



F P S A

Florida Political Science Association

THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST

Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association

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A Message from the Editor



It is hard to imagine that six months have passed since the previous issue of *The Political Scientist* was published. Undoubtedly, we have all been kept busy. With the 2019 Florida Political Science Association conference around the corner, it is important to acknowledge the work of those who serve as officers and board members. These individuals willingly volunteer their time to ensure that matters important to Florida and to those in our profession are addressed. As political scientists we do much more than teach our courses and publish our scholarship, we also pursue other endeavors both inside and outside of academia. Several of the contributors to this issue of the newsletter exemplify this.

In the first article, Liv Coleman, associate professor of political science and international studies at the University of Tampa, writes about her experience running as a candidate for office in Florida's 73rd house district. Next, John Barkdull, professor of political science and director of the global studies program at Texas Tech University, writes about the efforts made and challenges faced by his institution when internationalizing their students. The two remaining articles provide nuanced analyses of significant issues. Manuel DeLeon, assistant professor of international studies and homeland security at Bethune-Cookman University, and Douglas Rivero, associate professor of political science at St. Petersburg College, examine the U.S. sanctions-regime against Iran. Lastly, Carol Glen, professor of political science at Valdosta State University, contrasts two recent UK referendums, the first for Scottish independence and the second for Brexit.

I would like to express my gratitude to those who responded positively to my efforts to reinvent the newsletter. It is crucial to the mission of the association that *The Political Scientist* serve as an outlet that is representative of the values and interests of the broader profession, not just of those who call Florida home. As such, it will continue to seek contributions that are timely and informative.

Kindly,

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Upcoming Events

Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting **Saturday, March 2, 2019** The University of Tampa

Regular Registration until February 22, 2019:
\$75 for faculty and \$35 for students.

Late Registration after February 22, 2019:
\$80 for faculty and \$40 for students.

Registration includes lunch, refreshments, and a subscription to *The Florida Political Chronicle*. For preregistration, please go to www.fpsanet.org.

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2019 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute **Center for José Martí Studies Affiliate at The University of Tampa**



José Martí and the Immigrant Communities of Florida in Cuban Independence and the Dawn of the American Century **June 17—July 13, 2019**

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A Feminist in Trump Country Runs in the Year of the Woman

By Liv Coleman, Ph.D.

In 2018 I ran for the Florida State House of Representatives as a 38-year-old college professor and political scientist at the University of Tampa. I was born and raised in Minneapolis, but now living in Bradenton. My home is smack dab in the heart of Florida's Trump country, a place where the tony Sarasota suburbs meet rural cracker country with its thousands of new residents each year. The district, with about 180,000 total residents, includes the master-planned communities of Lakewood Ranch and University Park. I was a feminist among a sea of red-hatted Trump supporters and Trump bumper-sticker-clad pickup trucks. Tough terrain for a liberal college professor.

Entering the Race

I came to run for office via my activism in the Women's March on Washington DC and through the Indivisible movement to hold Members of Congress accountable for their support for and complicity in the worst abuses of the Trump administration.

I declared my candidacy for Florida State House at the end of January 2018. The first Republican to enter the race was Joe Gruters, who left to run for the State Senate. Next came Tommy Gregory, a Sarasota attorney and retired JAG. Another strong Republican candidate was Melissa Howard, a Lakewood Ranch social notable known for her philanthropy and charity organizing. My district was expected to have one of the most highly contested Republican primary elections in the region. Both Howard and Gregory raised large sums of money and had significant bases of support.

Just weeks before the Republican primary's final election day, after vote-by-mail ballots had already been sent out, the race broke wide open with scandalous allegations by a conservative online news outlet that Melissa Howard was pretending to have a college degree that she did not actually hold. When university officials publicly asserted that Howard was lying, and that she had never actually earned the degree, she became the subject of salacious national – even international – news coverage, made more sensational by her glamorous appearance and lavish lifestyle in the Sarasota suburbs of Lakewood Ranch. Eventually, Howard dropped out.

Gregory was not yet out of the woods before the August primary E-day, however, as he faced his own national media scandal. According to reporter Eric Hananoki, Tommy Gregory attended a meet-and-greet hosted by Peter Gemma, a known white supremacist involved with the Holocaust denial movement. Gregory had even posted about the meet-and-greet himself on his candidate Facebook page, thanking Gemma. To my surprise, however, the endorsement got little attention in the press.

I also couldn't help but note the discrepancy in media treatment of the scorned glamorous woman with the fake degree who was hounded nationally and internationally, compared to the disgraced military man caught up in what my view was actually the bigger, more toxic scandal, equally implicating the suitability of one's character for office. As a feminist scholar, and in light of what we learned about media coverage of the 2016 presidential campaign contest between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, I was not surprised that the female candidate's flaws were treated with much greater scrutiny and harshness than the male candidate's flaws. In the end, Melissa Howard was even criminally investigated by the Manatee Sheriff's office for violating statutes about misrepresenting one's educational credentials for public office and she was sentenced to probation and community service for her sins. At least they did not "lock her up."

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Running Blue in a Red District

My long odds of winning were apparent in the Republican lean of the district. Florida House District 73 voter registrations are approximately 50% Republican, 25% Democratic, and 25% No Party Affiliation (NPA). Given the past performance of the district, we knew many of the NPA voters to be reliably conservative. For example, President Donald Trump won FL HD 73 over Hillary Clinton by 25 percentage points in 2016.

My candidacy was largely ignored in civic meetings and the press. An example of this played out in the main community civic political discussion forum, Manatee Tiger Bay. This event was in August before the Republican Primary, and my two Republican opponents were invited but I was not. We took to social media to publicize the exclusion – and, finally, I got an invitation.

When I got home and published the text of my speech and METV public access video online, it quickly blew up on the Internet. Apparently my personal frustrations resonated strongly with a fairly large segment of the community.

My Campaign Team

I assembled a campaign committee and overall strategy for my race with the help of Doug Ross, a winter-time University Park resident with significant experience in Michigan and national politics. I received further campaign management help from Dr. Jeff Orenstein, a fellow University of Wisconsin-Madison political science Ph.D., who was retired from Kent State University and who had taught in the campaign management school there, in addition to running for Congress himself.

Mostly, however, the campaign operation was driven by myself; my husband Dr. Matt Lepinski, a computer scientist on research leave from New College of Florida; my sister-in-law Krysta Lepinski, who served as Campaign Coordinator; my Field Director Mackenzie Brown, a former political science student of mine at the University of Tampa; and Communications Director Allegra Smart, a political communication major at George Washington University who grew up in the area and handled marketing emails, contacts with local media, and helped me with talking points and speeches. My campaign committee also had rich political experience and talent in areas from data to databases to messaging and more. And I was grateful for the generous campaign volunteer help of Manatee and Sarasota County Democratic Party organizations, Indivisible groups, and volunteers from organizations who had endorsed me.

The Tasks of Running for Office

Candidate Training

The biggest training help I received was provided in several meetings guided by Doug Ross, my most senior adviser. The only formal candidate training session I attended was hosted at the Sarasota County Democratic Party Headquarters by political consultant Kevin Winchell. The training covered topics such as fundraising, messaging, putting together a campaign plan, and more. The most helpful online trainings I used were put together by Democracy for America. They were free online.

Messaging & Issue Selection

My top issue was public education because it blended well with my personal biography and professional identity. The Manatee County School District is the single largest employer in Manatee County, and teachers and others who work with our children had been lacking proper respect and pay for too long. I called for safe schools, fully-funded public schools, an end to

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giveaways to for-profit charter schools, and a freeze on the tax-credit voucher program. I called for an end to high-stakes testing. I also campaigned on tuition-free public higher education for at least a two-year degree, an initiative with possible bipartisan appeal based on its success in Tennessee under Republican Party-led government.

Environmental issues figured prominently in the race because of news headlines. Red Tide brought massive, abnormally large and stinky fish kills to the shores of Manatee and Sarasota County beaches, reduced tourism, and hurt local businesses.

Most experts strongly suggested avoiding gun safety issues in my campaign, but I chose to foreground them both because I strongly believed in the importance of common-sense gun safety measures, as well as because I thought the issue was politically safer than commonly appreciated. It seemed like a good “wedge” issue with which to attract suburban, well-educated women who I would need to win over to have even a shot at victory. A poll commissioned by the Florida GOP in spring 2018 had found that even a majority of gun owners in the state favored stronger gun laws, including universal background checks and a ban on assault-style weapons.

My general election opponent, on the other hand, was endorsed by the NRA, campaigned in the primary with pictures of himself with high-powered rifles, and spoke about the importance of Constitutional rights, which usually seemed to mean the Second Amendment to him. In the general election campaign, however, he seemed to try to avoid the issue when we went in front of mixed or moderate audiences, which confirmed my impressions that it was a good issue for my campaign.

The Money Game

Entering the race, I had little expectation of how much money I might be able to raise for the campaign, but I pleasantly surprised myself by hauling in close to \$60,000 in a ruby-red district viewed as uncompetitive. My husband and I also spent a significant sum of our own money on the campaign. Most of the money we raised online, using Act Blue, a trusted online portal for donors. We got checks at the end of meet & greet events from generous members of our community or later in the mail. I received no corporate PAC money.

By the end of the race, I had raised \$59,520.25, as well as giving the campaign a \$5,000 loan and making a number of in-kind contributions from our own expenditures. My opponent raised \$175,635.36; his affiliated political committee also raised a significant sum, with about \$100,000 donated by his parents. The vast majority of his funds were spent during the highly competitive Republican primary. The Manatee and Sarasota County Democratic Parties also spent some funds on my behalf. To my great surprise, a Washington DC-based Super PAC also got involved in my race. Forward Majority Action PAC embarked upon an unconventional strategy of targeting Florida State House races, including ones written off by most other donors and Super PACs, based on a notion that if suburbs flipped this year, even difficult districts for Democrats in Florida might be in play. I don't know how much they spent on my race, but I believe it was substantial. They ran Facebook ads and other digital ads and sent some simple mailers.

Endorsements

I was endorsed by EMILY's List, Run for Something, Planned Parenthood PAC, the Florida Chapter of the Sierra Club, Florida Chapter of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence; Moms Demand Action; Manatee Education Association; and the Florida Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers. I was also endorsed by the Florida Democratic Party's Young Democrats, Women's Club,

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Environmental Caucus, and Veterans' Caucus. In my most high-profile endorsement, a few days before the election, I was endorsed by Jake Sullivan, Vice President Joe Biden's National Security Adviser. I publicized the endorsement on Facebook and our campaign sent out press releases to media, but only Florida Politics online picked up the story and published an article about it. I wondered that if a male candidate was endorsed by Joe Biden's National Security Adviser and chief negotiator on the Iran nuclear deal, would the *Sarasota Herald-Tribune* have written about it?

Voter Outreach

I canvassed many doors throughout the campaign, which was especially grueling on foot in the hot summer. Many of the neighborhoods were in gated-communities and difficult to campaign in. We also operated in-person and virtual phone banks using the Florida Democratic Party's Votebuilder database system. In addition to attending numerous candidate forums and community events, I also attended countless meet-and-greet house parties or coffee events at homes of supporters in the district.

Debates

I participated in several debates, the first of which was with Tommy Gregory (while Melissa Howard was still in the race) at the Manatee Tea Party. I really enjoyed the opportunity to speak to a broad audience of mixed political viewpoints and was impressed with the graciousness and hospitality of the hosts. The extensive Q&A portion of the debate, however, revealed many persistent differences in worldview and sets of information between liberal and conservative base voters these days. I was surprised and befuddled by questions about right-wing conspiracy theories.

I ended up doing several subsequent debates and candidate forums, as well as live TV candidate appearances on ABC 7 in Sarasota twice.

Advertising

I had the help of Women for the Win, a volunteer group to help female candidates across the country. I was matched with an ad producer in Texas, a writer in New York, and a local director and production crew based in St. Petersburg, FL. We filmed an ad about public education, my signature issue. We also filmed one ad about Red Tide, which was devastating the Gulf Coast, including Sarasota Bay-area beaches. We ran them as digital ads on Facebook and the Google network. Overall, we had close to 2 million views of our video and still digital ads. I sent one mailer. I ran print ads in the *East County Observer*, a local free community newspaper, on the subject of affordable healthcare.

Lessons & Challenges

Getting staff to help me was one of the biggest challenges of the campaign. The local Manatee County Democratic Party is, and has been, led by spirited and smart volunteers, but languishing as the opposition in a one-party town has meant that local party organization has lagged in some respects. Having run so few candidates and having left so many elections uncontested in recent years, the party had little institutional memory or knowledge to convey about anything from the rules and procedures of setting up a campaign, to best practices for campaign management, to policy wisdom or briefing books to help candidates. They were, however, strong in using their network of area organizers, precinct captains, and local volunteers to host and facilitate many meet & greets that were critical for my voter outreach. The party also assisted voter registration efforts, albeit mostly outside my district, and distributed my literature to houses. They also facilitated coordination of a GOTV drive for me and all the other local, state, and federal campaigns that reached over

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10,000 voters. The Florida Democratic Party was marginally helpful at best. When the Democratic Party works to “build the bench” of political candidates in local areas, particularly in red counties, it will have to work equally hard to “build the bench” of trained campaign staffers as well, if they want to be in a position to contest elections.

Running in the Year of the Woman

I am married and I don't have children, but local candidate support organizations strongly suggested messaging for women emphasizing identities as mothers when appropriate.

I was told not to call myself a professor, that it was a negative. I decided to be open about that, but to call myself an educator, the broadest possible identity. On the campaign trail I heard someone on the board of a local university refer to an economist at the school as a “lady Ph.D.” After I ran, a local news media organization actually referred to me as a “schoolteacher,” which many people instantly recognized as sexist; it was a mistake they would likely have never have made with a male professor. Before the general election, a contrast newspaper article between me and my opponent listed all of my opponent's educational credentials from his B.A. to his J.D., but none of mine; the article also said I “taught” at University of Tampa, but not that I was a professor, much less a tenured one!

It's likely that all candidates receive feedback about enhancing their personal appearance, but it's clearly always a focus for women candidates. I'm almost 40 years old, but have frequently been told that I could pass for my late 20s. I was given a lot of criticism and advice about my candidate appearance, particularly from supporters, not from detractors or the opposition. I was given the advice to dress like a school principal or small-town lawyer, something professional without putting on airs. When I dressed casually, I was told to wear Ann Taylor. When I wore Ann Taylor, I was told to dress up more, to look more like a *real* state representative. “But I'm wearing Ann Taylor, what more are you looking for??” I replied. On the same day once I was told not to smile, to look more serious, as well as to smile more, to look friendlier. People often thought I was a student or someone too young to run for office; at one meet and greet, a woman, upon meeting me, cried out, “You look like a child!” “I'm a child genius,” I replied.

My impression that my youthful appearance affected how I was perceived was, in fact, confirmed not just through many personal happenstances and anecdotes but also through what I learned from data analytics in Facebook advertising. In a kind of inadvertent natural experiment, through deploying various kinds of Facebook ads with images of myself, other candidates, and objects, I learned that basically the only people who would click on digital ads featuring my campaign photos were men and women my age or younger than me – a potential liability in a district with one of the highest concentrations of senior citizens.

The gender contrast was strong in my campaign, however, not just because I was a Democratic woman and my opponent a Republican man. He seemed to support the judicial nomination of Brett Kavanaugh, I did not. I liked cats, he liked dogs. He was endorsed by the mostly male police and firefighters unions, and I was endorsed by mostly female teachers' and social workers' unions. In fact, during the campaign, my mother, a former teacher and nurse, wondered aloud why Democrats didn't go after those groups as aggressively as Republican candidates went after police officers and firefighters. So I made it my mission to do just that – to talk up these traditionally female-dominated professions to help elevate their status, give the overlooked groups the respect they deserved, and to make sure they could get proper salary, benefits, and working conditions. In other words, I deliberately ran on traditionally women's issues, for women. And, honestly, in Trump country, where the hostile sexism was sometimes palpable, it felt like the *necessary* thing to do.

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What Political Scientists Bring to the Game

Throughout the entire contest, I had a more philosophical approach to much of my campaign activities because of my background as a political scientist. I knew from my limited understanding of the literature on campaigns and elections that voters typically voted according to their party identification. Campaigns, then, mattered only on the margins, and in a small race for State House, we would not have big resources to use the most effective marketing techniques to get the message out anyway. I did know from my political science training, however, that whatever I did spend on advertising, I should save for the end of the campaign, when voters were paying the most attention. So I started running some digital ads as soon as voters were about to receive their vote-by-mail ballots, and I ran huge numbers of digital ads.

The Results

My opponent, Tommy Gregory, received 61.9% of the vote, or 64,285 votes. I received 38.1% of the vote, or 39,614 votes. In other words, even in a famously deep-red county, about four in every ten voters picked me.

In 2016, a presidential election year in which Democratic Party turnout is typically even higher, the previous Democratic candidate for the same Florida State House set had received 34.92% of the vote, or 36,678 votes. So I was pleased to have moved the needle definitively left – an improvement of about 3.2 percentage points over the previous election. I also received more votes than did Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton did when she was at the top of the ticket in 2016.

Toward True Democracy – Why Every Race Should Be Contested

I helped raise issues resonant with other Democratic candidates in my local community, forcing local elected leaders and opposition candidates to grapple with them and take them seriously.

We raised the profile of the Democratic Party in Manatee and Sarasota Counties. It seemed clear to me that many local interest groups were not in the practice of thinking about or reckoning with competitive party elections after years of one-party rule locally and so many uncontested elections.

I'm Glad I Ran

Finally, seeing the political process up-close first as an activist and then as a candidate in my own community gave me a deep appreciation of locally-specific challenges of democratic governance in my one-party town. The most significant of these is the influence of deep-pocketed developers who call the shots behind the scenes, the local Republican Party organizations who do their bidding against the will of the voters in many cases, and the local media organizations who are beholden to these same developers for advertising revenue amidst declining newspaper subscriptions and who do not offer very critical coverage. While my electoral bid is done, I am committed to continuing the work of forging a better democracy in this community and have identified some priorities for making that happen.



Associated Professor Liv Coleman is a tenured Political Science and International Studies faculty member at The University of Tampa. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Coleman specializes in East Asian and Japanese politics. Her research interests include family, gender, international organization and politics of the digital age.

Directing a Global Studies Program

By John Barkdull, Ph.D.

Texas Tech University is one of the state's three major public systems, with Texas A&M and the University of Texas. Texas Tech enrolls nearly 30,000 students. In addition to the main campus in Lubbock, Texas, the Texas Tech is affiliated with Angelo State University and has operations in Abilene, Amarillo, Midland, Odessa, Fredericksburg, El Paso, Dallas, Highland Lakes, Cleburne, Junction and Waco. In addition, it has long had a study abroad facility in Seville, Spain and recently opened a campus in Costa Rica.

The new campus in Costa Rica highlight's the emphasis Texas Tech has placed on international education. This includes attracting foreign students, sponsoring study abroad in dozens of countries, internationalizing the curriculum, and holding numerous academic and cultural events. The university's Quality Enhancement Plan included the theme of global communications. Texas Tech's administration includes an Office of International Affairs, led by a Vice Provost and housed in the International Cultural Center. The ICC provides meeting space, a passport office, and support for international education from kindergarten through graduate study. TTU also offers degrees in international business and international economics. Nearly every program incorporates a focus on world affairs, and some require an international experience to earn the degree. In short, TTU has committed to a global orientation and put that commitment into practice.

The Global Studies major is an important element of the university's international curriculum. Texas Tech's undergraduate major in Global Studies is an interdisciplinary degree, emphasizing social, political, historical and cultural aspects of world affairs. Students must take a set of core classes including classes in political science, history, communications, geography, and culture. Students select another set of elective classes from a list developed by the Director of Global Studies and the academic advisor for the Department of Political Science. In addition, they are required to achieve competence in a foreign language. The university requires the degree plan to encompass instruction in written, spoken, graphic, and numeric communications literacy.

Advanced undergraduates are required to take a capstone course which has several purposes; only Global Studies majors are allowed into the course. The capstone calls on students to synthesize their interdisciplinary course of studies, to reflect on how various disciplinary approaches, regions of the world, and issue areas relate to one another. The capstone also emphasizes communications literacy, with assignments and exercises aimed at developing written, oral, graphic, and numerical communication skills. The class provides the best opportunity to engage in program evaluation. The Global Studies program has established several goals for the curriculum, but gathering data to assess these goals is difficult when students are taking a wide variety of courses across the university. The data on such questions as whether students feel the program has met their expectations is most readily collected in a course for advanced Global Studies students. Moreover, the capstone facilitates assessing whether communications literacy goals have been met.

The Global Studies program at Texas Tech was established in 2013. In its first year, one student declared the major and graduated in Spring 2014. Today, Global Studies majors number about 90, in some semesters exceeding 100 students. The enrollment expectations specified in the plan to create the degree have been met.

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Prior to the Global Studies degree, Texas Tech offered a Global Affairs specialization in General Studies. Students showed little interest in this option. Although not far from the Global Studies degree in content, the Global Affairs specialization did not offer a diploma in Global Affairs. Instead, a note on the transcript would show that the student specialized in Global Affairs. Although the course content of the Global Affairs specialization was not far from what ultimately became the Global Studies interdisciplinary degree, students show far more preference for the stand-alone degree with Global Studies shown on the diploma. Thus, from almost no enrollment, Global Studies has grown to account for about one fifth to one-quarter of undergraduate students counted as part of the Political Science department.

At the request of the Vice Provost for International Affairs, this author initiated the process of creating the stand-alone degree. Texas requires that a request for a new degree program demonstrate student demand, a coherent curriculum, career options for graduates, and sufficient resources on campus and available to implement the program. Because of the lack of student interest in the Global Affairs specialization, other evidence of demand was required. The author had received numerous requests from students for a degree option, and experience at other universities showed that sufficient demand was likely to exist among a student body as large at Texas Tech's. Regional universities in the Big 12 almost all offered some kind of international studies degree. Enrollments when the request was initiated ranged from the 80s to over 400. Since, peer institutions have seen significant growth in enrollments in international studies programs. A survey of course offerings at TTU showed a large number of appropriate classes. No additional faculty resources were required. The only new class proposed initially was the capstone; since, a special topics class and a class on career development have been added. A Steering Committee was created to include faculty representatives from the majors represented among the core classes as well as other faculty with a strong interest in global studies.

The Global Studies program has addressed two important challenges. First, the question arises whether the program should stipulate an international experience to earn the degree. An international experience could include study abroad, scholarships that involve foreign study and research, internships, work experience, and the like. The premise of an international experience requirement is that a student ought not to earn a degree in Global Studies without ever having crossed a U.S. border. Indeed, a student could earn the degree without ever having left West Texas. Consequently, an international experience requirement would seem mandatory.

This raises the question of how to meet the needs of students who already have had significant international experience. Some students have military experience, or grew up in families that traveled and lived abroad (children of diplomats, for instance), or have worked abroad. Does it make sense to require such a student to undertake an international experience, at added cost in time and money, when it is not likely to add much to their appreciation for living abroad? The answer would seem to be to credit students with international experience and to require it of those without it. But this introduces considerable uncertainty into the degree requirements. Program managers might have to determine on a case by case basis whether students had met the criterion. Some students might believe their case was unfairly handled. Actual experiences can vary so widely that rigid rules might not work well.

In any event, Texas Tech mandates that any degree requirement apply to all students, and that a curriculum requirement be implemented as part of the student's Texas Tech degree plan. Thus,

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military service and other international experiences would not count. Consequently, Global Studies does not encompass an international experience requirement. Instead, the emphasis is to be on positive incentives, rather than a requirement. This includes encouraging students to take Study Abroad, raising awareness of internship opportunities, and providing scholarships. To this end, the Global Studies program has established a scholarship fund, with the goal of making it an endowed fund to provide a permanent source of scholarship funding for students engaging international experiences.

Already, the fund offers a prize in an annual essay competition. The Steering Committee proposes topics for the essay competition and selects winners, who are awarded \$500 for the winning entry.

Second, an interdisciplinary program faces the challenge of finding a focus. The director consulted with faculty, advisors and administrators about the broad purpose of the Global Studies undergraduate degree. A consensus emerged that the program must answer the question, "What can I do with a Global Studies degree?" Consequently, beyond providing advice on career options, Global Studies at TTU has adopted a career development focus. When fully implemented, this focus will entail forming a network of potential employers, providing regular career counseling, and raising student awareness regarding the wide variety of career paths available to the Global Studies major. Students can be advised on how best to design their degree plan to prepare for potential career paths.

In Fall 2018 Global Studies initiated a course, Professional Career Paths in Global Studies. The course is the first major step in implementing the career orientation. The class is numbered as lower division, because the idea is to provide guidance and outline options for freshmen and sophomores so they would have the knowledge to design appropriate degree plans. However, upper division students are welcome and indeed the class is open to all majors, not only Global Studies. The career paths addressed in the class include diplomacy, law enforcement, the military, global health, development, international organizations, and humanitarian organizations. Professionals holding positions in these fields visited the class, both in person and via Skype. Some visitors to the class were Texas Tech faculty. The units provided background information about each area and advice on how to get started in a given field. Background information included the organization of the profession, the legal framework governing the field, ethical issues, and day to day life as a professional in a given occupation. Visitors were especially valuable for enlightening students about the rewards and frustrations of their professional lives. Student evaluations showed 83 percent of responding students believing that the class was a valuable learning experience.

The Global Studies program is the home to the Peace Corps Certificate at Texas Tech. The PCP allows students to combine course work with volunteer experience to earn the certificate, which offers favorable consideration in Peace Corps applications. The PCP encompasses six tracks, including education, health, environment, youth in development, agriculture, and community economic development.

Global Studies at Texas Tech has enjoyed some significant successes. Of course, room for improvement and for further development remains. Immediate priorities include creating graduate certificate in global studies, enhancing financial support for international experiences, and sharpening the career orientation.

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Efforts are now underway to initiate The Director and other faculty are working toward a Master's degree. In addition, planning has begun to create a Graduate Certificate of Global Studies. Like the undergraduate degree, the Certificate would be interdisciplinary, with two or three required classes and three or four approved electives.

Financial support for Global Studies students means primarily endowing the scholarship fund. Fund raising efforts are on-going.

The career orientation needs more than just a single class. Materials for career counseling will be compiled and made available to counselors and students. The network of international professionals demands cultivation. Some of the visitors to the Fall 2018 professional development class were Texas Tech alumni. Building on their eagerness to help Texas Tech students, further outreach to those with global careers will provide opportunities for recent graduates.

In the professional development class, more career paths will be addressed. Emphasis will be placed on the skills needed for any professional setting. Case studies can be incorporated to highlight challenges international professionals must face. Students in the initial professional development class were enthusiastic about simulations and other in-class activities. Making the course as interactive and hands-on as possible will be pursued, extending to other required and elective Global Studies classes.

In sum, Texas Tech University has adopted an institutional orientation toward international affairs. The Global Studies program is an important component of the university's broader efforts. The growth of the Global Studies major and the range of associated activities indicate that a healthy, successful program will continue to make an important contribution to Texas Tech's academic mission.



John Barkdull received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and joined Texas Tech in 1993 after teaching at Michigan State University. His areas of specialization include international relations theory, international organization, international environmental politics, and globalization. Dr. Barkdull currently serves as the Director of Global Studies for the Department of Political Science and as the advisor for the International Studies Minor at Texas Tech University.

Assessing the Effectiveness of a Sanctions-Regime: How the E.U., China and Russia Plan to Circumvent the New Unilateral U.S. Sanctions-regime against Iran

By Manuel De Leon, Ph.D. and Douglas Rivero, Ph.D.

There are three types of economic sanction-regimes, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral. A unilateral sanctions-regime is when one nation imposes a set of economic sanctions on another nation; a bilateral sanctions-regime is when two nations impose sanctions on another nation; and a multilateral one is when a group of nations imposes economic sanctions on one nation. We make two arguments here. First, the reestablishment of sanctions against Iran by the U.S. will constitute a unilateral sanctions-regime since Russia, China and the E.U. have opted out by creating a new global payment system to allow Iran and its trade partners to circumvent the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Second, there is no doubt the U.S. economy remains the largest in the world and, thus, the U.S. can certainly afford to impose sanctions on several nations at the same time. However, we argue that the U.S. ability to enforce a unilateral sanctions-regime is rather limited when several economic powerhouses join forces against it. Overall, what is really relevant here is that this new event, the U.S. unilateral sanctions-regime upon Iran and the EU's SPE, represents an interesting new chapter in the literature of sanctions-regimes. This case study will eventually allow us to evaluate the efficacy of unilateral sanctions-regimes.

Assessing the Overall Effectiveness of Sanctions-Regimes

Many variables affect the overall effectiveness of sanctions-regimes. For example, Lektzian and Souva¹ focus on the objectives of sanctions-regimes, and they define three types. The first is punishment, and its objective is, as Galtung suggests, "create enough economic hardship in the targeted nation"², forcing it to change policies. The second is institutional, which combines punitive and expressive sanctions to target domestic institutions in a targeted nation. The third is expressive, what Lindsay³ defines as domestic and international symbolism and Tsebelis⁴, among others, calls demonstrative sanctions, for while they are largely ineffective at least politicians can claim that they are doing something to punish the sanctioned nation.

Lindsay⁵ explains that sanctions-regimes pursue five main objectives: compliance, subversion, deterrence and international, and domestic symbolism. Compliance aims at policy changes in a targeted nation. Subversion pursues changes in political regimes and leaders of a targeted nations. Deterrence attempts to prevent a nation from recurring to hostile politics. And international symbolism seeks to send a political message to the international community whereas domestic symbolism looks

¹ Lektzian, David and Mark Souva (2007) "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51 (6), p. 850.

² Johan Galtung (1967) "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, 19 (3), p. 388.

³ Lindsay, "Trade Sanctions as Policy," p. 156.

⁴ George Tsebelis (1990) "Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Conflict Resolution*, 34, p. 3-28

⁵ James M. Lindsay (1986) "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination," *International Studies Quarterly* (1986) 30, 153-173; p. 155.

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for political support in the sanction nations. For their part, Hufbauer et al⁶, hereafter HSEO, set five foreign policy goals for the cases they have studied. They are modest policy changes, policy and regime changes, prevent or disrupt military attacks or conflicts, weaken military capacities, and policy changes in major way.

Scholars also test how political regimes affect sanctions-regimes in sanctioned nations. For example, Lektzian and Souva⁷ find that autocracies tend to give in to sanctions more than democracies do (although democracies are almost never targeted with sanctions), while Pape⁸ and others argue that democracies are more likely than autocracies to give in to sanctions. As Nooruddin⁹ observes, democracies are more likely to be targeted with sanctions precisely because elected officials must respond for the welfare of constituencies. Though, Lektzian and Souva¹⁰ find that sanctions-regimes are democracies' prime foreign policy tool, and sanctions imposed by democracies, Hart¹¹ finds, are more effectual than sanctions imposed by autocracies. This is probably because most democracies are part of the core in the world capitalist system. As such, they have immense economic power.

Lektzian and Souva¹² also study political institutions in sanctioned nations. They examine two main factors: a) the political cost sanctions bring to the sanctioned nation's leadership; b) the political cost sanctions bring to the sanctioned nation's winning political coalition. Hence, the cost of sanctions is another variable to scrutinize. Sanctions are politically and economically costly to sanctioned and sanctioning nations, and they can be politically costly to political rulers and economically costly to business elites.

Eaton and Engers¹³ find that the efficacy of sanctions is higher when the cost of sanctions to targeted nations is lower with respect to the gains sanctions bring about; conversely, the cost of sanctions to targeted nations is higher than the cost they suffer for giving in to the sanctions. When Kirshner¹⁴ examined correlations between the cost which sanctions bring not to the targeted nation in general but to its ruling and business elites, they find that sanctions are more effective when targeting specific business elites over a long period of time, especially when sanctions hit policy-makers. Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens¹⁵ explain how sanctions limit governments and political elites' ability to access the means of oppression such as police gears, intelligence, and finance. For then, sanctions, no matter how mild they are, in time induce political volatility in targeted nations, forcing their business and political elites to relax political repression and change their political behavior. After all, targeted nations are often in a weaker economic position, relative the sanctioning nation.

⁶ Gary C. Hufbauer, Gary, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberley A. Elliott (2007) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics), p. 52, 53.

⁷ David Lektzian and Mark Souva (2003) "The Economic Peace Between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions," *Journal of Peace Research*, 40 (6), p.642

⁸ Robert A. Pape (1997) "Why Sanctions do not Work. *International Security*," 22 (2), 90-136.

⁹ Irfan Nooruddin (2002) "Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy" *International Interaction*, 28, p. 59-75.

¹⁰ Lektzian and Souva, "The Economic Peace Between...", p. 848

¹¹ Robert Hart (2000) "Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions," *Political Research Quarterly*, 53 (2), p. 267-284.

¹² David Lektzian and Mark Souva, (2007) "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51 (6): 848-871.

¹³ Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers (1992) "Sanctions." *Journal of Political Economy*," 100 (5), p. 901-928.

¹⁴ Jonathan Kirshner (1997) "The Micro-foundations of Economic Sanctions," *Security Studies* 6 (3), p. 32-64.

¹⁵ William H. Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg and William Mertens (2004) "International Economic Sanctions against a Dictator," *Economics & Politics*, 16 (1), p. 29-51.

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In fact, duration of sanctions-regimes is a key variable. Drezner¹⁶ and Marinov¹⁷ explicate that sanctions-regimes prompt political instability at the short run but are less effective at the long run, especially if sanctions aim at obtaining concessions from the sanctioned nation. Galtung¹⁸ notes that, in time sanctions can empower targeted autocrats and legitimize their stand against the sanctions, while Leventoglu¹⁹ observes that, at the long run, sanctioned nations adapt to economic hardships and even become more economically creative and innovative, and they even become experts in circumventing the sanctions. It is why long term sanctions often appear as failing policies, doomed to lose support from public opinion and international institutions.

Nonetheless, we propose the study other factors, such as the level of economic centralization in sanctioned nations and globalization. For instance, it is difficult to determine whether the economies of Cuba, North Korea, Russia and Iran suffer due to economic sanctions imposed on them or inefficiencies typical of their commanded, planned and highly centralized economies. Additionally, we should account for the relative decline of U.S.'s influence in the global economy. As HSEO argue, "the most obvious and important explanation for the decline in the effectiveness of U.S. led sanctions is the relative decline of the U.S. position in the world economy"²⁰, in part due to the growing relevance of Chinese economy and particularly when economic powerhouses such as the E.U, China and Russia join force against the U.S. There are simply more markets and opportunities for targeted nations to circumvent unilateral sanctions.

In sum, in this section we discussed the literature review, mainly that there are three types of economic sanction-regimes: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral. We also argued that many variables affect the overall effectiveness of sanctions-regimes, among which are objectives of sanctions, political regimes and institutions in sanctioned nations, and the cost and duration of sanctions. We additionally proposed the study of factors such as level of economic centralization in sanctioned nations, globalization and the economic strength of the sanctioning nations in the case of unilateral sanctions when accessing the efficacy of sanctions-regimes. In the next section we will claim, first, that the reestablishment of the U.S. sanctions against Iran will be a unilateral sanctions-regime since Russia, China and the E.U. will stay out by creating the SPE to allow Iran and its trade partners to circumvent the U.S. sanctions. Second, we will state despite the U.S. economic might, its ability to enforce a unilateral sanctions-regime is rather limited when several economic powerhouses join forces against it.

EU, China and Russia Circumvent a Unilateral Sanctions-Regime: Solidifying Trade with Iran Through a SPE

Some scholars, including the authors of this essay, see that globalization affects the efficacy of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral sanctions-regimes, but it affects unilateral ones even more for two main reasons: first, a sanctioned nation can still trade with all nations –and corporations- except with the sanctioning one; second sanctioned nations can utilize the agents and means of globalization to circumvent the sanctions.

¹⁶ Daniel W. Drezner (2003) "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization* 57 (2), p. 645.

¹⁷ Nikolay Marinov (2005) "Do Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 49 (3), p. 564-576.

¹⁸ Johan Galtung (1967) "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, 19 (3), p. 378-416

¹⁹ Bahar Leventoglu (2012) "The Use of Sanctions with Adapting Targets," *Duke University*, p. 1

²⁰ HSEO, 2007, p. 128

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We define globalization as complex, intense interdependencies and interactions among the agents and means of globalization (see Graph 1.1). Agents of globalizations are state and non-state actors. State actors include governments and their institutions, agencies and their agents. Non-state actors are corporations, financiers, NGOs, interest-groups and some powerful individuals with no legal relation to governments and their agencies. The means of globalization account for global demand for natural resources, banking, corporate models and manufacturing with its global assembly line. In economic terms, globalization is driven by the forces of global capitalism, namely supply, demand and competition between agents of globalization for the means of globalization. But sanctions-regimes limit those forces. Sanctions are political tools to pursue political goals by altering the natural course of the forces of global capitalism. Sanctions may scare off some agents of globalization, but they do not eradicate supply and demand. Rather, as suppliers abandon a sanctioned market or nation, demand increases there. The agents of globalization utilize the means of globalization to circumvent the sanctions and meet such a demand.

For their trade and financial volumes, the E.U., Russia and China are among some of the most influential agents of globalization, and we consider their new SPE a new means to circumvent the new U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran and keep Iran within the global economic cycle. The SPE is an alternative to SWIFT, which is significantly controlled by the U.S. In fact, SWIFT is a key component of globalization for it allows banks to talk to each other when moving data and payments between the agents of globalizations and across the world, including Iran and its corporations, and it should not be a surprise that the E.U., Russia and China are working to circumvent it. A joint statement by EU nations, Russia and China states that the new financial transaction vehicle will “assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran” (Turak, 2018, para. 2). Further, Federica Mogherini contends that the new legal entity “will allow European companies to continue to trade with Iran in accordance with European Union law and could be open to other partners in the world” (Turak, 2018, para.3). Not only do they have vast economic interests in Iran, but this anti-US bloc is also cooperating together in their support of the Nuclear Deal with Iran and they oppose President Trump’s America First policy. For the EU and China, President Trump’s strategy is also one that challenges the economic power of their own agents of globalization. All in all, the U.S. opposes the SPE for it makes its sanctions against Iran almost useless.

We should also consider that Iran is an attractive economic market, the second largest in the Middle East with about 82 million well-educated people. Iran has the second largest economy in that region with a diversified heavy, tech, oil and military industries. For its part, the E.U. was Iran’s largest trading partner before it implemented a sanctions-regime against Iran in 2012, coinciding with the Eurozone financial crisis that had started in 2009, which dramatically diminished Europeans’ purchasing power, forcing E.U.’s corporations to look somewhere else for business. Reestablishing trade with Iran in 2016 was a great opportunity for the E.U. as a whole and its single nation members. Indeed, the E.U. is already the largest exporter to Iran and the third largest importer, only after China.²¹ Let us not forget that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was the first E.U. leader to visit Iran after the E.U. lifted its sanctions in 2016. Since then, trade between Greece and Iran has grown about 96%, which is significant for Greece since it has been in deep financial crisis for almost 10 year. Greece needs as much trade as possible. But E.U. member-nations seek to intensify its trade with Iran with the creation of the SPE.

²¹ “Iran, Trade with World”, Report of Directorate-General for Trade, The European Commission, April 16th, 2018

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For example, Great Britain, one of the E.U.'s signatories of the SPE, was among Iran's largest trade partner until the Iran nationalized its oil in the 1970s. Signing the SPE shows its intention to retaking that position at least among E.U. member-nations. In fact, Germany is another signatory of the SPE and Iran's largest European trade partner as today, with no intention to quit. As Reuter reported, "German exports to Iran soared in October [2018], a month before the United States re-instated sanctions on the Islamic Republic to choke its oil and shipping industries... The surge signals willingness among Mittelstand to continue doing business with Iran despite the risk of being blacklisted by the United States for defying its sanctions. Official figures by the Federal Statistics Office reveal that German goods exported to Iran totaled almost 400 million euros (\$455 million) in October 2018, a year-on-year surge of 85 percent and the highest monthly volume since 2009.²² Mittelstands are small to medium-sized firms which otherwise would not be able to survive global competition. By investing in Iran, they secure a good source of income. They export to Iran machinery, plant equipment and industrial components. The German government insures them to counterbalance the risk of investing in Iran. As the Jerusalem Post reported, "nearly 1 billion euros have been provided to German firms since 2016 to protect their business dealings with Iran from the high risk of its markets."²³ And France, yet another SPE signatory, is not yet among the top ten Iran's trading partners, but its energy, industrial and finance sectors have made great inroads. France, after a decade of slow economic growth and high unemployment, needs access to as many markets as possible. It is significant to point out that the French government is particularly interested in protecting French corporations, for they are among the most recurrent violators of past sanctions-regimes.

The cases of Russia and China are worth noting for they both are currently confronting trade issues with the U.S. and both signed the SPE. Russia is facing economic sanctions from the U.S. and the E.U. So, it is certainly ironic that the E.U., having imposed sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine Crisis, now asks Russia to help circumvent the U.S. sanctions against Iran. For Russia, signing the SPE means both access to Iran and the E.U. Russia is Iran's seventh importer of good and services, especially oil and military equipment.²⁴ As for China, it is immersed in a trade war with the U.S., so signing the SPE is a means to secure access to the E.U. and Iran.

Regardless, the U.S. and E.U. sanctions against Iran from 2006 to 2016 represented a gold mine for China. With no competitor, China rapidly became Iran's biggest trading partner. China is Iran's largest importer and second largest exporter.²⁵ The Financial Tribune just reported that "Iran's trade with China amounted to \$19.66 billion just during the first half of 2018, representing an increase of 2.2% with respect to 2017".²⁶

Although trade volumes between the EU, Russia and China have increased, US financial power still poses certain challenges that make trade difficult. Many EU corporations have backed away from trade with Iran and are hesitant to defy the sanctions. In addition, while the anti-US bloc has called for a special transaction vehicle, no specific nation has come forward to host the new entity. They fear retaliatory sanctions from US. After all, "this is not the first time countries have tried to move away

²² "German exports to Iran grow by 85 percent in October", Rene Wagner, Joseph Nars, Reuters, December 11th, 2018

²³ "Despite Sanctions, Germany Supports Iran Trade with Nearly 1 Billion in Credit", Benjamin Weinthal, The Jerusalem Post, November 6th, 2018

²⁴ "Iran, Trade with World", Report of Directorate-General for Trade, The European Commission, April 16th, 2018

²⁵ "Iran, Trade with World", Report of Directorate-General for Trade, The European Commission, April 16th, 2018

²⁶ "Iran's trade with China amounted to \$19.66 billion just during the first half of 2018", Financial Tribune, September 4th, 2018


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from a U.S.-dominated financial system. During the global financial crisis a decade ago, policymakers from French President Nicolas Sarkozy to People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for a system beyond U.S. leadership" (Rosenberg & Saravalle, para. 5). Nonetheless, there is a point in which US threats will not work. For instance, "if Beijing could count on a more cooperative London, with its key financial services, to circumvent U.S. jurisdiction, it could seriously damage the U.S. sanctions edifice" (Rosenberg & Saravalle, para. 5). There is already evidence that the transatlantic alliance is fraying, as the UK dramatically increased trade with China following the 2008 financial crash and recently challenged the US's sanctions on Russia in Ukraine. Indeed, "emerging financial arrangements like China's money ties with Britain [financial] might" could be the catalyst that puts the anti-US bloc on firmer footing in their attempt to defy US actions. The EU may certainly be a willing partner given that "European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has argues that the euro should become a global reserve currency to reduce financial dependence on the United States" (). Certainly, the ingredients are there that could help firm up and establish a new system of globalization with a new global financial/trade architecture.

In conclusion, as Park and Glenn put it, "an unintended consequence of U.S.-led sanctions is more opportunity for Iran and China to cooperate"²⁷, but the same can be said about the E.U., Russia and Iran. The U.S. unilateral sanctions-regime upon Iran actually creates trade opportunities for those willing to circumvent them. Now, there is no doubt that the U.S. economy remains the largest in the world and American corporations the more global, for which the U.S. can still afford to impose sanctions and attempt to control world trade. However, we have argued that the U.S. ability to enforce a unilateral sanctions-regime is growing more limited, especially when several economic powerhouses are joining forces against it, as the E.U. China and Russia prepare to do with the creation of the SPE. Also, consider that Iran does not really need trade surpluses (it would certainly prefer to have them). It just needs trade volumes large enough as to survive the U.S. unilateral sanctions, reinforce its geopolitical influence in its neighborhood while counterbalancing Saudi Arabia geopolitical ambitions there. In any case, the U.S. unilateral sanctions-regime and the E.U.'s new approach to circumvent it constitute an excellent case study for assessing and discussing the overall effectiveness of sanctions-regimes, especially unilateral ones. They are certainly far less effective than multilateral sanctions. Such unilateral sanctions, as discussed in the literature, should also prove to be even more ineffective in the long-run as China's financial power continues to strengthen. Together with Russia, China is a powerful force that provides opportunities to circumvent trade sanctions against Iran, and E.U. nations are realizing the partnering with Russia and China may help circumvent the effect on their multinational corporations.

Graph 1.1



²⁷ "Iran and China", John S. Park and Cameron Glenn, The Iran Primer, January 2016

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Brexit and Scottish Independence: Two Referendums Contrasted

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On June 23, 2016 the British electorate voted to leave the European Union (EU). This historic outcome has not only broad repercussions for the United Kingdom's (UK) relationship with Europe, it also has significant implications for future political arrangements within the UK. The Brexit vote came just two years after a referendum was held on the question of Scottish independence, and the issue of continued EU membership was part of that debate. The electorate was warned that if Scotland became independent it would be forced to reapply for EU membership and that there would be no guarantee other member states would unanimously consent to this request. Polling has consistently shown that Scots want to remain part of the European Union, so the prospect of losing EU membership was one factor that influenced the outcome of the independence referendum. Ironically, after the Brexit vote, the decision by the Scottish electorate to remain part of the UK may result in Scotland being forced to leave the EU against its wishes. This study compares the two referendums that have dominated British politics in recent years: the Scottish independence vote and Brexit. It examines how these major constitutional questions emerged, and how the Brexit vote has affected prospects of a second Scottish independence referendum.

Referendum on Scotland's Independence

Proposals to reestablish an independent Scotland are as old as the Treaty of Union (1707) when Scotland voluntarily relinquished its parliament in favor of union with its more prosperous neighbor to the south. The treaty was signed and ratified by the Scottish parliament despite vigorous popular opposition that included street riots. For Scottish legislators, the union with England offered both personal and national economic opportunities; it would be a chance for Scotland to gain access to England's growing colonial empire. Despite their loss of political independence, Scots negotiated for as much autonomy as was permissible within a unitary state. As part of that bargain, Scotland retained its own legal system, education system, and church, and Scottish political leaders were given a relatively free-hand to run local affairs. Nevertheless, the union with England remained unpopular with a segment of the Scottish population, and numerous attempts to restore the Scottish parliament, either as a quasi-federal entity, or as a legislature in an independent state, have been pursued since 1707.

Support for Scottish independence is reflected in the electoral fortunes of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Although Scottish nationalism is greater than the SNP, it was only with an upswing in support for the party in the 1960s and 1970s that the possibility of restoring the Scottish parliament began to be taken seriously. As the British economy faltered in the 1960s, voters began to explore alternative options to the dominant Labour and Conservative parties, and the SNP became the beneficiary. At the same time, the SNP took advantage of the discovery of oil in the North Sea to promote its independence message, and the slogan "It's Scotland's Oil" brought electoral success.

In the following two decades, political and economic factors coalesced to strengthen support for greater autonomy for Scotland. The policies pursued by Margaret Thatcher, and her successors were bitterly opposed in Scotland. Given the vast population difference between Scotland and England (5 million and 54 million respectively), Scotland's electoral rejection of the Conservative Party and its policies had little impact within the British political system. With limited electoral influence at the Westminster, nationalist frustrations found a voice in a document titled the "Claim of Right for


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Scotland.” Formulated by a non-party group of prominent Scots in 1989, it stated, we “do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to their needs.” (Claim of Right 1989). All that remained was to wait for a pro-devolution party to be elected to Westminster, which transpired with the election of a Labour government in 1997. The new government quickly fulfilled its pre-election promises with respect to devolution. In a referendum held the same year, the Scottish electorate approved the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament with a vote of 75 percent in favor and 25 percent opposed.

The first elections for the re-established Scottish Parliament were held on May 6, 1999, and the Labour Party secured the most seats. This was widely anticipated since the party had dominated Scottish politics for most of the post-war period, both at Westminster and in local elections. Popular Labour leader Donald Dewar, dubbed “the father of the nation” became the First Minister of Scotland, and governed in a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. However, by the third parliamentary election, Labour’s popularity had witnessed a precipitous decline. Dewar died unexpectedly in 2000, and none of his replacements could match his repute. At the same time, the deindustrialization of the Scottish economy greatly reduced the power and influence of the labor unions from which the party drew considerable support. The decline of this class-based cleavage in Scottish politics created space for a more robust expression of identity politics that would increase in the following years. Figure 1 shows the decline in support for the Labour Party, and increase in support for the SNP over five elections to the Scottish Parliament. Between 1999 and 2016 the Labour Party went from being the largest party in the Scottish Parliament to third place behind the SNP and the Conservative Party, a result that would have been inconceivable just a few years ago.

Figure 1: Scottish Parliament Election Seats 1999-2016



The 2011 election to the Scottish Parliament represented a seismic shift in support for the SNP, which gained enough seats to form a majority government. This outcome was not expected, since the mixed proportional representation electoral system was specifically designed to prevent the dominance of a single party. The success of the SNP however, did not signal that Scotland was ready to vote for independence. Rather, increased support for the SNP at that time was based on the “most mundane

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of electoral reasons: most voters thought that it would do a better job in office than its rivals” (Johns et. al. 2013). As a minority governing party, the SNP had enacted popular policies and successfully allayed lingering fears about its competence. Opinion polls at the time revealed a high level of trust in the SNP government. In 2011, 71 percent of people said they trusted the Scottish Government to act in Scotland’s best interests ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time,’ an increase of 10 points over the previous year. By contrast, only 18 percent of respondents said that they trusted the U.K. government to act in Scotland’s best interests (Scottish Attitudes Survey 2011).

With an overall majority in the Scottish Parliament, the SNP began a series of negotiations with the UK’s Conservative government about an independence referendum. It was agreed that the vote would take place on September 18, 2014, and the Scottish electorate would be asked a single, straightforward question, “Should Scotland be an independent country.” In the lead up to the referendum all major Scottish political parties, with the exception of the SNP, advocated against independence. When the ballots were tallied, the votes were not as close as the opinion polls had suggested. The final result was 45 percent in favor of independence and 55 percent against, with an impressive 84 percent turnout. A post-referendum poll showed clear demographic distinctions (Ashcroft 2014). Older voters were the most decisively opposed to independence, with 73 percent of those aged 65 or over voting No, compared to 41 percent of 25-34 year olds. For No voters, the most important reason for their choice was the perceived risk of independence. In the poll, 47 percent of No voters agreed with the statement, “The risks of becoming independent looked too great when it came to things like the currency, *EU membership*, the economy, jobs and prices” (italics added).

Although the Yes campaign ultimately failed to achieve its principal objective, the percentage of the Scottish electorate who voted in favor of independence nevertheless reached its highest point in recent history. Support for independence was ten percentage points higher than its previous high watermark reached in 2005. The SNP also experienced an unprecedented upswing in its membership following the referendum. Membership in December 2013 was reported to be 25,000, by September 2018 that number had grown to over 125,000 members, making the SNP the second largest party in Britain (BBC News, 2018).

The Road to Brexit

The British relationship with Europe has always been lukewarm and unattached, an attitude famously summarized in a post-war speech by Winston Churchill, “We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed” (Churchill 1946). By the 1960s however, as the British economy was failing to keep pace with the growth rates being experienced by the EU’s founding members, it sought a closer relationship with Europe, only to be rebuffed by French President Charles de Gaul who vetoed the British application twice. De Gaul accused Britain of displaying “deep-seated hostility” towards European construction. Britain’s third attempt to gain membership was only successful in 1973, three years after De Gaul’s death.

De Gaul’s warnings about Britain in Europe proved to be prophetic as Britain has indeed been an unenthusiastic EU member. Stephen George (1990) coined the phrase “awkward partner” to describe this relationship. Among other factors, George attributes this strained partnership to Britain’s ideological preference for its ‘special relationship’ with the U.S., which often resulted in the UK treating its EU partners with disdain. This latent hostility towards the EU on the part of British political leaders was reinforced in the tabloid press. According to Daddow (2012), the British press increasingly displayed a “vigorously partisan hostility bordering on a nationalist and in some arenas xenophobic

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approach to the coverage of European affairs.” British membership in the EU was predominantly portrayed in the press as a zero-sum game.

Within this historical context, and amidst growing Euroscepticism after the Eurozone debt crisis, Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to renegotiate Britain’s terms of EU membership and give the British people a “very simple in or out vote.” Although Cameron framed his proposal in democratic terms, stating that the British people must “have their say”, there is little doubt that his motivations were largely political. A few months before Cameron’s announcement, almost 100 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) signed a letter demanding that a referendum on EU membership be added to the party platform. In addition to this internal party discord, party leaders were aware of the growing threat posed by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which was siphoning votes from the Conservatives. In combination, these political pressures compelled Cameron to promise a referendum about EU membership. He gambled that the British electorate would vote to remain in the EU, that this outcome would pacify his own party members, and that it would undermine support for UKIP.

The Brexit Campaign and its Aftermath

The referendum on EU membership positioned two opposing groups: the “Vote Leave” campaign, and the “Stronger In” campaign, commonly known as the “Remain” campaign. The former was spearheaded by UKIP, but it also enjoyed support from key leaders in the Conservative Party. The Leave campaign emphasized British sovereignty, ending the supremacy of EU law, and it adopted a strongly anti-immigration stance. UKIP claimed that the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as further EU expansion (especially if Turkey was added) would bring millions more people to live in Britain. On the opposing side, the Remain campaign was headed by leading members of the Conservative party, including David Cameron, and was supported by the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats. In Scotland, the SNP strongly favored remaining in the European Union. Those who campaigned to remain in the EU emphasized the benefits of membership and warned of significant negative economic consequences if Britain voted to leave.

The Leave campaign ultimately prevailed in the referendum. With a vote of 52 percent in favor of Brexit and 48 percentage against, the stage was set for a historic split. The vote was distinguished along demographic, educational, and geographic lines. While 75 percent of 18-24 year olds voted to remain, this was true of only 39 percent of those over 65. People with a university degree also voted to remain, 71 percent, compared to 34 percent of those with a high school education. In England, London and other metropolitan areas voted to remain, while rural locations voted to leave. Significant geographic distinctions were also evident among the UK’s four nations. England and Wales voted to leave, 53 percent and 52 percent respectively, but Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain by significant margins. Fifty-six percent of voters in N. Ireland opted to remain, while every Scottish local authority area voted to remain, with 62 percent of the electorate in favor.

The geographic split of the Brexit vote had immediate political ramifications in Scotland. Within a few hours, First Minister and SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon, proclaimed that the Scottish Parliament should have the right to hold a second independence vote since there had been a significant and material change in the circumstances that had prevailed in 2014. This was followed in March 2017 by a vote by the Scottish Parliament that authorized the SNP government to begin negotiations with Westminster for another independence referendum. In the midst of Brexit negotiations however, UK Prime Minister Theresa May rejected this demand and, for the most part, the Scottish government was content to wait until the “fog of Brexit” cleared (Sturgeon, 2018). However, as Brexit negotiations


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faltered, and following the parliamentary defeat of Prime Minister May's Brexit plan during January 2019, SNP demands for a second independence referendum intensified.

The SNP government is now firmly committed to a shortened timetable for a second referendum, regardless of what happens with Brexit, but the outcome of such a vote is far from certain. Since 2014, polls have shown a small but consistent majority of the electorate in favor of Scotland remaining part of the UK, so it would appear that SNP calls for a second vote is somewhat risky. At the same time, the chaos over Brexit has undoubtedly transformed the political landscape, which could impact voter preferences. In recent polling, a clear majority of the Scottish electorate indicate that they are in favor of a second referendum, although there is less agreement about timing. Figure 2 shows that only 7 percent believe that there should not be a second vote, while 23 percent believe that it should take place quickly, before Britain is scheduled to leave the EU on March 29, 2019. It is worth noting however, that the highest response to the question was "don't know," indicating that there is still considerable uncertainty or confusion about the issue.

Figure 2: Opinions about a second Scottish independence referendum (Nov.2018)



Source: What Scotland Thinks, www.what-scotlandthinks.org

There is also uncertainty about how the electorate would vote on the question of independence, even after Brexit. A poll during October 2018 asked "If the UK leaves the EU as planned in March 2019 and there was subsequently a referendum on Scottish independence, how would you vote?" Forty two percent said they would vote to leave the UK, but exactly the same percentage said they would vote to stay. With 15 percent saying they don't know, a swing of a just few percentage points among the "don't knows" in either direction would determine the outcome.

Conclusion

When the Scottish electorate rejected independence in the 2014 referendum by 10 percentage points, it was widely assumed that the question had been settled for a number of years. However, the Brexit vote and the chaos surrounding UK-EU negotiations has reinvigorated the issue. The SNP continue to highlight the stark geographic differences in the Brexit vote between Scotland and England, labelling the outcome of the referendum a "democratic outrage" (Blackford, 2018). Nevertheless, decisions

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about Scotland's future remain in the hands of the UK government. The Westminster government would have to authorize a second independence referendum, and that is unlikely at least until the Brexit question has been settled. So whether another independence referendum will take place, and whether it would be successful, will continue to be shaped by events in the rest of the UK. If the UK crashes out of the EU without a deal, then support for independence will likely increase. If, on the other hand, a second Brexit referendum is held and Britain remains an EU member arguments that favor Scottish independence will be undermined. At the same time, granting a second Brexit vote would also make it more difficult to deny a second independence vote.

When David Cameron called for a referendum on Britain's EU membership he probably did not foresee the constitutional crises that would result. Today, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about both the future of UK-EU relations and the future of the UK union. Although a small majority of the Scottish electorate have consistently expressed a desire to remain part of the UK, they have also expressed a desire to remain part of the EU. It is certainly conceivable that prolonged political turmoil and economic uncertainty associated with Brexit could be enough to sway a few more Scottish voters to opt for independence.

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