the State speech before a joint session and ends on the last Friday in April or the first Friday in May. The Florida Legislature often meets in special sessions, sometimes as many as a half dozen in a year, that are called for particular purposes, such as budget reduction or reforming property insurance. A special session may be called by the governor, by joint proclamation of the Speaker of the House and Senate President or by three-fifths vote of the members of both houses.⁴ Outside of these regular and special sessions, the members of both houses participate in county delegation meetings and interim committee meetings throughout the year, mostly from November to February in advance of the regular session.

The Florida Constitution authorizes the state legislature to create and amend the laws of the U.S. State of Florida. State senators propose legislation in the forms of bills drafted by a nonpartisan, professional staff. Successful legislation must undergo committee review, three readings on the floor of each house, with appropriate voting majorities, as required, and either be signed into law by the governor or enacted through a veto override approved by two-thirds of the membership of each legislative house


Its session laws are compiled into the *Laws of Florida* and the *Florida Statutes* are the codified statutory laws of the state which have general applicability.

In the state of Florida, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate are extremely powerful positions. Both are elected for two year terms by the members of their respective houses. In reality, the majority party caucuses prior to the official organization meeting of their respective House to choose their leader, and then they present their candidate formally for a perfunctory vote by all of the members of their chamber. Members usually line up years in advance waiting for a chance to be the leader of one of the legislative chambers.

The Speaker of the House and the Presidency of the Senate are coveted positions because of the extreme concentration of power in the office. Usually these leaders choose all of the committee chairs, all of the members to serve on specific committees, controlling who speaks on the floor, and the calendaring of the preferred bills the leader and the committee chair's want passed. This is the Speaker's or President's platform. Likewise, the Speaker and President can, and have removed, members from committees and committee chairmanship for opposition to their desired programs. In the past, legislators who voice and vote in opposition to the leader's platform have been removed from all committees, had their Capitol offices "closed for remodeling" and suffered the loss of their parking space.



The Speaker and President also decide to which committee bills will be referred. Both houses have standing committees of substance on topics of such as education, environment, appropriations, rules, tax and finance, economic affairs, health and human services, etc. as well as joint and special committees. Once referred to the committee the committee chair may assign the bill to a subcommittee to hold hearings, make amendments and then report back to the full committee. The committee chair may then decide to hold hearings or schedule the bill for a vote of entire committee (see the flow chart in Figure 7). The scheduling or non-scheduling of bills is one of the most important powers of the committee chairs.


Source: Wikipedia



Source: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (red Republican—blue Democrat)

Figure 7: Florida Senate Districts by Political Party

Florida State Senate			
Party		As of November 7, 2016	After November 8, 2016
	Democratic Party	14	15
	Republican Party	26	25
Total		40	40



Source: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (red Republican—blue Democrat)

Figure 8: Florida House Districts by Political Party

Florida House of Representatives			
Party		As of November 7, 2016	After November 8, 2016
■	Democratic Party	38	41
■	Republican Party	81	79
■	Vacancy	1	0
Total		120	120

THE FLORIDA SENATE – HOW AN IDEA BECOMES A LAW





Figure 9: How a Bill Becomes a Law



Source: Representative Karen Coolman-Black

Figure 10: How a Bill Really Becomes a Law

Judicial Branch




Florida Supreme Court in Tallahassee

Florida Courts

The Florida court system is comprised of the Supreme Court, five district courts of appeal, 20 circuit courts and 67 county courts. Each layer of the Florida judicial system has a distinct role in providing justice to all Floridians.

The Office of the State Courts Administrators (OSCA) is the administrative arm of the Florida Supreme Court. The office was formed in 1972, the result of Article V of the state constitution that sought to bring greater consistency and uniformity to the judicial branch.

Figure 11: Court System Organization & Structure



Appellate Courts:

Supreme Court

The highest appellate court in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court's 150+ years span a time when the state was the least populated (1845) to the present (2014) when it ranks third nationwide. Decisions stemming from Florida's highest court have helped shape, certainly, the state itself, but the nation as a whole.

District Courts of Appeal

There are five District Courts of Appeal in Florida, located respectively in Tallahassee, Lakeland, Miami, West Palm Beach and Daytona Beach. As a general rule, decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the final appellate review of litigated cases.

Trial Courts:

Trial Courts - Circuit

There are 20 judicial circuits in the Florida court system. Circuit courts have general trial jurisdiction over matters not assigned by statute to the county courts and also hear appeals from county court cases. Some circuits are made up of multiple counties.

Trial Courts – County

The Florida Constitution establishes that there is ONE county court in each of Florida's 67 counties. The county courts are sometimes referred to as "the people's courts," probably because a large part of the courts' work involves voluminous citizen disputes, such as traffic offenses, less serious criminal matters (misdemeanors), and relatively small monetary disputes.

Visit the **FLORIDA SUPREME COURT** AT WWW.FLORIDASUPREMECOURT.ORG



Organization

The Florida Supreme Court is composed of seven Justices. At least five Justices must participate in every case and at least four must agree for a decision to be reached. The Court's official headquarters is the Supreme Court Building in Tallahassee.

To be eligible for the office of Justice, a person must be a registered voter who resides in Florida and must have been admitted to the practice of law in Florida for the preceding 10 years.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is set out in the Constitution with some degree of flexibility by which the Legislature may add or take away certain categories of cases.

Mandatory Jurisdiction: The Court **MUST** review

- final orders imposing death sentences,
- district court decisions declaring a State statute or provision of the State Constitution invalid,
- bond validations,
- certain orders of the Public Service Commission on utility rates and services.

“Mandatory” jurisdiction defines those cases that, under the constitutional and statutory framework of a state, must be considered and decided by the court as a matter of right if properly filed.

Discretionary Jurisdiction: The Court, in addition to these forms of mandatory review authority, if discretionary review is sought by a party, the Court at its discretion **MAY** review

- any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute,
- construes a provision of the state or federal constitution,
- affects a class of constitutional or state officers,
- directly conflicts with a decision of another district court or the Supreme Court on the same question of law,
- certified as great public importance,
- certified direct conflict,
- certified judgment of trial courts,
- certified question from federal courts.

“Discretionary” jurisdiction defines the class of cases where a petition seeking review, if granted, would result in the case being considered and decided on the merits.

Figure 12: District Courts of Appeal



The purpose of Florida's District Courts of Appeal is to provide the opportunity for thoughtful review of decisions of lower tribunals by multi-judge panels. District Courts of Appeal correct harmful errors and ensure that decisions are consistent with our rights and liberties. This process contributes to the development, clarity, and consistency of the law.

Organization

There are five District Courts of Appeal in Florida, located respectively in Tallahassee, Lakeland, Miami, West Palm Beach and Daytona Beach. As a general rule, decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the final appellate review of litigated cases.

- First District Court of Appeal (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and 14th Circuits)
- Second District Court of Appeal (6th, 10th, 12th, 13th and 20th Circuits)
- Third District Court of Appeal (11th and 16th Circuits)
- Fourth District Court of Appeal (15th, 17th and 19th Circuits)
- Fifth District Court of Appeal (5th, 7th, 9th and 18th Circuits)

The bulk of trial court decisions that are appealed are never heard by the Supreme Court. Rather, they are reviewed by three-judge panels of the district courts of appeal. Florida did not have district courts of appeal until 1957.

Until that time, all appeals were heard solely by the Supreme Court. As Florida grew rapidly in the twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court's docket became badly congested. Justice Elwyn Thomas with help from other members of the Court perceived the problem and successfully lobbied for the creation of the district-court system to provide intermediate appellate courts.

The Constitution now provides that the Legislature shall divide the State into appellate court districts and that there shall be a district court of appeal (DCA) serving each district. There are five such districts that are headquartered in Tallahassee, Lakeland, Miami, West Palm Beach, and Daytona Beach.

DCA judges must meet the same eligibility requirements for appointment to office, and they are subject to the same procedures and conditions for discipline and removal from office, as Justices of the Supreme Court. Like Supreme Court Justices, district court judges also serve terms of six years and will be eligible for successive terms under a merit retention vote of the electors in their districts.

In each district court, a chief judge, who is selected by the district court judges within the district, is responsible for the administrative duties of the court.

Jurisdiction

The fundamental reasons for appeals from trial courts are to correct harmful errors by having review by a multi-judge panel of experienced judges and to promote clarity and consistency in the law by publishing opinions that set forth the relevant facts of the case and the proper application of the law to those facts.

The district courts of appeal can hear appeals from final judgments and can review certain non-final orders.

By general law, the district courts have been granted the power to review final actions taken by state agencies in carrying out the duties of the executive branch of government.

Finally, the district courts have been granted constitutional authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, as well as all other writs necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction.

As a general rule, decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the final appellate review of litigated cases. A person who is displeased with a district court's express decision may ask for review in the Florida Supreme Court and then in the United States Supreme Court, but neither tribunal is required to accept the case for further review. Most are denied.

Judicial Family Institute (JFI)

The Judicial Family Institute is a subcommittee of the Conference of Chief Justices. It also works with the National Center for State Courts and is dedicated to providing information, support and education to judicial family members.



Trial Courts - Circuit

Until 1973, Florida had more different kinds of trial courts than any state except New York. A movement developed in the late 1960s to reform this confusing system. As a result, Florida now has a simple two-tiered trial court system. A temporary exception was the municipal court, which was not abolished until January 1, 1977. Most of these courts in major population areas were abolished on January 1, 1973.

The majority of jury trials in Florida take place before one judge sitting as judge of the circuit court. The circuit courts are sometimes referred to as courts of general jurisdiction, in recognition of the fact that most criminal and civil cases originate at this level.

Organization

The Constitution provides that a circuit court shall be established to serve each judicial circuit established by the Legislature, of which there are 20. Within each circuit, there may be any number of judges, depending upon the population and caseload of the particular area.

Figure 13: Florida Circuit Courts



To be eligible for the office of circuit judge, a person must be an elector of a county within the circuit and must have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for the preceding five years.

Circuit court judges are elected by the voters of the circuits in nonpartisan, contested elections against other persons who choose to qualify as candidates for the position. Circuit court judges serve for six-year terms, and they are subject to the same disciplinary standards and procedures as Supreme Court Justices and district court judges.

A chief judge is chosen from among the circuit judges and county judges in each judicial circuit to carry out administrative responsibilities for all trial courts (both circuit and county courts) within the circuit.

Jurisdiction

Circuit courts have general trial jurisdiction over matters not assigned by statute to the county courts and also hear appeals from county court cases. Thus, circuit courts are simultaneously the highest trial courts and the lowest appellate courts in Florida's judicial system.

The trial jurisdiction of circuit courts includes, among other matters, original jurisdiction over civil disputes involving more than \$15,000; controversies involving the estates of decedents, minors, and persons adjudicated as incapacitated; cases relating to juveniles; criminal prosecutions for all felonies; tax disputes; actions to determine the title and boundaries of real property; suits for declaratory judgments that is, to determine the legal rights or responsibilities of parties under the terms of written instruments, laws, or regulations before a dispute arises and leads to litigation; and requests for injunctions to prevent persons or entities from acting in a manner that is asserted to be unlawful.

Lastly, circuit courts are also granted the power to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, *quo warranto*, and *habeas corpus*, and all other writs necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction.

Trial Courts - County

Organization

- The Constitution establishes a county court in each of Florida's 67 counties. The number of judges in each county court varies with the population and caseload of the county. To be eligible for the office of county judge, a person must be an elector of the county and must have been a member of The Florida Bar for five years; in counties with a population of 40,000 or less, a person must only be a member of The Florida Bar.
- County judges are eligible for assignment to circuit court, and they are frequently assigned as such within the judicial circuit that embraces their counties.
- County judges serve six-year terms, and they are subject to the same disciplinary standards, and to the jurisdiction of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, as all other judicial officers.

Jurisdiction

- The trial jurisdiction of county courts is established by statute. The jurisdiction of county courts extends to civil disputes involving \$15,000 or less.
- The majority of non-jury trials in Florida take place before one judge sitting as a judge of the county court. The county courts are sometimes referred to as "the people's courts," probably because a large part of the courts' work involves voluminous citizen disputes, such as traffic offenses, less serious criminal matters (misdemeanors), and relatively small monetary disputes.


Links

- [County/Circuit Cross Reference](#)
- [City/County Cross Reference](#)
- [Florida Association of Court Clerks and Comptroller](#)
- [MyFloridaCounty.com](#) - Pay county court services on-line
- [Conference of County Court Judges of Florida](#)

Judicial Family Institute (JFI)

The Judicial Family Institute is a subcommittee of the Conference of Chief Justices. It also works with the National Center for State Courts and is dedicated to providing information, support and education to judicial family members

Source: <http://www.flcourts.org>



Source: <http://flcourts.org>

Figure 14: Jurisdiction of Florida Courts

Local Government

There are four types of local governments in Florida: counties, municipalities, school districts and special districts.

Florida consists of 67 counties. Each county has officers considered "state" officers: these officials are elected locally, and their salaries and office expenses are also paid locally, but they cannot be removed from office or replaced locally, but only by the governor. The state officers subject to this requirement are the sheriff, state's attorney, public defender, tax collector, clerk of the circuit court (though styled as such, each circuit having multiple counties within its jurisdiction has a separate elected clerk within each county, and the office also handles official county records not pertaining to judicial matters), property appraiser, supervisor of elections, and judges.

There is one school district for each county; the Florida Constitution allows adjoining counties to merge their districts upon voter approval. The superintendent is by default an elected official; however, the Florida Constitution allows county voters to make the position an appointed one.


Municipalities in Florida may be called towns, cities, or villages, but there is no legal distinction between the different terms. Municipalities often have police departments, fire departments, and provide essential services such as water, waste collection, etc. In unincorporated areas of a county, the county itself can provide some of these services. Municipalities may also enter agreements with the county to have the county provide certain services. Each county has a Sheriff who also tends to have concurrent jurisdiction with municipal police departments.

Both counties and cities may have a legislative branch (commissions or councils) and executive branch (mayor or manager) and local police, but violations are brought before a county court. Counties and municipalities are authorized to pass laws (ordinances), levy taxes, and provide public services within their jurisdictions. All areas of Florida are located within a county, but only some areas have been incorporated into municipalities. All municipalities are located within a county and the county jurisdiction overlays the municipal jurisdiction. Usually, if there is a conflict between a county ordinance and a municipal ordinance, the municipal ordinance has precedence within the municipality's borders; however, the overlaying county's ordinances have precedence if the overlaying county has been designated a charter county by the Florida Legislature.

In some cases, the municipal and county governments have merged into a consolidated government. However, smaller municipal governments can be created inside of a consolidated municipality/county. In Jacksonville, the municipal government has taken over the responsibilities normally given to the county government, Duval County, and smaller municipalities exist within it.

Among special districts are "community development districts" which have virtually all the power of a city or county (except, notably, they do not have police power). Chapter 190 of the Florida Statutes governs these districts. Notable CDD's include the Reedy Creek Improvement District (the location of Walt Disney World) and substantially all of The Villages (the giant Central Florida retirement community). Other special districts include sports authorities, taxi cab commissions, five powerful water and flood management districts, mosquito control districts, airport authorities and navigation districts among a host of others.

Figure 15: Florida's Largest Cities



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010

The Future

As this 4th edition of *A Brief Introduction to Florida Government* goes to press there are several pressing issues in the state that will have to be dealt with in the near future by our government officials.

1. The issue of legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes will continue to surface in the state now that a constitutional amendment in its favor passed in November 2016. The state now needs to formulate the regulations for growing, possessing and distributing the substance.
2. As long as the country is divided along partisan lines, Florida will be a focal point for national elections. The state is nearly evenly split between voting Democrats and Republicans and the I-4 corridor is evenly split among the parties as well. After the November 2016 elections, Florida still has one Democrat (Bill Nelson) and one Republican (Marco Rubio) as U.S. Senators. Democrats carried the state's electoral votes in 1996, 2008, and 2012, and Republicans carried the state in 2000 (by 500+ votes), 2004 and 2016. In the last 20 years that is an even divide of three Democrat and three Republican Presidential electoral victories. By 2022, the state most certainly will have 2 more electoral votes if the current growth rate continues.
3. Nearly two million individuals have moved into the state in the last ten years, now making Florida the third largest state by population in the country. With the recent passing of Hurricane Irma, it seems that the populace as well as government officials cannot prepare enough for the next inevitable major natural disaster.
4. The state constitution is now in direct conflict with a recent Supreme Court case defining marriage as between one man and one woman. There is also conflict regarding Florida's abortion regulations and a recent Supreme Court decision. At the present time, the state Attorney General appears to be following Supreme Court guidelines.
5. Currently there is a severe migration of individuals from the Middle-East and Northern Africa. Governor Rick Scott (R) has told the Federal government that he opposes the placement of refugees in Florida.
6. Florida's largest metropolitan areas are lacking in mass transit when compared to metropolitan areas of the same size across the country. As the state continues to grow gridlock continues to worsen.
7. Governor Scott has refused the extension of Medicaid benefits to tens of thousands of Floridians authorized by Federal law. This has a severe effect on indigents and health care providers in Florida.
8. The State of Florida has been a litigant along with several other states pressing for the repeal of "Obama-Care." With the 2016 election of President Donald Trump (R), this may be a moot point since one of his campaign promises was to abolish "Obama-Care."

9. Previously, under President Barack Obama (D), there has been a formal thaw in relations between the United States and Cuba. This may lead to an unprecedented amount of trade and tourism to the island nation from its closest American neighbor, Florida. Already several commercial airlines have scheduled flights from Florida and Cuban hotels have seen an increase in tourists. With the death of Fidel Castro and the election of Donald Trump and his policies future relations are to be monitored closely.

10. The Florida House of Representative recently introduced rules changes regarding the filing of appropriations line items. Currently the Florida Senate is not in agreement with these rule changes. The next legislative session may see reconciliation in these divisions.

11. Currently, the Florida House of Representative, the Florida Senate and the Governor have major differences in the 2017 funding and even existence of the services of Visit Florida and Enterprise Florida. One side sees it as “corporate welfare” for specific industries while the other side sees them as job creation agencies. A partial compromise was reached at the end of the 2017 session.

12. Orlando attorney John Morgan successfully placed the medical marijuana amendment on the ballot. He may consider a run for governor in the next election. Governor Scott, who is term-limited is expected to contend in 2018 the U.S. Senate seat of Bill Nelson (D).

13. Currently, the 37 member Constitutional Revision Commissioners have been appointed and they are deliberating over potential changes to the current Constitution.

Appendix I

Selections from the *CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA*

AS REVISED IN 1968 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED

The Constitution of the State of Florida as revised in 1968 consisted of certain revised articles as proposed by three joint resolutions which were adopted during the special session of June 24-July 3, 1968, and ratified by the electorate on November 5, 1968, together with one article carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended. The articles proposed in House Joint Resolution 1-2X constituted the entire revised constitution with the exception of Articles V, VI, and VIII. Senate Joint Resolution 4-2X proposed Article VI, relating to suffrage and elections. Senate Joint Resolution 5-2X proposed a new Article VIII, relating to local government. Article V, relating to the judiciary, was carried forward from the Constitution of 1885, as amended.

Sections composing the 1968 revision have no history notes. Subsequent changes are indicated by notes appended to the affected sections. The indexes appearing at the beginning of each article, notes appearing at the end of various sections, and section and subsection headings are added editorially and are not to be considered as part of the constitution.

PREAMBLE

We, the people of the State of Florida, being grateful to Almighty God for our constitutional liberty, in order to secure its benefits, perfect our government, insure domestic tranquility, maintain public order, and guarantee equal civil and political rights to all, do ordain and establish this constitution.

[ARTICLE I](#) DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
[ARTICLE II](#) GENERAL PROVISIONS
[ARTICLE III](#) LEGISLATURE
[ARTICLE IV](#) EXECUTIVE
[ARTICLE V](#) JUDICIARY
[ARTICLE VI](#) SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS
[ARTICLE VII](#) FINANCE AND TAXATION
[ARTICLE VIII](#) LOCAL GOVERNMENT
[ARTICLE IX](#) EDUCATION
[ARTICLE X](#) MISCELLANEOUS
[ARTICLE XI](#) AMENDMENTS
[ARTICLE XII](#) SCHEDULE

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

[SECTION 1.](#) Political power.
[SECTION 2.](#) Basic rights.
[SECTION 3.](#) Religious freedom.
[SECTION 4.](#) Freedom of speech and press.
[SECTION 5.](#) Right to assemble.
[SECTION 6.](#) Right to work.
[SECTION 7.](#) Military power.
[SECTION 8.](#) Right to bear arms.
[SECTION 9.](#) Due process.
[SECTION 10.](#) Prohibited laws.
[SECTION 11.](#) Imprisonment for debt.
[SECTION 12.](#) Searches and seizures.
[SECTION 13.](#) Habeas corpus.
[SECTION 14.](#) Pretrial release and detention.
[SECTION 15.](#) Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.
[SECTION 16.](#) Rights of accused and of victims.
[SECTION 17.](#) Excessive punishments.
[SECTION 18.](#) Administrative penalties.
[SECTION 19.](#) Costs.
[SECTION 20.](#) Treason.
[SECTION 21.](#) Access to courts.
[SECTION 22.](#) Trial by jury.
[SECTION 23.](#) Right of privacy.
[SECTION 24.](#) Access to public records and meetings.
[SECTION 25.](#) Taxpayers' Bill of Rights.
[SECTION 26.](#) Claimant's right to fair compensation.
[SECTION 27.](#) Marriage defined.

SECTION 1. Political power.—All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.

SECTION 2. Basic rights.—All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.

History.—Am. S.J.R. 917, 1974; adopted 1974; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 9, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 3. Religious freedom.—There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.

SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.—Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 5. Right to assemble.—The people shall have the right peaceably to assemble, to instruct their representatives, and to petition for redress of grievances.

SECTION 6. Right to work.—The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to strike.

SECTION 7. Military power.—The military power shall be subordinate to the civil.

SECTION 8. Right to bear arms.—

- (a) The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.
- (b) There shall be a mandatory period of three days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, between the purchase and delivery at retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this section, “purchase” means the transfer of money or other valuable consideration to the retailer, and “handgun” means a firearm capable of being carried and used by one hand, such as a pistol or revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit as prescribed in Florida law shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

(c) The legislature shall enact legislation implementing subsection (b) of this section, effective no later than December 31, 1991, which shall provide that anyone violating the provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a felony.

(d) This restriction shall not apply to a trade in of another handgun.

History.—Am. C.S. for S.J.R. 43, 1989; adopted 1990.

SECTION 9. Due process.—No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 10. Prohibited laws.—No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

SECTION 11. Imprisonment for debt.—No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.

SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 31-H, 1982; adopted 1982.

SECTION 13. Habeas corpus.—The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without delay, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, suspension is essential to the public safety.

SECTION 14. Pretrial release and detention.—Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 43-H, 1982; adopted 1982.

SECTION 15. Prosecution for crime; offenses committed by children.—

(a) No person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment or indictment by a grand jury, or for other felony without such presentment or indictment or an information under oath filed by the prosecuting officer of the court, except persons on active duty in the militia when tried by courts martial.

- (b) When authorized by law, a child as therein defined may be charged with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of crime and tried without a jury or other requirements applicable to criminal cases. Any child so charged shall, upon demand made as provided by law before a trial in a juvenile proceeding, be tried in an appropriate court as an adult. A child found delinquent shall be disciplined as provided by law.

SECTION 16. Rights of accused and of victims.—

- (a) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed. If the county is not known, the indictment or information may charge venue in two or more counties conjunctively and proof that the crime was committed in that area shall be sufficient; but before pleading the accused may elect in which of those counties the trial will take place. Venue for prosecution of crimes committed beyond the boundaries of the state shall be fixed by law.
- (b) Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.

History.—Am. S.J.R. 135, 1987; adopted 1988; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 17. Excessive punishments.—Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden. The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by the legislature. The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any method of execution shall be allowed, unless prohibited by the United States Constitution. Methods of execution may be designated by the legislature, and a change in any method of execution may be applied retroactively. A sentence of death shall not be reduced on the basis that a method of execution is invalid. In any case in which an execution method is declared invalid, the death sentence shall remain in force until the sentence can be lawfully executed by any valid method. This section shall apply retroactively.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 3505, 1998; adopted 1998; Am. H.J.R. 951, 2001; adopted 2002.

SECTION 18. Administrative penalties.—No administrative agency, except the Department of Military Affairs in an appropriately convened court-martial action as provided by law, shall impose a sentence of imprisonment, nor shall it impose any other penalty except as provided by law.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 19. Costs.—No person charged with crime shall be compelled to pay costs before a judgment of conviction has become final.

SECTION 20. Treason.—Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort, and no person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court.

SECTION 21. Access to courts.—The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.

SECTION 22. Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.

SECTION 23. Right of privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law.

History.—Added, C.S. for H.J.R. 387, 1980; adopted 1980; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.—

- (a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.
- (b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution.
- (c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide by general law passed by a two-thirds vote of each house for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b), provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one subject.
- (d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall remain in effect until they are repealed.

History.—Added, C.S. for C.S. for H.J.R.’s 1727, 863, 2035, 1992; adopted 1992; Am. S.J.R. 1284, 2002; adopted 2002.

SECTION 25. Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights.—By general law the legislature shall prescribe and adopt a Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights that, in clear and concise language, sets forth taxpayers’ rights and responsibilities and government’s responsibilities to deal fairly with taxpayers under the laws of this state. This section shall be effective July 1, 1993.

History.—Proposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, Revision No. 2, 1992, filed with the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992.

Note.—This section, originally designated section 24 by Revision No. 2 of the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, 1992, was redesignated section 25 by the editors in order to avoid confusion with section 24 as contained in H.J.R.’s 1727, 863, 2035, 1992.

SECTION 26. Claimant’s right to fair compensation.—

(a) Article I, Section 26 is created to read “Claimant’s right to fair compensation.” In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to receive no less than 70% of the first \$250,000.00 in all damages received by the claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of \$250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This provision is self-executing and does not require implementing legislation.

(b) This Amendment shall take effect on the day following approval by the voters.

History.—Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State September 8, 2003; adopted 2004.

SECTION 27. Marriage defined.—Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof shall be valid or recognized.

History.—Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State February 9, 2005; adopted 2008.

ARTICLE XI AMENDMENTS

- [SECTION 1.](#) Proposal by legislature.
- [SECTION 2.](#) Revision commission.
- [SECTION 3.](#) Initiative.
- [SECTION 4.](#) Constitutional convention.
- [SECTION 5.](#) Amendment or revision election.
- [SECTION 6.](#) Taxation and budget reform commission.
- [SECTION 7.](#) Tax or fee limitation.

SECTION 1. Proposal by legislature.—Amendment of a section or revision of one or more articles, or the whole, of this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the legislature. The full text of the joint resolution and the vote of each member voting shall be entered on the journal of each house.

SECTION 2. Revision commission.—

- (a) Within thirty days before the convening of the 2017 regular session of the legislature, and each twentieth year thereafter, there shall be established a constitution revision commission composed of the following thirty-seven members:
- (1) the attorney general of the state;
 - (2) fifteen members selected by the governor;
 - (3) nine members selected by the speaker of the house of representatives and nine members selected by the president of the senate; and
 - (4) three members selected by the chief justice of the supreme court of Florida with the advice of the justices.
- (b) The governor shall designate one member of the commission as its chair. Vacancies in the membership of the commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments.
- (c) Each constitution revision commission shall convene at the call of its chair, adopt its rules of procedure, examine the constitution of the state, hold public hearings, and, not later than one hundred eighty days prior to the next general election, file with the custodian of state records its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of it.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988; Am. S.J.R. 210, 1996; adopted 1996; Ams. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision Nos. 8 and 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 3. Initiative.—The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision or amendment, except for those limiting the power of government to raise revenue, shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith. It may be invoked by filing with the custodian of state records a petition containing a copy of the proposed revision or amendment, signed by a number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of such districts respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in which presidential electors were chosen.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 2835, 1972; adopted 1972; Am. by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State August 3, 1993; adopted 1994; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 8, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 4. Constitutional convention.—

- (a) The power to call a convention to consider a revision of the entire constitution is reserved to the people. It may be invoked by filing with the custodian of state records a petition, containing a declaration that a constitutional convention is desired, signed by a number of electors in each of one half of the congressional districts of the state, and of the state as a whole, equal to fifteen per cent of the votes cast in each such district respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election of presidential electors.
- (b) At the next general election held more than ninety days after the filing of such petition there shall be submitted to the electors of the state the question: “Shall a constitutional convention be held?” If a majority voting on the question votes in the affirmative, at the next succeeding general election there shall be elected from each representative district a member of a constitutional convention. On the twenty-first day following that election, the convention shall sit at the capital, elect officers, adopt rules of procedure, judge the election of its membership, and fix a time and place for its future meetings. Not later than ninety days before the next succeeding general election, the convention shall cause to be filed with the custodian of state records any revision of this constitution proposed by it.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 8, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 5. Amendment or revision election.—

- (a) A proposed amendment to or revision of this constitution, or any part of it, shall be submitted to the electors at the next general election held more than ninety days after the joint resolution or report of revision commission, constitutional convention or taxation and budget reform commission proposing it is filed with the custodian of state records, unless, pursuant to law enacted by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the membership of each house of the legislature and limited to a single amendment or revision, it is submitted at an earlier special election held more than ninety days after such filing.
- (b) A proposed amendment or revision of this constitution, or any part of it, by initiative shall be submitted to the electors at the general election provided the initiative petition is filed with the custodian of state records no later than February 1 of the year in which the general election is held.
- (c) The legislature shall provide by general law, prior to the holding of an election pursuant to this section, for the provision of a statement to the public regarding the probable financial impact of any amendment proposed by initiative pursuant to section 3.
- (d) Once in the tenth week, and once in the sixth week immediately preceding the week in which the election is held, the proposed amendment or revision, with notice of the date of election at which it will be submitted to the electors, shall be published in one newspaper of general circulation in each county in which a newspaper is published.
- (e) Unless otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in this constitution, if the proposed amendment or revision is approved by vote of at least sixty percent of the electors voting on the measure, it shall be effective as an amendment to or revision of the constitution of the state on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the election, or on such other date as may be specified in the amendment or revision.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 8, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998; Am. H.J.R. 571, 2001; adopted 2002; Am. S.J.R. 2394, 2004; adopted 2004; Am. H.J.R. 1723, 2005; adopted 2006.

SECTION 6. Taxation and budget reform commission.—

- (a) Beginning in 2007 and each twentieth year thereafter, there shall be established a taxation and budget reform commission composed of the following members:
 - (1) eleven members selected by the governor, none of whom shall be a member of the legislature at the time of appointment.
 - (2) seven members selected by the speaker of the house of representatives and seven members selected by the president of the senate, none of whom shall be a member of the legislature at the time of appointment.
 - (3) four non-voting ex officio members, all of whom shall be members of the legislature at the time of appointment. Two of these members, one of whom shall be a member of the minority party in the house of representatives, shall be selected by the speaker of the house of representatives, and two of these members, one of whom shall be a member of the minority party in the senate, shall be selected by the president of the senate.
- (b) Vacancies in membership of the commission shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments.
- (c) At its initial meeting, the members of the commission shall elect a member who is not a member of the legislature to serve as chair and the commission shall adopt its rules of procedure. Thereafter, the commission shall convene at the call of the chair. An affirmative vote of two thirds of the full

commission shall be necessary for any revision of this constitution or any part of it to be proposed by the commission.

- (d) The commission shall examine the state budgetary process, the revenue needs and expenditure processes of the state, the appropriateness of the tax structure of the state, and governmental productivity and efficiency; review policy as it relates to the ability of state and local government to tax and adequately fund governmental operations and capital facilities required to meet the state's needs during the next twenty year period; determine methods favored by the citizens of the state to fund the needs of the state, including alternative methods for raising sufficient revenues for the needs of the state; determine measures that could be instituted to effectively gather funds from existing tax sources; examine constitutional limitations on taxation and expenditures at the state and local level; and review the state's comprehensive planning, budgeting and needs assessment processes to determine whether the resulting information adequately supports a strategic decision-making process.
- (e) The commission shall hold public hearings as it deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this section. The commission shall issue a report of the results of the review carried out, and propose to the legislature any recommended statutory changes related to the taxation or budgetary laws of the state. Not later than one hundred eighty days prior to the general election in the second year following the year in which the commission is established, the commission shall file with the custodian of state records its proposal, if any, of a revision of this constitution or any part of it dealing with taxation or the state budgetary process.

History.—Added, H.J.R. 1616, 1988; adopted 1988; Ams. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision Nos. 8 and 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 7. Tax or fee limitation.—Notwithstanding Article X, Section 12(d) of this constitution, no new State tax or fee shall be imposed on or after November 8, 1994 by any amendment to this constitution unless the proposed amendment is approved by not fewer than two-thirds of the voters voting in the election in which such proposed amendment is considered. For purposes of this section, the phrase “new State tax or fee” shall mean any tax or fee which would produce revenue subject to lump sum or other appropriation by the Legislature, either for the State general revenue fund or any trust fund, which tax or fee is not in effect on November 7, 1994 including without limitation such taxes and fees as are the subject of proposed constitutional amendments appearing on the ballot on November 8, 1994. This section shall apply to proposed constitutional amendments relating to State taxes or fees which appear on the November 8, 1994 ballot, or later ballots, and any such proposed amendment which fails to gain the two-thirds vote required hereby shall be null, void and without effect.

History.—Proposed by Initiative Petition filed with the Secretary of State March 11, 1994; adopted 1996.

From the Florida Constitution

SECTION 1. Governor.—

- (a) The supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor, who shall be commander-in-chief of all military forces of the state not in active service of the United States. The governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, commission all officers of the state and counties, and transact all necessary business with the officers of government. The governor may require information in writing from all executive or administrative state, county or municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices. The governor shall be the chief administrative officer of the state responsible for the planning and budgeting for the state.

- (b) The governor may initiate judicial proceedings in the name of the state against any executive or administrative state, county or municipal officer to enforce compliance with any duty or restrain any unauthorized act.
- (c) The governor may request in writing the opinion of the justices of the supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon any question affecting the governor's executive powers and duties. The justices shall, subject to their rules of procedure, permit interested persons to be heard on the questions presented and shall render their written opinion not earlier than ten days from the filing and docketing of the request, unless in their judgment the delay would cause public injury.
- (d) The governor shall have power to call out the militia to preserve the public peace, execute the laws of the state, suppress insurrection, or repel invasion.
- (e) The governor shall by message at least once in each regular session inform the legislature concerning the condition of the state, propose such reorganization of the executive department as will promote efficiency and economy, and recommend measures in the public interest.
- (f) When not otherwise provided for in this constitution, the governor shall fill by appointment any vacancy in state or county office for the remainder of the term of an appointive office, and for the remainder of the term of an elective office if less than twenty-eight months, otherwise until the first Tuesday after the first Monday following the next general election.

History.—Am. proposed by Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, Revision No. 1, 1992, filed with the Secretary of State May 7, 1992; adopted 1992; Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 2. Lieutenant governor.—There shall be a lieutenant governor, who shall perform such duties pertaining to the office of governor as shall be assigned by the governor, except when otherwise provided by law, and such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 3. Succession to office of governor; acting governor.—

- (a) Upon vacancy in the office of governor, the lieutenant governor shall become governor. Further succession to the office of governor shall be prescribed by law. A successor shall serve for the remainder of the term.
- (b) Upon impeachment of the governor and until completion of trial thereof, or during the governor's physical or mental incapacity, the lieutenant governor shall act as governor. Further succession as acting governor shall be prescribed by law. Incapacity to serve as governor may be determined by the supreme court upon due notice after docketing of a written suggestion thereof by three cabinet members, and in such case restoration of capacity shall be similarly determined after docketing of written suggestion thereof by the governor, the legislature or three cabinet members. Incapacity to serve as governor may also be established by certificate filed with the custodian of state records by the governor declaring incapacity for physical reasons to serve as governor, and in such case restoration of capacity shall be similarly established.

History.—Amendments proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision Nos. 8 and 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 4. Cabinet.—

- (a) There shall be a cabinet composed of an attorney general, a chief financial officer, and a commissioner of agriculture. In addition to the powers and duties specified herein, they shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be prescribed by law. In the event of a tie vote of the governor and cabinet, the side on which the governor voted shall be deemed to prevail.
- (b) The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer. There is created in the office of the attorney general the position of statewide prosecutor. The statewide prosecutor shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of a related transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or more judicial circuits as provided by general law. The statewide prosecutor shall be appointed by the

attorney general from not less than three persons nominated by the judicial nominating commission for the supreme court, or as otherwise provided by general law.

- (c) The chief financial officer shall serve as the chief fiscal officer of the state, and shall settle and approve accounts against the state, and shall keep all state funds and securities.
- (d) The commissioner of agriculture shall have supervision of matters pertaining to agriculture except as otherwise provided by law.
- (e) The governor as chair, the chief financial officer, and the attorney general shall constitute the state board of administration, which shall succeed to all the power, control, and authority of the state board of administration established pursuant to Article IX, Section 16 of the Constitution of 1885, and which shall continue as a body at least for the life of Article XII, Section 9(c).
- (f) The governor as chair, the chief financial officer, the attorney general, and the commissioner of agriculture shall constitute the trustees of the internal improvement trust fund and the land acquisition trust fund as provided by law.
- (g) The governor as chair, the chief financial officer, the attorney general, and the commissioner of agriculture shall constitute the agency head of the Department of Law Enforcement.

History.—Am. H.J.R. 435, 1983; adopted 1984; Am. H.J.R. 386, 1985; adopted 1986; Ams. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision Nos. 8 and 13, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 5. Election of governor, lieutenant governor and cabinet members; qualifications; terms.—

- (a) At a state-wide general election in each calendar year the number of which is even but not a multiple of four, the electors shall choose a governor and a lieutenant governor and members of the cabinet each for a term of four years beginning on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the succeeding year. In primary elections, candidates for the office of governor may choose to run without a lieutenant governor candidate. In the general election, all candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor shall form joint candidacies in a manner prescribed by law so that each voter shall cast a single vote for a candidate for governor and a candidate for lieutenant governor running together.
- (b) When elected, the governor, lieutenant governor and each cabinet member must be an elector not less than thirty years of age who has resided in the state for the preceding seven years. The attorney general must have been a member of the bar of Florida for the preceding five years. No person who has, or but for resignation would have, served as governor or acting governor for more than six years in two consecutive terms shall be elected governor for the succeeding term.

History.—Am. proposed by Constitution Revision Commission, Revision No. 11, 1998, filed with the Secretary of State May 5, 1998; adopted 1998.

SECTION 6. Executive departments.—All functions of the executive branch of state government shall be allotted among not more than twenty-five departments, exclusive of those specifically provided for or authorized in this constitution. The administration of each department, unless otherwise provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law under the direct supervision of the governor, the lieutenant governor, the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, except:


- (a) When provided by law, confirmation by the senate or the approval of three members of the cabinet shall be required for appointment to or removal from any designated statutory office.
- (b) Boards authorized to grant and revoke licenses to engage in regulated occupations shall be assigned to appropriate departments and their members appointed for fixed terms, subject to removal only for cause.

Source: Florida Senate

Appendix II Figure 16: Florida Senate Districts

View Individual Senate District Maps and Census Data

01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38
39	40																	



Source: Florida Senate

Appendix III

Amending the Florida Constitution



Amending the Florida Constitution

THE TAXWATCH TAKE

Florida TaxWatch has consistently maintained that Florida's Constitution should be the foundational document containing the root guidelines by which Florida law should be written and imposed. Florida TaxWatch was a key organization behind the 2006 reform to require 60% approval by voters for Constitutional Amendments.

Florida TaxWatch remains committed to the concept of Florida as a republic, and not a direct democracy, and stands by the concept that the Constitution should not be a repository for public policy issues that should be addressed by the Florida Legislature through law, absent extraordinary circumstances.

Constitutions are living documents, subject to adjustment as the people they serve encounter new challenges such as changes in culture, economic shifts, and advances in technology. Because of this, constitutions typically lay out a standard process for adopting amendments. Florida is unique in that it has five different ways to amend its constitution, each of them requiring a popular vote.

As of changes made to the amendment process in 2006, Florida now requires a super majority vote of 60% or greater in order to pass a constitutional amendment and a two-thirds vote to approve new taxes.

1. **The Florida Legislature** can place a constitutional amendment on the ballot through a joint resolution passed in both houses by a three-fifths vote.
2. **The Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC)**, which is composed of the sitting Attorney General and 36 members appointed by state leaders, meets once every 20 years to research the need for constitutional revisions. Any revisions offered by the commission are then placed on the next general election ballot. The CRC last met in 1997-98 and will meet again in 2017-18.
3. **Citizens** can place amendments on the ballot by forming a political committee, and collecting petitions with signatures from at least 8% of the total number of Florida voters that voted in the prior presidential election, and that come from at least one-half of the state's congressional districts. After the petition is certified by the Supervisor of Elections it is reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court to ensure that statutory requirements for ballot language have been met.
4. **A constitutional convention** to revise or replace the entirety of Florida's Constitution may also be called through a petition which must contain signatures from 15% of the total number of Florida voters that voted in the prior presidential election certified by the Supervisor of

Amending the Florida Constitution

Elections, after which a question of, "shall a constitutional convention be held?" will be placed on the ballot in the next general election.

5. The Taxation and Budget Reform Commission (TBRC) is an entity composed of 25 members appointed by state leaders which meets once every 20 years to recommend constitutional revisions specifically pertaining to the state budget, taxation, and governmental efficiency. Any constitutional revisions suggested by the commission are placed on the next general election ballot. The TBRC last met in 2007 and will reconvene again in 2027.

Frequently Asked Questions:
How Does Florida Compare?

Florida has historically had a high passage rate for constitutional amendments, averaging between 80% and 90% for over 35 years. Florida also has a higher number of citizen's initiatives than many of the other states that have similar amendment processes in place.

Why Amend?

While the majority of policy changes are made through statutory changes by the Legislature, there are many reasons an amendment could be the best way to enact a policy change.

Amendments are commonly undertaken when:

- passing a bill is not an option because it conflicts with current constitutional law;

- there is a perceived need to circumvent the political process of the legislature and gubernatorial veto power;
- those proposing a change desire increased permanence; the constitution is generally harder to change than statutory law; and/or
- issues or functions that are controlled by the Constitution (such as ad valorem taxes) are the target of change, as those changes cannot be done through statute.

For more information:

League of Women Voters;
www.thefloridavoter.org

The Florida Div. of Elections;
www.election.dos.state.fl.us

Susan MacManus, A. J. (2011).
The Florida Constitution. In
Politics in Florida (pp. 56-62).
Tallahassee: John Scott Dailey
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ABOUT THE TAXWATCH CENTER FOR FLORIDA CITIZENSHIP

The TaxWatch Center for Florida Citizenship works to educate citizens on the policies and operations of their state and local governments, in order to encourage an informed electorate capable of effectively holding those elected to positions of power accountable. The Center also operates the Florida Citizenship Institute, an applied learning program that prepares participants to understand how government action impacts their business.

ABOUT FLORIDA TAXWATCH

As an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit taxpayer research institute and government watchdog, it is the mission of Florida TaxWatch to provide the citizens of Florida and public officials with high quality, independent research and analysis of issues related to state and local government taxation, expenditures, policies, and programs.

Florida TaxWatch is supported by voluntary, tax-deductible donations and private grants, and does not accept government funding. Donations provide a solid, lasting foundation that has enabled Florida TaxWatch to bring about a more effective, responsive government that is accountable to the citizens it serves for the last 34 years.

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Director, Center for Florida Citizenship

Source: <http://www.floridatxwatch.org/resources/pdf/ConstAmends.pdf>

Appendix IV Florida's Congressional Districts




Figure 17: Florida's Congressional Districts

Heading into the November 8 election, the Republican Party held 17 of the 27 congressional seats from Florida.

Members of the U.S. House from Florida -- Partisan Breakdown			
Party		As of November 2016	After the 2016 Election
■	Democratic Party	10	11
■	Republican Party	17	16
Total		27	27

Appendix V Figure 18: Florida State Symbols

			
<p>State Reptile American Alligator</p>	<p>State Bird Mockingbird</p>	<p>State Butterfly Zebra Longwing</p>	<p>State Animal Florida Panther</p>
			
<p>State Marine Mammal Manatee</p>	<p>State Saltwater Mammal Porpoise or Dolphin</p>	<p>State Saltwater Fish Sailfish</p>	<p>State Freshwater Fish Largemouth Bass</p>
			
<p>State Flower Orange Blossom</p>	<p>State Wildflower Coreopsis</p>	<p>State Tree Sabal Palm</p>	<p>State Beverage Orange Juice</p>
			
<p>State Shell Horse Conch</p>	<p>State Stone Agatized Coral</p>	<p>State Gem Moonstone</p>	<p>State Soil Myakka Fine Sand</p>
			
<p>State Song "Old Folks at Home"</p>	<p>State Motto In God We Trust</p>	<p>State Play Cross and Sword</p>	<p>State Anthem Florida (Where the Sawgrass Meets the Sky)</p>

Source: Florida Department of State

Appendix VI Population Growth in Florida

NEWS RELEASE

Florida's population exploding; expected to reach 20.7 million by end of 2016

Analysis by Cushman & Wakefield depicts a thriving economy in Florida driven by explosive population growth and high consumer confidence. | 8/10/2016

ORLANDO, FL— Cushman & Wakefield announced today that it has released their inaugural **Florida Population Report**, an examination of population trends and its economic impact throughout the state of Florida.

Key findings from the report:

- **Florida's population will reach 20.7 million by the end of the year.** In 1910, the state had a population of 1 million people. By 1980 it had grown to 10 million. Since then, the population has doubled.
- **Florida's population grew 1.84 percent in the past year**, trailing only North Dakota, Colorado and Nevada as the fastest-growing states. Florida trailed only California (39.14 million) and Texas (27.5 million) in overall population.
- **Florida's population grew by more than 1,000 people per day**, a pace that has accelerated over the past year. Jobs are the No. 1 reason people are attracted to the state. This trend is driven, in part, by the economic challenges in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's population has declined by 1.7 percent over the past year, with most exiting residents settling initially in Florida.
- **For the past 38 months, Florida's job-growth percentage has exceeded the national average.** In the past 12 months, 244,500 new jobs were added, a 3 percent growth rate. Most new jobs supported the expanding healthcare, logistics and home construction markets. Retail and hospitality also contributed to the state's stellar employment performance.
- **Current home prices in Florida were down \$42,000 compared to fourth quarter 2006 values.** Prices have rebounded since bottoming out in 2011, however, rising by \$83,000 in the span of five years. Tight supply and pent up demand are driving price increases and pace of sales as new residents snap up homes in fast-growing metros.
- **Retail sales continued to highlight consumer optimism and a favorable local economic climate.** Florida's economy enjoyed elevated consumer confidence despite uncertainty at the national level caused by the upcoming presidential campaign.


"Florida remains a national leader in population growth," said Chris Owen, Florida Research Manager. "This is driven by excellent employment numbers, lagging home prices and favorable consumer sentiment."

"We foresee this optimism prevailing in the short term," added Owen. "All of the relevant indicators suggest Florida will remain one of the nation's premier live-work-play destinations."

Source: <http://www.floridatrend.com/article/20472>

Appendix VII Florida Appropriations Process

The Appropriations Process



Source: Governor's Budget Office

For complete description of the 2017 Florida budget, see <http://fightingforfloridasfuturebudget.com/HomeFY18.htm>

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Note: footnotes and hyperlinks correspond to the on-line version

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POS 2041 U.S. Government: Who Needs It??

by Mark Logas, Valencia College-Orlando



ABSTRACT: The purpose of this research project is to provide evidence that students who are entering colleges with a high school diploma are not properly prepared to answer the most basic questions regarding our founding documents, demonstrate an understanding of our rights under the Constitution of the United States of America, or answer basic questions from the U.S. Citizenship exam. In addition, this research project examines the commitment of colleges and universities to require a U.S. Government class for all AA Degree seeking students, how academic counselors and registrars encourage or discourage students who are attempting to avoid taking a college-level U.S. Government class, and the ramifications of removing the last safety net of the basic understanding of our Constitution and the way government functions in society. Finally, this research project will expose the outside influences on colleges and universities to abandon a requirement for college students to take U.S. Government and the lack of cooperation to find solutions to identify and solve the problems associated with this topic.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

- K-12 students are arriving to college with little to no knowledge of U.S. Government.
- First day quiz with questions from Citizenship Exam supporting this statement.
- During several separate semesters over a two-year period on the first day of class, student responses revealed that more than half of the students could not identify the 3 co-equal branches of government, name three amendments in the Bill of Rights, name the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, answer how many members serve in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, correctly answer how many amendments there are in the U.S. Constitution, or identify a picture of Ronald Reagan (results in charts below).
- These same students could almost all identify a song from *Walt Disney's The Lion King*, an animated movie that does nothing to identify and protect their personal freedom.
- Florida colleges and universities no longer require U.S. Government as a requirement for all AA Degree seeking students, therefore removing the safety net that was in place.
- Academic advisors and members from various registrar offices rarely encourage students to take government classes, most not seeing the merit in recommending them.
- Government is not interested in seeking solutions to this epidemic.
- Outside groups such as the Gates Foundation seek to influence college curriculums by offering grants to encourage global studies in place of classes that emphasize the U.S. founding and current form of government.
- Students learn most of their information about government from late night entertainment shows and the Media.
- There are no minimum requirements to be a journalist.

RESEARCH

As a Professor of Political Science for almost 15 years, I have seen a downward trend of student knowledge, understanding, and ability to demonstrate the most basic principles of the United States system of government.

Since the election of Donald J. Trump as president, his inauguration, and his first weeks in office, many Americans and most in the media seem to suggest that he is an illegitimate president who is breaking laws to impose his will to “Make America Great Again”. The lack of knowledge of our most basic principles is no longer contained in the classroom on the first day of class. Nationwide, there seems to be little or no understanding of our Declaration of Independence, two Constitutions, the electoral college, or the expressed powers of the three co-equal branches of government. The dumbing down of the American people through failed educational opportunities in our public schools and higher learning institutions has created this divided nation. When two members of Congress openly share their ignorance of the very Constitution they have sworn to uphold and defend, one must understand that America is in crisis as it relates to the understanding of our most basic laws and freedoms. On the floor of the House of Representatives, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee honored the Constitution that, in her words, has lasted “some 400 years”¹ Even the most challenged math student knows that our Constitution isn’t that old. In fact, none of our founding documents are. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer incorrectly gave Thomas Jefferson credit for writing the “Bill of Rights”². Schumer said, “I think if Thomas Jefferson were looking down, the author of the Bill of Rights, on what’s being proposed here, he’d agree with it. He would agree that the First Amendment cannot be absolute.”³ Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence. James Madison was the author of the Bill of Rights. Sadly, only one mainstream media outlet reported these two glaring examples of illiteracy.

During my tenure in the classroom, I have started each U.S. Government class asking how many students are in attendance because they want to be there. There have never been more than five hands raised out of classes that range in size from 32 students to 75 students. When I ask them why they are taking the class, they reply because Valencia College requires all AA Degree seeking students to take POS 2041. Nearly three years ago, Valencia College finally sunset this requirement and only students who are under the old catalog or who are choosing it from a drop-down menu of six choices are enrolling. Regardless, my next question to the students has always been, “How many students have earned a high school diploma?” With the exception of a few dual enrollment students, every hand goes up. At that point, I used to verbally ask them basic questions from the U.S. Citizenship exam. Amazingly, an overwhelming majority of students could not answer the questions but could almost always answer a pop culture question.

What began as an informal ice breaker on the first day of class to illustrate how important their U.S. Government class would be to their future long after the semester would end, has now evolved into more documented proof that students are virtually ignorant of the rights afforded to them by the Founding Fathers they cannot even identify. Now, I hand out and collect a First Day Quiz (that does not count toward their grade) with basic questions that each student should know based on what a student is required to know in order to earn a high school diploma. A sample of the content of these questions must also be answered by a non-citizen seeking citizenship in the United States, answering at least 60% of the questions on the U.S. Citizenship exam correctly.⁴

The Tables below provide proof that K-12 educational institutions are failing our country by promoting students who do not have a basic understanding of our government and how it works (see Table 1).

Table 1 – First Day of Class Spring 2016 Semester, January 11 & 12

The total number of student responses on the first day of class: 144

Questions from the Spring 2016 First Day Quiz:

1. List the three (3) co-equal branches of government.
2. Which form of government was created first: **FEDERAL** government or **STATE** governments?
3. _____ is a system of government in which power is divided, by a Constitution, between a central government (Federal) and regional governments (States).
4. _____ is the President of the United States.
5. _____ is the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
6. _____ is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
7. _____ is the Governor of Florida.
8. There are _____ Representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives.
9. There are _____ Senators in the U.S. Senate.
10. There are _____ U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
11. The *total number* of Electoral College votes is _____ .
12. What major event happened on September 11, 2001, in the United States?
13. List three (3) of the Bill of Rights.
14. The Walt Disney classic movie *The Lion King* features the popular song, “*The ___ of Life*”.
15. TRUE/FALSE The Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation & Perpetual Union, and the U.S. Constitution are subsections of a single continuing document written by the Founding Fathers to allow government to provide the public welfare of citizens who are not able to provide for themselves.
16. TRUE/FALSE Political journals, books in a library, *CBS Evening News*, *Rush Limbaugh Show*, *Huffington Post* and newspapers would all fit under the category of diverse sources of information.
17. TRUE/FALSE The 28th Amendment restricts the growth of the Federal government over State governments.


SHORT ANSWER ESSAY- *Be informative but concise.

18. List one (1) topic that you have researched prior to your first day of class in POS 2041 “U.S. Government” that has challenged you to do the most critical thinking. Then, using specific examples from your research on the topic, briefly explain why the topic appealed to you and share your fact-based conclusion as to where you stand on the issue.

M/W 10 am= 3	M/W 11:30am= 11	M/W 1 pm= 7	T/Th 7 am= 6	T/Th 8:30 am= 3
Abortion Ban Pesticides Terrorism	College Tuition Party affiliation Bay of Pigs 2 nd Amendment Holocaust ISIS Animal Abuse Abortion Voting Rights Death Penalty Donald Trump-2	Donald Trump-2 Privacy Issues Obama/Pope Marijuana Laws NSA Gun Rights	Iraq Immigration 2 nd Amendment 2 nd Amendment Donald Trump-2	Civil Rights Equal Rights Minimum Wage

19. Identify the person that you see on the screen (President Ronald Reagan).

*Students in the Monday classes were shown the picture during class discussion and asked to identify the person they saw. Few could identify President Reagan. I decided to add one more question to the first day quiz the next day for my Tuesday classes.



*Source: Data collected by author. Valencia College students, 11 January 2016 and 12 January 2016.

The same First Day Quiz minus Question 19 was given to each of my U.S. Government classes in the Summer 2015 semester with similar results (see Table 2).

Table 2 – First Day of Class ~ Summer 2015 Semester ~ May 11

The total number of student responses on the first day of class: 121


Questions from the Summer 2015 First Day Quiz:

1. List the three (3) co-equal branches of government.
2. Which form of government was created first: **FEDERAL** government or **STATE** governments?
3. _____ is a system of government in which power is divided, by a Constitution, between a central government (Federal) and regional governments (States).
4. _____ is the President of the United States.
5. _____ is the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
6. _____ is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
7. _____ is the Governor of Florida.
8. There are _____ Representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives.
9. There are _____ Senators in the U.S. Senate.
10. There are _____ U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
11. The *total number* of Electoral College votes is _____ .
12. Non-government actors attempt to influence elected and/or appointed government leaders, as well as public opinion. List three (3) non-government actors that may or may not be political in nature.
13. List three (3) of the Bill of Rights.
14. The Walt Disney classic movie *The Lion King* features the popular song, "*The ___ of Life*".
15. TRUE/FALSE The Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation & Perpetual Union, and the U.S. Constitution are subsections of a single continuing document written by the Founding Fathers to allow government to provide the public welfare of citizens who are not able to provide for themselves.
16. TRUE/FALSE Political journals, books in a library, *CBS Evening News*, *Rush Limbaugh Show*, *Huffington Post* and newspapers would all fit under the category of diverse sources of information.
17. TRUE/FALSE The 28th Amendment restricts the growth of the Federal government over State governments.

SHORT ANSWER ESSAY- *Be informative but concise.

18. List one (1) topic that you have researched prior to your first day of class in POS 2041 “U.S. Government” that has challenged you to do the most critical thinking. Then, using specific examples from your research on the topic, briefly explain why the topic appealed to you and share your fact-based conclusion as to where you stand on the issue.

M/W 8 am= 2	M/W 9:45 am= 4	M/W 1:15 pm= 3	M/W 3 pm A= 2	M/W 3 pm B= 0
Electoral College “Golden Age”	Holocaust Vaccinations Same-Sex Rights Abortion	Homeschooling Ferguson Addictions	Social Justice Checks/Balances	



*Source: Data collected by author. Valencia College students, 11 May 2015 and 24 June 2014 (Summer B).

After collecting the quiz and beginning class on the first day, what is most disturbing is when I purposely refer to the song from the movie *The Lion King* as the “Cycle of Life”. Students begin to giggle. I ask them what is wrong. In a very confident manner they inform me that the song title is “Circle” and not cycle. I ask them to vote on it. Almost every hand is raised in their favor. Laughter then fills the room. When they are finished, I tell them this will be a very humbling moment for them because they defended a childhood animated movie that does nothing to protect their Constitutional freedoms but could not identify three of the Bill of Rights that directly affects their way of life. It is at that moment they understand there is a lot of learning that needs to take place.


The following quiz was given the first week of class during the Spring 2015 semester. This quiz had a few additional questions from the U.S. Citizenship Exam (see Table 3).

Table 3 – First Week of Class ~ Spring 2015 Semester ~ January 14 & 15

The total number of student responses on the first week of class: 186

Questions from the Spring 2015 First Day Quiz:

1. The House of Representatives has how many voting members?
2. How many justices are on the Supreme Court?
3. Under our Constitution, some powers belong to the states. What is one power of the states?
4. What is the capital of Florida?
5. What is one promise you make when you become a United States citizen?
6. What ocean is on the East Coast of the United States?
7. Who wrote the Declaration of Independence?
8. There were 13 original states. Name three.
9. Name the U.S. war between the North and the South.
10. What major event happened on September 11, 2001, in the United States?



*Source: Data collected by author. Valencia College students, 14 January 2015 and 15 January 2015.

On the first day of the Spring 2017 semester at the University of Central Florida, in addition to the attendance sheet, I passed around a piece of paper requesting signatures to repeal an amendment to the Constitution. The statement at the top of the paper read, "***In an effort to rid the U.S. Constitution of amendments that no longer have a need for the reason in which they were originally ratified, I am forming a movement to repeal useless amendments. Please sign below as we move to repeal the 26th Amendment.***" Thirteen of 74 students signed the document in my "Mass Media & Politics class", while 8 of 75 students signed the document in my Politics in Film class. Twenty-one students at the second largest university in the United States readily gave their approval for me to help take away the voting rights of 18-21-years-old voters.

I believe that there are three reasons for students entering colleges and universities without basic knowledge of our government and why it is higher education's obligation to teach these students about their government.

First, K-12 educators appear to limit the scope of what they are able to teach based on standardized testing requirements and the fear and intimidation of those who either oppose our fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution or who simply have no clue as to what it contains. For instance, the National Education Association recently took a stand stating, "Across the nation, the testing obsession has nudged aside visual arts, music, physical education, social studies, and science, not to mention world languages, financial literacy, and that old standby, penmanship. Our schools, once vigorous and dynamic centers for learning, have been reduced to mere test prep factories, where teachers and students act out a script written by someone who has never visited their classroom and where 'achievement' means nothing more than scoring well on a bubble test."⁵ In addition, NEA President Lily Garcia concludes, "It's our job to bring back the arts and Social Studies and world languages and whatever it is our students need to leave behind the corrupting, unconscionable testing culture of blame and punish by test scores and move forward with an education that opens their minds to the infinite possibilities of their lives."⁶ There is hope that the educators throughout the country are not only identifying this crisis but taking positive action to correct it. In March of 2017, Kentucky and Arkansas, "became the latest of more than a dozen states since 2015 that have required the high school social studies curriculum to include material covered by the 100 questions asked on the naturalization exam."⁷

In my own classes at both Valencia College and the University of Central Florida (where I teach as an adjunct), students have shared that some of their high school religion classes did not allow the Bible or the teachings of Jesus Christ to be discussed because it violated "separation of church and state". Each of the other religions was openly discussed, according to the students. The "separation of church and state" does not appear in the U.S. Constitution; however, court opinions have established its current definition which is embraced by some and opposed by others.

Based on experiences shared during discussions in my U. S. Government classes, students in K-12 seem to be limited in their ability to even discuss the pros and cons regarding the issue of freedom of religion. Strangely, some college-level students have shared that many of their instructors either teach from the book or simply do not ask for their input when important issues such as freedom of religion are presented.

In higher education, the exchange of ideas is crucial to learning. For instance, students acknowledge that government requiring citizens to vote in a church on Election Day or to allow the use of a school cafeteria as a church on a non-school day presents a gray area that a constructive debate can examine as well as develop higher level thinking.

Another area where students have little to no formal educational training is in the role of government. Many students do not understand that formal restrictions are placed on government to preserve their freedom.⁸ They do not understand the concept of what a “public servant” is, many sharing their belief that people work for the government and not the other way around. It is clear these students have not been taught nor have they voluntarily read our founding documents.

During the first three weeks of each semester, I require my students to read the Declaration of Independence aloud in class. We discuss the merits of those immortal words and students share their understanding of its meaning. Later, students answer questions on their first exam from the Declaration of Independence as well as answer a short-answer essay question regarding its meaning while sharing their fact-based conclusion about it.⁹ While this process allows students to assess their level of learning, it also allows them to demonstrate college-level critical thinking while forming their own fact-based conclusion regarding this historic document.

In addition, students are asked to analyze the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union as well as our current Constitution in each government class. Students are amazed at the freedoms that they have and begin asking questions about government intrusions such as eavesdropping, drones, search and seizure violations, eminent domain, and even as to why Miranda is needed when government reminds many of them that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

One area that has surged to the forefront over the past year involves religious freedoms. Open class discussions and supplemental on-line participation assignments reveal that while most students support Same-Sex Marriage and Gay Rights, they also believe that those who oppose or do not recognize those rights based on the 1st Amendment right, “Freedom of Religion”, should not be fined by the government and/or be sued in civil court.¹⁰

While there are no right or wrong answers in these situations where students are sharing their fact-based conclusions on the pros and cons of the research they have conducted, debate on important issues is stimulated and dialogue is opened on topics long considered too taboo to talk about in large part because of “political correctness”.

One way to encourage students to expand their horizons and enhance their knowledge of government is for them to identify a current-day event that directly links to the assigned reading of important terms and concepts from government. I call this exercise “Our World”. Students must identify at least one topic they want to learn about for each class related to the assigned reading. They must research the pros and cons of their topic, form a fact-based conclusion, and demonstrate college-level critical thinking skills.

While students are now learning the answers to the basic questions from their first day exam through in-class discussions, there is a marked improvement in their awareness of the world around them and how events impact their lives.

Below are submissions from students on a separate quiz. Each student was required to choose an “Our World” topic, research the pros and cons, and share their fact-based conclusion. As you can see from the topics they chose, in just two weeks their knowledge of world events expanded reinforcing the terms and concepts from their assigned reading. Compare these topics to the topics that only a few students could identify on their first day quiz (see Table 4).

Table 4 – Two Weeks into the Spring 2016 Semester ~ January 27 & 28

SHORT-ANSWER ESSAY- * Be informative but concise.

18. List one topic that you have researched prior to your first day of class in POS-2041 “U.S. Government” that has challenged you to do the most critical thinking. Then, using specific examples from your research on the topic, briefly explain why the topic appealed to you and share your fact-based conclusion as to where you stand on the issue.

M/W 10 am	M/W 11:30 am	M/W 1 pm	T/Th 7 am	T/Th 8:30 am
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gun Control • Death Penalty • Clinton’s Server • Is Cruz Eligible? • Beheading in O.K. • Drones in U.S. • BlackLivesMatter • Gas Prices • Donald Trump • Syrian Refugees • Planned Parenthood • Free College • ISIS in the U.S. • ObamaCare • Federalism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tax Policies • LGBT Housing • ObamaCare • 9/11 Conspiracy • Obama Executive Orders • Carbon Tax • NSA • 2nd Amendment • Common Core • Iran Deal • Cancer News • Amend Constitution • Bernie Sanders • Gun Control • Assisted Suicide 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Redskins Name • Civil Forfeiture • Lionel Tate • Confederate Flag • Zika Virus • Obama Executive Orders • Campaign Finance • National Debt • Gender Neutral • Federal Reserve • Obama Economy • U.S. vs. N. Korea • State of Union • Trust in Gov’t • Legal Marijuana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. Dollar • Refugees • 2nd Amendment • Guantanamo Bay • Iran Nuke Deal • Privatize Social Security • Bill Cosby • Syrian War • Shell Oil • Minimum Wage • Is Cruz Eligible? • 2-Party System • 10th Amendment • Free Lunches • Obama Care 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guns on Campus • Federal Taxes • Marco Rubio • Military Drones • Animal Testing • Minimum Wage • China • Gun Control • Worth College? • SCOTUS • Border Security • Political Correctness • Death Penalty • FBI Kid Porn • Climate Change

* Mark Logas’ Students, Valencia College, Spring 2016, January 27 & January 28.

Second, few universities and colleges in the United States require all AA Degree seeking students to take and pass a basic U.S. Government class. According to the Wall Street Journal, “A majority of U.S. college graduates don’t know the length of a congressional term, what the Emancipation Proclamation was, or which Revolutionary War general led the American troops at Yorktown. The reason for such failures, according to a recent study: Few schools mandate courses in core subjects like U.S. government, history or economics. The sixth annual analysis of core curricula at 1,098 four-year colleges and universities by the American Council of Trustees and Alumni found that just 18% of schools require American history to graduate, 13% require a foreign language and 3% economics.”¹¹

In an article written by Annette Boyd Pitts in *The Florida Bar Journal*, the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania reported results of a national survey that demonstrated how little Americans know about their government. Thirty-five percent could not name one of the three co-equal branches of government. Nearly a third believed that a U.S. Supreme Court ruling could be appealed. The Center for the Study of the American Dream at Xavier University used a national survey to test the civic knowledge of native-born citizens compared to immigrants applying for U.S. citizenship. They found that “one in three native-born citizens failed the civics portion of the U.S. naturalization test (also referred to as the U.S. citizenship test), while a 97.5 percent passage rate was reported for immigrants applying for U.S. citizenship.” In addition, the survey also revealed that “85 percent did not know the meaning of ‘the rule of law’, 82 percent could not name ‘two rights stated in the Declaration of Independence’.” While so many citizens could not pass the citizenship test, the Center reported that “77 percent of native-born citizens agreed that all Americans should be able to pass the test, and 60 percent agreed that high school students should have to pass the civics portion of the naturalization test as a requirement for graduation.”¹²

If the public school system (K-12) is turning out students who are not prepared, colleges and universities are the safety net to make sure that we enhance the knowledge of students who will become potential voters and business owners. Of equal importance is introducing students to the concept of being a good citizen. It is clear that when students take a college-level U.S. Government class they become more informed. In addition to my own research, two college professors, Leonard Champney and Paul Edleman, used the Solomon Four-Group Design to measure student knowledge of U.S. Government and student knowledge of current events at the beginning and end of a U.S. Government course. They concluded that “students’ knowledge of government/politics, their knowledge of current events, and their self-confidence in their knowledge are all positively impacted by completion of a United States government course.”¹³ Sadly, not one college or university in the state of Florida requires all AA Degree seeking students to take and pass a basic U.S. Government class.¹⁴

I contacted each of the public colleges and universities in Florida and asked to speak with someone in the registrar’s office or with an academic advisor. I asked each person that I spoke with if a new or returning student seeking an AA Degree or Bachelors Degree would have to take and pass a basic U.S. Government course. The results were stunning. After being informed that there was no longer a U.S. Government class requirement for all degree seeking students, a few colleges tried to steer me clear of taking one as an elective. Very few of the representatives that I spoke with seemed to know anything about the new General Education requirements.

What became clear is that with the exception of a couple of colleges and universities, there is no active recruitment going on to encourage students to even consider taking U.S. Government, even as an elective. What I also learned through this process is how difficult it is to seek information from many of our Florida colleges and universities. If a potential student or parent has a bad experience from the first point of contact, it can tarnish an otherwise good reputation of a college or university (see Table 5).

Table 5 – Florida Public Universities U.S. Government Requirement & Recruitment

STATE UNIVERSITIES	U.S. Government Required	Actively Recruit U.S. Government
Florida Agricultural & Mechanical University (F.A.M.U.)	NO	NO
Florida Atlantic University (F.A.U.)	NO REPLY	--
Florida Gulf Coast University	NO	NO
Florida International University (F.I.U.)	NO	NO
Florida Polytechnic University	NO REPLY	--
Florida State University (F.S.U.)	NO REPLY	--
New College of Florida	NO REPLY	--
University of Central Florida (U.C.F.)	NO	YES
University of Florida (F.U.)	NO	YES
University of North Florida (U.N.F.)	NO REPLY	--
University of South Florida (U.S.F.)	NO	NO
University of West Florida (U.W.F.)	NO	NO

* Source: Mark Logas Sabbatical Research Artifacts.

There were only two university representatives that encouraged me to seriously consider the merits of taking a U.S. Government class. One was from the Registrar’s Office at the University of Central Florida. She went out of her way to assist me, spending over 15 minutes going through the catalog to determine if the class was required. She did that not only for me but because she believed that it was a question that staff members in their office should also know the answer to. Finally, she walked me through the catalog to page 72 where it explained that U.S. Government is one of seven classes offered in the drop-down menu under the new General Education requirements. After thanking her for helping me, she stated that U.S. Government would be a course that would benefit everyone.¹⁵ A similar sentiment was echoed from the University of Florida. One of their counseling specialists told me that the class is not required for all degree seeking students and then asked me if I was not looking forward to taking the class. I told her that U.S. Government seems to be a tough class and that a lot of students tend to avoid it. She expressed an opinion that the class has merit and encouraged me to take it. She also encouraged me to speak to a counselor for help understanding why it is a class that I should consider taking.¹⁶

The next phase of research results is from the 28 public community/state colleges in Florida. I contacted each of them and asked to speak with a representative from the registrar’s office or an academic advisor. Each representative was asked if returning students who have been out of college for some time or newly enrolled students are required to take a U.S. Government class. These representatives were also asked if they recruited students to take U.S. Government as an elective. Some colleges did not give me an option to speak with an actual person, while other colleges only gave an option to leave a message. Those that did not respond are labeled “No Reply” below. Here are the results (see Table 6).

Table 6 – Community/State Colleges U.S. Government Requirement & Recruitment

Community/State Colleges	U.S. Government Required	Actively Recruit U.S. Government
Broward College	NO REPLY	--
College of Central Florida	NO-“State sets the guidelines”	Gov’t is something students need
Chipola College	NO REPLY	--
Daytona State College	NO	No - Cultural/Global classes
Eastern Florida State College	NO REPLY	--
Florida Gateway College	NO REPLY	--
Florida Keys Community College	“What is it (US Gov class)?”	“I don’t know”
Florida State College-Jacksonville	“Not necessarily”	“We do encourage it”
Florida South-Western State College	NO REPLY	--
Gulf Coast State College	“Let me look. No”	NO
Hillsborough Community College (H.C.C.)	“I don’t know. I don’t know why you should have to.”	NO
Indian River State College	NO REPLY	--
Lake-Sumter State College	NO	Counselor would suggest it if the student showed an interest
State College of FL-Manatee	NO REPLY	--
Miami-Dade College	“Depends on career path”	NO
North Florida Community College	Returned my call-NO	Returned my call-NO
Northwest Florida State College	NO REPLY	--
Palm Beach State College	Intro or State/Local or History	Encourage
Pasco-Hernando State College	NO	“We do not recruit”
Pensacola State College	NO REPLY	--

Polk State College	NO REPLY	--
St. Johns River State College	NO REPLY	--
St. Petersburg College	"Depends on degree plan"	Tell a counselor of interest
Santa Fe College	"You have a choice. Not that course."	"You don't have to take it if you're not interested in it."
Seminole State College	NO REPLY	--
South Florida State College	NO REPLY	--
Tallahassee Community College	"Some type of government class is required...options."	YES
Valencia College	+YES "It has always been required as long as I have been here."	YES

* Mark Logas, Sabbatical Research Artifacts, 6-25 November 2015.

+ Valencia College stopped requiring POS-2041 in the 2015-2016 Catalog. Phone conversation 6 November 2015.

One college, Valencia College, insisted during our telephone conversation that POS 2041 was still a requirement of all AA Degree seeking students apparently not realizing that the requirement was retired with the last academic catalog. In fact, at one point I asked, "It's not going away anytime soon?" The advisor's reply was, "Right!"

In 2011, Valencia College earned the inaugural Aspen Award as the top community college in the United States.¹⁷ In addition to a committed faculty, staff, diverse curriculum, and innovative leadership by a motivational administrative team, I believe that another reason why Valencia College was awarded this prestigious honor was because of Valencia's 40 year commitment to enhance the knowledge of students through the AA Degree requirement of passing U.S. Government and the signature "Civic Leadership Internship Program" that gained national recognition while assisting students to become civically engaged as community leaders.

To learn how other colleges look at the relevance of U.S. Government as a required course for all degree seeking students, I personally stopped in and visited with a few counselors and one registrar who do not work in Florida. My first stop was at Rappahannock Community College in Glenss, Virginia. Ms. Sandy Darnell greeted me and answered my questions believing that I was an older student who was returning to school and was concerned about taking a U.S. Government class. She told me that very few students take U.S. Government at RCC. After learning that there is no U.S. Government requirement at RCC, I found the State of Virginia does not require it because colleges rely on the public schools to teach this important class. I confessed to Ms. Darnell that I was a college professor working on my research sabbatical. She was intrigued to learn about the statistics of my initial research. She was "shocked" by the statistics and told me that there was only one full-time government teacher for years and when he retired, adjuncts cover the few classes that are offered each semester. When we looked at the schedule to see how many classes were being offered throughout the six campuses, there were only two offerings and they were both online classes. When I asked what kind of recruitment efforts there were from the academic counselors, the reply was that they do not recruit students to take government classes. I was very impressed with Ms. Darnell. She immediately started asking the questions that political science professors have been raising for years. She wondered how uniformed students can be voting and if they even understand the concept of being a good citizen.¹⁸

My next stop was Charleston Southern University. I spoke with Amanda Sisson, the University's Registrar. She informed me that there is only one department for political science and that U.S. Government was not a required class. When I asked if CSU actively recruits students to take U.S.

Government, she told me that there is no recruitment for that class because they try to encourage students to take what fits into their schedule (career path). What struck me was that there was no interest to ask why learning about government would be important to students.¹⁹

The last stop was at the College of Charleston, the oldest educational institution south of Virginia.²⁰ The campus is spread across town with several buildings serving different student needs. After being sent to two incorrect buildings, I arrived on foot at the Academic Advising and Planning Center (Registrar's Office) shortly before closing time. I explained that I had been sent to two different buildings across town and had a quick question regarding their catalog. There were three student assistants and one academic adult. The academic adult would not offer her name or business card. I was told to come back the next day because she was going to be late for her Trolley. The receptionist (student assistant) was kind enough to write down the office for me. To save time, I explained that I was a college-professor working on my research sabbatical and was leaving town that evening. The academic adult asked what I wanted, and I asked if U.S. Government was required for all degree seeking students. She replied, "No requirement. Why would we?" I was stunned. I felt obligated to remind her that three of the signers of the Declaration of Independence and three framers of the U.S. Constitution were also founders of this very educational institution which she apparently did not know.²¹

While it is rather shocking, it is not surprising because academics no longer seem to see the need or importance of a U.S. Government class. If these colleges and universities are relying on K-12 public schools to educate students, then they may want to rethink their strategy. Harvard University history professor Harvey Mansfield told FoxNews.com, "Lost in the new guidelines is the central role of the American Founders in inspiring our country. Students are not led to the idea that America is an experiment in self-government, that all its struggles and troubles, its drama and heroes, come back to its great ambition to make freedom and equality a reality." Mansfield continued, "Instead of this...the guidelines present America as just another society, wandering, mistaken, prejudiced and boring."²² The guidelines, released last year, fail to mention unifying figures in American history, such as Benjamin Franklin and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., even once. Instead, it focuses on divisions in America.²³

Third, there seems to be outside influence by professional, politically charged groups, and government itself to push a "global student" or "One-world-order" agenda. In K-12, it is known as "Common Core". In colleges and universities, it is known as "The Gates Foundation". Bill Gates has been very generous with his money, influencing colleges and universities throughout the country with grants promoting the global student philosophy. His message is clear, "When the tests are aligned to the common standards, the curriculum will line up as well—and that will unleash powerful market forces in the service of better teaching. For the first time, there will be a large base of customers eager to buy products that can help every kid learn and every teacher get better."²⁴ Gates speaks passionately about education reform, "In the coming year, our goal is to partner with state education leaders, the Secretary of Education, and others to advance the field so that policymakers and educators demand standardized data—not just for compliance, but for improving student achievement. Over the past ten years, Melinda and I have dedicated a large share of our foundation's resources to the cause of school reform. We believe America's greatest promise is in its commitment to equality—and fulfilling that promise demands strong public schools."²⁵

Nowhere does Gates speak about the importance of students learning about Federalism that allows communities to be unique through their cultural and historical background. His vision for a Federal program that is supported without question by the states is stunning for someone who benefited greatly from a system of government that gave him incentives to pursue his career goals

without government intrusion. He seems to have forgotten about the 10th Amendment. He has touted President Obama's stimulus package as something that can reshape the way our students can think about government and their role as a global student. In the Summer of 2011, there were protests by teachers who were opposing Gates' influence in school curriculums throughout the country. Anthony Cody, a keynote speaker at one protest, said, "They (the Gates Foundation) need billions of dollars to try to carry public opinion. We don't need billions of dollars. We need the spirit, the hope, and the careful education that every one of us can carry out in our communities. So please, go forth and educate!"²⁶

Gates has clearly changed his view about Capitalism as well, a system that allowed him to invent and keep the financial rewards of his research. Imagine if Bill Gates had created Microsoft in a non-Capitalistic country. It is very conceivable that the government of that country may have stolen his work, leaving him to live in poverty the rest of his life as an unknown entity. Regardless, Gates has not hidden his distaste for Capitalism. The Huffington Post reported in 2013, "Speaking at the Royal Academy of Engineering's Global Grand Challenges Summit on Wednesday, Gates lambasted capitalism, saying it "means male baldness research gets more funding than malaria,"²⁷ In 2015, Gates railed against Capitalism in an interview on CNBC. He stated, "Science that helps poor people is where capitalism really doesn't have the right incentive". He concluded, "Science in general is underfunded because the benefits to society are greater than what comes back to the inventor. So there's a certain risk averseness."²⁸

Could it be that some colleges and universities are dropping government requirements in favor of Gates' vision? Valencia College dropped U.S. Government as a required course for all AA Degree seeking students after being the first recipient of the Aspen Award. The Bill and Linda Gates Foundation is a major contributor to the Aspen Institute.²⁹ Today, new students to Valencia must take a class known as "The New Student Experience". Throughout the country, it seems that grant money dictates that students be introduced to the benefits of a global economy and other well-worth issues, but nowhere in the curriculum is there anything that introduces students to the concept of citizenship or the United States being an exceptional and generous nation. I remember sitting in a Valencia College East Campus Faculty Senate Meeting and listening to a presentation regarding the new student experience class and how students would become more acclimated with the college campus, examine their inner being, branch out to understand and accept others different from themselves. Nowhere in the presentation was there instruction or even encouragement for students to become civic leaders in their communities. The life-lessons from POS 2041-U.S. Government that stressed the importance of students learning about government's influence on individuals and businesses, how government works, how it influences, how it benefits, how it punishes, and how each branch of government is limited as to promote the entrepreneurship of the American spirit was completely missing from the "New Student Experience" class. When I asked if any of these important issues could be added to the new class, the response was that while it was never considered they could take a look at it in the future.³⁰

Is it any wonder that colleges and universities are changing their curriculums from U.S. Government classes to global initiative classes in order to receive multimillion dollar grants and donations from the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation? According to the Gates Foundation website, "Since 2000, the foundation has invested nearly \$5 billion in grants and scholarships to improve opportunity in the United States by improving schools, raising college-ready graduation rates, and increasing college completion rates." The problem is that while Bill Gates makes the decision as to the educational material that colleges and universities embrace, he is not an educator or a supporter of the uniqueness of the U.S. economy.³¹ Most recently, Common Core has targeted K-12 learning institutions to better inform students. The Gates Foundation has donated \$150 million and developed a program that brings

K-12 and community colleges together in curriculum development.³² In addition to moving students away from learning about Federalism and Capitalism, Bill Gates stands to make a lot of money if K-12 and higher education adopts improved ideas that rely on his software to implement.

Finally, it seems that government itself does not want citizens to learn about what it is that government does. While the initial intent of FL [House Bill 7135 \(Chapter 2012-195, Laws of Florida\)](#) mandated the appointment of faculty committees to establish general education core course options under the new 30-hour general education requirement, it also had a negative consequence on colleges and universities offering U.S. Government as a required course for all AA Degree seeking students by forcing them to redefine General Education classes. Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the bill into law on April 22, 2013, stating that to complete the general education core, students must complete at least one identified course from each of the general education subject areas.³³ U.S. Government now becomes one of six choices in a drop-down menu. If students were reluctant to take U.S. Government when it was required at Valencia College, I cannot imagine them flocking to it when there are five other classes to choose from. In fact, the Valencia College East Campus used to offer over 80 sections of U.S. Government and now average 25 sections each semester.³⁴

What I have learned the most from doing this research project is how administrators in K-12, the college/university level, and elected officials in the Florida State Legislature have little to no interest in listening to or addressing the lack of preparedness of students as it relates to learning about government. Florida Governor Rick Scott and Orange County Public School Board Chairman Mr. Bill Sublette had no interest in meeting with me to discuss my research. I reached out to Governor Rick Scott, especially after receiving the e-mail that he sent to faculty members across the state on October 19, 2015, encouraging us to share ways to identify and improve educational opportunities for students. (see Appendix A). However, Amanda Wallace, a member of the governor's staff, called my office at Valencia and stated that the Governor had no interest in meeting with me over this issue.

State Senator Alan Hays was extremely impressed with the research project and even went so far as to invite me to speak before the education committee in Tallahassee. It became clear that meeting would never take place. He has since chosen to leave the Florida State Senate and was recently elected as the Supervisor of Elections in Lake County, FL. Representative Jennifer Sullivan invited me to a face-to-face meeting and took detailed notes of my research project. At the time, she seemed genuinely interested in helping me pursue my commitment to educate people about the state of student preparedness in regards to their understanding of government. Her interest in the topic has also waned as I have followed up with her only to find a busy agenda of other bills she is pursuing.³⁵

Simply put, government does not seem to want people to know what it is that government does. I require each student in my State & Local Government classes to attend, in person, a city council meeting, county commission meeting, and an arraignment session in traffic court. Students are required to submit two papers after their visitation. The first paper contains the facts of what they experienced such as the time the meeting started, what occurred next, and then the actual meeting itself. The second paper contains their thoughts about what they observed. Students are stunned that the meetings usually begin late. They cannot believe the meetings start with a prayer. In some cases, they are very upset at the disrespectful tone that many elected officials take with members from the community who show up to air their concerns about various issues. They're stunned that many members get up and walk out or get on their cell-phones while citizens are addressing the council or commission. Mostly, they are taken aback when they are asked by members from the council why they are in attendance. Most students admit that after the council member is told that they are students who

are there to observe, the rudeness turns to admiration. Students begin to understand why I require them to attend the meetings in person, instead of letting them watch the meetings through live streaming or on delay through the government access channel.³⁶

In conclusion, there is a basic question that needs to be asked. If students are not learning about U.S. Government in high school and the safety net for them to learn about it in college has been reduced or removed, then where are students learning about government and current events that directly or indirectly impact their lives? The answer lies with the media. Think for a moment about the requirements or qualifications of a journalist. There are none. Doctors must earn a medical license and take state boards for the rest of their careers in order to continue practicing medicine. Lawyers must earn a law degree and pass the Bar Exam. A journalist doesn't even have to possess a high school diploma. In fact, the new social media has spawned an entire new generation of "journalists" who are simply equipped with a phone and the good fortune of being in the right place at the right time.

Millions of Americans, including students, now gain their political knowledge from such shows like *The Daily Show* and *The Late Show*.³⁷ While the hosts of these shows take humorous liberties with the accuracy of their mostly biased opinions, every so often they hit the nail on the head. For instance, Aasif Mandvi from *The Daily Show* exposed Florida State Representative Scott Plakon's hypocrisy in supporting a law that would require anyone on public assistance to submit to a drug test. While I personally support the idea, I also believe that anyone receiving taxpayer dollars should submit to random drug testing. The problem is that Plakon receives tax dollars as a state representative but would not submit to a drug test when pushed by Mandvi. Neither would Florida Governor Rick Scott when Mandvi asked him to submit to a drug test³⁸ (see video link).



<http://www.cc.com/video-clips/vra301/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-poor-pee-ple>

Students watching that video certainly learned that elected officials who write, pass, and sign bills into law are not willing to abide by the same rules that they establish for their constituents. One of President Bill Clinton (D) biggest critics was Jay Leno. Night after night on *The Tonight Show*, Leno would relentlessly make jokes about Clinton's sex scandals, eventually questioning his ability to answer a question truthfully, something that mainstream media entities seemed to ignore.³⁹ Jay Leno was also well-known for exposing the ignorance of everyday people who could not identify Vice-President Joe Biden (D) or President Ronald Reagan (R). Remember, two of my classes failed miserably in identifying Reagan. The question is, "Did they fail themselves or did someone else like a teacher or a public-school system fail to teach them about a pivotal decade when over 20 million jobs were created and the first crack in the Berlin Wall would cause it to tumble shortly after Reagan left office?"

When people living in the United States no longer know what is in the Constitution, they have no idea what has been taken from them in the form of freedom. You cannot miss something that has been taken away from you if you did not know you had it in the first place. The most egregious example of trampling on the human spirit and spitting in the eye of the American citizen comes from Jonathan Gruber, one of the key architects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”, affectionately known as *ObamaCare*. In his own words, Gruber gives insight as to how President Barack Obama’s (D) Administration tortured the language of the bill, lied to young people whose vote and money was needed for the law to pass, created a lack of transparency, while counting on the “stupidity” of the voter to transforming U.S. policy without going through the proper and legal channels spelled out by the Founding Fathers⁴⁰ (see video link).



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G79Op0LcgbI>

Why is Gruber not locked up in a federal prison? He lied to Congress about his involvement in *ObamaCare* and how the process was carried out. He admitted that the administration had to torture the language of the bill to make sure that the Congressional Budget Office did not score it as a tax because it would die. He admits that if young and healthy people were told that they would be paying for the sick, the bill would die. Then, in the most narcissistic way, he lashes out at the American voter as stupid, completely ignoring the fact that the voters believed what they were told and had faith in their government to tell them the truth. Yet, almost none of my students had ever seen this video or heard of Jonathan Gruber. Frankly, if Richard Nixon (R) had this kind of media, he would have completed his two-terms as president and never resigned the presidency.

There are many reasons why it is imperative that U.S. Government classes are returned to the college curriculum and required of all students seeking a college degree. The following words have been written by students who did not want to take U.S. Government but sixteen weeks later learned the importance of knowing what government does:

“I was actually taught back in high school about how a bill becomes law solely from the ‘School House Rock’ video...It wasn’t until this class that I learned the large & long process of how & if a bill becomes law, especially if a president vetoes the bill, the House and Senate can override it by 2/3’s vote each.”

"Prior to this class I had always been under the general belief that we work for our government (because that is how our government has trained us to think). In this class I learned how to see through certain aspects of people and media and understand my rights and that government works for us."

"Before taking this class (U.S. Government) I thought that the drinking age was set by the government on a federal level. It's really interesting that the government essentially makes the states raise the drinking age to 21, or funding is cut. It is very disturbing and backwards to be taking away state power through blackmail. I don't think our founding fathers would approve, otherwise, they wouldn't have given the states those rights in the first place."

"I stepped in believing that this was going to be a boring course because Government classes are out-dated. I was very wrong, you gave us the ability to make sure that we carry out our own opinions with the proper evidence in facts by keeping up-to-date with the news and making sure we reflect on them."

"I thought that the federal government made and regulated state laws and that we worked for our government. After taking this class, I learned that everyone who lives in the U.S. should educate and learn more about American Government. I learned that the government works for us and the states created the federal government."

"Our World topics were by far my favorite part of the class. I did my own research on topics that I found interesting in order to participate in class. Keeping up with current events and getting different perspectives was what I looked forward to."

"As for me, I have never been into history. Did not much care for who was running or what the newest presidential scandal was, but taking this course really opened my eyes."

"Before taking this class, I had believed the Federal Government was the power in charge. During the course, however, I had learned that this along with Police and Health Affairs (state police powers) is a power given to State Governments."

"You have taught what I believe is the most important thing in most areas of academia, let alone Political Science, and that is to do one's own research and form one's own ideas, and ideals. It is thanks to you and your class (U.S. Government) that I will be studying and watching the 2016 Presidential campaigns and elections, and gathering my own stance and stake in it."

"I learned that the electoral college is how we elected the president and I always thought the first Tuesday in November was when we found out who won but I was incorrect."

"For whatever reason, I believed that Justices of the Supreme Court were voted into position, not appointed."

"I thought that the president of the United States declared war. When I found out that Congress declared war I was very shocked but glad that not just one person had all that power."


"I thought once the President of the United States vetoed a bill that it would officially die there, but then in class we learned that if a President veto's a bill and House and Senate still want it, with 2/3 vote they can override the president and the bill becomes law without the President's signature."

"Prior to this class I was under the notion that States had the right to deport illegals, but I learned that the U.S. Government is the one that deports."

* Mark Logas Sabbatical Research Artifacts

I always encourage my students to research the pros and cons of every issue and then form a fact-based conclusion from their research. I never grade their fact-based conclusion but do grade how they got there. If they can document using diverse resources, researching the pros and cons of the issue, while demonstrating college-level critical thinking and clearly articulating their fact-based conclusion, they are not only going to achieve each point that is available for the question, they will leave my class a better-informed citizen, and hopefully, better-informed voters.

Appendix



ENDNOTES

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- ¹⁶ Logas, Mark (2016d), *Sabbatical Research Project Artifacts* (25 November 2015).
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A Political History of Florida Elections, 1866-2016

by Seth C. McKee, Ph.D., Texas Tech University & Stephen C. Craig, Ph.D., University of Florida

ABSTRACT: In this essay we chronicle the political history of Florida elections from the days of the Democratic “Solid South” to the slowly waning Republican present. The comprehensiveness of our coverage of U.S. Federal elections and high-profile statewide contests as well as the partisan breakdown in state legislative races, makes this article a valuable resource and reference for anyone who is interested in the fascinating evolution of politics in the Sunshine State.

INTRODUCTION

In his classic treatise on the 11 former Confederate states of the U.S. Civil War (1861-65)¹ in *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, V. O. Key (1949, p.83) had this to say about Florida:

“It votes Democratic, it is geographically attached to Georgia and Alabama, it occasionally gives a faintly tropical Rebel yell, but otherwise it is a world of its own.”

Key penned these words under the subheading “Florida is Different.” Indeed, for a variety of factors the Sunshine State looks like an odd duck next to its Southern sisters. Perhaps the most telling components of why Florida is distinct are its remarkable population growth and its compositional change, due to immigration from everywhere in the U.S. and from abroad. In 1940, Florida contained fewer than 2 million residents,² making it the least populated Southern state. Based on the 2016 census estimate there are now over 20.5 million people who call Florida home, ranking it the third most populous state in the country and second only to Texas in the South. For most of the seven decades from 1940 to 2010, but especially during the 1950s and 1960s, Florida’s rate of growth exceeded by a wide margin that which occurred (on average) in any other part of the country. Only since 2000 has the state exhibited population growth similar to the rest of the South, which as a whole continues to surpass states outside the region.

Also compelling is the consistently high percentage of Floridians who were born outside the state. Spanning the same period from 1940-2010, Table 1 below shows that even before America’s entry into World War II, most residents were born elsewhere; subsequently, from 1960 to 2010, typically two out of three Floridians entered the world in some other place. Whether compared to other Southern states, the South as a whole, or “Non-Southern states”, or the entire United States, it is apparent that Florida is the nation’s perennial and foremost migratory magnet. Indeed, not only do most Floridians come from somewhere else, but many hail from another country (e.g., 1 out of 5 residents were foreign-born in 2014 and 57% of this population is Latino).³

Finally, the ongoing transformation of Florida’s population has dramatically altered its racial and ethnic composition, a key feature affecting election outcomes. In 1880, African Americans were roughly 47% of the state’s population (Kousser 1974, p.68); accordingly, Florida politics in the aftermath of

Reconstruction was akin to that practiced throughout most of the South, where high Black populations fueled White militancy and helped to maintain White supremacy under the Democratic banner (Key 1949). By the mid-Twentieth Century, however, Blacks comprised just 22% of Florida's residents—and the U.S. Census Bureau had yet to compile detailed statistics on its nascent Hispanic population. But now, based on the five-year American Community Survey data (2011-2015), non-Hispanic Blacks and Whites accounted for 16% and 56% of the state's population respectively, whereas its notably diverse Latino inhabitants has risen to an impressive 24% of the total.

Table 1.
Percent Born Outside of State of Residency, 1940-2010 (in percentages)

State	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Alabama	10	12	15	20	21	24	27	30
Arkansas	23	23	23	28	31	33	36	39
Florida	51	57	64	66	69	70	67	65
Georgia	11	15	19	27	29	36	42	45
Louisiana	14	16	19	23	22	21	21	21
Mississippi	10	12	14	19	21	23	26	28
North Carolina	10	13	16	21	24	30	37	42
South Carolina	9	12	18	24	27	32	36	41
Tennessee	16	20	23	26	28	31	35	39
Texas	22	24	27	30	32	35	38	40
Virginia	18	26	32	38	40	46	48	50
South	17	21	27	32	35	39	42	44
Non-South	34	35	36	37	36	38	39	40
United States	30	32	34	35	36	38	40	41

Source: Data compiled by the authors from on-line sources made available by the U.S. Census Bureau.

More than any other factor, these remarkable demographic changes are the driver of contemporary electoral politics in Florida. In the next section, we trace the state's political history from the post-Reconstruction era of Democratic dominance to the present day, where one observes a curious mixture of Republican hegemony in district-based elections and Democratic viability in high-visibility statewide contests. If the past is a helpful guide for anticipating the future, then most indicators point toward increasing two-party competitiveness in the years to come. But before looking to the future we should examine the past, including some of the ways in which Florida differed from other states in the old Confederate South in terms of its potential for political change. Those differences made the Sunshine State as fertile a breeding ground for Republicanism as existed anywhere in Dixie and contributed to its evolution from a one-party system dominated by the Democrats, to the independent-minded, but Republican-leaning state that it is today.

Electoral Change in Florida

The Era of Democratic Dominance

In Florida, as in much of the South, the Republican Grand Old Party (GOP) reigned during the Reconstruction Era (1865-1876) that followed the U.S. Civil War. However, after the end of Reconstruction in 1876, and especially after the Populist Revolt of the 1890s and disenfranchisement of the Black vote throughout the South (Kousser 1974), Republicans became virtually non-existent and the Democratic Party ruled what became known as the “Solid South” until the 1960s. Even so, to say that Democrats dominated the state and possessed a virtual monopoly on elective offices at all levels does not mean there was an absence of political competition. To the contrary, competition was often intense; it simply was bottled up in Democratic primaries because winning the Democratic nomination was tantamount to winning almost any election. Reflecting this reality, V. O. Key (1949, p.82) described Florida elections as:

almost literally [a matter of] every candidate for himself. Ordinarily each candidate for county office runs without collaboration with other local candidates. He hesitates to become publicly committed in contests for state office lest he fall heir to all the local enemies of the state-wide candidate. Each candidate for the half dozen or so minor elective state offices [i.e., Cabinet] tends to his own knitting and recruits his own following. Senators and Representatives hoe their own row and each of the numerous candidates for governor does likewise. With each successive campaign different divisions within the electorate develop. Few politicians exert real influence beyond their own county, and those who can deliver their home county are few. Florida is not only unbossed, it is also unled. Anything can happen in elections, and does.

According to Key (1949, p.87), Florida had “no political organization in the conventional sense of the term.” He explained that political organization is important because it provides a source of leadership, facilitates office-holders working together to enact programs, and offers the requisite accountability for citizens to know who to blame or to praise for the results of those programs (1949, p.87). What is obvious from Key’s analysis is that effective political organization, partisan or otherwise, simply did not exist in Florida during the period of Democratic dominance. In its place was a governing system characterized by numerous and shifting factions, issueless campaigns, and widespread voter confusion (as well as very low turn-out rates on election day). The result was a political structure that left many Floridians feeling uninterested, uninvolved, and unrepresented when important decisions were being made. As one Florida county judge summed up his state’s politics: “Issues? Why, son, they don’t have a damn thing to do with it” (Key 1949, p.94).

At the same time, conditions were present that eventually led to dramatic political changes in the Sunshine State. In addition to having a diverse economy and relatively high urbanization compared with the rest of the South, two other features differentiated Florida from its neighbors: unrivaled growth and a comparably lower Black population (the smaller and declining proportion of African Americans serving to diminish the salience of racial politics that was witnessed throughout most of the South). As mentioned, Florida’s explosive population growth took hold prior to World War II and accelerated thereafter; thanks to a large number of expatriate Yankees and foreign immigrants, it recently overtook New York as the third most populous state.

After World War II, many newcomers were lifelong Republicans, who often settled in the larger cities and suburban towns of Central and South Florida (Gimpel & Schuknecht 2001). Although it was not uncommon for these migrants to register as Democrats in deference to local realities, and to vote Democratic in the general election (either because the GOP did not field a candidate or because their party's nominee had little chance of winning), they nonetheless managed to establish several small pockets of Republicanism (Parker 1988) that emerged first at the presidential level and then, over ensuing decades, in other races as well.

Brief glimpses into Florida's political future were provided by the 1928 and 1948 presidential elections. In 1928, Republican Herbert Hoover was opposed by Democrat Al Smith, the governor of New York and the first Catholic to head the ticket of either major party. Though not a liberal by today's standards, Smith was opposed to Prohibition and more closely identified with the urban, ethnic, immigrant milieu of the Northeast than with the traditional, rural and small-town Protestant values of the South (Sundquist 1983). While the Hoover-Smith contest was not about race, racial factors played a significant role in shaping the voting behavior of Southern states. As analyzed by Key (1949, 318-29), counties with a higher proportion of African Americans (the so-called Black Belt) remained Democratic by virtue of their "common tradition and anxiety about the Negro"; in contrast, whites living in counties with fewer blacks "could afford the luxury of voting their convictions on the religious and prohibition issues." With its small number of Black Belt counties, most white Floridians went with their convictions and did the previously unthinkable—that is, they voted for a Republican presidential candidate. Blacks were still mainly Republicans at the time, so their high level of support for Hoover was expected.

The so-called "Bolt of 1928" exposed a previously hidden fissure in the wall of the Solid South: issues apart from race were capable of fostering large-scale defections from the southern Democracy. With one exception (Tennessee backed Calvin Coolidge by a narrow margin in 1920), this was the first time a Republican nominee had captured electoral votes in the former-Confederate South since the disputed election of 1876 (which led to a compromise that put Republican Rutherford B. Hayes into the White House in exchange for an end to military occupation of the South; see Morris 2003). In 1928, Hoover trounced Smith outside the South, while also carrying the votes of five Southern states, with Florida's 56.8% leading the way (Key 1949, p.318). Clinging to the race issue, Arkansas and the five Deep South states that were most strongly committed to the preservation of White supremacy under the Democratic label (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina) remained loyal to Al Smith.⁴

The lesser importance of race in Florida politics became evident once again in the 1948 presidential contest that pitted Democratic incumbent Harry S. Truman against Republican Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, who also had been the GOP nominee opposing Franklin D. Roosevelt four years earlier. Dewey was not a serious threat to carry Florida on his own, but Truman's relatively liberal civil rights position triggered a splinter group, the States' Rights Democrats (or Dixiecrats), who bolted the Democratic national convention after it adopted a platform committing the party to eradicating "all racial, religious and economic discrimination" in such areas as voting rights, employment, personal security, and treatment of members of the armed forces (Key 1949, p.335).

The Dixiecrats later met in Birmingham, where their own presidential nominee, South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond, declared that "there's not enough troops in the army to force the Southern people to break down segregation and admit the Negro race into our theaters, into our swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches" (Cohodas 1993, p.177). Truman won the election, but the Dixiecrats carried four Deep South states in which they appeared on the ballot as the Democratic Party.

Thurmond garnered only 15.9% of Floridians' Presidential votes, but popular dissatisfaction with the national Democratic Party—including its positions on issues that had nothing to do with race or civil rights—helped Dewey to do slightly better than he had against FDR four years earlier (see Table 2 below). Moreover, the very existence of the Dixiecrats pointed to growing tensions between the South and other elements of the Democratic coalition.

Table 2.
Presidential Voting in Florida, 1928-2016

Year	Democrats	%	Republicans	%	Other	%
1928	100,721	41.1	144,168	58.9	--	--
1932	206,307	74.9	69,170	25.1	--	--
1936	249,117	76.1	78,248	23.9	--	--
1940	359,334	74.0	126,158	26.0	--	--
1944	339,377	70.3	143,215	29.7	--	--
1948	281,988	49.8	194,280	34.3	89,755	15.9
1952	444,950	45.0	544,036	55.0	--	--
1956	480,371	42.7	643,849	57.3	--	--
1960	748,700	48.5	795,746	51.5	--	--
1964	948,540	51.1	905,941	48.9	--	--
1968	676,794	30.9	886,804	40.5	624,207	28.5
1972	718,117	27.9	1,857,759	72.1	--	--
1976	1,636,000	52.7	1,469,531	47.3	--	--
1980	1,419,475	38.8	2,046,951	56.0	189,692	5.2
1984	1,448,816	34.7	2,730,350	65.3	--	--
1988	1,656,701	38.7	2,618,885	61.3	--	--
1992	2,072,698	39.1	2,173,310	41.0	1,053,067	19.9
1996	2,546,870	48.3	2,244,536	42.5	483,870	9.2
2000	2,912,253	49.2	2,912,790	49.2	97,488	1.6
2004	3,583,544	47.5	3,964,522	52.5	--	--
2008	4,282,074	51.4	4,045,624	48.6	--	--
2012	4,237,756	50.4	4,163,447	49.6	--	--
2016	4,504,974	49.4	4,617,886	50.6	--	--

Source: Division of Elections, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee.

Note: Percentages are based on the two-party vote except in 1948 (Strom Thurmond, States Rights Democrats), 1968 (George Wallace, American Independent Party), 1980 (independent John Anderson), 1992-96 (Ross Perot, an independent in 1992 and nominee of the Reform Party in 1996), and 2000 (Ralph Nader, Green Party).

For the South as a whole, the same Black Belt areas that had loyally backed Al Smith in 1928 were the most likely to support Thurmond and the Dixiecrats in 1948. The message was clear: As long as segregationist whites saw the Democrats as their best hope for maintaining the racial *status quo*, they would continue to vote accordingly at all levels; but when the party showed too much sympathy for the cause of Black civil rights, all bets were off. The same underlying pattern could be seen in Florida as well,

even if the state's smaller percentage of African Americans and hence lesser preoccupation with matters of race allowed it to escape much of the turmoil that was being experienced elsewhere as segregationist institutions came under increasing attack.

However, there were parts of the state (the Panhandle and less urbanized North, for example) where Blacks were more numerous and, not coincidentally, race was a prime consideration for many White voters. As the national Democratic Party came to embrace more openly the goal of racial equality, the potential for defection from traditional loyalties grew stronger each year as older generations of (White) Southern Democrats were replaced by younger voters more inclined to align their party affiliation with their conservative values (Gimpel & Schuknecht 2004). Combined with the continued influx of Republican newcomers from other parts of the country, these circumstances created a situation that made political change in Florida inevitable.

The 1950s and 1960s: Republican Inroads

In hindsight, 1948 marked the beginning of the end of the "Solid South". The shift to Presidential Republicanism was impressive in 1952 and 1956, when Florida joined most of the nation to elect President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and again in 1960, when his former Vice-President Richard Nixon finally captured the state's electoral votes in his narrow loss to Democrat John F. Kennedy. In all three of these contests, GOP strength was concentrated less in the Black Belt northern counties that were receptive to the Dixiecrats, than in what has been described as "an urban horseshoe, with one leg beginning at Fort Lauderdale and Palm Beach, running up the east coast to Daytona Beach, then inland to Orlando and curving to St. Petersburg on the west coast and descending to Fort Myers and Naples" (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.117).

This electoral pattern began to change somewhat with the 1964 contest between Democratic President Lyndon Johnson and Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, the first Republican candidate not to carry Florida since 1948. In the final analysis, Goldwater's willingness to reform the Social Security system and his rigid conservatism on a broad range of other issues cost him a measure of traditional Republican support and contributed to his relatively poor showing in the state overall. Yet this same conservatism, and especially his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act (on what he said were constitutional grounds, specifically, that such matters were better handled by state governments), attracted many White voters who for decades had supported Democrats.

In his defense, it must be noted that Goldwater did not openly appeal to racist sentiments during the campaign. He did, however, adopt a "southern strategy" that sought the backing of disaffected White Democrats in the region; he also assumed (correctly) that there was little use in trying to mollify Black and liberal White voters, who would not vote for him anyway. While this strategy doomed Goldwater, it is now clear that the 1964 election marked an important turning point in the growth of Republicanism throughout the South (Aistrup 1996; Black & Black 1992, 2002; Carmines & Stimson 1989).

When Richard Nixon employed a modified Southern strategy four years later (see Phillips 1969), he was able to win both in Florida and nationwide despite an impressive third-party challenge from the right by former Alabama governor and American Independent Party candidate George Wallace. Although it was the segregationist Wallace more than Nixon who inherited the Black Belt Dixiecrat vote (Black & Black 1992), the Wallace candidacy may have served as a "halfway house" for conservative whites disenchanted with their old party but not yet ready to become full-fledged Presidential Republicans. Nixon won back most of the mainstream Republicans who had been scared off by

Goldwater's extremism in 1964 and, with his successful bid for reelection in 1972, he succeeded in merging the two groups (racial and economic conservatives) into what ultimately became a rather formidable coalition. Since the Goldwater debacle and prior to Barack Obama, Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Bill Clinton in 1996 were the only Democratic nominees to have drawn enough white votes to defeat this coalition in the Sunshine State (with Clinton probably benefiting from independent candidate Ross Perot's presence on the ballot).

Like most of the South, the 1960s were a time of growth for Florida Republicans below the Presidential level. Claude Kirk's unexpected victory in the 1966 gubernatorial race came at the expense of liberal Mayor Robert King High of Miami, who had unseated the more conservative incumbent Governor Haydon Burns in a bitter Democratic primary earlier that year (see the election results in Table 3). Burns and many of his supporters refused to endorse High, while businessman Kirk took further advantage of the rift in Democratic ranks by attacking High for his liberal racial attitudes and linking High to the increasingly unpopular Johnson administration in Washington. Kirk won with 55% of the vote, doing well in several North Florida and Panhandle counties where Democrats had historically racked up large majorities (see Table 3 below).

Table 3.
Gubernatorial Voting in Florida, 1966-2014

Year	Name (D)	Democrats	%	Name (R)	Republicans	%
1966	Robert King High	668,233	44.9	Claude R. Kirk Jr.	821,190	55.1
1970	Reubin Askew	984,305	56.9	Claude R. Kirk Jr.	746,243	43.1
1974	Reubin Askew	1,118,954	61.2	Jerry Thomas	709,438	38.8
1978	Robert Graham	1,406,580	55.6	Jack Eckerd	1,123,888	44.4
1982	Robert Graham	1,739,553	64.7	L. A. 'Skip' Bafalis	949,013	35.3
1986	Steve Pajcic	1,538,620	45.4	Bob Martinez	1,847,525	54.6
1990	Lawton Chiles	1,995,206	56.5	Bob Martinez	1,535,068	43.5
1994	Lawton Chiles	2,135,008	50.8	Jeb Bush	2,071,068	49.2
1998	Buddy MacKay	1,773,054	44.7	Jeb Bush	2,191,105	55.3
2002	Bill McBride	2,201,427	43.5	Jeb Bush	2,856,845	56.5
2006	Jim Davis	2,178,289	46.4	Charlie Crist	2,519,845	53.6
2010	Alex Sink	2,557,785	49.4	Rick Scott	2,619,335	50.6
2014	Charlie Crist	2,801,198	49.4	Rick Scott	2,865,343	50.6

Source: The 1966 to 2002 data were compiled from the *Guide to U.S. Elections* (CQ Press 2005). Data for 2006-2014 are from the Division of Elections, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee.

Another GOP breakthrough occurred in the 1968 U.S. Senate contest (see Table 4 below), as Congressman Edward Gurney defeated former Democratic Governor LeRoy Collins. The latter was burdened by the effects of yet another divisive Democratic primary, and by the public's antipathy toward the party's national ticket that year. A racial moderate, Collins was an advocate of civil rights reform during the late-1950s and early-1960s, but his progressive record ultimately did him more harm than good in the Senate race. Opponents dubbed him "Liberal LeRoy," and, in some of the rural Black

Belt counties of North Florida, a photograph circulated showing Collins walking alongside Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 1965 civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. By way of contrast, Gurney portrayed himself as a strong advocate of law and order and “as a fighter, a man of action, an effective leader” (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.122-123). In fact, Republican candidates ran stronger at all levels in 1968 despite a continuing Democratic advantage in voter loyalties. If nothing else, the back-to-back triumphs of Kirk and Gurney had many voters thinking for the first time about a possible genuine two-party competition in Florida politics (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.121).

Table 4.
Senatorial Voting in Florida, 1968-2016

Year	Name (D)	Democrats	%	Name (R)	Republicans	%
1968	LeRoy Collins	892,637	44.1	Edward J. Gurney	1,131,499	55.9
1970	Lawton Chiles	902,438	53.9	William C. Cramer	772,817	46.1
1974	Richard Stone	781,031	51.5	Jack Eckerd	736,674	48.5
1976	Lawton Chiles	1,799,518	63.0	John Grady	1,057,886	37.0
1980	Bill Gunter	1,705,409	48.3	Paula Hawkins	1,822,460	51.7
1982	Lawton Chiles	1,637,667	61.7	Van B. Poole	1,015,330	38.3
1986	Bob Graham	1,877,231	54.7	Paula Hawkins	1,551,888	45.3
1988	Buddy MacKay	2,016,553	49.6	Connie Mack III	2,051,071	50.4
1992	Bob Graham	3,244,299	65.4	Bill Grant	1,715,156	34.6
1994	Hugh E. Rodham	1,210,412	29.5	Connie Mack III	2,894,726	70.5
1998	Bob Graham	2,436,407	62.5	Charlie Crist	1,463,755	37.5
2000	Bill Nelson	2,989,487	52.5	Bill McCollum	2,705,348	47.5
2004	Betty Castor	3,590,201	49.4	Mel Martinez	3,672,864	50.6
2006	Bill Nelson	2,890,548	61.3	Katherine Harris	1,826,127	38.7
2010	Kendrick B. Meek	1,092,936	20.4	Marco Rubio	2,645,743	49.5
	Charlie Crist (NPA)	1,607,549	30.1			
2012	Bill Nelson	4,523,451	56.7	Connie Mack IV	3,458,267	43.3
2016	Patrick Murphy	4,122,088	46.0	Marco Rubio	4,835,191	54.0

Source: The 1968 to 2004 data were compiled from the *Guide to U.S. Elections* (CQ Press 2005). Data for 2006 to 2016 are from the Division of Elections, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee.

Note: Because of the strong independent challenge from Charlie Crist, a sitting Republican Governor who switched to “No Party Affiliation” in his bid for the U.S. Senate in 2010, we have added his votes and vote percentage below those of Democrat Kendrick Meek. Crist lost the race and then joined the Democratic Party and later won a U.S. Congressional seat for St. Petersburg, Florida.

The 1970s: Democrats Strike Back

The 1970s were a transitional period in Florida politics, as the Republican inroads of the 1960s were slowed by the emergence of Democratic politicians skilled in forging biracial coalitions that successfully countered the steady movement of more conservative Whites to the GOP (Lamis 1988). Democrats also were beneficiaries of the fallout from the Watergate scandal that ultimately led to President Nixon’s resignation in 1974 and, closer to home, of the controversies surrounding Governor Claude Kirk.

It was said of Kirk that he fostered “an exciting atmosphere with his politics of confrontation, flow of creative ideas and personal flamboyance. He fought to get a new [state] constitution and brought fresh faces into state government, many of them appointments of high quality” (Bass & DeVries 1976, p.118). Unfortunately, there also were problems. Today Kirk is remembered less for his leadership than “for his lavish parties at the governor’s mansion, for jetting around the country at state Republican expense, and for hiring a Madison Avenue firm with state funds to promote himself for the 1968 vice-presidential nomination” (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.118-119). The governor lost his 1970 reelection bid to state Senator Reubin Askew of Pensacola, who campaigned on a platform calling for tax reform, adoption of a corporate income tax, environmental protection, and financial disclosure for elected officials. Askew’s victory resulted largely from a strong showing in those areas of North Florida and the Panhandle that had demonstrated a willingness to vote for conservative Republicans in 1966 and 1968. By also faring well among Blacks and, to a lesser extent, among moderate Whites living in urban areas below the frost line, Askew provided a formula that Democratic candidates would use with success throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the 1980s.

The same can be said of Lawton Chiles. Kirk’s problems aside, the Republicans were believed to have a good chance of capturing the U.S. Senate seat left open in 1970 by the retirement of Democratic incumbent Spessard Holland. Not only were the Democrats in obvious disarray (Lamis 1988, p.183), but the GOP had a strong candidate in U.S. Representative William Cramer of St. Petersburg, a man often referred to as “Mr. Republican” of Florida politics and the first member of his party to have been elected to Congress (in 1954) from the state in the Twentieth Century. Cramer was wounded, however, in a highly divisive Republican primary when Kirk and Gurney recruited another candidate in an attempt to gain control of the state party organization (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.124). Though Cramer prevailed, his campaign split Republicans at a time when unity was essential. Democratic nominee Lawton Chiles was less willing than Askew to take left-of-center positions on issues (Lamis 1988, p.192), but he nonetheless managed to project an “aw shucks” populist image by walking 1,000 miles from one end of the state to the other and by stressing his ties to the working people of Florida (Coggin 2012). The state senator from Lakeland won 54% of the vote and, like Askew, he did better than anticipated in North Florida while also pulling in enough votes from the rest of the state to beat the favored Cramer. As Chiles later noted, “when you give [people in North Florida] a Democrat they can accept, they’ll vote for him” (quoted in Lamis 1988, 185).

For the next several statewide elections, Democrats proved to be fairly adept at nominating candidates whom the swing voters in the north could support. Governor Askew suffered some erosion there in his 1974 reelection campaign, probably due to memories of his opposition to an anti-busing referendum on the 1972 Presidential primary ballot (it passed with 74% approval)—but he balanced that by running well in some of the Central and South Florida urban areas that normally favored Republicans (Lamis 1988, p.187). Askew was succeeded as governor by Bob Graham, a state senator from Miami Lakes, who won an upset victory in the 1978 Democratic primary. One vital component of the Graham campaign was a gimmick known as “workdays.” The candidate spent 100 days working 100 different jobs ranging from bartender to garbage collector to schoolteacher, the idea being to demonstrate a connection to the state’s working people (Lamis 1988, p.188). Graham also benefited from selecting veteran Panhandle legislator Wayne Mixson from Marianna as his running mate, and wound up defeating Republican Jack Eckerd, a perennial candidate and drugstore chain owner, with almost 56% of the vote.

The 1978 Florida Gubernatorial election, according to Alexander Lamis (1988, p.188-189), generally fit the pattern of other statewide contests during the same period: “When the Democrats field a candidate who can hold together the traditional North Florida Democratic vote with a coalition of Blacks and blue-collar Whites in the large urban centers, plus the heavily Democratic areas of South Florida, they are usually able to win with a modest statewide majority.” By the end of the 1970s, Democrats controlled the governorship, both U.S. Senate seats, 12 of 15 U.S. House seats, 29 of 40 Florida Senate seats, 89 of 120 Florida House seats, and all six Cabinet positions. Republican growth had not been stopped by any means, but intra-party strife set the party back at times and made the task of challenging for majority status more difficult than it otherwise might have been. Meanwhile, by nominating the likes of Reubin Askew and Lawton Chiles in 1970, Democrats turned to a new generation of leaders with the political skills to appeal to a broad swath of the Florida electorate.

Democrats also benefited from the diminished salience of race, which had flared up in the 1960s and contributed to the electoral success of conservative Republicans such as Kirk and Gurney. In the 1970s, both nationally and statewide, the opportunities for further GOP gains were thwarted by the Watergate scandal and a growing concern with economic problems (especially inflation) during the Ford administration. Nevertheless, even as Florida Democrats continued to hold better than a two-to-one edge in voter registration, the period after 1964 left little doubt that the state’s political landscape (and that of the South as a whole) had changed dramatically since the days when Democrats were the only game in town. Republican activists and leaders at the state and local levels were becoming increasingly effective at recruiting strong candidates, raising the large sums of money necessary to run a credible race, and building a party apparatus that in some places had the Democrats playing catch-up (Bass & De Vries 1976, p.125). The GOP did not always win, of course, but the effort was there and public opinion was tilting in the Republicans’ favor (Stimson 2004). Then came the pivotal election of 1980.


The 1980s: the Reagan Years

Ronald Reagan was a transformational figure in American politics. In the South specifically, Earl and Merle Black (1992 & 2002) contend that Reagan helped attract White conservatives to the GOP while simultaneously “de-aligning” many White moderates from their erstwhile Democratic allegiances. His consistently conservative positions on the most salient issues of the day (race, abortion and other contentious social issues, size of government, foreign policy) redefined the Republican Party and also encouraged the Democratic opposition to stake out a more coherent liberal alternative. Figure 1 below tracks Florida voter registration by party affiliation from 1970 to 2016 and reveals that the largest GOP gains occurred during the Reagan years (rising from 30% in 1980 to 39% by 1988).

In 1980, Reagan handily defeated Jimmy Carter in Florida by 56% to 39%, with independent John Anderson capturing 5%. According to Alexander Lamis, “[n]ational factors were chiefly responsible for this result, although Reagan campaigned effectively and extensively in the state, paying attention to matters of local interest.” Unlike Goldwater, for example, Reagan appealed to Florida’s older voters by stressing his commitment to the Social Security system; and in South Florida, “where Cuban refugees were the source of local concern,” he criticized Carter for trying to shift the burden of what was essentially a national problem “onto the backs of Florida residents” (Lamis 1988, p.189). When these elements were added to the poor economy and Carter’s overall image as a weak and ineffective leader, any chance the president had of carrying Florida vanished.

Reagan’s impressive 1980 Presidential victory helped to elect Republican Paula Hawkins of Winter Park to the U.S. Senate. A former member of the Florida Public Service Commission, Hawkins defeated state Insurance Commissioner and former Congressman Bill Gunter, winner of a typically bruising Democratic primary over incumbent Richard Stone. With the Democrats divided, Hawkins ran strongest in Central Florida, the Gold Coast (from North Palm Beach down through Boca Raton, Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood), and “in just about every county with a sizable portion of immigrants from the North” (Barone & Ujifusa 1981, p.209). Hawkins received 52% of the statewide vote and became only the second Republican elected to the Senate from Florida in the Twentieth Century.

Figure 1.
Florida Voter Registration, 1970-2016 (in percentages)



Source: The data from 1970 to 1996 were compiled from Carver and Fiedler (1999, 344, Table 26). The 1998 to 2016 data are from the Division of Elections, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee. With the exception of 1970 (August) and 1974 (September), for all other years the registration numbers were valid for the October closing date before the November general election.

In 1982, however, the Democrats were able to hold their own by easily reelecting Governor Graham (65% against Congressman Skip Bafalis) and Senator Chiles (62% vs. state Senator Van Poole). Moreover, the party continued to control most congressional and state legislative seats in both 1982 and 1984—the latter despite Reagan’s rout of Democrat Walter Mondale in the Presidential race. Such inconsistent outcomes reinforced the idea that Florida, with its steady stream of new residents who lacked “any permanent connection with the civic culture of the state” (Barone & Ujifusa 1989, p.242), was becoming unusually volatile and unpredictable, subject to wide voting swings from one election to the next or even across a range of offices within the same election year.

In fact, 30% of native U.S. whites residing in Florida in 1950 were born outside the South, a figure that rose to 50% by 1980 (Black & Black 1987, p.17). And the sheer size of the state (almost 800 hundred miles from Pensacola to Key West) makes it difficult for candidates to reach voters except through the costly and mostly superficial medium of television—which, in turn, tends to focus attention on individual candidates rather than on the entire party ticket. V. O. Key cited a similar phenomenon (that “anything can happen in elections, and does”) in his analysis of Florida politics during the 1930s and 1940s, except that in Key’s time instability was limited to the Democratic side because Republicans were not competitive.

Voters in the modern era frequently sent mixed signals by supporting Republican candidates for some offices and Democratic candidates for others. Well-known incumbents occasionally lost reelection because they were unable to win support from an electorate that, with new arrivals plus high turnover among the large elderly population, was considerably different from the one that originally put them in office. Further, the close spacing of party primaries at times inflicted permanent damage even on winning candidates. Wounds that developed in the heat of an intense primary campaign did not always have time to heal during the short period separating the first primary (late-August or early-September) and runoff (late-September or early-October)⁵ from the general election in early-November.

The 1986 midterm elections provided a vivid example of several of these factors: (1) a vulnerable incumbent, (2) widespread ticket splitting, (3) divisive primaries, and (4) candidate-centered campaigns. For the U.S. Senate, incumbent Republican Paula Hawkins faced Democratic Governor Bob Graham in one of the nation’s glamour races. Hawkins had aligned herself with President Reagan and attempted to tie Graham with the failed administration of Jimmy Carter. Hawkins was hurt, though, by persistent health problems, a series of gaffes and a reputation for ineffectiveness. All of this contrasted sharply with Graham’s “image of competence built on a record of accomplishment” during his eight years as governor (Ehrenhalt 1987, p.288).

Graham also attracted support from conservatives with his stands in favor of capital punishment, stiffer penalties for drug dealers, and continued U.S. funding for the contra rebel movement in Nicaragua. Graham defeated Hawkins with a solid 55%, making her the third consecutive holder of that particular Senate seat (following Gurney and Stone) to leave office after serving one term.

The gubernatorial contest was an altogether different story. In the Democratic runoff, State Representative Steve Pajcic eked out a close win over Attorney General Jim Smith, but was weakened by Smith’s portrayal of him as an unrepentant liberal whose sympathy for higher taxes, pornography, and abolition of the death penalty placed him “totally out of step with Florida’s mainstream” (Lamis 1988, p.293). Smith refused to endorse Pajcic in the general election and, shortly afterwards, switched to the Republican Party. The GOP nominated Bob Martinez, who emphasized many of Smith’s anti-Pajcic themes while also stressing his administrative experience as mayor of Tampa during the early 1980s. Martinez won just under 55% of the vote, making him Florida’s first Hispanic governor.

It is worth noting that in each of the two major statewide contests in 1986, the winner (one Democrat, one Republican) outpaced the loser by a margin of approximately 1.55 million to 1.85 million votes—discrepant outcomes that could only result from a high incidence of ticket splitting. Both of these races were also marked by high campaign costs, heavy reliance on television ads (many of them hard-hitting attacks), and input from professional consultants whose main objective was to ensure their client’s success regardless of what happened to the rest of the party. When Key (1949, p.82) described Florida politics as a matter of “every candidate for himself,” he could as easily have been referring to the 1980s as to the period during and after the Great Depression.

Other than the governorship, Democrats fared quite well in 1986. They won all six Cabinet positions, 12 of 19 U.S. House seats (see Figure 2 below), and a majority in both state legislative chambers, though a post-election coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats was able to successfully challenge the progressive/liberal faction for control of the Senate.

Figure 2.
Number of Florida U.S. House Seats by Party, 1980-2016



Source: The 1980 to 2004 data were compiled from the *Guide to U.S. Elections* (CQ Press 2005). Data for 2006 to 2010 are from *The Almanac of American Politics* (2007, 2009 & 2011). The 2012, 2014 and 2016 data are from the Division of Elections, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee.

The 1988 cycle proved much kinder to the GOP. While Republican George H.W. Bush crushed his Democratic opponent Michael Dukakis in Florida (taking just under 61% of the votes cast), the most significant developments in 1988 were taking place lower down on the ballot. When three-term incumbent Lawton Chiles decided to retire from the U.S. Senate, Republicans initially rejoiced. However, when former Governor Reubin Askew immediately announced his bid to succeed Chiles, Democrats were confident they could retain the seat—at least until Askew, despite leading in the polls, dropped out the following May citing his distaste for fundraising. With the primary just four months away, other prospective Democratic candidates had little time to build an organization, raise money, and develop an effective message that resonated with voters. Once again, a typically nasty intra-party battle ensued, with centrist Congressman Buddy MacKay earning the nomination in an upset over Bill Gunter.

On the Republican side, Congressman Connie Mack III of Cape Coral won handily against former U.S. Attorney Robert “Mad Dog” Merkle and then spent the next several weeks trying to link his general

election opponent to unpopular Democratic policies. In addition to speaking of his commitment to “less taxes, less spending, less government, and more freedom,” Mack ran numerous attack ads that ended with the catchy tag line, “Hey Buddy, you’re a liberal!” Although Mack, in turn, seemed vulnerable to Democratic charges that he was not sufficiently committed to protecting elderly Floridians’ Social Security benefits (Barone & Ujifusa 1989, p.46-247), he received a boost from Bush’s Presidential coattails and managed to eke-out a narrow victory (50.4%) over McKay on Election Day.

Mack’s Senate win was by no means the only bright spot for Republicans in 1988. The GOP also captured two Cabinet posts (Secretary of State Jim Smith, the aforementioned party switcher, and Insurance Commissioner Tom Gallagher), plus 9 of 19 U.S. House seats; the Democratic advantage in Tallahassee fell to 23-17 in the Senate and 73-47 in the House. In 1989, the GOP increased its numbers in the U.S. House thanks to a party switch by Panhandle Congressman Bill Grant, who had been reelected in 1988 without opposition. With Grant’s defection, Florida Republicans now attained majority status in the state’s congressional delegation and their one seat advantage increased to 11-to-8 after Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (the first Cuban American ever to serve in Congress) won a special election following the death of Miami’s venerable Claude Pepper. One Democratic state legislator also switched parties in mid-year, while several of his colleagues and a smattering of local officials from around the state teetered on the brink of following suit – a clear sign that the time was passing when someone might run for office as a Democrat because it was the more viable party.

As a whole, this review of Florida elections in the 1980s underscores the fact that the particular mix of candidates, issues and circumstances in a specific race could often override any predisposition that citizens might have to favor one party or the other. Yet despite the electoral volatility that has been a cardinal feature of the Sunshine State’s political tradition for over half a century, a trend toward the GOP was evident throughout the decade. Indeed, by the late-1980s, Florida increasingly began to look like a state in the midst of a fundamental partisan realignment (Colburn 2007).

The 1990s: Republicans Take Control

The 1990s began auspiciously for Florida Democrats, but their early success soon faded as Republicans became the beneficiaries of racial redistricting, the emergence of a formidable candidate with a famous name, and a hastening of the shift of white voters to the GOP. By the close of the decade, Republicans had acquired comfortable majorities in the U.S. House delegation and both state legislative chambers, occupied the governor’s mansion, and held half the Cabinet positions, plus one U.S. Senate seat.

In 1990, Democrats managed to recapture the governorship when a rejuvenated Lawton Chiles came out of retirement to unseat Bob Martinez by the surprisingly comfortable margin of 57% to 43%. Martinez, who shortly after taking office had supported passage of a state sales tax on services, never recovered from the adverse public reaction to that tax—or from the weak leadership image he conveyed by also backing those who (successfully) worked for its repeal the following year. The governor’s presence at the top of the ticket proved to be a drag on other GOP candidates, helping Democrats retain control of the Cabinet and both houses of the state legislature; the Democrats even picked up one seat in the Florida House and one in the U.S. House, where party switcher Bill Grant lost to former-Vietnam POW Pete Peterson in the Tallahassee-based second congressional district.

Democrats survived in 1992 as well. In winning the Presidency, Democrat Bill Clinton lost Florida by roughly 100,000 votes, an election that in hindsight initiated the Sunshine State’s current status as the nation’s largest presidential swing state. Democrat Bob Graham won a second term in the U.S.

Senate by cruising past Republican Bill Grant with 65% of the vote. Republicans continued to improve their performance in legislative races, however, and achieved an historic 20-20 split with Democrats in the Florida Senate. Reapportionment yielded four new congressional seats due to rapid population growth, and Republicans went from a 10-9 advantage in 1990 to 13-10 in 1992. This set the stage for 1994, a year in which the GOP made huge gains nationwide: in Congress (winning majorities in both chambers for the first time since 1952), governorships (including the election of George W. Bush in Texas), and the various state legislatures. In Florida, Republicans won three of the six Cabinet positions, fifteen of the twenty-three U.S. House seats, a Florida Senate majority (21-19) for the first time since Reconstruction, and narrowed the Democratic advantage in the Florida House to 63-57 by picking up eight seats. Finally, incumbent Republican Senator Connie Mack won a jaw-dropping 70% of the vote against the hapless political neophyte and brother of the First Lady, Hugh Rodham.

One of the rare bright spots for Democrats in 1994 came in the gubernatorial contest, as Lawton Chiles held off a spirited challenge from presidential son and Miami businessman Jeb Bush. Chiles initially looked headed for defeat, having been elected four years prior on the promise of reforming state government and “Right-sizing” the bureaucracy—but then later calling for \$1.3 billion in new taxes and proposing a healthcare reform package that the legislature rejected. Bush championed a conservative agenda involving welfare reform, school choice, and swifter executions for death-row inmates, and most polls showed him with an early double-digit lead. Governor Chiles, however, responded with an effective negative attack (most notably concerning his opponent’s alleged ties with the savings-and-loan industry’s collapse) and began to emphasize his own southern “cracker” roots in an effort to attract support from conservative Democrats, especially in North Florida (Barone & Ujifusa 1995, p.291-292). On Election Day, Chiles prevailed with a 51% to 49% margin.

The governor, once again having shown Democrats how to hold a coalition together and triumph statewide, provided inspiration and a winning formula for President Bill Clinton in 1996. Deemed “irrelevant” by many pundits in the wake of the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” when he and his party were blamed for their failure to enact national healthcare reform (see Johnson and Broder 1996) and other key legislation, Clinton crafted a brilliant national campaign strategy, turning his 100,000-vote deficit in 1992 into a 300,000-vote surplus over Bob Dole in 1996. Nevertheless, even as Clinton became only the third Democrat to win Florida’s electoral votes since 1948, there were few other Democratic successes. Republicans maintained their 15-8 majority in the U.S. House delegation, increased their Florida Senate margin to 23-17, and, in another historic moment, took 61-59 control of the Florida House.

The 1998 elections featured spirited gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races, which ended in a partisan split. Having come so close in 1994, it was little surprise that Jeb Bush was again the Republican nominee for governor; this time his Democratic opponent was Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay. Bush won by the comfortable margin of 55% to 45%, vaulting to an early lead (just as he had four years earlier) that he maintained over an opponent who lacked Chiles’ personal magnetism and failed to craft a compelling message that might have attracted supporters to his cause.

The Florida GOP’s ascendancy in the late 1990s was such that many Republicans believed (or at least hoped) that Senator Bob Graham might also be defeated in 1998. Instead, Graham coasted to his third U.S. Senate term over state Senator Charlie Crist with over 62% of the vote. Once again, the results revealed widespread ticket splitting and offered a ray of hope for beleaguered Democrats. Thus, even as Republicans took control of state government for the first time in over a century, Graham continued to thrive with the old Democratic playbook that had worked so well for the likes of Chiles and Askew; he

carried, for example, 26 of 28 counties in North Florida and the Panhandle, while Bush won 25 of the same counties in the governor's race. The Graham victory aside, however, Republicans maintained their 15-8 U.S. House majority and added to their state legislative margins (25-15 in the Senate, 72-48 in the House, the latter figure including two party switches by Democratic incumbents).

An important component of Florida Republicans' electoral success in the 1990s was the implementation of racial redistricting. Based on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, several states (primarily in the South) covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act were directed by the Department of Justice to create majority-minority districts wherever possible in their drawing of congressional and state legislative boundaries (Cunningham 2001). In the Florida legislative maps, the result was "eight house and two senate districts with a black voting-age majority and nine majority-Hispanic districts in the house and three in the senate" (Carver & Fiedler 1999, p.362). In addition, the congressional plan for 1992 contained three majority-Black districts and two with majority Hispanic constituencies. As expected, these majority-minority districts virtually ensured descriptive representation congruent with the majority race/ethnicity in the district. But it quickly became apparent that Republicans were the big winners thanks to racial redistricting, as the concentration of African Americans into a relatively small number of districts meant a reduction of the Democratic Party's most ardent supporters in neighboring districts (Black & Black 2002; Epstein & O'Halloran 1999; Hill 1995).⁶

The GOP benefited directly from reduced minority populations in majority white districts, and indirectly from the fact that constituents redrawn into those districts were much more likely to cast Republican votes (Petrocik & Desposato 1998; McKee 2010). The overriding goal of drawing districts that virtually guaranteed the election of minority representatives did not curry favor with the Supreme Court, however, and a series of rulings (*Shaw v. Reno* 1993; *Miller v. Johnson* 1995; *Bush v. Vera* 1996) struck down the creation of numerous majority-minority districts because they were determined to be unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.

In compliance with the U.S. Supreme Court, Florida redrew its congressional and state Senate maps before the 1996 elections. But at this point, as far as Florida Democrats were concerned, the damage was done: Republicans had reaped the electoral benefits of racial redistricting in 1992 and 1994, after which incumbency helped to cushion their representatives from an influx of new minority voters when a majority-minority district was redrawn to make it majority White. Further, not all majority-minority districts were singled out for reconfiguring into white majorities (e.g., in the Florida U.S. House plan, only District 3 had to be redrawn into a White majority). Heading into the next decade, Florida Republicans clearly recognized that the implementation of racial redistricting had redounded to their benefit and thus a GOP legislative majority in control of line drawing seemed more than a little disingenuous when its members vehemently defended the continued existence of majority-minority districts (on this point, see Altman and McDonald 2015).

The 2000s: The New Millennium and Tested Republican Dominance

The new millennium began with the most controversial presidential election since 1876 (Morris 2003). Winning Florida's 25 electoral votes by the tiniest of margins gave Republican George W. Bush a total of one more (271) than the minimum needed for an Electoral College majority. On his way to claiming the White House, George W. Bush swept the South just as his father did in 1988. Redistricting again proved favorable to the GOP in congressional and legislative races, where Republicans were now in charge of drawing the boundaries (McKee 2015). After 2004, however, the electoral environment

became quite volatile as the growing unpopularity of President G.W. Bush (due largely to the 2003 Second Gulf War in Iraq and the 2005-2008 severe economic downturn since the 1929 Great Depression) yielded Democratic gains in both 2006 and 2008. But the ongoing post-2008 economic crisis contributed to the rise of the Tea Party movement (Skocpol & Williamson 2012), which fueled a Republican wave in the 2010 midterm elections that allowed the GOP to recover most of its losses from the two previous cycles. Overall, the 2000s proved to be another decade of Republican dominance in Florida politics, especially in district-based elections. At the same time, setbacks in 2006 and 2008 demonstrated the party's vulnerability to short-term forces, while the state's changing demographics (combined with a growing segment of independent registrants) held out the promise of a brighter future for the Democrats.

In 2000, Florida unexpectedly became the focal point of one of the longest and most confusing elections in our nation's history, but this was only part of the story. On the one hand, Republicans held onto or increased their congressional and state legislative majorities. On the other hand, Insurance Commissioner Bill Nelson won back a U.S. Senate seat for Democrats following the retirement of two-term incumbent Republican Connie Mack. Nelson, who was the consensus choice of most party leaders around the state, had no significant primary opposition, and was widely known as a centrist Democrat in the mold of Bob Graham. His opponent, Congressman Bill McCollum, also won his primary without a serious challenge (in part because Jeb Bush and GOP party officials persuaded Education Commissioner Tom Gallagher not to run) but went into the fall campaign with two serious disadvantages: (1) modest name recognition, and (2) a reputation for being more conservative than most of his Republican peers. Although McCollum fared better than expected (losing by just 52% to 47%), he was never able to overcome Nelson's initial advantage. Once again, the election returns demonstrated the willingness of Florida voters to support certain kinds of Democrats under the right circumstances.

This point was reinforced in the presidential race, which culminated in a 36-day standoff between Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore that ultimately was resolved when the Supreme Court (see *Bush v. Gore* 2000) issued a ruling that effectively precluded any further vote recounts from taking place. The story is well known and need not be considered in detail here (see Ceaser & Bush 2001; deHaven-Smith 2005). What is important for our purposes is that Florida—increasingly tilting Republican at the state and local level, and once described as “the safest Republican big state in Presidential elections” (Barone & Ujifusa 1989, p.247)—actually had solidified its status as a presidential battleground. For all intents and purposes, the presidential race was a statistical tie, with an official total of 537 votes (out of almost 6 million cast) separating the two major candidates.

Thus, although the GOP won most of its targeted races in 2000, the Presidential near-miss and Nelson's Senate victory left Democrats feeling confident heading into the 2002 midterm election. Many felt that Governor Jeb Bush, who was seeking reelection, was especially vulnerable due to the controversial role he played during the 2000 Presidential imbroglio.⁷ His principal Democratic challengers were Janet Reno, former Attorney General during the Clinton administration, and Tampa attorney Bill McBride, who was making his first run for public office. Although Reno began the race as the prohibitive favorite, her health (she suffered from Parkinson's disease and shook noticeably when speaking) and liberal views eventually became liabilities for many Democratic primary voters who did not deem her the strongest opponent for Bush in November. Reno was also damaged by the candidacy of Democratic state Senator Daryl Jones, an African American from South Florida. Jones took almost 12%

of the primary vote, most of which might otherwise have gone to Reno, and thereby paved the way for McBride to win by a margin of 4,794 votes.

While the Democrats (including Reno) quickly united behind their nominee, McBride's lack of political experience increasingly proved problematic as the campaign wore on. The stakes were high for both parties, not only because Republicans wanted to maintain their momentum in Florida politics—but also because, with the 2004 Presidential Election looming, a loss by the president's brother might be seen as an ominous harbinger of things to come. As a result, the Bush-McBride matchup became one of the nation's most closely watched, and most expensive, midterm races. McBride managed to stay competitive into October, but a weak performance in the last of three debates served to highlight his inexperience and raised questions about his grasp of key issues. With virtually all of the undecided voters moving to Bush in the final days, the governor won a second term by 56% to 43%. Following reapportionment, with Republicans controlling the redistricting process for the first time since Reconstruction, the GOP increased its majorities in the U.S. House (18-7 after Florida received two new seats that reflected the state's continued growth) and the Florida House (up to 81-39), and maintained its 25-15 Florida Senate advantage. With the Florida Constitution amended to reduce the number of elected Cabinet positions from six to three (Agriculture Commissioner, Attorney General and Chief Financial Officer), the GOP won all three of these contests in 2002.

Democrats nevertheless remained hopeful heading into 2004, though they received a setback when Bob Graham (who had unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Presidential nomination) decided to retire after serving 18 years in the U.S. Senate. In another bruising primary fight, former Commissioner of Education and state Senator Betty Castor of Tampa easily dispatched business executive Bernard E. Klein and two South Florida politicians, Congressman Peter Deutsch of Broward County and Miami-Dade Mayor Alex Penelas. Castor's Republican opponent was Mel Martinez, a former Orange County (Orlando) Chairman and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development during President Bush's first term. Martinez's ties to the administration (including the widespread belief that he was the president's choice in this race) helped him to defeat Bill McCollum and six others in an uncharacteristically divisive Republican primary—so divisive, in fact, that the *St. Petersburg Times* withdrew its endorsement of Martinez, and McCollum initially refused to support him (and later did so only tepidly). With the removal of the runoff in 2002, however (see note 5), the GOP had two months rather than one to heal their wounds and prepare for the general election campaign.

Early polls showed Castor and Martinez in a dead heat, and it stayed that way right up to the end. Martinez's White House connections were a double-edged sword given the closeness and controversy surrounding the 2000 Presidential race; while he played these connections up at every opportunity, Castor attempted to link Martinez to unpopular Bush policies (most notably, tax cuts for the wealthy). Martinez picked up on one of the charges leveled against Castor during the Democratic primary, specifically, that she was soft on terrorism.⁸ The contest was so close that Martinez was not declared the winner until the day after the election, and Castor did not formally concede until the day after that. The final margin separating them was approximately 82,000 votes out of 7.4 million cast. Just as had been true for Connie Mack in 1988, this particular Republican Senate victory might not have been possible except for the coattails provided by another Presidential candidate named Bush.

As expected, the 2004 Presidential race between George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry was hotly contested. Unlike 2000, however, both parties knew the stakes from the beginning and recognized that the Sunshine State could again be the battleground deciding the winner. Although polls taken late

in the campaign showed the election to be a toss-up, the priority given by voters to national security (Abramson et al. 2007), foreign policy, and moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage (as opposed to unemployment and traditional social welfare concerns; see Ceaser & Busch 2005) worked to the Republicans' advantage. Bush won the state by a surprisingly comfortable margin (just over 380,000 votes, 52% to 47%), and the GOP also preserved its margins in Congress (18 to 7), the state Senate (26 to 14), and picked up three additional seats in the state House (for an 84-36 edge). All in all, 2004 was a very good year for the Republican Party in Florida.

Not long after President Bush was sworn into office for his second term, his administration came under fire for a series of leadership failures. First, despite another narrow victory nationwide, the president claimed that the outcome had provided him with added political capital—which he quickly proceeded to expend on reforming Social Security, an issue that was not even seriously debated during the Presidential campaign. The more President Bush “went public” on the issue, traveling the country to gin up grassroots support, the more opinion turned against reform as various interest groups effectively mobilized in favor of defending the status quo (Jacobs 2009). Then, in August 2005, the administration's terribly botched response to Hurricane Katrina had more than a few supporters reassessing the president's competency. But more than any other issue, the deteriorating security in Iraq had Democratic and independent voters almost unanimously opposed to Bush's handling of his job as President (Jacobson 2007a); as the 2006 midterm neared, Gallup recorded one of the highest presidential disapproval ratings in the history of modern polling, going back to the days of President Truman.

Given the administration's low standing going into the 2006 elections, it was anticipated that the Democrats would notch significant gains both nationally and in Florida—and so they did. Nationally, the party gained a majority in both chambers of the U.S. Congress for the first time in a dozen years and, in the process, made history by not losing a single race with one of its incumbents seeking reelection or any of the open seats that a Democrat previously represented (Jacobson 2007b). In Florida, the “thumping” (as President Bush himself called it) taken by the GOP netted two U.S. House seats for the Democrats. One of the races Republicans lost (District 16) made national headlines and cast a pall over the party as Republican Congressman Mark Foley resigned in disgrace in October when news of his inappropriate relations with congressional pages came to light. And in the midst of a Democratic tide, 13-term Republican Clay Shaw failed to hold onto District 22, a South Florida seat that had favored Kerry over Bush in 2004 by 52% to 48% (Barone & Cohen 2007, p.458). With these losses, the Florida GOP's U.S. House majority dropped from 18-7 to 16-9. Although the Republican state Senate majority remained steady at 26-14, Democrats in the state House netted 5 seats to reduce the GOP advantage slightly to 79-41.

In the Florida Cabinet races, the Republicans' monopoly was short-lived as Democrat Alex Sink defeated Tom Lee in an open contest for Chief Financial Officer; Republicans retained the positions of Attorney General and Agriculture Commissioner. Of course, most of the attention of Florida voters was directed at the top-of-the-ballot contests for governor and U.S. Senator. Incumbent Democratic Senator Bill Nelson was seeking a second term and could hardly have been more fortunate in drawing as his Republican challenger former Secretary of State and Congresswoman Katherine Harris (District 13). Much maligned for her role in the 2000 Florida presidential recount and considered by most political observers to be too far to the ideological right for Florida voters, Harris stood no chance against the centrist Nelson. The incumbent held Harris to less than 39% of the vote.

For Republicans, the silver lining in an otherwise discouraging cycle was their retention of the governorship. After two terms as a sometimes controversial and yet generally effective chief executive (something that was begrudgingly admitted even by many of his detractors), the popular outgoing and term-limited Governor Jeb Bush was succeeded by Attorney General Charlie Crist. Widely viewed as a political moderate, Crist curiously campaigned as a “Reagan Republican” in the GOP primary, perhaps to protect himself against the attacks of his more conservative opponent, Chief Financial Officer Tom Gallagher. The affable Crist easily dispatched the more rigid Gallagher with 64% of the vote. In the general election, Crist squared off against Congressman Jim Davis (District 11), who represented an urban constituency consisting of south St. Petersburg and spanning Tampa Bay to cover sections of Tampa’s inner city. Despite a political climate that seemed to favor the Democrats, Crist’s superior name recognition (stemming from recent and past statewide campaigns) combined with his pleasant disposition and populist rhetoric doomed Davis. Crist ended up with slightly less than 54% of the vote, thereby keeping the governor’s office in Republican hands for the third consecutive term.

The modest setback Florida Republicans endured in 2006 was compounded in 2008, which turned out to be another relatively good year for the Democratic Party. President Bush’s approval ratings remained low, and the administration was effectively hamstrung in the realm of domestic policymaking thanks to the reemergence of divided government after the Democrats regained control of both the U.S. House and Senate in 2006. Indeed, the Republican presidential nominee, Arizona Senator John McCain, spent much of his campaign vehemently proclaiming his political independence from the discredited incumbent and touting his reputation as a party “maverick” who could work effectively with legislators on both sides of the aisle. McCain’s Democratic opponent was the rhetorically gifted and markedly younger first-term Senator from Illinois, Barack Obama, who also had the distinction of being the first African American to be nominated for national office by either major party. Any doubts about Obama’s viability were expunged when he narrowly (and surprisingly) captured the Democratic nomination over Hillary Clinton. In an election year when short-term forces clearly favored the Democrats, and especially following the massive financial collapse that occurred in mid-September, Obama’s race and political inexperience did not appear to be the liabilities that many pundits initially expected.

Reading the tea leaves, Governor Crist (who had been vetted as a possible running mate for McCain) declined an invitation to campaign with the Republican presidential nominee during one of his frequent visits to the Sunshine State. Florida Democrats picked up another U.S. House seat in District 24 (Orlando area), where Congressman Tom Feeney was effectively tied to the disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff (Barone & Cohen 2009, p.406). The Florida Senate remained at 26-14 in favor of Republicans, whereas Democrats gained three more seats to pull within 76-44 in the House. On his way to winning the presidency, Barack Obama captured the state’s 27 electoral votes with 51% of the popular vote. But even as Florida Democrats celebrated having whittled away at their opponents’ hold on most offices for the second consecutive election cycle, events were about to turn rapidly and dramatically back in the GOP’s favor.

The 2010 and 2012 Elections

In 2008, President Barack Obama captured 53% of the popular vote nationwide—the best showing for a Democrat since 1964 (and exceptional for the first African American as president). Equally impressive was the good will that Obama received shortly after taking office, as his job approval soared to the high 60s (the highest initial rating since John F. Kennedy in 1961).⁹ The “honeymoon” proved to be fleeting, however. Congressional Republicans vowed to obstruct the new president at every turn,

uniting in opposition on major votes like the federal stimulus bill (and later healthcare reform) that was designed to jumpstart the downward spiraling American economy. As the economy continued its descent and the unemployment rate soared, the usual “big government” response of spending one’s way out of a recession was met with a harsh rebuke by the emerging Tea Party movement. With a disproportionate share of local chapters and activists in those states hit hardest by the economic downturn (Cho, Gimpel & Shaw 2012) and especially in places that were enduring massive housing market foreclosures (like Florida), these organized and agitated citizens made a concerted effort to buck the political establishment and, in the process, elect politicians aligned with the philosophy of severely reducing the size and scope of the federal government.

As the 2010 midterm approached and political winds began clearly to favor the party out of power, an interesting dynamic unfolded. Whereas Tea Party activists were naturally allied with conservative Republican principles, they had no reservations about also targeting moderate Republicans for defeat in primary contests (Bullock 2012). Against this backdrop, Florida Republicans who rode the wave of Tea Party discontent were ideally positioned to win public office. Nationally, the party picked up 63 seats in the U.S. House to regain majority status in that chamber (though voter rejection of several Tea Party-backed candidates helped the Democrats to maintain control in the Senate). In Florida, Republicans not only recouped their congressional losses from the two previous elections, they added one additional seat to give them an unprecedented 76% of the state delegation (19 out of 25 districts). The GOP’s seat share in the state legislature also swelled to 28-12 in the Senate and 81-39 in the House.

Maintaining their momentum, Republicans swept the three contested Cabinet races in 2010. The only statewide race in doubt that year was the open contest for governor, as the GOP nominated a deeply flawed political amateur, Rick Scott, whom many believed to be unelectable. A multi-millionaire attorney and businessman, who somehow escaped the fallout associated with a two billion-dollar fine paid by a private healthcare company (Columbia/HCA) he once worked for (as the company’s chairman), Scott defeated political veteran Bill McCollum in the Republican primary. With nary a scintilla of support from the Republican establishment, Scott embraced the Tea Party movement and spent over \$70 million of his personal fortune to defeat Democratic Chief Financial Officer Alex Sink with less than 51% of the two-party vote. The Scott campaign was a political marvel if only for how it avoided media scrutiny and focused solely on reaching the Florida voter through television ads and mailings. Scott refused to meet with a single newspaper editorial board, and only engaged in the public eye for the gubernatorial debates (Hood and McKee 2015). On a simple message that resonated with Floridians desperately seeking economic relief (“Let’s Get to Work!”), Scott tapped into voter discontent and nudged past Sink based largely on the support of political independents (52% voted for Scott) who propelled the Republican tsunami both in Florida and nationwide (Abramson et al. 2012).

The governor’s race might have been the closest, but by far the most intriguing matchup in 2010 was the U.S. Senate contest. In 2009, Florida’s junior Republican Senator Mel Martinez unexpectedly resigned his position and Governor Crist filled the vacancy with his Chief of Staff, George LeMieux. It was intended that LeMieux would merely serve as a placeholder for the remainder of Martinez’s term, as Crist intended to trade in the governorship for what initially appeared to be a guaranteed seat in the U.S. Senate. The problem with this plan was that Crist had built his political career as a moderate, but by 2010 the political winds had shifted markedly to the right. Out of nowhere (see McKee & Craig 2011), former Republican House Speaker Marco Rubio emerged to challenge Crist for the GOP nomination.

When polls made it apparent that Rubio would defeat Crist in the primary, Crist bailed and changed his voter registration to No Party Affiliation (NPA) so he could run in the general election.

The general election thus featured three prominent candidates: Republican Marco Rubio, independent Charlie Crist, and Democrat Kendrick Meek (the African American congressman from Miami-based District 17). By late-September, there was little doubt Rubio would prevail and yet the contest still held voters' (and the media's) attention because in the last week it was rumored that Bill Clinton, while campaigning with Meek, had suggested that he drop out so Crist might have a better chance to win. In the end, Rubio garnered just under 50%, with Crist finishing second, due in part to voters behaving strategically by supporting Crist over Meek because the former was seen as more viable (McKee & Hood 2013). Like Rick Scott, Rubio was strongly backed by Tea Party sympathizers and also captured a majority of the independent vote (51% from a group that is typically more concerned with results than with ideological agendas; see Stimson 2004).

Compared to the three previous cycles, 2012 was a year in which the short-term environment did not appear to provide a clear advantage for either party. Although a high unemployment rate is a cause for concern for any incumbent president seeking reelection (and many thought it would be Obama's downfall; see Jacobson 2013), Democrats were encouraged as the rate trended slowly downward during the summer and fall. The Republican nominee was Mitt Romney, a wealthy business executive, former governor of Massachusetts, and runner-up to John McCain for the party's Presidential nomination in 2008. Running in a crowded field of right-wing Republican candidates, most likely pulled Romney too far from the middle of the American electorate once he became the GOP Presidential nominee (Hetherington 2014).

Obama had a modest but fairly comfortable¹⁰ lead going into the first of three scheduled Presidential debates, to be held at the University of Denver. After what many observers (including his own supporters) felt was a listless performance by the president, the media unanimously declared Romney the "winner" and thereby helped to provide a boost to his candidacy in Florida (where polls showed him drawing even with, or even pulling slightly ahead of, Obama) and elsewhere. Then, in late-October, Hurricane Sandy barreled up the NorthEast Atlantic seaboard wreaking havoc across a huge swath of coastal communities in several states and particularly New Jersey. The sheer devastation incurred by citizens unfortunate to be in the storm's path prompted the candidates to hit the pause button on campaigning. Putting crisis (bipartisan) leadership on full display, images of President Obama surveying the damage with New Jersey's Republican Governor Chris Christie were electorally priceless. With much stronger performances in the next two debates and improving economic numbers (Ceaser, Busch & Pitney 2013), the president's poor showing in Denver faded into the background and Florida once again was up for grabs.

True to form, the race stayed close to the end and Florida was not called for Obama until completion of a recount that went on for several days after the president was declared the winner nationally. Down slightly from his 2008 totals, Obama captured the state's 29 electoral votes with a mere 50.4% of the two-party popular vote. Aspects of the electoral process in Florida once again proved to be a source of controversy in 2012—not because of doubts about which candidate "really" won, but because of more fundamental questions regarding voting rights that had gained increasing attention over the course of the campaign. On Election Night, the news media zeroed in on some South Florida precincts where (primarily) minority voters reportedly waited in line for upwards of six hours to cast their ballots (Herron & Smith 2015). This coverage highlighted an ongoing partisan feud over restrictive voting laws. After Republicans won numerous majorities in state legislatures in the 2010 midterm, they set about proposing and in several

instances enacting laws that increased the requirements for casting a ballot (such as showing a photo ID) or shortened the time in which a voter was able to do so (reducing the period for early voting).

In Florida, Republicans passed House Bill (H.B.) 1355¹¹ in July of 2011 (for details see Herron & Smith 2013), which was designed to increase the costs among Floridians more likely to vote Democratic, in particular, African-Americans. The main provisions included reducing early voting from two weeks to eight days, with elimination of the Sunday before the election; the law also scaled back third-party registration drives to two days, with punitive consequences for turning in late petitions (this provision was overturned by the courts). Further, voters who had moved since the last election could no longer update their address at the polling place; instead they would have to cast a provisional ballot. In short, Florida Republicans used their lawmaking power to stack the deck in their favor by making it more difficult for likely Democratic voters to participate.

Partly because these actions precipitated a major grassroots effort to mobilize minority (and young) voters (see Valentino & Neuner 2016), the Democrats actually fared slightly better in 2012 than they had two years earlier. In addition to carrying the state for Obama, Florida Democrats reduced the GOP advantage in Congress to 17-10, in the Florida Senate to 26-14, and in the Florida House to 74-46. They also succeeded in reelecting Bill Nelson to the U.S. Senate for a third term. Nelson was never seriously challenged by his Republican opponent, Congressman Connie Mack IV (son of the former senator), who was hampered by some highly publicized personal indiscretions such as barroom brawls and citations for driving under the influence. Moreover, like Nelson's last opponent (Katherine Harris), Mack was a conservative ideologue—a quality that did not play as well in 2012 as it had in the Republican landslide of 2010. Nelson won handily with nearly 57% of the vote.

The 2014 and 2016 Elections: A Republican High-Water Mark?

As expected, the president's party, in this case the Democrats, did not fare well in the 2014 midterm election. Nonetheless, the electoral damage in Florida was modest compared to the national picture, which saw the GOP increase their U.S. House majority while netting nine U.S. Senate seats to win control of the upper chamber for the first time in eight years. Likewise, the Republicans registered an impressive showing in state legislative contests and gubernatorial races—going from controlling 57 of 98 partisan state legislative chambers before the election to a GOP majority in 68 chambers after the election, and netting three governorships for a total of 31 out of 50.¹² The GOP last performed this well across-the-board, back in the 1920s, before the onset of the Democratic New Deal era with the 1932 election of President Franklin Roosevelt.

In Florida, the GOP advantage in the U.S. House delegation (17 to 10), state Senate (26 to 14), and Cabinet offices (3 to 0) remained unchanged. The only notable Republican gains occurred in state House races where the party's 74-45 advantage prior to the midterm increased to 82-37 afterwards.¹³ The most salient contest in Florida, of course, and one that garnered national attention, was the gubernatorial match-up between incumbent Republican Governor Rick Scott and Republican-turned Independent-turned Democrat Charlie Crist. As Table 3 shows, Governor Scott prevailed by the same narrow (1.2 percentage-point) margin against Crist that first carried him to victory against Democrat Alex Sink in 2010.

Although a host of factors contributed to the extremely close gubernatorial election in 2014, we mention only a few key elements here. First, as any seasoned observer of Florida politics knows, absent a Democratic tide (such as occurred in 2006), midterm elections typically produce a voting electorate

whose demographics favor the GOP, particularly in terms of race/ethnicity (proportionally more non-Hispanic White voters) and age (proportionally more older voters). This held true in 2014. Second, even though Governor Scott was unpopular, this liability was overcome in part by Charlie Crist's controversial switch to the Democratic Party (see Hood & McKee 2015).

With respect to overall image, the 2014 exit poll¹⁴ indicated that 53 percent of Florida voters held an unfavorable opinion of Governor Scott (vs. just 45% favorable), and 86% of this group supported Crist. By comparison, 44% held an unfavorable opinion of Crist (vs. 51% favorable), and 88% of them voted for Scott. Throughout his tenure, Governor Scott has been plagued by low approval ratings and remarkably he still managed to win reelection. The principal reason why, in addition to a Republican-leaning midterm electorate, was the detrimental effects of Charlie Crist's switch to the Democrats (Hood and McKee 2015).¹⁵ As the recent literature on party switching has shown (Grose & Yoshinaka 2003; Evans, Peterson & Hadley 2012; Yoshinaka 2016), candidates who change sides generally lose vote share in their initial post-switch election bid. The 2014 exit poll addressed this issue by posing the following question: "Do you think Charlie Crist has changed his party affiliation more to (1) reflect his beliefs? or (2) help him win elections?" Only 29% of Florida voters chose the first option, whereas an impressive 60% selected the second option—that is, they viewed Crist as a political opportunist—and this proved fatal to the Crist campaign as 71% of these individuals supported Governor Scott.

Clearly the 2014 elections were kind to the Republican Party nationally, and to Florida Republicans in particular. By comparison, the 2016 elections did not produce a pronounced partisan tide and hence neither party was particularly advantaged. In Florida (and in Virginia), district boundaries were altered due to court actions. Specifically in the Sunshine State, the state Senate and congressional boundaries were redrawn because Republican legislators were found to be complicit in skirting the provisions of the Fair District amendments approved by Florida voters in 2010. Hence, the 2016 congressional and state Senate elections took place under redrawn districts that were more favorable to Democrats than the erstwhile Republican-drawn maps. In a 5-2 December 2015 opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled in favor of Democrats and their allies who pushed for a reconfigured congressional map that now flips the advantage to their party in three of the redrawn districts (Klas 2015). And in another ruling, the Florida Senate districts were ordered redrawn in a manner that tilts the overall advantage to Democrats, so that according to the 2012 election, President Obama carried 21 of the 40 districts (Kennedy 2016). Nonetheless, the remnants of the previously Republican-drawn boundaries have not been expunged¹⁶, and the benefits accruing from incumbency (including name recognition, the ability to raise money, and campaign experience), at least in the near term, should enable Florida Republicans to continue to hold majorities in both state legislative and congressional contests.

In 2016, under the redrawn districts, Democrats made the most modest of gains, netting one seat in the Florida Senate (15 seats to the Republicans' 25) and one in the U.S. House (11 seats to the GOP's 16; see Figure 2). In the state House, where the districts remained the same, Democrats also picked up two seats (now there are 79 Republicans and 41 Democrats). Two congressional races deserve some discussion. First, in a slightly altered Orlando-area District 7, Republican incumbent John Mica, tied for the second longest serving member of the Florida U.S. House delegation (elected in 1992 when Democrat Alcee Hastings was elected; the dean of the delegation is Ileana Ros-Lehtinen who took her seat in a 1989 special election), was defeated by political newcomer Stephanie Murphy, who is most likely the first Asian Democrat to ever take office in a southern congressional district. Also, former Republican Governor Charlie Crist finally found his way back into an elective office when the party

switcher and St. Petersburg native defeated incumbent Republican David Jolly in Florida District 13, which was redrawn to encompass the lower two-thirds of Pinellas County (including all of St. Petersburg and no longer Dunedin, the city Jolly was from in the northern end of the county).¹⁷

The incremental gains that Democrats made in district-based contests were greatly overshadowed by the attention paid to the top of the ticket contests where Republicans prevailed: the Presidential Election and the U.S. Senate race. In Summer 2015 it would seem that two Miami residents, Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, were both viable contenders for the Republican Presidential nomination. But neither candidate was prepared for the emergence of the real estate mogul and celebrity entertainer Donald Trump. With the exception of his close defeat in the Iowa caucuses by Texas Senator Ted Cruz, Trump led the way from the first in the nation New Hampshire primary to the finish line. Like Crist in 2010, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush at one time most likely thought he was in the driver's seat to win a contest also sought by Rubio. However, just as Crist was bested by Rubio in the 2010 Florida Senate race, Rubio's ascent in the 2016 Republican presidential race ended Bush's chances when Rubio's former mentor garnered less than 8% of the vote in the South Carolina primary. But Rubio, like all the other Republican hopefuls in the crowded 2016 GOP field, succumbed to the Trump movement when he was embarrassed by the frontrunner in the Ides of March Florida primary. Trump garnered almost 46 percent of the Sunshine State's winner-take-all vote (99 pledged delegates) and Rubio finished a distant second with 27%. With the electoral writing on the wall, Rubio suspended his Presidential campaign after such a disappointing loss in his home state.

In a typical contemporary Florida presidential election, the general contest was very close. Trump was victorious over Hillary Clinton with 50.6% of the two-party vote cast by over 9 million Floridians (see Table 2). And, as has been true in most competitive statewide contests in Florida, the outcome rested in the hands of independents. The Florida exit poll reveals a draw among partisans: Democrats (32% of voters) split 90 to 8 in favor of Hillary Clinton, while Republicans (33% of voters) divided their ballots 89 to 8 in favor of Trump. Independents (34% of Florida voters) delivered the pivotal swing vote in favor of Trump, casting their ballots 47% to 43% for the Republican.

Perhaps it is somewhat ironic that Rubio ultimately decided to seek reelection to the U.S. Senate (an office he openly disparaged) and in doing so ran ahead of Trump, collecting over 200,000 more votes than the man who ended his White House bid. Of course all of the evidence would suggest that running for president made Rubio a stronger Senate incumbent. He fairly easily dispatched of his Democratic opponent, sitting Congressman Patrick Murphy (FL-18), winning 54% of the two-party vote (see Table 4). The Florida exit poll indicates that Democrats were more likely to defect in favor of Rubio (12%) than Republicans were to back Murphy (7%), but it was independents who secured a solid reelection for Senator Rubio, breaking 52% to 42% in favor of the erstwhile Presidential candidate.

Reassessing Florida Politics

Given the changing demographics of the Sunshine State we are hesitant to interpret the latest election results as perhaps anything more than a solid short-term performance by a Grand Old Party that appears to be gradually losing its grip. The broader electoral dynamic is perhaps best characterized by stasis, which portends a (potential) Democratic advantage as the next decade nears. Like the rest of the South, Florida has experienced a partisan realignment in favor of the Republican Party. Considering the Florida GOP's recent track record in most statewide and especially district-based elections, it is

difficult to argue against that conclusion. Still, certain aspects of the electoral landscape hold portents of a more competitive two-party future.

Historically, Florida's in-migration helped to grow the GOP because newcomers were much more likely to be Republican than the state's smaller native population. But the patterns that once favored the GOP have slowed and in some cases even reversed themselves. Similar to North Carolina and Virginia, the South's newest presidential battlegrounds (McKee & Teigen 2016), recent arrivals to Florida have been more partial to the Democrats—and also more likely to register as Independents than as partisans (Hood & McKee 2010). This last point is important. In 1994, Republican registration in Florida reached its zenith at 42% of all voters. Since then, major party registration has neared parity: 38% registered Democrats and 35% registered Republicans in 2016. By comparison, the percentage of registrants not affiliated with *either* major party rose from 9% in 1994 to a remarkable 27% on the eve of the 2016 election (see Figure 1). Independents have become the kingmakers of Florida politics. According to Carver and Fiedler (1999, p.375-376), electoral outcomes in the contemporary era result less from

the absence of organized parties or the absence of voters with a strong adherence to their particular parties, but rather from the high percentage of independent voters who add volatility to every election... These voters, increasing in number, will be the swing voters in future elections, moved by issues and candidate appeal, and ensuring continuing volatility to Florida politics.

What was true when these words were written 18 years ago is even more so today: Independents have reached a critical mass and now determine the winners in most competitive statewide races (MacManus 2004, p.13).¹⁸

The other obvious impediment to Republican sustainability as the dominant party in Florida politics is growing demographic change. The non-Hispanic White majority is shrinking with each passing year, and the growing Latino population is much more Democratic in its voting choices. Even the once reliably Republican Cuban-American vote is now up for grabs, favoring Obama over Romney 49% to 47% and Crist over Scott 50% to 46%, although Trump was preferred to Clinton by an impressive 54% to 41% (according to the exit polls for these contests). Latinos overall accounted for 18% of Florida voters in 2016 (an increase from 14% in 2008) and 33% of them were Cuban. Among the faster growing contingent of non-Cuban Hispanics (particularly Puerto Ricans in Central Florida), Obama bested Romney by 66% to 34%,¹⁹ in 2014 Crist outperformed Scott by 66% to 31%; and Hillary Clinton dominated Trump with a 71% to 26% advantage among this increasingly important segment of the Florida electorate. In addition, African-Americans remain decidedly Democratic: In 2016, Blacks comprised 14% of the Florida electorate (1 percentage point higher than 2008) and 84% backed Hillary Clinton, an overwhelmingly Democratic vote although it pales in comparison to the 95% African American vote cast for Obama in 2012.

The variation in participation rates among minority voters who tend to back Democratic candidates has consistently proven to be of great electoral significance. For instance, Hispanics constituted just 13% of the voting electorate in 2014 – down 4 points from the comparable figure two years earlier and 5 points less than in 2016. In another razor-thin presidential contest, as discussed, independents are likely to decide the outcome, but if we turn our focus to the racial composition of the electorate and minority voter preferences in particular, then this is also another important factor.

Finally, whereas past generations of Floridians who came of voting age during the Reagan era were disproportionately Republican, those who entered the electorate while Bill Clinton was president were more Democratic in their allegiances (Craig 1998). And, mirroring a pattern that is evident

nationwide, the youngest generation of Floridians is decidedly Democratic in its voting behavior. According to exit poll data, 61% of those under age 30 backed Obama in 2008; in 2012, despite a national decline in support for the President among young voters, he managed to win 66% of Floridians aged 18 to 29. Likewise, in the 2014 Gubernatorial election, voters under 30 favored Democrat Charlie Crist 51% to 41% over Republican Rick Scott. Finally, in the 2016 Presidential Election, among voters from 18 to 29 years old, Hillary Clinton beat Trump 54% to 36% (17% of the Florida electorate).

Based on the various reasons outlined above, the Florida GOP's current electoral advantage seems likely to wane as time goes on. The authors expect that Florida, already a perennially mixed purple state in Presidential elections, will eventually become a much fainter shade of red in down-ballot contests as well. The unique mixture of voters in the Sunshine State nurtures a remarkably competitive political environment and one that, due to demographic changes, is likely to tilt increasingly in favor of the modern version of the Democratic Party.

ENDNOTES

1. Our comparison of Florida with the rest of the American South refers specifically to the 11 ex-Confederate states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
2. According to the 1940 Census, 1,897,414 persons resided in Florida and 50.5% were born outside the state.
3. The 2014 U.S. census estimates come from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) website: www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/FL
4. The data referred to in this paragraph are from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (<http://uselectionatlas.org/>).
5. The Florida legislature temporarily eliminated its runoff primary in 2002, and then made the change permanent in 2005. Party nominees are now determined by plurality vote in a single primary election.
6. Unlike other states (e.g., California, Texas) where majority Hispanic districts typically elect Latino Democrats, the heavy concentration of Cuban Americans in South Florida has resulted in the election of Cuban American Republicans.
7. The day after the election, Governor Jeb Bush recused himself from any active involvement in the State of Florida actions related to the vote count controversy. Nevertheless, partisans either hoped (Republicans) or feared (Democrats) that he was playing a behind-the-scenes role—perceptions stoked by the fact that Secretary of State Katherine Harris, whose office had responsibility for certifying the election outcome, had been a titular head (along with Mel Martinez) of George W. Bush's Florida Presidential campaign.
8. As President of the University of South Florida from 1994-99, Betty Castor suspended, but did not fire computer Associate-Professor Sami Al-Arian with alleged ties to Middle East terrorist groups. By October 2001 USF President Judy Genshaft suspended al-Arian and her orders to fire him by end-2001 were vehemently opposed by the USF Faculty Senate on grounds of Academic Freedom forcing her to suspend him with pay until 27 February 2003 when he was dismissed following his arrest and U.S. Federal indictment as alleged leader in the U.S. of the terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In November 2005 Al-Arian trial ended with his acquittal from half of the charges, followed by his 2006 plea agreement with the U.S. Justice Department for dismissal of other charges and eventual deportation to Turkey in February 2015.
9. Job approval data are from the American Presidency Project: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/initial_approval.php
10. Among other things (like Romney's somewhat embarrassing trip overseas and his comments on the upcoming Summer Olympics in London), prior to the first debate, in mid-September (17th) Obama benefited from the media's (specifically the liberal magazine *Mother Jones*) release of a video capturing the soon-to-be infamous "47%" comment Romney made at a private fundraiser.

11. Not a single Democratic lawmaker voted in favor of H.B. 1355 and only two Republicans voted against passage (state Senators Paula Dockery and Mike Fasano).
12. These data are from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website (www.ncsl.org) and were retrieved on 2 December 2014. Nebraska has a nonpartisan unicameral state legislature and that is why the total number of partisan state legislative chambers sums to 98.
13. There are a total of 120 Florida House seats, but one was vacant immediately prior and after the 2014 midterm. At the time of this writing the partisan division in the Florida House is 81 Republicans and 39 Democrats.
14. The 2014 exit poll data on the Florida gubernatorial election were accessed from the Fox News website: www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2014/exit-polls?year=2014&type=governor&filter=FL. The vote choice data we report often do not sum to 100 percent because they include the option of voting for Libertarian candidate Adrian Wyllie.
15. For another perspective on how voters react to party switching, and within the context of the 2014 Florida gubernatorial election, see Martinez and Craig (2015).
16. It would be mistaken to portray Republicans as drawing the maps they really wanted, because they were constrained by the passage of Amendments 5 and 6 in the 2010 midterms. The so-called Fair Districts amendments, which both passed with almost 63% of voters in favor, placed new restrictions on line drawers tasked with redistricting (the majority party in the state legislature, which of course meant Republicans for the 2012 elections). Among its several provisions (with Amendment 5 applying to state legislative districts and 6 applicable to congressional districts; otherwise the language is identical), district boundaries shall not be drawn to *favor* or *disfavor* an incumbent or political party. Because Republicans had overwhelming majorities in district-based contests, this language was certain to at least loosen the GOP's electoral stranglehold. A GIS analysis conducted by one of the authors confirms that compared to the 2002 redistricting, there was a considerable increase in the percentage of constituents incumbents of both parties inherited after the 2012 redistricting. For additional information on the 2012 Florida redistricting for Congress and the state legislature, see McKee (2015).
17. The reconfigured Florida District 7 presidential vote cast for Republican Mitt Romney in 2012 went from 52.6% under the old boundaries to 50 percent under the new district borders. The redrawn Florida District 13 Presidential vote cast for Democrat Barack Obama in 2012, increased from 50.7% to 55.4%. Republicans prevailed in two reconfigured Florida congressional districts left open by Democrats: District 2 vacated by Democrat Gwen Graham (daughter of Bob Graham) and District 18 vacated by Democrat Patrick Murphy who lost the 2016 U.S. Senate contest to Republican incumbent Marco Rubio. The one-seat Democratic pickup in the Florida U.S. House delegation came down to the party's victory in the substantially redrawn open Orlando-centered majority-minority District 10, which was won by African-American Val Demings (65% of the vote). The district delivered a 61% Barack Obama vote in 2012 and its voting age population is 27.1% African American and 22.9% Hispanic.
18. We stand by this statement despite the fact that the exit poll in 2012 showed a slight majority of Florida's independents (many of whom actually "leaned" toward one party or the other in their preferences; see Keith et al. 1992) backed Republican Mitt Romney for President. The 2014 exit poll registered an almost even split in the independent vote for gubernatorial candidates Charlie Crist and Rick Scott.
19. These 2012 data are from a report produced by the Pew Research Hispanic Center: www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/

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Election Daze: Voting Modes and Voter Preferences in the 2016 Presidential Election

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ABSTRACT: To say that the outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election was a surprise to many political experts would easily qualify as an understatement for the ages. Nonetheless, in defense of the political handicappers, there is notable evidence that the dynamics of voter choice in the days leading up to the last day of voting were differentiable from preferences registered on Election Day. That is, in some states it would seem that Hillary Clinton (Democrat) was advantaged by early voting and Donald Trump (Republican) was favored by voters who came to the polls on Election Day. This paper draws on aggregate- and individual-level data from Florida to examine voting across racial/ethnic groups, distinguishing between votes cast on Election Day with those cast early in-person and by mail in the 2016 Presidential Election. The paper also compares variation across modes of voting in 2016 with 2012 county-level Presidential Election returns. By leveraging original datasets that merge the modes of voting for different groups with aggregate presidential results, as well as using 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) individual-level data, we are able to determine the extent to which the story of Trump's historic Presidential victory hinged on the support he garnered from voters who showed up on the final day of voting.

The outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election took almost everyone by surprise, the experts, the voters, and apparently "The Donald" himself. Simply put, rare events are very hard to predict. Further, in defense of the generously funded political handicappers, there is notable evidence that the dynamics of voter choice in the days leading up to the last day of voting were differentiable from preferences registered on Election Day. Indeed, hindsight and the empirical record strongly suggest that Hillary Clinton would have become the 45th President of the United States if the election concluded a day earlier.

This study focuses on the electoral dynamic that unfolded in the nation's most coveted perennial Presidential battleground state: Florida. The authors' analysis of local support for Trump in the Sunshine State draws on an original dataset of county- and precinct-level data as well as survey data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). This paper advances three empirical inquiries. First, come county-level data from 2016 and 2012 to explore how Trump's election returns differed from those of Mitt Romney four years earlier across the three modes of voting available in Florida: early in-person (EIP), vote-by-mail (VBM), and Election Day. Next, we draw on precinct-level election returns broken down by mode of voting to untangle how Trump's supporters differed across the three modes of voting. Last, is the analysis of the 2016 CCES data to show that self-reported vote choice jibes with our aggregate-level findings. This work strongly supports the notion that the pundits and election scholars were right about the ballots already in the vault via early in-person and vote-by-mail. If not for an Election Day surge in favor of Trump, the improbable and historic 2016 presidential outcome would not have come to pass.

Support for Trump and Clinton across Modes of Voting in Florida

In Florida, Donald Trump won 50.6% of the two-party vote and 49% of the 9.42 million total votes cast for all the Presidential candidates. To many political observers, Trump's victory in the Sunshine State came as a surprise—perhaps not as big of a shock as his upsets in the “Blue Wall” states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—but an unexpected result nonetheless. One of the stated reasons for why many election observers got Florida wrong was because they read too much into the advance voting tea-leaves that showed Clinton performing well. Touting the top-lines from a list-based survey of registered voters, including those who had already cast early in-person and vote-by-mail ballots that he conducted with the College of William & Mary, one such knowledgeable observer was Tom Bonier, the CEO of TargetSmart, a Democratic-aligned campaign consultancy. A few days before Election Day, Bonier claimed on *MSNBC's Last Word with Lawrence O'Donnell* that Clinton was well-poised to win Florida, pointing to his survey indicating that over a quarter of registered Republicans who had already cast ballots said they were backing Clinton. “A lot of the vote in Florida has already been cast,” Bonier (2016) informed his host. He was correct: prior to Election Day, roughly 2.96 million vote-by-mail ballots had been cast along with nearly 3.88 million early in-person ballots; combined, it would be just shy of 70% of the total ballots cast in the election.

Across much of the country, including Florida, convenience voting has become wildly popular (Gronke 2012; Herron & Smith 2012). In roughly three-quarters of the states, voters may cast their ballots in person at early voting locations; in addition, in nearly half the states, voters may apply for no-excuse absentee ballots which they can mail back to their local elections officials (NCSL 2017). “In reality, the days of an actual election ‘day’ are long gone,” noted Mike McDonald in the 2014 general election; it is now “a solid election month, if not more in some places, and will continue to expand” (Lee 2014). Oregon and Washington now conduct their general elections entirely by mail, and Colorado has moved in that direction. There were over 40 million ballots cast ahead of the General Election in 2016 (McDonald 2017), and thus, the contest can be won or lost well in advance of Election Day. So it seemed also in Florida.

Following Trump's victory, Bonier and others who relied on votes cast prior to the election to inform their modeling of the presidential vote were pilloried for their prognostications. “Historically,” though he offered no longitudinal data to support his claim, FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver (2017a) wrote sagely that, “the relationship between early voting in a state and the final voting totals there has been weak, and attempts to make inferences from early voting data have made fools of otherwise smart people.” Silver was certainly correct to opine that “early voting data can be easy to misinterpret” (Silver 2017a). But ballots cast in advance of an election in a state like Florida, where over two-thirds of voters cast their ballots before Election Day, nevertheless provide valuable, real-time information to candidates and their campaigns.¹ As such, there is no reason why Bonier and other election observers should not draw conclusions from votes cast in advance of an election. And as we show below, there was considerable evidence that Clinton was performing well on the eve of Election Day, though it is certainly debatable as to whether the Democratic nominee was winning every fourth Republican who cast an early ballot (a shoddy poll can detract from a generally plausible trend).

¹ Patterns of early in-person and vote-by-mail ballots are important tools for understanding how the composition of the electorate differs across the three modes of voting. Of course, for whom voters cast their early in-person or vote-by-mail ballots remains unknown. Still, much can be gleaned from knowing which voters cast ballots by which methods. Though painstaking to collect these data, it is also possible in Florida (and several other states) to merge precinct-level vote outcomes—which includes placing into precincts voters who cast ballots by mail or at county early voting sites—with individual-level vote methods aggregated to the precinct level.


Convenience Voters for Clinton

An examination of the partisan and racial/ethnic makeup of those voters who cast early in-person and vote-by-mail ballots provides ample indication that Clinton was well-positioned to win Florida. Drawing on data from statewide early voter files and absentee ballot files, Smith (2016) documented the partisan and demographic breakdown of the voters casting EIP and VBM ballots. Over the 14 days of early voting, Democrats cast 1.58 million ballots, up 43% from four years earlier when voters had only eight days of EIP voting. But Republicans saw an even larger jump in EIP voting in 2016, as 1.43 million party faithful went to the polls before the election, an increase of 65% over 2012. Still, 154,000 more Democrats cast EIP ballots than Republicans prior to November 8. Democrats also held their own with VBM ballots. Some 1.05 million Democrats mailed in their ballots, up 14 percent from the party's 2012 totals. Republicans, who have long-dominated voting by mail in Florida, cast just 59,000 more VBM ballots than Democrats. The 1.11 million VBM ballots cast by Republicans was up only 12% from their 2012 tally.

The largest increase in the use of EIP voting, however, was with those voters not registered with either party. These independent voters, with No Party Affiliation (NPA), cast nearly 780,000 EIP ballots, more than twice as many EIP votes cast by NPAs than in the 2012 election. NPAs also mailed in over half a million VBM ballots, up 36% from 2012. Although "Democrats have a smaller raw voter lead going into Election Day," Steve Schale (2016), Obama's Florida Political Director in 2008, blogged the morning the polls opened, "pretty much everything that Hillary Clinton wanted to have happen to position herself to win Florida has happened."

With respect to the racial/ethnic dimensions of pre-Election Day voting, key constituencies for Clinton—African Americans and Hispanics—also were turning out in force. Most notably, Hispanics cast 2.4 times as many EIP ballots in 2016 than they did in 2012. Although they comprise roughly 15% of the electorate, Hispanics cast more than 16% of the 3.9 million EIP ballots cast in Florida. Despite concerns that they would not be as energized without a black candidate at the top-of-the-ticket, African Americans once again came out in force, especially during the final days of the early voting period, bringing their "Souls to the Polls" as they did in 2008 and 2012 when Obama was on the ballot (Herron & Smith, 2012 & 2014). In fact, more blacks cast EIP ballots in 2016 than in 2012, although the overall share of EIP voters who were Black dropped by six percentage points from 2012, from 22% of all EIP voters to just 16%. To be sure, more than 900,000 White voters came out to cast an EIP ballot than in 2012, but proportionately, Black and Hispanic voters were still more likely to vote EIP in 2016 than White voters. In short, while the overall share of Black EIP voters fell in 2016 from 2012 rates, Hispanics more than made up the difference of EIP voters compared to four years earlier.

All seemed to be in place for a Hillary Clinton victory in Florida. And in fact, Bonier *was* correct when he told Lawrence O'Donnell that Clinton was winning Florida heading into Election Day. As Figure 1 reveals, final election results showed that Clinton won convenience voters, and decisively so. Prior to any ballots being cast on 8 November 2016 Clinton was beating Trump by 206,330 EIP votes (5.5 percentage points higher in the two-party vote) and 40,468 VBM votes (1.6 percentage points higher in the two-party vote). Instead, on Election Day, Trump would go on to wipe out Clinton's 246,798 vote lead, and then some, as he won 360,831 more votes than Clinton, trouncing her by nearly 13 percentage points in the two-party vote. The reversal stunned Trump supporters: "This was a data defying feat that captured a populist fervor we just couldn't measure," according to a shocked Republican pollster, noting that "[t]he Trump campaign kept talking about the missing white voter. Well, they showed up on Election Day" (Caputo & Cheney 2016).




The nascent scholarship on modes of casting ballots and candidate vote choice is quite limited (Burden et al. 2017). Given what scholars know about who tends to vote in advance of Election Day, however, the differences in candidates support across the three modes of voting should not come as a surprise. Studies of non-precinct convenience voters (EIP and VBM) have found these voters are different than Election Day voters, particularly more partisan and ideological (Gronke et al. 2008; Hanmer & Traugott 2004; Karp & Banducci 2001; Kousser & Mullin 2007; Neeley & Richardson 2001; Stein 1998). There is some evidence that the expansion of convenience voting has not expanded or diversified the electorate. It is possible that early and no-excuse absentee voting does not bring to the polls registrants “who would not have voted on Election Day” (Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997, 668), as some convenience voters may just be substituting their advanced vote for voting at the traditional time (Berinsky 2005). This may be one of the reasons why some studies have found that overall turnout does not appear to be enhanced by greater voting convenience (Burden et al. 2014; Burden & Gaines 2015). Of course, even with added accessibility, some voters intentionally eschew voting early or by mail, out of choice or necessity (e.g., last-minute deciders). On the other hand, some registrants may be wedded to EIP or VBM voting, and might otherwise not vote absent the flexibility of casting an EIP or VBM ballot. Nonetheless, convenience voting may provide the institutional framework for certain low-propensity voters to be mobilized to the polls, as Herron and Smith (2012; 2014 & 2016) have found in Florida and North Carolina. And while not a panacea, the availability of early voting sites and no-excuse absentee ballots may help offset transportation or information costs, as well as the consolidation of Election Day polling locations (Amos, Smith & St. Claire 2016).

That Trump won the Election Day vote in Florida should not have come as a surprise. Romney beat Obama by 2.4 percentage points in the two-party Election Day vote in 2012. (Romney, unlike

Trump, also prevailed over Obama among VBM voters, winning 52.1% of the two-party vote, although Obama crushed him by 11.7 percentage points among EIP voters.) As Figure 2 shows, however, among Election Day voters Trump performed nearly 6 percentage points better than Romney did against Obama in 2012. Obama won fewer votes than Romney on Election Day, but the margin among those who waited until the final day was much closer than Clinton’s share against Trump; Clinton’s share of the two-party vote on Election Day against Trump was 4.6 percentage points less than Obama’s share against Romney. Although Clinton fared better than Trump among EIP voters (recall Figure 1), Trump fared much better—and Clinton much worse—among EIP voters relative to their parties’ nominees four years earlier. Clinton’s share of the EIP vote was nearly three percentage points less than Obama’s, and Trump’s was 3.4 points higher than Romney’s share. Figure 2 also signals a possible shift in the long-dominance of voting by mail by Republicans in Florida. Not only did Clinton beat Trump with VBM voters (as shown in Figure 1), her share of the two-party vote was 3.7 percentage points more than Obama’s tally in 2012.

Figure 2: Percentage Point Difference in Florida Presidential Two-Party Vote by Method, 2016 - 2012



County-Level Vote for Trump and Romney across Modes of Voting

As Figure 1 makes clear, the difference in votes cast for Clinton and Trump among EIP and VBM voters, compared to those cast by Election Day voters, is stark. Further, as discussed above, the partisan and racial/ethnic makeup of those who voted in advance of November 8 was different than that of the voters who waited to cast their ballots on Election Day. What explains, then, the surge in votes for Trump on Election Day? We leave it for others to tease out the impact of former FBI Director James Comey’s infamous letter on October 28 reigniting concerns about Clinton’s email problems when she was Secretary

of State (Silver 2017b),¹ though it will surely be recorded by historians as an “October Surprise” of epic proportions. But thinking in historical terms, was Trump’s dominance on Election Day new in Florida, how does it compare to Romney’s performance in 2012 when he narrowly lost to President Obama?

We begin our analysis by looking at the shift in the two-party share of the county-level Presidential vote in 2016, comparing Trump’s support with that of Romney in 2012.² Estimating the overall two-party share of county-level votes won by Trump and Romney, McKee and Smith (2017) control for a host of variables in their county-level regression models. As expected, they find that with every increase in a county’s share of Democratic, NPA, third party, and Black voters, county-level support for Romney is consistently and significantly negative, all else equal. Perhaps surprisingly, they find null effects for Romney’s two-party share of the vote for a county’s percentage of Hispanics who voted by any method. They also find that rural counties, and the share of evangelical adherents increase county-level support for the 2012 Republican nominee.³ In contrast, the two-party county-level support for Trump is even more negative among a county’s share of Democratic voters; for every additional 10 percentage points of a county’s share of voters who were Democrats, Trump’s support dropped 7.2 percentage points, 1.6 percentage points more than for Romney. However, Trump’s support among a county’s share of NPAs who cast ballots, while negative, was less so than for Romney. In other words, although Trump’s vote share in a county decreases as its share of voters with no party affiliation increases, the rate was not as severe as for Romney. Most notably, however, although they find no relationship in the overall vote share won by Trump with regard to a county’s rural/urban status or Evangelical population, when compared to a county’s percentage of white voters, Trump’s support is consistently lower than Romney’s as a county’s share of racial and ethnic minority voters increases.

How might these county-level relationships differ across the three modes of voting? Did Trump fare relatively better on Election Day in counties that had higher shares of Democrats and NPAs turning out to vote, compared to his support among EIP or VBM voters? Comparatively, did Trump fare better than Romney among Election Day voters? Table 1 provides four county-level regressions with the dependent variables estimating Trump’s share of the overall two-party vote as well as Trump’s share broken down by method of vote. Given the discrepancies in county population size, each model is weighted by the number of voters casting their ballots by each method. The independent variables—which we calculate by aggregating the voting histories of individual voters by their mode of voting—are the percent of voters across political party and race/ethnic categories (for each mode of voting), with the reference categories a county’s percentage of Republican voters and White voters. Given the omitted categories, we expect that all six variables should have a negative and significant coefficient. The question, then, is not the sign but the relative magnitude of each independent variable’s coefficient across the four models (Trump’s share of the overall two-party vote in Model 1, the EIP vote in Model 2, the VBM vote in Model 3, and the Election Day [ED] vote in Model 4).

¹ <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-comey-letter-probably-cost-clinton-the-election/>

² The authors have not been able to build a complete dataset of 2012 precinct results by method of votes cast. As such, we rely on county-level returns disaggregated by the three types of voting. Despite multiple public records requests, the authors still have not received 2012 returns broken down by method of votes for Glades or Hardee counties.

³ Following McKee and Smith (2017), we weight our regressions by a county’s total two-party presidential vote (by method of vote) and also cluster robust standard errors on the county. Lastly, for the regression coefficients, the level of statistical significance is indicated as follows: # $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. All of these statistical tests are two-tailed.

What is immediately notable is that as the Democratic share of a county’s voters increased, Trump fared marginally “better” among Election Day votes cast. For every 10 points increase in the percentage of a county’s voters who were registered Democrats who voted EIP and VBM, Trump’s share of the vote is expected to decrease by 6.8 percentage points and 7.7 percentage points, respectively. Trump’s share of the vote among Election Day voters, however, was *only* 5.8 percentage points lower for every 10 points increase in a county’s share of Democrats who voted by that method. The favorable difference for Trump is even greater among NPAs who voted VBM compared to those who voted on Election Day. The difference, however, is not due to black or Hispanic turnout in a county on Election Day. Indeed, Trump fared worse on Election Day as a county’s share of Hispanic and Black voters who cast their ballots by that mode increases, compared to those voting by mail (and for Hispanics, also those voting EIP). Trump’s share of a county’s two-party vote only fared worse among EIP voters, as for every 10 percentage point increase in the Black share of the EIP electorate, Trump is expected to lose 11 percentage points vs. Clinton.

**Table 1:
County-Level Two-Party Support for Trump**

	(1) Trump Two-Party Vote	Overall Trump EIP Two-Party Vote	(2) Trump VBM Two-Party Vote	(3) Trump ED Two-Party Vote	(4) Trump ED Two-Party Vote
% Voters	-0.629 ^{***}	-0.680 ^{***}	-0.771 ^{***}	-0.579 ^{***}	-0.579 ^{***}
Democrat	(0.0777)	(0.104)	(0.0845)	(0.0783)	(0.0783)
% Voters	-1.579 ^{***}	-1.218 ^{***}	-1.801 ^{***}	-1.214 ^{***}	-1.214 ^{***}
NPA	(0.208)	(0.218)	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.172)
% Voters	-0.871	-1.348	-0.985	-1.709 [*]	-1.709 [*]
Third Party	(0.718)	(0.681)	(0.791)	(0.790)	(0.790)
% Voters Other	-0.722 [*]	-0.359 ^{**}	0.0113	-0.579 ^{***}	-0.579 ^{***}
Race/Ethnicity	(0.344)	(0.128)	(0.0331)	(0.103)	(0.103)
% Voters	-0.0330	-0.0692	-0.298	-0.0991 [*]	-0.0991 [*]
Hispanic	(0.0405)	(0.0390)	(0.266)	(0.0466)	(0.0466)
% Voters	-0.472 ^{***}	-1.109 ^{**}	-0.365 [*]	-1.079 ^{**}	-1.079 ^{**}
Black	(0.107)	(0.363)	(0.174)	(0.330)	(0.330)
Constant	1.201 ^{***}	1.164 ^{***}	1.195 ^{***}	1.239 ^{***}	1.239 ^{***}
	(0.0270)	(0.0215)	(0.0320)	(0.0400)	(0.0400)
N	67	67	67	67	67
R ²	.9565	.9679	.9458	.9438	.9438

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2 provides comparable estimates for the 2012 Presidential Election. As with the county-level models of support for Trump across modes of voters, as a county’s share of Democrats who voted by each mode of voting (relative to the percent of Republicans, the reference category) increases, the share of

Romney’s two-party vote decreases. What is most notable, is the difference in the negative coefficient measuring the percent of a county’s Election Day voters in each election who were Democratic. For every 10-points increase in a county’s Democratic share of the Election Day electorate, Romney’s two-party support fell by 6.2 percentage points; Trump’s, in contrast, fell only 5.8 percentage points, which is by far the lowest negative drop across any of the three modes of voting in either election.

Trump also did not fare as poorly as Romney as a county’s share of NPA voters increased; for every 10-points increase in a county’s composition of NPA Election Day voters, Trump’s share of the vote declined by “only” 12.1 percentage points, whereas Romney’s support declined by nearly 19 percentage points. Furthermore, it appears that Trump’s relative Election Day success was due to the support of white voters. For every 10-points increase on Election Day in the percentage of a county’s voters who were black, Romney’s share of the two-party vote declined by just 5.4 percent, whereas Trump’s share of the vote dropped by nearly 11 percentage points. As Table 1 compared with Table 2 reveals, Trump also fared much worse than Romney as a county’s share of Election Day voters of other racial/ethnic backgrounds increased (Other percentage and Hispanic), all else equal.¹

**Table 2:
County-Level Two-Party Support for Romney**

	(1) Romney Overall Two-Party Vote	(2) Romney EIP Two-Party Vote	(3) Romney VBM Two- Party Vote	(4) Romney ED Two-Party Vote
% Voters Democrat	-0.649 ^{***} (0.0589)	-0.667 ^{***} (0.0650)	-0.824 ^{***} (0.0658)	-0.621 ^{***} (0.0643)
% Voters NPA	-2.023 ^{***} (0.168)	-2.129 ^{***} (0.157)	-1.876 ^{***} (0.174)	-1.887 ^{***} (0.146)
% Voters Third Party	-2.420 ^{***} (0.359)	-2.222 ^{***} (0.345)	-2.285 ^{***} (0.623)	-2.527 ^{***} (0.299)
% Voters Other Race/Ethnicity	0.136 (0.264)	-0.109 (0.286)	0.122 (0.246)	0.191 (0.283)
% Voters Hispanic	0.0110 (0.0376)	0.0256 (0.0374)	0.00473 (0.0347)	-0.0236 (0.0368)
% Voters Black	-0.467 ^{***} (0.0955)	-0.444 ^{***} (0.0807)	-0.209 (0.137)	-0.540 ^{***} (0.130)
Constant	1.248 ^{***} (0.0294)	1.243 ^{***} (0.0178)	1.226 ^{***} (0.0277)	1.270 ^{***} (0.0303)
N	65	65	65	65
R ²	.9623	.9804	.9158	.9566

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


¹ Unlike the “Other” racial category we include in the CCES survey data models, the Other voter in the Florida voter file means that it is not clear what is the race/ethnicity of the registrant.

Precinct-Level Vote for Trump and Clinton across Modes of Voting

County-level data can certainly be informative when thinking about election results. Indeed, many studies use county data to understand statewide and national turnout and vote choice (Burden et al. 2014; Filer, Kenny & Morton 1991; Gomez & Hansford 2010; Gomez, Hansford & Krause 2007; Hill & McKee 2005; McKee & Teigen 2009; Stein & Garcia-Monet 1997). But they also are subject to ecological inference fallacies. For a more granular assessment of Trump’s victory in Florida, we merged precinct-level outcome results broken down by mode of voting with individual-level data from Florida’s statewide voter file and vote history files, which allows us to assess at the precinct-level the profiles of the voters who cast ballots by the three modes of voting.

We begin our analysis by plotting across Florida’s more than 5,800 precincts the two-party vote (on the vertical axis) for Trump (in red squares) and Clinton (in blue circles) against the proportion of a precinct’s White voters (out of all voters, on the horizontal axis) who cast a ballot by any method. The size of each precinct is scaled to the total number of voters casting a ballot. As the LOWESS curves reveal, as the share of voters who are white in a precinct increases, Trump’s share of the two-party vote also steadily increases, whereas Clinton’s reciprocal share declines. Trump and Clinton’s share of the two-party vote cross (at .50) as the share of a county’s electorate approaches 70% White. Not surprisingly, there are only a smattering of precincts that Trump won a majority of votes cast that have less than 50% of voters who are White (red squares above .5 on the left-hand side of Figure 3).

**Figure 3:
Proportion of Two-Party Vote for Trump and Clinton across Precincts**



**Table 3:
Precinct-Level Two-Party Support for Trump**

	(1) Trump Two-Party Vote	Overall Trump Party Vote	(2) EIP Two-Party Vote	(3) VBM Two-Party Vote	(4) ED Two-Party Vote
% Voters White Democrat	-0.760 ^{***} (0.0212)	-0.829 ^{***} (0.0813)	-1.599 ^{***} (0.0567)	0.0579 (0.0828)	
% Voters White NPA	-1.067 ^{***} (0.0361)	0.452 ^{***} (0.128)	1.292 ^{***} (0.107)	0.727 ^{***} (0.118)	
% Voters White Third Party	-0.724 ^{***} (0.113)	3.363 ^{***} (0.390)	4.753 ^{***} (0.392)	0.289 (0.382)	
% Voters Black Democrat	-1.117 ^{***} (0.00967)	-1.218 ^{***} (0.0376)	-1.994 ^{***} (0.105)	-1.384 ^{***} (0.0562)	
% Voters Black NPA	-0.584 ^{***} (0.0801)	-0.550 (0.338)	-7.200 ^{***} (1.730)	-6.057 ^{***} (0.601)	
% Voters Black Third Party	1.946 ^{***} (0.535)	2.716 (2.012)	11.51 ^{**} (4.431)	0.875 (2.920)	
% Voters Hispanic Democrat	-0.955 ^{***} (0.0221)	-2.297 ^{***} (0.119)	-2.020 ^{***} (0.222)	-1.956 ^{***} (0.231)	
% Voters Hispanic NPA	-1.067 ^{***} (0.0331)	0.391 ^{**} (0.151)	-0.620 (0.458)	-1.842 ^{***} (0.258)	
% Voters Hispanic Third Party	-2.373 ^{***} (0.360)	1.302 (1.200)	10.72 (5.990)	3.482 (1.821)	
% Voters Other Democrat	-1.928 ^{***} (0.115)	-3.002 ^{***} (0.331)	-7.091 ^{***} (0.872)	-4.742 ^{***} (1.272)	
% Voters Other NPA	-1.395 ^{***} (0.0991)	-1.747 ^{***} (0.307)	0.0757 (1.369)	-1.269 (0.735)	
% Voters Other Third Party	-2.964 ^{***} (0.740)	-2.986 (2.302)	7.820 ^{**} (2.591)	-1.818 (2.688)	
_cons	1.113 ^{***} (0.00649)	0.686 ^{***} (0.00635)	0.658 ^{***} (0.0134)	0.687 ^{***} (0.00545)	
N	5804	5763	5759	5756	
R ²	.9141	.7524	.6795	.7091	

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Rather than providing similar scatter plots broken down by methods of votes cast (for different proportions of votes cast by racial/ethnic groups or party), Table 3 provides four regressions that allow us to tease out the different levels of two-party support for Trump at the precinct level while controlling for the actual race/ethnicity and party of those voters who cast ballots in each precinct by each mode of voting. Each of the four models has a series of variables that provide the percentage of all voters in a precinct who cast ballots by each mode of voting broken down by racial/ethnic and party groupings. The reference category for each model—(1) Trump Overall Two-Party Vote, (2) Trump EIP Two-Party Vote, (3) Trump VBM Two-Party Vote, (4) Trump ED Two-Party Vote—is a precinct’s percentage of Republican voters (which combines all four racial/ethnic categories) who voted by each mode. Consistent with the county-level results, relative to the share of all Republicans who voted in a precinct, the overall two-party vote for Trump (Model 1) declined on average by 7.6% for every 10-points increase in the percentage of white Democrats who voted by any method. Indeed, when considering the overall precinct-level vote, every other race/ethnicity by political affiliation breakdown (except one) relative to Republican voters was significantly less likely to support Trump¹ (see Table 3 above).

Breaking down the precinct-level support for Trump by mode of voting, however, reveals a glaring divergence from otherwise predictable findings. Among Election Day voters (Model 4), for every increase in the share of a precinct’s White Democratic voters, there is no significant relationship in the vote against Trump when compared to a precinct’s share of Republicans who also voted on Election Day. As the share of White NPAs who waited until the last day to vote increases, relative to Republican Election Day voters the precinct is likely to have a positive vote share for Trump, up more than 7 points for every 10-points increase in a precinct’s share of voters who are white NPAs. Predictably, as a precinct’s share of voters on Election Day who are Black Democrats or Black NPAs increases, support for Trump drops precipitously relative to Republicans who voted on Election Day. This is also true as the share of a precinct’s voters who are Hispanic Democrats and NPAs rises—support for Trump drops. These relationships remain consistent across other modes of voting: as the share of minority voters (of any party) increases relative to the share of Republicans voting by that mode, precinct support for Trump either decreases, is not statistically significant, or if positive, is not substantively meaningful. For example, as the share of EIP voters in a precinct who are Black Democrats or Hispanic Democrats increases by 10% points, support for Trump plummets by 12% points and 23% points, respectively; Trump’s share drops roughly 20% points for every 10-points increase in the share of Black and Hispanic Democratic VBM voters in a precinct.

Findings from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

We now turn to an individual-level analysis of mode of voting and presidential vote choice in Florida drawing on the 2016 CCES. The CCES includes over 3,000 respondents from Florida, including 923 who said they voted on Election Day (28%), 1,166 who said they voted EIP (35.3%) and 1,211 who said they exercised the VBM option (36.7%).² Although the self-reported mode of voting and two-party split

¹ Substantively, the positive relationship in Table 3 for percent black Third Party votes cast in a precinct is infinitesimal. Across the more than 5,800 precincts, the percentage of all votes cast by Black Third Party registrants ranges from 0% to .056%, with a mean of .001%. Similar caution should be taken when interpreting the signs and significance levels of the coefficients for percent Hispanic Third Party votes cast as well as the three “Other” race/ethnicity by party variables.

² All of the data we report on and analyze, are weighted by the post-election weight provided in the CCES survey.

are not spot on with that found in Figure 1, which is based on the actual votes cast across the three available modes, the summary data from the CCES are in line. With respect to respondents who reported using the VBM method, the vote was 48.2% Trump vs. 51.8% Clinton. For EIP respondents, the reported vote was 48% Trump/52% Clinton. By comparison, Trump wins the Election Day vote by 53.3% vs. 46.7% for Clinton. So, the general pattern of support by method is found in survey data, which gives us some confidence in our statistical models that isolate the effect of the timing and mode of the vote on the likelihood of supporting Trump.

**Table 4:
Individual-Level Two-Party Vote for Trump – Election Day vs. Otherwise**

	All Voters	White	Other	Hispanic	Black
Election Day	0.263** (.108)	0.215* (.126)	0.845** (.335)	0.659** (.287)	0.065 (.334)
Democrat	-2.945*** (.125)	-2.977*** (.142)	-3.672*** (.370)	-3.436*** (.327)	-2.143*** (.574)
Independent	-1.448*** (.122)	-1.402*** (.140)	-1.175*** (.348)	-1.720*** (.304)	-1.901*** (.601)
Other	0.017 (.138)	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	-0.225 (.142)	--	--	--	--
Black	-0.878*** (.268)	--	--	--	--
Constant	1.545*** (.106)	1.545*** (.118)	1.400*** (.300)	1.446*** (.203)	0.341 (.546)
N	3,200	2,381	154	399	266
Pseudo R ²	.514	.459	.624	.559	.180

Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: 1= Trump, 0 = Clinton; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 4 above presents five probit regressions with the dependent variable coded 1 for a Trump vote and 0 for a Clinton vote. All five models include a dummy variable coded 1 if a respondent voted on Election Day and 0 otherwise. This is the key independent variable since we expect that Election Day voters are more likely to report voting for Trump. We also control for party affiliation, with a dummy for Democrats and a dummy for Independents, with Republican identifiers as the omitted reference category. Given the increasing significance of party affiliation in presidential voting (Bartels 2000), it is expected that compared to Republican voters, Democrats and Independents will be much less likely to report a vote for Trump. In the first model that includes all voters, we also have controls for a respondent’s race/ethnicity. For the Other

category, respondents are collapsed into this dummy variable if they report being Asian or Asian-American, Native-American, Middle Eastern, or Mixed Race. The other two racial/ethnic variables are Hispanic and Black; White is the omitted reference category. At minimum, given the well-known allegiance of African Americans to the Democratic Party, this group of voters is expected to be significantly less likely to report voting for Trump when compared to White voters. The next four models are confined to respondents of one of the aforementioned racial/ethnic categories: White, Other, Hispanic and Black. Thus, in these models the covariates consist of the Election Day dummy and the party identification variables (Democrat and Independent). We are interested in whether the Election Day variable holds statistical significance when it is limited to a specific racial/ethnic group.

Starting with the model that includes all respondents who reported voting for either Trump or Clinton in the 2016 Presidential Election in Florida, multivariate analysis indicates a strong relationship between the mode of vote and vote choice: Election Day voters are significantly more likely to report voting for Trump ($p < .05$), all else equal. As expected, versus Republicans, Democrats and Independents are much less likely to vote for Trump. And with regard to race/ethnicity, black voters are notably less likely to support Trump vis-à-vis the reference category of white voters. Racial polarization in vote choice, especially in the case of Black voters, accounts for the unsurprising finding that the Election Day variable is insignificant in the vote choice model for African Americans. Black voters who reported casting a ballot prior to Election Day in Florida went 94-to-6 in favor of Clinton, while African Americans claiming to have voted on Election Day, voted 93%-to-7% for Clinton. Regardless of mode, Black voters cast ballots against Trump.

Interestingly, however, for each of the remaining models limited to one racial/ethnic classification, the Election Day variable registers statistical significance and is signed in the anticipated direction; whether one looks only at Whites, Hispanics, or voters in the residual "Other" category, each group of voters was more likely to report voting for Trump if they claimed to have cast their ballot on Election Day. As is always the case with limited dependent variable models, we must generate predicted probabilities in order to interpret the size of the effects of the covariates. We have resorted to the popular observed value approach explained by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013). With this method, apart from the variable of interest whose value is being manipulated, the remaining variables in the model are set at their observed values (hence we do not alter the values of these covariates, e.g., setting them at their modal, average, or minimum/maximum value). Table 5 presents the predicted probabilities for all of the variables in the models from Table 4 that attained statistical significance. The predicted probabilities are the likelihood of voting for Trump and they are displayed on the condition of whether the respondent claimed to have voted on Election Day or otherwise (Not Election Day).

In the model for all voters, the likelihood of voting for Trump when all of the covariates are set at their observed values is .526 on Election Day and .475 if not on Election Day. Once again, the dynamic is clearly evident in the survey data: Trump prevailed in Florida because of his surprising and impressive performance on the last day of voting. Going down the rows in the table and focusing on the overall likelihood of voting for Trump in the separate models limited to a racial/ethnic group, only among white voters would Trump have won the Sunshine State's 29 electoral votes on the basis of his support on Election Day, or otherwise. It should be noted, however, that consistent with our aggregate-level findings (county- and precinct-level), white Independents and Democrats who said they voted on Election Day were 2.7 percentage points and 5.5 percentage points, respectively, more likely to say they voted for Trump than those who voted EIP or VBM. Similar to white voters, on Election Day, a majority of Hispanic voters and voters classified as other, also preferred the upstart Republican (see Table 5 below).

**Table 5:
The Likelihood of Voting for Trump – Election Day vs. Otherwise**

Category	Election Day	Not Election Day	ED – Not ED (%)
<i>All Voters</i>	.526	.475	+5.1
Democrat	.085	.053	+3.2
Independent	.371	.310	+6.1
Republican	.950	.919	+3.1
Black	.362	.310	+5.2
Not Black	.538	.484	+5.4
<i>White Voters</i>	.576	.534	+4.2
Democrat	.084	.057	+2.7
Independent	.415	.360	+5.5
Republican	.961	.939	+2.2
<i>Other Voters</i>	.581	.453	+12.8
Democrat	.055	.008	+4.7
Independent	.514	.352	+16.2
Republican	.988	.919	+6.9
<i>Hispanic Voters</i>	.503	.392	+11.1
Democrat	.069	.018	+5.1
Independent	.361	.217	+14.4
Republican	.982	.926	+5.6

NOTE: Predicted probabilities of voting for Trump were generated based on the observed value approach (see Hanmer & Kalkan 2013). Predicted probabilities are from the first four regression models displayed in Table 4: all voters, White voters, Other voters, and Hispanic voters. There was not a statistically significant difference in the vote choice of Black voters according to whether or not Black respondents voted on Election Day and therefore no predicted probabilities were generated from the model confined to Black voters. The last column in the table displays the percentage points difference in the likelihood of voting for Trump for Election Day vs. Not Election Day, for each voter characteristic.

Finally, the paper concludes with a more nuanced model of vote choice in Table 6. Here we include the same models as those in Table 5 except for one distinction: we parse the mode of vote so that dummy variables are included for VBM and EIP, with Election Day voters again as the omitted reference group. It is notable that, despite essentially no difference in the split of the two-party vote for Trump and Clinton on the basis of VBM and EIP (as discussed above), in the multivariate analysis for all voters, the statistical significance loads on VBM respondents and those exercising the EIP option reveal a preference indistinguishable from Election Day voters. This said, when we turn to models limited to a specific racial/ethnic group, there is variability in the relationship between mode of casting a ballot and vote choice. Similar to the model for all voters, for white voters (by far the largest group), only VBM voters said they were less likely to vote for Trump. Interestingly, in the catch-all “Other” category of non-white, non-Hispanic, and non-Black respondents, these voters were less likely to cast a ballot for Trump if they were VBM or EIP voters, as opposed to Election Day participants. In contrast to white voters, VBM voters are not differentiable from Election Day voters with respect to their preferences, but EIP voters are; early in-person Hispanics were significantly less likely to vote for Trump as compared to Election Day Hispanic voters. Lastly, African Americans are again found to be the only group immune to a potential relationship between the mode of voting and voter choice—a result expected because the vicissitudes on the campaign season rarely reach a magnitude capable of moving this group away from its deep loyalty to the Democratic Party (see Table 6 below).

Table 6:
Individual-Level Two-Party Vote for Trump – VBM and EIP vs. Election Day

	All Voters	White	Other	Hispanic	Black
VBM	-0.363 ^{***} (.122)	-0.345 ^{**} (.143)	-1.127 ^{***} (.418)	-0.312 (.310)	-0.193 (.316)
EIP	-0.157 (.122)	-0.060 (.135)	-0.643 [*] (.361)	-0.979 ^{***} (.329)	0.011 (.437)
Democrat	-2.960 ^{***} (.123)	-2.997 ^{***} (.140)	-3.693 ^{***} (.375)	-3.399 ^{***} (.329)	-2.105 ^{***} (.603)
Independent	-1.462 ^{***} (.119)	-1.427 ^{***} (.135)	-1.147 ^{***} (.355)	-1.683 ^{***} (.293)	-1.836 ^{***} (.622)
Other	-0.001 (.138)	--	--	--	--
Hispanic	-0.234 (.144)	--	--	--	--
Black	-0.896 ^{***} (.261)	--	--	--	--
Constant	1.823 ^{***} (.124)	1.778 ^{***} (.137)	2.237 ^{***} (.355)	2.072 ^{***} (.308)	0.368 (.584)
N	3,200	2,381	154	399	266
Pseudo R ²	.515	.463	.631	.574	.183

Probit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: 1= Trump, 0 = Clinton.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Conclusion

While Tom Bonier and other election observers who analyzed EIP and VBM returns got the advance voting for Clinton correct, but the final election results wrong, other pundits who correctly predicted Trump's overall victory may have just gotten lucky. "Hillary has to get enough Black votes in the lock box before the old fashioned vote next Tuesday and it appears she'll fail," wrote Democratic political consultant Ed Jesser in an e-mail to Chris Matthews on 4 November 2016. "Every indication I get is that everything is breaking for Trump and has been from before the Comey letter," he continued, and "[i]f so, it's been my experience that late breaking waves are virtually immutable."¹

As our results show, this was not the case. Clinton performed well among Blacks who voted early, and she did especially well among Hispanic voters who cast EIP and VBM ballots. Indeed, she was leading going into Election Day by nearly a quarter-million votes. But she got walloped on Election Day. Our county- and precinct-level analyses suggests that Trump's late support came with a wave of white support on Election Day, particularly among White NPAs, but also among White Democrats. Neither groups voted against the Republican at the same levels as their compatriots who voted in advance of the November 8 vote. The authors' aggregate-level findings are bolstered by the CCES data, as we find that White Independents and Democrats were consistently more likely to cast votes for Trump on Election Day than those who voted during advanced voting period. It is entirely possible that many of these Election Day voters were more undecided than their fellow White Republicans when they bubbled in the oval at the top of their ballots in their precincts; Trump was the beneficiary.

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¹ Ed Jesser's e-mail to Chris Matthews on 4 November 2016. Quoted by Chris Matthews on "Hardball with Chris Matthews," December 14, 2016. Available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UJqBKLrUm8>

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Appendix

Table A1: Trump – Romney Two-Party Difference in County-Level Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Trump – Romney Difference, Overall Two-Party Vote	Trump – Romney Difference, EIP Two-Party Vote	Trump – Romney Difference, VBM Two-Party Vote	Trump – Romne Difference, ED Two Party Vote
Change in % Voters	-0.678 ^{***}	-0.793 ^{***}	-1.169 ^{***}	-0.461
Democratic	(0.159)	(0.166)	(0.133)	(0.274)
Change in % Voters	0.636	0.553	-0.677 [*]	0.828
NPA	(0.400)	(0.279)	(0.334)	(0.457)
Change in % Voters	0.683	0.317	-1.088	1.006
Third Party	(0.465)	(0.461)	(0.595)	(0.594)
Change in % Voters	-3.001 ^{**}	-3.038 ^{***}	-3.092 ^{**}	-3.883 ^{**}
Other Race/Ethnic	(0.886)	(0.769)	(1.101)	(1.173)
Change in % Voters	-0.217	-0.491 ^{***}	0.244	-0.991
Hispanic	(0.293)	(0.128)	(0.288)	(0.822)
Change in % Voters	1.579 ^{***}	-0.126	0.254	-0.0489
Black	(0.325)	(0.156)	(0.340)	(0.538)
Constant	0.0259 [*]	0.0118	-0.0123	0.0410 [*]
	(0.0104)	(0.00886)	(0.00808)	(0.0157)
N	65	65	65	65

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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The Comparative Effects of Electoral Laws on Voter Rationality: Plurality vs. Proportional Election Rules

by Donald L. Davison, Ph.D. & Margaret Lewicki, B.A. (Rollins College)

We in America do not have government by the majority. We have government by the majority who participate. - Thomas Jefferson

ABSTRACT: Electoral rules inherently structure the development of party systems and create incentives or disincentives for individuals to participate in politics. Few scholars study the interaction between electoral arrangements and how they encourage or discourage voting based on the characteristics of individuals. We use the *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* to investigate whether plurality and proportional electoral arrangements influence citizens' levels of political knowledge, sophistication, and the likelihood to vote. The countries studied are the United States which uses plurality rules, Australia employs the alternative vote with compulsory voting, and Ireland uses the single transferable vote. This paper finds that plurality electoral arrangements produce consistently lower levels of political knowledge and voter sophistication. Furthermore, low levels of knowledge but not sophistication reduce turnout in plurality systems. These decreased turnout levels are greatest among individuals with the lowest levels of political knowledge, where individuals experience the highest burdens of voting. Strikingly, turn-out among the highest educated citizens in the U.S. is still lower than participation by the least educated in Ireland.

1. Voting Rules and Electoral Systems

A hallmark of democracy are fair and periodic elections that aggregates citizens' preferences so representatives may make fitting social choices. Institutional design and electoral rules are essential ingredients for the functioning of democracy. But all rules and institutional arrangements possess some set of biases. As Steven Brams explains: ". . . voting and fair-division procedures . . . foster democratic choices by giving voters better ways of expressing themselves, by electing officials who are likely to be responsive to the electorate, and by allocating goods to citizens that ensure their shares are equitable or preclude envy (2008)." The study of electoral systems has largely followed two theoretical traditions: one examines the development of party systems and representation, the other explores how rules influence political participation. Less research examines how electoral arrangements might condition how voters receive and understand political information. This study argues that plurality voting rules and the electoral systems they tend to create, decreases voter rationality and sophistication.

A large literature investigates how electoral institutions influence the development of political party systems and, in turn, how those parties affect the quality of representation. Generally, the winner-take-all feature of plurality systems favors the formation of only two parties thereby limiting the range of options presented to voters. Duverger (1962) finds that ". . . the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to third parties... their natural tendency [is] to transfer their

vote to the less evil of the two adversaries” (226). In other words, plurality rules “manufactures” majorities which results in only two large parties.

The typical consequence is large numbers of citizens, especially minority groups and interests, are unrepresented (Duverger, 1962; Norris, 1997). In a plurality system where the threshold for gaining representation is higher than in proportional representation, political parties seek to attract the marginal voter in order to win and control power in office (Downs 1957). Assuming single-peaked preference orderings from left to right then in order to gain the upper hand, political parties adjust and readjust their platforms with each election cycle in the hopes of appealing to more voters. This phenomenon makes it more difficult for voters to decipher information in order to make the best decision in the current environment (Downs, 1957). Consequently, plurality arrangements tend to exaggerate representational distortions compared to proportional representation (Gallagher, 2014) and may select the least preferred candidate to the majority in elections with three or more candidates (Brams 2008).

Proportional representation tends to be more reflective of voters’ choices by more accurately transferring the percentage of votes in the electorate to the number of government representatives (Norris, 1997). Under proportional rules parties feel a lesser need to alter their platforms and policy positions in order to gain votes (Downs, 1957; Milner, 2014). Also unlike parties in a plurality system, the core beliefs of the political parties in proportional representation are arguably more stable and programmatic over time (Norris, 1997; Downs 1957).

The second theoretical tradition studies how different electoral rules affect voters’ calculus whether to participate. Since voters are more likely to conclude their vote is ‘wasted’ under plurality rules then many [rationally] refrain from voting (Blais, 1999; Hallett, 1984). In contrast, proportional arrangements make voting easier since citizens are reassured their votes are more closely connected to their preferred representatives. Consequently, we see a consistently higher turnout in the proportional systems (Gallagher, 2014; Norris, 1997). Furthermore, proportional representation presents the voter with more choices through its multiple parties. Because of the increased competition and choice, voters believe their vote contributes to the outcome of the election and candidates and political parties are more likely to seek appeal from multiple constituencies.

Plurality and proportional electoral rules also tend to produce different types of representation. Proportional systems promise some level of representation to a greater range of interests. In a plurality system, however, a marginal shift by the electorate can produce disproportionate effects in representation. Logically this implies that it encourages participation because of the increased competition but it seems to be an insufficient incentive to increase turnout in plurality systems compared to proportional countries (Norris, 1997).

Less research investigates the linkage between the traits of individual voters and the electoral systems in which they make their political decisions. We argue that different types of electoral rules allocate directly and indirectly both burdens and opportunities for voters. In other words, electoral institutions mediate the political environment voters find themselves operating in where each distinct set of electoral laws contain inherent biases favoring the formation of party systems and the emergence of candidates. We examine whether electoral arrangements influence levels of political knowledge and sophistication held by voters. Do specific electoral rules allocate greater costs on certain categories of voters in acquiring the political knowledge and sophistication to make their voting decisions? Second, do lower levels of political knowledge and sophistication reduce turnout among certain types of voters

thereby producing a bias in representation in certain electoral systems?

We contend that different types of electoral arrangements allocate burdens and advantages to voters which influences the quality of democratic accountability they are able to impose on their representatives (Gallagher, 2014). We hypothesize there will be higher levels of political knowledge and voter sophistication in proportional representation systems than in plurality systems. And secondly, citizens with lower levels of political knowledge and sophistication are less likely to vote in plurality systems than under proportional arrangements for similarly capable individuals.

We study Australia, Ireland, and the United States as examples of three different types of electoral arrangements. The United States uses single member simple plurality. Australia uses a combined method of proportional representation and majoritarian with the alternative vote. It is also important to note that Australia adopted compulsory voting in 1924. Finally, Ireland uses an elaborate method of proportional representation through the single transferrable vote.¹ Proportional representational methods are commonly understood to be more reflective of voters' choices by more precisely expressing the percentage of votes in the electorate to the percentage of government representatives (Norris, 1997). However, proportional electoral arrangements still contain inherent biases that can encourage or discourage voting albeit less powerfully than in plurality systems (Gallagher, 2014).

2. Individual-Level Participation: Examining the cost of voting in plurality and proportional institutions

Citizens make their political decisions inside distinctive national contexts which are partially shaped by electoral rules. Different electoral arrangements can allocate incentives and disincentives, burdens and opportunities, in various amounts that influence individual-level political behavior. One explanation for who votes in American elections is explained as the interactions between citizens and strategic politicians (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003). Citizens who possess greater amounts of individual-level traits such as high levels of education and income and are connected into social networks that facilitate communication, are more likely to vote. These attributes reduce the costs of participating. Strategic politicians, understanding who are the most likely-voters, devote their comparatively limited resources in attempts to mobilize those citizens into participating. Hence, if plurality electoral institutions increase the costs of participating then these individual-level resource traits assume greater importance. Alternatively, we can expect these individual-level traits to be less important when proportional rules organize national politics because the burdens imposed by proportional arrangements are less compared to plurality systems.

Fisher et al. (2008) examine this phenomenon from the perspective of the voter rather than the political system. Plurality systems weaken the motivations to vote for the less knowledgeable, according to Fisher. Low knowledge citizens are influenced by political system level characteristics such as national-level competitiveness of elections and the type of electoral system (Fisher et al., 2008). Similarly, Milner (2014) finds that more politically knowledgeable citizens are more likely to vote. By establishing a connection between the distribution of information in electoral systems and turnout, Milner concludes that proportional representation better distributes knowledge. This allocation decreases the burden of voting by allowing individual characteristics to be less influential in predicting voter turnout (2014).

¹ Norris (1997) classifies the single transferable vote as a semi-proportional representation method while Gallagher (2014) and many other scholars deem it as a purely proportional method.

While political system characteristics provide incentives for turnout, we seek to explain whether electoral rules influence the levels of political knowledge and voter sophistication. This paper argues that different electoral systems either increase or decrease the importance of individual-level characteristics considered necessary for participation. This paper expects that the United States—a plurality system which is more candidate-centered—will reflect the significance of individual traits. In contrast, individual characteristics will be less important for citizens' levels of political knowledge and sophistication and therefore, participation, under proportional arrangements.

3. Political Knowledge and Sophistication

There is broad consensus that political knowledge improves turnout (Milner 2014). Logically, a better informed citizen finds it easier to decipher the positions of competing political parties and candidates as well as make decisions that align with his/her preferences. Citizens with lower levels of education are less likely to vote—especially in plurality systems (Fisher et al., 2008). The process of obtaining knowledge takes an active effort and can be costly thereby encouraging citizens to only retain and synthesize information they feel is absolutely necessary (Popkin 1994; Lupia & McCubbins 1998). These information costs are greatest for citizens at lower socio-economic levels (Milner, 2014).

In order to maximize votes parties in plurality electoral arrangements are tempted to offer ambiguous positions in order to increase their appeal. Furthermore, plurality rules encourage parties to remake themselves with each election cycle (Downs 1957, Milner 2014). This lack of stability in the two party system will make it more difficult for citizens to achieve high levels of political knowledge because it is difficult to distinguish between the two dominating political parties (Milner, 2014; Gordon & Segura, 1997). In contrast, voters find it easier to acquire information in proportional systems because the parties are able to form (comparatively) clear positions without fear of losing seats. This stability places the burden of effectively deciphering and distributing information on the political parties rather than the electorate. This structure of parties in proportional representation results in stability ultimately decreasing the cost of obtaining information by allowing, “political knowledge [to be] less dependent on formal education” (Milner, 2014, p. 4).

Over the past 60 years various studies of political sophistication conclude that the masses are either highly politically unsophisticated (Converse 1964) or their lack of sophistication is unreliable because of inadequate measurement (Gordon & Segura 1997). Converse's view suggests that the perceived lack of attitudinal constraint in the American electorate, resulting in inconsistent voting, decreases citizens' level of political knowledge and sophistication which threatens democracy (1964).

Other scholars acknowledge voters' mediocre abilities but claim they are able to make competent voting decisions using low-level rationality (Popkin 1994). Recent research concludes that a lack of political sophistication is not necessarily a result of an intellectually inferior electorate. Rather, it illustrates a systematic flaw in the electoral arrangements influencing the development of political party institutions (Gordon and Segura, 1997). Gordon and Segura, while believing that political sophistication is subject to the electoral arrangement, also conclude that the level of sophistication is a result of choices strongly predetermined by contextual factors that affect a voter's motivation to obtain information and sophistication (1997). For example, obvious electoral disproportionality, exaggerated in a plurality system, creates a disincentive in political interest and lowers the political sophistication of the electorate (Gordon & Segura, 1997).

4. Method and Analysis

The paper uses the different electoral systems of Australia, Ireland and the United States for research. Australia uses a mixed system where the lower house (House of Representatives) is selected using the Alternative Vote and the upper house (Senate) is selected using the Single Transferable Vote. Also Australia adopted compulsory voting in 1924 (Hooghe, 2014). Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote for its lower chamber—*Dáil Éireann*. Ireland's upper chamber (a ceremonial body) is appointed. The United States uses Single Member Simple Plurality rules to fill its co-equal chambers and Simple Plurality for presidential elections. The *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 3* is used to study the effects of different electoral arrangements on the citizens' own political knowledge, sophistication and participation.

Table 1
Mean Score for Factors Related to Political Knowledge*

	Australia (2007)	Ireland (2007)	United States (2008)
Ideology** Left= 0 Right= 10	5.29	5.78	6.25
Strength of Ideology Very Weak= 0 Very Strong= 4	2.29	2.28	2.51
Efficacy (Vote) Won't Make a Difference= 1 Will Make a Difference= 5	3.78	3.81	4.15
Satisfaction with Democracy Not at all Satisfied= 1 Very Satisfied= 5	3.60	3.04	3.72
Who is in power makes a difference Doesn't Make a Difference= 1 It Makes a Big Difference= 5	3.68	3.50	3.91
Contacted by Candidate/Party during Campaign No=0 Yes=1	0.61	0.54	0.31
Are you close to a political party No= 0 Yes= 1	0.87	0.21	0.61
Interest in Campaign Not Closely at All=1 Very Closely= 4	3.17	2.87	3.08
Following the News**** Not Closely at All= 1 Very Closely=5	2.74	3.51	2.78
Number of Effective Political Parties	3.42	4.61	2.19

* Values are the average (mean) score on each variable. Scale range is listed below each variable.

** Ideology is measured on a left (0) to right (4) scale.

*** Political Knowledge quiz is an indicator variable created from the questions in CSES, Module 3 designed to measure the

respondent's recall of political information.

**** Following in the News means were retrieved from each countries nationally administered data sets as that information was not available in *Comparative Study of Electoral System*, Module 3.

This paper begins by comparing our countries across a range of factors typically associated with citizen sophistication and participation. The mean scores reported in Table 1 above highlight several differences separating the United States, i.e., a plurality system, from the proportional systems. On average, the United States is more conservative (6.25) than either Ireland (5.78) or Australia (5.29). Additionally, the United States considers itself more ideological compared to Australia or Ireland; more American respondents believe themselves to be either strongly conservative or strongly liberal. On the one hand this is somewhat surprising given that American parties are often characterized as lacking a fundamental ideology and run candidate-centered campaigns. On the other hand, this likely reflects partisan polarization which has been increasing over the last generation.

Interestingly, the United States has the highest voter efficacy (do you feel your vote will make a difference) and satisfaction with democracy compared to Australia and Ireland. One might expect the United States to have lower voter efficacy because of the high number of wasted votes, and consequently, the lowest satisfaction with democracy. However, high values for 'satisfaction with democracy' suggests that Americans believe in the value of the democratic process in its ideal form and do not necessarily connect the American democratic process to the American voting system (see Table 1 above).

4.1. Political Knowledge.

Like Milner (2014) and Fisher (2008), the United States has the lowest score for political knowledge compared to the proportional systems. It is well-established that citizens' level of political knowledge improves turnout. Do electoral arrangements influence the knowledge its citizens are able to use when making political decisions? Using a series of political information questions from *Module 3* we construct an index variable that measures political knowledge in each country where zero (0) corresponds to respondents unable to answer any question correctly and three (3) indicates a perfect score.¹ The United States has the lowest political knowledge score with a value of 1.22, while Australia and Ireland each have high scores of 1.65 and 1.50 respectively (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1



¹ The authors tested similar constructions and found similar results using Modules 2 and 4.

Thus, Equation 1 estimates the influence of factors that typically influence the levels of political knowledge and behavior at the individual level.

$$\text{Equation 1. } Y = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{age}) + \beta_2(\text{education}) + \beta_3(\text{income}) + \beta_4(\text{religious attendance}) + \beta_5(\text{campaign interest}) + \beta_6(\text{gender}) + \beta_7(\text{government performance}) + \beta_8(\text{voter efficacy}) + \beta_9(\text{Party ID}) + \varepsilon,$$

when Y = Political Knowledge with a range from low (0) to high (3),

β_1 : coefficient on age of respondent (4 categories),

β_2 : coefficient on educational level of respondent from no formal education to post-college,

β_3 : coefficient on respondent's household income measured by quintiles,

β_4 : coefficient on frequency of church or worship service attendance,

β_5 : coefficient on how involved is the respondent in the election campaign,

β_6 : coefficient on gender, Male (1) Female (2),

β_7 : coefficient on respondent's evaluation of the performance of their government over the last year,

β_8 : and, coefficient on how likely the respondent believes their vote will matter to the election outcome, and,

β_9 : coefficient on closeness of the respondent to a political party,

Recall that our argument is proportional systems reduces information costs for voters compared to plurality electoral arrangements. Electoral arrangements are one of several mechanisms that mediate the flow of information for citizens. If the cost of information is lower in proportional systems then its greatest beneficiary will be those voters with lower levels of resource endowments such as education and income. Or levels of knowledge will be less dependent on citizens' education and income in Australia and Ireland compared to the United States. Put another way, the coefficients on factors estimating the importance of individual resources endowments such as education and income should be larger and statistically significant in the United States compared to Ireland and Australia.

This expectation is largely supported. Household income is the only statistically significant variable that contributes to obtaining political knowledge in Ireland. In the mixed electoral system of Australia age, education, and campaign involvement are significant but have only modest coefficients. Conversely, all individual-level characteristics are both statistically significant and demonstrate very large impacts on political knowledge in the United States. Education has 10 times the importance in the U.S. compared to Australia and Ireland for predicting respondents' political knowledge. The weight of individual resources in the United States also suggests an upper class and conservative bias is more likely under plurality rather than in proportional representation. Likewise, these predictor variables have more explanatory power in the United States than in Australia or Ireland. The r-squared value for Australia and Ireland is 0.056 and 0.042 respectively, whereas the r-square value for the United States is 0.270¹ (see Table 2).

¹ A full description of the variables used can be found in Appendix A.

Table 2
Political Knowledge Predicted by Individual and Political System Characteristics

Independent Variables	Australia (2007)	Ireland (2007)	United States (2008)
Age	0.146** (0.000)	0.049 (0.311)	0.171** (0.000)
Education	0.041** (0.004)	0.033 (0.440)	0.194** (0.000)
Income	0.054* (0.012)	0.082* (0.033)	0.100** (0.000)
Religious Attendance	-0.022 (0.172)	0.028 (0.356)	-0.025 (0.236)
Strength of Partisan ID	-0.035 (0.397)	0.049 (0.404)	-0.018 (0.568)
Campaign Interest	0.077* (0.046)	0.062 (0.265)	-0.272** (0.000)
Government Performance	0.026 (0.430)	0.004 (0.944)	-0.049 (0.123)
Voter Efficacy	0.039 (0.187)	-0.214 (0.557)	-0.026 (0.360)
Gender	0.041 (0.461)	-0.144 (0.094)	-0.141** (0.006)
Intercept	0.659** (0.004)	1.008** (0.010)	-0.494* (0.026)
R-squared	0.056	0.042	0.270
N	876	356	1101
(p-value) * $p \leq 0.050$ ** $p \leq 0.010$ Source: <i>Comparative Study of Electoral Systems</i> , Module 3			


4.2. Voter Sophistication

Unlike political knowledge, sophistication requires a more developed expectation by citizens. Sophistication expects citizens to use a degree of abstraction when considering the objects of politics such as ideology and political parties. The earliest studies of sophistication (Converse 1964) assessed whether voters demonstrate ideological “constraint” across a set of related issues. Converse and others (Luskin, 1987; Sullivan, Pierson & Markus 1978) conclude that voters in the United States lack demonstrable levels of sophistication, and the results in Europe are not much more encouraging.


This paper measures voters’ level of political sophistication by estimating their ability to accurately locate political parties in their countries along an ideological spectrum. The CSES asks respondents to place political parties from their countries along a left-right scale measured from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). The parties’ position along the left-right scale is also recorded by the expert judgment of CSES collaborators. The absolute difference between each citizen’s ideological self-placement and the value assigned by the CSES expert is calculated. As the deviations approach zero (0), the citizen’s placement of each party corresponds to the judgment of the expert indicating a high level of sophistication. Conversely, larger deviations indicate greater distance between the respondent and the expert or less sophistication.¹

Similar to the results for political knowledge, Australia and Ireland exhibit the highest levels of political sophistication. The United States has a higher average (mean) deviation and the distribution is more widely dispersed indicating much greater variation in the assessments of Americans. Further, the distribution of deviations for Australia and Ireland are skewed strongly toward zero. Ireland with its single alternative voting procedure has the smallest average deviation (1.8) for both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael parties. The average deviation for the two largest parties in Australia are 2.2 for the Labor Party and 2.1 for the Liberal Party. Finally, the average deviation in the United States is 4.0 for the Democratic Party and 2.6 for the Republican Party (see Figures 2 & 3).

Figures 2 & 3



¹ Imputed values were assigned for respondents who replied they did not know where to place a political party. The imputed values were calculated by adding one standard deviation to the mean of all the placements by the respondents. Segura and Gordon (1997) use a similar approach when evaluating sophistication among voters using Eurobarometer studies.



Again, there is no *a priori* reason to expect intelligence or political sophistication to be concentrated in one developed democracy compared to others. Australia, Ireland, and the United States are all economically and socially developed democracies. Similar to the logic for political knowledge, we expect individual-level resource endowments to be of less importance in Ireland and Australia compared to the United States. Accordingly, we re-estimate the impact of typical individual-level factors from Equation 1 on the degree of political sophistication for the two largest parties in each country.

$$\text{Equation 2. } Y = \alpha + X_1\text{Age} + X_2\text{Ed} + X_3\text{Income} + X_4\text{Attend} + X_5\text{Campaign} + X_6\text{Gender} + X_7\text{GovtPerform} + X_8\text{Partisanship} + X_9\text{Efficacy} + \varepsilon,$$

when, Y= deviations in political sophistication,

Age=age of respondent (4 categories),

Ed=respondent educational level from no formal education to post-college,

Income=respondent household income measured by quintiles,

Attend=frequency of church or worship service attendance,

Campaign=how involved is the respondent in the election campaign,

Gender=Male (1) Female (2),

GovtPerform= respondent's evaluation of the performance of their government over the last year,

Partisanship=closeness of the respondent to a political party, and

Efficacy=how likely the respondent believes their vote will matter to the election outcome.

Similar to the results for political knowledge, the regression results for sophistication illustrate the stunning power of individual-level characteristics in the United States but their comparative weakness in Australia and Ireland. Respondents' age, education, and income levels are expected to improve political sophistication. As citizens age they acquire increased levels of informal or experiential education which helps them interpret political information. Similarly, higher levels of education and income improve citizens' cognitive skill and ability to think abstractly. The results in Table 3 indicate their relative weakness in the proportional systems but great strength in the United States. The power of education is five times greater in the United States than in Australia, and is only weakly important in Ireland (see Table 3).

Table 3
Influence of Individual-Level Characteristics on Political Sophistication

Variable	Australia (Labor Party)	Australia (Liberal Party)	Ireland (Fine Gael)	Ireland (Fianna Fail)	United States (Democrat)	United States (Republican)
Age	-0.138* (0.013)	-0.156** (0.003)	-0.091 (0.231)	-0.164* (0.047)	-0.046 (0.507)	-0.119 (0.065)
Education	-0.067* (0.024)	-0.102** (0.000)	-0.109 (0.102)	-0.126* (0.080)	-0.483** (0.000)	-0.318** (0.000)
Income	-0.088* (0.050)	-0.097* (0.023)	-0.059 (0.325)	0.057 (0.377)	-0.429** (0.000)	-0.287** (0.000)
Religious attendance	0.000 (0.995)	-0.052 (0.099)	-0.026 (0.578)	0.104* (0.043)	0.107 (0.097)	-0.063 (0.293)
Campaign involvement	-0.095 (0.241)	-0.064 (0.405)	0.205* (0.022)	-0.009 (0.921)	-0.160 (0.126)	-0.102 (0.297)
Gender	0.084 (0.467)	0.233* (0.034)	-0.023 (0.865)	0.172 (0.235)	0.577** (0.000)	-0.040 (0.785)
Government performance	-0.000 (0.998)	-0.092 (0.164)	0.092 (0.259)	0.058 (0.505)	-0.407** (0.000)	-0.562** (0.000)
Strength of Partisan ID	0.252 (0.003)	0.255** (0.006)	-0.121 (0.193)	0.041 (0.681)	0.349** (0.000)	0.306** (0.001)
Voter Efficacy	-0.061 (0.322)	-0.057 (0.331)	0.055 (0.332)	0.041 (0.509)	0.218* (0.012)	0.194* (0.016)
Intercept	2.535** (0.000)	2.871** (0.000)	2.118* (0.001)	1.319* (0.046)	5.638** (0.000)	5.349** (0.000)
<i>R-squared</i>	0.034	0.063	0.036	0.035	0.241	0.142
<i>N</i>	807	817	340	347	1109	1109

(*p-value*)

* $p \leq 0.050$

** $p \leq 0.010$

Source: *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*, Module 3

A second important factor is strength of partisan identification. Here, too, the sense of closeness to a political party is quite powerful in the United States but is in the wrong direction. There is a robust literature that demonstrates the centrality of partisanship for the American voter. Party identification serves as a selective filter through which political information is received and interpreted (Campbell et al., 1962). Interestingly, close association with a political party reduces political sophistication in the United States. In other words, as citizens' attachment to a political party increases, they are less likely to correctly locate either the Democrat or Republican parties along a left-right scale. Conversely, closeness to a party demonstrates little predictive power in Ireland and slightly more influence in Australia—the proportional systems. Thus, the multivariate results support the importance of individual-level characteristics of voters in the U.S., which the authors believe is partially a result of the differential burdens imposed by plurality electoral arrangements.

5. Political Knowledge, Voter Sophistication and Turnout

The results suggest that different electoral institutions have consequences for levels of political knowledge and sophistication held by citizens. Proportional representation appears to reduce information costs unlike plurality electoral rules. Do electoral institutions differentially affect individuals with low levels of knowledge and sophistication? Since plurality electoral laws impose greater burdens on individuals than proportional arrangements we then might expect to find lower levels of participation by those citizens with the lowest levels of knowledge and sophistication. To test this proposition we estimate a multivariate logistic regression to determine whether the likelihood to vote differs by levels of knowledge and sophistication in our three countries.

Equation 3 estimates the probability that a respondent voted in their national election by political knowledge, sophistication and the typical characteristics of voters used in the previous equations, and a dummy variable for country,¹

$$\text{Equation 3. } L = \alpha + X_1(\text{Age}) + X_2(\text{Ed}) + X_3(\text{Income}) + X_4(\text{Attend}) + X_5(\text{Campaign}) + X_6(\text{Gov Perform}) + X_7(\text{Efficacy}) + X_8(\text{PID Strength}) + X_9(\text{Knowledge}) + X_{10}(\text{Sophistication}) + X_{11}(\text{Ireland}) + X_{12}(\text{USA}) + \varepsilon,$$

when L=estimated logit for vote decision (0/1),

- α =intercept; Australia is base condition,
- Age=age of respondent (4 categories),
- Ed=educational level of respondent from no formal education to post-college,
- Income= respondent's household income measured by quintiles,
- Attend= frequency of church or worship service attendance,
- Campaign= how involved is the respondent in the election campaign,
- GovPerform= respondent's evaluation of their government's performance over the last year,
- Efficacy= how likely the respondent believes their vote will matter to the election outcome,
- PID Strength= closeness of the respondent to a political party and,
- Knowledge=level of political knowledge,
- Sophistication=level of political sophistication measured in deviation from expert,
- Ireland=dummy variable,
- USA=dummy variable.

¹ A separate equation is estimated using political sophistication for Party A and Party B.

Predictably, traits defining individuals' personal resources such as education and income as well as social characteristics such as religious attendance are strongly significant. Evaluations of the government's performance are not significant. Respondents' political knowledge is a strong predictor of their likelihood to vote, however, sophistication is not statistically significant. Apparently, only modest increases in the level of political knowledge are necessary to increase turnout. Notice also that the United States has the largest, negative value indicating the suppressing effect of plurality rule (see Table 4).


Table 4		
Logistical Regression Coefficients Predicted by Individual and Political System Characteristics on Likelihood of Voting¹		
Predictor Variables	Coefficient Values (Party A) (p-value)	Coefficient Values (Party B) (p-value)
Age	0.214 (0.007)**	0.214 (0.007)**
Education	0.289 (0.000)**	0.298 (0.000)**
Income	0.142 (0.032)*	0.150 (0.025)*
Religious Attendance	0.186 (0.004)**	0.181 (0.005)**
Campaign Interest	0.605 (0.000)**	0.618 (0.000)
Government Performance	0.089 (0.388)	0.097 (0.350)
Voter Efficacy	0.280 (0.000)**	0.276 (0.000)**
Party ID Strength	0.486 (0.000)**	0.485 (0.000)**
Political Knowledge	0.219 (0.034)*	0.232 (0.023)*
Voter Sophistication (Party A) ²	-0.035 (0.334)	--
Voter Sophistication (Party B)	--	-0.008 (0.818)
Ireland	-2.944 (0.000)**	-2.925 (0.000)**
United States	-3.875 (0.000)**	-3.938 (0.000)**
Intercept ³	-2.202 (0.005)**	-2.357 (0.003)**
R-squared	0.269	0.273
N	2222	2225
<i>(p-value)</i>		
Source: <i>Comparative Study of Electoral Systems</i> , Module 3		

1. Two equations were run where the two measurements for voter sophistication is separated where Party A is the Australian Labor Party, the Irish Fianna Fail, and the United States Democrats and Party B is the Australian Liberal Party, the Irish Fine Gael, and the United States Republicans
2. Two measurements of Voter Sophistication exist as respondents were asked to place the nation's two largest political parties on a Left-Right continuum
3. Australia is the base condition

(p-value)

* p < 0.050

** p < 0.010



Source: *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 3*

Finally, do plurality electoral rules exert a greater impact on those at lower socio-economic levels? Figure 3 illustrates the likelihood of voting at each level of political knowledge for the average respondent.¹ For all three countries, as political knowledge increases so does the probability of voting. Consequently, small increases in political knowledge can positively improve voter turnout in both plurality and proportional electoral arrangements. Australia, naturally, has the highest likelihood of voting with little variation because it uses compulsory voting. Ireland exhibits the second highest probability of voting followed by the United States. However, it is evident that in a proportional representation system, the likelihood of voting, even at the lowest levels of political knowledge, is still higher than the likelihood to vote at the highest levels of political knowledge in the U.S. plurality system. Apparently, relatively modest burdens on voters can suppress turn-out—especially in a plurality electoral arrangement (see Graph/Figure 3 above).

¹ The probability that respondents vote is retrieved by setting the independent variables equal to their mean value and calculating, $P = 1/(1 + e^{-L})$, for each level of knowledge.

Plurality systems exert a stronger burden on voters at the lowest levels of political knowledge compared to proportional representation. Fisher et al. noted similar findings, “those with high levels of knowledge... are little affected by the character of the electoral system” (2008, p.100). Not only is the probability of voting in Ireland higher than the United States at every level, the difference in likelihood of voting is not equal as the level of political knowledge increases. With this increase in political knowledge, the difference in the likelihood of voting diminishes. Further, the research results seem to be consistent with Samuel Popkin’s conclusion that relatively modest types of information are able to improve the likelihood of voter turn-out (1994).

6. Discussion

This paper finds plurality arrangements to place higher burdens on citizens’ political knowledge as well as reduces their levels of sophistication. Further, plurality rules appear to increase the importance of the individual traits of citizens. These processes are not present in the proportional systems of Australia and Ireland. The hypothesis that political knowledge and sophistication increase respondents’ likelihood to vote is only partially supported. While the level of knowledge is important the degree of political sophistication does not seem to matter for voting. The probability of voting is consistently lower in a plurality electoral arrangement independent of the level of political knowledge but, the burden of voting at the lowest levels of political knowledge exaggerate this trend. Citizens at the highest level of knowledge in the U.S. are still less likely to vote than those at the lowest levels of knowledge in Ireland and Australia.

Voting is the typical method used by citizens to participate in the political process. On a fundamental level electoral laws structure the choices presented to citizens. Through voting the electorate can hold officials accountable, support or refute public policies, mediate conflict, and establish a voice for individuals. While proponents of the plurality systems support this arrangement because of its efficiency (Norris 1997), proportional electoral arrangements are typically more effective in accurate descriptive representation (Gallagher 2014; Norris, 1997). Conventional research typically finds that proportional representation is fairer because it is able to capture broader interests. Plurality systems, on the other hand, often punish minority interests. Although the type of electoral system is not the driving incentive in voting and the authors acknowledge that not all factors operating are accounted for in these models, the incentives that characterize these systems appear to influence the behavior of voters.

Most research regarding electoral arrangements studies the number and type of effective political parties, fairness in the allocation of representation, and the wasted vote. This paper seeks to explain how electoral institutions themselves allocate some of the burdens and incentives of voting and obtaining information at an individual level. Our results indicate that distortions produced by plurality rules are felt most profoundly at the lower positions of the socio-economic scale; electoral rules appear to matter for the “resources, interests and social positions [that] distinguish people who participate in politics from people who do not” (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003 p. 228).

Moreover, the objective of elected officials and political parties is to accurately respond to the desires and demands of the citizens in the country. Voters who are more capable of easily meeting the burdens of casting a ballot (better education, high income, elevated interest) are more likely to see the benefits of voting and participate in politics. But higher costs of obtaining political knowledge discourages citizens from voting. Low participation often distorts representation. As burdens from plurality electoral rules are imposed then on citizens at the lowest levels of education, income, and campaign interest then the accuracy of representation will likely decline further. Plurality electoral procedures appear to contribute to the upper-class bias often associated with participation in the United States.

While this collective effect can be viewed as negative, an alternative notion is that a larger number of participants involved in the political process (whether through voting or other methods of participation) can negate the inequalities of representation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003). It is important to recognize, however, that representation does not automatically mean policy reform. The representation of specific groups has the potential to change public opinion and attitudes, which can act as an initiative for engagement, leading to future policy reform (Krook, 2014). Further, there is mounting evidence in the United States that policy makers respond to economic elite interests to the exclusion of the lower class (Page, Bartels & Seawright 2013; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1997; Gillens & Page 2014). While collectively participating in politics can act as a remedy for inequality in representation, it is difficult to break this cycle: inequalities in education and political knowledge lead to “inequalities in participation, [which] lead to inequalities in influence, which lead to inequalities in policy outputs, which let to inequalities in resources, which lead once more to inequality in participation and the beginning of another vicious circle” (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003, p. 245).

Appendix A: Variables Descriptions

Variables Name (Code name)	Description
Age (C2001)	Broken into four categories ranging from 0 to 3 with a lower value indicating a lower age. Age ranges is between 17 and 100.
Education (C2003)	Ranging between 0 and 8 with a higher scored indicating high levels of education (1 equals 'none;' 2 equals 'incomplete primary;' 3 equals primary completed;' 4 equals incomplete secondary;' 5 equals 'secondary completed;' 6 equals 'post-secondary trade/vocational;' 7 equals university undergraduate degree incomplete;' and 8 equals 'university undergraduate degree complete.')
Income (C2020)	Measured by household income, it is split into 5 (1-5) quintiles where a lower value indicates a lower household income (1 equals 'lowest income quintile;' 2 equals 'second household income quintile;' 3 equals third household income quintile;' 4 equals 'fourth household income quintile;' 5 equals 'highest household income quintile').
Religious Attendance (C2023)	Determines the frequency of religious attendance of the respondent per year with a values ranging between 1 and 6 (1 equals 'never;' 2 equals 'once a year;' 3 equals 'two to eleven times a year;' 4 equals once a month;' 5 equals two or more times a month;' 6 equals 'once a week/more than once a week.')
Strength of Partisan ID (C3020_4)	Measures the degree of closeness to a political party with a range in scores between 1 and 4 (1 equals independent; 2 equals 'not very close;' 3 equals 'somewhat close;' 4 equals 'very close.')
Campaign Interest (C3018)	Ranges from 1 to 4 with a higher score indicting more interest in the campaign (1 equals 'not closely at all;' 2 equals 'not very closely;' 3 equals 'fairly closely;' and 4 equals 'very closely.')
Voter Efficacy (C3005)	Respondents were asked to rate the phrase “who people vote for makes a difference’ where the 1 equals ‘who people vote for won’t make any difference’ and 5 equals ‘whole people vote fore will make a big difference.’
Gender (C2002)	Separated into two categories where 1 equals ‘male’ and 2 equals ‘female.’
Government Performance (C3006)	Asses the government’s general performance with a score ranging between 1 and 4 (1 equals a ‘very bad job;' 2 equals a ‘bad job;' 3 equals a ‘good job;' and 4 equals a ‘very good job.’)

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The Strong State and Governing Through Crime in the United States

by Richard W. Coughlin, Ph.D., Florida Gulf Coast University-Fort Myers

ABSTRACT: Neo-liberalism is incorrectly understood as an anti-state doctrine. Instead, it requires a strong state capable stabilizing a market society, which neo-liberals such as Becker, Friedman and Hayek – among many others – have wanted to institute. Contrary to the Adam Smith-like notions of the society emerging spontaneously as a result of the market transactions, the emergence of contemporary neo-liberal societies have necessitated an overarching governance of the social. This notion of the governance of the social emerges from the work of Michel Foucault (2004, 2008) and subsequent Foucauldian studies of governmentality. This essay draws on the work of criminologist Jonathan Simon (2006, 2012 & 2014) in order to examine how the governance of the social in the United States has assumed the form of governing through crime. The author argues that this governance of the social emerged on the basis of racial conflicts that were deeply etched into the post New Deal social order in the United States. In addition, the trajectory of governing through crime has moved in the direction of inserting the territory of the United States within an increasingly globalized world, which is conceptualized as the “space of flows”. This essay concludes by considering if current debates and conflicts with respect to immigration, police violence and mass incarceration mark a break with the strong state or its recalibration.

1. Security, Citizenship and Neo-liberalism

The existence of global capitalism depends on local forms of rule – that is, it depends on a plurality of states. Understanding these local forms of rule requires examining not just states, but state/society complexes. And not just state/society complexes at a given moment of time, but rather their path dependent development through time. State and society have been historically mediated by the production of security. The production of security can be linked to emergence of the state as secular institution, uncoupled from a religiously constituted conception of the world in which the social order was regarded as a universal order, naturally and divinely ordained (Neocleous, 2000). The secular state was concerned instead to fabricate the social order by means of governing society as if it were the household of the sovereign (Foucault, 2004). State power became police power, concerned not only with commanding obedience from subjects, but also with organizing the ways in which they should live. Early modern states were concerned to mobilize the wealth of their territories. According to one mercantilist contemporary, “[a]ll methods of the state whereby riches may be increased insofar as the authority of the state is concerned, belong under the charge of the police” (quoted in Neocleous, 2000: p.14).

An important locus of police power was ensuring conditions of circulation of goods – grain, in particular – in way that avoided scarcity and destabilizing consequences (food riots) that attended it. As Foucault (2004 & 2008) has argued, police power resulted in the accumulation of police knowledge. This is a knowledge of population that is concerned with security as opposed to being a disciplinary knowledge of individuals who must live, work or study within the framework of a particular disciplinary

enclosure (Foucault, 1979). Disciplinary knowledge is about artifices (disciplinary enclosures) while security is concerned with the environments in which the population lived and, specifically, their built environments. Foucault shows that police state security was concerned, above all, with the organization of life within towns where the problems of government became conceived in terms of commerce, infectious disease and hunger, concepts that could be understood in terms of the idea of circulation "...in the very broad sense of movement, exchange and contact...the problem being, how should things circulate or not circulate" (2004: p.64).

The problem of circulation redefined statecraft from an emphasis on maintaining the power of the sovereign and his rule over a particular territorial domain to an orientation that, as Foucault writes "...allow[s] circulations to take place, of control[s] them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement...in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out" (2004: p. 65). This reconfiguration of sovereignty must also be understood in the context of the disintegration of the feudalism and the emergence of pauperized, dislocated "masterless men" that had to be ordered in conjunction with emerging forms of circulation (Procacci, 1991; Neocleous, 2000). Consider, in this regard, Procacci's exploration of 18th Century conceptions of pauperism: Paupers, noted contemporaries, constituted a dangerously mobile, incompletely integrated, ignorant and insubordinate strata of society that comprised "a dangerous enemy to our civilization" (1991: p.158-162). This was because pauperism defied the norm of ordered circulation associated with the Police state and emerging patterns of market exchange. Considered as a technique of the government, security was oriented toward creating order from the turbulence of systemic transformation by means of inserting individuals into forms of circulation associated with the emergence of markets. Securing market based forms of circulation was (and is) rooted in engendering certain forms of political subjectivity in the people who are inserted into these modes of order/circulation.

This is where security becomes connected to political being (Huysmans & Guillaume, 2012). This connection is variable: political being can be folded into security or it may diverge from security imperatives. In the relationship between security and political being, we can discern the emergence of citizenship, construed here as a process through which "agents enact themselves as political subjects, asserting the right to be political" (Huymans & Guillaume, 2012: p.23). From this point of view, security is the political medium in which individuals constitute themselves as, simultaneously, "a subject to be governed and a subject with the right to act creatively on modes of government" (Huysmans & Guillaume, 2012: p.23).

This essay seeks to develop the implications of this proposition for the implantation of neoliberal modes of governance in the United States. What does it mean, to begin with, to think in terms of neoliberal governance? Neo-liberalism is often understood as an economic and political strategy for overcoming the rigidities of Fordism, one which draws on the state in order to pry open new pathways of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2003). In other words, neo-liberalism is about the crisis induced reproduction of capitalism. At the heart of capitalism, always, is the question of accumulation. How can it move forward? What temporal and spatial fixes will allow capital to overcome the impasses that emerge from its own internal contradictions? As Wendy Brown (2015) has recently suggested, these sorts of inquiries focus on the production of wealth to the exclusion of the production of truth. Politics, from a Marxist perspective, is about establishing conditions for the production of wealth and politics is thus instrumental to wealth production rather than establishing an order of truth in its own right. This order of truth is connected to our political being.

In what follows below, the essay discusses how contemporary forms of political being emerged in path dependent fashion. *Section two*, examines how political being was shaped by a crisis of liberal disorder, which was itself embedded within the unresolved conflicts of the New Deal order. *Section three* demonstrates how this disorder was assuaged by means of governing through crime, which meant, as Jonathan Simon suggests (2006), governing people as victims or potential victims of crime. Governing through crime displaced New Deal modes of governance through expertise and established a new kind of nexus between state and society. *Section four* chronicles the emergence of the strong state, as the state's coercive powers, unleashed in the defense of people in their capacity as victims, seeped into the corners to civil society, generating a regime of security that engenders contemporary modes of political being. The resulting culture of security is examined in *section five* of this essay. Here the author draws upon Karl Polanyi's (1957) contention that the advance of market forces always incite some corresponding encroachment of social protections. These protections assume the forms of expulsion and exclusion of people deemed to pose a security risks to neoliberal modes of order and circulation. *Section six* of this essay argues that the new modes of social protection characteristic of neo-liberalism have been productive in terms of facilitating the insertion the territory of the United States into a globalized space of flows. In particular, the author argues that neoliberal security entails the construction of a society of control and that this society of control opens up spaces of political being within the globalized present. An important argument developed throughout the course of this paper is that the neoliberal globalization has been rooted in the emergence of the strong state. The *seventh section* of this essay considers, briefly, the prospects of the strong state and the possibilities for change.

Liberal Disorder

Discussions of the strong state can be situated with critical approaches of neoliberal capitalism. For David Harvey (2005), neo-liberal capitalism was (and is) a corporate class offensive which aimed to liquidate the institutional structures of the core components of society: labor, nature and money (Polanyi, 1957). These protections were, of course, devised on the basis of certain racial and gender based exclusions. The Labor Rights Act of 1935, for example, excluded domestic and agricultural workers from collective bargaining rights. The welfare legislation of the New Deal, such as the old AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) was formulated as a Federal/State partnership, providing states with opportunities to restrict the access of minorities and, more generally, the poor, to welfare benefits. In sum, the New Deal established the fragmented social policy state. But these reforms at the same time comprised a partial alleviation of the economic precarity – the condition of the being fully exposed to the vicissitudes of market forces. Similarly, the post-World War Two Bretton Woods monetary order protected money as a means of exchange – that is, as a social utility – by imposing capital controls so that money had to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the nation state. Under these circumstances, progressive tax structures could be implemented, exchange rates stabilized and self-reinforcing cycles of mass production/mass consumption organized.

The strong state is the form of rule that emerged in the United States and the UK (see Hall, et.al, 1978) as the social protections associated with Fordism eroded over the course of the 1970s-1980s. The strong state, as this paper discusses, emerged in the midst of liberal disorder and was formulated and embraced as a remedy for this disorder. Liberal disorder emerged in the United States as a condensation of contradictions which were already deeply inscribed into U.S. society. As suggested above, the New Deal in the United States had instituted a deeply racialized political order, which shifted, demographically, with

the emigration of the Blacks from the rural South to the urban North. Blacks were not incorporated into working class solidarity. Working class solidarity itself became increasingly dissociated from the state. This was an effect of the demobilization of the New Deal with the Taft Hartley Act and subsequent communist purges of union leadership, leaving unions to engage in depoliticized bargaining with employers over the extension of what were, in essence, privatized welfare states (Panitch & Ginden, 2012).

Liberal disorder emerged at the margins of this social compact between capital and labor. This was disorder that was rooted, in part, in structures of racial exclusion. This became clear as the civil rights movement moved from the South to the North and as black communities demanded an expansion of the welfare state and an end to segregation in employment, communities and schools. To draw on the analysis of Loic Wacquant (2002), liberal disorder emerged as a result of the rupturing of ghettos as spaces for the containment of black populations.

But the rupturing of ghettos was also enmeshed within the arc of liberalism in the United States. In the early decades of the 20th Century, liberal intellectuals broke with the doctrines of self-governance for local communities and self-help for individuals (in other words, respectively, dual federalism and laissez faire) in order to articulate a conception of how the United States should develop as a national society. This project of nation building emerged alongside industrialization and urbanization, material transformations which were making the United State into a country that was scaled at the national level. Liberals situated themselves as at the vanguard of this developing national society. They construed themselves, in H. L. Mencken's terms, as the members of a civilized minority, seeking to build a national society against the backdrop of a provincial and backward society (Lasch, 1991). Liberals instituted new modes of governance in society. By and large, they attached themselves to the state as the structure from which they could infuse their particular forms of professional expertise into the rest of society, becoming, in the process, organic intellectuals not so much of the working or subaltern classes, but of the state as an agent of progressive change. Liberal governance extolled problem solving expertise. Through both the progressive reforms and the New Deal, liberal expertise formed an increasingly dense network of public services that linked citizens to the state, displacing, in the process, the political machines of the 19th Century (Simon, 2006).

The capacity of liberals to build or maintain identification with the people was always weak. This can be seen in terms of the way in which liberals could be subjected to anti-communist witch hunts. The case of Alger Hiss was especially notable in this regard (Hiss, 1945). Hiss was a Harvard law graduation, a clerk for Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Court, a lawyer in Roosevelt's Department of Justice and then a prominent diplomat within the State Department, credited with having negotiated the creation of the United Nations. He was brought down by the House Un-American Affairs Committee and in particular, by the testimony of the journalist Whitaker Chambers, for whom Hiss's later conviction of perjury charges marked "...the jagged fissure...between the plain men and women of the nation and those affected to think, act and speak for them...the enlightened and the powerful, the clamorous proponents of the open mind" (quoted in Micklewait & Woolridge, 2004: p.44-45). Liberal open mindedness was disciplined by anti-communism. Anti-communism extolled conservative orthodoxies. As David Campbell (1992) has suggested, the anti-communism was concerned with scripting or writing a particular form of American identity in relationship to a set of dangers that confronted the United States from both within and without. Liberalism was situated within these spaces of danger – liberalism was, in this sense, the site of an excess of freedom that would manifest itself as disorder and, crucially, as disloyalty to the nation (Neocleous, 2006). Liberal excess was situated outside the nation, which anti-

communism defined in terms of heartland conceptions of conservative morality: submissive femininity, compulsory heterosexuality, conventional religiosity, blindness to racism or inequality, and contentment with the *status quo*.

But the capacity of anti-communism to define the boundaries of national identity was limited and, indeed, subverted by the enormous waves of socio-economic change unleashed by the long wave of growth in the United States. This growth generated large scale population movements – the emigration, as noted above, of Blacks from South to North, but also the settlement of the suburbs and the shift of population from Northeast and industrialized Mid-West to the Sunbelt states of the South and West. These population movements disrupted the normative structures of communities as neighborhood were replaced by suburbs, shopping malls and housing projects. These patterns of change might be understood as the advent of late modernity, a movement toward increasing cultural pluralism characterized by the disintegration of communal norms that formerly constrained individuals. This loosening of constraints increasingly obeyed the logic of a consumer society in which people engaged in the work of self-production through consumer choice – and increasingly, life-style choice. In the analysis of the New Left, younger generations, raised in post-war affluence, sought not only freedom of choice, but authenticity.

These emerging forms of freedom collided with the edifice of conventional morality and Cold War nationalism. In the early-1960s, it appeared that these collisions might be contained within the political consensus of post-war liberalism. The landslide victory of the Lyndon Johnson in 1964 certainly seemed to signal this possibility. Johnson remarked in his inaugural address that “We have achieved a unity of interest among our people that is unmatched in the history of freedom” (quoted in Perlstein, 2009: p.6). For Johnson and the supporters of his coalition, this unity of interest was nothing other than a process of overcoming barriers to progress rooted in the past. Thus Johnson affirmed in a 1965 commencement address at Howard University that “Our earth is the home of revolution. In every continent, men charged with hope contend with ancient ways in the pursuit of justice” (Johnson, 1965). The idea of liberalism as progress could also be seen in Gunnar Myrdal’s account of racism in America. Myrdal (1944) argued that racism was ultimately incompatible with the “American creed” – and that racism was the residue of traditional society which would dissipate as a result of the accretion of modernizing change enacted by liberal professional classes.

But all of this was change from above. To take a crucial example, Johnson’s Great Society programs did not respond to any sort of ground swell for social inclusion or racial injustice. Nor did these programs address, in any way, class conflict or capitalism. “The Great Society,” observes Ira Katznelson, “was not an organic part of a larger vision of politics of the left” (1989: p.198). It represented rather what Patrick Moynihan termed, at the time, “the professionalization of the reform” (1965) by policy makers concerned with the persistence and – for racial minorities- growth of poverty in the United States, despite the unprecedented post-war affluence.

In effect, the labor question and race question in the United States had become divorced from one another. Indeed, the New Deal had resolved the labor question only under the condition of perpetuating black subordination (Katznelson, 2013). The subsequent re-emergence of the racial question would provoke liberal disorder and the emergence of the strong state. To see how this unfolded, consider Ronald Reagan’s successful campaign for the governorship of California in 1966. Reagan defeated incumbent Pat Brown, a New Deal Democrat who had presided over California’s unprecedented post-War prosperity, expanding water projects, freeways and higher education. Reagan,

however, succeeded in responding to the disorder of the riots and Watts, the campus protests in Berkeley and the emergence of an anti-authoritarian counter-culture. In the wake of the events, Pat Brown represent liberal disorder, whereas for Reagan, in the words of one admirer, "...everything he says is America." Another supporter added "Brown has practically ruined the state. He has a nice home but he lets the Negroes come right next to you" (quoted in Perlstein, 2009: p.119). President Reagan's triumph marked the beginnings of a conservative backlash to the advance of liberalism.

This backlash, was marked by "the reactionary attitude toward late modernity. This an attitude that, in David Garland's terms, "regretted the changes [associated with late modernity] and aspired to reverse them where possible" (94). From the perspective of the reactionary attitude, disorder emerged from the disintegration of norms that had formerly constrained individuals. The disintegration of these norms, in turn, signaled a crisis of borders. Any society is organized borders between genders, social classes, ethnicities, public spaces and private spaces. In the United States, these borders were scrambled by the rights revolution (Edsall & Edsall, 1991). The rights revolution advanced the liberal ambition to construct a national society by means nationalizing rights and rescinding the capacities of the states to police morality. The expanding the rights of women, minorities, criminal defendants, immigrants, homosexuals, prisoners, students, atheists, welfare recipients and the disabled threw conventional morality into disarray. These were all categories of individuals that had been brought to heel by the ideological orthodoxies of Cold War anti-communism.

The "rights revolution" – and the subjects it empowered – had the effect of exposing cherished traditions, such as the patriarchal family or the exceptional nation, as absurd and groundless illusions. The reactionary attitude toward late modernity constituted a kind of counter-enlightenment to the critical awareness that emerged from the social movements of the 1960s (Rensin, 2014; Perlstein, 2014). It was a reassertion of a conservative, Cold War nationalism, carried out against a youth culture and a liberal establishment that was deemed antithetical to the silent majority who comprised, in President Richard Nixon's words, "...the millions of people in the middle of the political spectrum who do not demonstrate, who do not picket or protest loudly" (Richard Nixon, quoted in Perlstein, 2009: p.277). While the demonstrators proclaimed their virtue through protest, ordinary people lived their virtue by keeping faith with existing social, political, and religious values. Society, conservatives proposed, could be governed in terms of these values rather than in terms of different forms of professional expertise. Reagan stated this thesis clearly at the 1964 Republican Convention: "They say we offer simple solutions to complex problems. Well, perhaps there is a simple solution – not an easy answer, but simple: if you and I have the courage to tell our elected officials that we want our national policy to be based on what we know in our hearts is morally right" (1964).

Governing Through Crime

An especially important target of popular resentment against the cultural/liberal elite was liberal policy expertise, one of the legitimating pillars of the New Deal. This expertise, conservatives argued, had supplanted populist common sense, with socially catastrophic consequences. The neo-conservative critique of New Deal policy expertise converged with the reactionary attitude toward late modernity to engender a new style of governing, what Jonathan Simon (2006) refers to as *governing through crime*. Governing through crime was, in part, a response to higher crime rates, which grew in the United States from the early 1960s to the early 1990s. As Catherine Beckett (1997) has shown, however, public concern with crime is not well correlated with the increase in the crime rate. Surges in public concern

with crime correlate, rather, with the decisions of the political elites to signal crime as a threat to the social order. What one sees here is the domestic version of what international relations theorists term Securitization Theory (William, 2003): élites utter the speech acts that characterize crime as a security issue, where the idea of security implies the probability of mortal combat with the enemy and hence the need for a response that breaks with normal routines of political deliberation. Securitization Theory draws on Carl Schmitt's conception of politics as the relationship between friend and enemy. The enemy is someone who is "existentially different" from us. From the point of view of governing through crime, he is a willful wrong doer who must be deterred and punished in order to safeguard the security of an increasingly exposed community (Lemke, 2014).

Securitizing speech acts presuppose a set of back ground understandings that link speaker and audience. With respect to governing through crime, these relationships are rooted in racial stereotypes, which were formed in relationship to slavery. During slavery, blacks were depicted as simple and childlike – and in need of white paternal guidance – in the form of slavery – in order to live useful lives. With emancipation, the characterization of blacks in the United States shifted abruptly – they were no long simple souls, but violent criminals that could not be expected to live within the framework of the law. This characterization of blacks was closely associated with the convict leasing system that emerged in the American South, a form of neo-slavery, which reinforced a larger pattern of subordination of black sharecroppers to white landowners (Lopez, 2014). Crucially, however, the conception of Blacks as criminogenic followed them in the two great migrations of Afro-Americans from the rural South to the industrializing North.

From 1924 to 1965, the United States also maintained immigration quotas that excluded non-Europeans from emigrating to the United States. There were, of course, deep racial animosities between different cohorts of immigrants, spearheaded by Anglo-Americans who saw themselves as sitting atop of the racial pecking order. But during the middle decades of the 20th Century, much of this pecking order became dissolved as different ethnic groups became assimilated into Fordist capitalism. Indeed, in this particular respect, the Ford Corporation was a leader, operating English language schools for foreign born workers that inculcated them with the Protestant virtues of sobriety and the consumer habits of an emerging mass consumption society (Rupert, 1995). In effect, non-Black ethnics were whitened and, at the same time, they were nationalized. Wendy Wall (2008) has examined, in this respect, the emergence of consensual conception of national identity that bridged the gaps between different religious, ethnic and ideological identities. All were brought under the rubric of, on the one hand, an American creed which established the freedom for all people and, on the other, a rapidly expanding corporate economy that promised a rising standard of living for all.

Blacks stood outside of this circle of membership. Their exclusion was based on racial attitudes and sustained as the core meaning of race shifted from biological to cultural difference in the 20th Century. Viewed through the lens of cultural difference, blacks comprised an ethnicity, characterized by weak family structures, unattached males and welfare dependent female households. Crime emerged from this, in Moynihan's (1965) words, "tangle of pathology" and, as such, posed a singular challenge to liberal governance via professional expertise. This expertise, as Garland notes, was rooted in the practices of penal welfarism oriented toward the rehabilitation of deviants that had been defectively socialized by their families or communities. The rise of progressive sociology sought to dispel the racist idea the blacks comprised a class of guilty felons, whereas whites were positioned in relationship to blacks as innocent victims (Dilts, 2014). While the progressive tradition reshaped, to some extent, the

practices of the state, orienting them toward penal welfarism, it made limited inroads into the consciousness of the white (or newly whitened) working class. The idea of black criminality as a threat to stable urban communities – rather than economic disinvestment or political disempowerment – would become a corner stone of the strong state and governing through crime (Simon, 2014: p.127).

Penal welfarism vested probation officers, social workers, judges and wardens with extensive discretion to impose penalties on offenders that would achieve the aims of rehabilitation. Crime was a problem that could be solved with the right techniques and interventions. Some of the social policy dimensions of penal welfarism are evident in the linkages that liberal policy makers drew between poverty and crime. The 1967 report from the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, held, for example, that "Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment is warring on crime. A civil rights law is a law against crime. Money for schools is money against crime. Medical, psychiatric and counseling services are services against crime. More broadly and more importantly, every effort to improve life in America's "inner cities" is an effort against crime" (quoted in Garland, 2001: p.225).

By the mid-1960s, crime and poverty had emerged as national problems to be addressed through the large scale mobilization of Federal resources, informed by policy expertise. It is important, in this context, to consider the experiences of white ethnics that lived in close proximity to black inner cities in which riots and crime raged. Jonathan Rieder's informants in the Canarsie neighborhoods of Brooklyn recollected vivid instances of criminal violation. "A trucker remembered defecating in his pants a few years ago when five black youths cornered him a few years ago and placed a knife blade on his throat....the police came and we caught one of them. The judge gave them a fucking two year probation" (quoted in Edsall & Edsall, 1991: p.157). Of significance here is racial violence as an axis around which the crisis of Fordism was experienced (Simon, 2014). Elsewhere, Rieder remarks that in light of these sorts of experiences, "...many middle income Democrats saw liberal fellow democrats as moral adversaries," a perception that signaled the transformation of liberalism – or, indeed, as Lopez (2014) discusses, the *darkening* of liberalism. It was no longer about supporting vulnerable working people, but rather "...taking the side of Blacks no matter what...handcuffing the police, transferring resources...to minorities, rationalizing rioting, dependency and other moral afflictions as "caused" by the environment or as the justifiable response to oppression" (Rieder, 1989: p.258).

These experiences emerged in the context of slowing economic growth, rising inflation and intensifying class conflict. But these economic crisis tendencies, associated with the disintegration of Fordism, were experienced by working and middle class communities as a crisis of order, which called, above all else, for a restoration of order. With respect to crime, the structural criminology characteristic of penal welfarism was displaced by volitional narratives of street crime. The idea that the state could, through policy expertise, solve to social problems such as crime or poverty gave way to the neo-conservative assertion that nothing works (Garland, 2001). Over the course of the 1960s and the 1970s, the rise of conservative policy culture (the so called neo-conservatives) created a counter New Deal policy science, largely outside the university system (conceived, of course, as a bastion of liberal orthodoxy) which spoke systematically to the proposition that government policy-making was counter-productive, exacerbating rather than solving social problems (Micklewaithe & Woolridge, 2004). This neo-conservative critique pressed for a restoration of social order rather than a program of social transformation.

At the heart of this restoration of order was the protection of victims. Governing through crime shifted the focus of criminal justice from criminals, as potential objects rehabilitation, to crime victims,

both potential and actual, as consumers of security. In the movement from offender to victim, new forms of political authority emerged. Where penal welfarism vested authority in the work of criminal justice experts, governing through crime accentuated what Simon terms “prosecutorial authority” (2006). In contrast to other countries, in the United States, prosecutors are elected officials, accountable to public in their capacity to secure convictions against criminal defendants. From the perspective of the prosecutor, there is a zero-sum relationship between the interests of criminal defendants and crime victims. The latter are typically interested in retributive justice, which serves as compensation for their injuries. The public at large also participates in this form of justice with the assurance that escalating convictions and punishments protect them from future harm.

Simon (2006) argues that this model of political authority became generalized within the United States as the conservative conception of the crime became a lens through which other issues could be represented by political figures eager to identify themselves as protectors of the public. Central to this view of crime was the idea that offenders were willful wrongdoers (and not themselves the victims of social injustice). The figure of the wrongdoer could be associated with other issues. Neighborhoods were harassed by gangs. Economic productivity was sapped by drug use. Schools were threatened by powerful teachers unions. Healthcare costs were inflated by greedy trial lawyers. National security was imperiled by fanatical terrorists. Across these issues the public emerged as an exposed community, a community of victims set upon by wrongdoers of different stripes and dependent on the determination of their leaders to protect them. This protection would become the vocation of the strong state.

The Strong State

The idea of social protection returns us to the work of Karl Polanyi. For Polanyi, the protection of society emerged in relationship to operation of market and the attempt to treat the essential components of society – land, labor and money – as commodities. The turn to neoliberalism exposed society to market forces, but the strong state protected society from the social forces that we unleashed by liberal disorder rather than markets. It is nonetheless the case, as Polanyi notes, that markets are instituted processes. What I would like to suggest in this section of the paper is that, in the context of the crisis of Fordism, they became instituted by means of establishing a neo-conservative social order that became the foundation for neoliberal freedom. This order assumes, in turn, the form of the strong state. The strong state is not just an increasingly powerful state apparatus; it is centered on the new ways in which state power penetrates civil society through the provision of security – indeed, through the provision of a distinctive kind of security. The security of the Fordist welfare state was rooted in institutions of social insurance, which mitigated the insecurities associated with the capitalism. The new security institutions, discussed in the next section, do not mitigate insecurity but rather they are adaptations to its pervasive presence.

These new security institutions grow out of governing through crime. To see how, let us take a look inside the first Reagan Administration (Republican). U.S. President Ronald Reagan, of course, wanted to cut social spending in order to diminish the insulation of the poor and the working class from market discipline (Piven & Cloward, 1985). But not all domestic spending would be cut. David Stockman, Reagan’s Director of the Office of Management and Budget recollects the arguments made by William French Smith, Reagan’s first Attorney General. “The Justice Department is not a domestic agency,” Smith maintained, “...it is the internal arm of the nation’s defense” or, more succinctly, the “Internal Defense Department” (quoted in Beckett, 1997: p.53). The provision of domestic security

became increasingly linked to national security agencies, engendering in the process the growth of a militarized internal security state. The Nixon administration had begun to define a role for the military in federal drug enforcement policy, leading to judicial reinterpretation of the *Posse Comitatis* Act. The Reagan administration pushed further in this direction with the Military Cooperation and Law Enforcement Act, which gave law enforcement agencies access to military intelligence (Balko, 2014).

With the election of President Bill Clinton (Democrat), the Justice Department entered into a formalized technology and equipment sharing agreement with the Defense Department. Underpinning this was a convergence in the missions of both agencies toward militarized policing, whether in a post conflict zones outside the United States or in high crime urban regions inside the United States. “So let me welcome you,” remarked Attorney General Janet Reno in a speech to defense and intelligence specialists, “to the kind of war our police fight every day. And let me challenge you to turn your skills that served us so well in the Cold War to helping us with the war that we are now fighting daily in the streets of our towns and cities” (quoted in Balko, 2014: p.193).

This conception of law enforcement as internal defense signaled a shift from a Durkheimian problem of solidarity to be achieved by means of policies oriented toward integrating marginalized groups into the social order (Garland, 2001) to a Schmittian project of maintaining a social order based on the friend/enemy distinction. This relationship was re-drawn to unify victims and potential victims against offenders. As Scheingold remarks, “We are led to think of criminal as persons fundamentally different in character (and appearance) from law abiding members of society; criminals are unknown predators, awaiting their opportunity to attack property and persons” (1991: p.179). Reagan invoked, in this regard, the figure of the enemy/criminal in the form of a “stark, staring face – a face that belongs to the frightening reality of our time: the face of a human predator...nothing in nature is more cruel, more dangerous” (Reagan, 1981).

In this same speech, Reagan argued that the expansion of the welfare state had weakened the mediating institutions of society – the family, the church, and the community – from which spring the bedrock values of society. The disintegration of these mediating institution generates anomie and criminality. But these circumstances cannot be reversed through the techniques of penal welfarism: “...the solution to the crime problem,” argued Reagan, “will not be found in the social worker’s files, the psychiatrist’s notes, or the bureaucrat’s budgets. It’s a problem of the human heart and there we must look for an answer” (1981). The human heart is formed by the mediating institutions of society. It is these institutions, therefore, that must be defended. This defense entails a relocation of the state power along the borders of a “free society” and what Reagan termed “the law of the jungle” threatening to violate the mediating institutions of society. These borders were literally everywhere.

Here we encounter, once again, the policy dilemma articulated with a strong neo-conservative accent: liberal expertise cannot organize society; society must organize itself. The role of the state is to act on the margins of the self-organizing society. These margins must be delineated by the coercive exercise of state power that is oriented toward protecting law-abiding citizens. At stake in all of this is the circulation of people, money and investment through an ordered environment. A requisite of neoliberalism is, in this sense, the practical functioning of a space that can secure a market order and which, perhaps more importantly, can produce the subjects of such an order. In this way, society can survive as a realm of amicability – between neoliberal subjects - from which the enemy has been banished.

The organization of internal spaces of security emerged as the new project of governance. Nancy Fraser (2004) characterizes this project of governance in terms the implementation of segmented governmentalities responsabilized self-care for some and increasingly invasive social control for those “deemed incapable of the discharging the responsibilities of late modern freedom” (Garland, 2001: p.194). The possibility that one might fail to discharge the responsibilities of freedom was spread over the entire surface of society. It emerged, most obviously, in the rise of mass incarceration as a response to rising crime rates. But it existed, as well, within the institutions of the neighborhood, the school, the workplace and the family. The borderlines between spaces of self-care and repression reached deep within each of institutions, attempting to demarcate spaces of the security within an insecure world.

Consider, in this regard, how the previous assembly of the national – the welfare state – comprised an institutional structure that contained precarity, relegating this condition to subaltern groups, that is, to blacks, migrants, and women. With the onset of neoliberal restructuring, precarity – in the form of exposure to economic insecurity – has been de-contained: it has been able to establish a more pervasive and threatening exterior that consists of a growing mass of precaritized individuals who are subject to new forms of social and economic dislocation and deprivation. In his regard, Isabel Lorey comments on precarity as a source of disorder. The greatest threats to the social and political body do not emanate from threats that come from outside, but instead “...develop in an excess of what is no longer governable...an excess of what is to be ordered, an excess of what can no longer be regulated or controlled and consequently no longer governed” (2015: p.44). This is the virus of precarity, which calls forth new mechanisms of security in order to contain it.

These new mechanisms of security act as a buffer to the social disorder that is generated by successive rounds of neo-liberalization. As discussed below, these mechanisms of security operate within the neighborhood (or community), family, school and workplace by means of establishing ever more exclusive but nonetheless precarious spaces of circulation. They both protect and against external dangers and pose the possibility of expulsion of individuals and groups that are either insufficiently productive or, in terms of behavior or disposition, disruptive to the goals of ever increasing productivity and growth.

With regard to neighborhoods, Kelling and Wilson (1982), in their well-known account of broken windows policing, extolled foot patrol policing as a way not to reduce crime but to maintain order within neighborhoods by regulating everyday public interactions:

Drunks and addicts could sit on the stoops, but could not lie down. People could drink on side streets, but not at the main intersection. Bottles had to be in paper bags. Talking to, bothering, or begging from people waiting at the bus stop was strictly forbidden. If a dispute erupted between a businessman and a customer, the businessman was assumed to be right, especially if the customer was a stranger. If a stranger loitered, ...[the officer] would ask him if he had any means of support and what his business was; if he gave unsatisfactory answers, he was sent on his way. Persons who broke the informal rules, especially those who bothered people waiting at bus stops, were arrested for vagrancy. Noisy teenagers were told to keep quiet.

The unruly could and should – as a matter of public order – be excluded from the public sphere in order to protect the interests of law abiding citizens. Their exclusion was enacted for the sake of the maintaining the physical order of neighborhoods, which would then provide the secure spaces in which the law abiding could live. In major metropolitan areas, “broken windows policing” became translated into Order Maintenance Policing (OMP) in which police focused on petty crime committed by racial

minorities as pretexts for searches and arrests that would uncover illegal gun possession, narcotics possession or outstanding warrants (Fagan & Davies, 2000). Rather than helping to sustain communities, the objective that had been originally envisioned in broken windows policing, OMP imposed order through a policy of mass arrest. This signaled, to real estate developers, the presence of security conditions that enabled gentrification of neighborhoods that were previously inhabited by the poor. In this way, urban areas that had experienced high levels of deindustrialization were refurbished as the enclaves of an emerging knowledge economy inhabited by “the creative classes” (Medina, 2015; Peck, 2010). While these practices opened up new social and economic spaces for emerging social classes, they also criminalized urban minorities, particularly, the urban poor, with the effects of subjecting them to jail time and rendering them unemployable. Policing thus engendered marginalization as the flip side of economic revitalization. And the continuing application of the OMP, in New York and other major metropolitan areas, is intended to generate security for this economic transformation.

In this regard, Beckett and Herbert (2009), discuss the development of new policing techniques, centered on the use of civil citations that target criminal intentions rather than acts. Ostensive drug dealers and prostitutes, for example, can be given a civil citation for intent to sell or consume illegal drugs or intent to engage in prostitution. The civil citation functions as a banishment order, requiring its recipient to vacate a particular urban region for specified period of time. Beckett and Herbert (2009) emphasize the territorial character of this form of policing: it is not oriented toward deterrence or the retribution, but rather toward securing space for legitimate modes of circulation, that is, the unimpaired circulation of goods, consumers and workers within increasingly high valued urban spaces.

There are additional instruments of control that also function with this same end in mind. These include the use of banishment orders from public parks for alcohol consumption and public urination and the use of trespass admonitions that police deploy as the agents of property owners and managers. In Seattle, where Beckett and Herbert conducted their study, the indigent have been banished from the public transport system, college campuses, hospitals, religious institutions, social service agencies and commercial establishments (2009: p. 50). Historically, these practices can be seen as a recuperation of police powers. These were previously exercised through vagrancy laws, but were struck down as a result of the rights revolution and its emphasis on diminishing arbitrary police power. Deindustrialization, drastic cuts in Federal housing assistance and deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill have created new indigent and often homeless populations. New practices of policing operated to secure urban spaces from the economically and socially dislocated by relegating them to the margins of society. At issue here, once again, is the practical functioning of neo-liberal spaces of circulation.

These new forms of order required a greater police presence and, as a result, a society that is increasingly ordered by means of policing. The war on drugs has abetted the intense patterns of policing associated with OMP and the new practices of urban banishment. Mona Lynch calls attention to the magnitude of drug arrests. “In 1982, police made approximately 676,000 drug arrests, of which 75% were for possession; by 2007, police had made 1,840,000 arrests, of which 80% were for possession” (2012: p.186). Drug arrests were the only category of criminal offense to have grown since the 1980, as crime rates in other categories have fallen since the early-1990s. On account of increased drug arrests, the police have expanded its institutional presence of American social life. Lynch illustrates this point by noting the increased number of police and costs of policing during an era when crime has steadily declined. “While non-drug arrests fell dramatically from 1992-2008, the nation’s pool of sworn police

officers rose by 26% and the costs of local policing (excluding federal) doubled from \$131 per U.S. resident to \$260 per resident in the 14 years from 1993-2008” (2012: p.189).

Schools have similarly become zones in which law enforcement is increasingly integral to the adjudication of everyday interactions. Whereas teachers previously mediated conflicts between students – and thereby engaged in a process of norm-shaping - they have been largely displaced in this capacity by law enforcement personnel. The effect of this has been to forge a closer link between public education and criminal justice systems, where misbehavior in the former establishes the grounds for exile into the latter. The impetus for the formation such a conduit stemmed from a growing recognition of the educational failure of the public schools, a finding that was enunciated in the 1983 Carnegie Foundation Report, *A Nation at Risk*. As Simon (2006: p.214) observes, the Safe Schools Act of 1994 mandated the every school in the United States should be free of drugs and thereby offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning. Here as within the public spaces of neighborhoods, the interests of victim and potential victim – both aspiring, one must assume, to accumulate human capital - had to be protected by an increasingly robust, zero tolerance security apparatus.

Increased police presence within schools was a manifestation of the federalization of the crime, with the Justice Department, through the 1990s, funding the hiring of police in schools. These programs were associated with the warnings of “juvenile super predators” described by conservative Political Scientist John Diliulio as “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless” sociopaths, “who pack guns and instead of lunches and have absolutely no respect for human life” – and hence the need for exclusionary policies in order to protect potential victims (quoted in Vitale, 2015). Schools became, consequently, the sites of broken windows policing in which small infractions of school discipline were rigorously punished, establishing a more greater classroom discipline, enforced in the interests of learning and, reflecting the concerns of *A Nation at Risk*, namely maintaining economic competitiveness. Increasingly subject to evaluation on the basis of standardized test scores, schools have targeted black boys for disciplinary actions, suspensions and expulsions.

In workplaces, governing through crime has escalated as collective bargaining has declined. Prior to the New Deal advent of collective bargaining, collective action by workers – in the form of strikes or the formation of unions – was suppressed through the use of coercive force on the part of the police, federal troops or private militias maintained by employers (Piven & Cloward, 1978). These forms of class conflict disrupted assembly line production leading reformers, including many different industrialists, to advocate collective bargaining as a means of replacing often violent class conflict with productivity enhancing class collaboration (Fraser, 1989). Collective bargaining’s institutionalization of labor relations (Reich, 2000) has receded, leaving in its wake a highly individualized regime to labor control. This is marked by the norm of at will employment and the multiplication of conditions for gaining and losing employment, including drug testing of employees and more intensive surveillance of employee conduct both on and off the job. The neo-conservative agenda of social control – diminishing welfare benefits while waging a war on drugs – have made livelihoods outside the formal labor market problematic. The highly surveilled workplace is an increasingly inescapable and individualized zone of exploitation in which the prospect of sudden expulsion looms continuously.

Campbell (1992) notes, in this regard, that the implementation of drug testing protocols in workplaces and schools during the 1980s sought to erect new distinctions between normality and criminal pathology. Similar to the red scares of the 1950s, think tanks and universities publicized the signs of pathological difference, including “arriving late and leaving early,” “taking long lunches,” “Friday

and Monday absences,” “putting things off,” “Irresponsibility in completing tasks,” “faulty decision making,” “overreactions to criticism,” and “poor personal hygiene.” (Campbell, 1992: p.208). The manifestation of such symptoms mattered, asserted Ronald Reagan, because “drug use is not a private matter. Using illegal drugs is unacceptable behavior.” Like criminals, drug users “can no longer excuse themselves by blaming society. As individuals, they’re responsible” (quoted in Beckett, 1997: p.55).

Reagan’s inclusion of drug use within an expanding zone of criminality made families subject to increasingly intrusive policing. A key development has been for families to become increasingly responsible for policing the criminality of their dependent children – or face the prospect of exclusion from access to vital services such as insurance, housing, schools, financial aid, and student loans. Balko (2014) offers an account of such policing, which occurred in March 1996 with a SWAT team raid in Toledo, Ohio, which turned up only an ounce of marijuana in the bedroom of a teenager who lived in the house with its family. Media coverage of the incident portrayed it not as an abuse of police power, but as a successful enforcement of a new federal policy directed at public housing residents: Clinton’s “one strike and you’re out” policy in which any drug offense became grounds for eviction for eviction, even, adds, Balko, “if the drug offense was committed by someone who did not live in the home or was committed without the tenant’s knowledge” (Balko, 2014: p.195). Here was another small victory, reported ABC news, in the war on drugs.

The possibility of suffering these dire consequences has led families to become consumers of security services in the form of home surveillance, boot camps, and counseling services. The quest for spaces of familial security has led, of course, to the proliferation of gated communities, the adaptation of continuous adult supervised activities, and preferences for security conscious educational institutions, keen to exclude trouble makers. There is an uncanny symmetry between the affluent suburban household and the much feared career criminal. The former, “locked in SUVs, parked in secured garage, locked inside a gated and privately policed subdivision” is the mirror image of the latter, “locked inside a high-technology armored cell within a super-max prison” (Simon, 2006: p.204). Security insulation for affluent households and long term incapacitation for career criminals describe the ends of a security continuum that has been implanted in U.S. society in the context of neo-liberalization.

Security Culture

The similarity to discern across these settings is that security has become a field of *differential inclusion* in which individuals and households can become subject to the possibility of exclusion from the fundamental institutions of civil society. This dovetails with the logic of neo-liberal restructuring in which economic relationships of all kinds have become increasingly volatile. This volatility leads, of course, to widespread social and economic dislocation in which, as Polanyi (1957) famously argued, the commodification of the fundamental elements of economic life – land, labor and money – provoke the emergence of counter-movements oriented toward the self-protection of the society. Followers of Polanyi (Harvey, 2005; Evans, 2005) have tended to see double movements as oppositional struggles to market society rather than ways of institutionalizing processes of neo-liberalization. But how if double movements institutionalize and “protect” market society? Brenner, Peck and Theodore call attention, in this regard, to the ways in which “the interplay between neo-liberalization projects and inherited institutional landscapes produces a *ricocheting* of multiple, differentially spatialized yet interconnected double movements across places, territories and scales” (2010: p.197). The processes of differential inclusion sketched out above can be understood in terms of how inherited institutions absorb and adapt to recurring waves of neo-liberalization through the production of new forms of security.

These new forms of security are increasingly mediated by security professionals and devoid of conviviality. This is a reflection of the ways in which neoliberal economic restructuring eviscerates networks of social trust and capital. Consider, in this regard, the distinctions that Simon (2012) draws between different modes of punishment. Associated with penal welfarism were practices of probation, which comprised, in Foucault's terms (2007), a kind of pastoral power, with deviants as sheep that state officials attempt to guide or correct, not by asserting correspondence to a disciplinary norm, but rather through re-connecting individuals to their communities. Probation did not, in this sense, occur within disciplinary enclosures – as was the case with Foucault's (1979) analysis of the disciplines as rooted within particular settings (the school, the factory, the military barracks, the hospital) - but within the space of civil society. Probation declined as the institutions of civil society disintegrated. These were practices that simply could not work in the absence of community. But other forms of control could: in the words of Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1978), a different kind of societal control culture was implanted with the rise of neo-liberalism. This was a culture in which control was no longer invested in a knowledge of individuals, but rather, as Simon indicates, in the aggregate management of the populations characterized as high risk. Social control became organized around precautionary technologies which pose the possibility of exclusion from the institutions of civil society. While the new system of societal control is ultimately anchored in the prison, it is also spread out across the surface of society and it operates in terms of the logic of governing through crime in the sense of drawing upon and supporting "how citizens have been taught to protect themselves against victimization" (Simon, 2012: p.79).

The emerging system of control is, in effect, not a panopticon, but a banopticon (Bigo, 2008), which operates to secure the exclusion of risky individuals for the circuits of the production and circulation associated with neo-liberalized modes of economic growth. At the core of this new cultural of societal control is the control of mobility (not social mobility, but movement) as a way of coming to terms with catastrophic social risk – the risk, in particular of having one's living spaces violated or, even worse, the critical infrastructures upon which one's life depends. Contrast this with social insurance as a way of hedging against markets risks. During the Fordist/New Deal era, society was diagrammed in terms of widely disseminated forms of social insurance, such as unemployment insurance, social security pensions or aid to families with dependent children. Protection against catastrophic risk today is more concerned ensuring the security of a more volatile and exposed space of flows. The emerging culture of control, as William Walters (2006) suggests is about governing access to these flows in terms mobility, credit, and information, while filtering out a possibly dangerous remainder. One important transformation that has occurred here concerns the temporality of the security. Social insurance mapped out security over the course of an individual's lifetime. Neo-liberalized security is concerned, on the other hand, with the security of the moment. One might regard this foreshortening of security as a manifestation of the time/space compression that Harvey (1989) associates with capitalist modernization.

These bureaucratized provisions of security are politically grounded in the figure of the political leader as a protector of the people against willful wrongdoers. Within the tenuous spaces of security that these leaders (in their capacities as mayors, governors and presidents) offer, individuals and households cultivate themselves as neo-liberal subjects, that is, as economically rational subjects seeking to position themselves competitively within a constantly changing economic environment. This situation is rife with insecurity, as Brown explains: "As human capital, the subject is at once in charge of itself, responsible for itself, and yet an instrumentalizeable and potentially dispensable element of the whole" (2015: p.38).

Security is a matter of creating a secure perimeter around this competitive arena, enclosing and protecting the forms of inequality and stratification that are produced through neo-liberalization. These points can be understood by consulting Foucault's (2008) reflections on neoliberalism. At the core of this work is that idea that the market is an artifice rather than a spontaneously created order. Economic competition does not occur naturally, but has to be instituted politically by means of administratively delineating the space of market society and governing in a way that supports this formal structure rather than intervening directly within it. Society must be regulated by the market, but this society must, in its own right, be produced by neoliberal government. Thus, the neoliberal formula is that the state constructs the society that is regulated by the market by virtue of securing (and often securitizing) the institutions of civil society. The previous section of the paper, drawing on the work of Simon (2006) provided a brief overview of this project.

Within the framework of market society, individuals are free to engage in self-determination. Of particular significance, suggests Terrence Turner (2003), is the emergence of synchronic pluralism in place of diachronic nationalism. The idea of diachronic nationalism is that people participate in – and are defined by – the realization of national purposes which unfold over time (Beer, 1965; Schambra, 1999). In Hegelian terms, the state represents, in this sense, the higher unity of civil society in which the ends one wills individually are consistent with the universal aims of the state. In the great national community, Americans would embrace the national idea and subordinate individual self-interest to the national interest. The New Deal and the Great Society sought to, in Lyndon Johnson's words, "perfect the unity of the people" (quoted in Schambra, 1999: p.106). Synchronic pluralism, by contrast, is not focused on the historical horizons of the nation state, but instead on the self-production of individuals through individual choices, which articulate lifestyles that are no longer beholden to any encompassing social or political order. But this synchronic pluralism is nonetheless rooted in the neo-conservative orientations to social policy that, as Garland remarks, "fasten on to the behavior of unemployed workers, welfare mothers, immigrants, offenders and drug users" (2001: p.100).

Consider the transformation of the New York City as an illustration of this point. During the post-World War Two decades, New York City had become an urban heartland of the New Deal, offering its citizens extensive social services, delivered by a heavily unionized municipal bureaucracy. Indeed, New York built an extensive network of public hospitals, a tuition free university, a highly developed transportation infrastructure, an excellent public school system, an egalitarian system of rent-control that enabled working and middle class people to maintain access to the city (Phillips-Fein, 2013). New York's capacity to sustain this level of public provision diminished under the strain of urban riots, suburban flight and de-industrialization. As this capacity diminished, New York was re-imagined as a moral cesspool. An example of this is Travis' speech to Senator Palantine in the film *Taxi Driver* (1976). Asked by Senator Palantine what he would like the next president to do, Travis responds: "Well, he should clean this city up, here. Its filth and scum and scum and filth. It's like an open sewer. Sometimes I can hardly take it. Some days I go out and smell it and then I get headaches that just stay and never go away. We need a President who will clean up this whole mess. Flush it right down the fucking toilet." This passage – and indeed the film as a whole – speaks to the way in which the disintegration of Fordism was experienced as a crisis of order – an order which the strong state could restore.

New York engaged in deficit spending, financed through loans provided to the city through Wall Street investment banks. The debt crisis emerged when investors refusal to roll over New York's debt. When the federal government refused a bailout, city leaders were left to negotiate a deal with creditors

whereby it agreed not only to sharp budget cuts and massive public layoffs, but also a reorientation of city governance from public provision to corporate growth and expansion. The new project of governance combined the establishment of order with the retrenchment of services and entitlements for dependent poor (Peck, 2010: p.146). Emerging from the debt induced restructuring of New York City, Harvey discerns a cultural politics in which "...the ruling elites moved, often factiously, to support the opening up of the cultural field to all manner of diverse cosmopolitan currents. The narcissistic exploration of self, identity and culture became a leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture.... Delirious New York (to use Rem Koolhaas' memorable phrase) erased democratic New York" (2005: p. 47).

The point to notice here is the way in which synchronic pluralism – of the kind celebrated in New York – emerges through the imposition of neo-conservative order. This is indicative of the larger fusion between neo-liberalism and the neo-conservatism in which the agendas of freedom and control become hierarchically conjoined. As discussed above, this fusion has materialized in different institutional sites: the city, the neighborhood, the school, the workplace, and the family, each of which becomes reconfigured in terms of security. Each is subject to a more intensified regime of security oriented policing and towards the expelling anyone that poses a threat to security by means of "zero tolerance" policies. Through these mechanisms of security, the neoliberal state establishes ever more exclusive and protected zones of circulation. These are the nodes, or the pathways of circulation, for the life that neoliberal power seeks to protect. This organization of security/circulation also corresponds to the processes neo-liberal economic restructuring operate by means of expelling people from previously secure livelihoods, financializing more and more aspects of their well-being, subjecting everyone and everything to the vicissitudes of market forces. In all of this, security provides a series of mechanisms for expulsion and a means by which the life that power means to protect can be secured through the production and containment of a dangerous outside.

Neo-liberalism proposes a life of market freedom. To make this life live, it has to be secured against its enemies (Dillon, 2009: p.168). The contribution that neo-conservatism makes to neo-liberalism is to produce an enemy in relationship to which neo-liberalism is able to reproduce itself. Political élites have engaged in security mobilizations, which invoke the presence of this enemy in the form of a criminal class that is thought to be incapable of discharging the responsibilities of the freedom. As Beckett (1997) shows, public opinion in the United States has been highly responsive to these mobilizations. Consider an example of such a mobilization: the Polly Klass murder of 1993 involved the kidnapping and murder of the 12-year-old girl from a Northern California suburban home. Klass' murderer was a paroled ex-convict, guilty of several serious crimes. The publicity her case generated demonstrated the depravity of the crime (and of criminals in general), the vulnerability of white suburbanites to it, and inability of government to protect them from it. The political response was the overwhelming passage of California's "Three Strikes" ballot initiative (Simon, 2006: p.156-158). Criminologists deplored Three Strikes as counter-productive criminal justice policy, but, as with almost all of the turn toward penal severity, expert opinion mattered less than the state's capacity to perform its sovereignty through inflicting exemplary punishments on offenders.

This is a form of bio-politics that sustains neo-liberal ways of living by means of constituting individuals as communities of victims. In neo-liberal times, as Garland observes: "Every individual is more and more obliged to adapt the economic attitude of the responsabilized, competitive entrepreneur. The corresponding psychic posture is that of tensed up, restless individual regarding one another with mutual suspicion" (2001: 157). The insecurities of the neo-liberal order are, Garland adds, "the social surface that gives rise to our emphatic, overreaching concern with control" (2001: p.194).

Like Hurricanes that gather strength from warm waters, penal severity draws on the insecurities of neo-liberal society. These are aggregated and condensed into a conception of society as an “exposed community” (Lemke, 2014: p.68). The idea of society as an exposed community marks a division between public and private spheres in which the private sphere emerges as a realm of individualized freedom and the public realm takes shape as a zone of security.

The next section of this paper focuses on the expansion of the public realm, conceived as a zone of security, in conjunction with the processes of globalization. The argument here is that the modes of security that have emerged from the strong state have proven to be effective in terms of inserting U.S. society into a globalizing world. The strong state and governing through crime are, indeed, ways in which globalization in the United States has become institutionalized.

Security and the “Space of Flows”

Globalization can be understood as the construction of a transnational and, indeed, global “space of flows”. Manuel Castells analyzes the space of flows as form of capitalist restructuring in which the space of places has become progressively uprooted by liberalized flows of information, money, investment, images and people. These flows are articulated by global networks of various kinds. Castells describes networks of industrial production that are “submitted to the endless changing movements of cooperation and competition between firms and between locales, sometimes historically cumulative and sometimes reversing patterns through deliberate institutional entrepreneurship” (2000: p.425). Alongside of this constantly changing “variable geometry” of economic relationships, Saskia Sassen discerns the emergence of corresponding policy networks formed “by experts on a variety of issues critical to a global corporate economy” (2006: p.298). What transpires within both of these economic and policy networks is the formation of de-nationalized spaces which are subject to global market forces.

The meaning of “de-nationalization” requires some qualification. The space of flows does not create a purely smooth space, the equivalent of what Thomas Friedman has termed “the flat world” (2005). It rather emerges on the basis of an ongoing fragmentation and differentiation of space. One view of this fragmentation of social space is offered by Evelyn Meiskins Wood (2003), who notes the dependence of global capitalism on local systems of rule. Local systems of rule depend upon processes of bordering: partitioning and administering social spaces in ways that orchestrates social differences into a system of control. On this account the identity of the social hinges on the delineation of new borders between outside and inside. These borders establish spaces of identity and security from a threatening outside. They rearticulate historically grounded relationships between political being and security.

One way to think about the relationship between security and the space of flows is to consider the significance of the frontier myth in U.S. history. The frontier was a zone of conflict in which American heroes produced order in the midst racial and ethnic conflict. Frontier expansion surged beyond the territorial borders of the United States. By the middle of the 20th Century, U.S. envisioned transforming the world in the image of the United States. When conflicts, like the Vietnam War, emerged on the edges of the U.S. sphere of influence, they were framed, culturally and politically, as frontier wars (Slotkin, 1992). The frontier secured an integrative, Fordist order in which class conflict was institutionalized by collective bargaining and racial injustices were to be ameliorated – theoretically - by the formation of the welfare state. By the 1970s, however, the boundaries of the frontier had become weakened both internally and externally. In the wake of defeat in Vietnam, U.S. cultural narratives – in the form of popular movies and pulp novels – depicted what many liberals refused to recognize, “the absolute reality of evil” (Gibson,

1994: p.74). “By insisting that there are no bad man but only bad social conditions,” writes William Gibson, “liberals fail to see that criminals, Communists and terrorists commit their horrendous acts because they feel pleasure in killing, raping and kidnapping” (1994: p.74). The figure of the terrorist emerged as a cover term to describe a wide range of adversaries, from gangs to criminal organizations to left wing conspiracies. What the term “terrorism” signifies is the transgression of order fueled by the limitless desire of terrorists to satisfy all of their impulses. The horizon toward which this limitless desire moves is chaos. And this chaos can no longer be located on the periphery. It emerges everywhere and marks the insecurity associated with the disintegration of Fordism. The national emerges here as a space that has been weakened and violated. Notice once again how the decline of Fordism is experienced as liberal disorder. It is the failure of liberal leadership that has empowered the community’s racial and ideological adversaries.

The notion of the community suggested here is the Jacksonian community in which America is regarded as an exceptional space of identity. Pat Buchanan, the leader of the last Jacksonian rebellion within the Republican Party, evoked the idea of America as an exceptional space with his depiction NAFTA as the “virus of free trade.” NAFTA, the World Trade Organization and other international agreements signaled the emergence of the Washington as a manager of globalization and its consequent attenuation from the people, conceived as a demos capable of programming the state that governs them. Again, Buchanan’s rhetoric is illustrative of the gap that emerges between Washington as a manager of globalization and America as an exceptional space that must be kept free of corrupting and impoverishing foreign influence: “It is time,” said Buchanan to the Daughters of the American Revolution, “Americans took their country back. Before we lose her forever, let us take America back from the parasites of the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund], who siphon off America’s wealth for Third World socialists and incompetents” (quoted in Mayer, 1998: p.233).

How is this contradiction between globalization and democratic sovereignty managed? Consider, in this regard, William Walters’ (2004) discussion of domo-politics, an administrative disposition which conceives and seeks to secure the state as a collective home to which some belong, others are invited and still others unlawfully transgress. The common sense of domo-politics corresponds to Cerny’s (1997) conception of the competition state: in order to be economically successful, states must position themselves competitively within the global economic order. What this means from the point of view of security can be understood through the analogy the Walters’ draws between the security of personal computers and national security. To be productive, personal computers have to be linked to the internet, but the risk of productivity is exposure to software viruses. The situation with states is similar. They have to be linked to the globalization, exposing them to the potentially dangerous space of flows. To counter this danger, the state must undertake a comprehensive regulation of mobility, sorting between malign and benign flows in order to carve out the nation’s territory as a space of security, identity and order in an otherwise insecure world.

An exemplar of domo-political understanding is former Border Patrol Commissioner Alan Beslin’s view of U.S. territorial boundaries, crafted in the wake of NAFTA: “We are moving decisively toward a border that functions effectively, one that is a lawful and orderly gateway, one that manages significantly better the problems of illegal migration and smuggling and one that promises and routinely delivers handsome dividends from investment in regional integration” (quoted in Nevin, 2002: p.134). Beslin’s border seamlessly folds the United States into a globalizing world. Consider, on the other hand, a 2007 resolution from the North Carolina Sheriff’s Association on the subject of collaboration of with

the federal authorities on immigration enforcement. The resolution refers to “illegal alien invaders” who “...do not pay taxes, commit crimes against North Carolina citizens and others in this country lawfully, place tremendous strain on the economic and natural resources in North Carolina.” The document added that “reliable documented evidence indicates that terrorist groups, dedicated to the destruction of the United States and its people are entering the United States across its porous and essentially unprotected Southern borders” (quoted in Coleman, 2012). Taken together, these statements point to a new fusion of the neo-liberal freedom and neo-conservative control. On the one hand, the border facilitates the pursuit of freedom through legitimate forms of travel, trade and investment. On the other hand, the border is out of control. Malignant flows have penetrated into the United States, activating local defenses.

Putting these two statements together leads to the conclusion that we have already considered with respect to the strong state, namely that control has to be exerted in order for freedom to exist. Indeed, the nexus between freedom and control which has emerged in the early 21st Century can be characterized as an extension of governing through crime. Characteristic of both is the prosecutorial mode of authority where political leaders protect a public, conceived as a community of victims and potential victims, from willful wrongdoers moved by complete antagonism toward law abiding citizens. John Ashcroft’s post-“9/11” Terrorist Attack rhetoric, in both public speeches and Congressional testimony, captures the ethos of this discourse. “Terrorist operatives infiltrate our communities – plotting, planning, and waiting to kill again. They enjoy the benefits of our free society even as they commit themselves to our destruction” (2001).

The project of Homeland Security entails re-imagining the United States as a homeland, a usage that, as Kaplan notes, “...conveys a sense of native origins...common bloodlines, ancient ancestry, and ethnic homogeneity” (2003: p.86). The idea of the homeland presupposes the national unity and purpose. This purpose, as the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy made clear (2002), is the advance economic freedom unconstrained by barriers to trade or investment. From this perspective, the purpose of the homeland security is not to seal off the homeland from the external world, but to create secure connections between inside and outside. The establishment of these connections depends upon safeguarding the nation conceived as an exposed community living within a perpetual state of emergency (Kaplan, 2003).

But this exposed community is, at the same time, an abstract space, “...founded on the vast network of banks, business centers, and major productive enterprises, as also on motorways, airports, and information lattices.” The operation of these techno-structures is predicated upon de-politicized amicability (Luke, 2004). This de-politicized amicability is not just a requisite of the globalized techno-structures which form the material basis for the “space of flows”, it is also the locus for the forms of political community that have emerged with the disintegration of Fordism and the New Deal order. As the exposition developed above suggests, these have been rooted in the shift of social policy in the U.S. from welfare to social control characteristic of governing through crime. The War on Terror can be conceived as an extension of the modes of control characteristic of governing through crime.

Consider the parallels. The War on Terror relied incarceration as a mode of incapacitating terrorist suspects both within and outside the United States. Executives – in particular, George W. Bush, wielded prosecutorial authority. Bush invoked his “solemn duty to protect duty to protect the people” in dismissing charges of human rights abuses at U.S. detention centers. A zero sum logic emerged in which the deprivation of the rights of detainees was superseded by the security concerns of the public, untroubled by widespread human rights abuses at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and innumerable other detention sites

(Simon, 2006: p.264-273). Like the burgeoning inmate population in the United States, war on terror detainees were, in Bush's terms, "killers" and, in Cheney's, "the worst of the worse" – they were willful and sinful wrongdoers and not the products of historical or social circumstances (Simon, 2006: p.264-273). Notice how this parallels the distinction made earlier in this essay between volitional and structural criminology (Scheingold, 1991). Suspected terrorists were not only incarcerated, but are also, as Ashcroft emphasizes, among us. The dispersion of the terrorist threat corresponds with the proliferating network of connections associated with the space of flows. The insecurity emanating from the space of flows represented a deepening of the insecurity associated rising crime rates in the context of late modernity. The state's response was similarly oriented toward creating a security apparatus that penetrated into civil society and sought, through its expanding presence, to guide the conduct of citizens in terms of security.

Homeland Security emerges as a strategy for policing the space of flows. This is the adaptation of pre-existing institutions, capacities and political dispositions to the challenges that are associated with globalization. Where the Fordist welfare state insulated domestic society from external economic shocks, neo-liberalization has progressively exposed society to ongoing gales of creative destruction characteristic of global capitalism. But security has also emerged as core component of neo-liberalization, engendering a social order that secretes security from every pore. As Hallsworth and Lea remark, "the real border is no longer simply that of the nation state, but of the secured enclaves and neighborhoods within it. The border is everywhere and has become a general resource for internal population control" (2011: p. 150).

Future Prospects

If the border is everywhere, however, then this means that the possibilities for resistance are likewise dispersed. There are two ways to think about this dispersion. The first is to recall a basic insight of securitization theory, which is that security is intersubjective rather than objective in character. Security exists because it has been called into existence by securitizing speech acts which are always addressed to an audience. Securitization is predicated on an ethos of sovereignty, which establish the felicity conditions for securitizing speech acts. As the exposition above has shown, these felicity conditions have been formed historically in conjunction with the development of the state's institutional capacities for delivering the security that it promises. All of this is a path dependent process centered on the production and re-production of political community.

Of particular interest here is the possibility that the modes of securitization through which political community in the United States has been historically constructed are losing force. The mass incarceration is now widely regarded as morally problematic and fiscally unsustainable. Numerous localities have refused to cooperate with the Obama Administration's Secure Communities program. The Obama administration has shifted, to a less rigorous but ambiguously defined "Priority Enforcement" approach. Protests against police killings of black men have ignited widespread debates about policing and community security in the United States. These changes are occurring as the demographic composition of the U.S. population is becoming less white and less religious. The legalization of gay marriage in the United States is indicative of these deep seated changes.

In contemplating the future of the strong state, Simon (2014) suggests that Law's violence, manifested through policies of mass or through policies of mass deportation are, in the future, more likely to be recalibrated than dismantled. Law's violence, suggests Simon, is in the process of being redeployed from the war on drugs to the containment of criminal violence and securing of borders that

are (still) perceived to be insecure. This redeployment is still driven by securitizing practices and, in particular, by narratives of racialized violence that continue to inform the organization of built environments, the content of media programming and the rhetoric of political leaders. While mainstream Democrats abjure these narratives of racialized violence, their economic thinking remains rooted within a neo-liberalized pragmatism which is tied to the demands of “markets”, as such, for economic growth and their aversion toward barriers that would impede that operation of the space of flows (Peck, 2010). Moreover, fiscal discipline, low inflation and regressive tax structures continue to be understood as underlying conditions of economic growth. In this sort of setting, precarity remains viral and the institutions of security described in this paper are likely to remain in effect. In this likely future, the public sphere is a site of security, rather than justice and security continued to be tied to policies of exclusion for actual or potential trouble makers – or, indeed, for anyone who is insufficiently productive to contribute to the overriding objective of achieving and sustaining economic growth.

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Legislative Gridlock, Partisanship and Trust in Government

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ABSTRACT: Trust in government has been enduring an overall decline as legislative gridlock has been increasing in frequency and strength, with both breaking historic records. Research is still in the early phases of determining the many variables that contribute towards varying levels of trust in government. Except for a single examination finding a relationship between legislative gridlock and congressional approval, minimal research analyzes the effects of legislative gridlock on the public. As such, this paper explores whether legislative gridlock is a contributing factor of declining trust in government. Moreover, this paper explores how trust in government may vary by partisan identification as questions still remain regarding the intricacies of such. I utilize ANES survey responses for partisan identification and trust in government from 1984-2012, along with biannual measurements of legislative gridlock levels. A series of multivariate regressions permit an empirical testing of whether legislative gridlock has an effect on trust in government and whether the effects vary by partisan identification. Specifically, this paper presents evidence that legislative gridlock has a significant, if small, negative effect on trust in government. The effects are most pronounced for Pure Independents and Strong Republicans. The remaining findings emphasize the need for additional research in understanding how trust in government varies by partisanship.

Introduction

In October 2013, proximate the government shutdown, public trust in government plummeted to 20%, continuing to reach historic lows (Gallup 2014; PEW 2014). In reality, public trust in government began an overall downward trend beginning in the 1960s (Keele 2007; Nye 1997; Ulbig 2002). At the same time, legislative gridlock has been exhibiting an overall upward trend since the 1950s (Binder 2014). Trust in government is frequently associated with various performance ratings of the government, based on both institutional factors and the individuals involved (Bok 1997; Citrin 1974; Feldman 1983; Keele 2007; Lawrence 1997; Mansbridge 1997; Miller 1974; Ulbig 2002; Weatherford 1987; Williams 1985). At the same time, throughout the literature legislative gridlock is mentioned in relation to government performance and public approval of the various institutions of the government (Binder 2003; Durr et al. 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Nye 1997). Lastly, a prominent feature in the literature is the role of partisanship in relation to trust in government, though results are far from consistent (Citrin 1974; Hibbing & Smith 2004; Keele 2005; Miller 1974; Williams 1985).

The history of legislative gridlock includes several events that are indicative of its partisan roots and demonstrative of the extremes to which this condition can reach. The key event at hand here, a government shutdown, may be considered exemplary of legislative gridlock at its worst. First appearing in the U.S. in 1981, government shutdowns have since ranged from involving a single department to being much more expansive (including multiple Federal agencies). At the same time, government shutdowns have while varied in length of time, lasting from a weekend long to months long (Meyers 1996 & 1997). Two such events occurred during former President Clinton's first term in office, both of which took place

near the end of the first year the 104th Congress (Williams & Jubb 1996). During President Obama's first term in office, a government shutdown was avoided just a few months into the 112th Congress (Phillips 2011). In 2013, during the 113th Congress, tensions ultimately culminated in a complete government shutdown (Benderensky 2014). In merely examining the conditions surrounding just a few cases the relationship between government shutdowns, legislative gridlock, and the partisan divide becomes clear.

Moreover, the impetus for legislative gridlock to lead to government shutdowns is likely partisan driven. For example, during the second half Clinton presidency and the 104th Congress, legislative gridlock had reached what was as of yet a historical high (Binder 2003). To be sure, legislative gridlock is frequently attributed to polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties in Washington (Abramowitz 2013). In particular, between the 95th Congress and 112th Congress ideological distance between parties in both the House and the Senate increased by one hundred percent and fifty percent respectively (Abramowitz 2013). However, both parties do not similarly drive the growing ideological gap; in a little over 30 years, a substantially greater shift in ideological stance was clearly made by the Republican Party (Abramowitz 2013)¹.

The implication of an ideological divide between political parties is that ideologically based issues are generally more difficult to resolve (Benderensky 2014). Similar to the sharp increase in ideological distance between the Republican and Democratic parties, legislative gridlock increased one hundred percent between the 1940s and 1990s. Examination of a few cases since 1990 supports the relationship between ideological divisions, legislative gridlock, and government shutdowns. Moreover, the ensuing public reaction to these events lends credence to the proposed relationship between legislative gridlock and trust in government. To begin, Republican Whip Newt Gingrich's rejection of a new budget agreement, which included tax increases and was supported by President Bush, led to a brief shutdown in 1990 (Meyers 1997). The catalyst for the lengthier government shutdowns of 1995 (the second one extending into the beginning of 1996) included not only the existence of several areas of contention (i.e. appropriations bills for Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and the Interior), but also an impending debt-ceiling crisis (Meyers 1997). More importantly, in a calculated effort to incite a presidential veto, a newly Republican-controlled Congress presented a continuing resolution that significantly reduced spending on Clinton's key issue areas (Meyers 1997). Instrumental in this move were both Republican House Budget Committee Chair John Kasich (Meyers 1997) and Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (Maraniss & Weisskopf 1996). The basis of the 2013 government shutdown was similarly an ideologically-based dispute, this time over the Affordable Care Act (Bendersky 2014).

To be sure, the events surrounding government shutdowns are not without their consequences. The effects of the 2013 budget sequester provide a clear example of this. The sequester decimated a large portion of funds (1.5 billion approximately) available for the National Institute of Health, greatly reducing financing for the National Cancer Institute for one (Schmidt 2013), in addition to funding for social programs catering to women and children (Titus 2013). The public was far from pleased with the government shutdowns in 1995-96; the inability of political parties to resolve disputes over appropriations

¹ The measure for ideological distance is derived from Poole and Rosenthal's DW-Nominate scale, which places representative in Congress on a liberal-conservative scale of -1 to 1 and is based on recorded votes. Between the 95th and 112th Congresses, Democrats exhibit approximately a .10 shift towards the left, while Republicans exhibit nearly a .45 shift towards the right in the House; in the Senate, Democrats exhibit less than a .10 shift towards the left, while Republicans exhibit nearly a .30 shift towards the right (Abramowitz 2013).

bill frustrated the public, and even more so over employees that did not lose income (Meyers 1997). Following the 2013 government shutdown the U.S. government suffered severely in public opinion polls, with 8-in-10 individuals disapproving of the shutdown itself; even more so, Congress and the Republican Party in particular experienced great public disapproval (Balz & Clement 2013).

Largely absent in the literature is an empirical examination of the possible effect that legislative gridlock and the frequency thereof has on declining trust in government. Moreover, it is unexamined whether partisan identification plays a role in *how much* of an effect legislative gridlock has on the level of trust in government. Furthermore, there are many relevant implications of declining trust, including the fate of electoral outcomes, political participation, and public policy, while democratic representativeness itself is at risk (Chanely et al. 2000; Hetherington 1999; Hetherington 2004; Hetherington & Husser 2012; Pollock 1983). As such, declining trust in government should not be left unexamined in greater detail. This research attempts to delineate further how the components of trust in government vary by partisanship. More specifically, the author seeks to determine whether the actual level of legislative gridlock should be considered as a vital source of variations in this trust and whether this has a differing effect dependent upon partisan identification.

This paper begins with an introduction to public trust in government and the many factors considered to be instrumental contributors towards its variations. This is followed by a thoughtful consideration of the role of partisanship on trust in government. The essay discusses also existing research on legislative gridlock and identify a gap in the literature. Then it introduces the hypotheses, data, and methods of this study. Following a presentation and discussion of the results, I offer a brief discussion of some possible limitations and concluding remarks.

Public Trust in Government

Leading up to the mid-1960s, trust in government experienced unseen before growth and a historical apex, a positive trend that was commonly attributed to beneficial economic conditions (Nye 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001). Hence, it was surprising to many when trust in government began a sharp descent in the mid-1960s during this very same period of economic growth (Nye 1997), though economic conditions have deteriorated overall since the 1970s (Lawrence 1997). As such, in the 1970s debate among researchers surfaced in search of understanding this phenomenon. The initial debate between Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) establishes the foundation for the complexities of the research on trust in government. Miller's (1974) research focuses on the public's discontent with moderate policy options falling short of expectations, leading to discontent with the political system in general (Miller 1974). On the other hand, Citrin (1974) argues the trust in government is more likely measuring dissatisfaction with the incumbent regime than alienation from the political system as a whole.

Research demonstrates these disparate views might be attributed to measurement difficulties and the limitations of the trust in government index questions, which are apt to varied interpretations (Abramson & Finifter 1978; Feldman 1983). Over time though, these questions have proven to be a consistent and reliable measure (Weatherford 1987). This long-term consistency supports the idea that trust in government is based on a combination of enduring views of the political system, including policy issues and party elites in power, and short-term shifts in response to particular individuals, events, conditions, and generally temporal concerns (Weatherford 1987). Most researchers concede on the intricate nature and diversity in sources of trust in government (Bok 1997; Erber 1990; Ulbig 2002; Weatherford 1987). The many facets explored are discussed following a brief explanation of the relevance of trust in government.

Why Trust in Government Matters

Several relevant areas are considered throughout the literature regarding the effects of declining trust in government, including electoral repercussions, political participation, and policy preferences. It is surmised that some of these effects, if true, may threaten democratic representativeness itself. Research is varied in regards to how trust in government may affect electoral outcomes. In general, Pollock (1983) does not find trust in government to be a principal forecaster of political participation. He does find though that different combinations of trust in government, political efficacy, and education lead to either greater or less political participation, such as changes in voter turnout. For example, individuals with low trust in government and high efficacy exhibit a higher likelihood of defection from party allegiances when voting (Pollock 1983). Evidence also demonstrates that incumbents often end up suffering the consequences of declining trust in government (Hetherington 1999). Hetherington (1999) also notes that in three-party races this has a greater effect on electoral consequences, with votes usually going to the third-party candidate.

Other research proposes that low levels of trust in the government are more highly associated with decreasing support for redistributive policies (Hetherington 2004). Specifically, higher trust in government has a greater effect on the number of liberal policies (i.e. social and welfare) enacted than when the presidency alone or both houses of Congress are ruled by the Democratic Party (Hetherington 2004). Public willingness to back the government's choices regarding domestic policy matters is especially vulnerable to low trust in government (Chanley et al. 2000). If this is true, the potential effect of this on rising economic inequality or other disparities in policy outcomes may be substantial should trust in government continue to decline. To be sure, Pollock (1983) also asserts that individuals with low trust in government in combination with lower levels of education often remove themselves from the political process by not voting at all. In any case, voting or not voting at all has serious implications for the democratic system. Understanding that declining trust in government may have serious consequences solidifies the importance of gaining an improved understanding of the causes thereof.

Discontent with the System

Many researchers since Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) further investigate discontent with the political system as a whole. Trust in government is more often than not associated with public evaluations of government performance, both institutional and of the individuals involved (Bok 1997; Chanley et al. 2000; Keele 2007; Lawrence 1997; Mansbridge 1997; May 1997; Nye et al. 1997; Ulbig 2002; Weatherford 1987; Williams 1985). As Nye (1997) explains, the scope of the government has fluctuated over the years and there is a possibility that the public reacts to its expanding and retracting reach. The main concern here is that the discussion on this subject is rooted in history and has not kept up with present day conditions, thus exacerbating frictions resulting from conflicting views on how much responsibility the government should have (May 1997). Discontent with the scope of the government may be related to previous government expansions, in that an increasing scope results in higher demands by the public, due to raised expectations (Williams 1985). May (1997) states that two of the main concerns include the reach of the government in regards to the economy and citizen morality. The former is discussed later in greater detail.

It is also suggested that trust in government is an accumulation of reactions to more temporal policy concerns for which government officials often bear the blame in the short-term (Weatherford 1987). Alternatively, other findings point towards varying assessment of specific institutions (Feldman 1983). To be clear, Feldman (1983) finds that trust in government in relation to the president is based

more on incumbent performance, while in relation to Congress it is based more on the institution's performance and responsiveness itself. Importantly, finding a concise measure of government performance and thus its adequacy proves to be rather difficult due to the complexity in summing up the results of various policy programs (Bok 1997). What is clear though via comparative analysis is that the level of distrust in the American government is particularly bleak and while reflective of these perceptions, it appears something else must be at work in the case of the United States.¹

Approval of Congress and the Presidency

In the literature, for the most part findings suggest a strong relationship between approval of Congress and trust in government, with congressional approval taking on a central role (Bowler & Karp 2004; Chanley et al. 2000; Feldman 1983; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995; Hibbing & Smith 2004). Many researchers refer to Fenno's (1975) theory that individuals can dislike Congress and at the very same time approve of their members in Congress (Binder 2003; Cooper 1999; Durr et al. 1997). Some evidence shows that while the public generally likes their own representatives, it is often other members of Congress the public finds issue with (Cooper 1999). Even more so, the public demonstrates high support for the institution itself even if only conceptually (Cooper 1999).

More specifically, research indicates that scandalous events tied to Congress not only affect approval on Congress, but also trust in government (Chanley et al. 2000; Bowler & Karp 2004). Further, scandals tied to Congress and ensuing assessments also demonstrate a much stronger effect on trust in government than do scandals related to the president (Chanley et al. 2000). This also supports previous assertions that it may be easier to separate presidential evaluations from overall evaluations of the government (Feldman 1983).

Even more contrasting evidence backs the need to distinguish between the effects of congressional and presidential approval. For instance, Hibbing and Smith (2004) affirm the unique link between approval of Congress and trust in government. The authors state that not only is there no link between presidential approval and trust in government, but even belonging to the same party as the president has no effect on trust in government (Hibbing & Smith 2004). However, other research provides results that establish a significant link between power shifts, whether in Congress or the executive branch, and trust in government (Keele 2005). Most importantly, public displeasure with resulting gridlock has been dually noted (Durr et al. 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995; Nye 1997). While dissatisfaction with legislative gridlock and conflict among politicians may not necessarily translate into full-blown disenchantment, though it is possible that certain views may have a cumulative nature (Nye 1997). For instance, lagged trust illustrates a compounding effect (Chanley et al. 2000).

Other Factors

To begin, economic conditions may also be highly influential on trust in government (Hetherington 2004). While expectations likely play a role, in that when economic conditions fall short of those in the past it is possible that the public's perceptions of government performance decline (Chanley et al. 2000; Lawrence 1997), Lawrence (1997) declares the link to be far from explicit. For one, it is not certain how

¹ Bok (1997) contends that a cross-national comparison with other advanced industrial democracies illustrates that the United States lags far behind in regards to policy development. Policy programs in composition and actualization fail by and large to meet the general public's wants.

much responsibility towards this the public places on the government, whether the concerns are more personal or for the economy as a whole, or whether they are more temporal or extensive (Lawrence 1997). Again, here it is important to recall that trust in government began its greatest descent during a period of economic growth (Nye 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001). Several researchers do find that evaluations of macroeconomic policies and economic conditions play a more central role (Binder 2003; Chanley et al. 2000; Weatherford 1987). However, Hibbing and Smith (2004) find that certain economic policy concerns are insignificant, such as those in relation to job security and defense spending.¹ While some evidence backs a connection between congressional and presidential approval and economic conditions it is not clear whether this translates into an effect on trust in government (Durr et al. 1997).

Events are discussed throughout some of the literature as a likely contributor towards trust in government (Citrin 1974; Chanley et al. 2000; Miller 1974; Williams 1985). Yet, the extent of this effect on trust in government is not agreed upon. First, Williams (1985) posits that it is doubtful the public extends the blame for past events onto the current regime, though the public may be primed to react in a negative manner. More likely, any emphasis placed on past events more likely translates into institutional discontent (Williams 1985). Specific events, such as the 9/11 attacks, were definitely followed by a boost in trust in government as focus shifted towards international security (Chanley et al. 2002). Dalton (2005) attempts to examine trust in government apart from specific events, since trust in government does not appear to be unique to the United States. These findings lead into the next topic concerning social factors and trust in government.

Evidence is mixed on the importance of social factors on trust in government. Earlier research does not validate a distinction between 'social groups' and trust in government, so all 'social groups' became less trusting of the government during the mid-1960s to early-1970s (Citrin 1974). However, Weatherford (1987) asserts that the repercussions of economic policy provide the most relevant link to social status and trust in government as a factor of policy performance, due to the disparate effect such policy has on different socioeconomic groups. In fact, deeper insight clarifies that social and cultural shifts have a dual effect on trust in government, with a greater proportion being indirect in nature (Mansbridge 1997). To be clear, when shifts such as these occur the government is challenged to meet changing needs and as a result this takes a toll government performance and thus trust in government; as a whole the public becomes less trusting in general since some individuals will always be on the losing side (Mansbridge 1997).

More recent research finds the greatest decrease in trust in government among individuals with higher educational attainment and social group status (Dalton 2005). Still yet, these findings also advance the notion that shifting expectations are a key component, though it is possible that institutional reforms might alleviate some of this (Dalton 2005). A last variable of significance is that of social capital; Keele (2007) finds that social capital has an even stronger effect than government performance on trust in government. An active civic life may be conducive towards building attitudes of trust not only among the public, but may have a spillover effect in how trusting the public is of the U.S. government and its institutions (Keele 2007).

¹ It should be noted that Hibbing and Smith (2004) only address trust in government in the years 1984, 1992, 1994 and 2000. The authors clearly state the limitations of such and note that the results may differ if tested again with another set of policies or in other years.

Partisanship and Trust in Government

Returning to Citrin (1974), it is proposed that partisanship and trust in government overall do not have a strong association. Yet, both Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) agree that individuals at the farthest ends of the partisan spectrum tend to be the most cynical, hence the curvilinear relationship between partisanship and trust in government. Again, it is vital to recall the question of why trust in government even matters, especially in relation to partisanship. In the words of Miller (1974: p.971): “The great dissatisfaction with the policies of both parties implies that conditions are highly conducive to party realignment and reformation or a third party movement.” Some research establishes a clear, albeit not strong, relationship between partisan identification and trust in government, though greater trust by Democrats may have been due to a Democratic administration (Williams 1985). Other research hints towards public moderates who are disgruntled with disparate views among elite politicians (Hibbing & Smith 2004). Hibbing and Smith (2004) do not find any empirical support for greater discontent among moderate partisans and instead stress that the public prefers when politics is free from egocentricity and conflict among those engaged in the political process. The public, regardless of partisanship, may believe they are surrounded by political elites that have little concern for the general public’s needs (Hibbing & Smith 2004).

In an examination of trust in government over time, Keele (2005) provides evidence that mean trust among Democrats is not greater than that of Republicans, though substantial difference exists when comparing Partisans to Pure Independents. A brief test extending this examination past the years covered in Keele’s (2005) study (1964-2002) signals towards a slight change (see Table 1). As illustrated in Table 1, similar to Keele (2005) mean trust in government during the period 1964-2002 is not significantly different between Democrats and Republicans. This is also true after extending the examination up through 2012. Similar also to Keele (2005), there is a significant difference between the mean on trust in government when comparing Pure Independents to all other partisan groups. This also holds true after extending the examination up through 2012. The main noticeable difference is that overall mean trust in government has declined greatest for Republicans (inclusive). Of late, polls also show that Republicans and Pure Independents are generally less trusting of the government than Democrats (PEW 2014). Hence, this study will include an exploration into variations in trust in government by partisan group.

TABLE 1
Mean Difference between Partisan Trust in Government (1964-2012)

	1964-2002	2002-2012
Democrats	35.53	33.70 (-1.83)
Republicans	36.19	33.34 (-2.85)
Difference	.66	.36
N	28910	36777
Partisans	35.80	33.56 (-2.24)
Independents	31.78	29.81 (-1.97)
Difference	4.02**	3.75**
N	32958	41945

Source: ANES 2012 Note: Comparison of means made between two dummy variables. Partisanship dummy I: 0 Republican, 1 Democrat with Leaning Partisans included and all Independents excluded. Partisanship dummy II: 1 Pure Independents, 0 Partisans (leaners inclusive). Numbers in parentheses indicate change in mean trust.
* p < .01, **p < .001

Legislative Gridlock

In its most basic form gridlock is defined as the inability of Congress to produce substantial policy output (Teter 2013). Sufficient literature develops the intricacies of what substantial policy output is and how this should even be measured. The various measures researchers use to assess the level of legislative gridlock dually demonstrate some of the consequences of such gridlock.

To begin, Mayhew (1991) finds policy output to be unaffected by gridlock; however, Binder (1999) contends that these results prompted questions about the methods of measurement used and thus sparked interest in discovering a more finite measure. To be clear, Mayhew's measure assesses purely policy output, not policy output in proportion to issues on the agenda, due to the acknowledged difficulty in constructing a measure for the latter (Mayhew 1991; Binder 2003). Several different methods emerged following this.

First, Krehbiel (1996) suggests that legislative gridlock, defined as the persistence of status quo in extant policy despite popular support for policy change. Heading towards a more specific measure, Jones (2001) contends that gridlock is considered to be present when important legislation put forth does not come to fruition at any time during the legislative process. Consistent with previous literature, this is unaffected by divided or unified government and is more a factor of party polarization and institutional factors (D. Jones 2001; Krehbiel 1996). Binder (2003) establishes a more concise method of measuring legislative gridlock accounting for the quantity of legislation remaining in a transitional state in proportion to the number of salient and non-salient policy issues brought forward. Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) extend this concept in order to differentiate between false low policy yields based on a lower incidence of agendas put forth from true legislative gridlock. Of course, gridlock may just be the result of an increasing quantity of legislation on the table (Melnick 2013).

Consequences of Legislative Gridlock

Apart from those understood by its various measurements, the effects of legislative gridlock are less examined, especially in regards to effects it may have on the public (Binder 2003). The effects of gridlock considered thus far include the possibility of electoral backlash, the likeliness of Congressional members to run for successive terms, and variation in public approval of Congress and the President.

There is minimal consensus that legislative gridlock has an effect on electoral outcomes (Adler & Wilkerson 2012; Binder 2003; D. Jones 2001). Some research shows congressional performance does affect electoral outcomes for the Senate (McDermott & Jones 2005). Other research demonstrates that while both Partisans and Independents view conflict in Congress negatively, Independents more highly revere bipartisan actions (Harbridge & Malhotra 2011). While Binder (2003) does find a relationship between the retirement of congressional members and the level of legislative gridlock, this is a limited observation. Further, as Congressional members do experience gridlock first-hand this is not an extraordinary finding.

We are only offered a rare glimpse at a few potential effects of legislative gridlock on the public. Most importantly, Binder (2003) finds a significant negative relationship between the level of legislative gridlock and public approval of Congress. In fact, congressional approval polls often incorporate a method to discern public opinion on congressional accomplishment (Magleby & Patterson 1992). To be sure, scholars do find that the public does not look favorably upon legislative gridlock, chaos, or setbacks in Congress (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002). In general, the public seems to react negatively when Congress is doing its job (Binder 2003). Evaluations of Congress may be highly based on conflict between

its members and the public may even prefer when members work together (Ramirez 2009). It is possible that the public likens legislative gridlock to the unfortunate product of special interests at odds with one another and out of touch with the public (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002).

Taking this evidence into consideration, along with recent polls that demonstrate these feelings about Congress persist (Pew 2015) and the public may even relate this disapproval to legislative gridlock (Saad 2013), it is not out of context to consider that legislative gridlock may lead to declining trust in government. Even withstanding his assertion that legislative gridlock is a mere fallacy, Melnick (2013) notes that gridlock is a preeminent feature in the news today and that congressional approval ratings have plummeted to an all-time low. Hence, the possibility should be examined that legislative gridlock may have an effect on trust in government.

Hypotheses

H1: As the level of legislative gridlock increases, overall trust in government will decrease.

H2: As the level of legislative gridlock increases, the decline in trust in government will be greater for Strong Partisans and Pure Independents than for all other partisan groups.

The works of Citrin (1974) and Miller (1974) present a curvilinear relationship between partisanship and trust in government, with Strong Partisans proving to be less trusting of the government and those towards the center more trusting of the government. However, conflicting evidence does not offer a clear picture on this. Varying methods of grouping Leaning Independents with Partisans also do not offer enough insight. The means test performed in this paper shows that mean trust in government is much lower for Pure Independents. Recent evidence also shows Republicans and Independents to be less trusting of the government than Democrats (Pew 2014). Again though, Republican and Democrat identification are Leaning inclusive. Furthermore, Hibbing and Smith (2004) do not find moderates to be less trusting of the government. Based on these considerations, the second hypothesis proposes that the effects of legislative gridlock on trust in government will be greater for Strong Partisans and Pure Independents.

Data and Methods

In order to assess the relevance of legislative gridlock on trust in government, I utilize a series of multivariate regression analyses to test for effects in the period 1984-2012. The dependent variable, trust in government, is tested against legislative gridlock separately by partisan identification. The inclusion of relevant control variables will solidify the findings in the tests. The trust in government measure is comprised from the four most commonly used trust in government questions, which are combined into an additive scale (1948-2012). The 7-category party identification response is used to analyze the varying effects that legislative gridlock and partisanship have on trust in government. Professor Sarah Binder, Ph.D., of George Washington University, provides a comprehensive measure of legislative gridlock in her data set covering 1947-2012.¹ The independent variable, level of gridlock, is given as a percentage biannually. This is measured by the number of failed salient legislative issues in proportion to the number of issues on the agenda (Binder 2003). This biannual measure coincides with

¹ A special thanks to Dr. Sarah Binder for graciously providing the data sets.

twelve congressional terms in this study and results from content analysis of *New York Times* editorials¹ (Binder 2003 & 2014).

Several instrumental control variables are included in the analyses. This includes measures of approval of Congress, approval of the President overall, specific approval of the President's performance on the economy, retrospective and prospective economic evaluations (personal), institutional responsiveness, and divided government. Commonly used demographic control variables are also included, such as education, race, and gender. The literature review contains valuable information regarding the relevance of including approval of Congress, approval of the President overall, specific approval of the President's performance on the economy, retrospective and prospective economic evaluations, and institutional responsiveness. Divided government is included as this is shown to have an effect on presidential approval (Nicholson et al. 2002).

The additive scale for trust in government runs from zero (0) for least trusting to one hundred (100) for most trusting. The remaining instrumental variables, except for the institutional responsiveness index, are coded such that a higher number would indicate a response that indicates negative feelings towards the government; thus, these variables are expected to result in a negative effect on trust in government. Congressional and Presidential approval are coded one (1) for disapproves and zero (0) for approves of either's job performance, respectively.

Approval of the president's performance on the economy is coded on a range of zero to one, with one (1) for strongly disapprove and zero (0) for strongly approve. Retrospective and prospective economic evaluations are coded on a range of zero to one, with one (1) for worse than last year/in next year. Institutional responsiveness is an index that is coded from 0 to 10, with 10 signifying the respondent finds the government to be most responsive. The divided government variable is coded zero (0) for unified and (1) for divided. Race is coded one (1) for white and zero (0) for all others. Gender is coded one (1) for male and zero (0) for female.

There is some uncertainty regarding the direction of the relationship between trust in government and approval of Congress and the President. In fact, some researchers conclude that the relationship moves in both directions (Chanley et al. 2000; Hetherington 1998). For instance, Hetherington (1999) finds variations in trust in government affects both approval ratings of Congress and the President. However, Chanley et al. (2000) find the bidirectional relationship only true for congressional approval. Also, it has been mentioned that approval of Congress and the President may be highly correlated with institutional approval (Williams 1985).

Furthermore, Binder's (2003) work also confirms that legislative gridlock has an effect on congressional approval. Thus, in order to ensure the results and protect against multicollinearity, initial regressions are performed with all independent variables on both approval of Congress and approval of the President (Pollock 2005). The tolerance statistics do not suggest that multicollinearity is a concern here. The overall tolerance for approval of Congress is .934, while the VIFs are less than 1.2. The overall tolerance for approval of the President is .466, while the VIFs are less than 1.2. Thus, following this reliability test the multivariate regressions are run with confidence.

¹ Methods of calculating legislative gridlock are further described in the Appendix.

TABLE 2

Effect of Legislative Gridlock on Trust in Government by Partisan Identification (1984-2012)

	Strong Republican	Weak Republican	Leaning Republican	Pure Independent	Leaning Democrat	Weak Democrat	Strong Democrat	Total (Pooled)
Gridlock	-.281**	.011	-.171^	-.370**	.080	-.097	.023	-.127**
Disapprove Congress	-23.644**	-8.974	-16.712**	-36.602**	-7.292	-17.665**	-7.885	-16.987**
Disapprove President	-2.620	-7.232**	-5.834**	.243	-2.458	-3.306^	-7.274**	-4.216**
Disapprove President Economy	-10.096**	-6.313**	-5.338**	-11.160**	-5.159*	-7.309**	-1.694	-6.775**
Prospective Economic Evaluation	-2.153	-4.609^	-3.629	-8.737**	-1.679	-2.659	.705	-2.876**
Retrospective Economic Evaluation	-4.109**	-5.385**	-3.206^	-1.630	-2.293	-.748	-5.007**	-3.300**
Gridlock* Disapprove Congress	.367^	-.004	.103	.485**	-.031	.137	-.013	.134**
R-Squared	.239	.206	.214	.246	.163	.161	.170	.187

TABLE 2 (continued)

Effect of Legislative Gridlock on Trust in Government by Partisan Identification (1984-2012)

	Strong Republican	Weak Republican	Leaning Republican	Pure Independent	Leaning Democrat	Weak Democrat	Strong Democrat	Total (Pooled)
Divided Government	-5.538**	-4.395	-5.952*	-5.273	.662	-6.856**	-2.797	-4.679**
Race (White)	-8.531**	-3.384	-4.719**	-2.245	-2.397	-1.095	-1.777	-2.451**
Gender (Male)	.074	-.535	-2.990^	-2.725^	-.628	.823	.219	-.630
Education	2.594**	-2.303**	-.201	-.744	.504	.220	-.022	.053
Income	-.345	.252	-.859	-1.302^	-.109	-.682	-.243	-.511*
Institutional Responsiveness	1.917**	1.789**	1.833**	2.148**	2.017**	1.746**	1.986**	1.959**
R-squared	1429	1495	1306	1056	1540	2012	2380	11263
N								

Sources: Legislative gridlock data is courtesy of Dr. Sarah Binder, PhD. (George Washington University; Brookings Institute); All other data is from the *ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File* (1948-2012).
 Note: ^p < .05, * p < .01, **p < .001

Results

The findings demonstrate evidence worthy of greater contemplation and should prompt further investigation into not only the effects of legislative gridlock on trust in government, but also how trust in government varies by partisanship. To begin, the cumulative findings (inclusive of all partisan groups) reveal that legislative gridlock has a mild, significant negative effect on trust in government. These results support the first hypothesis. As previously discussed, public frustration with legislative gridlock and disputes among politicians is noted throughout the literature (Durr et al. 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995; Nye 1997). The occasional government shutdowns that result from extreme cases of such conflict similarly have a negative effect on public opinion of the government (Balz & Clement 2013; Meyers 1997), and more specifically Congress and the Republican Party in the case of the most recent occurrence (Balz & Clement 2013).

As expected, legislative gridlock has clear implications on trust in government, which is not surprising given that it has been theorized that the public may relate disapproval with Congress to legislative gridlock (Saad 2015). To be sure, the most significant factor affecting trust in government is congressional approval. The interaction between legislative gridlock and congressional approval indicates that legislative gridlock amplifies the effect of congressional approval on trust in government.

This is unsurprising given the previously discussed link between congressional approval and trust in government and the results of specifically designed congressional approval polls that have been able to clarify that the public relates this congressional performance (Magleby & Patterson 1992). Additionally, when congressional approval is zero, meaning the public approves of Congress, legislative gridlock alone has a negative effect on trust in government. The ability of the legislative gridlock variable to withstand the powerful link between congressional approval and trust in government should be taken as lending further support to the hypothesized relationship between trust in government and legislative gridlock.

As expected, approval of the president and approval of the president's performance on the economy have a significant negative effect on trust in government. The findings on presidential approval and trust in government contrast evidence in the literature of no link between the two, while the less powerful relationship between presidential approval and trust in government compared to congressional approval and trust in government corroborates the findings of a unique link between opinions of Congress and trust in government (Hibbing & Smith 2004). Retrospective and prospective economic evaluations all have a significant negative effect on trust in government. This clarifies previous findings in the literature, where conflicting evidence had left undetermined whether the public places any responsibility on the government for economic conditions (Chanley et al. 2000; Lawrence 1997). Feelings of greater government responsiveness have the effect of increased trust in government. This supports evidence that the public, regardless of partisanship, prefers when political elites take the general public's needs into actual consideration when making policy decisions (Hibbing & Smith 2004). Divided government demonstrates a negative effect on trust in government. Although legislative gridlock similarly occurs under divided and undivided government, polarization has been noted as a more important factor contributing towards gridlock (D. Jones 2001; Krehbiel 1996). This signals toward the partisan roots of gridlock and government shutdowns, while also adding further support to the link between legislative gridlock and declining trust in government. While no assertions were made regarding the effect of race, being white also has a negative correlation with trust in government.

More importantly, the findings signify some pertinent differences in the effects of the independent variables on trust in government. The key variable of interest in this study, legislative gridlock, is significant for Strong Republicans and Pure Independents, having a negative effect on trust in government. Pure Independents, followed by Strong Republicans, show the strongest connection between congressional approval and trust in government. This is also the case for approval of the president's performance on the economy. This is contrary to the second hypothesis, as Strong Democrats are generally more trusting of the government. The two variables that are significant almost across the board are the president's performance on the economy and institutional responsiveness. The importance of institutional responsiveness on trust in government is more significant and strongest for Pure Independents.

Many questions remain to date on Independent identification, which began an abrupt ascent in the 1960s (Campbell 1960) and peaked at 43% in 2014 (J. Jones 2015). It is possible to theorize that for shifts in partisan identification towards Independent affiliation institutional responsiveness, trust in government, and approval of Congress and the president are key factors. Moreover, the link between ideological divides and legislative gridlock lends further conceivability to this connection. In regards to the results for Strong Republicans, knowledge that the growing ideological divide has been driven more so by the Republican Party than the Democratic Party (Abramowitz 2013) may be telling as to why the effects for several variables are considerably more powerful and significant for Strong Republicans than Strong Democrats.

Discussion

While the results of this study contribute to the previous literature, above all they introduce several topics of interest that are worthy of future investigation. Primarily, the findings reveal that while legislative gridlock has a mild, negative effect on trust in government, it is significant nonetheless. Since legislative gridlock is generally increasing it is possible to expect the significance of this on trust in government may grow over time. Second, the findings clarify some unknowns regarding how trust in government varies by partisanship. The findings clearly highlight that Strong Partisans and Pure Independents are the least trusting of the government. Understanding these intricacies may help enhance researchers' capacity to comprehend shifts in partisan identification and political participation. For example, one might suppose from these results that Independents are on the rise partially because certain individuals are highly frustrated with a nonresponsive government that is plagued by gridlock and conflict between polarized elites in Congress. This research can be used as a solid foundation for future research. As discussed earlier, the relevance of trust in government should not be ignored. The findings here suggest that the possible effects of trust in government, whether on electoral outcomes, political participation, or partisanship itself should be examined in more depth.

Of course, this study is not without its limitations. For one, measures of legislative gridlock are still being revised, even as this study comes to fruition. Binder (1999; 2003 & 2014) and Chiou and Rothenberg (2003 & 2006) establish measures of legislative gridlock that may provide conflicting results. This study should be run again against varying robust measures of legislative gridlock. Also, as explained in the ANES (1948-2012) codebook, question wording and the placement of the questions over the years may change. This may impact the control variables and distort results. Since legislative gridlock is measured as the portion of failed legislative issues to salient issues on the agenda (Binder 2003) and gridlock is popularly talked about by media outlets, such as newspapers and television news stations, a control might be useful to take exposure to such news into consideration. This follows in line with previous findings that increased media exposure in combinations with greater political knowledge may actually enhance positive evaluations of Congress (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1998). It is possible a similar effect occurs with trust in government. Again, evidence is conflicting on the direction of causality in the relationship between views on congressional and presidential performance and trust in government (Chanley et al. 2000; Keele 2007). For this reason, some studies find it necessary to perform a two-stage analyses or integrated methods (Avery 2006; Chanley et al. 2000). One possible method includes performing a two-stages least squares (2SLS) regression analysis to obtain the effect of congressional and presidential approval on trust in government, as opposed to the reverse (Avery 2006). In the future this may be helpful in discerning better whether legislative gridlock has a stronger relationship with trust in government.

In the future it also may be useful to utilize another type of data set to measure trust in government. For instance, Gallup polls conduct monthly surveys that assess levels of trust in the government. These surveys may offer a deeper analysis into the more immediate effects of periods of high to very high legislative gridlock. Another path worthy of consideration would be the examination of trust in government from multiple ANES panel studies. To be clear, panel studies would be chosen that cover a time range where both periods of low and high legislative gridlock are present. In this manner it would be conceivable to explore true individual changes in trust in government as a possible result of legislative gridlock. Thus, several alternate routes may accentuate the research done here. In conclusion, this research opens-up a range of plausible research avenues. Each of these and more may grant a more

profound comprehension of trust in government by partisanship, the causes of the decline in trust in government, and the effects of the legislative process and its complexities on such.

Appendix

The following questions are retrieved from the ANES Time Series Cumulative File (1948-2012). In the time-series analysis the data for the dependent variable, trust in government, is taken from respondents' answers to four survey questions, which are used to create an additive scale. The 7-category party identification question, the follow-up question to the 3-points party identification question, is used to measure partisan identification. In general, the control variables are each measured by a single question from the surveys. Legislative gridlock data was retrieved from a cumulative file provided by Dr. Sarah A. Binder. According to Binder's (2003) appendix, *New York Times* editorials mentioning legislative policy issues were coded for the years studied. Salience of issues was measured by the frequency of mentions, with more mentions equating to greater salience. Success or failure of these issues was measured via coding results of legislative initiatives in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

1. *"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, an Independent, or what?"*
2. *(If Republican or Democrat) "Would you call yourself a strong (REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT) or a not very strong (REPUBLICAN/DEMOCRAT)?" (If independent, other [1966 and later: OR NO PREFERENCE]): "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?"*
3. *Education of respondent. (Grade school/Some high school, High school diploma, Some college, College degree/Post-grad)*
4. *Income level of respondent's family. (Percentiles: 0-16; 17-33; 34-67; 68-95; 96-100)*
5. *"Do you approve or disapprove of the way the U.S. Congress has been handling its job?" (Approve, Disapprove, Don't know)*
6. *"Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the President is handling his job as President?" (Approve, Disapprove, Don't know)*
7. *"Do you approve or disapprove of the way the president is handling the economy?" "How strongly?" (Approve strongly, Approve not strongly, Disapprove not strongly, Disapprove strongly, DK/NA)*
9. *"We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?" (Better, Same, Worse, DK/NA)*
10. *"Now looking ahead and thinking about the next few years, do you expect your financial situation will stay about the way it is now, get better, or get worse?" (Better, Same, Worse, DK/NA)*
11. *Rate government responsiveness on a scale of 0 to 100. (0-least responsive; 100-most)*
12. *Party with House Majority Before the Election. (1-correct; 2-incorrect)*
12. *"How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?"*
13. *"Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are (1958-1972: a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked (1958-1972: at all)?"*
14. *"Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?"*
15. *"Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?"*

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Regional Political Power in Florida

by Bradley J. Caouette, *2017 Best Undergraduate Paper*, University of Central Florida-Orlando

ABSTRACT: How much does political influence in the Florida Legislature affect the amount of tax dollars appropriated to Florida's 67 counties, ten media markets and three geographic regions (North, Central and South)? First, a legislative power index is developed. We then analyze county allocations from the Budget Year 2016/2017 and the legislative power index to determine if there is a relationship when controlling for other possible influences. The research finds that the legislative power of a county as measured by the legislative power index had no statistically significant effect on per capita allocations. The presence of a state university and miles of roadway in a county did have an influence. In terms of geographic bias, these findings suggest that the allocation process is based more on rational criteria than political power and thus more fair than previously thought.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, Florida's political landscape has undergone a considerable transformation. This transformation has largely been geographical in nature, directly related to a shift in population from mostly rural North Florida to the more concentrated areas of Central and South Florida (Hill, MacManus, & Moreno, 2004). Early in Florida's history, the western panhandle was an area of notable political influence. A group of Democratic politicians controlled the legislative tenor of Florida's government much to the benefit of the panhandle region. These "porkchoppers" represented the rural counties of North Florida and often worked to protect their own self-interests with little concern for the regions of Central and South Florida (p.129). The "porkchopper" influence continued into the 1960s until segregation was brought to a halt and the Supreme Court decided that reapportionment was the means necessary to ensure that political districts would have more equitable representation (p.104-105).


For nearly 60 years, from the early-1900s to the mid-1960s, the media markets of Panama City, Tallahassee and Gainesville were also contributing to the political dominance of the north. These media markets, along with Pensacola, comprised 22 counties and controlled the path Florida would follow. There was almost a dictatorial posture as elected leaders at all levels of government set much of Florida's policies and spent taxpayer dollars accordingly (p.125).

Population was the largest factor for this political stronghold in North Florida. From 1900 to 1930, these 22 counties held a majority of Florida's population, with some estimates claiming nearly 70% (p.126). However, as people began to migrate into Central and South Florida, the "porkchoppers" increased their efforts to retain political power (p.129). Their ideology was simple – keep state resources in North Florida at the expense of the needs of Central and South Florida. Indeed, as Florida's population shifted further south, the "porkchoppers" became very intentional in their efforts to choke out the funding these areas needed to sustain a growing constituency (p.129). Yet the influx of people into Central and South Florida proved to be too much to overcome, with reapportionment the last nail in the coffin for North Florida's political dynasty, rendering this area of the state virtually inconsequential in state politics (p.125).

Thus, the power once held in North Florida has been distributed to areas further south, but the “porkchopper” style of influence has not made the transition. In 2004, Kevin Hill and Dario Moreno authored a chapter in *Florida Politics: Ten Media Markets, One Powerful State* reporting that legislative influence in South Florida was not what one would expect. At that time, South Florida had the largest legislative delegation in Florida with one quarter of the state’s Representatives and nearly one-third of the state’s Senators.


Yet the legislative influence of South Florida remained compromised. Not only was the political influence not there, but state resources were lacking in South Florida as well, indicating a lingering bias in the legislature against the region for a number of years (pp. 271-272). In today’s legislative landscape, the Central Florida region, made up of the Tampa and Orlando media markets, has the largest legislative delegation (see Figures 1 & 2).

**Figure 1:
Legislator Distribution by Media Market**



Source: Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate


**Figure 1:
Legislator Distribution by Region**



Source: Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate

There has also been a considerable change in party control of the legislature over the years as well. Susan A. MacManus asserts that during the 1970s, Democrats held both U.S. Senate seats and controlled super majorities in both chambers of the Florida Legislature. Democrat Reubin Askew was Governor, and Democrats occupied all six cabinet positions (p. 14). However, after losing soundly in the 2002 elections, the Democratic influence bottomed out in spite of maintaining a higher percentage of party registrants. Republicans now found themselves with super majorities in both the House and Senate (p. 14, fine print note) (see also Figure 3).

**Figure 2:
Legislator Party Shift**



Source: Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate

LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP/INFLUENCE

During the 2016 Legislative Session, the Chairperson for nearly every committee was a member of the majority party. The three exceptions to this were all Senators – Senator Bill Montford, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture; Senator Eleanor Sobel, Chair of the Committee on Children, Family and Elder Affairs; and Senator Jeremy Ring, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Oversight and Accountability (Florida Senate).

The role of Chairman is very significant, especially from a policy crafting perspective. Committee Chairs are responsible for determining which legislation will or will not be allowed to be presented in their committee. Recent examples of this control are found in Representative Charles McBurney, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Senator Miguel Diaz de la Portilla, chairman of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. Both men singlehandedly killed controversial legislation by refusing to place a bill on any agenda for their respective committees. Chairman McBurney refused to hear legislation regarding Stand Your Ground reform that had been defeated earlier in another House committee but was brought back to life through the Senate and sent back to McBurney's committee (Mitchell, 2016). Chairman Diaz de la Portilla sat on a key piece of legislation regarding campus carry which had already passed through the House by a significant margin (Sarkissian, 2016).

State Representative Eric Eisnaugle drafted a plan in 2015 to decentralize the power in the Florida House, indicating the great influence leadership has in the day to day operation of the legislature. While his plan largely deals with dissipation of the Speaker's control and how that influence affects decisions made by committee chairs, Eisnaugle gives testimony detailing how this power could be more evenly distributed among chamber leadership as well as discussion about how to make the minority party more relevant (Torres, 2015). The point here is to demonstrate that there appears to be a tier structure for legislative power that influences behavior and outcomes in the Florida Legislature.

EFFECT ON ALLOCATIONS

This research explores the possible effect that legislative power has on funding allocations as applied on county by county, media market and regional levels. The hypothesis considered is that areas of Florida with demonstrably more legislative power receive increased levels of funding. Because each legislator's district is equally apportioned according to population, and not geography (Morris & Morris, 2014), it stands to reason that regions and media markets with greater populations would receive greater appropriations. Conversely, we could expect areas with sparser population densities to receive lower appropriations.

County by county allocations were considered for this project as published by the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives, 2016). This publication is generated based upon the actual Conference Report for the General Appropriations Act as passed by the 2016 Florida Legislature. Included in this report are dollars that are associated with specific counties, as well as several multicounty programs. Additionally, this report includes allocations for certain transportation projects plus various grant allocations such as cultural and library funding and the Florida Recreation Development Assistance Program. Funding associated with DEP projects are also included in the report. However, K-to-12 Education funding, otherwise known as FEFP (Florida Department of Education, 2016) and money that comes to the counties through state agencies are not included in the report (Florida House of Representatives, 2016).

Legislative power for this project was determined by creating a new geographic legislative power variable, or Legislative Power Index (LPI). This index was developed by assigning a value to each legislator based upon the position they held in the legislature (see Table 1). The logic behind the scoring is as follows. While each member of the legislature has some power to affect legislation, those in the minority party have less influence than those in the majority party. Therefore, members of the minority party received one point and members of the majority party received two points. Speaker *pro-tempore* and President *pro-tempore*, as well as Majority and Minority Leaders each were assigned 4 points because of their influence on the chamber floor emphasizing their respective party’s position. Committee chairmen received 5 points, due to their influence in the committee process of setting agendas that permit or restrict legislation from advancing. Appropriations Committee Chairmen received 7 points since their committees help determine the overall budget.

Finally, the Speaker of the House and the Senate President both received 8 points because they control much of what happens in the Florida Legislature. This LPI was then calculated by adding the appropriate values together for each county based on the number of and position held by any legislator representing any portion of that county. A full listing of counties and their associated LPI is in Table 2.

The average LPI score for all counties is 16.5. Miami-Dade County has the most legislative power with a score of 78, followed by Hillsborough County (47), Orange County (40), and Broward County (39). The most powerful county in North Florida is Duval with a score of 28. At the low end of the scale are counties with the least amount of legislative power, including Monroe (with the lowest score of just 3), Flagler and Putnam (4 each), Gadsden (5) and St. Johns (6).

By comparing and analyzing the Legislative Power Index with county by county allocations, it should be possible to ascertain whether the political influence in any given area of Florida reflects a greater amount of money for that area.

**Table 1:
Associated Legislative Roles Determining Legislative Power Index**

Position in the Legislature	Assigned Value
Member of the Minority Party	1
Member of the Majority Party	2
Chamber Leadership	4
Committee Chairman	5
Appropriations Committee Chairman	7
Chamber Leader	8


**Table 2:
County Legislative Power Index Rankings**

County	LPI	County	LPI
Alachua	13	Lee	28
Baker	10	Leon	12
Bay	11	Levy	7
Bradford	7	Liberty	10
Brevard	33	Madison	10
Broward	39	Manatee	21
Calhoun	10	Marion	30
Charlotte	24	Martin	19
Citrus	10	Miami-Dade	78
Clay	9	Monroe	3
Collier	29	Nassau	10
Columbia	10	Okaloosa	19
Desoto	16	Okeechobee	10
Dixie	7	Orange	40
Duval	28	Osceola	16
Escambia	14	Palm Beach	28
Flagler	4	Pasco	20
Franklin	10	Pinellas	28
Gadsden	6	Polk	29
Gilchrist	7	Putnam	4
Glades	14	Santa Rosa	9
Gulf	10	Sarasota	17
Hamilton	10	Seminole	14
Hardee	16	St. Johns	6
Hendry	10	St. Lucie	28
Hernando	12	Sumter	17
Highlands	19	Suwannee	10
Hillsborough	47	Taylor	10
Holmes	9	Union	7
Indian River	17	Volusia	19
Jackson	9	Wakulla	10
Jefferson	10	Walton	9
Lafayette	10	Washington	9
Lake	26		

RESEARCH ANALYSIS

Examining the raw data, it is clear that there is significant difference in the money received on a regional level. Looking at the dollars received per capita, the Northern Florida region received \$1,139 per person, twice as much money as Central Florida with \$569 and slightly over twice as much as Southern Florida with \$548 (see Figure 4).


**Figure 3:
Per Capita Dollars Received - Regional**



Source: Florida House of Representatives

Surprisingly, the Legislative Power Index for each region is nearly inversely proportional to the allocations received. The Northern Florida region, made up of the Pensacola, Panama City, Tallahassee, Gainesville and Duval Media Markets only shows an LPI of 102, while the Central and South Florida regions reflect indexes of 241 and 222, respectively (see Figure 5).


**Figure 4:
Regional Legislative Power**



Source: Florida House of Representatives


At the media market level, there is also great disparity in the per capita dollars distributed. The extreme ends of the spectrum show the Gainesville market realizes \$3,454 per citizen while the Fort Myers market sees only \$370 per person (see Figure 6). Figure 7 illustrates that again, there is somewhat of an inverse relationship between the legislator influence and allocations. An even greater disparity in the per capita allocations is seen at the county level - \$4,262 in Alachua County as compared to \$96 in Charlotte County. A full listing of all county’s revenue per capita can be found in Appendix “A”.

**Figure 5:
Per Capita Dollars Received - Media Market**



Source: Florida House of Representatives

**Figure 6:
Media Market Legislative Power**



Source: Florida House of Representatives

The scope of this research considered the effect that legislative power has on these differences in per capita dollars each county receives. Using SPSS data analysis software, three different models were analyzed to determine if any such relationship existed. The dependent variable for each model was the county by county allocations. The first model consisted of a bivariate regression directly evaluating the LPI effect on allocated dollars per capita, with the LPI as the independent variable.

Hypothesis 1 is that there is a positive relationship between allocated dollars per capita and the LPI.

If politics is a factor, we would expect that counties with more power in the legislature should receive more state money. Surprisingly, this regression indicated that there was little or no relationship between the two. Results of the first model analysis are seen in Table 3. The model shows almost no variance is explained (R Square of just .009) and that the LPI variable is not statistically significant and has a negative coefficient, which is opposite the expected direction.

Table 3: Bivariate Regression

Ind. Variable	B	Beta	Std. Error	Significance
Total LPI	-5.090	-0.093	6.737	0.453
Constant	783.959		138.873	0.000

R Square = 0.009 Adjusted R Square = -0.007

The second model considered the effect of other demographic and environmental factors in addition to the LPI. These additional independent variables included majority party influence, population density, poverty, household income, Hispanic and black populations, the presence of a state university (State University System of Florida, Board of Governors, 2016) and the number of road miles IN transportation projects within each county (Florida Department of Transportation, 2016). As in the bivariate regression, LPI is expected to have a positive relationship with allocated dollars per capita. The expected relationship for each of the other control variables is detailed below.

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of Republican registered voters and per capita allocated dollars. Since Republicans control the state legislature, it makes sense that counties with more Republicans might receive more money.

Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between population per square mile and per capita allocated dollars. Counties with higher density might be expected to receive more money per capita.

Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of residents in poverty and per capita allocated dollars. It is possible that there is some redistribution of dollars to counties with high numbers of people in poverty.

Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between median household income and per capita allocated dollars. Wealthier counties may exercise more influence over the legislature resulting in more money coming to their area.

Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between Hispanic population and per capita allocated dollars. While Hispanics are a large and fast growing demographic group in Florida, they have typically lacked political power (with the exception of Cubans who dominate in South Florida).

Additionally, many Hispanics in Florida lack citizenship and cannot participate in the political process. Finally, Hispanics have voted mostly Democratic in the past several elections (except the majority of Cubans) as more Puerto Rican voters move to Florida and younger Cuban voters begin to abandon the Republican Party (Lopez & Stepler, 2016). Thus, overall, expectations are that counties with large numbers of Hispanics will receive less money.

Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between black population and per capita allocated dollars. Black citizens are among the most reliable supporters of the Democratic Party and so a Republican legislature could be expected to send less money to counties with high numbers of black residents.

Hypothesis 8: Counties that are home to a state university are likely to receive a higher per capita allocation of state dollars than counties without a university. Because the county by county allocations specifically include money for higher education (Florida House of Representatives, 2016), it follows that counties with state universities will receive more money.

Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between the miles of road in a county and per capita allocated Dollars. Since the allocated dollars include money for transportation, it makes sense that counties with several roads might receive more money than counties with fewer roads.

Data for the demographic and socioeconomic variables is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Registration data is taken from the Florida Division of Elections. State university location was verified with the State University System and road mileage comes from the Florida Department of Transportation. Results of the second model are reflected in Table 4 below:

**Table 4:
Multivariate Regression**

Ind. Variable	B	Beta	Std. Error	Significance
Total LPI	-4.901	-0.090	13.807	0.7240
Republican %	-2.822	-0.040	11.871	0.8130
Population per sq. mile	0.220	0.174	0.190	0.2510
Poverty %	44.270	0.329	32.418	0.1770
Household Median Income	0.011	0.117	0.019	0.5800
Hispanic Pop. %	-0.747	-0.013	9.621	0.9380
Black Pop. %	4.314	0.059	11.542	0.7100
State University	1130.321	0.618	268.239	0.0000
Road Miles	-0.206	-0.437	0.122	0.0960
Constant	-308.216		1329.159	0.8170

R Square = 0.401

Adjusted R Square = 0.307

In Table 4 (above) this multivariate regression indicated that LPI and these additional factors accounted for 30% of the variance in county allocations with an adjusted R Square value of .307. Only two variables are statistically significant at the .10 level (although .05 is often used as a cut off, with a small sample like 67 counties we employ the slightly more generous .10 level in this research): state universities and road mileage. The LPI variable is again not statistically significant and again actually has a negative coefficient. Counties with state universities do receive a higher per capita allocation than counties without an institution in the State University System.

However, counties with more miles of roadway actually received less per capita allocation than counties with fewer roads. The third model isolated the effect that state university presence and transportation projects had on the county by county allocations. With state university presence and total highway miles per county as independent variables, about 30% of the variance in per capita allocation was still accounted for in Model 3, and both variables were statistically significant (see Table 5). As one would expect, this model revealed that state universities had a positive relationship to the county allocations. However, it was interesting to see that the number of road miles per county still had a negative relationship. In other words, the more road miles the county had, the less money they received (see Table 5). Possible explanations of this negative influence could be found in the nature of the projects – some might be bridge maintenance or replacement rather than all out resurfacing or construction of new roads. It is also possible that small counties with fewer roads still needed to receive a certain amount of dollars to address basic infrastructure needs and thus on a per capita basis, rural counties received more transportation dollars.

**Table 5:
State University and Road Miles Regression**

Ind. Variable	B	Beta	Std. Error	Significance
State University	1321.451	0.722	243.750	0.000
Road Miles	-0.25	-0.531	0.063	0.000
Constant	941.361		117.761	0.000

R Square = 0.319 Adjusted R Square = 0.297

CONCLUSION

The results obtained through this research indicate that the hypothesis suggesting that legislative power has an influence on county by county allocations is not supported. There is no demonstrable statistically significant relationship between the legislative power a county has as measured by the LPI and the amount of money that county receives. The same holds true when looking at the relationship at the regional level and by media market. This could possibly indicate that there is a higher level of transparency and accountability in today’s Florida Legislature than there was in the 1960s-1970s during the era of the “porkchoppers.” This is good news for Florida taxpayers as it suggests that tax dollars are being distributed by a more rational and less political means. For instance, the presence of a state university that logically contributes to the determination of the amount of tax dollars disbursed to the counties. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that even though legislative power as measured by the index had no effect on allocation, Northern Florida still received more money per capita than the far

more populous (and politically powerful) central and southern regions of the state. This may indicate that the counties of the more rural panhandle still have basic service needs that require funding regardless of population. Or it may simply reflect that the several universities located in the region skew the overall per capita allocation.

This research was predicated on the amount of dollars distributed to the counties as listed in the Legislature’s County by County Allocations (Florida House of Representatives, 2016) as generated by the General Appropriations Act. Future research may consider narrowing this field to Budget Issue Requests (Florida House of Representatives, 2016), otherwise known in the legislature as “member projects”. These budget issues are required to be submitted through the legislator’s office, whereas some of the items found in the County by County publication are requests that are submitted directly by the municipality or other local government. While these requests may have the legislator’s name attached to them, the legislator may only have limited knowledge of the request, relying solely on what others tell them. Water projects and various grant requests are examples of some of the budget requests that may bypass the legislator’s office.

Future research may also consider assigning an additional value for calculating the Legislative Power Index representing the longevity a legislator has served in office. Freshman legislators typically have little experience in lobbying for various funding while legislators who are term limited may find themselves with not as much influence as they enjoyed during years 3-6 of their service.

Additional research might also include a broader scope of fiscal years. This research focused on the most recent budget process during a year of possibly one of the most controversial presidential elections ever. Some of these results may be affected by legislators being more cognitive of their reelection efforts than actually pursuing projects for their districts. Sampling across more fiscal years may produce a more accurate picture of how the money really flows throughout Florida.

**APPENDIX A:
MEDIA MARKET AND REGIONAL ALLOCATION SUMMARIES**


Florida's 10 Media Markets	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
Pensacola	104	884,810,159	5	5,350,000	99	879,460,159	400,000	-	400,000	879,860,159	676,707	\$ 1,300
Panama City	133	301,800,021	2	800,000	131	301,000,021	4,294,751	8,408	4,286,343	305,286,364	388,178	\$ 786
Tallahassee	174	942,174,907	6	1,495,000	168	940,679,907	7,221,393	17,352	7,204,041	947,883,948	485,543	\$ 1,952
Gainesville	86	1,149,675,246	4	3,222,602	82	1,146,452,644	4,271,999	15,757	4,256,242	1,150,708,886	333,198	\$ 3,454
Jacksonville	255	838,620,657	16	8,908,000	239	829,712,657	10,332,447	268,245	10,064,202	839,776,859	1,737,406	\$ 483
Tampa	488	2,481,575,723	28	25,250,000	460	2,456,325,723	14,820,499	2,507,669	12,312,830	2,468,638,553	4,662,286	\$ 529
Orlando	438	2,463,901,888	40	45,601,553	398	2,418,300,335	5,600,714	996,928	4,603,786	2,422,904,121	3,935,258	\$ 616
Ft. Myers	153	500,646,178	13	15,219,676	140	485,426,502	3,300,658	305,311	2,995,347	488,421,849	1,320,649	\$ 370
West Palm	250	970,405,744	20	12,741,500	230	957,664,244	5,226,931	86,239	5,140,692	962,804,936	2,065,023	\$ 466
Miami	618	2,987,035,513	98	38,508,600	520	2,948,526,913	12,139,893	1,355,566	10,784,327	2,959,311,240	4,667,024	\$ 634
State Totals	2,699	13,520,646,036	232	157,096,931	2467	13,363,549,105	67,609,285	5,561,475	62,047,810	13,425,596,915	20,271,272	\$ 662

Source: Florida House of Representatives


Florida's Three Regions	# of Projects	Amt. Allocations	# Vetoed	Amt. Vetoed	Net # of Projects	Sub Total Allocations	Multicounty Allocation	Amt. Vetoed	Multicounty Sub Total	Total Allocations	Population	Per Capita \$
North	752	4,117,080,990	33	19,775,602	719	4,097,305,388	26,520,590	309,762	26,210,828	4,123,516,216	3,621,032	\$ 1,139
Central	926	4,945,477,611	68	70,851,553	858	4,874,626,058	20,421,213	3,504,597	16,916,616	4,891,542,674	8,597,544	\$ 569
South	1,021	4,458,087,435	131	66,469,776	890	4,391,617,659	20,667,482	1,747,116	18,920,366	4,410,538,025	8,052,696	\$ 548
State Totals	2,699	13,520,646,036	232	157,096,931	2467	13,363,549,105	67,609,285	5,561,475	62,047,810	13,425,596,915	20,271,272	\$ 662

Source: Florida House of Representatives


**APPENDIX C:
TOTAL ALLOCATIONS AND POPULATION BY MEDIA MARKET AND REGION**




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau

Orlando Media Market Allocations and Population




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau


Ft. Myers Media Market Allocations and Population



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau




Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau

Media Market Allocations and Population



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau

Regional Allocations and Population



Source: Florida House of Representatives and U.S. Census Bureau

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
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


BOOK-REVIEW

Susan A. MacManus, *Florida's Minority Trailblazers: the Men and Women who Changed the Face of Florida Government*

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2017), p.640, ISBN 978-0-8130-6293-8

by Kathryn A. DePalo, Ph.D., Senior Instructor, Florida International University, Miami



Florida has long been a place of solace, hope, and diversity, often called a microcosm of the United States, a “melting pot” of cultures and languages. The demographic make-up of Florida is akin to figures nationwide, including diversity within broad racial and ethnic categories. Florida has a long history of drawing people to its shores, many fleeing political persecution; African Americans and Haitians, to Cubans and Venezuelans, sometimes with differing political leanings, party affiliation, and voting behavior. With this richness of diversity, Florida can boast its status as a “trailblazer incubator.” Susan MacManus defines trailblazers as “those individuals in minority groups who have braved the tangled jungle of government in the past half century and carved out a trail for others like them to follow.” This study looks at modern politics in Florida over the past 50 years. Institutional changes and political movements beginning in the 1960s have created political opportunities for minority representation at all levels of

government.

Legislation at the Federal level, constitutional amendments, and court decisions all expanded civil rights and provided minority pathbreakers in Florida an opportunity to blaze a trail and for others to follow their lead. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, “coincided with Florida’s rapid population explosion that yielded the state more representatives in Congress” (from Preface) and fundamentally changed Tallahassee. Institutional barriers lifted with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with the 1975 amendments adding language minorities. In the Florida Legislature, the House began to see racial and ethnic diversity beginning in the 1960s and the Senate by the 1980s. Redistricting and court battles encouraged majority-minority districts starting with the 1967 reapportionment fight. The Women’s Movement of the 1970s added minority women to legislative ranks. In 1982, the implementation of single-member districts created additional opportunities for trailblazers to make their mark, along with the passage of term limits in 1992.

Redistricting has been the main driver in getting minorities elected to congress. The 1992 and 2002 redistricting battles led directly to the increase in majority-minority districts. In 1992, redistricting brought the first blacks to the House since Reconstruction. By the 2000s, there were many in-roads for Hispanics, culminating in the election of Mel Martinez in 2004 as the first Cuban immigrant in the U.S.

Senate. As Florida became a two-party state, special elections and appointments by governors seeking diversity in the executive and judicial branches have also played an important role.

This volume contains a wealth of qualitative (and quantitative) data. The book is a treasure trove of personal interviews, documenting and presenting an important piece of Florida's diverse history. It is a testament to Dr. MacManus' strength as a political scholar to have so many people talk to her candidly about their experiences. The in-depth biographies are not just a political career checklist, rather the story of their lives- politicians humanized. The book contains invaluable personal stories, campaign literature, photos, and family histories. Stories abound of the famous (Ros-Lehtinen, Gwen Cherry, Marco Rubio); Florida political dynasties (Bullards, Meeks, Diaz-Balarts), and the not-so-famous, but equally intriguing, such as John "Gus" Plummer and Mimi McAndrews.

The study is categorized by 1) minority, 2) gender, 3) party, and 4) office. The book covers the three branches of government at the state and federal level, where applicable. Several were trailblazers at more than one level of government (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in both the state legislature and congress), and more than one political position (Mel Martinez as the first to chair a major party) demonstrating the importance of a political pipeline for minority politicians.

The impressive range of demographics include Spanish, Chinese, Cuban, Puerto Rican, African American, Korean, Bahamian, Haitian, Mexican, Colombian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, Nicaraguan, Ecuadorian and Syrian for a total of 15 different nationalities/ethnicities. The experiences of politicians range from educators, business people, political activists, and military (including Javier Soto in the Bay of Pigs Brigade).

You get a sense from these path-breakers of giving back to the community. Some were recruited to run, some came from political families. Most had politics in their genes. Many say that their race or ethnicity did not necessarily matter, that they represented diverse districts and people, desiring to represent everyone and the issues they were passionate about. Some felt the weight on their shoulders. Women felt their gender keenly. They realized the importance of that branch's function, the gravity of their position (let alone trailblazing position), and that service to people and community come first. A common theme among the trailblazers: they ran to help people and had bases of support already in the community.

Their advice to others is invaluable. Most discussed the importance of knocking on doors and meeting people and being heavily involved in your community first before running for office. Many talked about their supportive, encouraging families. When in office, understanding the process and issues, working with people, and giving your community a voice was paramount.

Leadership roles and the influence of minority legislators, increased, for example, with Marco Rubio as the first Hispanic Speaker of the Florida House. Those elected to the Florida Senate suggested it gave them greater positions of influence than in the House.

The interviews preserve an important history of the state and how it has changed. Some saw the end of rural rule in Florida (Pork Chop Gang). Sen. Pres. Louis De la Parte, Jr. was prescient, speaking in 1974, recognizing the coming growth and power of conservative Republicans. Further, his warning of minority political organizations seems fitting: "I think that any group that attempts to polarize that group and then use that group for elections, is creating a real disservice to that group. I don't think any group can benefit if it sets itself apart and is in competition with the majority. No minority group ever beat a majority" (p.276-277). The negative effect of the growth of partisanship was evident from the interviews. Others lamented the immense growth of money in politics.

The list of trailblazers at the state legislative level is long. This has not been the case in the other two branches of Florida government. State Executive positions have offered little opportunity for minorities and those attempting to retain their positions fared poorly. While Hispanics, such as Bob Martinez and Carlos López-Cantera had slightly more success in attaining positions at the top of the executive hierarchy, as governor and lieutenant governor, this is not so with African Americans; and Republicans have been more successful than Democrats. This trend reverses with other Cabinet positions as African Americans had more success than Hispanics (none) and especially through gubernatorial appointment.

It took the Florida Supreme Court until the 1970s to diversify its high court. Joseph Hatchett was the first African American to win a statewide election for a seat on the Florida Supreme Court, and the first African American to win statewide anywhere in the South. The following year, through a state constitutional amendment, Justices on the Supreme Court were appointed through merit retention. Governors since have sought to diversify the bench through appointments. Peggy Quince, jointly appointed by Governors Chiles and Bush is the only black woman to head a branch of Florida government when she served a term as Chief Justice.

At the federal level, Ros-Letinen is the first Hispanic woman to be elected to congress. She later served as Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and as a naturalized citizen is the most senior Republican woman (she plans to retire in 2018). Corrine Brown as one of the first African American women elected to congress in the House in 1992, stated, "Black women work harder because we see being elected is like a calling. And so we serve, we're servers. And no matter how big or important you are, you have to go home and wash your laundry. That keeps you humble. You know, men go home, their wives do their laundry. We do our own" (p. 435).

Political dynasties abound at both the state and federal level in the legislative branch: the Bullards, Edward, Larcenia and son, Dwight in the Florida Legislature; the Meeks: Mother, Carrie and her son, Kendrick who has the distinction as the first African American to replace his mother in congress; and the Diaz-Balarts, Lincoln and Mario, have both served concurrently in the Florida Legislature and in the U.S. House. Further, Lincoln is the first Hispanic to serve on the powerful Rules Committee.

Former Congressman, Allen West has the distinction as the “first African American Republican elected since Reconstruction.” In the U.S. Senate, Mel Martinez, a Hispanic Cuban, is the only pathbreaker from Florida to have served in the chamber to date.

Another interesting aspect of these stories is the intersection of these trailblazers. For example, Joseph Hatchett, a former Florida Supreme Court Justice (now federal judge) was one of three federal judges charged with redrawing congressional districts in the 1992 redistricting battle that created four majority-minority seats won by these path-breakers. U.S. Sen. Martinez was the first to lead a major party as Republican Chairman, and as a Senator, confirmed the first Hispanic, Sonja Sotomayor, to the U.S. Supreme Court.

If there is one minor point of criticism, the preference would be to organize all trailblazers alphabetically. As it is presented here, some trailblazers are found at more than one level of government and the reader must seek further, by level of government and office to read the full story, which can be difficult to navigate. On the flip side, “listing” each trailblazer by chamber looks even more compelling.

This book is a gem of Florida history with an extensive bibliography, news clippings, archival info, and extensive interview data, including stories of those now deceased. Further, the appendices are rich with information showing just how impactful these trailblazers were with the incredible numbers of those who have come after. The book provides a significant contribution in preserving such an important part of Florida history.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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