

THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST

Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association

Volume 6, Issue 1—March 2020

Inside this issue

A Message from the Editor Denis Rey Ph.D.	. 2
Would the Trump Presidency Fall into Groupthink? Manuel De Leon, Ph.D. and Douglas Rivero, Ph.D.	. 3
Who Lost Iraq? Political Partisanship & the Lessons of History	. 8
The Cuban Revolutionary Party in Tampa: Origins, Objectives and Transcendence	12

A Message from the Editor



As you may have heard by now, the 2020 annual conference is cancelled due to the global coronavirus pandemic. Like many of you, I regret not seeing friends and colleagues from around the state, and beyond. It unsettles me that our graduate and undergraduate students will not be able to share their research and receive the encouragement and support that their efforts merit. As mentors, we know how hard they work and how much they value the opportunity to highlight their work. However, our wellbeing must come first.

Within the pages of this issue of *The Political Scientist*, readers will find an enthusing set of articles. In the first article, Manuel De Leon, from Bethune-Cookman University, and Douglas Rivero, from St. Petersburg College, address the timely issue of presidential decision-making by exploring whether the reconstituted Trump administration is capable of making sound decisions after the purging of those considered not loyal enough to serve the president. In the second article, Kelly McHugh, from Florida Southern University, examines the Iraq War from the perspective of partisan politics, concluding that one's ideology influences how the war is perceived. The final article analyzes the formation and function of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in Tampa in the lead up to the Cuban war of independence. This transcript of a recent lecture by Ibrahim Hidalgo Paz, from the University of Havana and Center for Jose Marti Studies, explores how the Cuban immigrant community of Ybor City was able to organize and unite politically, thus allowing them to wage their war of liberation.

Before signing off for the last time, I would like to thank the officers and board members of the Florida Political Science Association for allowing me to serve as newsletter editor for the previous two years. It has been a privilege to act in this capacity. I am confident that the next editor will strive, successfully, to publish timely and informative articles while simultaneously shaping the newsletter in their image.

Thank you,

Denis Rey Associate Professor Political Science & International Studies University of Tampa denis.rey@ut.edu

Would the Trump Presidency Fall into Groupthink?

By Manuel De Leon, Ph.D. and Douglas Rivero, Ph.D.

The House's impeachment and Senate's trial against President Trump are over. The 'grown ups' are gone, and the President has either fired or removed those who testified against him. Now he is surrounded by people fully loyal to him, individuals who share the same worldviews and approach to government and policymaking. It all us leads us to ask: Would the Trump's presidency fall into groupthink?

The literature on how personality affects leadership is rich and vast. Authors such as James Barber (1972), Alexander George (1980), Larry Berman (1988), Cecil V. Crabb and Devin Mulcahy (1986) among many others have contributed tremendously to the topic. But it is Irving L. Janis (1972, 1982) who first studied how a leader's personality could drive a group into what he called groupthink. Groupthink is just that: a group of people thinking as a group almost all the time without real debating, questioning, and reasoning. Janis (1972) employs the term to explain why a group would almost always pursue consensus. According to Janis (1982), groupthink is the result of four important conditions: too much cohesiveness among members of a group; faulty structural organization of a group; stressful situational factors within a group; and personality predisposition.

First, cohesiveness here refers to a measure of the internal quality of a group, meaning the quality of interactions and relationships between the members of a group. Strong cohesiveness in a group could bring about a positive work environment, sound interactions, healthful relationships, and high degrees of camaraderie and solidarity. For its part, low levels of cohesiveness could create a hostile work environment, harmful interconnections and stressful human relations. But cohesiveness alone does not lead to groupthink because, as Janis affirms, "cohesiveness is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient one" (Janis, 1982; p. 245).

The second condition to consider is faulty structural organization of a group, which according to Janis includes impartial leadership, homogeneity of members of the group, lack of norms and methodologies in the group, and insulation of the group (Janis, 1982; p.244). Those elements could emerge and grow overtime, but a leader could impose them on a group through what Janis calls personality predisposition.

The third condition is stressful situational contexts (Janis, 1982; p.244), which refer to internal and external stressful factors directly affecting the work environment and relations among members of a group. Some of those contexts are recent mistakes and failures, low expectations, poor choices or lack of alternatives, moral dilemmas, short-term low levels of self-esteem, and egocentrism among others. Actually, the list of stressful contexts is endless, and the larger the list is, the more stress and, therefore, more groupthink in the group.

The last but most relevant condition is personality predisposition. Janis (1982, 1992) notices a direct correlation between groupthink and personality predisposition. For Janis (1992), personality predisposition is a constraint -Alexander George (1980) calls it 'ever present personality constrains' - against the decision-making process. Here, we should consider three important factors. First, personality predisposition creates stressful work relations, for which they are harmful and detrimental to work environments. Second, when facing stress, some leaders tend to behave in unethical,

unprofessional and incompetent manners despite of their skills and experience, creating, consciously or not, an unpleasant and hostile work environment in detriment of free thinking, debating and negotiation. Third, in order to overcome a hostile work environment, members of the group tend to come together, unite and become more amicable and less prompt to dissent and confront their leader.

Some leaders utilize reasoning as a means to promote a group's discipline, cohesion and open critical thinking. Such a leadership approach may create groupthink but in a positive way: the members of the group may respond not only with gratitude and a solid sense of loyalty, duty and responsibility but also with new ideas, more productivity and efficiency. In the same way, a too amicable, pleasing and comfortable leader could create a too amicable, relaxed work environment and a too independent critical thinking. That approach could create groupthink as well. As Janis states, "the more amicability and sprit de corps among the members of a policy-making group, the greater is the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink" (Janis, 1982; p.13). But some leaders use fear, humiliation, aggression, and retaliation as psychological mechanisms for promoting and enforcing group discipline, cohesiveness, and obedience. Under such circumstances, the reaction of the workgroup is often of acceptance, submission, and consensus, along with a great effort to never disagree with the leader or provoke his/her bad temper.

Janis focuses on Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson's personality for his research on groupthink. He argues that President Johnson's personality created a work environment truly hostile and inappropriate for effective policy-making. Of President Johnson's persona, for example, George Reedy wrote: "was a miserable person, a bully, sadist, lout and egoist... His lapses from civilized conduct were deliberate and usually intended to subordinate someone else to do his will. He did disgusting things because he realized that other people had to pretend that they did not mind. It was his method of bending them to his designs" (Reedy, 1982; p.157).

President Johnson's leadership style was not based on reasoning and persuasion but on aggression and coercion. His harsh, despotic and abusive leadership was known in the Senate as the Johnson's Treatment. Some members of the House and Senate feared it.

Actually, President Johnson did promote cohesiveness, friendship and solidarity among members of his inner circle. He even created the Tuesday Lunch Group, which was a lunch gathering for members of his cabinet so they could open up, speak freely and frankly, exchange ideas, debate, and work on resolutions. It just did not work, and according to Janis, the Tuesday Lunch Group reinforced groupthink around President Johnson and throughout his administration. Could it happen to the Trump administration now that the 'grown ups' are gone and the President seems to have no opposition in the White House and the Republican Party?


Enough has been said of President Trump's personality, enough at least to study the possibility of groupthink in his administration and even within the Republican Party.

President Trump has had a very public life, so we know a lot about him. President Trump himself has published numerous books, from which we learn a lot about his personality and approach to business and negotiation. In addition, we have his speeches and tweets, which reveal a lot about his thinking, style and approach to politics and leadership. And with respect to his tenure in the White House we have books like Fear of Bob Woodward (2018), Fire and Fury (2018) and Siege (2019), both of Michael Wolff. Based on conversations and interviews with members of President Trump's cabinet, advisers and collaborators, those books expose a lot about President Trump's personality and chaotic, unethical leadership. For example, we learn that he is egocentric, authoritarian, and aggressive, and that he can be mean to whoever contradicts and opposes him.

Some of those accounts have been confirmed by those who were called to testify as part of the Muller and the Trump-Ukrainian-Biden investigations.

Still, we can analyze it from another angle: those who have departed or have been fired from the Trump's administration, as opposed to those who have stayed and have been recently hired.

For instance, as of February 2020, the turnover of the Trump administration is at 82%, meaning that 82% of his closest advisers and cabinet members have resigned or been dismissed. We are talking about Jeff Sessions, Reince Priebus, Sean Spicer, Steve Bannon, John Kelly, H.R. McMaster, Rex Tillerson and James Mutis among others, people who served Donald Trump from day one. Graph 1 shows that the turnover of Trump's presidency is higher than any other presidency since President Reagan.



Source: Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration", by Kathryn D. Tempas. Brookings Institute, February 2020

On the other hand, we have those still members of the Trump administration, people like Steve Miller, William Barr, Mark Esper, Gina Haspel, Mike Pompeo, Mick Mulvaney, and Kellyanne Conway among others less visible. They probably learned how to cope with President Trump's personality and leadership style. Studying them could allow us to access the possibility of groupthink in the Trump Administration. The cases of Rudy Giuliani and Senator Lindsey Graham are very interesting, for they seem to have succumbed to President Trump's personality and leadership style. In fact, there are yet another three cases worth researching: William Barr, Robert C. O'Brian, and Richard Grenell.

By most accounts, William Barr is a talented lawyer, but for many he was appointed U.S. Attorney General not for his talent but because of his views in favor of a strong imperial presidency. Mr. Barr may not have Trump's personality, but he shares President Trump's approach to the presidency: robust, active, authoritarian, and somehow dictatorial, almost above the law. Through Mr. Barr's writings and public statements throughout his career, especially after Nixon's presidency, we learn that he never approved the restructuring of the Justice Department meant to restrict and limit the executive branch. Barr sees the executive branch as an equal to the legislative and the Justice Department as an extension of the presidency. Particularly interesting and controversial is the unsolicited memo that Mr. Barr directed to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Assistant Attorney General Steve Engel in Jun 2018, for in it Mr. Barr strongly questions the legality of Muller's Investigation over possible obstruction by President Trump. Today, Mr. Barr is largely seen not as working for the United States but for President Trump as his lawyer and fixer. Some even go as far as arguing that Barr is Trump's Ron Cohn.

For his part, Robert C. O'Brian is President Trump's fourth national security adviser. With him, as Crowley and Sanger of the New York Times put it, "Mr. Trump has finally gotten what he wants — a

loyalist who enables his ideas instead of challenging them." Crowley and Sanger report that in National Security Council meetings, Mr. O'Brien distributes printouts of President Trump's tweets to the members of the Council. Then he directs the Council to "find ways of justifying, enacting or explaining Mr. Trump's policy, not to advise the president on what it should be." It presents a true problem for U.S. foreign policy because the job of the NSC is the way around: challenge and advice the president, not agreeing and justifying everything he says and does.

Finally, President Trump's appointment of Richard Grenell as U.S. Chief Intelligence officer could mean more groupthink in the Trump Administration. Mr. Grenell is appointed to the position not for his talent, merit and experience but because he is loyal to President Trump. Mr. Grenell does not seem to be willing to challenge and advise the President; he seems to be interested in protecting the President more than the United States itself. In fact, Grenell's first act as U.S. Chief Intelligence officer seems to corroborate it: he has begun to 'overhaul' the U.S. intelligence community by ridding it of President Trump's political enemies and those perceived as not loyal enough to the President.

In conclusion, would the Trump's presidency fall into groupthink? It is hard to answer that question, but we do know that the White House now looks more like President Trump than ever. The President has surrounded himself with people who think and behave like him, people who would not challenge and truly advise the President. They seem to fear the "Trump Treatment': harsh dismissal, baseless accusations and name-calling in twitter and Fox Friends. It all presents a true challenge for U.S. institutions, policies, democracy and democracy in general.



Manuel DeLeon is Assistant Professor of Political Science, International Studies and Homeland Security/Department Chair at Bethune Cookman University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Florida International University in Miami, FL. His research interests include sanctions-regimes against Iraq, Iran, Syria, Russia and Cuba; international security studies, focusing in Middle East; international political economy and international security; international relations, U.S. foreign policy; and homeland security.



Douglas Rivero is Chair of the Social and Behavioral Sciences division at St. Petersburg College. Rivero earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Florida International University in Miami, FL. His areas of specialty are American foreign policy, the Cold War, and international political economy.

Bibliography

- Barber, James D. 1972. "The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House" Englewood Cliff, Prentice-Hall, New York.
- Berman, Larry. 1988. "Lyndon B. Johnson: Paths Chosen and Opportunities Lost" In Fred I. Greenstein, ed., "Leadership in the Modern Presidency" 1st ed., Harvard University Press, Boston.

Caro, Robert. 1982. "The Path to Power" Knopf, New York.

- Crabb, Cecil V. Jr., and Mulcahy, Devin V. 1986. "Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR To Reagan" Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge and London.
- Crowley, Michael and David E. Sanger, "Under O'Brien, N.S.C. Carries out Trump's Policy, but Doesn't Develop It". The New York Times. February 22, 2020.

- Donovan, Robert. 1984. "Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia" St. Martin's Press, New York.
- George. Alexander L. 1980. "Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice" Boulder, CO: Westview. New York.

Halberstam, David. 1972. "The Best and The Brightest" Random House, New York.

- Janis, Irving L. 1982. "Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes" 2nd ed., Yale University, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.
- Janis, Irving L. 1989. "Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management" The Free Press, A division of McMillan, Inc. New York,
- Janis, Irving L. 1992. "Causes and Consequences of Defective Policymaking: A New Theoretical Analysis" In Frank Heller, ed., "Decision-Making and Leadership" Cambridge University Press.
- Kearns, Doris. 1979. "The Art of Biography: The Power and Pathos of LBJ" New Republic, March 3, 1979.
- McNamara, Robert. 1996. "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam" With Brian Van Demark. Times Books. Random House. New York.

Reedy, George. 1982. "Lyndon Johnson: A Memoir" Andrews and McNeal, New York.

Tempas, Kathryn D., "Tracking Turnover in the Trump Administration". Brookings Institute, February 2020.

Who Lost Iraq? Political Partisanship & the Lessons of History

By Kelly McHugh, Ph.D.

Nearly 18 years after its initiation, the 2003 Iraq War remains a political flashpoint, and the 2020 election is likely to be the fifth consecutive presidential contest in which the legacy of the War is debated. Although there is an elite consensus that the United States failed in its initial goal of creating a stable pro-American regime, there appears to be no parallel consensus regarding why the United States lost the War. Democrats -- both those who supported the War in 2003 and those who opposed it from the start -- have unified around a simple argument. They hold that invading Irag was an act of folly, as it was unrealistic for the United States to attempt to wholly remake politics and society in a foreign nation thought military force. Many Republicans, however, argue that the goal of a stable, democratic Iraq was achievable, but during the course of the War, policymakers made strategic blunders that foreclosed a successful outcome. Specifically, they blame the administration of Barack Obama for prematurely withdrawing all forces in 2011; they assert that this created a power vacuum, which resulted in the collapse of the Iragi Army and the rise of ISIS. These competing explanations for the outcome of the Iraq War constitute more than simple political rhetoric. Each of these interpretations has clear policy implications, as the memories -- and more specifically the lessons -- of the Iraq War will likely loom large for both elected officials and the public when the United States is considering future armed interventions.

The Democrats on the Iraq War

Initially, the Democratic Party was divided on the question of whether or not the George W. Bush administration was justified in pursuing regime change in Iraq in 2003. When it began, there was bipartisan support for the War; 39 percent of House Democrats and 58 percent of Senate Democrats joined Republicans in authorizing the use of force against Iraq (Coen, 2018). These "yes" votes included several prominent members of the Party, including 2004 Democratic Presidential nominee Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, New York Senator Hillary Clinton, and Delaware Senator Joseph Biden. Overall, the divisions within the Democratic Party precluded any serious debate about the Iraq War during the early years of the conflict. Democratic discontent with the War steadily grew; by the time of the 2006 midterm elections the Party leadership ran on promises to end "Bush's War," and gained control of both chambers of Congress.

Barack Obama, then a Democratic Senator from Illinois, succinctly summarized the Party's views on the Iraq War a 2006 floor speech:

"I said that Saddam Hussein was a ruthless man, but that he posed no imminent and direct threat to the United States. I said that a War in Iraq would take our focus away from our efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. And, with a volatile mix of ethnic groups and a complicated history, I said that the invasion and occupation of Iraq would require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences. In short, I felt the decision unfolding then to invade Iraq was being made without a clear rationale, based more on ideology and politics than fact and reason" (Obama, 2006).

The 2008 election functioned as a catharsis for national Democrats, demonstrating that almost uniformly, members the Party believed the decision to invade Iraq had been a terrible mistake and should serve as a cautionary tale for future leaders. During the primary contest, Clinton admitted that

her vote in favor of the 2003 military authorization had been a mistake, while Obama trumped his consistent anti-War credentials. In the general election, Obama faced Arizona Senator John McCain, one of the most vocal proponents of the War. As such, the 2008 election served as a referendum on the Iraq War, with Obama Warning that if McCain were elected, he would ensnare the United States in additional Middle East quagmires.

In sum, the narrative embraced by Democrats to explain failure in Iraq is straightforward, and places blame squarely with the Bush administration. This interpretation holds that it was an act of hubris for United States to believe it could impose democracy on an ethnically fractured foreign nation. In this view, Iraq had become a second Vietnam, an unwinnable quagmire that the United States had entered into without critically analyzing the likelihood of success.

This lesson appears to have had a concrete impact on Obama's decision making about the use of military force during his Presidency. His administration did intervene in Libya in 2011, but only after much deliberation, and intense lobbying from European leaders. Notably, when announcing the military action, he explicitly invoked the lesson of Iraq to justify the limited mission, saying "Of course, there is no question that Libya -- and the world -- would be better off with Qaddafi out of power ... To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq ... That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya" ("Remarks by the President", 2011). Similarly, in 2013, when debating airstrikes against Syria in response to the regime's use of chemical weapons against civilians, the lessons of Iraq loomed large. According to a number of his advisors, Obama sought to balance his desire to punish the Assad regime for violating international law, with concerns that any U.S. military response could creep into a protracted ground War. Ultimately, Obama elected not to intervene, telling his speechwriter, "we can't fool ourselves into thinking that we can fix the Middle East" (Rhodes, 2018, 200).

Republicans on the Iraq War

While most prominent Republicans now agree that the United States had failed in its goal of creating a stable, pro-American government in Iraq, unlike their Democratic counterparts, they reject the notion that the U.S. effort was destined to fail. Instead, prominent members of the Party now assert that the seeds of failure were not sown in 2003, but instead in 2011. To understand this interpretation of events, it is necessary to examine the sharply divergent ways in which the two parties perceived developments between 2007 and 2008. In January of 2007, despite the deep unpopularity of the War, Bush announced that he planned to send more than 20,000 additional soldiers to the country to focus on counterinsurgency. Bush and his advisers believed this would ultimately allow a political compromise between ethnic groups and result in the development of a viable democratic government.

Democrats, as well as some Republicans, immediately rejected the plan, arguing it was merely a symbolic effort, destined to fail since the War was already lost.

Most Congressional Republicans, however, argued that although the War was going poorly, the President had outlined a bold new approach that could secure a U.S. victory. This debate over the status of the Iraq War spilled into the 2008 election contest; at this point, Republicans and Democrats offered sharply different assessments regarding whether or not the surge had effectively "reset" the War. Bush and his allies in Congress trumped the success of the surge, pointing to a reduction of violence in Iraq. McCain, an ardent supporter of the surge, argued that his unwavering support of the mission demonstrated his superior judgment in foreign affairs. As he argued during the first Presidential debate, "We are winning in Iraq and we'll come home. And we'll come home as we have when we have won other Wars and not in defeat" (Spillius, 2008).

Following his 2008 Election victory, Obama announced that his administration would adhere to the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government.

Under this plan, the United States would withdraw its forces from all major cities in Iraq by the end of June 2009; subsequently, all U.S. forces were to leave the country by December 31, 2011. In response, conservative pundits and major figures in the Republican Party argued that this move would create a power vacuum in Iraq that would undo all of the progress accomplished by the troop surge. During the 2012 Presidential campaign, Republican nominee Mitt Romney called the withdrawal an "astonishing failure" which would squander the progress that was gained "through the blood and sacrifice" of American soldiers. He charged that the decision was either "the result of a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude in negotiations" (Montopoli 2011).

By the time of the 2012 elections, however, Iraq had largely faded as a political issue; it reclaimed the headlines in 2013 after the Islamic State, an offshoot of al-Qaeda in Iraq, launched a major military offensive. The group quickly captured several major cities in Iraq and Syria and declared that it had established an Islamic caliphate. The rapid deterioration of Iraq after the U.S. exit, as well as the global spread of ISIS, ensured that Obama's stewardship of the Iraq War would become an issue in the 2016 Presidential campaign.

During the 2016 Republican Presidential primary, the leading contenders conceded that in hindsight, the United States should not have invaded Iraq, though they stopped short of blaming the Bush administration's policy choices for the failure. Instead, they argued that Obama's desire to rapidly end U.S. involvement in Iraq led to the rise of ISIS. For example, in August 2015, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush praised his brother's administration for the "success of the surge"; he then faulted the current administration for its management of the War, asserting that Obama's "premature withdrawal was the fatal error, creating the void that ISIS moved in to fill – and that Iran has exploited to the full as well" (Kiely, 2015). Similarly, South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham, an ardent hawk, told attendees at a campaign event, "If you fought in Iraq, it worked. It's not your fault it's going to hell. It's Obama's fault" (Costa, 2012).

The Party was not wholly united in adopting this narrative, however. Donald Trump, who had not held elected office before seeking the Presidency, had long claimed that he opposed the Iraq War from the start and thus was able to distinguish himself from other members of his Party on the issue. For example, during the first Republican primary debate, he argued, "I came out strongly against the War with Iraq because it was going to destabilize the Middle East. And I'm the only one on this stage that knew that and had the vision to say it" ("Transcript", 2015). After securing his Party's nomination, however, Trump and his Vice Presidential candidate, Indiana Governor Mike Pence, frequently invoked the rise of ISIS as a political cudgel to argue that Democrats, including Clinton, were weak on national security.

Trump did publicly embrace the Republican interpretation of the U.S.' failure in Iraq, but the degree to which he truly believes this putative lesson is unclear. During the 2016 campaign, he consistently articulated a neo-isolationist position, characterized by a desire to avoid involving the United States in any more nation building operations. This proclivity seems far more compatible with the Democratic understanding of the lessons of Iraq. On at least one occasion, however, Trump has heeded the Republican version of the lessons of Iraq. In 2017, when deciding whether or not to maintain a U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Trump was swayed by arguments that a full U.S. withdrawal from the then 16-year old War would create a power vacuum, and Afghanistan would summarily spiral into chaos. As Senator Lindsey Graham Warned him, Afghanistan would become "Iraq on steroids" (Woodward 2019, 128). Ultimately, against his instincts, Trump elected to send additional troops to Afghanistan to prevent this outcome.

Conclusion

Democrats, including those who initially supported the War, generally believe the lessons of Iraq

parallel those of Vietnam - the United States should avoid entanglement in the internal affairs of another country, lest they become embroiled in an unwinnable quagmire. In contrast, while few Republicans now argue that the 2003 decision to invade Iraq was wise, most members of the Party appear to believe that the conflict was winnable, had the United States been willing to maintain a military presence indefinitely. The adoption of this revisionist interpretation of the Iraq War suggests that members of the Party would be willing to support regime change in the future. While U.S. combat operations in Iraq officially lasted eight years, from 2003-2011, the debate about the proper lessons the United States should draw from its failure is likely to last far longer.



Dr. Kelly McHugh is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of History and Political Science at Florida Southern College. She teaches course in international relations and is a past president the Florida Political Science Association

References

- Coen, Jonothan. 2018. "Iraq War at 15: Who voted for it, who didn't, and where are they now?" Medium, March 20, 2018. https://medium.com/@JonathanCohn/iraq-War-15-who-voted-for-it-who-didnt-and-where-are-they-now-595d1654bf9e
- Costa, Robert. 2015. "How Republicans hope to turn Islamic State into a problem for Democrats." Washington Post, May 5, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-republicans-hope-to-turn-islamic-state-into-a-problem-for-democrats/2015/05/20/e8e3bec4-ff0b-11e4-805c-
- Kiely, Eugene. 2015. "Bush, Clinton Play Blame Game in Iraq." FactCheck.org, Aug 13, 2015. http:// www.factcheck.org/2015/08/bush-clinton-play-blame-game-in-iraq/
- Montopoli, Brian. 2011. "Romney, Perry hammer Obama over Iraq pullout." CBS News, October 21, 2011. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/romney-perry-hammer-obama-over-iraq-pullout/.
- Obama, Barack. 2006. "Floor Statement of Senator Barack Obama on Iraq Debate." http:// obamaspeeches.com/080-Iraq-Debate-Obama-Speech.htm
- "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya." 2011. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2011/03/28/remarks- presidentaddress-nation-libya
- Rhodes, Ben. 2018. The World as It Is. New York: Random House Publishing Group.
- Spillius, Alex. 2008. "US presidential debate: Barack Obama and John McCain clash over foreign policy." The Telegraph, September 27, 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/uselection2008/ presidentialdebates/3090470/US-presidential-debate-Barack-Obama-and-John-McCain-clash-over-foreign-policy.html
- "Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate." 2015. Time, August 11, 2015. https:// time.com/3988276/republican-debate-primetime-transcript-full-text/

Woodward, Bob. 2019. Fear: Trump in the White House. New York: Simon & Schuster.

The Cuban Revolutionary Party in Tampa: Origins, Objectives and Transcendence

By Dr. Ibrahim Hidalgo de Paz

Translated by James Lopez, Ph.D., Professor of Spanish, Co-Director, Center for José Martí Studies Affiliate

It is a great pleasure for me to be here to deliver this conference, and I wish to thank the Center for the Martí Studies Affiliate at the University of Tampa for the invitation, as well as for all the effort it took to make this event possible.

For students of the history of Cuba, and of Cuban emigration to the United States, as well as of the historical evolution of the tobacco industry and many other economic, political and social issues, the City of Tampa merits special attention, since it presents such a unique case of how that immigrant community transformed a small Southern town of fishermen and loggers into an important industrial center during the second half of the 19th century, and also, how the internal divisions among those inhabitants had to be overcome lest they undermine the patriotic independence movement in its attempt to free the Antilles from Spanish colonial rule.

If we center our attention on this last element, we find that most historians of this period highlight the key importance of José Martí's first visit to Florida, at the end of November 1891, an event that marked the beginning of the process that would lead to the establishment of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and the organization of the Cuban emigre communities, which in turn made possible the final armed uprising against the Spanish metropolis on February 24, 1895.

Several questions arise when we carefully assess what happened during Martí's first visit to Tampa: Why was this illustrious Cuban invited, and not another, to speak at the patriotic ceremony organized by the Ignacio Agramonte Club in Ybor City? Were Martí's ideas and activity well known in Tampa, laying the groundwork for his acceptance by the Cuban immigrant community? What were the conditions that existed here that made possible the enthusiastic acceptance of Martí's proposal to redirect this community's efforts, and of all Cuban patriots, towards joint action?

Historical evidence would indicate that José Martí was known among the revolutionaries in Tampa, and also Key West, at least since 1887, and possibly prior to that date, when the so-called Executive Commission, chaired by him, was established in New York with the mission of organizing the immigrant communities in preparation for a new independence war in coordination with revolutionary groups in Cuba, and of opposing any premature military action. On that occasion, at the end of 1887, Martí sent communications to several compatriots in which he explained the aims they were pursuing, and also sent emissaries to some locations with the same purpose. In Tampa, Ramón Rivero established the "Flor Crombet Club," officially dedicated to instruction and recreation, but in reality dedicated to promoting the political objectives of General Crombet and Martí, in opposition to Juan Fernández Ruz, a military officer of the same rank who held different ideas, namely, the desire to restart the war for independence with no other strategy than that of transporting an expeditionary group to the island as soon as possible. Soon after, the strategic break between Crombet and Fernández took place.¹ The truth is that we know little about this club; however, it is possible to infer that Rivero, in some way, communicated with the aforementioned Executive Commission chaired by Martí in New York.

It can be surmised that beginning around that time, and perhaps earlier, various patriotic factions in Tampa were interested in meeting the man who was already well known as an outstanding journalist and orator, and recognized for his honesty and discipline. He was not a stranger to them. It is also likely that the lectores, or cigar factory readers, had disseminated some of Martí's writings collected in the press and in the bulletins that had wide circulation among the immigrant communities, so his ideas on the need for unity and against racism would have been known, as they were keys elements in Martí's conception of a future democratic republic dedicated to social justice.²

These ideas found a favorable reception among the progressive sectors of the city, concerned about the rise in disagreements among those groups who needed to unite around a common purpose. Conditions in the Cuban community had become tense in previous years. As could be expected, the accelerated industrial development of Tampa, beginning with the opening of the Martínez-Ybor and Ignacio Haya cigar factories and the relocation of others from Key West after the devastating fire in that city in 1886, led to a sharp increase in the number of workers and labor organizations, including not only charities and mutual aid societies, but also combative organizations like the Knights of Labor —a subsidiary of The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor – and the anarchist organization known as The Resistance, *La Resistencia*, among others. Cubans and Spaniards fought over jobs, moderates and radicals organized strikes for the benefit of the working class, and this led to inevitable clashes between workers and employers.

To this was added another cause of internal division –racism–, which manifested itself in diverse forms of segregation, most notably in the existence of two large neighborhoods in the city, one of which was inhabited primarily Cuban blacks and mulattos in Ybor City, and another of primarily African-Americans on "the opposite side of the city around the old Fort Brooke settlement."³

At the beginning of the 1890s, the divisions between the leaders of the labor movement, who were mainly anarchists, and the traditional leaders of the Cuban independence movement were noticeable. There were public debates that contributed to deepening these divisions.⁴ There was no one in Tampa, at that tumultuous moment, who could bring together the various factions within the independence movement, and at the same time make them recognize the existence of serious social problems that had arisen across many sectors of the working class, especially among Afro-Cubans and mulattos.

José Martí had the characteristics needed to put an end to this unfavorable situation, and to bring about a new stage in which these divided groups could unite in common cause. In addition to his charismatic personality, the persuasive power of his oratory, and his writing, Martí promoted highly progressive ideas that were shared by the most radical sectors of the labor movement. He defended workers' rights, while at the same time recognizing the rights of owners, for in his view, the rights of both would be guaranteed by the future republic that would be founded after independence was obtained, one in which no class would hold unjust dominance over another.⁵ Nor would any form of discrimination be tolerated, since what separates or segregates human beings favored the continued permanence of foreign domination, because it weakened the nation internally.

As I've already pointed out, Martí was known by the émigré community, and his arrival to Tampa by train, on November 25, 1891 at half past one in the morning, was impressive. In spite of the heavy downpour, an enthusiastic crowd received him, led by the directors of the Ignacio Agramonte Club. He was taken to the Liceo Cubano (or Cuban Lyceum, on what is now 7th Ave.), where he spoke briefly, and after the applause, the band played the Bayamo anthem, the national anthem of the independence movement and of the future Cuban republic.⁶

It was not an occasion for rest, so that November 26 Martí met with representatives of several local revolutionary organizations. The information at our disposal indicates that they discussed issues related to the political state of the émigré communities, and that of Tampa in particular, as well as the need for joint action to overcome the many organizational and financial obstacles they faced. A decisive step in this regard was the drafting of the document known as the "Resolutions," in which their shared ideas were collected, and whose authorship corresponds to Martí. In just four small paragraphs, the document captures the urgent need for unity among all the revolutionaries to act in accordance with the "democratic soul of the country," and to devise strategies to dispel the fear of another war, conceived as an "instrument of the popular government in the honest and disinterested preparation of the Republic," built without class divisions and "lifted up with all and for the good of all"⁷ in accordance with democratic methods, which implied respect for the autochthonous organizational structures of the various émigré communities.

The political and cultural activities that night began at half past eight with an opening speech by Nestor Leonelo Carbonell, president of the Ignacio Agramonte Club, followed by others. When Martí was introduced, there was a resounding round of applause, after which he delivered a speech that has gone down in history not only for setting in motion the creation of the new revolutionary movement, but also for having been an exceptional oratorical performance, with a coherent and persuasive demand for unity among all the sectors of the émigré communities, without distinctions of any kind, and founded on a spirit of generosity: "I embrace all those who know how to love. I bring the star, and I bring the dove, in my heart."⁸ Martí did not criticize anyone, nor were his ideas conceived from a position of superior intellectual sophistication; neither did he engage in opportunistic flattery, but instead called upon those present to reconcile their interests and objectives for the good of the future nation, and to respect all honest opinions that contributed to its spirit and might. The future republic should have among its fundamental principles the habit of each of its citizens to "think for themselves," because their mission was to free all Cubans, and "not to imprison them."⁹ It was possible to achieve political and economic well-being after independence, as long as justice occupied the highest post, guaranteeing respect for the rights of each and every citizen.¹⁰

He did not avoid any issue, including the one most in need of clarification, namely, discrimination based on race or nationality. Martí spoke out against racism energetically and with intellectual clarity, establishing it as one of the pillars of national unity. And with the wisdom of a builder of an inclusive society, in which there was no room for irrational hatred or contempt for any national origin, he addressed the situation of Spaniards who lived in Cuba, insisting that they would be respected as long as they did not take arms against other citizens.¹¹

This call for unity had as its concluding sentence a phrase that is fixed in the collective memory of all Cubans from then until today, and which constitutes a principle of both Cuban and universal political aspirations that remain in dire need of implementation: "And let's put around the star, on our new flag, a formula of triumphant love: 'With all, for the good of all".¹²

It only took a few hours for his words to begin to become a reality. On November 27, the board of the secret society known as the Cuban Patriotic League, held an extraordinary session in which they initiated their "brother José Martí." This fact should be considered not only as a sign of confidence towards Martí, but also as an opportunity for him to expand his contacts in the local community, and to influence them with his ideas and actions.¹³

In the quest to mitigate the effects of racial discrimination, Martí met with two prominent Afro-Cubans –Cornelio Brito and Bruno Roig–, who were very respected in the community. To them, he proposed the creation of a group that would contribute to elevating the racial consciousness of those who

needed it, while at the same time fostering greater fraternity among people of different pigmentation. For this purpose, the "Tampa League of Instruction," similar to one already existing in New York, was established, and was immediately embraced by the émigré community.¹⁴

The activities announced for that night at the Cuban Lyceum began at eight, with an impressive turnout. The occasion was the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the massacre of medical students in Havana by a mob of *Voluntarios*, or Volunteers, an armed militia created, armed and sponsored by the colonial authorities. The occasion was ripe for an incendiary speech against the repressive regime and those who supported it; but Martí had no intention of inciting feelings of anger and revenge, but rather to explain the causes behind that abominable act and to call on all patriots to unite to prevent something similar from happening again, because "it is not right for Cubans to live, like jackals in a cage, ruminating on their hate!"¹⁵

The last paragraph of this speech, of great poetic beauty, is an allegory of the triumph of life over death. The speaker sees "the joyful sprouts of new pines" rise from among the trunks of the fallen trees; these sprouts, in Martí's imagery, are the patriots willing to stand up with renewed energy to continue the work of national redemption: "That is us: new pines!"¹⁶ It would be a mistake to find a negative connotation in this expression, because in all of Martí's work there is no rejection of different generations, only common goals. It is a new revolutionary concept that is sprouting, embraced by men and women of all ages, backgrounds and colors, not just a group of these.¹⁷ This is how his contemporaries understood the speech, and like Martí, they understood the decisive importance of strengthening the bonds of society, in the search of the consolidation of the Cuban nation.

The return to New York was scheduled for the next day. The effect his two speeches had on the community was instantly confirmed, as a multitude filled the hall of the Cuban Lyceum and surrounded the building. After several speeches, various members of different organizations lifted their banners and prepared for the farewell. Illuminated by torchlight, the procession extended three blocks, accompanied by a marching band. The local chronicler in attendance concluded: "No one has ever witnessed, or conceived that in Ybor City there would be an act capable of bringing together the whole town, without distinction of classes, nationalities, or conditions."¹⁸ This unity among so many diverse and dispersed factions was one of Martí's greatest successes.

The impact of these events quickly reached Key West. There, Francisco María González and José Dolores Poyo were the first to report on what had happened in the city of Tampa. They soon invited Martí to visit their community, which had a long tradition of supporting Cuban independence. When we consider the preparations for his trip, as well as the documents he presented to the leaders of the Key West organizations, we can deduce that Martí was aware of the situation he would encounter upon his arrival in that community. So as to promote a celebratory atmosphere, Martí was accompanied on his trip by representatives of two Tampa clubs and a band, and the steamer *Olivette* on which he was traveling was festooned with colorful flags. Previously, the organizing committee led by Ángel Peláez and promoted by Poyo's newspaper *El Yara* had drummed up enthusiasm and drew a large crowd. The event reached an important symbolic climax when Martí was welcomed on the pier by the elder war hero José Franciso Lamadriz. According to oral tradition, Martí said to Lamadriz: "I embrace the past Revolution," and the veteran replied, "I embrace the new revolution." The connotations of that meeting were understood clearly by all the émigré communities.

The moment was propitious for the publication of a call to unity, embodied in two documents that he discussed with the representatives of the patriotic organizations of Key West: the "Bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party" and "The Secret Statutes." The decisive meeting took place on December 5th in the San Carlos Club, and all the active patriotic clubs were summoned, as well as two Tampa

organizations: The Ignacio Agramonte Club No. 1, and the Cuban Patriotic League, represented by Eligio Carbonell, Esteban Candau and Arturo González, respectively.²⁰ The inclusive nature of the meeting, free of sectarianism, is evident in the composition of the twenty-seven attendees. In addition to the two Tampa patriots already mentioned, as well as Martí –who was representing the New York-based clubs– there were ten representatives from seven Key West clubs, and thirteen prestigious members of the local community. The heterogeneous nature of the gathering reveals the presence of various sectors of Cuban society, and therefore of differing views of Cuban reality and the possible solutions to its situation. Present at the meeting were military veterans of past wars, former members of the rebel government during the Ten Years War and exiles from that earlier conflict, labor leaders, factory and business owners, and black and mulatto activists.²¹ When the documents presented were approved after debate and discussion, the process of founding the Cuban Revolutionary Party had begun.

The next day was there was massive farewell. Martí was celebrated with a patriotic party during which Francisco María González publicly announced the *Bases of the Cuban Revolutionary Party*. Other speakers praised the work carried out by Martí. A crowd accompanied him to the pier from where he left for Tampa.

He had been elected president of the Recommending Committee that had approved the documents, and of which González was secretary, and his charge, like that of the presidents of each of the local clubs, was to submit them to the members for consideration, and after ratification, to integrate them into the creation of the new party. Upon arriving in Tampa, Martí presented the *Bases and the Statutes* to the members of the Cuban Patriotic League, and they were adopted. He fell ill again for several days, during which time he received shows of support from various factions, who publicly repudiated some accusations made against Martí in a letter published in a Havana newspaper, an incident that was settled a few days later.

After returning to New York, Martí received the pleasant news that he had been named a ranking member of the Cuban Lyceum in Ybor City. His intimate ties with the inhabitants of Tampa extended beyond merely political commitments, they included feelings of mutual admiration, respect and affection, as can be seen in the first speech Martí delivered in New York on February 14, 1892, known as the "Discourse on Tampa and Key West," in which he recalled his recent trip: "And what about that first invitation from Tampa, which was like the shriek of the eagle." What he saw there during "three days of immaculate beauty," he remembered as "an incredible celebration, in which men merged together!" In this city the first step was taken towards the creation of the organization that made the start of the independence war possible and set the foundation of a future democratic republic, dedicated fully to social justice, still so lacking in our contemporary world. Martí summarized this desire for action and hope for the future: "And what came out of Tampa, and was there consecrated, may stumble on a blade of grass or a grain of corn, but in Cuba it will grow and prosper!"²²

Martí returned to Tampa, where this initial idea germinated, and where he found his first welcome, on multiple occasions. A careful and patient student of these events calculates that Martí visited Tampa on twenty occasions, and yet another, no less careful researcher, posits one additional visit.²³ Faced with the severe economic constraints of financing a new war-, Martí depended on the men and women of all the émigré communities, but particularly those of Tampa and Key West, when he was confronted with delays or the impatience of those who wanted to initiate hostilities prematurely; or when it was necessary to ratify the democratic statutes that governed the Party and would be the foundation of the future Cuban nation; or when his presence and his words were necessary to raise spirits, which is an essential element of any individual or collective human endeavor; or when he had to raise the banner of unity and reason against factionalism and discrimination; or when he was forced

to convalesce from his chronic poor health, which sometimes betrayed his spiritual strength. Through all these difficulties Martí continued coming to Tampa, where he was always welcome.

Proof of the mutual trust that existed between the revolutionary leadership and the people of Tampa occurred during those terrible days when virtually all of the funds that had been raised to that point were lost, when a traitorous Cuban alerted U.S. authorities and the ships transporting arms to the island were impounded, an event known as "the failure of the Fernandina Plan." Martí sent a representative to Tampa to raise at least two thousand dollars to face urgent expenses, and after visiting the cigar factories, and obtaining the help of the factory owners and patriotic workers, he was able to collect almost the entire amount. At that crucial moment, just as throughout the entire period of preparation for the war, the Tampa clubs and the men and women who lived here contributed small and large amounts depending on their economic situation, but all were moved by the same patriotic fervor, encouraged by the ideas and the example of that man who, after the war began, went to fight in the independence army to endorse with his presence the promise of his words: José Martí, whose thought transcends his time and even today contributes to democratic and humanistic ideals that should be embodied in every act of justice and dignity.

References

¹ See José Manuel Pérez Cabrera, Martí y el "proyecto Ruz." Academia de la Historia de Cuba, Imprenta El Siglo XX, La Habana, 1955, p. 15-22; José Rivero Muñiz, "Los cubanos en Tampa." En Revista Bimestre Cubana, vol. LXXIV, La Habana, primer semestre de 1958, p. 27, and Gerald E. Poyo, Exile and Revolution. José D. Poyo, West Key, and Cuban Independence. University Press of Florida, Gainesville, United States of America, 2014, p. 118-124. (Martí's first letter to José Dolores Poyo, leader of the emigre community in Key West, dates from this time (in José Martí, Epistolario, Compilación, ordenación cronológica y notas de Luis García Pascual y Enrique H. Moreno Pla, prólogo de Juan Marinello, Centro de Estudios Martianos y Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 21993, tomo I, p. 429-431).

² See Ibrahim Hidalgo Paz, "Reseña de los clubes fundadores del Partido Revolucionario Cubano." En Incursiones en la obra de José Martí, Centro de Estudios Martianos y Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 1989, p. 116-117.

³ J. Rivero Muñiz, ob. cit, p. 33. See p. 24-38 regarding the workers' movement.

⁴ See Gerald E. Poyo, "José Martí, artífice de la unidad social. Tensiones sociales dentro de las emigraciones cubanas en los Estados Unidos. 1887-1895," en Anuario del Centro de Estudios Martianos, no. 7, La Habana, 1984, p. 47-51; and also by the same author, Con todos y para el bien de todos. Surgimiento del nacionalismo popular en las comunidades cubanas de los Estados Unidos. 1848-1898, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 1998, p. 169-172.

⁵G.E. Poyo, "José Martí [...], ob. cit., p. 52-54.

⁶ This and the following information has been taken from Néstor L. Carbonell, "Desde Tampa. José Martí. Su Ilegada. Estancia entre nosotros. Su despedida," El Porvenir, Nueva York, 9 de diciembre de 1891. Regarding the process that led to the invitation of Martí to Tampoa, see Gerardo Castellanos G., "Martí, conspirador y revolucionario," en Vida y pensamiento de Martí, Municipio de La Habana, 1943, vol. II, p. 134-136.

⁷ These quotes are taken from José Martí, "Resoluciones tomadas por la emigración cubana de Tampa el día 28 de noviembre de 1891," en Obras Completas, Editorial Nacional de Cuba, La Habana, 1963, tomo 1, p. 272. (From now on, this edition will be referred to with the initials OC, preceded by the author's initials, and followed by the volume and page numbers).

⁸ J.M., "Discurso en el Liceo Cubano, Tampa. 26 de noviembre de 1891," en OC, v. 4, p. 269. Regarding the

participation of González and Poyo in these activities, see G. Poyo, Exile and Revolution [...], ob. cit., p. 140-142.

⁹ The quoted passages correspond respectively to J.M., "Discurso [...]", ob. cit, p. 270 y 271.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 273.

¹¹ The quotes correspond to Ibidem, p. 276 y 277, respectively.

¹² Ibidem, p. 279. We have eliminated the word "y" (and) since it does not appear in the original printed version which appeared immediately after the speech.

¹³ See "Liga Patriótica Cubana. Ibor City. Tampa. Libro de Actas," en Archivo Nacional de Cuba. Fondo Donativos y remisiones. Legajo: Fuera de caja 139, no. 3. Also see Gerardo Castellanos García, Recuerdos del exilio. Tampa. Rivero Muñiz y el periódico Cuba, s.l., s.f., p.6-7; and Hidalgo, "Reseña de los clubes fundadores [...]", ob. cit., p. 118.

¹⁴ See J. Rivero Muñiz: ob, cit., p. 62.

¹⁵ J.M., "Discurso en conmemoración del 27 de noviembre de 1871, en Tampa. 27 de noviembre de 1891," en OC, v. 4, p. 284.

¹⁶ Idem.

¹⁷ See Luis Toledo Sande, "Pinos nuevos, para el bien de todos", en Ensayos sencillos con José Martí. Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, 2012, p. 42.

¹⁸ N. L. Carbonell: "Desde Tampa. José Martí [...]," ob. cit.

¹⁹ This anecdote appears in Jorge Mañach, Martí, el Apóstol. Espasa-Calpe, S. A., Argentina, 1942, p. 208. The information regarding this trip is taken from Primera jornada de José Martí en Cayo Hueso, ed. Sotero Figueroa, Imp. América, Nueva York, 1896.

²⁰ See Hidalgo, "Reseña de los clubes fundadores [...]",ob. ci., p. 121; and Paul Estrade, José Martí. Los fundamentos de la democracia en Latinoamérica, Ediciones Doce Calles, S.L., with the collaboration of Casa de Velázquez, Madrid, España, 2000, p. 689.

²¹ See G. Poyo, Exile and Revolution [...], ob. cit., p. 146.

²² These quotes are found in J.M., "Discurso en Hardman Hall, Nueva York. 17 [error: 14] de febrero de 1892," en OC, v. 4, p. 294, 298 y 299.

²³ See Emiliano J. Salcines, "José Martí en Tampa: 20 visitas documentadas (1891 a 1894)," en La Gaceta, Tampa, viernes 15 de abril de 2016, p. 1, 6 y 7 (traducción del inglés de Dr. James J. López), and Gabriel Cartaya, "Sobre las visitas de Martí a Tampa: las razones de Emiliano Salcines," en La Gaceta, Tampa, viernes 15 de abril de 2016, p. 3.



Dr. Ibrahim Hidalgo de Paz is the recipient of the National Cuban History Prize, and a voting member of the Cuban Academies of History and Science. He has published eight books on José Martí. His latest book of forensic accounting, The Treasury of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, 1892-1895 was published this year.

2019—2020 Officers & Council Members

President: Mark Logas, Valencia College, mlogas@valenciacollege.edu

1st Vice-President: Zachary Baumann, Florida Southern College, zbaumann@flsouthern.edu

2nd Vice-President: Giselle Jamison, St. Thomas University, gjamison@stu.edu

Secretary: Sean Foreman, Barry University, sforeman@barry.edu

Treasurer: Aubrey Jewett, University of Central Florida, aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu

Editor, Florida Political Chronicle: Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo University, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

Editor, The Political Scientist Newsletter: Denis Rey, University of Tampa, denis.rey@ut.edu

Executive Council (staggered in 3 year terms)

Gary Boulware, (2017-2020) Santa Fe College Gary.boulware@sfcollege.edu

Brian Kupfer, (2017-2020) Tallahassee Community College <u>kupferb@tcc.fl.edu</u>

Manuel DeLeon, (2017-2020) Bethune-Cookman <u>deleonm@cookman.edu</u>

Houman Sadri, (2019-2022) University of Central Florida houman.sadri@ucf.edu

Frank Orlando (2019-2022) St. Leo University <u>francis.orlando@saintleo.edu</u> Kathryn VanderMolen, (2018-2021) University of Tampa <u>kvandermolen@ut.edu</u>

Kevin Wagner, (2018-2021) Florida Atlantic University kwagne15@fau.edu

Richard Murgo, (2018-2021) Tallahassee Community College <u>murgor@tcc.fl.edu</u>

Leah Blumenfeld (2019-2022) Barry University Iblumenfeld@barry.edu



Florida Political Science Association

The Florida Political Science Association is committed to promoting political science research, education, and service throughout the state of Florida. Our board of officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. From the University of West Florida in Pensacola to Florida International University and the University of Miami, our association spans the state bringing together political scientists at public and private institutions to network, to collaborate on research, and to discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

Visit us online: http://www.FPSANET.org

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

The Political Scientist, the newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association, is a semi-annual publication (Fall/Winter and Spring/Summer editions). The Political Scientist is published electronically, sent to all members of FPSA and posted on the FPSA website (<u>www.fpsanet.org</u>).

Please submit your:

*Announcements (e.g., program announcements, job vacancies, promotions and awards, related conferences and calls for papers)

*Book reviews about textbooks, teaching materials

*Short articles about teaching Political Science (innovative methods, new courses, curriculum development)

*Short research articles

*Research and Resources (literature reviews on specific topics, research notes, examination of new research threads)

*Public policy prescriptions from practitioners in the private, public, or non-profit sectors.

The Political Scientist is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact, the Editor for more information concerning submission guidelines.

Editor: Denis Rey, University of Tampa, denis.rey@ut.edu