

THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

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Electoral Constituencies, Competitions, and Legislative Behavior in the U.S. Senate

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and

Michael Krassa (University of Illinois)

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Saint Leo College

Orderly Disorder: Multiple International Regimes for Trade

Renée Marlin-Bennett (School of International Service/American University)

Metaphors We Kill By: The Legacy of U.S. Antiterrorist Rhetoric

Kenneth S. Hicks (University of South Carolina)

Runaway Organizations: A Definition and Some Behavioral Propositions

Carl Lutrin (California Polytechnic State University)

and

Richard Ryan (San Diego State University)

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The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

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Introduction

As has become the custom and pattern of this journal, we offer a potpourri of topical materials in the political science subfields.

In the first essay, Donald Davison and Michael Krassa examine electoral constituencies and senatorial strategies for reelection. Two basic strategies emerge: maximization of reelection probabilities by changing votes to resemble constituency preferences or mobilization of particular segments of the constituency to enhance election possibilities. These two strategies are examined when they account for the election of two ideologically distinct senators from the same state.

Renée Marlin-Bennett's essay is a significant foray into the field of international political economy. One approach by which to understand the dynamics of international trade is through the device of "regimes," recently recognized as a sophisticated and crucial concept for analysis. Do they represent order or disorder or both?

Kenneth Hicks covers some novel ground in an essay on terrorism. Moving beyond the more obvious topical treatments, he examines authoritative personnel's use of rhetoric, especially metaphors, in their perception of terrorism, and ultimately the response basis. As valuable as metaphors are, particularly in this phenomenological area, how accurate are they and what consequences flow from their use, are some of the issues treated in this essay.

Carl Lutrin and Richard Ryan's essay employs a series of case studies to creatively examine behavioral breakdown in the public and private organizational sectors. The three case studies are very representative of a broader phenomenon that has a past U.S. history, but is of intensive concern in current political sociological analysis of American society. Is this more of our future or shall it become part of our past?

With this issue we complete the 1991 editions of **The Political Chronicle**. We are diligently at work on the February-March, 1992 issue. Again, I want to thank the many reviewers and contributors this past year who make the Journal's success possible. I compliment you for your devotion to a very time-consuming, but hopefully satisfying effort in behalf of our profession.

Bernard Schechterman
Editor

ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES, Competition, and Legislative Behavior in the U.S. Senate

Donald L. Davison and Michael Krassa

Authors' Notes

This research examines how two ideologically distinct candidates may be elected and reelected by the same constituency. Using various indicators of a Senator's voting record and survey data on constituencies, two established theories of legislative support are examined. One assumes that congressmen structure their voting to maximize reelection probabilities. This suggests that legislators should change their voting to resemble as nearly as possible the preferences of their constituents. Thus, extremist Senators may wish to moderate their views in election years, and it is reasonable to assume that two persons representing the same constituency (state) will display similar records in their respective reelection years.

Another theory suggests that different legislators mobilize different segments of the electorate. With different "reelection constituencies" the Senators need not "behaviorally converge" at election time, but rather must please their respective reelection constituencies.

Introduction¹

A significant portion of the research on Congress focuses on two important and related questions. One set of questions rests on the assumption that roll call votes are public pronouncements of each legislator's position on the issues confronting the government. This line of inquiry assumes that legislators devote careful consideration to issues in order to reach an appropriate, informed position.

The second line of inquiry concerns how and why legislators are elected and reelected. Constituencies, albeit diverse, recruit and elect legislators who represent their interests. Accordingly, a legislator's roll call voting and the level and location of support of constituents should be related. How a legislator votes on an issue should have an impact on his prospects for reelection. Thus, policy positions must be evaluated in light of the legislator's own preferences, but always also cognizant of his constituency preferences as well.

We examine the relationship between legislative decision making, particularly as demonstrated in roll call votes, and the

sources of legislators' electoral support. One may argue that legislators cast their lot so as to maximize their chances of reelection. Typically this means voting to please the largest number of voters in the district. Alternatively, legislators may be depicted as having distinct "electoral constituencies," which they can routinely mobilize every election year provided they do nothing to alienate those supporters.

A striking feature of Congressional politics is that some states often elect two senators who are very different, yet purport to represent the same people—"the citizens of the great state of" In 1968, for example, South Dakotans elected the liberal George McGovern to a second term; McGovern served until 1980. During much of this period, however, the other man sent to the Senate was Karl Mundt, a conservative Republican who served until his retirement in 1974. We investigate how two such ideologically different candidates can be elected and reelected by the identical constituency. Do they mobilize different segments of the population, or do they both receive the votes of largely the same people? If both senators receive the support of the same voters then is it because they appear to be similar to their constituents at the time of the election?

One useful indicator of a Senator's ideological orientation may be found among the annual ratings of public officials made by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). This rating (ranging from 0 to 100) is used to summarize a legislator's agreement with the liberal ADA's position on a number of key roll call votes by Congressmen and Senators. High ADA scores indicate a high concurrence in a legislator's voting with the liberal ADA position and are indicative of a liberal political orientation, while low ADA scores indicate low agreement and point to a conservative philosophy.

If ADA ratings provide a measure of a Senator's ideological positioning extremity, then the difference in ADA scores provides an index of the ideological distinctiveness of two Senators. The greater the difference in the ADA scores of two senators, the greater the difference in their ideological orientations. From 1963

through 1967 for example, George McGovern received an ADA average of 91, indicating he voted in agreement with the liberal ADA position approximately ninety-one percent of the time. By contrast, his conservative colleague, Karl Mundt, held an average ADA score of 7.5 over the same period. The 83.5 point difference in their rankings is indicative of dramatically different ideological leanings and yet both represent the same people.

This research investigates whether the Senators are correct—is each accurate in his contention that he represents "the people of South Dakota," or are there distinct constituencies within the electorate that are differentially mobilized depending upon whether McGovern or Mundt is seeking reelection? Also considered is an alternative possibility: do perceptions of the electorate influence a Senator's voting? Do Senators vote on issues according to their ideological orientation, or are they influenced by their perceptions of their constituency? Is the timing of the election important to these questions? We consider the period from 1968 through 1978 both broadly with a national focus, and more narrowly with specific attention to the cases of Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah, where the citizens were represented by what we call "ideologically distinct" Senators.

Legislative Decision Making and the Imminence of Elections

There are three general explanations for why legislators vote as they do in their roll call records: constituency explanations, organizational descriptions, and the individual or trustee model (Jackson, 1974: 1).

A representational view of legislative decision making focuses on the influence constituencies exert on a legislator's behavior. The basic and simple assumption underlying all varieties of the representational model is that legislators are motivated by a desire to remain in office. Accordingly, they must "consider the positions of their voting constituents and pursue voting strategies which will please a majority of these constituents" (Jackson, 1974: 4).

Thus, the representational model assumes that legislators' votes are consistent with the preferences of a majority of their constituents. Legislative districts, and particularly entire states, however, are heterogeneous entities. The "interest" of a state is not particularly well defined, as diverse interests exist within every state. Further, different issues will be salient to different groups within a constituency. Thus, the rational electoral strategy for any legislator is to adopt visible and compatible positions on those issues where there is an intense and sizable majority.

This view of the representation model may be extended to explain logrolling. In order to maximize their chances of satisfying their constituents on important issues, legislators will actively seek to trade votes with legislators representing other groups. Thus, a legislator's re-election goal leads him to a strategy of building coalitions around issues important to the district in exchange for votes on other issues less important to the district (Jackson, 1974: 5-6).

The organizational perspective examines the importance of formal and informal leaders who are able to influence the decisions of individual senators or representatives (Jackson, 1974: 2-3). Formal leaders, such as committee and subcommittee chairs, floor leaders and their whips, and party leaders enjoy influential positions within the institution and therefore are strategically placed to influence the behaviors of others within the legislature.

Informal leaders develop influence from their "personal expertise, experience, seniority, or because they are members of some inner club or clique which, as a group, strongly influences the inner body as a whole" (Jackson, 1974: 3; see also Kingdon, 1981: 72-145). However, the Senate of the 1980's has been characterized as significantly less "clubby," and more individualistic, at least in comparison with that of the 1950's through 1974. Indeed, the Senate is believed to have moved toward a more equal distribution of influence, giving individual Senators greater opportunity to participate in legislative decision making (Sinclair, 1986).

Finally, the trustee model of legislative decision making assumes that the elected representatives base their decisions on their own notions of appropriate policy or what is the "best interest" of the district or nation. This perspective views legislators as informed decision makers who scrutinize the merit of policy proposals, and vote accordingly (Jackson, 1974: 7).

Among these models, most authors assign disproportionate power to constituency explanations of legislators' voting decisions. Indeed, Jackson found that the voting records of 30 percent of all U. S. Senators were best understood in light of the constituency model, while only 20 percent exhibited no significant constituency effect after the influences of their institutional colleagues were accounted for (Jackson, 1974: 79-81, 128). Similarly, Kingdon identifies constituency as a relatively significant factor in determining a Congressman's voting decisions. He determines that only the influence of close colleagues is greater than that of constituents. Moreover, the impact of one's close colleagues tends to be consistent with the constituency factor because one's closest colleagues tend to have similar ideological predilections. Thus, Kingdon concludes that when the colleague variable is excluded, constituency powerfully explains congressmen's roll call voting decisions (Kingdon, 1981: 20-22).

The literature also includes important statements about the mechanisms by which constituencies influence legislators' voting decisions. Mayhew (1974) argues that congressmen are single-minded seekers of reelection. A congressman's electoral incentive compels the legislator to engage in behaviors which will secure the chance of reelection. An important assumption of Mayhew's argument is that congressmen think that they can influence their chance of reelection through their public record; they therefore behave in ways which they believe will improve their vote margins over prospective challengers. Their goal is not necessarily vote maximization; rather, they engage in activities which they believe will ensure a safe reelection margin so that attractive candidates are deterred from challenging the incumbent—they attempt to create a 'safe seat.'

Likewise, Fenno contends that legislators uniquely cultivate their own "reelection constituencies" which routinely mobilize sufficient proportions of the electorate to secure their chance at reelection. Therefore, Fenno's thesis implies that legislators enjoy the luxury of pursuing strategies other than simply the altering of roll call voting to improve their probability of reelection.

Fiorina (1974) also assumes that constituents' policy preferences are reflected in roll call voting due to legislators' reelection concerns. Thus, Fiorina makes the fundamental assumption that representatives evaluate their situation with a subjec-

tive estimate of their current reelection probability (Fiorina, 1974: 31). Indeed, representatives pursue numerous goals such as legislative influence, writing good public policy, prestige, and higher public office. However, Fiorina assumes that reelection is the primary goal and that the constituency controls their destiny in this regard; thus legislators placing primary importance on electoral survival will attend to the desires and preferences of their constituents. Consequently, congressmen cast roll call votes which they expect will maximize public satisfaction, which in turn will maximize their reelection probability.

The proximity of the upcoming election, however, exerts a substantial and systematic influence on each legislator's decision making. If representatives are reelection-seeking, and if they believe that their roll call votes provide one yardstick by which their performance is evaluated, then they naturally also hold that more important votes have a greater impact on their reelection probability than do less important votes.

But what makes one roll call vote important? One factor is time. Assuming that voters are retrospective, and thus remember more clearly and attach more importance to the most recent of the votes cast by their representative, then roll call votes assume greater importance as the election approaches. Accordingly, legislators exhibit a greater responsiveness to their constituents as the election draws near.

This pattern should be particularly evident for U.S. Senators. The lengthy term offers the opportunity for Senators to adopt a more responsive position, one more sensitive to the needs and preferences of their constituents, in the later years of their terms—most notably in the sixth year. Indeed, Jackson (1974: 106-107) finds the influence of constituency is greatest for Senators during their sixth year. By contrast, the weight of organizational influences increase in the first few years after reelection and decrease in the reelection year (1974: 131; see also Patterson and Caldeira, 1987).

Constituency preferences and the proximity of reelection also exert a systematic influence on patterns of ideological voting of senators. A considerable shift in the ideological positions of senators' takes place over the course of their terms, and the shifts are largely a function of the years remaining in a term prior to reelection. Indeed, Elling (1982: 79-80) finds that in

TABLE 1
Average Change in ADA Scores by Partisanship, 1968-1978

DIFFERENCE	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS
less than -10	n=94 (%) 49.2	30.00 21.60
-10 - -5	27 14.1	15 10.5
-5 - -2	27 14.1	7 4.9
0 - -2	4 2.1	24 16.8
0 - 2	11 5.8	24 16.8
2 - 5	16 8.4	21 14.6
5 - 10	7 3.7	17 11.9
greater than 10	5 2.6	6 4.2
N:	55	41

NOTE: DIFF is calculated as the election year ADA score minus the average of off-year ADA scores, for each Senator. Thus, a negative DIFF score is a shift in the conservative direction in the Senator's reelection year.

about 75 percent of the cases, senators move in a more conservative direction.

It is important to note that the shift to the right represents an average for all the cases. Democrats shifted to the right as their reelection approached, while Republican senators tended to become more liberal over the course of their term (Elling, 1982: 87). Thus, Senators of both parties and both ideological predispositions tended to moderate their ideological positions on roll call votes as the elections approach, presumably shifting to an ideal point in the constituencies they represent (1982: 87), thereby maximizing their chance at reelection.

Poole concludes that senators maintain ideologically stable positions "...with the exception that senators up for reelection tend to change position and become more ambiguous (1981: 49). Thus, the literature indicates that constituency characteristics are important to a senator's voting decisions, and that senators alter their positions as elections near in order to increase their appeal to voters. It is less clear whether such ideological shifting accomplishes the desired goal.

A controversy also exists over the objective which senators are pursuing in their attempts to maximize their reelection likelihood. Elling (1982) argues that senators converge toward some ideological mean among their constituents. Martin Thomas, who also finds that senators alter their

behaviors in election years, argues that the change will be in the direction of constituent perceptions of their likely challenger in any reelection context (Thomas, 1985: 109). Of course, these are not mutually exclusive results. It may in fact be the case that challengers seek to occupy positions close to the ideological mean.

Hypotheses

We explore two alternative explanations regarding how and why two ideologically distinct senators are able to represent the same constituency. One explanation expands the argument that legislators engage in floor voting which will maximize their chances of reelection. According to this hypothesis, legislators will make roll call vote decisions in such a way as to satisfy the desires of the largest number of constituents. Thus, senators may be expected to increasingly emphasize election-specific goals as the election draws near; this possibility may be evidenced by the drop in McGovern's rating from nearly 100 in the early 1960's to 43 in 1968—his reelection year.

If one assumes that voters are retrospective, weighting recent events more heavily, then this logic leads to the expectation that in an election year a senator will modify his or her roll call voting decisions to better reflect some "ideal" position—either a constituency median or the position of a challenger—in which the chance

of reelection is maximized. We further expect that, after re-election, such a senator will then resume voting in accordance with his or her own ideological predispositions until confronted with the next reelection cycle. One may argue that through the combination of the senator's shifted voting pattern and their own time-discounted retrospective evaluations of the senator's behavior, voters are 'fooled' into perceiving the senator as more similar to their own interests than may be the case.

An alternative hypothesis revolves around the notion that ideologically distinct senators mobilize different segments of the state's electorate. This hypothesis incorporates the thesis that different senators mobilize different re-election constituencies (Fenno, 1978). Thus, a liberal senator mobilizes certain groups more effectively than a conservative colleague might, and vice versa. Hence, ideologically distinct senators are elected in tandem to represent the same state for overlapping terms because they win the support of and mobilize different voters.

Of course, if this is indeed the case, then it is likely that the shifting of positions in an election year need not be as severe as required by the 'vote maximization' strategy, and may be suboptimal because too great a shift may alienate core supporters. Indeed, we believe that "vote maximization" and "re-election constituency" are not necessarily competing explanations. Rather, behavior of Senators may vary with contextual factors specific to their states and constituents, as well as the ideological position of challengers.

Individual Legislative Behavior: Elections and the Abandonment of Off-year Partisan Norms

At first blush it appears that little debate is necessary: the evidence demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Senators take more moderate positions in the years they stand for reelection than in other years. Between 1968 and 1978, 191 Democratic Senators stood for reelection; the average election year conservatism of these legislators is reflected in an average ADA-score drop of 11.1 points from their average of the preceding five years. Although a few Democrats do become more liberal as the elections approach, most of these are strong ideological conservatives for whom moderation to the median voter may require changes in the liberal rather than conservative direction (resulting in increased rather than decreased ADA ratings). Examples of such cases include

TABLE 2
Regional Patterns: Election Year ADA Changes by Party and Region, 1968-1978

REGIONS	DEMOCRATS	REPUBLICANS
SOUTH	DIFF: -11.7 NOELECT: 24.6 N: 51	-2.1 9.3 7
BORDER SOUTH	-1.4 47.2 4	-0.9 37.2 6
MIDWEST	-12.7 74.9 49	0.9 29.7 28
NEW ENGLAND	-8.7 81.0 21	6.2 50.0 31
WEST	-11.6 70.0 41	-1.3 21.4 36

NOTE: DIFF and NOELECT are averages across Senators in a region. DIFF is the average DIFF in a region, where the DIFF for each Senator is computed as the election year ADA score minus the average of the senator's previous five ADA scores. NOELECT is the average off-year ADA score in the region. Each senator's NOELECT is the average ADA score for the 5 years preceding the year in which he/she is up for reelection.

Alabama Democrat James Allen, whose ADA rating increased by 9.4 points to 14 in the year he was to stand for reelection. Similarly, Herman Talmadge (D-Georgia) also managed to earn an ADA of 14 in his reelection year by becoming more liberal, and William Brock's (D-Tenn) election year liberalism earned him an ADA of 15 for that year.

Thus, for the most part, Democrats behave much as Downs (1957) would have advised, moving an average of 11.1 ADA points nearer the ideological center of the electorate in their election year than in other years. Similarly, Republicans in the Senate show a slight tendency to become more liberal in their election years. Over the same decade 143 Republicans sought re-election to the Senate; 66 of them shifted in their election year to the left of their traditional positions (as measured by ADA scores). Thus, again the data seem to support the Downsian expectation that in the effort to maximize votes Senators will shift nearer the position of the median voter (Fiorina, 1974). However, this "supporting evidence" among Republicans does not seem to be as strong as that for Democrats.

Like Democrats who become more liberal, some of the Republicans who become more conservative in their election years are shifting toward the ideological center of the electorate, for these are the ones whose Republican partisanship belie a liberal voting record. Thus, when Republican Mark Hatfield (Oregon) became more

conservative for his 1972 reelection bid, he was moderating from a relatively liberal position that earned him an average ADA score of 72 in non-election years, to a more centrist position which the ADA rated at 55 in 1972. Mark Hatfield, however, is one of the very few liberal Republicans in the '68-'78 period, while Democrat William Brock enjoyed the company of a number of conservative Democrats in the Senate. Thus, very few of the anomalous Republicans may be explained as individuals whose behaviors remain consistent with the Downsian model after close inspection. Other factors must be involved, or other mechanisms must be at work

Regional Patterns and Influences

Due to differences in both the composition of the electorate and basic elements of competition within the electoral system across regions of the U.S., it is not surprising that there are regional variations in the ways legislators prepare for upcoming elections. Democrats in all regions of the nation tend to become more conservative as an election approaches, but there are differences in both the degree of the election year shift and in the average from which they must deviate. There is less consistency among Republicans: the tendency in some regions is for Republicans as well as Democrats to become more conservative for impending elections; in other regions, however, Democrats and Republicans shift

in opposite directions, conforming more to the median voter hypothesis.

The South is often characterized as having an unique character and history. Indeed, on many political and cultural dimensions it is unlike the rest of the nation. This characterization is upheld in table 2, where the data show that Southern Democrats, like Democratic Senators elsewhere, do become more conservative in an election year (indeed, the mean election year ADA shift for Southern Democrats matches the national Democratic mean), but their election year shift to the right is one that is best described as becoming more extremely conservative rather than a shift of moderation. Note that southern Democrats, when not running for reelection, have an average ADA of only 24.6, and it is from this relatively conservative baseline that they shift an average of 11 points in preparation for the electoral contest.

Several explanations exist for the behavior of Southern Democrats. One is that Southern constituencies are more conservative than the nation as a whole. Another portion of the explanation may be found in the behavior of the Republican Senators from the South, who also become more conservative for elections; for the 7 cases where Republican senators are up for reelection in the South, the shift in election years is a 9 point ADA decrease, to an average election year ADA of 0. Democratic senators from the south, while relatively conservative by most standards, thus have colleagues and constituents who also are very conservative, requiring them to become even more conservative to remain electorally competitive. The off-year ADA average of 24, while not liberal, is certainly more liberal than that of their Republican counterparts, and may reflect a tendency for them to be somewhat more liberal than either their constituents or their own electoral competitors, both from within and outside the party.²

Midwestern Democrats alter their behavior more than southerners; indeed, their shift is greater than that of the senators of any other region. However, at least by comparison with the Southerners, these Democrats begin as liberals, as is reflected in their mean off-year ADA average of nearly 75. Thus their shift truly is toward an ideological center as well as the center of their constituencies. The Midwest Republicans who stood for reelection in these years also moderated, becoming marginally more liberal for their elections (thus moving the opposite direction of the South-

ern Republican Senators), but the magnitude of the change is very small (see table 2).

In the aggregate, the Senators representing most regions of the nation behave in a fashion that is more or less in accordance with the predictions of Elling, Fiorina, and Thomas, moderating their behavior in such a way that their most recent activities (i.e., those least discounted in retrospective evaluations) are "middle-of-the-road." As noted, Southerners, especially Southern and Western Republicans, are exceptions. They begin with very low ADA ratings, and become even more conservative when standing for election. The interesting aspect of their behavior, however, is that unlike the Southerners, they serve with Democrats who, though moderating their positions, continue to have relatively liberal voting records even in election years.

Constituencies and Ideological Change

These findings demonstrate that legislators do alter their behavior in an attempt to retain office. Further, these patterns support theories of candidate convergence to the median voter. However, only one side of this two-sided coin has been considered, because it is rational to change your behavior only when there are electoral gains to be made in the process. If different groups are mobilized for different individuals—i.e., in different elections, then candidate convergence may be "suboptimal." Further, it may be important to discover what differences exist between constituencies across different types of Senators.

Important questions, therefore, revolve around the constituencies as well as the legislators. We have noted that most Senators do change their behaviors in election years, and it is clear that some Senators moderate more than others. It remains to be shown, however, what factors condition behavioral changes by legislators, or whether there are regularities among legislators. Differences in the degree to which Senators change their voting on issues just prior to their reelection bids may be due to a number of factors, including those internal to Senators, the demands of the party, the characteristics of the residents of their state, the peculiarities of some reelection constituency, seniority, or the margin of victory in their last reelection.

One important test of these questions revolves around the nature of each Senators constituency and each state. If Sena-

tors are maximizing their probabilities of reelection, then one expects that they will not only move "to the median voter," but that the profiles of those who voted for the Senator should resemble the profile of voters in the state. In other words, if a Senator moves to the position of the median voter, the characteristics of those voting for the Senator should be similar to those of voters in the state. Thus, the nearer the Senator moves toward the median voter, the more his coalition will resemble all voters; the means of those voting for the Senator should not be far from the means of all voters on a variety of measures.

Many demographic and political variables are informative about the general character of a population of voters, whether it be of all voters within a state, or of those who have voted for a specific Senator. Such variables may include the general distribution of partisan affiliations, incomes, educations, etc. However, when one compares the means of the voters within a state with those voting for various candidates, there are few trends. Senators who moderate their ideological positions often are neither nearer nor further from their state means than are Senators who fail to change their positions. In general it is a rarity to find a candidate (win or lose) whose supporters have mean characteristics that are dramatically different than the average of all voters in the state. The greatest differences are usually found on income variables, where occasional Republican candidates have supporters with incomes far above their state's average. But even these situations are rare, and the candidates are neither the winner of that race nor the incumbent Senator going into that electoral contest.

Thus, the differences in the central tendencies of those who cast their vote for one or another Senator is rather small—a fact which may lead one to believe that the various constituencies are rather similar. However, we should note that these are central tendencies, specifically means on a number of demographic and political variables, and they do not show great variation across senators; there are other ways that constituencies may differ. Further, on many variables there are other factors at work which act to decrease variations in means, and thus it is not surprising to find that the mean education levels, for example, of voters for one senator or another are not greatly different, since most states have mandatory schooling requirements which truncate the distribution at the lower end, etc.

Heterogeneity and Electoral Strategy

Bullock and Brady (1983) argue that as states are more homogeneous the elected representatives have greater freedom to remain ideologues, and thus there is a reduced tendency for Senators in homogeneous states to moderate their views in an election year. Our data show this tendency as well, and many of those senators who remain firm in their ideologies through their election contests are from heterogeneous states. However, many senators from heterogeneous states do moderate their election year positions, and some of those who do not moderate their stands are from relatively homogeneous states.

When states are homogeneous the electoral constituencies of senators must also be homogeneous (Bullock and Brady, 1983). This is in one sense undeniable: any subset of voters in a homogeneous state will indeed be homogeneous to the degree that a sample cannot be more diverse than the population from which it is drawn. However, this does not mean that two senators from the same state will have equally diverse (or uniform) constituencies just because they come from a state that lacks great diversity. And obviously, senators from heterogeneous states may have relatively homogeneous constituencies, or they may have more representative, heterogeneous constituencies (or some mix between heterogeneous and homogeneous).

We compare the stability of a senator's voting behavior with the heterogeneity of his electoral constituencies rather than focusing on overall state characteristics or estimating constituency characteristics from census data. Using data from the American National Studies for the years from 1968 through 1978 and ADA scores for senators who served during this period, we attempt to identify the linkages between legislator behavior and the voting patterns of state residents. While the number of individuals included in any one state who voted for a particular senator will be relatively small³, the total numbers are sufficient in the aggregate to support regression analyses using these individual level data.

We estimate the change in ideology as an election approaches as the difference between a senator's election year ADA score and the average ADA for the five prior years. Thus, our primary dependent variable (DIFF) is a measure of change, where negative values show a more liberal

TABLE 3
State Homogeneity and the Change in Senatorial Voting Scores, 1968-1978

VARIABLE	PARAMETER	SE	P
Constant	37.2	15.5	0.01
Education	- 4.1	1.6	0.01
Income	- 0.000055	0.000030	0.05
Union	- 3.5	2.6	0.10
Race	- 3.1	2.6	0.10
Social Class	- 1.8	2.6	0.20
Party ID	- 3.6	1.5	0.01
R = 0.22 F = 43.0 N = 36			
NOTE: The variables shown are standard deviations of state populations on the measures indicated. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the change in ADA in an election year from the mean of the senator's five prior years			

voting record in the election year. These values range from a -54 (for John Tunney of California) to 24.2 (for Lowell Weicker of Connecticut). As measures of the diversity, in both states and constituencies, standard deviations on certain common key demographic and political variables are used. For states, the standard deviations were calculated for all residents of a state included in the survey; for constituencies, the measure was computed for just those reporting that they voted for the senator in question.

Thus the key independent variables in the study are standard deviations on demographic and political variables—an obvious measure of homogeneity/heterogeneity. The measures reported here are for race, income, education, union membership, subjective social class, and partisan affiliation. These variables, in addition to being useful political descriptors and predictors, are available in all of the surveys utilized in this project. In all cases, the survey responses have been recoded to be as comparable as possible across surveys, and they have been scaled to be as nearly continuous as possible. Education, for example, is recoded as years of education in all years except 1968, where we have recoded to years, but the mid-point of the class interval has been used because the question in that year grouped respondents into education categories rather than recording actual years. Similarly, income was recoded to class interval mid-points in dollars for all years; additionally, a deflator was used to make incomes comparable

across time. This is important when pooled data is employed.

Ideological Extremity

We focus on ten states which have been represented for at least some part of the 1968-1978 period by senators who have held strong ideological positions as reflected by very high or very low ADA scores (i.e., $20 > \text{ADA} > 80$). These states have both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Further, of the senators representing these states, some show great changes in their ADA scores in election years, while others show very little election year moderation. We focus on these states because the senators representing them have the greatest opportunity to change their views in election years: in states represented by more centrist senators it is not as necessary for the senator to move to an "ideal" point. Thus, these states provide a clear test of the linkage to changes in floor voting.

It should also be noted that the senators in these states include both conservatives and liberals, giving greater balance and credibility to the analysis, but also requiring that the DIFF (change in ADA) measure be made directionless in order that liberal changes not cancel conservative movement by liberals. Thus, in the regression reported in table 3, the absolute value of DIFF is used.

A second technical point about the regression presented in table 3 is that although standard deviations of state population characteristics are used as indepen-

dent variables, this should not be confused with or interpreted as a standardized regression, and the parameter values are not partial correlation coefficients. The dependent variable is not standardized, and the independent variables are standard deviations, not deviations from some mean expressed in standard units, as would be the case in a standardized regression.

Table 3 shows quite clearly that there is some relation between the heterogeneity of a state population and the election year voting patterns of senators who have extreme ADA ratings in their non-election years. Recall that this regression is for only those senators with extreme off-year ADA scores, thus the intercept shows the mean change that can be expected of such senators who reside in homogeneous states. This is the only positive coefficient in the regression, indicating that the greatest election year ADA shift will be among senators representing homogeneous populations. The negative coefficients on the other variables reflect the fact that as states become more heterogeneous, there is less need for the senators to moderate their extremity. Increasing standard deviations in the various states may mean that there are constituencies for more and more extreme positions—and apparently, these constituencies are large enough to reelect most senators, as in only two cases did a senator fail to win the contest.

This regression, however, does not directly shed light on constituencies. Arguments from this data may be made only indirectly. Thus, further investigation into the constituency base of the various senators is required to support this line of reasoning. The only valid inference from table 3 is that increasing heterogeneity in state populations decreases the need for senators to soften their views in election years.

Defining an electoral constituency as those voting for the senator, and computing standard deviations of those individuals to measure the heterogeneity of a senator's electoral base poses a slightly different question, and allows us to examine the actual electoral support a senator commands. It also presents a slightly different estimation problem with our data because, although the total N's are greater, the number of respondents for the heterogeneity measure for electoral constituency is smaller than that used for the overall state heterogeneity measure.

A comparable examination of electoral constituencies produces similar results: the negative coefficients on the constitu-

TABLE 4
Reelection Constituency Homogeneity and the Change in Senatorial Voting Scores, 1968-1978

VARIABLE	PARAMETER	SE	P
Constant	37.2	19.9	0.02
Education	- 6.3	2.0	0.01
Income	0.000019	0.000037	0.30
Union	- 2.2	1.8	0.27
Race	- 4.5	1.5	0.01
Social Class	- 2.0	1.1	0.03
Party ID	- 5.7	2.8	0.02
R = 0.38 F = 65.2 N = 37			
NOTE: The variables shown are standard deviations of reelection constituencies on the measures indicated. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the change in ADA in an election year from the mean of the senator's five prior years.			

ency characteristic standard deviations (and positive constant) demonstrate that the senators with the most heterogeneous appeal are the ones who are least likely to moderate their views for election. As in table 3, regression results shown in table 4 are for the senators with extreme off-year ADA scores, but in table 4 the independent variables are the standard deviations among those who voted for the senator in his reelection attempt, rather than for the entire state population.

The results of table 4 appear rather counter-intuitive in one sense, for they seem to show that senators who remain extreme in their voting patterns through their election are able to maintain the most heterogeneous support base, while senators who do change their floor voting patterns appear to have a more narrow appeal. A number of anecdotes supporting this interpretation are possible, especially when one considers that in the media age one's opponents will quickly publicize the senators's "flip-flopping on the issues." It also seems to be in conflict with a basic understanding of an informed electorate, where a moderate or median voter positioning should result in the greatest appeal, regardless of where one's opponent stands.

However, the regression shown in table 4 has another (though obviously related) interpretation which makes greater substantive sense. The above interpretation assumes that causality runs from the election year position of the senator to the breadth of appeal. An alternative interpretation reverses the direction of causality, suggesting that the diversity of appeal

influences how much a senator's election year floor voting must be adjusted. This interpretation sounds obvious. It simply says that among senators with relatively extreme off-year voting records, there is a reduced need to moderate in an election year since the base of support is broader and more diverse. In short, where senators have a wide appeal in spite of their ideological extremity, they do not have to adjust their voting patterns. However, those senators with "radical" off-year records who lack a broad base of electoral support must moderate their behaviors in order to draw the votes of the large numbers located near the political and demographic centers of their constituencies.

The finding that the broader the base of support, the less even an extreme off-year position need be moderated for election is also indicative of the fact that variables other than floor voting influence both who votes for a candidate and that, for many voters, a senator's floor voting patterns may not be central to their vote choice. Obviously, factors such as name recognition and seniority play an important role, and senators with high name recognition may draw from wider segments of the population regardless of their floor voting. Similarly, as documented so convincingly by Fenno (1978), a legislator may use such activities as constituency service and "bringing home the pork" to build and maintain a re-election constituency. Thus, at least some of the senators will not need to adjust their voting patterns, particularly on issues which are not central to the concerns of voters in the state, if they have

other means of building a broad based reelection coalition.

Moreover, the stage in the senator's career may affect voting decisions. Senior senators who feel sufficiently secure may "protect" (Fenno, 1978) their reelection constituencies and thus not feel compelled to modify their election year voting records. Alternatively, a junior senator may succumb to the necessity of enlarging his reelection constituency through timely roll call modifications. Even this consideration, however, does not satisfactorily account for possible behaviors. Senior senators who have been 'protecting' their reelection constituencies will likely change their voting records if a strong challenger encroaches into their formerly reliable source of support.

Voters and Constituencies

The preceding discussion shows that heterogeneity both in the state populations and in the reelection constituencies attenuate the "need" for senators with "extremist" voting patterns to moderate their views in an electoral contest. In states with heterogeneous populations it is easier for distinct reelection constituencies to form, which makes it easier for the senator to remain steadfast in floor voting (though it should be noted that a heterogeneous population is by no means an assurance that distinct constituencies will form). Homogeneity in the state population, by the same logic, makes it more difficult to form distinct reelection constituencies. Thus, the two analyses, though treated separately, make the same point, and it is therefore not surprising that the analysis using constituencies produces slightly better results in both parameters and overall fit.

Interestingly, state and constituency heterogeneity, at least as measured by standard deviations, are not as strongly related as the above logic might indicate. For example, the simple correlation between state standard deviations and constituency standard deviations ranges from 0.30 (for income) to 0.57 (for partisan identification) in the ten states identified as having senators with "extreme" views. For the full sample, the correlations are higher (from 0.38 to 0.61 on the same indicators), but not dramatically. This therefore suggests that factors other than just the heterogeneity of state populations make possible a heterogeneous reelection constituency. Although some cases of relatively homogeneous constituencies within heterogeneous states certainly do depress the state-

constituency correlations, cases of constituencies with greater standard deviations on the demographics than the states within which they reside are also found. Thus, the argument cannot fully revolve around the state heterogeneity-constituency linkage, and there must be some independent contribution from each.

This presents a small dilemma for a causal analysis focusing on the state/constituency connection. One cannot assume that constituency heterogeneity has any causal role over state heterogeneity, and it appears that state heterogeneity only makes constituency heterogeneity more likely, but it is clear that other factors influence constituency heterogeneity as well. These other factors may include candidate specific forces: that elusive thing called charisma, or things like "bringing home the pork," or even stands on one or two important issues.

Two Candidate Elections

We should also not overlook the fact that senate contests are two or more candidate elections, and the activities and reputation of opponents in an election may influence the behavior of a senator either directly or through an influence on the heterogeneity of one's reelection constituency. One may adopt different behaviors depending upon whom the opponent is or the tactics used by the opponent. Thus, any examination of how a senator changes behaviors in an election should give some consideration to the role played by the electoral opposition. Indeed, no consideration of "movement to an ideal point" is really complete unless there is some treatment of the fact that elections in democracies are contests between two or more candidates and not just an approve/disapprove vote on an incumbent. This, in fact, is part of the original rationale for the idea that candidates will try to position themselves as near the median voter as possible.

From the perspective of campaign tactics there are at least two situations in which a candidate should try to seek a moderate position. One occurs when the opponent is near the median position and the incumbent does not enjoy a demographically broad base of support. In this case, moving to the center is a means of attracting more of the large numbers of voters that are usually found in "middle-of-the-road" positions. A second situation occurs when the two candidates are equally attractive to large numbers of voters. Here, although an incumbent, even one with "extreme" views, enjoys a broad base of

support as measured by the standard deviations of the demographics, some portion of that support is split with the other candidate (who himself may or may not be "middle-of-the-road"). Overlapping constituencies may force even those incumbents with a broad support base to moderate their views.

We believe election year competition is an important variable. Presumably, all legislators are concerned about their reelection margins (Mayhew, 1974). Accordingly, electorally 'safe' senators, i.e., senators enjoying wide reelection margins in their last bid, may feel secure to pursue ideological roll call voting in their current term. The problem, however, is that a wide reelection margin in the last contest does not guarantee a weak challenger in the current election--especially in the Senate. Recall the close-call that the very senior Mark Hatfield (R, OR) maneuvered through in the 1990 elections. Thus election year (i.e., sixth year) competition from a challenger interacting with constituency heterogeneity/homogeneity will condition the incumbent's roll call decisions.

To examine the effects of opponents and the support they attract in an election, several new measures must be formulated. Of direct concern are both the opponent's location vis a vis the population distributions, and as well as the level of support the opponent is able to attract. Unfortunately, nothing akin to ADA ratings are available for non-incumbent senatorial candidates (unless, of course, they are House members who have decided to seek statewide office), so how (and if) they adjust their voting records to prepare for such contests is difficult to study. However, this does not preclude an examination of their influences on incumbents seeking reelection.

One factor that may influence the incumbent's strategy is their relative locations vis a vis the electorate. Clearly, one measure of this is the differences in the mean values of their respective electoral constituencies. The nearer they are to each other, one presumes, the more they will be competing for the votes of the same portion of the electorate. However, it should immediately be obvious that constituency heterogeneity is also important here, for even if the means of their constituencies show them to be close to each other in terms of who they try to "woo into the flock," the candidate with the more heterogeneous constituency will likely have the advantage.

Similarly, even if the means of their electoral constituencies are distant from one another, this does not mean that they are not in competition for some of the same voters. Overlapping constituencies are possible even for ideologically and demographically distinct candidates if both manage to attract heterogeneous electoral bases.

As an indicator of the overlap (or lack thereof) in the constituencies, we again turn to a measure which is based in part on the standard deviations of the social demographics of their constituents. In particular, since it is important to know the degree of shared constituency, some measure of the breadth of appeal around the mean should be compared. Thus, for each incumbent, a measure of overlap with the major party opponent was computed. This measure is computed simply as:

$$(M_L + SD_L) - (M_H - SD_H) \text{ (eq. 1)}$$

where M_L is the mean (on the demographic or political variable) for the constituency or candidate with the lowest mean and SD_L is the respective standard deviation; M_H is the mean on the same measure for the constituency of the other candidate, and SD_H is the standard deviation for that candidate. This measure is a better indicator of overlapping appeal than is the simple difference of means because it accounts for differences in the breadth of each candidate's appeal. It is negative when no overlap exists (at the one standard deviation level), becomes larger as the two candidates' constituencies become more similar, and is positive as constituencies overlap at their one standard deviation levels. Other measures of breadth than one standard deviation may have been employed in constructing this indicator, but the one standard deviation was chosen because this measure accounts for approximately 84% of each candidate's voters. Further, when the opponent is beginning to garner support within the one standard deviation range, he may be at least beginning to attract some of the incumbent's "core supporters," the 34 percent nearest the incumbent's constituency mean, but on the challenger's side of that mean.

Table 5 reports the results of simple linear regression of overlap measures on (absolute) changes in incumbent ADA scores. Even in this simplest test the overlapping constituencies show an important influence. In short, the positive coefficients show that the greater the overlap of electoral coalitions with one's opponent, the greater the chance that a senator will

TABLE 5
Constituency Overlap and the Change in Senatorial Voting Scores, 1968-1978

VARIABLE	PARAMETER	SE	P
Constant	-11.3	8.2	0.10
Education	1.1	0.4	0.01
Income	0.000067	0.00022	0.01
Union	2.4	1.7	0.10
Race	0.81	0.32	0.01
Social Class	1.77	1.30	0.10
Party ID	2.29	1.32	0.05
R = 0.42 F = 72.4 N = 218			
NOTE: The independent variables are measures of overlap between the incumbent and the main opponent on the social demographics shown [defined as $(M+SD) - (M-SD)$, as noted in equation 1 of the text]. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the change in ADA in an election year from the mean of the senator's five prior years.			

have altered his floor voting behavior in the election year. Similarly, less overlap, or no overlap, reduces the chance that the incumbent's floor voting behaviors were changed in the election year.

Table 5 shows that as a challenger is better able to gain the support of the incumbent's reelection constituency, the more we tend to find incumbents who have altered their floor voting patterns. Of course, the data preclude any knowledge of causal orderings—in part because statistical analyses almost always preclude this (see Davis, 1985), and also because the constituency data are based on who cast votes for which candidate on election day. Thus, we cannot know whether the incumbent's floor voting was altered because of a challenger's intrusion into the core constituency, or whether the challenger was able to tempt some of the incumbent's base as a result of the incumbent's "inconsistent record" (or, did the incumbent move to gain some of his powerful opponent's constituents?).

Multiple Influences

Several factors appear to influence the election year floor voting patterns of congressmen. As others have noted (see especially Bullock and Brady, 1983), there is a link between state homogeneity and the degree to which an incumbent will change his voting behavior in the legislature. Heterogeneous states offer senators an opportunity to find a niche from which to run for reelection without any great change in ideological position. Those representing

homogeneous states are more confined in where they can find support.

Related to this is the even stronger linkage between election year shifts in floor voting and the heterogeneity of the senator's own constituency: the more homogeneous the senator's constituents, the more extreme shifts in the voting record become. As noted earlier, there is necessarily some association between state and constituency heterogeneity because it is much more difficult to attract a relatively heterogeneous constituency from a homogeneous state than a heterogeneous one. However, it is possible for a senator to have a homogeneous constituency in a state with a heterogeneous populace. Thus, each has some independent contribution.

Complicating all of this is the fact that one's major electoral opponents, and even anticipated opponents, may have an influence. There is clear evidence that senators whose electoral constituencies overlap with those of their opponents in the election are more likely to have moderated their floor voting, presumably in an effort to enlarge the dimensions of their own electoral base.

The basic set of relationships may be expressed as a structural equation model in which the various influences on the shifting positions of the senator are the independent variables and the change in the senator's positions is the dependent variable. Note that this is a specification of relationships between different "concepts" or variables for which we have no perfect measures. What is important are things such as the heterogeneity in state and constituency populations, the degree to


which the incumbent's reelection constituency overlaps with his opponent's, and the various changes in the outward behaviors of the incumbent in order to appear more attractive. We have used multiple indicators of each of these concepts that, while reasonable, are not perfect even in combination. Thus, any estimation of a system of "model" should begin with an admission of imperfectly measured concepts, and regard those variables as *latent* rather than *manifest* variables.

Thus, three direct influences on the changing postures of the incumbent are constituency heterogeneity, state population heterogeneity, and constituency overlap. Additionally, the linkage between state population heterogeneity and the heterogeneity of a senator's reelection constituency must be taken into account. And finally, the degree of overlap between an incumbent's reelection constituency and the constituency of the opponent is a function of both the heterogeneity of the incumbent's constituency and the heterogeneity of the state. Other factors influencing constituency overlap must be the actual locations of both candidates on various issue and ideology scales, and some candidate specific forces. These, however, are left exogenous to the model.

Using the covariance structure model estimation program known as LISREL, the appropriate latent variables may be estimated from the indicators used previously (estimating the measurement model through a confirmatory factor analysis method). Following this, the structural equation model is estimated using a two-stage regression among the latent variables (because in simple path analysis the relations among the various "independent" variables and error terms may not be easily specified in the model, and because path analysis assumes perfect measurement of the variables).

The measurement model is basically a system of confirmatory factor analysis, where some of the factor loadings must be set to zero in advance, indicating that there is no relationship between those variables. This creates the latent variables which are then used in the structural equation model. The variables used in the measurement model are the same ones employed previously as indicators of various concepts in this paper; the advantage in using the LISREL program or other covariance structure models is that from these multiple indicators of each concept comes a single measure of the latent variable. In the analysis presented here, multiple indica-

Figure 1
Structural Equation Model of
Influences on Election Year Behavioral Shifts



tors of changing floor voting are employed in the measurement model. Specifically, ratings of each senator by the conservative ACA and labor-oriented COPE ratings by the AFL-CIO are included with the ADA scores as measures of how much senators' floor voting patterns change as elections approach. The addition of these ratings give greater reliability to the measure of changing voting patterns by diversifying the base of issues and votes considered.

The LISREL program estimates (using a maximum likelihood method) show that the relations between the four theoretical constructs are significant, and that the entire model is also significant (chi-square=41.5, 16 d.f., with GFI goodness of fit=0.86 and root mean square residual RMR=0.034; coefficient of determination=0.86). More importantly, figure 1 shows the estimated correlations between the various latent variables.

(Please see Technical Appendix, page 12 for further information regarding the LISREL estimates.)

Figure 1 shows that the strongest influences on the Senator's behavior are the direct influences of the opponent's constituency overlap and the heterogeneity of the senator's own reelection constituency. A heterogeneous constituency reduces the chance that a senator will have shifted views for the election, while any constituency overlap with an opponent increases the chance that the incumbent will shift his positions.

Heterogeneity in the state population is indeed correlated with a heterogeneous reelection constituency, as well as negatively correlated with a shifting of views by the incumbent. In neither instance, however, is the impact as large as the direct impacts of the two constituency factors on the shifts. Even the indirect impact of the state population is less than the direct constituency effect.

Discussion

Senators and representatives are well known for their election year posturing—changing voting patterns in election years to reflect a more moderate position than they otherwise hold. Traditionally this behavior has been expected of legislators whose off-year records are more or less “extreme,” but there is considerable evidence that it is a practice common to most members of both houses, to one degree or another. One explanation for this has been the idea of vote maximization in an attempt to maximize the probability of reelection. Others have argued that this sort of shift is unnecessary, at least for many, because legislators cultivate reelection constituencies.

This research shows that senators who shift most are those with the least heterogeneous reelection constituencies. Where they have narrow appeal, they need to moderate their positions in order to increase their election year support. Senators, even those with extreme views, who have heterogeneous constituencies, need not alter their floor voting nearly as much as those with narrow constituencies. These senators, for one reason or another, have a broad base of support which they have developed without a large shift in their voting; they may have developed the support through their solid support on certain issues important in their state, name recognition, or constituency service. Whatever enables them to build and maintain that base, it remains that once the broad base is in place, there is less incentive or need for them to change.

One factor induces change in the floor behaviors of senators more or less independent of the breadth of their electoral base. That factor is the opponent and his electoral base. The more that the opponent cuts into the incumbent's base—as the opponent begins to gain the support of individuals nearer the core of the incumbent's base—the more the incumbent is likely to alter his behavior. This, in a large sense, is quite logical (indeed, it would be surprising if one's electoral opponents had no impact); strategic behavior is the essence of campaigning. Further, it is simply an extension of the Downsian (1957) and Fiorina (1974) logic of movement to the center of maximize votes—but this interpretation takes heterogeneity (variances) into account as well.

Thus, Fenno's (1978) argument, that reelection constituencies are built and depend upon electoral support, reasonably explains the floor-voting patterns of some

legislators. However, where reelection constituencies insufficiently guarantee reelection, as when they are small and homogeneous, we can expect senators to alter their behaviors—both in response to challengers and simply to improve their electoral base.

One question that motivated this research revolved around the fact that many states have ideological opposites “representing” them. This research has given some answers regarding how Senators are reelected in these states. Where each is able to gain broad support, they should be successful in their reelection efforts, especially since they do not run against one another. In this instance, moderation is necessary if an opponent challenges the incumbent’s electoral base. On the other hand, if their support is narrow, they can be expected to moderate their views as the election approaches, in an effort to enlarge their electoral base. Thus, by adopting appropriate strategies given the character of their constituencies, states and opponents, it is feasible for ideologically distinct Senators to represent the same state. In turn, this implies that voters of a state will elect distinct Senators for one of two reasons. The Senators may modify their voting records in the election year so that they appear consistent with the populations’ desires and goals. This relies upon the retrospective nature of voters. Or, distinct Senators may mobilize different electoral constituencies. In such instances, the constituency does not demand moderation by their candidate, because the Senator’s views, though perhaps extreme by a national ADA scale, appeal to their perspective.

Endnotes

- ¹ The dates utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The date for Voting Scores for Members of the U.S. Congress, 1947-1977 were originally collected by the Congressional Quarterly, Inc. The data for the CPS American National Election Studies were originally collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Neither the Consortium nor the original collectors bear any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
- ² Although the days of the “Solid South” are disappearing, it is worthy of note that the strongest competitors for most of the Southern Democrats during the 1968-1978 period remained within the party. Primary challenges, rather than general election challenges, remained the greatest electoral threat to many incumbent Democrats.
- ³ For states included in this paper the average number of respondents voting for the senator in question is about 30, ranging from a low of 7 to a high of 90. The total N’s across senators range from 1233 (in 1970) to 2566 (in 1972).

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ORDERLY DISORDER: Multiple International Regimes for Trade

Renée Marlin-Bennett

Author's Note

An earlier version of this paper, with a similar title but containing two case studies, was co-authored by Carolyn Rhodes and me and was presented at the 1987 meeting of the American Political Science Association. We agreed to split the original paper in two. I am indebted to Dr. Rhodes for her assistance, collaboration, and continued support. Critical comments from Jeffrey Hart (comments on the original Marlin and Rhodes-Jones paper), Oran Young, Mark Zacher, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., anonymous reviewers, and especially Nicholas Onuf were extremely useful. Kimberly Alexander, Elizabeth Arias, Richard Kolar, and Sally Corcoran provided valuable research assistance.

Abstract

Orderly Disorder:

Multiple Regimes for Trade

This paper reconceptualizes international regimes as the principles, rules, and procedures which order behavior and expectations of a group of actors for a given issue-area. Under this definition, more than one regime can exist for any issue-area. A multiple regime framework can explain international conflict in addition to the more common theoretical perspective of regimes explaining cooperation. In international trade, four regimes are identified: the post World War II liberal, the Soviet socialist, the mercantilist, and the South preferential. The distinctiveness of the regimes is evident in their ideological underpinnings, as well as in the existence of formal institutions and codifications of the rules.

Much of the work on international trade regimes assumes that a particular set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures sets the context for an entire substantive area, such as trade or international security.¹ A revised definition of regime is offered, one which accounts for similar practices by groups of actors over a wide range of issue-areas. A regime can be defined as a set of principles, rules, and procedures around which the perceptions and expectations of a group of actors converge. Linked regimes may order behavior for several (or possibly all) issue-

areas for a particular group of actors. Most importantly, more than one regime can often be identified for any given issue-area.

The title of this paper refers to "orderly disorder" because every regime provides a set of regularized behaviors or expectations despite the fundamental disorder of the international system. In the instance of international trade as an issue-area, four regimes can be identified:

1. the post World War II liberal trading regime;
2. the Soviet socialist trading regime;
3. the mercantilist regime; and
4. the South preferential trading regime.

Most trade takes place without any of the parties involved voicing opposition to the terms of the transaction or to the way in which the transaction was arranged. A trade dispute, in contrast, represents a departure from this (at least ostensibly) amicable relationship. Trade disputes are the outcome of at least one international actor claiming that the principles, rules, and perhaps procedures of a relevant regime for trade have been broken, or that different regimes present trading partners with incompatible obligations. Although some may argue that a trade dispute demonstrates that no regime exists, it can be shown that trade disputes serve to highlight the principles and rules of the relevant regimes because the parties invoke them.

The first section of the paper redefines regimes more fully and argues the saliency of the multiple-regime approach. The second section provides a taxonomy of the four regimes identified in contemporary international trade.

Multiple Regimes

In its current form, regimes theory, by defining regime by issue-area, misses the way ideologies influence rule formation and how rules generalize to several issue-areas. With the notable exception of Young and Aggarwal, most scholars have attempted to "fit" a single regime to all the behavior in a broadly defined issue-area.²

A more fruitful approach avoids confusing the scope of a regime with the regime itself.³ In contrast to the approaches cited above, it may be argued that *the boundaries of a regime must be defined by determining both the substantive reach of the regime -- what rules? -- and the participants -- who adheres to what rules?* As Kratochwil and Ruggie note in their discussion of intersubjectivity, focusing on the beliefs of groups of actors better represents the heterogeneity of states' and non-state actors' behavior because a participant-centered focus addresses the distinctiveness of different paradigms of behavior.⁴ Furthermore, focusing on adherents to different rule-sets allows a look at common perceptions and expectations among several issue-areas at different levels of specificity. This approach avoids looking for implicitly universal nested regimes, which can not account for differences between, for example, Soviet and Western modes of trade.⁵

Redefining Regimes

This paper defines a regime as a set of principles, rules, and decision-making procedures around which a group of actors' perceptions and expectations converge.⁶ Principles are informed by an ideology,⁷ though the regime may "corrupt" the intent of the ideology. The rules and decision-making procedures implement the principles. Documents codifying the rules and international organizations routinizing the procedures of the regime give the regime more formality.⁸ Although a regime will have specific rules for a given issue-area, principles and informal rules (Krasner's norms) may apply to several issue-areas. Decision-making procedures are rules by which the participants in the regime agree on the principles, make or change the rules, and implement the rules.

As Alker notes, regimes penetrate other regimes in two ways.⁹ First, some rules overlap. Shared rules facilitate cooperative interaction among actors of different political and ideological stripes. Second, actors may choose to adhere to more than one regime. The actors' choices may be constrained by inequalities of power relative to other international actors or to domestic political considerations.¹⁰ Sepa-




Figure 1

rate-- though overlapping -- ideologically consistent regimes can be identified by looking to which actors adhere to which rules.

Most authors identify a regime as the summation of all the rules regulating a single issue-area, but a multiple regime approach accounts for distinct sets of rules which regulate several issue-areas (or a single issue-area). Ideologies no less than issues help to define regimes. As Young notes:

[R]egimes resting on socialist premises will encompass more extensive collections of rules as well as more explicit efforts to direct behavior toward the achievement of goals than *laissez faire* regimes that emphasize decentralized decision making and autonomy for individual actors.¹¹

Aggarwal has suggested that regimes for particular markets are nested within an implicitly universal "meta-regime" for trade, which in turn is nested within an international strategic regime, and that the degree to which these narrow-scope regimes (the textile trade regime) are liberal or protectionist can vary over time.¹² In Aggarwal's terms, the post World War II liberal trading regime, protectionism (if not a mercantilist regime), and the Generalized System of Preferences (if not a South preferential regime) could all be

nested within a relatively liberal meta-regime, although the degree to which the meta-regime actually is liberal would vary. In a similar vein, Ruggie would suggest that protectionist practices and perhaps the Generalized System of Preferences are "embedded" within liberalism.¹³

Postulating a universal meta-regime or a complex embedded regime for trade ignores the considerable differences in the principles, rules, and procedures of several distinct regimes. How, for example, are Soviet bloc trade practices reconciled with liberal principles? The Soviet bloc system of long term arrangements based on centrally planned production, export, and import does not seem conceptually nested within a universal liberal meta-regime.

Also, both the mercantilist trading regime and the South preferential trading regime (as described below) embody *market regulation* or management as their primary principle, though advocates of the mercantilist trade regime guard the market share of the dominant economic powers, and advocates of the South preferential trade regime seek to redistribute market share rights. This regulatory aspect again differs greatly from the liberal desiderata of "free trade."

Nevertheless, the concept of nesting is very helpful. Actors with similar ideologies may adhere to several related regimes of greater and lesser generality. The par-

ticipants and their ideologies determine how the regimes are nested. Figure 1 graphically depicts the differences between this paper's definition of regimes and that of the majority of scholars. In Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, the issue-areas define the regime. In Figure 1.4, which depicts this paper's definition, regimes are manifestations of the overlapping ideologies which guide state and non-state actors' behavior. The boundaries of the ideologies, and hence the regimes, are the participants.

The most obvious defect of this schema is that parsimony has been lost. But the world is a complex place. This multiple regime framework helps identify how, in the current world system and especially since the decline of post World War II U.S. economic hegemony, regimes order -- or fail to order -- trade.

Nature of the Regimes

The post World War II liberal, Soviet socialist, mercantilist, and South preferential trading regimes do not necessarily determine the behavior of international actors involved in trade (*i.e.* representatives of states, international organizations, customs unions, producer groups, multinational corporations). Rather, the regimes, as rule sets, serve as paradigms of proper trade practices.¹⁴ The regimes work and every day trade takes place when the participants generally adhere to the rules. Conflict arises, however, when an actor claims that another actor's practice is "unfair" or breaks a rule. In some cases, the actors are complying with incompatible regimes. In other cases, the dispute occurs within a single regime. The rules of the post World War II liberal and the Soviet socialist regimes are fairly explicit, and the task of negotiating a dispute involves an analysis of whether a rule has actually been broken or whether another rule supercedes the rule in question. When normative claims are raised in the context of the mercantilist or South preferential trading regimes, however, the discussion often centers around what the content of the rule should be.

For each of the regimes, the following points are discussed:

1. ideology;
2. principles and rules for trading;
3. procedures for trading, for changing or creating the rules for trading, and for dealing with trade disputes; and
4. formal institutions which help implement the rules and documents which codify the rules.

Procedures in this context represent ways in which the rules are developed, altered, and implemented.¹⁵ The discussion of formal institutions identifies the international organizations which provide a legitimated environment for developing, implementing, and altering rules. The typology is complex, however, because actors may adhere to more than one trade regime and may advocate the rules of one over the other whenever it is useful. For example, many developing countries play by the rules of post World War II liberal trade and participate in the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but they still advocate the "regulated" trade of the South preferential regime, as evidenced by calls for a New International Economic Order.

The Post World War II Liberal Trading Regime

The post-World War II liberal trading regime has received the most attention, especially from American scholars. Liberalism, as an ideology, informs the development of the post World War II liberal trading regimes's principles. Free trade is the greatest good, with limited governmental intervention in markets to correct market failures. Trade improves welfare, as does the existence of governments, if the governments act prudently. Actors are rational, and they wish to maximize their utility.

Efficiency and sovereignty (or "balanced treatment"), two central but contradictory principles of this regime, derive from the neoclassical liberal economic paradigm.¹⁶ Efficiency reflects the belief that the more freely trade flows, the more utility accrues to traders and consumers. Equity concerns, both domestic and international, are of secondary importance. The principle of sovereignty is embodied in the doctrine that states have a right and a duty to protect their national security, including economic security.¹⁷

The primary rules include unconditional most favored nation status (Keohane's "diffuse reciprocity"),¹⁸ reciprocity ("specific reciprocity"), and safeguards of vital economic sectors. Most favored nation status closely links the principle of efficiency to trading practices, because lowering barriers to imports and exports should, according to neoclassical economic theory, increase welfare. Reciprocity and safeguards, however, both relate to sovereignty and often work at cross purposes to most favored nation status. Reciprocity, a tit-for-tat strategy, puts na-

tional interest ahead of pure efficiency by requiring reciprocal reduction of tariffs.¹⁹ Another rule of this regime is the Generalized System of Preferences, which in some ways can be interpreted as a long term strategy to redress inequitable resource distributions to make trade more efficient; however, concern for welfare in developing countries seems to be the major rationale. Here, principles that have come to be associated with the South preferential trade regime (see below) have influenced the evolution of the post World War II liberal trade regime.

The articles of the GATT, as well as the later agreements signed by GATT members, contain the most formalized rules of all the regimes. For example, there is a rule prohibiting the use of subsidies to obtain a more than equitable market share. This rule has been the focus of disagreement between the United States and the European Community over agricultural trade policy.

Trading takes place when firms or governments sign contracts to purchase goods or services for market prices. Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations provide routinized procedures for states to create new rules for trade, change the existing rules, and implement reciprocal reduction of tariffs. Dispute conciliation procedures are also routinized, and their implementation depends on the GATT secretariat, which furnishes the technical expertise necessary for the dispute conciliation process. In addition, the secretariat reviews the actions of the Council and publishes many documents, including the summary, **Activities of the GATT**. The dissemination of information reinforces the regime by making the record of precedents available to international actors. The Agreement itself, along with subsequent international agreements, codifies the rules.

Soviet Socialist Trading Regime

Although changes within the Soviet bloc are altering the way the Soviet Union and its allies conduct trade, the Soviet socialist regime has provided the setting for a trading regime which differs dramatically from the post World War II liberal regime.²⁰ It could be argued that the hegemonic position of the Soviet Union within its bloc creates a regime in which the rules are obeyed much more closely than in the post World War II liberal regime. Despite Soviet rhetoric about the evils which capitalism perpetrates against the developing world, other Soviet statements have made it clear that the Soviet

socialist regime is not equivalent to the social welfare ideals of the South preferential regime.²¹ In international discourse, participants in this regime primarily articulate the regime's components by condemning capitalist practices rather than by enunciating alternative modes of proper trade.

The ideology of the Soviet socialist regime is Marxism-Leninism, which stresses centralization and state control of the economy and production. The fundamental principle of this regime, according to the rhetoric from the Soviet Union, is a rejection of capitalist modes of trade, which necessarily involve collusion between capitalists and monopolies. Western interpretation suggests that another fundamental principle is the long-term protection of Soviet hegemony over trade relations and division of labor among the Soviet bloc countries.²²

The primary rule of this regime is state trading. State trading can protect against the accumulation of surplus value by capitalist monopolies and the expatriation of low wage countries' wealth. The Western perspective, however, suggests that state trading serves to preserve Soviet hegemony over the bloc by guaranteeing prices and delivery of commodities needed by the Soviet Union, as well as by solidifying intra-bloc cooperation. State trading is closely tied to centrally planned development strategies. The post World War II development plans imposed certain patterns of industrial and agricultural production on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) members. The patterns of industrialization and growth, as mandated by the Soviet Union serve to encourage intra-CMEA trade in preference to extra-CMEA trade. The predominant system of unit of account (transferable ruble) payments -- as opposed to hard currency -- is a double-edged sword.

The use of transferable rubles increases the potential ability of the Soviet Union to have an influential role in the trade relations of its CMEA partners, since it can insist that accounts be cleared and trade balanced. On the other hand, persistent surpluses in Soviet-East European trade results in the Soviet Union acting as an involuntary lender.²³ The often-cited Soviet subsidization of oil prices paid by its East European trade partners during the energy crisis of the 1970s suggests that the East European countries have had some success in "bargaining to exchange 'allegiance' to the Soviet Union for economic subsidization of trade."²⁴ To implement

the rule of state trading, the participants in this regime usually condemn capitalist trading practices and negotiate long-term arrangements. Non-discrimination in access to markets is another articulated rule.

Procedures for trade within this regime include state-state negotiations on prices, quantities, delivery dates, and length of agreements. Determining procedures for dispute conciliation is more difficult because, according to the traditional rhetoric, there are no intra-bloc disputes. However, Lavigne offers evidence that discussions within the CMEA have dealt with problems of intra-Soviet bloc trade.²⁵

Codifications of the Soviet socialist trade regime can be seen in the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, which directs that the State shall conduct all international trade. In addition, the provisions of long-term arrangements and statements made by the Soviets and their bloc partners in international fora also set forth the elements of this regime. The CMEA is the international institution of Soviet socialism, and it is in this organization that the intra-bloc terms of trade have been set.

Mercantilist Trading Regime

Mercantilism identifies state interests with both wealth and power (Gilpin, for instance, defines the "nationalist" ideology of political economy).²⁶ This ideology legitimates states' drives to garner more wealth and more power through managing the market.²⁷ For trade, the negotiations and coalition-building will involve dividing market shares in a discriminatory fashion. A strong link exists between domestic corporatism and international mercantilism. While a decline of hegemony drives the development of the managed markets of mercantilism from the level of the international system, corporatist structures in industrialized and newly industrialized states drive the development of mercantilist international policies from the level of the domestic system. Aggarwal, Keohane, and Yoffie have identified the domestic dynamic as the "demand for negotiated protectionism."²⁸

Olson provides a historical precedent.²⁹ He charts the development of mercantilism from "jurisdictional integration." The medieval guilds, rooted in cities and towns, were transformed into jurisdiction-wide

special interest groups which advocated the imposition of protectionist trade policies.

In recent decades, corporate special interest groups have fulfilled a similar

role. The re-emergence of mercantilist trade in the guise of managed markets and the rise of corporatist structures of domestic relations in industrialized and newly industrialized countries are closely related. Schmitter notes that societal corporatism is a result of the evolutionary decay of advanced pluralism,³⁰ specifically resulting from the "collapse of [pre World War II] liberal economic regime."³¹ The development of societal corporatism in the advanced countries coincides with the development of what Schmitter calls state corporatism in the authoritarian newly industrialized states. In the newly industrialized states, state corporatism is associated with "the rapid demise of nascent pluralism."³² Both forms of corporatism complement the systemic trend toward bargaining and interest articulation among states.

In short, mercantilism and the mercantilist trading regime are outgrowths of demands for sovereignty (*i.e.* legitimated articulation of the needs of the state) and protection of domestic industry (*i.e.* legitimated articulation of the needs of a corporatist interest group within the state) overshadowing liberal concerns about efficiency.³³ Mercantilist actors have created a normative context in which international bargaining embodies "fair," rather than "free" trade as the ideal.

Thus, the mercantilist trading regime can be called a "conservative" regime because it has market stability and the institutionalization of present-day (or the restoration of prior) power hierarchies within the market as its central principles. In contradistinction to the post World War II liberal trading regime, discrimination is a central rule of the mercantilist regime, because certain states are to be targeted as threats to stability and the distribution of power in the market. This rule corresponds to the domestic corporatist rules concerning interest aggregation and internal control structures of organizations.³⁴ Under mercantilist trade rules, states serve to aggregate interests and pursue political negotiations for trade on behalf of exporter and sectoral groups. International organizations, such as the European Community (EC) or the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) may serve to aggregate the interests of states by implementing discriminatory "deals."

The bargaining of compromises (equitable or imposed) is the most common procedure of this regime. This procedure routinizes trade transactions, creates new rules, and allows for the resolution (or

management) of disputes. The negotiations may be either multilateral or bilateral. The results of these negotiations are often "voluntary export restraints" or "orderly marketing arrangements" which serve to manage the market.³⁵ The specifics of a particular bargaining outcome are codified on an *ad hoc* basis in these agreements.³⁶

No formal universal organization, such as the GATT, serves to institutionalize this regime, because the regime itself is one of organized "deal cutting." States or groups of states can cooperate to aggregate interests and provide a unified voice for the bargaining. No supranational authority exists to mediate among interests. By default, then, the hierarchy of power in markets is reinforced. Similarly, no wide-ranging codification of this regime exists. Each time the actors conclude a bargain, the agreement codifies the rules. However, no GATT-like systematic framework exists because each mercantilist negotiation is idiosyncratic.

Two objections can be raised regarding the validity of a mercantilist trade regime. First, regimes are often assumed to foster cooperation. The mercantilist trade regime as described in this research, however, may disadvantage some state and non-state actors. An explanation is that regimes need not be beneficial to all nor even simply not malign. Nothing in the definition of regime as put forth by Krasner, *et al.*, speaks to the intentions -- for good or evil -- of the regime's creators, or to the good or evil consequences of a regime.

The second objection pertains to what exactly constitutes a regime. All those not taking the broadest and most inclusive approach to what defines a regime require more than cooperation and patterned behavior as evidence of a regime's existence. Haggard and Simmons prefer a definition of regimes emphasizing "multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within issue-areas."³⁷ They would define the Multi-Fiber Arrangement as a regime. However, several specific regimes identified with multilateral agreements of the kind fitting Haggard and Simmons' criteria may have the same underlying ideology and principles. When specific, small-scope regimes are tied together by their ideology and principles, the regimes are "nested," to use Aggarwal's term, in a superordinate regime (in this case the mercantilist trade regime).

TABLE 1
Summary of Trade Regimes Elements and Actions

ELEMENTS AND ACTIONS	POST WORLD WAR II LIBERAL	SOVIET SOCIALIST	MERCANTILIST	SOUTH PREFERENTIAL
PRINCIPLES	Efficiency; Sovereignty	Rejection of capitalism; (Soviet hegemony)	Sovereignty; Stability; Institutionalization of hierarchy	Redistributive justice; Stability and Equity
RULES	MFN/Non-discrimination; Reciprocity; Safeguards for vital sectors; GSP; No subsidies	State monopoly on trade; (Discrimination)	Discrimination	Regulating international markets to create special trade rights for LDCs.
PROCEDURES	Firm to firm contracting; MTN; Bilateral or multilateral negotiations; GATT dispute conciliation	State to state arrangements; LTAs; (Within bloc negotiations)	Bilateral or multilateral bargaining; VERs and OMAs	Multilateral negotiations; Issue-specific international agreements; All under international organization aegis
INSTITUTIONS	GATT	CMEA	Organized deal-cutting	UNCTAD, FAO
CODIFICATIONS	GATT	Soviet Constitution; Provisions of LTAs	Different Agreements	NIEO; Commodity Agreements
ACTIONS	GATT-centered discussions	Rhetoric; Planned trade	EC-ACP arrangements	ISA-centered discussions

South Preferential Trading Regime

Developing country advocates of significant changes in the structure of the international economy have constructed, albeit with limited success, another trade regime. The ideology behind the South preferential trading regime is social welfare theory. According to the ideology, society -- in this case global society -- has the responsibility to help the disadvantaged. Laszlo, *et al.* argue that fairness in the political economy coincides with Rawls's understanding of social welfare and distributive justice.³⁸

Murphy stresses the development of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) ideology as a response to the failures of the Bretton Woods system which was instituted at the end of World War II.³⁹ In this way, the development of a South preferential regime parallels the development of a mercantilist regime. Both are reactions to problems of post World War II liberal trade. An argument can be made that this regime has never existed, because of its adherents' failure at actually redistributing wealth.⁴⁰ However, although compliance with this regime's rules may not be widespread, some actors continue to

advocate its principles, rules, and procedures.

The fundamental principles of the South preferential trading regime reflect the ideals of social welfare theory by attempting to create a stable economic environment -- a goal which sounds surprisingly similar to that of the mercantilist trading regime. However, the character of the stability which the South preferential trade regime adherents seek necessarily rejects the status quo. Adherents of this regime seek to redistribute wealth and power among the nations of the world to provide a more equitable allocation. The South preferential trade regime would establish international market rights and duties for countries, depending on their historical economic and political status. This regime embodies the hope for a trading system with predictable prices, demand, and supply of commodities.

Adherents believe that regulating international markets can foster equity and stability. In contrast to trade rights under the mercantilist trade regime, trade rights under the South preferential trading regime favor a counterfactual assessment of what the market share would be if this were a fair world. Specific rules depend on the particular issue, but import and export

quotas, as well as internationally or nationally held reserves or other mechanisms are to be used to create stable conditions of supply, demand, and prices. One more rule which applies after the special rights of developing countries have been put into practice is that no discrimination in access to markets should be applied. In a sense, "positive" discrimination designed to help developing countries is mandated, while "negative" discrimination which could hurt these countries is prohibited.

The procedures of this regime are multilateral for both philosophical and pragmatic reasons. Philosophically, to be truly successful, a South preferential trading regime requires the participation of all states; pragmatically, the advocates of the regime are weak and seek strength in numbers. Disputes over rights, duties, and prices are negotiated in multilateral or international fora such as the commodity agreement commission and meetings of The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Moreover, negotiations under this regime are sector or issue specific. Thus, separate agreements are negotiated for each of the different commodities included under the umbrella of the International Commodities Agreement. A final distinctive feature of the procedures of the South preferential trading regime involves the venue for negotiations. Most negotiations take place under the aegis of international organizations, the secretariats of which often act as advocates of the principles of this regime.

The NIEO is the main codification of the principles and rules of this regime, and the Brandt Commission Reports remain the quintessential explications of the relationship between social welfare ideology and the practices desired by the participants.⁴¹ UNCTAD and the Food and Agricultural Organization are among the formal institutions for this regime, and their role is essential to the development of NIEO. The secretariats, as advocates for the developing countries, have promulgated reports which point out how market problems affect developing countries. Like the GATT secretariat, the secretariat of UNCTAD and the Food and Agricultural Organization disseminate information. Unlike the GATT secretariat, however, these organizations' reports and the good offices of their officials seem to be especially "political." The choice of subjects for reports and administrative action, as well as the tone of reports indicate that these secretariats are actively "lobbying" for acceptance of redistributive principles.

Murphy suggests that the NIEO involves a political alliance between developing countries and international organizations.⁴² Because of the welcoming environment of UNCTAD and other United Nations agencies, participants in this regime have attempted to promulgate the regime's rules by creating commodity agreements under United Nations aegis.

Can South preferential trade be considered a regime when its effect on international behavior is so limited? This paper suggests that it can, albeit with qualifications. The South preferential trade regime, in many respects, is an example of a still-born regime. It has failed, because it has not attracted enough adherents. On the other hand, its principles, norms, and rules pervade the discourse on international agricultural trade in United Nations fora. As a coherent, programmatic set of trade rules, the South preferential trade regime presents a challenge to the dominant post World War II liberal trade regime.

As a summary, **Table I** identifies how the regime elements overlap. Actors may overlap as well. Despite the interpenetration, however, the regimes are distinct. Their underlying ideologies differ; therefore their paradigms of trade behavior differ. The institutions and codifications are not the same, nor are several principles, rules, and procedure.

Conclusion

This paper argues that four contending regimes order the discourse and practice of trade. These regimes are neither universal nor disjoint rule sets. Conceptualizing regimes as bounded by participants as well as by scope increases regime theory's power to explain conflict as well as cooperation. The agents of states, international organizations, and private entities bring to trade negotiations expectations arising from regime-based understanding of the world. Specifying the differences in principles, norms and rules, procedures, institutions, and codifications of the regimes presents a clearer picture of what actually happens in trade and situates regimes within the world's larger ideological patterns.

The four trade regimes have, to differing degrees, shaped participants' behavior. Formal international organizations encourage development and may increase levels of compliance with these regimes. Most significantly, perhaps, actors may adhere to more than one regime at a time. Very often the choice of regime depends on the actor's own perception of its power.

To what extent do simple realist calcu-

lations of power negate the influence of these regimes on their adherents? It has been suggested that regimes, because they encapsulate the members' ideology, are not simply "intervening variables."⁴³ Regimes interact with changes in power in influencing the behavior of actors -- hence orderly disorder.

In the West, the post World War II liberal trade regime has a deep ideological base, because of a traditional belief in the evocative metaphor of the unseen and unfettered hand of the market. Today, however, actors seem to be complying less with this regime. The dominance of those powers which once championed its principles and rules has eroded. With the decline of the advanced capitalist economies' dominance, more trade is managed in a mercantilist manner.

A different kind of change faces the adherents of the Soviet socialist trading regime. The reforms of the Gorbachev era have changed the rules without changing the underlying Marxist-Leninist ideology, generating uncertainty for individuals who must make decisions on trade and production.⁴⁴ Current upheavals within the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc herald major changes. Western sources have suggested that the Eastern European countries are becoming more vocal about their disaffection with some trade rules.

The mercantilist trading regime, in contrast, is ordering more trade as agents of international actors find it expedient to negotiate acceptable market management arrangements. Because the states advocating mercantilist policies usually remain relatively politically and militarily powerful even though their economic power is declining, they are often able to force these arrangements on less powerful traders. On the other hand, governments of authoritarian newly industrialized countries adopt mercantilist trade rules to further development in preferred sectors. The configuration of rules in any specific arrangement depends on the negotiating skills of the actors' agents, the relative differences in power, and other political interests of the participants.

Adherents of the South preferential regime have been largely unsuccessful at gathering broad-based support for redistributive management of international markets. Any advances in the establishment of the international commodity agreements, it seems, depends on the willingness of the South to compromise and of the North to accept an agreement for the purpose of showing good will.

The structure of the South preferential regime lends itself to being taken over by members of a mercantilist regime. Despite the antithesis between the principles of the two regimes, the rules are very similar. Calling for the management of international markets opens the door to conservative rather than redistributive arrangements. More powerful states are able to impose their interests as a condition of their participation. Because South preferential management can not succeed without almost universal participation, powerful states hold the trump cards. This pattern -- principles informed by ideology and rules constrained by power and interests -- further illustrates the complex interaction of regimes and actors' behavior.

Other research suggests that a multiple regime framework sheds light on the causes and dynamics of trade disputes involving food and feed products.⁴⁵ More research needs to be conducted to test whether these conclusions generalize to all trade and to other issue-areas. The existence of multiple regimes does not tell us anything about their evolution or about the dynamic roles of ideology, interests, and power in their evolution. Is the "popularity" of the mercantilist regime growing? Are the post World War II liberal trade regime and the South preferential trade regime truly in decline? Has the Soviet socialist trade regime changed? These questions should be answered by looking carefully at longer term trends in behavior of actors and the coherence of regimes.

Endnotes

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- ² C.f., O. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics* 32.3 (1980): 331-56; V. Aggarwal, *Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); in contrast to, R. Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36.2 (1982): 357-78; M. Zacher, "Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps: Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade Regulation," *International Organization* 41.2 (1987): 173-202.
- ³ S. Haggard and B. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41.3 (1987): 497.
- ⁴ F. Kratochwil and J. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40.4 (1986): 753-75.
- ⁵ Aggarwal, *Liberal Protectionism*. Aggarwal's theory is discussed in greater depth below.
- ⁶ Norms can be considered less formal rules. See N. Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

- 7 Ultimately, economic ideologies are fostered by even more deeply held beliefs of societies. See M. Tamari, "With All Your Possessions": Jewish Ethics and Economic Life (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
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- 14 Compare with R. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 57-59.
- 15 Contrast Keohane, *After Hegemony*; Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regimes"; and Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization."
- 16 C. Rhodes, "Reciprocity in Trade: The Utility of Bargaining Theory," *International Organization* 43.2 (1989): 273-300. Keohane describes the principles of GATT to include "non-discrimination, liberalization, and reciprocity" along with preferences for developing countries, *After Hegemony*, 188-89. Keohane notes that the principle of non-discrimination was weakened during the Tokyo Round when some of the codes adopted permitted discrimination against non-adherents. In contrast, a multiple regime framework allows the assertion that the Tokyo Round codes represent either a redefinition of national security, or, in the extreme, a break-down of the liberal regime in favor of an international corporatist trade regime.
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- 18 Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40.1 (1986).
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- 27 W. Seabold and N. Onuf identify mercantilism as "international corporatism." They argue that international corporatism is an implicit repudiation of capitalism as market failures and inefficiencies become increasingly prevalent. See W. Seabold and N. Onuf, "Late Capitalism, Uneven Development, and Foreign Policy Postures," in *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior* Vol. 6 of *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, edited by C. Kegley, Jr. and P. McGowan, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981).
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- 31 *Ibid.*, 34.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 23.
- 33 Ruggie, in contrast, suggests that protectionist practices are part of embedded liberalism. See J. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change."
- 34 See T. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States* 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979); P. Katzenstein, *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); U. Staber, "Corporatism and the Governance Structure of American Trade Associations," *Political Studies* 35.2 (1987): 278-88.
- 35 Aggarwal, *Liberal Protectionism*.
- 36 S. Strange argues that bilateral agreements among trading partners have actually helped maintain levels of international trade, despite the recession of the 1980s. See S. Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics," *International Organization* 39.2: 233-59. The view taken here of mercantilist trading practices is, admittedly, less sanguine.
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- 38 E. Laszlo, R. Baker, E. Eisenberg, and V. Raman, *The Objectives of the New International Economic Order* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1978).
- 39 C. Murphy, *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).
- 40 R. Rothstein, "Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities," *International Studies Quarterly* 23.3 (1984): 307-28.
- 41 Brandt Commission, *North-South: A Program for Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); Brandt Commission, *Common Crisis North-South: Cooperation for World Recovery* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).
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METAPHORS WE KILL BY: The Legacy of U.S. Antiterrorist Rhetoric¹

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Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.

Friedrich Nietzsche²

Author's Notes

Images of terrorism come to us from many levels of abstraction. We hear of terrorist attacks on the news, we read about terrorism in the local papers, we watch television shows in which terrorism plays a prominent role. If we want to know more about terrorism, we can go to the local library and read journal articles and books which deal with terrorism in a more intellectual manner. In a significant way, terrorism is one of those issues that is nearly impossible to avoid: it has been discussed at some point — no matter how superficially — in nearly every medium, from McNeil-Lehrer to MTV. And whether we like it or not, our image of terrorism is affected by this multitude of images. This essay will look at one particular source for our images of terrorism — the government, and in particular Executive Branch pronouncements on terrorism — and examine the largely metaphorical nature of those descriptions, and how in turn these metaphors have fundamentally structured our perceptions and subsequent policies in such areas as the Middle East.

The most obvious difficulty in dealing with terrorism as a matter of policy is that the very process of defining what constitutes terrorism places policy makers in the position of focusing on types of violence which seem most pressing; frequently, this serves to mute debate over which kinds of violence we should properly consider terroristic. For example, even if policy-makers are genuinely concerned with providing effective options for dealing with all forms of violence, inevitably certain particular types of coercion are emphasized as more threatening to national security, and there arises a dichotomy between what a policy-maker views as "terrorism" and what — for lack of an obvious threat or tractable solution — is written off as either irresolvable or somehow "benign" in nature. It is unfortunate that such seemingly pragmatic notions contribute to the continued confusion surrounding the sub-

ject and lend support to the contention of some that "terrorism" as an analytical tool "is hardly more useful than a term of abuse."³

With this in mind, the study of the metaphors used to describe terrorism seems to be a particularly effective method of illustrating the political complexities surrounding the subject. Also, this study helps to illuminate the rhetorical structures used to comprehend dissident terrorism, and how these language structures affect our understanding of terrorism: what is included and emphasized; what is deliberately left out; and what is not considered. Consequently, this study is not so much concerned with definitions of terrorism, but rather focuses on the depiction of terrorism and the accuracy of those descriptions.⁴ This perspective helps to illustrate the fact that metaphors are necessary but not sufficient factors in communication, so that when then-Vice President George Bush refers to terrorists as "primitive psychological warriors engaged in ... violent graffiti"⁵ he is using language which at once illuminates a particular aspect of the behavior of individuals who utilize terrorism, while necessarily obscuring other factors which might be equally important to comprehending the challenge that terrorism presents to U.S. policy makers.

The initial thrust of this essay identifies some of the primary attributes of metaphor, and how we can discern "good" metaphors from "bad" ones. The second section presents and describes several metaphorical statements of U.S. foreign policy officials concerning terrorism and their efforts to counter what has been perceived as a threat to U.S. security and interests. Finally, this study puts forward an interpretation of some of the implications of these metaphors to the public, and how terrorism has fundamentally conditioned our ways of thinking about certain regions of the world — and implicitly of certain peoples who occupy those regions like the Middle East. These presumptions not only provide a framework for response, but also serve as a justification for increasingly intrusive policies, both at home and abroad.

Metaphor, Rhetoric and Terrorism

Metaphors play an important role in our understanding of the world: they help us comprehend the unfamiliar, they extend our language beyond conventional limits, and they provide us with powerful expressions that are often far more persuasive than any more literally conceived argument. However, metaphors are not intrinsically beneficial: their utility, like all other devices and tactics utilized in politics, is determined through their use. Hence, metaphors may be a particularly effective instrument for the further understanding of some unfamiliar phenomenon, or they may simply exacerbate the confusion surrounding an issue. They may provide us with a bridge to previously misunderstood phenomena, or with a pathway to delusion.

If metaphors provide a bridge between the known and the unknown, then they do so in ways which structure our understandings in a particular manner. Colin M. Turbayne called this conditioning impact of metaphor "attitude-shifts," which bring "forward aspects that might not be seen at all through another medium."⁶ But this attitude-shift can have unanticipated results. As Turbayne observes: "A story often told — like advertising and propaganda — comes to be believed more seriously. Those details stressed tend to stay stressed while those suppressed tend to stay suppressed until another effective metaphor restores them."⁷ This function of metaphor is of particular concern for this study; for, as Turbayne admonishes, "there is a difference between using a metaphor and being used by it, between using a model and mistaking the model for the thing modeled. The one is to make believe that something is the case; the other is to believe it."⁸

This danger — of being used by rather than using language — may be seen clearly in the conduct of foreign policy, where political leaders attempt to persuade the public that their positions on a given issue are more reasonable or somehow better serve the national interest. Frequently, arguments lead to exaggeration and overstatement, and all too often discourse is reduced to abstraction rather than address-

ing more fundamental strategic or moral dimensions. Consequently, we see public debate turned into meaningless posturing over largely symbolic issues that fail to incorporate more fundamental concerns: our politicians adopt "positions" on flag burning or the public funding of art, rather than approach the real issue of tolerance in a democratic society or whether such a society can maintain democratic principles in the face of rising bias and parochialism.⁹

In essence, we face the dilemma of on the one hand relying too greatly on metaphors and symbolism, and thereby losing contact with the reality to which we must respond; on the other hand, if we attempt to "say what we mean" in an unequivocal manner, we ephemeralize our language in an entirely different way: we risk sterilizing our language and restricting the range of what we can describe. Consequently, we might be guilty in either extreme of abandoning the one means of available to us for apprehending the unfamiliar in human interaction.

Metaphor is conceptualized in this study as neutral and not uniquely amenable to any manipulation by a particular ideological perspective. The fact that metaphors are used in order to portray terrorism to a wider audience is not criticized, *per se*; however, we must consider the appropriateness of these conceptualizations, to the extent that these metaphors possess the potential of accurately reflecting what they portray, and do what they are intended to do (e.g. mobilize opinion in favor of a particular policy). More than simply relying on a consequential standard of metaphorical adequacy, this essay will also investigate the degree to which metaphors serve an educative or mobilizing function; that is, whether a particular usage of metaphor serves to facilitate or close off discourse. Obviously, there must be some point of closure in any discussion if we are to get anything done; however, if the established political community increasingly closes off discussion and debate of public policy, then that political community runs the risk of using language as propaganda and is guilty of *using* the people rather than *representing* the people.¹⁰

The most commonly identified feature of metaphor is its duality of sense; in other words, a metaphor presents two concepts, speaking of one in terms of the other. As Hannah Arendt notes, "No language has a newly-made vocabulary for the needs of mental activity; they all borrow their vocabulary from words originally meant to correspond either to sense experience or to

other experiences of ordinary life."¹¹ This would seem to imply that all language begins as a metaphor; that is, we experience some phenomenon in the world surrounding us, and we use sounds corresponding to that experience in order to relate that phenomenon to others. As Arendt eloquently states, metaphors "are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience."¹²

Unfortunately, these threads are not so easily made, nor are they easily grasped. Colin Turbayne points out that "However, appropriate in one sense a good metaphor may be, in another sense there is something inappropriate about it."¹³ Ordinarily, people appear to be inclined to take statements at the most basic levels of abstraction, since that is where most everyday communication is situated; with metaphorical statements, such a literal translation is rendered into an absurd meaning. It is this incongruity which (ordinarily) compels the listener to identify some sense in which the statement is comprehensible, to determine which aspects of the statement contribute to understanding and which do not.

The fact that metaphor creates this tension — by "pretending something is the case when it is not" and asking one's audience to do the same¹⁴ — allows the listener to play a relatively active role in assigning meaning to a statement. For example, to state that "terrorism is a cancer" should initially evoke strong feelings in one's audience, which might first envision terrorism as some rampant malignant growth requiring drastic treatment. At the same time, however, people who have seen loved ones suffer through chemotherapy and repeated surgeries might play out the entailments of the metaphor differently: they might recognize that cancer is frequently the result of excessive smoking or some other abusive behavior; they might question the efficacy of such drastic treatment at non-lethal stages of the disease, and they might consider rest and abstinence from bad habits as a more proper cure than a traumatic removal of diseased tissue.¹⁵ Consequently, although a speaker may utilize powerful metaphors to persuade an audience, he or she has less control over such symbolic phrases.

This is not to say that a speaker cannot lead an audience to desired conclusions. Perhaps the most effective method of mobilizing public support is to invoke the rhetoric of crisis: by arguing that an issue

has reached "crisis" proportions, government officials find it easier to close off debate and take action. Walter Lippman points out that wartime is a particular kind of crisis which creates a kind of "window of opportunity" for public officials:

The symbols of public opinion, in times of moderate security, are subject to check and comparison and argument. They come and go, coalesce and are forgotten, never organizing perfectly the emotion of the whole groups. There is, after all, just one human activity left in which whole populations accomplish the union sacree. It occurs in those middle phases of a war when fear, pugnacity, and hatred have secured complete dominion of the spirit, either to crush every other instinct or to enlist it, and before weariness is felt.¹⁶

Obviously, crises do exist, and governments frequently must act quickly in order to address crisis situations; however, there arises the question of just who decides what is or is not a crisis, and what criterion should be used to determine when a situation becomes a crisis. Over time, democratic societies face two dangers: those external and internal crises that require timely and effective action; but perhaps more crucially, they face the problem of maintaining control over their governmental institutions, which are conversely seeking greater degrees of control over the political process.

This political context may encourage political leaders to utilize the rhetoric of crisis, emphasizing threats to the "American Way of Life" over issues which might be more pressing, such as voter apathy, rising unemployment, the condition of the nation's banking industry, or the mounting burden that these issues will place on an overburdened middle class. One need only look at the rhetoric of the Cold War in the 1950's to understand the degree to which policy-makers have used a seeming crisis to close off debate, and in the process may also have become trapped within the confines of their own rhetoric, and subsequently encased an entire nation within a way of thinking which appeared to have a dubious grasp of reality, at best.¹⁷

Within such a context of voter alienation and increasing symbolization of public issues into almost unfathomable abstraction,¹⁸ the rhetoric of political leaders treads a fine line between persuasion and propaganda. Consequently, relations between the public and government officials seem to take on the appearance of a courtship ritual. As Kenneth Burke somewhat ironically notes, relations among political

haves and have-nots "are like the ways of courtship, rape, seduction, jilting, prostitution, promiscuity, with variants of sadistic torture or masochistic invitation to mistreatment."¹⁹ Burke's somewhat trenchant view of the relationship between the courter and the courted helps us to recognize both that the hierarchical environment of modern societies situates and reinforces existing distributions of power and influence, and that the identification of the public with the speaker plays an important role in how the speaker's comments will be interpreted.²⁰

To summarize: First, we have noted the role that metaphors play in language. They are — to use a metaphor to describe metaphors — like gently waving threads which humans must grasp in order to communicate with each other. Second, metaphors are tricky things: they are not self-evident; rather, they must be actively pursued and considered in order to be fully appreciated. And third, metaphors play an important role in the art of identification and persuasion: rhetoric. Political leaders can use metaphors to achieve a variety of aims, whether informing, persuading, mobilizing, or deceiving.

Given that rhetoric is used in ways which might facilitate or impair a free exchange of arguments in public discourse, it is important to identify some criteria for determining when metaphors are being used in order to pursue desirable or undesirable rhetorical ends, assuming that a desirable rhetorical end would be one which seeks to contribute to a relatively open debate.²¹ First, we should think about the descriptive adequacy of the metaphor: Does a metaphor communicate to an audience what the speaker intends? Does it have some meaningful correspondence with reality? In regard to the both questions, we must look into the principal and secondary entailments of the metaphor (as we did earlier with "terrorism is cancer") in order to ascertain its descriptive validity. Secondly, we must consider a metaphor's communicative function, that is, the degree to which a metaphor seeks to facilitate understanding of the phenomenon or simply close off debate by using some polemical phrase. To use a simplistic example: if we were to ask a person "Was it right for the United States to bomb Libya?" and that person were to answer "Of course we were right to bomb Libya! Are you an American, or some kind of Communist? This might be construed as a rather unsubtle means of denying the efficacy of the ques-

tion and thereby eliminating any opportunity for rational argument.

The point here is not that attempting to sway views is intrinsically bad; indeed, there are instances where it may be morally justifiable in some instances to be deceptive or to overstate one's case in order to achieve what might in retrospect be widely accepted as a desirable goal. However, such instances seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Simply put, in a democratic society public discourse must be open to a variety of opinions, because a polity whose leaders deny the right of its citizens to question their judgment — or whose citizens lack the interest or capacity to question their leaders — cannot be meaningfully characterized as a democracy.

Terrorism and Response: Metaphorical (and Near Metaphorical) Constructs

Having somewhat exhaustively considered some of the theoretical underpinnings of this study, this section will seek to provide some examples of what has been previously discussed. In addition to illustrating several of the more pervasive metaphors of the Reagan and Bush administrations, this essay also attempts to depict the pressures and incoherences of official representations of terrorism during the 1980s. This study is interpretive and impressionistic in methodology; that is, it makes no attempt at constructing a quantifiable criterion for determining whether metaphors help or hinder a policy maker's rhetorical efforts.²² However, this investigation should raise some interesting questions regarding the methods by which foreign policy is justified, and it helps to illustrate the basic dilemma of rhetorical speech: How much rhetoric is enough? How can one discern when one has achieved one's aim or overshot the mark? How does one undo the damage of excessive rhetoric?²³

One additional observation is that rarely, if ever, is the official government definition of terrorism presented to the listening audience; instead, the defining quality of terrorism is related in metaphorical terms. This does not insinuate that the government lacks a definition of terrorism; indeed, they possess several of varying quality. It does reveal, however, a disparity between the way government officials (particularly in the Executive Branch) discuss terrorism within the administration and

the way they portray terrorism to the populace or even to other governmental bodies like Congress. Within an administration, policy makers discuss what they consider to be terrorism, its potential impact, and the best response; outside of an administration, officials are more concerned with persuading the listening population that their interpretation of terrorism, their assessment of its impact, and their response to terrorism are the proper ones. Here metaphor plays a powerful role in orienting people's understanding of terrorism.

The "Rise and Fall" of Terrorist Rhetoric

Metaphors and other forms of allusion frequently provide a reified basis for experiencing a phenomenon. For example, metaphors may structure our understanding of a whole complex of concepts in relation to one another, providing an up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep, shallow, central-peripheral framework for locating our experiences.²⁴ These phrases are directly conditioned by both our environment and our culture. Similarly, metaphorical expressions situate our understanding within an object or substance, allowing us to treat experiences as physical things bounded by a surface, much in the same way as our bodies are surrounded by physical entities.²⁵ Thus, language of this nature utilizes deeply-embedded semiotic structures as a foundation from which more elaborate symbolic structures like metaphor can be elicited.

These structures are interesting in that they once might have served a metaphorical function, although they no longer serve an explicitly metaphorical function; in other words, they were once metaphors in the same way that referring to the top of a car as the "roof" was once metaphorical. Now, however, they are somehow "dead," and are no longer understood by way of any figurative interpretation. At some point, frequently used metaphors die, to the extent that it is used so often that the listener no longer needs to search for a figural meaning because that metaphor has been translated so thoroughly by previous experience. And while it should be acknowledged that these language mechanisms have been buried in our experience, so that we are frequently unaware of their presence, these devices play an important role in our understanding; therefore, we will begin with these "dead" metaphors in order to get an idea of the symbolism embedded in even the most "objective" phrases.

It should be emphasized that such expressions depend on the subject for their orientational coherency. For example, orientations such as "up is good" and its antithesis "down is bad" might be inverted when considering different aspects of an issue like terrorism. That terrorist incidents rise and that the U.S. seeks to reduce terrorism might seem confusing if one were to approach such orientational entailments simplistically. In this case, the orientational entailments are reversed, so that up (in terrorism) is bad, while down (efforts to reduce terrorism) is good. An example of how context determines the orientation of a metaphor may be illustrated in Undersecretary for Management Richard Kennedy's statement that 1980 statistics "reflect the trend over the past few years toward increasing death and injury from terrorism violence."²⁶ In the same speech he discusses programs designed to "upgrade" U.S. readiness in the event of terrorist attacks. Both statements possess an "up" orientation, yet the first statement clearly denotes "up is bad," while the second carries positive connotations.

Relating the yearly rise and fall of terrorist incidents by means of statistics is a frequent method of impressing upon an audience the apparent proliferation of terrorist events. Such "objective measures"²⁷ provide documentation of the growing seriousness of the problem of terrorism, which in 1984 Robert M. Sayre, then-State Department Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, argued was clearly "growing," and that "the figures so far (in 1984) ... suggest a significant increase" in instances of terrorism.²⁸ In a similar vein, Frank H. Perez, who in 1981 was the Acting Director for Combatting Terrorism, maintained that "the level of violence has escalated to unprecedented levels ..."²⁹

Response to terrorism, in contrast with "bad is up," frequently take a "down is good" orientation. Kennedy, for instance, contends that "we cannot solve this problem without a deeper understanding of the sources and dynamics of international terrorism,"³⁰ while Sayre links the Soviet Union with terrorism in the West, arguing that if "the Soviet Union would stop providing military training, equipment, and other support, there would be a significant drop in terrorist activity."³¹ Perez adopts a similar stance, proclaiming that "the United States must work with other like-minded nations to reduce the cycle of terrorist violence, death, and destruction..."³² Ironi-

cally, there is little discussion of such "deep" topics as the degree to which superpower arms competition exacerbates the degrees of violence in developing countries, or the degree to which much of the violence is a function of poverty, or of repressive and non-democratic regimes held in power by the system of alliances which characterized the Cold War.

Some of the more striking metaphors used by the Reagan administration are ontological in nature. George Shultz, who showed a particular gift for metaphorical portrayals, illustrates this talent in stating why the Reagan administration was so adamant in its opposition to terrorism:

The terrorist uses innocent human beings the way a smoker uses matches. People become throwaways: they are stripped of their humanity; used, then abandoned.³³

The images expressed in this metaphor are powerful, and reinforce the initial abhorrence that terrorism is likely to create. Within the context of this metaphor, the terrorist treats human lives with such casual indifference that they are no longer human: they are "matches," divested of dignity and respect. When combined with the imagery of burning, this metaphor portrays "the terrorist" in such a way as to deny the legitimacy of any cause which employs such brutality.

Another metaphor, utilized by both George Shultz and Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead,³⁴ presents Soviet involvement with dissident terrorism in a particularly effective manner:

One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can be found in almost every society. But, certainly, in some countries terrorism has been more violent and pervasive because of support from the Soviet Union and its satellites — notably Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.³⁵

The implications of this statement echo beyond its literal connotations. Although the audience is not required to think of the Soviet Union as puppeteers, it is nonetheless encouraged to do so by the structure of the statement, so that we imagine the Soviet Union manipulating dummies, who act without purpose other than to further Communist aggression. Obviously, to the Reagan administration the issue of state-sponsorship was quite simple, and this uncomplicated view of both terrorism and U.S.-Soviet relations contributed greatly to the resumption of the Cold War and the escalation of the arms race in the early

1980s. However, as the decade wore on and the Reagan administration became more sympathetic with Gorbachev as Soviet leader, a more complicated theory of sponsorship gained acceptance. This theory advanced leaders of radically anti-American nations such as Libya, Syria, and Iran as the puppeteers.

Two other important ontological metaphors illustrate the means by which terrorism is structured. One depicts terrorism as a disease, such as when Perez cautions that "the United States is not immune from terrorism."³⁶ George Shultz invokes a similar perspective when he characterizes the families of hostages as "victims of the terrorist scourge."³⁷ Additionally, the metaphor "terrorism is war" also attempts to highlight certain aspects of terrorism, as when George Shultz describes terrorism as "ambiguous warfare."³⁸ Ronald Reagan strikes an analogous note, stating that "these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the Government and people of the United States."³⁹ Of course, one could argue that these comments are not metaphorical at all; rather, at that time they accurately reflected the state of affairs between the United States and nations like Libya, Syria, and, by implication, the Soviet Union and her (then) proxies. However, it is also possible that these statements were exaggerations to the point of being metaphorical; that is, the Reagan administration's perception of what constitutes warfare might have differed fundamentally from the perceptions of the leaders of those countries to which they referred, and especially the perceptions of Americans listening to those speeches. Consequently, while Reagan and others in his administration talked of warfare in terms of "low-intensity conflict," members of these official's audience may have perceived of warfare as a total imposition of force, a mortal conflict with an evil adversary.⁴⁰

Each of these metaphors emphasize terrorism as an external phenomenon, as either an intrusive malignancy or as an invasion from a hostile power seeking the destruction of the

"American Way of Life." These metaphors, by highlighting terrorism as an exogenous factor, encourage conceptualizations of terrorists as an externally-rooted enemy, emphasizing purported sources of funding over fundamental political dynamics. For example, George Shultz claims that "where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is ... its enemy."⁴¹ In this statement the United States is a gar-

dener, democracy is a plant or tree, and terrorist Dutch Elm disease or some pathogenic bacteria. More than simply reinforcing existing perceptions of the horror of terrorism, these metaphors introduce a martial element, at the heart of which is an attempt to mobilize support for certain policy options. This effort is at the heart of Reagan's assertion that terrorism is warfare, and the option desired is revealed with his comment that "under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself."⁴² Thus, included in these extreme entailments is the justification of an equally extreme response.

Metaphorical Identification, Metonymy, and the Problem of Demonization

Both dissident terrorism and U.S. justifications for response have been established within a context of certain metaphorical structures. However, these constructs only partially express the range of metaphors that policy-makers in the Reagan administration used to describe terrorism to their audience. There are also metaphors and related tropes which place terrorism and response on a more individual level of abstraction. This section will illustrate how metaphorical identification and other metonymic usages provide insight into the ways in which Reagan administration officials expressed more specifically normative feelings in order to justify increasingly coercive policies.

Metaphorical identification projects the motivations, characteristics, or attitudes of one person onto another individual, while metonymic devices use a part of something to explain a whole. This necessarily involves typifying those motivations, characteristics or attitudes, and using what is essentially a stereotype as the basis for comparison. The problem is that while we use typification in a useful fashion in our everyday life, stereotyping encourages us to ignore the contexts of situations that might undermine a stereotypical comparison.

Technically speaking, metonymy is not a metaphorical construct: it serves primarily as a referential device, allowing us to use one thing to stand for another.⁴³ However, according to Lakoff and Johnson, metonymy "also serves the function of providing understanding."⁴⁴ In Turbayne's terms, then, metonymy possesses the potential for "full metaphorhood," inasmuch as it focuses our attention on one particular

aspect of a phenomenon in a nonliteral (or at least non-exhaustive) way.⁴⁵

One form of identification attempts to portray terrorism in terms of experiences that we are confronted with every day. Terrorism, as described by Richard Kennedy "is an assault on civilization itself. In addition to the lives and freedom of the innocent, the right of the individual, democratic institutions, and the rule of law are under attack."⁴⁶

In this statement terrorism is a violation, and the terrorist is the generic mugger. Nearly everyone has either been a victim of such as assault or knows someone who has been preyed upon. This representation portrays terrorism in a way which provides a powerful everyday symbol with which to anchor the public's perceptions. Kennedy explicates this notion more plainly when he states that "terrorist acts are illegitimate criminal acts."⁴⁷

Two other identifying phrases evoke an interesting image. One, offered by George Shultz, is used to account for the problem of states conceding to terrorist demands, explaining that "too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities for fear of provoking the bully."⁴⁸ Another, used by Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism L. Paul Bremer III, contends that "Giving in to terrorist demands will only breed future demands, demands which are likely to be greater than those of today. As a father, I learned long ago that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated."⁴⁹

Both statements highlight terrorism in a very personal way, although utilizing disparate imagery. On the one hand, terrorism is portrayed as the schoolyard bully intimidating smaller children and relying on coercion to get what he wants. On the other hand, Bremer portrays the terrorist as a child caught doing something forbidden. Both metaphors emphasize deviance: the first highlights the intimidating quality of terrorism, while the second illustrates the terrorist as a miscreant juvenile. What both statements do quite well is to depict the terrorist in immoralist terms, thereby serving to undermine whatever cause the terrorist advocates. Moreover, the language in both comments effectively trivialize the ideological or nationalistic claims surrounding terrorist violence, which—while easy enough to do in some situations—in many other instances amounts to ignoring serious and legitimate grievances. Additionally, although the meaning of *terrorism as crime or delinquency* is not completely consistent with *terrorism as war-*

fare, both share a consistent entailment: the cure.

For example, the response to terrorism is frequently characterized in ways which emphasize the need for action by equating restraint with impotence. George Shultz, within the context of the "terrorism as warfare" metaphor, maintains that:

We are right to be reluctant to unsheath our sword. But we cannot let the ambiguities of the terrorist threat reduce us to total impotence. A policy filled with so many qualifications and conditions that they could never be met would amount to a policy of paralysis.⁵⁰

This metaphor visualizes the United States as a knight beset by unarmed ruffians, hesitant to use his superior weaponry against a bedraggled but clearly aggressive enemy; however, for all intents and purposes, this hesitation is merely for effect, a prelude to the doing of a dirty job that must be done.

There are two additional entailments in this statement. The first, relating ambiguity to impotence, clearly has a number of potential ramifications, most of which need not be discussed here. Those entailments fit for consideration, however, draw upon a feeling of helplessness, of sterility, and of an inability to perform a necessary, vital function. The second metaphor, which likens qualifications with paralysis, is similar in that it refers to the state of being incapable of normal functions. Yet the difference is qualitatively apparent: impotence refers to the lack of power; paralysis to the loss of will. This distinction is important in considering the nature of the debate surrounding the United State's role as a superpower. Shultz refers to the position of the Carter administration—which emphasized the limits of U.S. power⁵¹—as a "council of despair," while arguing that the "values" and "ideals" of America "must be a source of strength—not paralysis—in our struggle against aggression, international lawlessness, and terrorism."⁵² In effect, however, the essential overlapping entailment of these metaphors for responding to terrorism is that *effective response is repression*.⁵³

The Reagan administration also used metonymic devices which emphasized one aspect of terrorism to stand for the entire issue; in particular, it appears that the principal strategy was to portray the controller as the controlled, where the accused director of terrorism is not only spoken of in terms of the physical act, but is held responsible both for sanctioning and committing the act. Such uses of language are

comparable to university students in the 1970's condemning Nixon because "he bombed Hanoi." Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq War George Shultz argued in support of Saudi Arabia's defense of the Persian Gulf, claiming that "if Khomeini-ism advances into that area, America's strategic interests will be harmed."⁵⁴ Ronald Reagan provides another example — with a predictably different target — when he concludes that "Colonel Qadhafi's outrages against civilized conduct are, of course, as infamous as those of the Ayatollah Khomeini."⁵⁵

In both cases terrorism is embodied as a single person. The first statement not only places the onus of terrorist violence on Khomeini, his name becomes a synonym for terrorism. Moreover, Khomeini's name evokes images in the United States of the hostage crisis in 1979-1980, and by labeling Iran's foreign policy as "Khomeinism," Shultz draws upon the constellation of negative images that many Americans feel toward Iran. The obvious anti-American feelings in Iran — and through much of the Middle East — is cast in terms of a "terrorist ideology" aimed primarily at the United States. The second statement clearly links Qadhafi with Khomeini, which provides the U.S. with a reinforcing object to fix its enmity upon.

It might be added that these statements, along with similar comments from the State Department, were made approximately one year prior to the U.S. air strike on Libya. This stated commitment to military force as a serious strategic option for countering terrorism began to be voiced around 1984, which might be indicative of a number of changes — either in personnel or in an evolution of opinion — within the Reagan administration. One important problem with this manner of characterization is that it allows the listener to oversimplify the complicated political and logistical dynamics of terrorist organizations, thereby blinding people to the vagaries of these groups' organization and the ephemeral nature of their ties to governments like Iran, Syria, and Libya. More importantly, it apparently led some members within the Reagan administration to adopt rather inflexible attitudes toward certain organizations utilizing terrorist tactics in the Middle East, while encouraging others in the National Security Council to engage in covert operations which not only violated the rhetoric of certain highly-placed officials in the State Department, but seriously encroached upon some basic constitutional statutes.

It is ironic that presently neither Khomeini nor Qadhafi are perceived as the personification of evil. Instead, Saddam Hussein is portrayed to the U.S. audiences as a megalomaniac bent on world conquest. And it is George Bush, not Ronald Reagan, who would say in relation to Hussein's invasion of Iraq, "A half-century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should — and could — have been stopped. We are not about to make the same mistake twice."⁵⁶

This obvious comparison of Hussein with Hitler epitomizes the rhetoric of crisis, and highlights the perception that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait should have been viewed in the same light as the German invasion of Poland. At the same time, invoking the image of Hitler also necessarily flattens the range of options available to those who feel that Hussein's aggression must be stopped. The possibility that negotiative policies might be more appropriate is simply not considered.⁵⁷ And this personification is carried further when Secretary-of-State Baker suggests that the Iraq's invasion amounted to the "rape of Kuwait": "Let me be blunt: Saddam Hussein has invaded and tortured a peaceful Arab neighbor purely for self-aggrandizement."⁵⁸

Thus, we see both metonymy and personification in one statement: Hussein is Iraq, and Hussein is a rapist and a torturer. Such a characterization may seem accurate; yet, we might also get the sense that Hussein is also the new bearer of all that American policy-makers view as dangerous to U.S. "interests" in the Middle East. Beyond being seen as a threat, he may also be viewed as the repository for American rage, which stems from more than a decade of frustration and humiliation over a variety of policy setbacks.

Unfortunately, the history of U.S. relations with the Arab world has been one of fundamental confusion. Americans appear to have made the mistake of believing that because we have interests in the region it is a matter of national security that we impose some form of stability, which has been translated into arms shipments and military treaties. This conflation of national interest with national security has also thrown us into some morally ambiguous situations, among them being our logistical support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, which was a war that he initiated. In fact, Hussein's invasion of Kuwait may be characterized as brutal, illegitimate, and contrary to U.S. interests

in the region. However, the rhetoric of crisis used by the Bush administration to mobilize support for U.S. action seems to have led to a situation where there was precious little room for maneuvering.

Ultimately, equating Saddam Hussein with Hitler seems overstated. If we were to insist on utilizing a personification to describe Hussein's actions, it might not be Hitler but rather Josef Stalin that would be the more accurate characterization. Hussein, like Stalin, came from a minority group in his country, employed brutal methods to secure and maintain his personal power, and seems to have some sense of strategic rationality (which Hitler seemed to lack), which has pulled him back from the brink of personal destruction. The parallel becomes even more ironic when we note that Stalin and Hussein were allies of some sort or another with the U.S., and both utilized the support lent to them by the West to aggrandize their nation's power. Perhaps it is the sense of betrayal which created the antipathy with which the U.S. and her allies prosecuted the war with Iraq. In the final analysis, however, Hitler was Hitler, Stalin was Stalin, and Saddam Hussein is Saddam Hussein; and, if we rely on such comparisons unreflectively, we run the risk of misunderstanding the context which underlies the politics of the Middle East.

Conclusion: On the Danger of Mistaking Masks for Faces

Terrorism is a phenomenon which is uniquely amenable to metaphorical elaboration: its physical manifestations are apparently remote from everyday human experience, yet it can be compared to those more familiar mischances which intrude into our lives. At the same time, terrorism is a phenomenon which is singularly vulnerable to the abuse of metaphor: to mistake the model for the thing modeled; to mistake figurative association for literal fact; and to lead others into mistaking the mask of rhetoric for the face of reality.

The metaphors used by the Reagan and Bush administrations to portray terrorism placed that phenomenon within a relatively inflexible context: terrorism rises while U.S. security and prestige falls; terrorism undermines democratic institutions that the U.S. seeks to "plant" and nurture; terrorism uncompromisingly assaults the norms and rules which the U.S. upholds — while America has too often been paralyzed and impotent to defend itself; finally, terrorism is embodied in bearded or

maniacally-visaged figures, while response to terrorism is embodied (at least from 1981-88) in the person of Ronald Reagan. Certainly, we cannot doubt that the Reagan administration was faithful in its portrayal of terrorism: few would argue that members of Reagan's foreign policy establishment were deliberately deceiving the American public when they argued that terrorism represented a fundamental threat to U.S. security. The question is whether these policy makers fully comprehended the nature of the portrait they were painting.

Regardless of whether the policy-makers of the Reagan administration came to reify their own rhetoric, the pervasive portrayal of terrorism and terrorists in metaphorical terms seems to have encouraged people in the U.S. to take this rhetoric seriously. By characterizing terrorism in terms of disease, war, crime, communism, and juvenile delinquency, the Reagan administration created an imagery of what constitutes terrorism and what a terrorist looks like; yet, these pictures were blurred by imprecision and the cavalier use of metaphorical devices. Certainly, it is appropriate to say that terrorism is wrong and to compare terrorism to other forms of behavior that a society considers to be inappropriate; however, if those images remain undifferentiated, and no attempt is made to distinguish terrorism from what constitutes crime or war, then such a portrayal is likely to become a simplistic caricature of terrorism, and obscure what measures might be most appropriate to counter such violence.

The Reagan administration's image of terrorism, judging from the metaphors utilized in their public comments, seems to have become ill-defined accretion of pejoratives; as a result, the impression that U.S. citizens likely received was that terrorism, and in particular terrorists, represented a fundamental threat to the United States. In the wake of attacks on U.S. property and personnel, U.S. officials sought to create an atmosphere which would justify a swift and devastating response to future attacks. However, because the "bridge" that metaphor creates between the unfamiliar and the familiar frequently encourages oversimplification of complex situations, the administration's portrayal of terrorism, rather than allowing for some flexibility, placed severe limitations on U.S. response, on the one hand allowing repressive measures, while on the other hand placing strong disincentives on negotiative responses. And this trend fi-

nally came to fruition under Bush, who clearly gave little credence to the possibility that non-military measures would work against a man who was, to his way of thinking, "mad."

One final metaphor, invoked by George Shultz, declares that "the terrorists cannot be allowed to run us out of town."⁵⁹ Such imagery conjures up visions of *High Noon*, first with Ronald Reagan and now George Bush, facing off a bearded man-in-black in an unnamed, dusty cow town in the Old West. It is a metaphor uniquely tailored for an American audience, one which epitomizes the analytical assumptions regarding terrorism during the Reagan years, and it is a vision that — when contrasted with the complexities facing any administration — illustrates the dangers of accepting metaphors for reality, where fiction trespasses on non-fiction.

"Truth may be an esoteric language," Norman Cousins wrote in the aftermath of the Iran Contra affair, "but it is the only language the U.S. government is authorized by its history to speak to its people."⁶⁰ The difficulty, of course, lies in comprehending just what the truth is, and unfortunately, one of the first casualties of conflicting ideas is truth. The Reagan administration clearly was torn by incompatible policy goals: on the one hand, it wanted to appear "strong," and sought to mobilize public support for violent reprisals against terroristic activity directed at the U.S.; on the other hand, U.S. officials clearly felt pressure to free American hostages held in Lebanon.⁶¹ In seeking to accommodate both these goals, the Reagan administration appeared to become split, between an "official" policy which sternly lectured our allies that they should never negotiate with groups and nations that utilize or support groups who utilize terrorism, and an "unofficial" policy which sold weapons to Iran in an attempt to free the hostages. This two-tracked policy provoked widespread furor over America "negotiating with terrorists."

By emphasizing repressive policies metaphorically, Reagan officials placed themselves in a policy straightjacket, and — rather than creating an atmosphere which supported a "strong, flexible" response to terrorism — actually inhibited the range of potential responses at the administration's disposal, and in the process encouraged a plethora of incoherences which challenged the credibility of the role of the United States as world leader in the "war" against terrorism. That George

Bush has reestablished U.S. credibility in this regard may be viewed as a mixed blessing, given the severity of the U.S. economic woes. Perhaps more fundamentally, the continued use of the rhetoric of crisis can fundamentally threaten the civil liberties of American citizens, and can justify the increasing imposition of authoritarian internal policies, as well as the continued pursuance of intrusive foreign policies which will increasingly call into question our claim to being a democratic polity.

Looking back again to the "terrorism is cancer" metaphor, we can see how metaphors can be used to portray terrorism in a more authentic light. On the one hand, cancerous cells are dangerous only to the extent that they cause the cells around it to mutate, to become like the pathogenic cell; otherwise, the mutated cell is considered "benign," and may be removed with little danger to the patient. On the other hand, if the cancer causes that mutation, then the tissue no longer acts in a manner which benefits the patient, and regulative agents in the body are no longer capable of fighting the onset of the disease. In this, we can truly see the danger of terrorism: as extremism and an unwillingness to engage in discourse with one's adversary increases, opponents in a political struggle are encouraged to adopt progressively radical, "pathogenic" policies. Once violence is initiated, there is an almost irresistible urge to respond in kind, to fight violence with violence, to take an eye for an eye. This is the penultimate paradox of response to any form of terrorism: to avoid becoming monstrous while combatting monsters, and to resist becoming part of a larger problem, in the search for potential solutions.

Endnotes

- ¹ The idea for this title comes from a book written by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson — *Metaphors We Live By* — cited in the text. Special thanks to Peter Sederberg, Jerel Rosati, Donald Puchala, Paul Kattenberg, and Morris Blachman of the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina. Thanks also to Alfred Nordmann of the Department of Philosophy at USC, as well as the three anonymous reviews for the *Political Chronicle*.
- ² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, Walter Kaufman, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 89.
- ³ Christopher Hitchens, "Wanton Acts of Usage," *Harper's Magazine*, (September 1986: 68-70), p. 70.
- ⁴ For the record, terrorism is defined by this author as "undiscriminating and severe coercive attacks

- deliberately aimed at noncombatants." We may further distinguish *dissident* terrorism — which are attacks initiated by groups outside of established boundaries of authority — from *establishment* terrorism, which is coercion initiated by the government or groups who support the government. This definition is from Peter C. Sederberg's *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 25.
- ⁵ George Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation: Building a Governmental Consensus on Terrorism," *SAIS Review* 7 (Winter-Spring 1987: 1-10), p. 6.
- ⁶ Colin M. Turbayne. *The Myth of Metaphor* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 21.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ⁹ This does not mean, however, that policy-makers must avoid using metaphors. Ultimately, a nonmetaphorical language — if we could conceive of such of thing — may find itself incapable of communicating the ambiguities and subtleties of human interaction. For a good discussion of this issue, see Elliot Zashin and Philip C. Chapman, "The Uses of Metaphor and Analogy: Toward a Renewal of Political Language," *Journal of Politics* 36, (1974: 290-336), p. 294.
- ¹⁰ Which would appear to be the distinction between a democratic and a non-democratic polity.
- ¹¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 102.
- ¹² Arendt, p. 109.
- ¹³ Turbayne, op. cited, p. 11.
- ¹⁴ Turbayne, p. 14.
- ¹⁵ Peter Sederberg discusses the descriptive adequacy of such disease metaphors in his *Terrorist Myths*, op. cited, pp. 180-181.
- ¹⁶ Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*, (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 11.
- ¹⁷ See, for example, Edwin R. Bayley, *Joe McCarthy and the Press* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981). See also Jerel Rosati, *The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Dallas, TX: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Forthcoming).
- ¹⁸ This is not so much to deny the coherency or efficacy of most interest group's arguments; rather, it is to say that as the debates over such issues as abortion and nuclear power become increasingly sloganized, it decreases the likelihood that the public-at-large will comprehend the discourse.
- ¹⁹ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1950), p. 208.
- ²⁰ Morse Peckhams' *Explanation and Power*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979) takes as his point of departure the notion that "the meaning of any verbal event is any response to that event." p. 16.
- ²¹ Obviously, this initial assumption might not be one with which everyone will agree. Government officials might argue that open debate is not especially conducive to efficient government. However, it seems in most cases that this argument is overstated, and that open debate, allowed to run its course, frequently leads to a more democratic policy than one which stays within the purview of the policy makers. At least this is the normative stance of this study.
- ²² Several reviewers and friends have commented that this study would have benefited from a content analysis of the *State Department Bulletin* and/or *Current Policy*. While admitting that content analysis is a viable research method, there are also significant drawbacks. Frankly, it is difficult to measure with any great precision the effect of language—particularly metaphor—on an audience. The ephemeral nature of metaphor also renders attempts at coding hopelessly unstable. Without descending into a radically deconstructionist refutation that there is any meaning beyond the text—or immediate context—of a statement, it may be suggested that an interpretive approach provides a persuasive illustration of the implications of rhetoric that this study is seeking to consider.
- ²³ Most of the statements considered in this essay were extracted from the *Department of State Bulletin* and *Current Policy* and were made before various groups and organizations concerned with terrorism, such as The American Jewish Committee, at conferences focusing on terrorism, such as The Jonathan Institute's annual Conference on International Terrorism, or before formal bodies debating terrorism, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the U.N. General Assembly. Certainly, it is true that in most cases these speeches do not reach the mass public with the frequency that less official sources — such as the newspaper, the evening news, or some television show dramatizing terrorism — nonetheless, the government exerts considerable influence over the ways in which these mediating sources of information portray terrorism, and many of the metaphors that are utilized by government sources find their way onto the wire services and into editorials and scripts. These speeches serve at least two functions: to relate the U.S. government's assessment of the nature of terrorism and its relative threat to U.S. interests; and to mobilize public opinion in support of policies that government officials believe to be the most effective means of meeting this threat.
- ²⁴ Lakoff and Johnson, p. 14,
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- ²⁶ Richard T. Kennedy. "International Terrorism," *Department of State Bulletin* 81 (September 1981: 65-67). Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1981.
- ²⁷ The veracity of these claims by the Reagan administration has been questioned by many scholars and journalists during the 1980s. For example, Tom Wicker challenged the administration of padding their annual statistics by adding threats and other forms of nonviolent coercion in the CIA listing of terrorist incidents in 1981. Alex P. Schmid's has also criticized Edward Mickolus's ITERATE data set, from which most (if not all) of these statistics were drawn. See Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983).
- ²⁸ Robert M. Sayre. "International Terrorism: A Long Twilight Struggle," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (October 1984: 48-50), p. 48. Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on August 15, 1984.
- ²⁹ Frank H. Perez. "The Impact of International Terrorism," *Department of State Bulletin* 82 (January 1982: 55-57), p. 55. Address before the "Conference on Violence and Extremism: A Leadership Response" in Baltimore on October 29, 1981.
- ³⁰ Kennedy, "International Terrorism," op. cited, p. 65.
- ³¹ Sayre, "A Long Twilight Struggle," op. cited, p. 49.
- ³² Perez, "The Impact of Terrorism," op. cited, p. 57.
- ³³ George Shultz. "The Struggle Against Terrorism," *Department of State Bulletin* 88, (April 1988: 35-38), p. 35. Address before the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in Palm Beach, Florida, on February 12, 1988.
- ³⁴ The Reagan administration excelled at composing themes and "lines of the day" in attempting to shape people's perceptions regarding certain issues, like terrorism. W. Lance Bennett argues that this attempt to tailor perceptions is not peculiar to the Reagan presidency; rather, all politicians do it. But the Reagan administration appears to have been particularly good. He discusses "message composition at length, noting that "an image is an impression of something that is anchored partly in symbolic suggestion and partly in the feelings and assumptions that people have in response to that suggestion." p. 74. Images like Roosevelt's New Deal, or Kennedy's New Frontier, are examples of such imagery in Bennett. *News: The Politics of Illusion*, op. cited.
- ³⁵ George Shultz, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (August 1984: 31-34), p. 32, and John C. Whitehead. "Terrorism: The Challenge and the Response," *Department of State Bulletin* 87 (February 1987: 70-73), p. 71. Address before the Brookings Institute Conference on Terrorism, on December 10, 1986.
- ³⁶ Perez, p. 55.
- ³⁷ George Shultz. "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," *Department of State Bulletin* 86 (March 1986: 15-18), p. 15. Address before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference at the National Defence University, on January 15, 1986.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ Ronald Reagan. "The New Terrorist Network," *Department of State Bulletin* 85, (August 1985: 48-50), p. 8. Address before the American Bar Association, on July 8, 1985.
- ⁴⁰ The suggestion that Americans have a somewhat extreme perception of war is echoed by Richard Falk, who recently observed "slow to war, but even slower to peace has been the US experience. At least historically, the American disposition toward isolationism in relation to European warfare raised the threshold of persuasion, and has come to be associated with the sense that war is justifiable only if the enemy can be destroyed absolutely." See Richard Falk, "Reflections on Democracy and the Gulf War," *Alternatives* 16, (Spring 1991: 263-274), p. 265.
- ⁴¹ Shultz, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies," op. cited, 1984, p. 33.
- ⁴² Reagan, "The Real Terror Network," op. cited, p. 8.
- ⁴³ Lakoff and Johnson, p. 36.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ Of course, one can debate whether metonymic language is symbolic or metaphorical, or even whether such distinctions are important; however, the symbolic and metaphorical *potential* of metonymy should become apparent during the course of this discussion.
- ⁴⁶ Kennedy, "International Terrorism," op. cited, p. 66.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ Shultz, "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies," op. cited, p. 33.
- ⁴⁹ L. Paul Bremer. "Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy and Proposed Legislation," *Current Policy* No. 1019, October 15, 1987, p. 2. Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

- ⁵⁰ Shultz, "Low-Intensity Warfare," *op. cited*, 1986, p. 15.
- ⁵¹ Certainly, the Reagan interpretation of the Carter administration's perception of America's strength is open for debate.
- ⁵² Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 85 (December 1985: 25-27). Address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, on October 2, 1985, p. 27.
- ⁵³ This does not imply that other policies are not considered; rather, it means that other policies are addressed in commonsense, lexical terms, while repression — at least during the Reagan administration — was transmitted predominantly through symbolic, metaphorical language.
- ⁵⁴ Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy," *op. cited*, p. 27.
- ⁵⁵ Reagan, "The Real Terror Network," *op. cited*, p. 7.
- ⁵⁶ George Bush, "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf," *Current Policy* No. 1293. Address to employees at the Pentagon, August 15, 1990.
- ⁵⁷ This is not a problem that the Bush administration suffers from alone, however. The Hussein regime has also used rhetoric which demonizes the West and effectively eliminates the humanity of their adversaries from consideration in their strategic considerations, which may have led Hussein to underestimate the resolve of the Bush administration to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
- ⁵⁸ James Baker, "Isolation Strategy Toward Iraq," *Current Policy* No. 1308. Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 17, 1990.
- ⁵⁹ Shultz, "The Struggle Against Terrorism," *op. cited*, p. 37.
- ⁶⁰ Norman Cousins. *The Pathology of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), p. 206.
- ⁶¹ Ronald Reagan, in particular, appeared to be quite concerned with effecting the release of the hostages. For example, the Tower Commission Report states that "By his own account, as evidenced in his diary notes, and as conveyed to the Board by his principal advisors, President Reagan was deeply committed to securing the release of the hostages." in John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), p. 79.

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RUNAWAY ORGANIZATIONS: A Definition and Some Behavioral Propositions

Carl Lutrin and Richard Ryan

Authors' Notes

In the late 1980's, a number of organizations — important components of the American political system — were out of control. The regulatory mechanisms that had been created to assure their performance had failed. Accountability, a cornerstone of democratic theory and practice, was jeopardized. This was a period rife with scandal of individual and organizational excesses. Wall Street suffered from monstrous excesses with people like Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken paying fines in the \$100s of millions. The Savings and Loans scandal which was first revealed in 1987 resulted in the failure of hundreds of S&Ls and will cost the taxpayers more than \$500 billion over a thirty year period. In 1985 Donald Manes, the Borough President of Queens in New York City committed suicide because of allegations of bribes and kickbacks in the Bureau of Parking Violations. At the national level it was revealed that perhaps \$8 billion had been squandered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.¹ Religious organizations had their share of organizational problems; Oral Roberts and Jimmy Swaggart were two of the most prominent televangelists having encountered serious difficulties.

Case studies have been used by social scientists to conduct intensive analysis on a complex configuration of events.² Exemplary case studies, such as Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision Making*, have expanded our understanding of bureaucratic behavior. Although we do not presume that this paper will be the definitive analysis on organizational accountability, we hope that our effort will be considered in the tradition of using case studies to enlarge our comprehension of bureaucratic behavior.

This paper is a study of three organizations which represent types of institutions that are not only important to American political life, but also posed serious threats to the concept of accountability in the 1980's: the The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Security Council (NSC) and Praise the Lord (PTL). The EPA is a variant of the regulatory agency whose beginnings can be traced to

the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 and proliferated at the national and state levels since. The NSC is typical of advisory bodies that were created to assist presidents, governors and mayors in this century. Evangelical churches have been significant forces for some time, but televangelism only began to exert its influence in the 1950s. We will illustrate the pattern of processes and behaviors common to the scandals which befell these institutions, and in so doing, will define them as "runaway organizations."

We will define a runaway organization as having the following characteristics:

1. It breaks its own charter or mission.
2. Its internal controls are inadequate.
3. It creates and/or utilizes obstacles to accountability.
4. Its leaders are selected on the basis of charisma or ideology, not expertise.

A runaway organization is also characterized by the following behaviors:

1. After wrong-doing has been uncovered and the ideological or charismatic leader has been removed, he/she will be replaced by a more traditional Establishment figure. This is done to reassure supporters and to regain the lost rationale for claiming financial and other resources.
2. As the organization's momentum builds, the new mission so overwhelms rational internal checks that it begins to disregard the law. The laws may appear to be insignificant or inapplicable to the runaway's policy makers, or it may be reasoned that the end justifies the means.
3. In the aftermath of scandal and/or organizational disgrace, remedial efforts will be taken in order to regain lost prestige and support. These efforts will be incremental in nature and will not assure future stability.

What follows are fairly brief case studies of the EPA, the NSC and PTL, outlining the procedural errors which caused them to become runaway organizations. Although these discussions are not exhaustive by any means, the characteristics and behaviors common to these individual scandals can be clearly discerned as part of the larger issue of runaway organizations.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1981-1983)

The advent of rapid industrialization and modernity forced political systems to deal with the problems of the excesses of this process. These included unfair labor practices, environmental protection, consumer safety and monopolistic tendencies. In the late nineteenth century and through most of the twentieth, most democratic societies emphasized the nationalization of industry as the best solution to deal with the possible excesses of industrial capitalism. The United States largely eschewed this concept. Instead it has tried to use government to regulate rather than to administer industry.

The EPA was created in 1970 by President Richard Nixon. It was established as a response to popular concerns about the damage to air, water and land resulting from industrial pollutants and toxic substance disposal. Nixon wanted the support of the burgeoning number of environmentally oriented voters, but he also wanted to ensure that environmental policies would be compatible with other objectives such as economic growth. His creation of the EPA was a compromise between those who wished to do nothing and those who advocated the establishment of a new Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR).³ It provided a highly visible and innovative action. As a non-independent regulatory agency, the president would have a greater degree of control over the EPA. The EPA was created by executive order, and a number of existing agencies were transferred to the new body. In the absence of congressional opposition, the EPA was officially created on September 9, 1970. As an organizational entity, the EPA was created with many of the characteristics of Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy. It operates according to published rules: its goals are publically stated; it is staffed by career experts; it is hierarchically patterned; and it collects and transmits information maintained as files.⁴ During its first sixty days of operation the EPA, under director William Ruckelshaus, brought five times as many actions as the

agencies it inherited had put together during the same amount of time. Ruckelshaus, followed by Russel Train and later Douglas Costle, tried to adhere to the stated purposes of the agency. Although the EPA did not completely satisfy environmental or business interests, it remained a vital and important agency dedicated to protecting and preserving the environment. This trend changed dramatically during the Reagan Administration.

Although in many ways Ronald Reagan was the most ideological of American presidents, protecting the environment was not high on his agenda. For Administration advocates of less government and unfettered development, the appointment of Ann Burford as head of EPA was a personnel coup only surpassed by James Watt's appointment as the Department of Interior Secretary. The reason is basic. Value assumptions underlying environmental legislation were rejected. Burford, like Watt, reconstructed the debate on the environment. The environmental lobby, which had successfully appealed to the public concern for preserving natural beauty and clean air was confronted with an EPA Director and Interior Secretary who declared that development comes first and environmental regulation is open to reexamination.⁵ Instead of viewing environmental policy as pluralistic, which would have left room for alternative views, Watt and Burford vigorously applied the Reagan administration's conservative agenda to the exclusion of other viewpoints. During a question and answer session at a 1981 fundraiser, Reagan remarked that, "We have a young lady now at the... (EPA), and she is introducing, as fast as she can, common sense in an area that I think has been yielding to environmental extremists."⁶

The environmental paradigm was changed, but not through legislation which Congress would have likely rejected. Instead, administrative discretion, budget reductions and personnel actions were used to achieve Administration goals. Burford herself stated, "Many of the areas are so technical that Congress left a great deal of rule-making authority, which should be legislative authority, to the discretion of the (EPA) Administrator."⁷

Perhaps it can be debated as to how far a President can go in changing the avowed mission of an agency. But in the case of the EPA, more was changed than its orientation. As the five different subcommittees which investigated the 1982 wrongdoings found, policy decisions were made, imple-

mented, and reversed — seemingly at the whim and convenience of big industry.

On February 25 (1982) the (EPA) proposed to reverse previous rules...that prohibited the burning of hazardous liquids in drums at waste disposal landfills...The agency said it was suspending the ban for a ninety day period, in part because it was unworkable and because industry had complained about the cost of complying with the the previous regulations...Rep. James Florio (D-N.J.), Chairman of a House subcommittee with jurisdiction over hazardous waste policy, characterized EPA actions as "a wholesale retreat" from the efforts to clean up hazardous waste disposal practices.

On March 19, 1982, the EPA reversed its three week old decision and established an interim rule prohibiting the burial of any container in which toxic liquids are standing in observable quantities... (And on April 12, 1982) the EPA reversed a much-criticized decision made in October 1981 and said that an estimated 10,000 hazardous waste disposal facilities would now have to obtain liability insurance protecting people from chemical contamination.⁸

The lack of policy enforcement, mismanagement, misuse of funds and the refusal to honor congressional subpoenas led to the departure of thirteen top EPA officials in a seven week period in 1983. Five of them left on one day. Rita Lavelle, EPA Assistant Administrator in charge of environmental waste programs, was given a six month prison sentence. Burford resigned. When the dust settled on the EPA scandal in the Spring of 1983, the Administration had brought back William Ruckelshaus, the agency's highly respected former administrator. Although the EPA scandal was serious the White House was able to cope with it fairly easily. The NSC and the Iran-Contra Affair would prove much more difficult.

The National Security Council (NSC), 1984-1986

Much of the blame for the EPA scandal can be attributed to the ideological views of the Reagan administration. Clashing ideology and policy views were also at the heart of the Iran-contra NSC scandal which began to unravel in 1986. Ronald Reagan, beginning in 1981, became increasingly concerned by the leftward drift of the Sandinista government which had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979. Although he perceived this as a growing threat, he faced difficulties in

gaining public support to oust the Sandinista regime. Congress, mirroring public opinion, was not very enthusiastic about aiding the Contras. In fiscal year 1983, legislation was passed prohibiting aid that could be used to overthrow the Sandinistas. Following heated debate, Congress exercised its constitutional powers and cut off military and paramilitary aid to the Contras. The constitutional provision for terminating funds was known as the Boland Amendment. The President turned to the National Security Council (NSC) for help.

Advisory bodies to elective chief executives have become an integral part of the American political system. In some instances they are created on an ad hoc basis and abolished after they have performed their assigned task. The National Security Council was created by the National Security Act of 1947 to "advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies," and to enable cooperation among departments involved in foreign policy development.⁹ The purpose of the Act was to give the President a tool to craft and implement national security policy. *It was never intended to be an operational body.* The Council's membership by statute includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Advisor. Considering that all these officials are appointed by the President, it is not surprising that the Tower Commission, created by President Reagan in 1987, concluded that, "The NSC is pretty well what a president wants it to be and what he determines it should be."¹⁰ Presidential use of the NSC reflected, as it should, the requirements and styles of different men. Under Eisenhower, the National Security Advisor emerged as a principal advisor and a staff system was created. On the the other hand, Kennedy judged this system to be too rigid and formal. His style of decision making was more personal. For him the NSC was more of a sounding board than a decision making body. The trend since the Kennedy administration has been to bypass the Department of State when possible and to rely more on the NSC for foreign policy problem solving because State and its secretary are seen as being too cautious. Richard Nixon sent his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, to Pakistan and China in 1971 to pave the way for his historic China visit. But under Reagan the NSC became an operational entity somewhat like the CIA. It acted in secret and

broke some of the basic norms of constitutional government.

The NSC helps to defy Congress

Despite congressional limitations on Contra aid, President Reagan was steadfast in his support for the Nicaraguan rebels. In the words of National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Reagan ordered the NSC staff to keep the Contras "body and soul together"¹¹ The NSC, supposedly an advisory body, soon became an operational entity that ran the secret Contra assistance effort. Later it would be the major conduit for the secret sale of arms to Iran from which some of the proceeds went to finance the Contras. An NSC staff officer, Lt Colonel Oliver North, was the action officer in both operations.

Because Congress had denied Contra funding, the President turned to third countries and to private sources. From June 1984 to early 1986, the President, the NSC Advisor and the NSC staff raised \$34 million for the Contras from other nations. These activities were concealed from Assistant Secretary of State A. Longhorne Motley, who testified that such actions could not take place because they would violate the Boland Amendment. The first contributions received were placed in bank accounts used and controlled by the Contras. But in July, 1985, Colonel North took control of the funds and used them to run covert operations to support the Contras. He claimed to have the support of NSC Advisors Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey.

The Enterprise. At Casey's suggestion, North recruited retired Air Force General Richard Secord. Secord had extensive experience in special operations dating back to United States involvement in a counter insurgency movement in Laos in the 1960s. Secord set up Swiss bank accounts and North directed future private and third nation donations be deposited to those accounts. Utilizing these monies and other funds generated from the sale of arms to Iran, Secord and his associate Albert Hakim created what they called *the Enterprise*. This was to be a private organization designed to engage in covert operations on behalf of the United States. According to North, Casey saw the diversion of funds garnered from the sale of arms to Iran to the Contras as part of a more grandiose scheme to use *the Enterprise* as a "stand-alone, off the shelf," organization with the capacity to act throughout the world. It would operate without congressional knowledge

or oversight, since it was "private". It was not clear if the President would be let in on this little secret.

Operating largely under North's supervision, *the Enterprise* had its own airplanes, operatives, ships, secure communications devices, munitions and secret Swiss bank accounts. The organization served as an arm of the NSC for sixteen months using private and non-appropriated monies and without the accountability imposed by congress or the law. It supported a program of covert aid to the Contras despite the fact that the law prohibited such activities.

On October 5, 1986, the *Enterprise's* aircraft was shot down over Nicaragua. The President, NSC officials, and Administration spokesmen denied any government connection with the flight. In December of that year McFarlane told Congress that he had no knowledge of Saudi Arabia's contributions to the Contras. But he and the president had, in fact, discussed and welcomed \$32 million given to the Contras by the Saudis. In 1987, North conceded that he had made statements that were, "false, misleading, evasive and wrong". During the weekend of November 25-26 1986, on learning that the Attorney General had been authorized to find the relevant facts, North and Poindexter shredded and altered official documents. On November 25, 1986, North's secretary concealed classified documents, and with North's knowledge removed them from the White House. With McFarlane's help, North rewrote NSC chronologies so that it appeared that the U.S. had no knowledge of Israel's shipments of arms to Iran. This was inconsistent with reporting requirements of the Arms Control Export Act. North's covert operation required disclosure to the Intelligence Committees of Congress under Section 501 of the National Security Act. Such disclosure was never made.

The operation of an organization such as the *Enterprise*, the lying and concealment of such activity, and the disregard for the law were made possible, to a large measure, because the men who ran the NSC were selected on the basis of their loyalty to the President and to his ideology.

Robert McFarlane was a complex figure. He was experienced and knowledgeable. He had served in the NSC in the Ford Administration and on Senator John Tower's staff and had a Masters degree in Strategic Studies from the University of Geneva. He was not an ideologue and his appointment to be Na-

tional Security Advisor was deplored by the New Right. But he he was pressured to tow the ideological line. He told the Iran-Contra committees in 1987 that, "he didn't have the guts to..tell the president that his secret Central America policy would not work because he feared that Casey, Weinberger or UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick," would have said that I was some kind of commie"¹² McFarlane attempted suicide in 1987. He resigned in December, 1985 and was succeeded by John Poindexter. If nothing else, Poindexter was loyal. Conservatives such as Representative Newt Gingrich (R-Ga) and Patrick Buchanan stress that the loyalty of appointees, above all, must be to the spirit of the leader, if not the leader himself. Poindexter, therefore was hailed as 'truly tough' for approving the diversion of funds from the sale of arms to the Contras. Poindexter testified that he, and not the President ultimately approved the diversion of the funds, but he had no doubt that the President, "would have approved the decision at the time if I had asked him."¹³ Poindexter was allowed to resign in November of 1986. He was replaced by Frank Carlucci, a seasoned and highly regarded bureaucratic player. He served at the Office of Management and Budget during the Nixon Administration. He was the number 2 man at the CIA during the Carter years and as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1981. He has been described as the "ultimate bureaucratic manager," and a man of "some courage and independent judgement."¹⁴

The EPA and the NSC are examples of governmental organizations which experienced a considerable degree of corruption and mismanagement. Many of their problems can be traced to the fact that people who ran them placed ideology above the law and the missions of their organization. Our final case shows similar problems.

Jim Bakker and the PTL: A Televangelist Organization as a Runaway

Religious broadcasting is almost as old as broadcasting itself, with the first religious program being aired in 1921. Evangelical ministers and urban revivalists were quite active in radio broadcasting. Relatively simple equipment and low costs facilitated their use of radio to beam their messages. Television was regulated and was a more expensive medium. In order to avoid charges of favoritism, the television networks broadcast more representative

religious groups such as the Federation Council of Churches of Christ and the National Council of Catholic Men. Churches on the fringe of the religious community, mostly independent Protestant evangelicals or fundamentalists, were excluded.

A number of factors facilitated the growth of televangelism. In 1960, television stations were allowed to use religious broadcasts to credit FCC public service requirements for license renewal. When tobacco ads were withdrawn from television, stations were more amenable to selling time to religious groups in order to fill vacant slots. A number of evangelical ministers, as part of their calling, saw television as an excellent tool by which to spread the gospel. The advent of cable TV opened up new opportunities. Pat Robertson was able to create the largest religious cable network in the nation. His Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) claimed 33 million subscribers and was reached 468,000 people daily with his 700 Club. By 1986, televangelism was a \$ 2 billion dollar industry in the United States.

Jim Bakker met his wife Tammy in bible college and soon married. After stints with Pat Robertson and Paul Crouch's all religious Trinity Broadcasting Network they struck out on their own. In 1974, they created Praise the Lord (PTL). Bakker saw video technology as a means to fulfill Jesus' 2000 year old injunction to reach out to the world and spread the gospel. Bakker said, "If Jesus were on earth today, he would have been on TV. That would be the way that he could reach the people he loves."¹⁵ Former PTL administrator Bill Perkins stated that Bakker started with good intentions. But Bakker was a charismatic and gifted entrepreneur. As we shall see, there were no organizational bounds to restrain him.

Jim and Tammy Bakker built PTL from scratch. By 1987, it was worth some \$172 million and reported 1986 revenues of \$129 million. Their 24 hour broadcasting system with satellite links and production facilities had 13 million subscribers. The jewel of the PTL empire was the Heritage USA theme park near Fort Mill, South Carolina. As a 2,300 acre theme park, it drew 6 million people in 1986. The complex included an Assembly of God Church, a 500 room gilt-encrusted Heritage Grand hotel, and a turn-of-the-century mall with an artificial sky. The last major addition was a 12 million dollar water park which featured the world's largest wave pool and a 52 foot water slide. When rival

televangelist Jimmy Swaggart asked what the water slide had to do with the Kingdom of God, Bakker replied, "If you want to be a fisher of men, you had better have good bait." The Bakkers also generated \$3 million dollars in sales from records, tapes, and cosmetics. Bakker said, "Jesus doesn't teach poverty."¹⁶

In the years 1985 and 1986, the Bakker's salary was \$265,000; in 1986 they drew \$1.6 million in bonuses. Executive Director Richard Dortch received more than \$350,000 in salary and bonuses. The financial excesses of the Bakkers, for the most part, were unknown to the public until "the scandal" broke. In March, 1987, it was revealed that Jim Bakker had authorized Richard Dortch to pay \$265,000 to Jessica Hahn to hush up the sexual liaison she and Bakker had in 1980. On March 1987, Bakker resigned and on May 2, 1987 he was expelled from his parent Church, the Assemblies of God, for "sexual excesses."

Immediately after Bakker's resignation, Jerry Falwell was asked to take over PTL. Although Falwell was dynamic and charismatic, he was a more traditional religious leader. He was not a Pentacostal holy roller as was Bakker. Frances Fitzgerald, in her lengthy piece on Falwell, noted that in comparison with other evangelists he was "...the most sobering and conventional of preachers." She also noted his moderate views on such things as drinking and homosexuality. In 1987, Falwell endorsed the moderate establishment candidate George Bush and not the Pentacostal Pat Robertson for President. On October 8, 1987, despairing friction and rebuffs with the PTL, Falwell resigned from PTL. Upon his departure he called Bakker's leadership of the PTL, "the greatest scab on the face of Christianity."¹⁷

PTL and the Dilemma of Accountability. How was Bakker able to amass such wealth and use it for his own purpose? The answer lies in the fact that there are few internal or external checks on the activities of televangelists. As long as they retain the loyalty of their followers, they enjoy enormous latitude. As Jeffry Hadden one of the most prominent students of the subject points out:

"The major televangelists exhibit important differences in the style and in the structure of their organizations, but a critical thread traverses all of them: they stand as autonomous units.

Organized on the principles of free enterprise, their hierarchical structures are essentially oligarchic. Super salesmen all, the televangelists are free to pursue any project they want so long as they can convince their

audiences that it is worthwhile. They have neither bishops, nor presbyterians, nor general conferences, nor burdensome bureaucracies to hold them back when they feel the Lord is calling them to pursue a new venture."¹⁸

Bakker's parent body, The Assemblies of God, did very little to police the work of its affiliates. The IRS and FCC are two regulatory bodies that have some jurisdiction and responsibility in monitoring churches such as the PTL. In reality their powers are quite limited. The IRS, under a 1984 law, can begin an investigation of a church's finances only if the regional commissioner or higher IRS official believes that the church may not qualify for tax exempt status or may be engaged in an unrelated business activity. Before beginning the inquiry the church must be notified as to why it is being investigated. At any time prior to the examination, the church may demand a meeting with the IRS to discuss the problems in order to see if they can be resolved without an audit. A church is only required to file a report to the IRS if it generates income from a nonrelated business. These reports are not available, even under the Freedom of Information Act. PTL's amusement park was not challenged by the IRS until the PTL filed for bankruptcy. It is estimated that no more than 20 of the nation's 350,000 churches are audited annually.

The FCC does have jurisdiction over religious broadcasters, but it is limited to looking into complaints about radio or television stations. FCC spokesperson Rosemary Kimball noted that the agency assumes that stations have no control of syndicated programs and would not investigate a station unless the circumstances were unusual.

Evangelicals have long been aware that despite the fact that most of their clergy are honest and hard working people, there are some "bad apples." In 1979, in part to fend off possible regulatory legislation pending in the House of Representatives, the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA) was formed. However, in 1987 none of the major televangelists (Bakker, Falwell, Swaggart, Schuller, Roberts, and Robertson) were members. Although Falwell had been an original member he withdrew. Bakker also joined, but withdrew, after lengthy dialogue with ECFA in which some very uncomfortable questions were raised. The National Association of Religious Broadcasters has guidelines for its members, but membership in the organization is voluntary. It polices itself.

On August 31, 1989 Jim Bakker was sentenced to 45 years in prison for fraud and conspiracy and fined one half million dollars. In the aftermath of the scandal, on October 6, 1987, Congressman J.J. Pickle held one day of hearings on the problem of regulating organizations such as PTL. Then the issue was dropped.¹⁹

Defining Runaways: The Examples of the EPA, NSC and PTL

We have already defined runaway organizations as having a particular set of characteristics.

1. *Runaway organizations break their own charters or missions.* The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency was a response to the wave of support for environmental concerns that became very deep and real in the late 1960s. The EPA was mandated to protect the environment and administer laws enacted for that purpose. Our case study showed that the EPA became more of service agency for businesses seeking avoidance of environmental regulations: a clear deviation from its initial mission. The chartered purpose of the NSC was to advise the President on national security matters and to help forge and coordinate national security policy. During the years 1985-86 the NSC became almost a mini-CIA with its own aircraft vessels, communications equipment and airfields. It conducted policy unknown to the Departments of Defense and State. Clearly the NSC overstepped its stated purpose. PTL was a religious ministry affiliated with the Pentacostal Assemblies of God. As such, its mission was to spread the gospel of Jesus Christ. While the use of sophisticated communications equipment — and even the creation of Heritage USA — can be defended as PTL's stated mission, the vast accumulation of Bakker's personal wealth cannot. Nor can the expenditure of PTL funds in the attempt to cover up the its leader's sexual indiscretions.

2. *Internal controls are inadequate to control runaway organizations.*

The EPA is a traditional bureaucratic organization. The organization, like all federal agencies, was required to maintain files, conduct internal audits, required supervisory controls, and had an Inspector General. But authority was delegated to loyalists. The traditional internal controls that worked reasonably well for most federal agencies, proved inadequate in the case of the EPA, because political penetration into important managerial positions

blunted their effectiveness. As an advisory agency, the NSC was perhaps subject to fewer traditional controls, yet the Tower Commission was critical that even those in existence were ignored. It noted that the norms of legal constraints and administrative accountability were abandoned by the NSC staff. "Compartmentalization" of information by NSC Advisors McFarlane and Poindexter resulted in excessive secrecy. General Scowcroft, a member of the Commission expressed concern about the absence of an institutional memory because so many files were missing, perhaps destroyed.²⁰ A system of accountability must be privy to all pertinent organizational data if it is to function properly. The NSC's deliberate concealment and destruction of documents led to an internal accountability failure. As for the PTL, we noted that televangelistic enterprises are autonomous structures which are essentially oligarchic. They are creatures of their creators. PTL was created by Jim Bakker, and the administrators were selected by him, as was the Board of Directors. The Board (which in this case was more of an internal control because it was created by Bakker himself), was often ignored. Board members, in the aftermath of the scandal were shocked to learn that bonuses were approved without their knowledge. There was no budget, nor were there any internal checks. In all three cases, internal checks proved inadequate.

3. *Runaway organizations create obstacles to accountability.*

The power to request relevant information and documents is perhaps the most basic tool that Congress has for monitoring the activity of federal agencies. Burford was in contempt of Congress from December 9, 1982-March 9, 1983 for failure to turn over documents subpoenaed by a House committee. This was a clear attempt to thwart Congressional investigation. Rather than turn over the documents in question, she resigned. The NSC created a number of obstacles to accountability. *The Enterprise* was conceived to be a self-contained and self-financed miniature CIA, wholly outside Congressional (and conceivably Presidential) intervention and accountability. Having its own sources of revenue, and Swiss bank accounts in which to hide them, they could avoid the scrutiny of the press, Congress and the President. National Security Advisors McFarlane and Poindexter created considerable obstacles to accountability, mostly by deceiving Congress and administration officials. McFarlane, in 1985 and

1986, assured Congress that he and North were following the letter and the spirit of the Boland Amendment on restrictions for aiding the Contras. Yet he personally arranged for contributions from the Saudis and the Sultan of Brunei. He helped North to rewrite NSC chronologies so that it appeared that the Administration had no knowledge of Israel's arms shipment to Iran. Poindexter lied and deliberately withheld information about the covert activities in support of the Contras because, "I didn't want any outside interference."²¹ Poindexter also withheld information about Contra fund raising from White House Chief of Staff Don Regan because he was afraid Regan might tell the press. Secretary of State Schultz was also denied information about much of the operation for the same reason. Poindexter revealed his greatest breach of accountability in testifying to Congress on July 15, 1987 that he never told the President that funds raised from the sale of weapons to Iran were diverted to the Contras. Poindexter created obstacles of accountability to the press, Congress, key members of the Administration and to the President himself. He admitted that he wanted "no outside interference"—meaning no accountability. Oliver North admitted making statements to Congress that were false, misleading and wrong. In the NSC, accountability gave way to denial. The PTL made fewer efforts to create obstacles to accountability because it was, by its nature, less accountable. There was no strong parent body to monitor PTL's actions as exists in more structured religions such as the Roman Catholic Church or the Episcopal Church. Nevertheless, Bakker did create obstacles to accountability. He had no budget, and funds were scattered among twenty five different banks; cash management was described as "loose." Separate accounts were used to pay PTL executives. The PTL Board had no knowledge or control over those accounts.

4. *The leaders of runaway organizations are selected on the basis of charisma or ideology, not expertise.*

One kind of charisma is the charisma of office. By this we mean that the office is perceived to have special or unique qualities associated with it, and these qualities are automatically attributed to the person who holds that office. The Presidency of the United States is one such office, and his personal advisors share some of that charisma. The National Security Advisor, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board or the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors would be obvious examples. Ann

Burford as EPA Administrator had little presidential charisma. But she was highly ideological and her views were very much in sync with that of the Reagan Administration. Burford was interviewed by three important representatives to assure that her views were compatible with the Administration and that she would be "tough enough to see that they were put into practice." National Security Advisors, as just noted, can be said to have the aura of the Presidency because they are selected by the President, although the rapid turnover of NSC Advisors during the period under study may have reduced that charisma. The Advisors themselves were selected because their worldview or ideology was similar to that of the President's, not because of their expertise. Richard Allen (1981-82) was an international relations professor known for his strong anti-communists views. He was opposed by his mentors who refused to pass favorably on his Ph.D thesis. He was succeeded by William Clark, a judge, with very little knowledge or background in national security issues. Clark was, however a close friend of the President and an ideological soul mate. McFarlane is a more complex case. He was knowledgeable and experienced in foreign affairs. His views were more moderate than many of those in the Administration. But as we saw he yielded to the more conservative strong anti-communist position out of fear of being considered a whimp. John Poindexter cheerfully, energetically, and faithfully championed and carried out the President's ideological preferences. Maybe even a bit too energetically. By nature of his position, Jim Bakker was perceived as charismatic by his followers, but it was perhaps his personal charisma that propelled him to power in the first place. As Weber noted, it is the "...quality of an individual" endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers and qualities...on the basis of them the individual is treated as a leader.²²

Behavioral Propositions of Runaway Organizations

We have demonstrated that each organization exhibited the characteristics that define a runaway organization. Using our case studies, we can return to the behavioral properties resulting from and in tandem with these characteristics. As stated earlier, a runaway organization will behave in the following patterns:

1. Change in Leadership.

At the EPA, the strongly *laissez faire*

Ann Burford was replaced by the widely respected William Ruckelshaus. Ruckelshaus had served in the Justice Department as Deputy Attorney General and was the first Administrator of the EPA. After leaving government he went to head up the Weyerhaeuser Corporation a giant paper manufacturing and processing company. His return to EPA was welcomed by both the environmental and business communities, especially as a way to regain financial and other resources. John Poindexter was permitted to resign in November 1986. He had been vigorous in pursuing the ideologically motivated effort to overthrow the Contras as well as other related activities. He was replaced by the highly respected Frank Carlucci who held important positions in the Carter and Reagan administrations. When Jim Bakker was forced to give up his stewardship at PTL, he invited Jerry Falwell to take over. Falwell was much of an establishment figure. He was not a holy roller Pentacostal and his views on drinking and homosexuality were fairly moderate. Moreover in the 1988 presidential contest, Falwell endorsed the Establishment choice, George Bush, rather than fellow televangelist and highly ideological Pat Robertson.

2. Runaway organizations disregard laws.

Rita Lavelle, Assistant Administrator for Hazardous Wastes, was imprisoned for administrative mismanagement, Burford resigned rather than yield to the demands of Congress to submit requested documents and thirteen other high ranking EPA officials resigned rather than face further congressional probes. Seven men were convicted and sentenced in cases related to the NSC and its role in the Iran-contra scandal. John Poindexter, former National Security Advisor, was convicted in 1990 of conspiracy, two counts of obstructing Congress, and two counts of making false statements about assistance to the Contras and shipments of missiles to Iran. He was sentenced to six months in prison. Poindexter's predecessor, Robert McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of withholding information from Congress. He was placed on two years probation, fined \$20,000 and sentenced to 200 hours of community service. Oliver North, NSC aide and *Enterprise* action officer was found guilty in May, 1990 of three felonies: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress; destroying official documents; and accepting an illegal gratuity. He was sentenced to two years probation, fined \$150,000 and ordered to

serve 1,200 hours of community service. North's appeal of this conviction was partially successful, but Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh vowed to fight to restore the conviction. Richard Secord was the *Enterprise's* chief executive officer. He received a two year suspended sentence for lying to Congress. Albert Hakim, who functioned as *the Enterprise's* financier pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of aiding and abetting in supplementing North's income by paying for a security fence. He was fined \$5,000 and sentenced to two years probation. Jim and Tammy Bakker enjoyed a life style that was perhaps more appropriate for those who appeared on the program *The Life Styles of the Rich and Famous*. The only problem was that the money to provide for this extravagant living didn't come directly from God. It came from people who thought their monies were being used for religious purposes, never imagining their donations would be used for hush money to quash the Jessica Hahn scandal. The IRS claimed that the Bakkers had received \$9 million in excess compensation during the years 1981-1989. The jury found Bakker guilty of one count of conspiracy and 23 counts of mail and wire fraud. Judge Potter sentenced Bakker to pay a \$500,000 fine and 45 years in prison of which he must serve at least the first ten.

3. Remedial action.

In all three cases, remedial action was implemented to prevent the reoccurrence of wrong doing. In each instance the action will be minor and incremental. Congress, frustrated with EPA's lack of cooperation in providing data and information that it regarded as essential for discharging its oversight function, insisted on a more timely reporting procedures. A better reporting system might be of some value, but it is unlikely to prevent bureaucratic misbehavior seen in the EPA scandal. In 1987, in an effort to improve accountability in the NSC, an Office of NSC Legal Advisor was created. Perhaps a useful step, but hardly one that will limit the discretionary power of the NSC or the president's use of it. Stronger measures failed to be enacted. As for the PTL, Jerry Falwell was brought in after Bakker was forced to resign. Falwell tried to bring some order and improved accountability, including trying to appoint a new Board of Directors and new financial procedures. After seven months of friction and feuding, a tired Falwell resigned from PTL on October 8, 1987. In 1987, one day of hearings, presided over by Congressmen Pickle were

held on the problem of church finances. Clearly some efforts were taken to try to assure scandal would not occur again. As in the first two cases, there was a response. But how significant the responses were in light of the magnitude of the problems posed remains doubtful.

Summary and Conclusion

Accountability is a core value in a democratic society. The 1980s saw the evolution of what we called runaway organizations. We found that the EPA (1981-1983), the NSC (1984-1986) and PTL (1981-1987) met the definition of runaway and exhibited the behavioral propositions suggested. It would be useful to see if other organizations meet the definition and pattern of behavior outlined here. American history is replete with organizational scandals. The scandals of the Grant and Harding administrations might be fruitful avenues for explorations. State and local governments show a myriad of smallish organizations, some of which may have been involved in scandal. Public safety agencies, in part because of their paramilitary nature, might provide some useful examples. Evangelical religious organizations, from Aimee Semple McPherson in the 1920s to Jimmy Swaggart in 1988, have produced occasional but sometimes sensational and fairly well documented cases of organizational excesses. Other religious organizations have had some cases of scandal. The study of these organizations might help to test the validity of our effort to better understand and perhaps predict organizational behavior. Greater attention needs to be given as to how future organizational scandals might be averted. This paper has clearly shown that honest, capable, and experienced personnel are critical requisites for organizations acting within the parameters of a democratic society. All three organizations studied could have benefitted from greater journalistic scrutiny. External audits could be mandated by law for the three organizations explored in this essay. The EPA might benefit from having its members serve staggered terms. This might help reduce the politicization of the Agency. Crabb and Mulcahy note that the NSC has been, as compared to the Departments of State and Defense, underscrutinized and under legislated. They also draw a number of important conclusions from the Iran contra affair, including that too many of the major participants in the Reagan administration had little or no background, experience or interest in the substance of foreign policy. In

their view this was perhaps the most fundamental reason for the scandal. 23 Waterman also concludes that the lack of experience on the part of Reagan appointees contributed to the EPA's 1983 scandal.²⁴ Clearly we need to do more to understand and control the organizations that are so central to our security and well being.

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