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# THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

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*The Pitfalls of Applying Morality to U.S. Foreign Policy*

James J. Horgan †  
(Saint Leo College)

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*Mexico's Coming Democratic Revolution?*

Waltraud Queiser Morales  
(University of Central Florida)

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*Descriptive Representation and the Perception of Representation:  
A Comparison of Racial and Ethnic Group Perceptions with Descriptive Political Representation  
in Local Government*

Allen Bronson Brierly (University of Northern Iowa)  
&  
David Moon (University of Colorado)

*Political Healing in Democratizing Systems: the Case of Post-Dictatorial Greece*

Planton N. Rigos  
(University of South Florida)

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# Introduction

This issue of the *Political Chronicle* is dedicated to the memory of Dr. James J. Horgan, who died recently and had been a Professor of U.S. Diplomatic History as well as the for twenty years Chairman of the Social Sciences Department at Saint Leo College in Florida for twenty years. Dr. Horgan's posthumous essay "The Pitfalls of Applying Morality to U.S. Foreign Policy", was presented at the Saint Leo College-Center for Inter-American & World Studies Conference at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida on: "Strategic Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War". Dr. Horgan considers whether morality and ethical terms apply to the diplomatico-military actions of nation-states and especially to the United States. This is a fundamental controversy between the two schools of Diplomatic History: Idealists value moral considerations as essential to foreign policy, while Realists reject morality as inappropriate to the national interest. It is extremely difficult to affect the internal behavior of other nations on purely moral grounds, and weighing the balance between moral ideals and national interest can be painful, as shown by U.S. diplomacy in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, South Africa, Somalia, or China. Dr. Horgan artfully merged Realism with Idealism, by stressing that morality applies to national actions abroad and that by avoiding the pitfalls of historical experience a nation can pursue both its pragmatic interests (security, economic stability) and its moral principles (human rights, humanitarianism). According to him America should invoke moral principles in diplomacy only where it can avoid being sanctimonious abroad, or pressured by domestic rabble-rousing factors (i.e.: the misguided idealism of pacifists, ecologists and human rights groups, or ideological lobbies like the anti-Castro forces or fundamentalists). America should always set achievable goals, weigh carefully the costs, support international peace-keeping in vital places (Bosnia, Haiti), but steer clear of murky peace-making (Lebanon, Somalia). As the world's sole Super-Power, America should especially behave ethically both at home (human dignity for its citizens) and abroad (foreign aid, humanitarian missions, respecting International Law and holding itself accountable for violations, war crimes, or assassination plots).

Dr. Waltraud Q. Morales of the University of Central Florida presents an intriguing study on "Mexico's Coming Democratic Revolution?" stressing that Mexico's dominant Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) is today on the verge of a democratic revolution. The PRI controlled the country's political system since 1916, but serious democratic reforms are now necessary if Mexico is to function. Instead, public dissatisfaction and protest voting for the small opposition parties grows as reaction to domestic guerrilla insurgencies, drug mafias and political corruption which threaten future stability and democracy. If the current trend is not reversed, Mexico's ruling PRI could likely face defeat in the national presidential elections at the turn of the century and be forced into a coalition government with the opposition National Action Party, while facing mounting domestic violence.

The seminal essay by Drs. Allen Bronson Brierly of the University of Northern Iowa and David Moon of the University of Colorado, "Descriptive Representation and the Perception of Representation: a Comparison of Racial and Ethnic Group Perceptions in Miami and Dade County's Local Governments", was presented to the 1997 Florida Political Science Association Conference. The authors compare how race and ethnicity (Anglos, Jews, African-Americans, Cubans, non-Cuban Latins) interact with the perceptions of political representation in the city and county governments in Miami and Dade County, Florida (the only federated metropolitan government in the United States), by studying the role of description representation and the delivery of services for minority groups and individuals to assess whether typical residents perceive urban reforms by their city and county commissions.

Dr. Platon Rigos of the University of South Florida-Tampa analyzes process of democratic evolution in "Political Healing in Democratizing Systems: the Case of Post-Dictatorial Greece". Greece underwent major domestic clashes and socio-economic transformations since World War II, which buffeted her weak democratic system. But today no major threat comes from the Communists (1944-49 Civil War), or the Right (1968-74 Military Dictatorship). Democratic discourse, political incorporation and patronage in Greece have diminished the sharpness of politico-ideological contrasts, while favoring policy compromises and cooperation between opposing parties (Left and moderate Conservatives) in reaction to PASOK's political domination, corruption and coercion. Greece has made enormous political progress in achieving a solid democracy, but problems remain over defense spending, a bloated unprofessional civil service, and Cyprus' future in Greek-Turkish relations.

# *The Pitfalls of Applying Morality to U.S. Foreign Policy*

James J. Horgan

## **Abstract**

*Dr. Horgan's posthumous essay considers whether morality and ethical terms apply to the diplomatico-military actions of nation-states and especially to the United States. This fundamental controversy pits the two principal schools of Diplomatic History, as the Idealists value moral considerations as essential to foreign policy, while Realists reject morality as inappropriate to the national interest. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to affect the internal behavior of other nations on purely moral grounds, and weighing the balance between moral ideals and national interest can be a painful process, as shown by U.S. diplomacy in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, South Africa, Somalia, or China. Dr. Horgan artfully merges Realism with Idealism, stressing that morality applies to national actions abroad and that by avoiding the pitfalls of historical experience, a nation can pursue not only its pragmatic interests (security and economic stability), but also its moral principles (human rights and humanitarian interventions). America should invoke moral principles in foreign policy only where it can avoid being sanctimonious abroad, or pressured by domestic rabble-rousing factors (i.e.: misguided idealist like pacifists, ecologists and human rights groups, or by ideological lobbies like the anti-Castro forces or fundamentalists), while always setting achievable goals and weighing carefully the costs. America should also support international peace-keeping missions in vital places (Bosnia, or Haiti), and food distribution in crisis areas (Somalia), but steer clear of following this with murky peace-making ventures (Lebanon, or Somalia). As the world's sole Super-Power, America should especially behave ethically both at home (human dignity for all its citizens) and abroad (foreign aid, humanitarian interventions, respecting International Law and holding itself accountable when its agents commit violations, war crimes, or assassination plots against "enemy" leaders).*

## **I. Realists vs. Idealists**

Does morality apply to the actions of nation-states? Should countries try to do good in the world? Is it proper to judge their conduct in ethical terms? There is much debate on these matters among diplomatic historians, who are split in the two schools of thought called Realism and Idealism. Idealists value moral considerations as a legitimate part of the national interest and diplomacy. Realists instead reject morality as an inappropriate feature in foreign policy which must remain focused on overriding issues of national interest and power. As to how policies should be evaluated, a case in point is the national attitude in America toward the Vietnam War—a conflict which stirred passions in the course of its duration and long after. Some opponents at the time called it an "immoral" war; presidential candidate Ronald Reagan later termed it a "noble cause."<sup>1</sup> Realists dismiss both characterizations as unduly sentimental, emotional and improper.

In *Principles of International Politics*, Realist Charles O. Lerche writes: "The only concepts of 'good' and 'bad' which have any reference to the international conduct of the state are relative to its success or failure in attaining its objectives."<sup>2</sup> The war should be judged smart or foolish if it advanced or retarded U.S. interests, but it should be considered neither virtuous nor ignoble. The grand old man of the Realists is George F. Kennan, career diplomat and scholar, who was highly influential during the outward reorientation of U.S. diplomacy in the postwar 1940s. In his view, people must behave morally towards one another, but the same is not true for states:

*Moral principles have their place in the heart of the individual and in the shaping of his own conduct, whether as a citizen or as a government official... But when the individual's behavior passes through the machinery of political organization and merges with that of millions of other individuals to find its expression in the*

*actions of a government, then it undergoes a general transformation, and the same moral concepts are no longer relevant to it.... Morality as the foundation of civic virtue, and accordingly as a condition precedent to successful democracy—yes.... But morality as a general criterion for the determination of the behavior of states and above all as a criterion for measuring and comparing the behavior of different states—no.<sup>3</sup>*

Another leading Realist was Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, who took this position: "Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation." For him, the central consideration of foreign policy was whether or not the policy was consistent with national power. Morality was not relevant. "The moralist asks; 'Is this policy in accord with moral principles?' And the political realist asks; 'How does this policy affect the power of the nation?'"<sup>4</sup> Idealists value moral principles in foreign policy and view the so-called Realists in a negative light. In *The American Tradition in Foreign Policy*, Frank Tannenbaum presented a biting characterization:

*This doctrine is confessedly, nay gleefully, amoral. It prides itself upon being realistic and takes Machiavelli as its great teacher. It is contemptuous of the simple beliefs of honest men, jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that men may strive for peace among nations, and looks upon democracy as a hindrance to skilled diplomacy.<sup>5</sup>*

Another member of the Idealist school - Robert Osgood of the University of Chicago and then Dean of the Johns Hopkins University-School of Advanced International Studies -- was forthright in defense of morality in *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*.

*If one believes that the enrichment of the individual's life, and not the aggrandizement of the state, is the ultimate goal of politics, if one believes that the object of survival is not mere breathing but the fulfillment of the liberal and humane values of Western civilization, then the preservation and the promotion of American power and interests cannot be an end in itself: it is but a means to an end. ...[Unless American security is measured by ideal standards transcending the national interest, it may take forms that undermine the moral basis of all social relations.]*<sup>6</sup>

Realists like Kennan deny the juxtaposition with Machiavelli and the allegation that they are advocating "a cynical and amoral policy, devoted to the cultivation of America's military power and devoid of respect for the noble national ideals of which American foreign policy ought to be the reflection." While forswearing moralization, he urges the U.S. to "show patience, generosity, and a uniformly accommodating spirit in dealing with small countries in small matters" and "reasonableness, consistency, and steady adherence to principle in dealings with large countries in large matters." Above all, he says:

*[W]hile always bearing in mind that its first duty is to the national interest, it would never lose sight of the principle that the greatest service this country could render to the rest of the world would be to put its own house in order and to make of American civilization an example of decency, humanity, and societal success from which others could derive whatever they might find useful to their own purposes.*<sup>7</sup>

In their assessments of the course of U.S. diplomatic history, the Kennans and Morgenthau come to a generally unhappy conclusion. "Realist historians," writes one observer, "believe that American foreign policy has been naive, overly idealistic, and moralistic."<sup>8</sup> They particularly bemoan developments in the twentieth century,

following the turning point of 1898 and the Spanish-American War, which for the first time carried the United States into an active role in world affairs. Realists define national interest very narrowly--not including the promotion of moral values. Hans Morgenthau sees American concern for such principles as unwarranted and considers it "utopian."<sup>9</sup> George Kennan uses the phrase "legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations" to characterize what he regards as the chief theme of American diplomacy in this century.<sup>10</sup> Realists make a persuasive case in many respects: focus on national interest; make policy on realities rather than self-serving illusions; develop action on a case-by-case basis instead of being regimented by some preconceived universalist "doctrine."

On the other hand, Idealists raise a meritorious point about moral judgments being relevant to the actions of states. While all foreign policies may not be obvious in terms of moral right and wrong, some of them clearly are. Surely the Nazi Holocaust was not simply an "unwise" national policy but an "immoral" one as well. Thus morality does apply. But there are pitfalls in the application of moral concerns to foreign policy. It seems to me that they lie in four categories: 1) the danger of sermonizing and hypocrisy; 2) a certain phoniness in pronouncements designed primarily for a domestic audience; 3) the raising of false hopes through unattainable goals; and 4) the sacrificing of tangible interest for idealistic considerations.

## II. Sermonizing and Hypocrisy

At the turn of the century, the United States was in the grip of Manifest Destiny; the belief that the American people have a God-given mission to spread their "civilization" throughout the continent, the hemisphere, and ultimately the world. "Fellow-Americans, we are God's chosen people," said Senator Albert Beveridge, one of its foremost promoters, in 1903.<sup>11</sup> Longtime Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright later termed this attitude "the arrogance of power" in his 1966 book of the same title, defining it in this way: "the tendency of great nations to equate power with virtue and major responsibilities with a universal mission."<sup>12</sup>

Three presidents in the early years of the century--William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson (two Republicans and a Democrat; the attitude was bipartisan)--were enthusiastic in their embrace of these same values and self-righteous in their posture toward the rest of the world. President McKinley, for example, explained in 1899 to a visiting delegation of clergymen why he had decided to acquire every one of the Philippine Islands after the Spanish-American War: ". . .there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them..."<sup>13</sup> No matter that Spain had been pushing its own version of these concepts in the Philippines since the sixteenth century; the only real "civilization" and "Christianity" came from America.

The most intense exponent of the idea that "Our way is the right way" was President Theodore Roosevelt. In 1904, he put forward a policy which came to be called the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

*Chronic wrongdoing... may in America, elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.*<sup>14</sup>

Carrying out this "international police power" in the name of "civilization" Roosevelt subsequently invaded a number of Caribbean countries in the spirit of gunboat Diplomacy, leaving a long-lasting legacy of anti-Yankee antagonism.

President Wilson pushed ahead the same sentiments when he sent troops into Mexico in 1913 because he disapproved of the dictatorship of Adolfo de la Huerta: "I am going to teach the Latin American republic to elect good men," he said, in self-righteous justification.<sup>15</sup> Later presidents in pursuit of human rights around the globe would sometimes present the same superior visage: "[L]ike a stern schoolmaster clothed in the mantle of perfect virtue," writes one Realist historian, we "sit in judgments over all of

governments, looking sharply down the nose of each of them to see whether its handling of domestic affairs meets with our approval."<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the U.S. has often been hypocritical in its posturing toward other nations. In the 1890s for example, the State Department made frequent complaints to the government of Spain over the mistreatment of its Cuban citizens. At the same time, the country was opening itself to a charge of hypocrisy on two fronts: the U.S. Army was conducting final campaigns against American-Indians (including the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee); and Jim Crow segregation and the lynching of black people were becoming commonplace in the American South. Half a century later the State Department was similarly active in criticizing the Union of South Africa, at the very time that the civil rights movement of the 1950s-60s was showing the world how America treated its own black citizens. The notorious regime in South Africa was thereby presented with an easy defense of its *apartheid* system and flatly told the United States to "mind its own business."<sup>17</sup>

More recently, the U.S. took an inconsistent and hypocritical stance toward the U.N. International Court of Justice (or World Court). It won a favorable ruling from the tribunal in 1980, condemning Iran's kidnapping of American diplomats.<sup>18</sup> But when the C.I.A. mined three Nicaraguan ports in 1984 in an effort to topple the Sandinista government—"an act of war" in the view of an angry senior Republican Senator Barry Goldwater—and when Managua then brought suit in that same World Court, claiming a violation of International Law, the Reagan Administration denied jurisdiction and the case collapsed.<sup>19</sup> Such a presidential response was an embarrassment to a country which prides itself on the rule of law. This persistent streak of self-serving egotism flies in the face of the American tradition of generosity and tolerance.

### III. For Domestic Consumption

American foreign-policy-makers frequently issue ringing statements of a moralizing (and often jingoistic) nature, which appear to be aimed more at rousing the domestic American voter than at

achieving some international result. The demonization of adversaries was a favorite practice of President Ronald Reagan. He told a convention of conservative evangelicals in Orlando in 1983 that the Soviet Union was "the focus of evil in the modern world" and received a predictably enthusiastic response.<sup>20</sup> Three years later, to secure public endorsement for an air attack on Libya, he called President Muanmar Khaddafi "this mad dog of the Middle East."<sup>21</sup>

His successor President George Bush compared Iraq's Saddam Hussein to Hitler and the Nazis in an extreme analogy evidently designed to build domestic support for the coming Persian Gulf War.<sup>22</sup> Pointing out how such emotional rhetoric can sow confusion, retired General Colin Powell later noted in his memoirs that President Bush's characterization of "Saddam as the devil incarnate did not help the public understand why he was allowed to stay in power."<sup>23</sup>

No American Secretary of State was more given to moralizing than John Foster Dulles. When he took office in 1953, he repeatedly called for not just the containment of Soviet power, but the "liberation of these captive peoples" behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>24</sup> "This approach doubtless won many votes among Hungarian and Polish immigrants in America," as one historian put it, but when the Hungarians revolted in 1956—encouraged by such statements and led to believe that American assistance would be available—no such aid was forthcoming as Soviet tanks crushed the uprising.<sup>25</sup> Dulles's comments looked reckless and irresponsible.

Theodore Roosevelt, the prechiest of all the presidents, was also noted for posturing before the world with pronouncements designed chiefly for domestic consumption. In 1904, a naturalized Greek-American named Ion Perdicaris was seized in Morocco by an Arab chieftain named Raisuli. Even though his release had already been arranged, Theodore Roosevelt had a telegram sent to the American consul general in Tangier with this strident challenge: "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead!"<sup>26</sup> It was an election year and presumably the voters would be pleased by such histrionics. The incident later sparked a fanciful 1975 Hollywood movie entitled *The Wind and the Lion* with Candice Bergen and Sean Connery.

An issue which has been the subject of moralizing for domestic purposes for the past three decades is Cuba. The U.S. has conducted a severe economic boycott of the island for purposes unrelated to any clear national interest or the prospect of effecting change. The intense feeling among Cuban-American exiles and their political activism prompted President Bill Clinton, who might have preferred otherwise, to sign the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which carried anti-Castro pressure even further. Clinton had lost Florida in the 1992 election but he wound up winning the state by a narrow margin in 1996. His domestic-politics actions toward Cuba may have made the difference. But even Pope John Paul II became critical of the American embargo, and the United Nations General Assembly called upon the United States to bring it to an end by a vote of 137-to-3.<sup>27</sup>

The issue of human rights in general had domestic overtones during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, particularly in the case of Russian Jews. He publicly chastised the Soviets and even sent an open letter of encouragement to prominent dissident Andrei Sakharov in 1977. The Brezhnev government responded by restricting Jewish emigration even further, convicting two leading Jewish dissenters in a show trial, and creating difficulties during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II.<sup>28</sup> President Carter was no fool. He must have realized that high-profile attacks in the name of human rights would not bring a Superpower to its knees. Thus one suspects a domestic agenda. Ironically, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—whom columnist Jack Payton calls "the high priest" of "*realpolitik*," who ignored "concepts such as ethics and morality" in foreign policy—had more success than Carter because he used quiet persuasion behind the scenes and made no attempt to embarrass the Soviets.<sup>29</sup> Thus one should continually subject a foreign policy-maker's pronouncements to scrutiny. The audience may not be international after all.

### IV. The False Hopes of Unattainability

For Realist historians, the best example of how *not* to behave in foreign policy is

Woodrow Wilson: his inflexibility and refusal to compromise over congressional hesitancy about conditions for membership in the League of Nations, his attitude of superiority in posturing toward the rest of the world, and particularly his projection of false hopes in the American people by deluding them with unattainable goals in the prosecution of World War I. He called for a "crusade to make the world safe for democracy" and "a war to end war."<sup>30</sup> Such sentiments pose a danger of disillusionment for the public when it finally perceives that such lofty aims cannot be achieved. That's just what happened in the postwar 1920s when the U.S. turned inward and fled from international responsibility. The culmination of this spirit of unreality was manifested in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris, a treaty put together by the American Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister, and signed by most of the world's nations. It outlawed war "as an instrument of national policy."<sup>31</sup> One historian calls it "one of the most meaningless and futile of all international engagements;" another terms it "a monument to illusion."<sup>32</sup> Such agreements raise empty hopes and distract people from taking the proper realistic steps to protect national interest.

Another kind of unattainability comes in the form of sweeping proclamations and commitments presidents from time to time put forward. A case in point was the Truman Doctrine of 1947. "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States," said Harry Truman, "to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."<sup>33</sup> A so-called "doctrine" is a permanent policy--good for every time and place. Thus by its very nature it is a dangerous trap for policy-makers and should be shunned. Policies may be long-lasting, but none are eternal. Foreign policies should all be directed toward carrying out national interests. It's the interests which are permanent, and the policies which are changeable. Thus the Truman Doctrine, which was developed very narrowly for particular situations in Greece and Turkey, was soon applied--in a universalist manner and without much thinking--to Vietnam, when the U. S. began sending aid and advisors in 1950. In his *Memoirs*, George Kennan remarks that Americans have an aversion "to taking specific decisions on specific

problems" on a case-by-case basis and a "persistent urge to seek universal" formulas. He explains his concerns this way:

*Whatever the origins of this tendency, it is an unfortunate one. It confuses public understanding of international issues more than it clarifies it. It shackles and distorts the process of decision-making. It causes questions to be decided on the basis of criteria only partially relevant or not relevant at all. It tends to exclude at many points the discrimination of judgment and the prudence of language requisite to the successful conduct of the affairs of a great power.<sup>34</sup>*

A more recent example of false hopes and unattainable goals drew Mr. Kennan to the op ed page of the *New York Times* at the age of 89: the Bush-Clinton rescue mission in Somalia. He criticized the emotional spirit in which the venture was proceeding (driven by television images of starving children) and particularly the notion that this brief operation could wash away long-standing problems of political instability and cultural antagonism. "Our action holds no promise of correcting this situation," he wrote.<sup>35</sup> In life, one often sets lofty goals in the hope of stirring one's motivation: to reach for the stars in order to gain the moon. But in international affairs, a nation's aims must always be realistically attainable or serious consequences may result.

## V. Weighing Priorities

The final pitfall in making moral efforts in the world is the difficulty of choosing between a tangible national interest and an idealistic standard. "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere," said Jimmy Carter in a memorable line from his 1977 Inaugural Address.<sup>36</sup> It was a red flag for Realists. Carter was a president who believed most deeply in human rights; he had an uneven record, however, in actually advancing them. One issue in particular had costly consequences for the United States itself.

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter felt bound to take some moral action in protest. He cut off U.S. grain sales to the Soviets. This

not only did not result in the invaders' withdrawal, but it also had a substantially negative impact on American farmers by removing a significant portion of their market and causing a sharp drop in prices and profits. Ironically, the stern anti-communist Ronald Reagan restored Soviet grain sales in his first major step in foreign policy after he took office in 1981. It was the proper choice of a tangible domestic priority over an international statement of principle.<sup>37</sup> In the case of China, subsequent administrations evidently drew a lesson from the grain embargo and did not revoke most-favored-nation commerce status over human rights, even after the 1989 clash in Tienanmen Square. In the face of a reported 1995 trade deficit of \$35 billion with China, and convinced that economic pressure would have minimal impact on the Asian giant's internal behavior, while at the same time proving costly to U.S. sales and jobs, the Clinton government--as had George Bush's before it--properly chose a domestic interest instead of a moral ideal.<sup>38</sup>

South Africa, however, was the occasion for a choice of an opposite character: human rights in another country took priority over American economic concerns. Even Jimmy Carter had been hesitant to invoke economic sanctions in protest of *apartheid* because of the value of U.S.-South African trade and investment. But after Congress passed (over Ronald Reagan's veto) the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 against that infamous regime, both the Bush and Clinton administrations supported economic restrictions despite domestic cost.<sup>39</sup> The earnest appeal of Nelson Mandela that such action was "the best lever" to force change in F.W. de Klerk's Afrikaner government and gain world-wide condemnation of South Africa, proved irresistible.<sup>40</sup>

As President Clinton once remarked, the United States should not embrace a "cookbook cutter" approach to foreign policy; it should make distinctions from situation to situation.<sup>41</sup> Historians find it hard to determine the precise impact of international sanctions in changing South African policy.<sup>42</sup> Certainly of great weight were both the determination of the black African majority and the political pragmatism of the de Klerk government. Yet American willingness to push economi



considerations to the back burner and bring human rights principles to the foreground proved justifiable in the infamous case. Weighing the balance between moral ideals and tangible interests can be a painful process.

## VI. Conclusion: a Realistic Idealism

I believe that morality does apply to the actions of nations and that states should try to promote human dignity where they can. But these pitfalls illustrate the difficulties in doing so. The United States should invoke moral principles in foreign policy only where it can avoid being sanctimonious, assure that domestic rabble-rousing is not a motivating factor, set an achievable goal, and weigh carefully the cost in tangible interests. It is extremely difficult to affect the internal behavior of other nations on purely moral grounds. One can comb the historical record in vain for examples of clear-cut success. But there is one country whose actions the U.S. can influence--and that is the United States itself. America should take care that it behaves ethically in the world. It should respect International Law and hold itself accountable when its agents commit violations, as in the case of the 1968 My-Lai massacre and the five-fold assassination plots against "enemy" foreign leaders during that same period.<sup>43</sup>

It should contribute foreign aid on humanitarian grounds, as Barbara Ward called for in her widely acclaimed *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations* (1964). It should use its military forces to protect food distribution in crisis areas like Somalia (but avoid unrealistic "nation-building"). It should participate in international peace-keeping missions in places like Bosnia (but steer clear of peace-making ventures, which can be illusory). Above all, the United States should treat its own citizens in a moral way by seeing that their human rights are assured and that they live lives of human dignity. If it avoids the pitfalls suggested by historical experience, a nation can pursue not only its pragmatic interests like security and economic stability, but also its intangible interests of moral principles in the world.

## Notes

1. Quoted in Robert Timberg, *The Nightingale's Song* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p.15-17.
2. Quoted in Dorothy Jane Van Hoogstrate, *American Foreign Policy--Realists and Idealists: a Catholic Interpretation* (St. Louis: Herder, 1959), p. 33.
3. Quote: George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), p.48-49. Hereafter cited as *Realities*.
4. Quote: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 10-11.
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## Lasswell and McDougal's *Jurisprudence*: Note on a Student Edition

Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, *Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy*. New Haven: (New Haven Press and Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992,) 2 vol, 1, 1588 pp., with charts, appendices, index. Sold and distributed by Kluwer Law International, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139. ISBN 90-411-0611-1. \$75.00

This book, which I reviewed in these pages in 1993,<sup>1</sup> now is available in a special edition for students. It has soft backs, contains a new and brief preface for students by McDougal, but is priced considerably differently from the prohibitive \$580.00 set for the first edition. (Note a new ISBN number.)

Lasswell and McDougal were familiar master figures in political science and international law a generation ago. Their appearances on reading lists and in footnotes show evident diminution in frequency. These two volumes, which incorporate much previously published material with much that had not been circulated broadly before, may contribute to reviving their conception of the "policy sciences." Their orientation both differs from and embraces policy studies, now hugely popular in and out of universities and law schools. At \$75.00, the special student edition will attract not only attention among a new generation of scholars but also from other individuals in research institutions and academic libraries.

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<sup>1</sup>"Lasswell and McDougal's Map of Policy Sciences of Democracy," in *Political Chronicle*, Vol 5, No. 1 (1993): p. 1-4. For another review essay of the same original edition, see Ronald D. Brunner, "A Milestone in the Policy Sciences," in *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 29, n.1 (1996): p. 45-67.

# Mexico's Coming Democratic Revolution?

Waltraud Queiser Morales

## Abstract

This essay considers whether the Mexican political system, dominated for most of the twentieth century by the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) is on the verge of a democratic revolution which could result in the defeat of the PRI in the national presidential elections at the turn of the century and the establishment of a coalition government with the opposition National Action Party (PAN). The Mexican system is viewed in terms of T. J. Pempel's one-party dominant model and is found deficient; democratic reforms are necessary if Mexico is to function like the democratic one-party dominant systems in Europe. However, guerrilla insurgencies, drug mafias and political corruption and violence threaten future stability and democracy.

Recent political and economic events have left Mexico watchers wondering which of the different faces of this nation of 95 million people reveals the reality and probable future of Mexico. On the one hand, there is the Mexico that has prided itself for decades as the most stable country in Latin America and the Third World, even claiming First World status. And on the other, there is the recent Mexico of political assassinations, Indian and guerrilla insurgencies, drug mafias and economic chaos. Is Mexico on the verge of a democratic revolution and the defeat of the oldest remaining one-party dominant system at the turn of the century? And will the July 1997 elections cause the ruling Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) to lose control of the National Congress and the Mexico City government for the first time in sixty-eight years.<sup>1</sup> Is one of the most persistent cases of one-party dominance since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union nearing an end? After all, "one-party dominance is an art far more than it is an inevitability."<sup>2</sup>

The irony of Mexican democratization is that its progress has occurred because of and in spite of incomplete electoral reforms since the suspect 1988 national elections

which brought Carlos Salinas de Gortari to his six-year, non-renewable presidency. If the political transition from one-party rule succeeds, will Mexico become a more traditional two-party or multi-party system; or will Mexico inherently remain a more authoritarian version of an "uncommon democracy," T. J. Pempel's term for one-party dominant regimes? And how will a democratic transition impact and respond to the regional and global forces of privatization, capitalist development and modernization? Has "neoliberal" privatization "accentuated the nation's deep social inequalities, particularly among the campesinos," beyond repair?<sup>3</sup> And therefore, will political reforms within the framework of continued one-party dominance be sufficient to address the crises of legitimacy and justice for average Mexican citizens and the crisis of confidence in domestic and international economic circles? Finally, has a revolutionary democratization of Mexico become critically essential to restart and maintain international investment and growth, and to provide a better economic future for all Mexicans?

## I. PRI's One-Party Dominance

Since 1929 the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* has won every presidential election, governed alone, and singularly dominated the political and economic landscape.<sup>4</sup> Indeed the persistence and extent of PRI's control places the Mexican system closer to a one-party state than a one-party dominant one. T. J. Pempel characterizes one-party dominant regimes in industrialized nations as ones where "despite free electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of free political association," a single party has governed for substantial periods of time alone or in coalition.<sup>5</sup> In the Mexican case key conditions of this model remain absent, notably, free electoral competition, relatively open information systems, and extensive industrialization and economic modernization. The PRI has never permitted real competition or coalition government, and

has consistently dominated the media. Mexican industrialization and economic modernization has been highly uneven, concentrated in the northern states, and so absent in the backward agrarian south, that Chiapas (the southernmost state bordering Guatemala) is often dismissed as Central America. Only if democratic reforms correct such critical deficiencies, can Mexico approximate the authentically democratic one-party dominant system that Pempel's theory describes.

To date, Mexico's electoral history, although stable and relatively non-violent, has been plagued by fraud and corruption. In 1940 and 1952 challenges to PRI from ex-party dissidents were met with fraud and violence, and despite recent electoral reforms in 1986, 1990, 1993 and 1994, "nearly every election at the municipal, state, or federal levels continues to yield a disputed result."<sup>6</sup> Even with the playing field for interparty competition a bit more level, the two most recent presidential elections encountered problems. In 1988, PRI's victory was clouded by charges of massive fraud. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the legendary 1930s revolutionary President Lázaro Cárdenas and candidate of the left-of-center opposition party, the PRD, Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*), claimed that he had won. Although the 1994 presidential elections, despite irregularities, were cleaner and more competitive, they were not necessarily fair.<sup>7</sup> Virtual PRI-government control of the media, extravagant (and illegal) PRI campaign spending, and what one writer characterized as the "distinct symbiosis of government administration and partisan political structures," ensured the dominant party's victory, although a more narrow one.<sup>8</sup>

Since 1976 PRI's share of the vote has steadily fallen from 99 percent to 74 percent in 1982, and 51 percent and 50 percent in the 1988 and 1994 elections.<sup>9</sup> Conversely, the vote for PAN (*Partido de Acción Nacional*), the conservative opposition party based in the industrialized, North

Americanized northern states, has been steadily increasing. Founded in 1939, the *Partido de Acción Nacional*, or National Action Party, has struggled to become Mexico's second major party, and since 1989 (when PAN won the gubernatorial elections in Baja California) controls major state governorships, mayoral offices, and, for the first time, a cabinet position in the PRI government of President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León. In the 1994 elections PAN officially received 27 percent of the vote, and President Zedillo appointed Antonio Lozano Gracia, PAN's opposition leader in Congress, his attorney general.

Analysts have hailed the PRI's decreasing electoral margins as proof of democratization and the party's weakening; most elected presidents never received less than 70 percent of the vote.<sup>10</sup> Clearly, today's opposition has more of a voice than in the 1920s when General Alvaro Obregón claimed 1.7 million supporters against zero negative votes.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, PRI's slipping electoral control is all the more amazing considering the media empire and oligarchic wealth at its behest. Despite a new party financing law which limited individual contributions to \$650,000 (compared to \$20,000 in the United States) and contributions of interest groups to \$3.25 million, the PRI secretly violates these limits. Press exposure of the infamous fund-raising dinner in February 1993, which requested Mexico's wealthiest men (most billionaires known as the "Mexico Twelve") to contribute \$25 million each to party coffers, only encouraged more creative and subversive measures.<sup>12</sup>

Another reform ostensibly capped spending for presidential campaigns at \$103 million (about what both Bush and Clinton together spent on their presidential races in 1992).<sup>13</sup> The richest billionaire in the group and Mexico's *Televisa* telecommunications tycoon, Emilio Azcarraga, was estimated to be worth \$5.1 billion and reportedly promised \$50 million for the party's electoral bid. *Miami Herald* correspondent, Andrés Oppenheimer, writes that "the billionaires' pledges were a startling symptom of the massive corruption in Mexico's official circles--a world where publicly disclosed funds amounted to a small fraction of the

fabulous sums that were moved under the table."<sup>14</sup> Even with officially reported campaign expenditures of \$105 million, PRI far outspent all opposition contenders combined.<sup>15</sup> Amazingly, PRI has even bankrolled smaller opposition parties that traditionally receive no more than three percent of the vote in order to divide the opposition and reinforce the perception of free democratic contestation.

Oppenheimer also criticizes the PRI-government's manipulation of information. A staunch PRI loyalist, Don Emilio Azcarraga's pro-government *Televisa* has a virtually monopoly of Mexico's airwaves, owning four of the five television channels in Mexico City and controlling 95 percent of the audience share in the country. Most print media, particularly the larger dailies of the twenty-three newspapers circulating in Mexico City, are heavily subsidized by the government and often disseminate paid political advertising and campaign propaganda as news.<sup>16</sup> The media's campaign strategy in 1994, Oppenheimer concludes, was to convince the voter that, in the aftermath of a year that featured the Chiapas peasant revolt, high-level political assassinations and escalating drug violence, Mexico especially needed the stability of a PRI victory.<sup>17</sup>

## II. PRI's Corruption: Guerrillas and Mafias

The explosion of the Chiapas rebellion on New Year's Day 1994 set into motion a chain of events which would graphically expose the political corruption of the Mexican political system and of the entrenched old-guard clans in PRI's revolutionary family. Despite intelligence reports within Mexico and in Washington as early as 1990, Mexico's Interior Minister, and wealthy former governor of Chiapas, baldly denied the existence of guerrillas in Chiapas. With strong opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, both the Salinas and Clinton Administrations feared bad publicity. Desperate Mayan Indians and leftist revolutionaries overrunning towns in Chiapas, Mexico's most underdeveloped region that had much in common with neighboring Guatemala (with its own 38-year history of violent internal war) would

certainly have derailed passage of NAFTA and stalled integration initiatives.

Within short order, ski-masked Subcommandante Marcos emerged as spokesman of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (or EZLN, *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*) of 2,500 rebels, and as an international Robin Hood. By the time President Zedillo purportedly unmasked Marcos on national television as Rafael Sebastián Guillén, a former UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico) student and architecture professor, and a member of the Marxist National Liberation Forces, the issue of the guerrilla leader's identity was basically moot. To many Mexicans Marcos had come to embody the myth of Emiliano Zapata's agrarian revolution. And despite official attempts to discredit the local and indigenous nature of the Zapatista insurrection, the appallingly feudal economic conditions, corrupt oligarchic power structure, and routine violation of human rights by police and military forces in Chiapas, proved more convincing.<sup>18</sup>

Chiapas's civil society had responded to local backwardness and repression with intense organizing, forming thousands of functional popular organizations, solidarity committees, social movements and non-electoral associations.<sup>19</sup> These included an active local human rights center, hundreds of Christian Base Communities (CBCs), and thousands of indigenous lay catechists. Within the Roman Catholic Church was the voice of the outspoken liberationist Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia, spiritual leader of the Mayan diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas for over thirty years and long-time opponent of former Governor Patrocinio González Garrido and Salinas' Secretary of Interior in 1994. In this nation of over 6 million Indians, Bishop Ruiz became a fierce defender of Indian rights; he condemned the PRI-government for its continued betrayal of Mayan peasants and abandonment of the agrarian program of the Mexican Revolution.<sup>20</sup> Officially promised land, the majority of Chiapas's indigenous people remained landless, unemployed, left behind by Mexico's modernization, oppressed by the local cattle-ranching elite, and disenfranchised by the corrupt and entrenched

PRI machine that ran the state.<sup>21</sup>

Whatever the origin or ideological complexion of the Zapatista insurgency, local conditions were at the root of social unrest. In the end the Zapatista's "Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle" generated popular sympathy with its basic demands for jobs, land, justice, democracy, and freedom. Under NAFTA, the peasants of Chiapas feared an even greater agricultural depression in prices for coffee, corn, and fruits and vegetables. To defuse the crisis, Salinas and Zedillo promised more (largely inappropriate social works which sometimes generated more kick-backs for PRI cronies than actual economic development), and relied upon various peace initiatives, and ineffective army operations to capture Marcos. Although the Chiapas stalemate has faded from the limelight, it has further weakened the ruling party in public opinion, encouraged guerrilla uprisings in Guerrero, Oaxaca and other regions of the country, and fueled dissent within PRI's ruling family, particularly the military which had favored repression over negotiation.<sup>22</sup>

In the face of rising social conflicts since 1990, the army, some 170,000 strong, has operated like the rural police of old, sweeping into the countryside to quell peasant unrest. One great success of the Mexican Revolution was to remove military men from power politics and to stabilize civil-military relations. The result was an end to the chronic military coups and dictatorships that have plagued Mexico's other Latin American neighbors. The Chiapas uprising, as well as the militarization of Mexico's drug war, may have seriously upset that balance. Expenditures for the armed forces are up by nearly 50 percent, and for the first time for many Mexicans, "soldiers in the streets have become a part of everyday life."<sup>23</sup> Also, more conflicts such as the June 1995 massacre of seventeen peasants in Guerrero, even if on a smaller scale than the Chiapas rebellion in which over a hundred died and several hundreds were wounded, will further worsen the military's already abysmal human rights record. Not since the Massacre of students in Tlatelolco Square in 1968, has the Mexican military found itself under such negative scrutiny; and neither the PRI of Salinas or Zedillo came to their rescue.<sup>24</sup> The military's direct involvement in the drug war has fared

little better and has raised fears that the military's new powers may permit it to rival both local and national civilian authority, or more likely to serve as an instrument of internal control by a beleaguered PRI-government.<sup>25</sup>

PRI's corruption and debility has been further exposed by a year of political and drug-related assassinations and coverups, the most notorious being the killing of PRI-presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 1994, and on September 28 of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, former brother-in-law to President Salinas and General Secretary of the PRI. Arrested by Zedillo's new opposition attorney general for Ruiz Massieu's murder, Raúl Salinas, former President Salinas's brother, has also been implicated in wide drug corruption. The U.S. DEA has estimated that 75 percent of Colombian cocaine enters the United States through Mexico. After over \$120 million was discovered in Raúl Salinas' foreign bank accounts, drug corruption seemed to taint the presidency and electoral politics.<sup>26</sup> This high-level drug corruption mirrored extensive complicity by federal and state police and military forces.<sup>27</sup> Among conspiracy theories circulating, the so-called "Colombianization" of Mexico attributed the rash of assassinations, including the 1993 killing of Guadalajara's Cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, to vicious turf wars between rival Pacific and Gulf Coast drug cartels.<sup>28</sup>

Narcofunding of electoral campaigns poses an acute danger to future Mexican democracy. As one Latin Americanist reasoned, elections are extremely expensive and "money buys votes and influences policy."<sup>29</sup> In Mexico these problems may become more acute with dwindling resources and increasing demands on them, and the sheer wealth of Mexican drug traffickers. Mexico's attorney general believed that the country's drug barons earned \$27 billion annually.<sup>30</sup> Despite President Zedillo's goal to stamp out government corruption, without serious campaign financing reform and effective control of money laundering, the power of illegal money, especially when combined with NAFTA's open border, could turn Mexico into a very "uncommon democracy"--a narcodemocracy.<sup>31</sup>

### III. Revolving Dictatorship or Uncommon Democracy?

Although Pempel's theory of one-party dominant regimes assumes a group of advanced industrialized democracies with significant political openness and without "authoritarian controls," quite unlike the present Mexican system, one can argue that Mexico represents a one-party dominant regime according to the more general criteria of political theorists like Duverger, Sartori, Blondel, McDonald, and Pempel himself. Application of Pempel's scheme to Mexico confirms that as a party the PRI has been dominant in numbers and bargaining position, and both chronologically and governmentally. However, the current post-revolutionary Mexican system, with its remaining uneven industrialization and authoritarian controls, falls short of Pempel's classic one-party dominant model. Pempel argues that long-term one-party rule is not "difficult to comprehend in countries where social stagnation and rule by a limited oligarchy prevail," as in Franco's Spain, or in "authoritarian regimes where the sole legal party serves as a key element in a broad arsenal of rigid state controls," such as the Former Soviet Union or Communist China.<sup>32</sup> Clearly the Mexican model does not represent either extreme, but future democratization is essential in order to realize the uncommon democracy that Pempel describes. Both the Indian unrest and guerrilla insurgency in Chiapas and the growing power of narco-trafficking in Mexico's society and economy underline the critical absence of social dynamism and political openness integral to single-party dominance in industrialized democracies. If, as Pempel asserts, the major hallmark of democracy is a people's ability to change their government and throw the rascals out, then what is the prognosis for democracy in any regime dominated by PRI, which has never conceded a presidential election in 68 years? Is there a special relationship in Mexico between elections, democracy and alterations in power that must be considered further?

The PRI's vital role has been its ability, as is the case with one-party dominant regimes, "to dominate the nation's policy agenda, and to use that agenda to recreate

and reconstitute the dominant party's own following."<sup>33</sup> Beyond electoral politics, the Mexican PRI, as its very name implies, successfully institutionalized the policy-making roles of interest associations in Mexico--labor, business, church, military, peasants, etc.--and served as the glue in the political system. However, in the process the interests of the Mexican state and the PRI (especially powerful cliques in the party) increasingly diverged. New domestic and international forces and conditions, among them economic globalization, Mexico's national debt repayment and NAFTA, and politically the diffusion of democracy through the intervention of international nongovernmental organizations concerned with human rights and sustainable development are all playing greater roles in party politics. As a result, PRI's greater vulnerability has necessitated a closer reliance on Mexican civil society, especially industry and business, and favored an economic policy of privatization and selective liberalization and deregulation. The sell-off of hundreds of state enterprises, has forced PRI and the Mexican state to rely more heavily on private wealth and competitive campaign fund-raising. In short, economic privatization may be forcing a dramatic realignment between Mexico's ruling class and its relationship with future PRI governments and the state. Reductions in state enterprises continue to shrink the government's economic pie, and challenge PRI, which has historically relied upon pork and cooptation to forge consensus and loyalty among the party's competitive *camarillas*. Politically, PRI has lost its former hegemony, making it more difficult for Mexican president's, especially weak one's like Zedillo, to delay the democratic transition and still maintain investor confidence and critical economic stability.

#### IV. Toward a Democratic Revolution?

Whether the Mexican political system, and most particularly PRI, its dominant party, will risk full democratization in the years ahead is dependent on both political and economic factors, and the complex relationship between the two. To date, the relatively rapid but limited and fragile post-1994 economic recovery has served to

reinforce declining electoral support for PRI and has allowed President Zedillo to successfully control the pace of liberalization. Not only has economic growth been a function of political continuity and stability, but the reverse has also been true, especially in the 1990s when economic transformation "inevitably brought pressure for political change"; and forced economic restructuring since 1982 opened up not only "Mexico's creaking, protected economy" but its creaking, one-party dominant rule.<sup>34</sup> Mexico and Mexicans have changed, but can PRI change along with the country? Although President Zedillo has staked his presidency on a more open political system, the chance of electoral defeat that openness would bring has drawn him closer to PRI's traditional partisan interests. For the first time since the revolution the possibility that national power will be shared by opposing parties exists.<sup>35</sup>

Two experts have reminded us that "in Mexico the legacy of 'the Revolution' remained a key issue of contestation."<sup>36</sup> Precisely because the direction and content of future change will become more difficult to predict with democratization, contemporary Mexican political and economic reforms have the great potential to unleash a revolution within the Mexican Revolution, exposing old divisions and betrayals. In this sense the uprising in Chiapas would represent a cry for revolutionary reform and not "revolution as a relic come to life," as one journalist disparagingly characterized a 1996 guerrilla action in Peru.<sup>37</sup> Will a Mexican-style *glasnost* stimulate the resurgence of populist forces and leftist political parties, and in the process polarize political life? Or will the limited PRI-led reforms continue to freeze out leftist party alternatives while coopting and incorporating the more amenable of the popular sectors, a strategy that has worked in the past? And will the delicate recovery of the Mexican economy, now more dominated by a powerful and increasingly autonomous private sector, persist and thereby provide the necessary political incentives and space for liberalization?<sup>38</sup>

Not unlike Octavio Paz's description of the Mexican Revolution as an incredible continuous compromise of opposing forces, Mexico's coming democratic revolution will

entail several, perhaps incompatible, societal-wide struggles; one will strive to officially recast that historic compromise in favor of free market over statist economic forces and toward democratic rather than single party hegemony.<sup>39</sup> Traditionally, that compromise has occurred exclusively within PRI itself. The new century may witness a common cause and coalition government between the technocratic wing of Mexico's dominant one-party, and PAN, its most powerful opposition. PAN already shares much of the technocratic PRI's ideological and policy vision and is fast outdistancing the PRI in voter popularity. If in the past Mexican political stability has been achieved at the expense of effective democracy, in the future, the very "factors that had previously contributed to political stability could have the opposite effect."<sup>40</sup> In the twenty-first century, futile attempts to constrain the democratic revolution will contribute to regime instability.

#### Notes

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11. A. Oppenheimer, *Bordering on Chaos*, p. 169.
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# *Descriptive Representation and the Perception of Representation: Comparing Racial and Ethnic Group Perceptions in Miami and Dade County's Local Governments*

*Allen Bronson Brierly & David Moon*

## **Abstract**

*This essay compares the political interaction of race and ethnicity (Anglos, Jews, African-Americans, Cubans, non-Cuban Latins) with the perceptions of political representation in the city and county governments in Miami and Dade County, Florida (the only federated metropolitan government in the United States). The study analyzes the role of descriptive representation and the delivery of services for minority groups and individuals to assess whether typical residents perceive urban reforms by their city and county commissions.*

## **I. Introduction**

This paper compares perceptions of political representation with descriptive representation in city and county government in Miami and Dade County, Florida. The paper builds on a significant existing literature studying the importance of descriptive representation for minority groups, while examining whether individuals perceive changes in descriptive representation at the elite level. By comparing levels of representation on city and county commissions with residents' perception of representation in local government, this paper provides evidence concerning whether typical residents have sufficient information to perceive urban reforms.

Given the complexity of the changes, representation in levels of government, and the delivery of services, the case of Dade County, Florida presents an interesting test of whether most residents perceive changes in political representation because it represents the sole instance of a federated metropolitan government in the United States. In previous work<sup>1</sup>, we showed a direct connection between minority group

membership and preferences for institutional reform. This paper takes a step back, by addressing the general question of whether residents feel represented in local government in Dade County, Florida. This comparison involves an overall assessment of representation by the individual, based on their level of descriptive representation on city and county commissions.

The distinction between actual and perceived representation is as old as the field of Political Science. From Hanna Pitken's classic work, *The Concept of Representation*, onward, there has been a concerted effort to distinguish descriptive from substantive political representation for racial and ethnic group minorities. In the literature on urban reform, the existence of a single minority representative falls short of guaranteeing influence in policymaking. In these cases, even a proportional representation system may not ensure minority legislators influence over the delivery of local services. The reasons for examining how individuals perceive distinctions between descriptive and substantive representation are justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds. This is because it remains an open question whether individuals perceive the difference between descriptive and substantive representation.<sup>2</sup>

For this paper, we define descriptive representation as the correspondence between the race and ethnicity of constituents and commissioners. The literature considers descriptive representation a necessary condition for substantive representation, however, descriptive representation alone does not guarantee the existence of substantive representation. It is also quite possible that substantive representation may occur without descriptive representation. Clearly, descriptive representation is

important to constituents for symbolic reasons, and because we expect that levels of descriptive representation are related to the way residents perceive services.

One explanation for this is because the existence of some descriptive representation may hold an important psychological value for constituents. This is because citizens may become more aware of local services after the success of a minority group candidate in winning an election. We would expect attitudes toward services change because of increased contact between a minority group representative and constituents. The combination of electoral success and increased viability may also contribute to an overall increase in how much interest, and therefore information, constituents have concerning representation in local government.<sup>3</sup>

A second explanation for why attitudes toward representation may vary involves the actual distribution of services. Although the evidence in the literature is mixed, patterns of employment, contracting, and expenditures may change because of changes in descriptive representation. For example, the evidence suggests mayors may have a greater impact than changes in commission elections. There is also evidence of a lag time between changes in elective representation and changes in either employment or contracting patterns in local government. These delays may occur because expenditure patterns reflect cost rather than demand factors, or because spending levels provide an imperfect measure of actual service delivery



output. As a result of these complexities, citizens may not perceive a difference between descriptive and substantive representation.

Perceptions are an important consideration when gaps do exist between descriptive and substantive representation in local government. While citizen perceptions are important for many reasons, those concerned with questions of minority representation are generally pursuing factors that increase both mobilization and access. Furthermore, without some articulation of what citizens want, attributing satisfaction levels or particular policy demands to them is presumptuous. Ultimately, the policy demands that "count" are those that influence citizen attitudes. Substantive representation may be in the eye of the beholder, but, when the beholder is a voter, perceptions matter. Consequently, the examination of citizen perceptions of representation is an important part of any consideration of whether citizens have a voice in their local government.

Perceptions of representation depend on whether individuals believe they can make local government listen to their demands. These attitudes may flow from either an individual citizen's feeling about local service outcomes or a citizen's views about local political leaders and officials. Voice, or the perception that local government is responsive to demands, depends on whether individuals believe that their demands are considered when representatives make policy decisions. No one bases perceptions of voice only on the level of attention given individuals. Some believe individual perception may also include the importance groups have within coalitions. This may occur because members of ethnic groups may make inferences about their policy influence based on actual numbers of group members serving in a local legislature. At the same time, these inferences may be inaccurate because descriptive representation fails to correspond with substantive representation. This occurs when groups are not incorporated in decisive coalitions within a legislature. In these situations, legislators may exclude ethnic group members on a council from ruling coalitions, or their votes may be considered inconsequential by others involved in the bargaining over policy.<sup>4</sup>

For voters with limited knowledge about local politics, numbers and percentages may be important, visible information about whether a local legislature represents a community's racial and ethnic composition. Of course voters may disregard such evidence in the face of clearly responsive or unresponsive service delivery patterns. We expect that an individual's sense of voice be related to real differences in how groups are treated concerning service outcomes. We also expect that the correspondence between the race and ethnicity of the electorate and the racial and ethnic background of the legislature will contribute to differences in perceptions of voice.<sup>5</sup>

Dade County Florida presents an interesting context in which to compare descriptive representation with perceived representation. This is because the numerical representation of minorities varies across incorporated cities and unincorporated community's within Dade County's federated governmental structure. This variation also reflects changes in the composition of Dade County's electorate and in the institutional arrangements employed for representation on Dade County city and county commissions.

The County Commission provides services for all residents, while the Dade League of Cities exerts considerable influence throughout the incorporated areas of Dade County. The Dade County Commission has substantial powers, which they are redefining after the recent creation of a strong mayor form of government and the adoption of a single member district system for electing members to the Commission. City governments retain varying degrees of local autonomy adding to the intricacy of the representation system in Dade County politics.

Dade County also contains different majorities from other metropolitan studies, where Non-Latin Whites are a minority, with African-Americans and Latino-Americans forming distinct minorities, alone and combined. In addition, these ethnic cleavages are politically salient, where identifiable subgroups exist within the more widely studied racial and ethnic groupings. Many of these groupings have not been examined within the literature with survey data. This paper fills this void by comparing actual

numerical representation with the perceived responsiveness of local government across racial and ethnic groups in Dade County.<sup>6</sup>

The evidence presented here examines three related hypotheses concerning political representation. First, we combine survey data and actual data on commissions to test whether members of racial and ethnic groups perceive differences in political representation. Given the variation in minority group representation on commissions, we expect to find variation in the perceptions linked to variation in descriptive representation. Second, we also examine whether descriptive representation is positively related to perceived representation. Specifically, we would expect that increases in descriptive representation correspond with increased perceived representation. Finally, the literature suggests that substantive representation is positively related to perceived representation. We use survey data to test the first two hypotheses and discuss the likelihood of the third hypothesis being true given the division of policy responsibilities between the cities and county government in Dade County.

## II. Political Representation in Dade County, Florida

### *Service Delivery Issues*

A referendum in 1957 created the Dade County Metro-government. Since then, there have been repeated proposals to change the representation system. Several reforms involved changing the election procedures for the County Commission. Before Metro-Dade, the County government used at-large elections, where voters throughout the County elected five representatives to the County Commission. The original Metro-Dade Commission employed a combination of at-large and district elections from 1957 through 1963, with five districts created for residency purposes (called an at-large, place system), and three districts for cities over 60,000. In 1957, only the City of Miami qualified for a city district; however, by 1960, both Hialeah and Miami Beach also gained a seat under this provision. After the creation of Metro-Dade, political leaders in favor of metropolitan government found out quickly that these districts elected anti-Metro, or pro-decentralization representatives, who sided

with the incumbent County commissioners from the pre-Metro County Commission elected in 1956. These incumbent Commissioners held their five seats until the Fall 1960 elections. At this time, some of the anti-Metropolitan government forces, led by one of the incumbent commissioners (Johnny McLeod), proposed a series of initiatives to weaken the Metro-Dade charter. The defeat of these proposals and incumbent commissioners resulted in a proposal for a nine-member, at-large, election system. This referendum was passed in the Fall 1963. As a result, pro-Metro organizations eliminated the city districts, other districts, and place requirements for election to the Metro-Dade Commission. The residency or place requirements were later restored.<sup>7</sup>

More recent attempts at reform began in the mid-1980's, when concerns about the costs of the Metro-Rail, mass transportation, system became an important issue. Homeowners, businesses, and other anti-tax groups sought to alter the representation system to elect more business-oriented or fiscally conservative representatives. The rapid and extensive development of suburban areas within unincorporated Dade County also led to additional concerns with both the lack of decentralized access to planning and zoning and the overall pro-development slant of Metro-Dade Commissioners. During this period, homeowner associations in Key Biscayne, plus East and West Kendall, began an ever increasing demand for decentralization of zoning and planning decisions to the neighborhood or community level.

The present manifestation of this movement has produced some increases in decentralization consisting of sixteen elective district councils and community-level Department units called Team Metro. Metro-Dade officials organized both Team Metro and Community Councils around neighborhood units, in a comprehensive effort by Metro-Dade to devolve some service delivery information, problems, and casework to the community level. Metro-Dade is using this twofold approach to both decentralize and extend authority to communities within unincorporated Dade County. In part, they have intended this effort to slow the creation of new municipalities

which is also taking place in Dade County, with the recent incorporation of four cities (Key Biscayne, Aventura, Pinecrest, and Sunny Isles Beach).

Ironically, the original supporters of reform, including the *Miami Herald*, Dan Paul and Ed Sofen predicted this demand for decentralization or federation in the governmental structure of Metro-Dade. Yet, for a twenty-year period, the Dade County Commission choose to ignore these demands for changes in the delivery and administration of services. Under these service delivery arrangements, those citizens living in unincorporated Dade County had the County Commission as their sole local legislature. Over the years some efforts at federation were made by allowing areas to create special tax districts for capital improvements. A referendum established elective fire protection boards, while other Metro-Dade services were targeted to communities under various task force recommendations and comprehensive or strategic plans. In all of these cases, there were insufficient resources to independently administer services. At present, the County Commission governs those citizens who reside in the unincorporated areas of Dade County and Metro-Dade's presence is also visible in the smaller cities who contract with the County for many of their services. City residents are governed in part by the Dade County Commission, and in part, by their locally-elected municipal government.

#### *Minority Group Representation*

Until the 1980's, many studies argued that a small and homogeneous group of Anglos held power in Dade County. This group was called the "non-group" because it generally attempted to influence the policymaking process after elections, rather than run candidates for office. With some notable exceptions, the "non-group" has become less influential in recent times with the rapid social, economic, and political changes that have taken place in Dade County. Many new political leaders among Dade's elite are Latinos, with some African-Americans gaining influence in Dade County politics. In contrast to most of the postwar growth period in Greater Miami, there is at present no easily identifiable elite<sup>8</sup>

The shift in elites parallels the shift in the electorate from the 1950's, when Southern Whites with a substantial Jewish population made up 80% of the population in Greater Miami. At the time of the survey, the Dade County electorate was 45% Latino, 36% White, and 19% African-American ("Dade County Facts," 1986). Since this time, the proportion of Latinos and African-Americans in the population and registered electorate have both increased slightly.

While the most publicized explanation for these figures involves immigration from Cuba, people have come to Miami from all over Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. This immigration has not, for the most part, produced residential integration. Instead, there are identifiable ethnic communities or "enclaves" in Dade County. Geographically, the areas occupied by Non-Latin Whites are found in the beach towns and along the northern (Broward County), western (the Everglades), and southern (Monroe County) boundaries of development in Dade County. While African-American and Latino neighborhoods exist throughout Dade County in Liberty City and Hialeah, they tend to be concentrated in the central part of the county, in some older neighborhoods, such as Overtown and Little Havana inside the City of Miami.<sup>9</sup>

The location of racial and ethnic communities has a noticeable influence on political representation on city and county commissions. For example, Non-Latin/Non-Jewish White majorities (frequently called Anglo) exist in the suburbs of Coral Gables, Miami Shores, North Miami, Miami Springs, Virginia Gardens, El Portal, and Biscayne Park. There is also an Anglo majority in Homestead, the largest incorporated city in southern Dade County. African-Americans have been elected to the mayors office and form a majority of the commissions in Florida City (Otis Wallace) and Opa-locka (Robert Ingram). These two small cities are in the extreme southern and northwestern edges of Dade County, and, until the early 1980's, both had Anglo majorities on their city commissions.

Despite a pronounced descriptive under-representation on the Metro-Commission

(i.e., 1 of 9 seats vs. 45% of the population), there has been a perception of growing influence throughout Dade County politics by Latinos. The recent creation of a strong mayor's office has reinforced this perception in the County government, through the historical appointments of Latinos to the County Manager's office and the City Manager's office in Miami, and the election of Latinos to single-member districts on the Metro-Commission and various city commissions in Dade County. As evidence of this increase, Latinos achieved council majorities in the two largest cities in Dade County (Miami and Hialeah), and three other suburbs (Hialeah Gardens, West Miami, and Sweetwater) in the late-1970's and early-1980's. Latino candidates have also been also elected to the mayor's offices for

the cities of Miami (Maurice Ferre, Xavier Suarez, Joe Carollo), Hialeah (Raul Martinez), Hialeah Gardens (Gilda Oliveros), Sweetwater (Gloria Bango), Coral Gables (Raul Valdes-Fauli), West Miami (Rebeca Sosa), Metro-Dade County (Alex Penales). Thus, the perception of growing influence is, in part, based on an actual increase in Latino representation.

Furthermore, increasing Latino representation involves a diversity of groups within the Latino community. This ascendancy of Latino representation began with the election of Maurice Ferre (of Puerto Rican heritage) as Mayor of Miami in 1973 and Manolo Rebozo (a Cuban-American) to the Miami City Commission. This process continued when Raul Martinez and Andres Mejides (both Cuban-Americans) were first elected to the City of Hialeah Commission in 1977. By 1985, Nicaraguan-Americans

held a majority of seats on the Sweetwater Commission and the former Mayor of Sweetwater, Jorge Valdez, was elected as the first Latino member of the Metro-Dade Commission. Increased Latino representation has also come at a price. Rivalries between Democrats and Republicans, the County and city governments, and older municipalities versus new suburban areas have also increased with the increased number of seats. For example, Maurice Ferre defeated Manolo Rebozo twice for the Mayoralty of Miami. Later, Xavier Suarez (a Cuban-American) competed against Maurice Ferre (of Puerto Rican heritage) three times for the City of Miami Mayor's office and the County Mayor's office. Recent elections in the City Miami have involved a Suarez-backed candidate (Victor DeYurre) who lost to Joe Carollo, a candidate who has run 7 times for the Miami City Commission against African-

TABLE 1: REPRESENTATION STATUS OF ETHNIC GROUPS ON COMMISSIONS

Jurisdiction	Anglo	Jewish	Black	Cuban	Latin
Dade County	Minority	Minority	Minority	No Seats	Minority
Miami	Minority	No Seats	Minority	Majority	No Seats
Hialeah	Minority	No Seats	No Seats	Majority	No Seats
Coral Gables	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	Minority	No Seats
North Miami	Majority	Minority	No Seats*	No Seats	No Seats
Miami Beach	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Opa-Locka	Minority	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats
North Miami Beach	Minority	Majority	No Seats	Majority	No Seats
Homestead	Majority	No Seats	Minority	No Seats	No Seats
South Miami	Minority	Minority	Minority	No Seats	No Seats
Miami Shores	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Miami Springs	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Hialeah Gardens	Minority	No Seats	No Seats	Majority	No Seats
Florida City	Minority	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats
West Miami	Minority	No Seats	No Seats	Majority	No Seats
Bal Harbour	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Bay Harbour Islands	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Sweetwater	Minority	No Seats	No Seats	Minority	Majority
North Bay Village	No Seats	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
El Portal	Majority*	Minority	Minority	No Seats	No Seats
Biscayne Park	Majority	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats	No Seats
Virginia Gardens	Majority*	No Seats	No Seats	Minority	No Seats
Surfside	Minority	Minority	No Seats	Minority	No Seats

American and Cuban-American candidates, including winning and losing previous commission elections to DeYurre. Both candidates are Cuban-American, yet the elections have been competitive, involving distinct factions within the City of Miami. With respect to partisan affiliation, Alex Penales, Raul Martinez, and Maurice Ferre are all Democrats, while Xavier Suarez, Jorge Valdez, and all of the elective state legislative (and Congressional) leadership is Republican.<sup>10</sup>

Besides politics in the City of Miami, there is also substantial evidence of individual and factional competition for seats on the Hialeah City Commission. This competition extends to the County-level, where Jorge Valdez was defeated by Alex Penales (a Cuban-American). Indeed, Alex Penales's victory is particularly notable, because he is the first to hold the recently created strong mayor's office for Metro-Dade County. In the primary election for this office, he defeated both Xavier Suarez and Maurice Ferre. In certain ways, Penales represents a distinct change in the elective leadership because he represents a younger generation of Latino voters. In each of his elections, beginning with his election to the Hialeah City Commission, Penales has defeated more visible candidates or candidates that have had the endorsement of established political leaders.

While descriptive representation for Latinos is increasing, there are exceptions to this trend. For example, Latinos comprise over one-third of the population of Miami Beach and Miami Springs, yet they presently hold no seats on these City Commissions. Furthermore, other Latino communities, such as Mexican-Americans in the Homestead area and Central American immigrants in Miami and Miami Beach appear to receive little attention from County government, despite sporadic protests. One prominent Mexican-American leader from South Dade has been outspoken in his criticism of Cuban-American political leadership in Dade County, while the most recent civil disturbance was concentrated in the Winwood neighborhood, historically the center of the Puerto Ricans' community in the City of Miami. Thus, we should not conclude that Latino ascendancy has been uniform throughout Dade County.

Furthermore, Cuban-American success in achieving political incorporation has not always translated into increased representation for other Latino groups in Dade County (e.g., Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, and other Central and South Americans).

The perception of growing influence by Latinos in County politics is very different from the limited representation of African-Americans and the perceived loss of clout by Non-Latin Whites. Besides recent city commission majorities in Florida City and Opa-Locka, African-Americans have held up to two seats on the Miami and South Miami City Commissions, and a seat on the Metro-Dade Commission since the 1960's. However, this pattern has changed in recent elections. For example, in the most recent elections African-Americans have lost their only seat on the Miami City Commission and the Metro-Dade Mayor's election. African-American leaders were also defeated in a referendum proposal to create a new majority African-American city, called Destiny, while Anglo-majority areas voted in favor of incorporation (Aventura and Pinecrest). These represent significant defeats for the African-American community in Dade County. At the same time, African-Americans have won a seat on the North Miami Commission (Larry Sorey), a majority of seats on the El Portal City Commission, and the Mayor's office in the City of South Miami (Anna Price).

For both Anglos and African-Americans, the perceived loss of representation is based on the ongoing trends and events in Dade County. Others are based on the changes in commissions described earlier, and the significance attributed to the loss of specific elections. For Anglo residents, this involves the replacement of Stephen Clark as Mayor of Miami and Metro-Dade by Joe Carollo and Alex Penales. While Alex Penales' general election defeat of Arthur Teele (an African-American, Republican) is an additional signal of the growing importance of the Latino vote in Dade County politics, Latinos do not form a countywide majority on their own. Anglos hold majorities on seventeen city commissions (Aventura, Bal Harbour, Bay Harbour Islands, Biscayne Park, Coral Gables, Homestead, Key Biscayne, Medley,

Miami Beach, Miami Shores, Miami Springs, North Bay Village, North Miami, North Miami Beach, Pinecrest, South Miami, Surfside, and Virginia Gardens). This list includes four newly created cities (underlined), where we have included these residents in the county totals for the purposes of this study.

Given these patterns of descriptive representation, and the changes that are occurring in Dade County, there is ample reason to believe that racial and ethnic group members hold different attitudes toward representation in local government. The geographical segregation of groups into definable communities and the degree to which change has occurred in local elections assures that race and ethnicity is a salient part of how Dade County residents view themselves and their local government.

### III. The Survey

To determine the attitudes of Dade County residents about the representativeness of their local government, telephone interviews were conducted in April of 1987 with 535 individuals selected randomly from the population of active Dade County telephone exchanges. The sample was drawn by Statistical Sampling, Inc., Fairfield, Connecticut from a population of all listed and unlisted telephone households in Dade County (estimated to be 90.8% of all households in Dade County). We screened respondents for political eligibility in Metro-Dade elections (i.e., U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older residing in Dade County).

Of the 514 respondents answering questions about their ethnicity, 50.1% were Whites, 32.5% were Latinos (64.7% of these Cuban-American) and 13.4% were African-American. In contrast, the population figures for Dade County in 1987 were roughly 36% White, 45% Latino and 19% African-American. Latinos and African-Americans, then, were under-represented in our sample. This does not mean that the sampling procedure itself was biased in any significant way. Rather, we believe that two factors contributed to the disparity between the population and sample proportions. First, most recent immigrants to Dade County from foreign countries have been either Black or Latino, so that Latinos and African-

Americans in Dade County have higher concentrations of those under age 18 (as evidenced by school populations). Since we were primarily interested in potential (though not necessarily registered) voters' opinions about Metro-Dade government, we screened respondents for political eligibility (i.e., age and citizenship). Thus, an accurate sample of those who are currently political eligible should contain lower proportions of Blacks and Latinos than the population as a whole. Second, there may be a higher proportion of non-telephone households among those sections of the population. This may occur for a variety of reasons, related to income, mobility, and home ownership. Both of these factors may contribute to fewer households being in the telephone pool.<sup>11</sup>

While the sample reasonably reflects the population of the county as a whole, the data will be used here to compare various groups in their geographic contexts. Thus, making the sample as much like the population in each of the various parts of the county as possible is desirable. Therefore, a re-sampling procedure was used prior to the data analysis, using census information for comparison.<sup>12</sup> After re-sampling, the sample proportions are almost equal to those in the census figures. This was done to allow direct comparisons between representation on city-county commissions with the attitudes of those cities' inhabitants toward the representativeness of Dade County government.

#### IV. Results

The analysis below breaks the sample down into five racial/ethnic groups, reflecting the racial and ethnic groups in Dade County politics. The five groups are: Non-Jewish/Non-Latin Whites (Anglo, N = 177), Cuban Latinos (Cuban, N = 137), African-American (Black, N = 97), Jewish/Non-Latin White (Jewish, N = 81), and Non-Cuban Latinos (Latin, N = 66). Our attribution of which "city" each respondent lived in is based on the respondent's address, not their self-placement.

##### *Commission Representation*

Table Two compares the race and ethnicity of the respondent with the racial and ethnic composition of each respondent's

Commission. For summary purposes, we calculated the median for each category by assigning -1 for no seats, 0 for some seats and 1 for a majority of seats (as in Table One), summing for all respondents in that category and dividing by the number of respondents in that category. The median, then, is an index of descriptive representation for each grouping. Table Two shows that 81.4% of the Non-Jewish Non-Latin Whites (Anglos) in the survey lived in areas having at least one Anglo Commissioner, whereas only 15.3% lived in areas with an Anglo majority on their local commission. Thus, Anglos had some, but not a majority, representation on a commission in over 4/5 of the cases.

The pattern of representation for African-Americans generally parallels Anglos. Besides commission majorities in Florida City and Opa-Locka, there was one African-American Commissioner on the Dade County (Barbara Carey, later replaced by Arthur Teele) and Miami City (Miller Dawkins) Commissions. Similarly, there was a single Anglo Commissioner on the City of Miami (J.L. Plummer), Florida City (Steve Shiver), Sweetwater (Ron Mitro), and Hialeah (Ray Robinson) Commissions (where the latter two have since retired).

Since these seats are key to the existence of some representation, it is not surprising that African-American and Anglo leaders in Dade County have been concerned with the at-large system used to elect commissioners in Dade County. The existence of substantial Latino communities with the cities of Miami Beach and South Miami, non-Cuban Latino

communities within the cities of Opa-Locka, Florida City, and Homestead, and Haitian communities in Miami and North Miami also contributes to these concerns. Although the primary focus has been on increasing descriptive representation at the countywide level, many secondary issues increasingly are involving other layers of government such as the County School Board and city commissions.

In contrast to Anglos and African-Americans, most Cuban-Americans lived in areas with either a majority or no representation on their local commission. Cuban-American representation also differs from that available to other Latinos, since only 1.5% of other Latinos in the sample live in Sweetwater. All the "Some Seats" category involves other Latino residents in unincorporated Dade County. Through the defeat of an incumbent, this County Commission seat has changed hands since the time of the survey. As a result, it is fair to say that Latinos other than Cuban-Americans have virtually no descriptive representation in Dade County politics. Again, this contrasts with Cuban-Americans, since more than 3/5 of the Cuban-Americans in the sample lived in the four cities with Cuban-American majorities on their commissions.

A final point about descriptive representation concerns the existence of a notable minority within the Non-Latin White community. Jewish Commissioners form majorities in five cities, and they held a plurality of the seats on the County

TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION ON COMMISSIONS  
BY ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT

Council Representation	Anglo	Jewish	Black	Cuban	Latin
No Seats*	3.4%	11.1%	9.3%	35.8%	53.0%
Some Seats or Minority**	81.4%	56.8%	85.6%	2.9%	45.5%
Majority	15.3%	32.1%	5.2%	61.3%	1.5%
Average	.119	.210	-.041	.255	-.515
Group Ranking: High-Low	3	2	4	1	5

\*No Seats = -1; \*\*Some Seats = 0; \*\*\*Majority of Seats = +1

Commission. In Dade County politics, Jewish leaders are both visible, and at times, provide independent leadership from other Non-Latin White groups, such as the "non-group" described earlier in the paper. Jewish leaders also form commission majorities in cities that have been socially distinct and geographically isolated from Latinos. Given this separation, the existence of significant Jewish and Cuban-American representation has provided the basis for two competing, and sometimes conflicting, sources of leadership in Dade County elections.

Based on the percentages reported in Table Two, the geographic breakdown of respondents reveals that Cuban-Americans had the greatest level of descriptive representation overall, among Dade County's racial and ethnic groups. This level of descriptive representation was followed closely by Jewish and Anglo residents. The results also confirm that African Americans were distinctly less well represented, while Non-Cuban Latinos trailed far behind the other groups in achieving descriptive representation.

*Perceived Representation*

Besides informational questions and other questions involving structural reforms in local government, we asked respondents to evaluate the job Metro-Dade does in giving each citizen a voice in local government.<sup>13</sup> Though the question specifically addresses the County Commission, the federated structure of Dade County government makes responsibility for substantive representation difficult to assign with any certainty. In a series of questions about officeholders, for example, respondents frequently confused the mayors of Dade County and the City of Miami, and these attribution errors are consistent with studies of voter attitudes in other metropolitan structures. Therefore, we treat this question as an overall perception of representation, or assessment of voice, in Dade County politics.<sup>14</sup>

Table Three summarizes this assessment for members of each of the previously described racial and ethnic groups. In each case, we calculated a group median in a manner similar to the calculation of group medians based on descriptive representation, where responses of "very poor" or "poor"

**TABLE 3: PERCEIVED REPRESENTATION BY ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT**

Response on Representation Question	Anglo	Jewish	Black	Cuban	Latin
Very Poor or Poor*	27.1%	29.6%	26.8%	19%	12.1%
Adequate**	43.5%	39.5%	34.0%	35.8%	48.5%
Good or Very Good	29.4%	30.9%	39.2%	45.3%	39.4%
Average	.023	.012	.124	.263	.273
Group Ranking: High-Low	4	5	3	2	1

\*Very Poor = -2; Poor = -1 \*\*Adequate = 0; \*\*\*Good = +1 Very Good = +2

were assigned a value of -1, "adequate" was assigned a score of 0, and "good" or "very good" responses were given a score of 1. The group median, then, is an index of perceived representation for each group. Responses to the question about voice suggest that groups have very different perceptions of representation in Dade County. Index scores for perceived representation show that Non-Latin Whites (Jewish and non-Jewish) feel least represented, whereas Latinos feel the most represented, with African-Americans falling somewhere in-between.<sup>15</sup>

Given the results in Tables 3 and 4, we are ready to examine the viability of the first hypothesis: specifically, do race and ethnicity make a difference in how residents' perceive representation. To test for statistical

differences in perception, we estimated a series of equations of voice (using the trichotomized version of voice as the dependent variable).<sup>16</sup> The independent variables for each test were categorical variables for four of the five ethnic groups. We estimated this model five times, using a different group as the excluded or comparison category in each model. By applying this methodology, we can perform difference-of-means tests for each pairing of groups.

The estimated coefficients reveal that Anglo and Jewish respondents hold lower opinions of their voice in local government when compared with Cuban and Latino respondents. These findings also confirm that significant differences exist among racial and ethnic groups, at least when employing

**TABLE 4: PERCEIVED REPRESENTATION BY ETHNICITY OF RESPONDENT: A DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST**

Reference Category	D.V.Y. =	Intercept	Cuban	Latin	Black	Jewish	Anglo
Cuban	Voice =	.959	excluded	-.055	-.319**	-.406**	-.383**
Latin	Voice =	.904	+.055	excluded	-.263	-.351*	-.329**
Black	Voice =	.640	+.319**	+.263	excluded	-.088	-.065
Jewish	Voice =	.553	+.407	+.351*	+.088	excluded	-.023
Anglo	Voice =	.576	+.384**	+.329**	+.065	-.023	excluded

Note: Each row represents the (probit) estimates for a voice equation intercept and slope, where the dependent variable is perceived representation in each equation.

\*t-test is significant at the .10 level  
 \*\* t-test is significant at the .05 level

the conventional tri-ethnic distinctions. The results do not support a more complex set of cleavages, involving five groups, suggesting that diversity within racial and ethnic groups were less important than the differences in perception between the Anglo, African-American, and Latino-communities.

#### *Comparing Perceptions with Actual Representation*

Given the significant differences in perceived representation across racial and ethnic groups, are the perceptions of individuals consistent with the level of those individuals' descriptive representation in Dade County? We test this second hypothesis by considering the relationship between scores on voice (or perceived representation) and scores on descriptive representation for each individual. The expectation is that greater descriptive representation should correspond with greater perceived representation.

Table Five presents the results of a tabular analysis of this relationship for all respondents, followed by an analysis in Table Six of the bivariate relationship between commission representation (majority, minority, no seats) and perceived representation (very poor-poor, adequate, good-very good). As the findings in Tables Five and Six demonstrate, descriptive and perceived representation is statistically unrelated across the whole sample and for each group.

We can interpret this absence of a statistical correlation further by comparing the indices based on the findings presented in Table Two and Table Three. From these results, it also appears there is a considerable discrepancy between perceived and descriptive representation for most of the groups in our study. Specifically, Table Seven shows that Non-Cuban Latinos and, to a lesser extent, African-Americans are more sanguine about their representation than their level of descriptive representation appears to warrant. Jewish respondents, on the other hand, appear to see their level of

**TABLE 5:**  
**A COMPARISON OF PERCEIVED VS. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION**  
Cross-tabulation: All Respondent

Perceived Representation	Descriptive Representation				
	Count	No Seats	Some Seats	Majority	Row Total
Col. Pct.					
Poor or Very Poor	27/22.9%	82/27.6%	25/17.5%	134/24.0%	
Adequate	38/32.2%	122/41.1%	61/42.7%	221/39.6%	
Good or Very Good	53/44.9%	93/31.3%	57/39.9%	203/36.4%	
Column Total	118/21.1%	297/53.2%	143/25.6%	558/100.0%	

\* Kendall's tau-b = .009 (not significant)

**TABLE 6: ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF DESCRIPTIVE ON PERCEIVED REPRESENTATION: A PROBIT ANALYSIS OF VOICE BY COMMISSION REPRESENTATION**

Sample	Dependent Variable	Intercept	Slope
All Respondents	Voice=	.705	+.014
Anglo Respondents Only	Voice=	.607	+.020
Jewish Respondents Only	Voice=	.584	-.020
Black Respondents Only	Voice=	.555	-.077
Cuban Respondents Only	Voice=	.853	+.165
Latino Respondents Only	Voice=	.988	-.381

Note: Actual commission representation is the independent variable in each equation. None of the estimated slope coefficients achieved statistical significance at the 10 level.

representation in a less positive light than one would expect based on their relative level of descriptive representation. Finally, Anglos and Cuban-Americans are slightly less satisfied and slightly more satisfied, respectively, than their descriptive representation suggests they might be.

There are many plausible explanations for the divergence between descriptive representation and perceived representation. For Latino and African-American respondents there may be symbolic value in having a representative on the Metro-Dade Commission (and for African-Americans, the Miami City Commission, as well). These groups may also overestimate the value of majorities in three small cities (so that, for example, a Commission majority in Opa-

Locka, El Portal, or Florida City may provide some symbolic value for African-American residents in other parts of Dade County). Furthermore, Non-Cuban Latinos may feel better represented by a Cuban-American than by a Non-Latin White or African-American, while Anglo and Jewish respondents may perceive dim future prospects for representation given the demographic and electoral trends. Finally, all residents may undervalue either the existence of seats in small cities or a single seat on a commission.

#### *Substantive Representation: Commission Representation with greater Functional Responsibility*

As a way of partially testing the third hypothesis that substantive representation

**TABLE 7: COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED REPRESENTATION BY ETHNIC GROUP SAMPLE MEANS**

Group Indexes	Anglo Sample Mean	Jewish Sample Mean	Black Sample Mean	Cuban Sample Mean	Latino Sample Mean
Commission Representation	+ .119	+ .210	- .041	+ .255	.515
Voice Question	+ .023	+ .012	+ .124	+ .263	+ .273
Rank Ordering of Group Means	Largest Average #1	Second #2	Third #4	Fourth #4	Fifth #5
Commission Representation	Cuban >	Jewish >	Anglo >	Black >	Latino
Voice Question	Latino >	Cuban >	Black >	Anglo >	Jewish

effects perceived representation, we believe there may also be a differential value of commission seats in larger cities with greater control over local services. If substantive representation is important to perceived representation, council representation in local governments with greater functional responsibility should matter more than representation in governments with less control over service delivery.

In Dade County, the jurisdictions with the greatest functional responsibility are Metro-Dade County, Miami, Hialeah, Miami Beach, and Coral Gables. Rather than examining descriptive representation throughout Dade County, citizens may base their perceptions on Commission representation within the most important, functionally, local government jurisdictions. However, descriptive representation on these five commissions produces the following rank ordering as to winning seats: 1) Cuban-Americans, 2) Jewish, 3) Anglos, 4) African-Americans, 5) other Latinos. Since perceived representation was inconsistent with this ranking, greater descriptive representation in the jurisdictions with more responsibility for the delivery of services fails to account for the differences between descriptive and perceived representation. Although we believe there must be some connection between substantive and perceived representation, the findings suggest that there is no simple relationship between control over jurisdictions with greater functional responsibility for service

delivery and citizens' sense of voice.

With respect to the group perceptions themselves, few objective observers of Dade County politics would conclude that local government has better served African-Americans. In this case, changes in expectations must play some role in perceptions. For instance, if Non-Latin Whites perceive themselves to be losing ground, whereas Hispanics generally feel they are gaining, perceptions may follow these trends, rather than actual current levels of descriptive or substantive representation. We did not find much support then for the third hypothesis that perceived representation is determined by substantive representation, but this does not preclude that there is some underlying connection between perceived responsiveness and perceived representation.

In summary, the results show that descriptive representation differs by racial and ethnic groups in Dade County. Racial and ethnic differences are also significantly related to perceived representation. Evidence confirms this conclusion by showing that statistically significant differences exist between traditionally defined racial and ethnic groups: Non-Latin Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos. However, it may not be the case that descriptive representation drives perceived representation. It is also unlikely that differences in substantive representation adequately account for the differences in perceived representation or for the gap between perceived and descriptive representation.

## V. Conclusion

The question of how representation interacts with race and ethnicity involves a complex set of symbolic and tangible issues. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the relationship between descriptive representation for racial and ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the perception of representation, on the other, is itself not a simple one.

Even when asked, we would expect that people would respond, at least in part, based on their level of descriptive representation in local government. With respect to Metro-Dade government, actual representation involved four Anglo, three Jewish, one African-American and one non-Cuban Latino Commissioners. Yet, perceptions were clearly inconsistent with representation on the Metro-Dade County Commission. Based on the level of descriptive representation on the County Commission, we would expect Non-Latin Whites (both Anglo and Jewish) to feel well-represented, African-Americans and Non-Cuban Latinos to feel somewhat represented, and the Cuban-American citizens of Dade County to feel very much unrepresented. Perceptions, then, were almost perfectly inverted from what we would predict based on descriptive representation.

One explanation for this important counterintuitive finding is that individuals may not institutionally relate descriptive representation to substantive representation. The lack of a connection occurs in many metropolitan areas because local legislative representation is weakly connected to the functional responsibilities for delivering services. In many metropolitan areas, including Dade County, the existence of overlapping jurisdictions and complex contracting arrangements for delivering services make it difficult for most citizens' to evaluate either descriptive or substantive representation.<sup>17</sup>

This information problem is likely to be worse in every other metropolitan area in the country, since Metro-Dade is the sole metropolitan government in the United States. While residents may have difficulty sorting out the functional responsibilities of Metro-Dade, municipal governments, and the



recently created cities and district councils, the premise of two-tier federalism is firmly ensconced in Dade County politics. Residents in other metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, have a much larger number of city, county, special district, and contracting arrangements to ponder when evaluating substantive representation. Furthermore, we seldom explain these combinations formally, because there is no metropolitan government charter in place for a whole area.

This complexity has consequences not only for studies of representation, but for citizens seeking to hold local government accountable for the delivery of services. In most metropolitan areas, we may closely link descriptive representation to symbolic responsiveness, but only tangentially relate descriptive representation to actual service delivery outcomes or patterns in policy responsiveness. Such complexity may well mean that individuals in the same jurisdiction perceive representation in significantly different ways. In Dade County, both perceptions and descriptive representation are clearly related to racial and ethnic groupings. It is not, however, simply the case that the greater a group's descriptive representation, the greater that group's perceived representation. This suggests other factors such as relative expectations based on experience, events and trends play important roles as well.<sup>18</sup>

**Notes**

1. Allen Bronson Brierly & David Moon, "Electoral Coalitions and Institutional Stability: The Case of Metropolitan Reform in Dade County, Florida", *The Journal of Politics*, (vol.3) n.53 (August 1991); p.701-719; Allen Bronson Brierly & David Moon, "Ethnic Differences in Greater Miami," in Susan A. MacManus ed., *Reapportionment and Representation in Florida: A Historical Collection*. (Tampa, FL: Intrabay Innovation Institute.1991).
2. Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation*. (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1967); Joseph Stewart & Kenneth J. Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: The Case of Florida", Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, Florida, 7-9 November 1991; Susan Welch & Timothy Bledsoe, *Urban Reform and Its Consequences: A Study in Representation*.(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
3. S. Welch & T.Bledsoe, *Urban Reform and Its Consequences: A Study in Representation*, p. xvii.

4. S.A. MacManus ed., *Reapportionment and Representation in Florida: A Historical Collection*, p. 638; Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall & David H. Tabb., *Protest is not Enough* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), p.25.
5. J. Stewart & K.J. Meier, "Representative Bureaucracy: The Case of Florida", p.7.
6. Bruce Cain & Roderick Kiewiet, "Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican-American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District", in *Social Science Quarterly* n.65: p.315-327; Dorothy Gaiter, "Keep the 'Tri' in Tri-ethnic Society", in *The Miami Herald* (26 June 1987); Clarence N. Stone, Robert K. Whelan & William J. Murin., *Urban Policy and Politics in a Bureaucratic Age*.(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986).
7. Brian Dickerson, "Miami's Power Elite", in *The Miami Herald* (31 January 1988): p.1A; Edward Sofen., *The Miami Metropolitan Experiment: A Metropolitan Action Study*.(New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1966), p.63; Celia Dugger, "New Rivals Challenge Old Guard", in *The Miami Herald* (1 February 1988): p.1A; Justin Gillis & Neil Brown, "Strong Political Leadership is Unpopular, Risky in Dade", in *The Miami Herald* (4 February 1988): p.1A.
8. Edward Sofen, "Miami (Dade County): Yes, But..." in Edward Banfield ed, *Big City Politics*, New York: Random House.,1965); Christopher Boyd, "Latin Builders Increase Political Clout." *The Miami Herald* (3 February 1988): p.1A.
9. Alejandro Portes & Robert L. Bach, *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p.204; David Rieff, *Going to Miami: Exiles, Tourists and Refugees in the New America*.(Boston: Little, Brown , 1987).
10. Brad Edmondson, "In Little Managua: Nicaraguans are Transforming Miami as They Stake Out Their Territory", in *American Demographics*, n.11 (1989): p. 53-55.
11. Daniel Balz, "Polling and the Latino Community: Does Anybody Have the Numbers?" in Rudolfo O. de

la Garza ed, *Ignored Voices: Public Opinion Polls and the Latino Community*.(Austin, TX: Center for Mexican-American Studies Press, 1987).

12. The re-sampling procedure was fairly simple. The Dade County profile from the County Planning Division breaks the County population down by location and ethnicity. These figures were compared with the sample where location information was available for 503 cases and ethnicity for 514, but we had both for only 484 cases. The re-sampling procedure started with the 484 cases where both location and ethnicity were known. As a first step, population percentages in the cities and the county were compared to the sample percentages. The cities of Miami, Miami Beach and Hialeah appeared to be under-sampled. Second, the percentages of Non-Latin Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos in the population and the sample were compared. This comparison revealed that African-Americans and Latinos were undersampled in Miami and unincorporated Dade County. Third, random draws were used to bring the sample into line with the population percentages (Christopher Z. Mooney & Robert D. Duval, *Bootstrapping: A Nonparametric Approach to Statistical Inference*, Sage University Paper 07-095.(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993). In the City of Miami, all of the African-American and Latino cases were duplicated and added to the data set, since this coincided with the number of new cases needed. This is essentially the same as weighting these cases by two. This procedure produced a total of 578 cases (484 original cases plus 94 duplicated cases). The ethnic and locational distribution of the cases added by re-sampling is:
13. The survey item read as follows: How good a job would you say Metro-Dade elected officials (the Mayor and County Commissioners) do in seeing to it that all of the citizens of Dade County have a voice in Dade County government? Is it...? Very Good Good Adequate Poor Very Poor
14. David Lowery & William Lyons, "Governmental Fragmentation vs. Consolidation: Five Public Choice Myths about How To Create Informed, Involved, and Happy Citizens", in *Public Administration Review*, n.49 (1989): p.533-537.

**TABLE 8: RESAMPLING BY ETHNICITY AND LOCATION**

	Total	Anglo	Jewish	Black	Cuban	Latin
Miami	50	0	0	15	27	8
Hialeah	9	0	0	0	7	2
Miami Beach	10	2	8	0	0	0
Homestead	2	2	0	0	0	0
Florida City	1	0	0	1	0	0
Dade	22	0	0	16	4	2
TOTAL	94	4	8	32	38	12

15. African-Americans are more satisfied with the voice citizens have in Metro than were Non-Latin Whites, notwithstanding the general perception that they receive the least substantive representation in Greater Miami. Results from the survey showed that African-Americans were generally seen as the group least well-treated by local government. The questions asked how "good a job Dade County government" does in attending to the needs of each of the three commonly-identified groups in Dade County:
16. Probit is an appropriate estimation technique to apply here because the dependent variable, voice, is an ordinal (ordered categorical) variable. The coefficient significance tests used in probit are analogous to those used in OLS.
17. Gary J. Miller, *Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation*. (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1981); Robert M. Stein, "The Political Economy of Municipal Functional Responsibility", in *Social Science Quarterly*, n.63 (September 1982): p.539-546.
18. David Lowery, William Lyons & Ruth DeHoog., "Institutionally Induced Attribution Errors: Their Composition and Impact on Citizen Satisfaction with Local Government." *American Politics Quarterly*, n.18 (1990): p..69-97.

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**TABLE 9:**

	Very Good	Good	Adequate	Poor	Very Poor
NLW	7.7	38.8	42.2	8.4	3.4
Latino	13.2	32.3	40.1	10.3	4.1
Black	2.0	21.2	37.7	30.3	9.8

Interestingly, Non-Latin Whites saw themselves as significantly worse-off than other groups saw them as being, while Latinos saw themselves as better-off. African-Americans saw themselves as others did (A. Brierly & D. Moon, "Ethnic Differences in Greater Miami", *ibid.*).

# *Political Healing in Democratizing Systems: the Case of Post-Dictatorial Greece*

Platon N. Rigos

## **Abstract**

*Greece underwent major domestic clashes and socio-economic transformation since World War II which have buffeted her weak democratic system. Today however, no major threat comes from either the Communists (1944-49 Civil War), or the Right (1968-74 Military Dictatorship), while since 1974 democratic rule, political incorporation and membership in the European Union have strengthened the country's democratic system and economy. Democratic discourse, political incorporation and patronage in Greece have diminished the sharpness of politico-ideological contrasts, while favouring policy compromises and cooperation between opposing parties (Left and moderate Conservatives) in reaction to PASOK's political domination, corruption and coercion. Greece has made enormous political progress in achieving a solid democracy, but problems remain over defense spending, a bloated unprofessional civil service, and Cyprus' future in the Greek-Turkish relations.*

## **I. Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, a number of nations previously racked by class wars, dictatorships and civil wars have begun a process of political healing. Democracies have sprung up in Latin America, Argentina being one of the best examples of painful healing. South-Africa represents another poignant case of healing with truth commissions established to uncover past persecutions and provide hearings for airing out painful memories before forgiveness and amnesty can be granted. Political healing of political systems is a long process and involves more than flamboyant events like truth commissions and amnesties and free elections. All too often if healing is not complete, conflicts can reemerge and reactions to one set of reforms can bring back authoritarian regimes.

Greek politics have been confrontational

and conflict ridden since independence in 1821. It was only twenty-five years since the country was under a military dictatorship. It has been 50 years, since it was torn in a vicious civil war.<sup>1</sup> The policies of its prime minister Andreas Papandreou through the 1980's seemed to deepen the Left/Right rift. His hard socialist rhetoric and foreign moves (supporting Poland's Communist regime in 1987) were highly polarizing. In December of 1995, as Papandreou lay close to death, observers seemed certain his party would lose power. This was expected to lead to a right of center government which would have to contend with unions in the streets at the slightest suggestion of cutbacks. The Greek political system seemed locked into an unending cycle of reaction and revenge as has happened among many developing nations.

Yet the transition took place smoothly in June of 1996. A new (socialist) prime minister, Constantine Simitis emerged to rule and be confirmed by national vote in September. Greece made the transition from charismatic to democratic governance without difficulty. The party that had dominated Greece's politics since 1981, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement of Greece (PASOK) reinvented itself into a very moderate social democratic party occupying the center of the political spectrum. Its leader dropped some of the old populist divisive rhetoric. The conservative opposition party called New Democracy (N.D.) which had already adopted a rhetoric of the political center after the end of the dictatorship, is coping with the challenge of maintaining unity, now that believers in free market policies seek to take the party away from the *clientelism*<sup>2</sup> of the past.

This paper will use Greece as a case study to show how the healing process takes place. To begin with, the concept of political healing must be defined. The paper will start with a closer look at how political healing takes place in most countries, then turn to an overview of the Greek society and economy at the end of the Twentieth Century. Some

conclusions about the difficult choices needed to further political healing, should emerge. This paper will also show that the political healing of small states is complicated by external factors such as the prevailing ideologies of the time and the actions of powerful nations.

## **II. The Process of Political Healing**

How does political healing take place in polarized political systems? Some systems, with deep and reinforcing political cleavages<sup>3</sup> like in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Argentina, have experienced major wounds like civil wars and authoritarian intervals which have retarded any healing process for generations. After civil wars and dictatorships, a revenge mentality emerges and creates political ghettos, where citizens are scared of what would happen to them if the "enemy" (meaning the other party) got into power. Once violence has taken place in one clash, it is likely to lead to further violence in future clashes. As to why massive violence is used in the first set of clashes (shooting at workers during a strike), most authors fall back on the nation's political culture as an explanation.<sup>4</sup> The culture is described as condoning or revering violence as a mode of interpersonal exchange.<sup>5</sup> Still, cultures change as wealth and security increases. Even the most violent episodes (the Dirty War in Argentina) are eventually set aside.

It can be theorized that the creation and maintenance of a social safety net may seem to be the major method for political healing. In most of Europe, even conservatives like Bismark, have contributed to building this policy system. Yet a safety net system administered by a poorly professionalized bureaucracy among economically deprived populations, may still create favoritism and the need for clientelistic practices which then freeze democratic development for long or short periods. It is said that clientelism helps

humanize relationships and provide a sense of security and dignity in societies that are suffering from the overthrow of the traditional order (e.g., feudal, tribal society). Yet clientelism often legitimizes a corrupt system which is antithetical to democratic development.<sup>6</sup>

Professionalization of the civil service along strict merit criteria, has been the difference between societies that have moved beyond clientelism and others that have been mired into it. Germany and France are examples of societies which have moved beyond clientelism because of the quality of their civil service.

Increased prosperity is of course a very important element in bringing about healing. It improves the safety net and will reduce scarcity. This in turn diminishes the need for patron-client relationships. Again, Germany and France are good examples, yet both countries experienced crises even after prosperity was widespread in their respective populations. Prosperity sometimes is poorly distributed and good economic performance has not lasted long in Southern European nations. Today's prosperity and lack of major wars or civil strife in Europe and parts of Latin America are truly unparalleled. Yet true healing requires more than that. Political systems must undergo a period of political empowerment or incorporation<sup>7</sup> of class, religious and ethnic minorities. The previously oppressed must feel they belong. This is what was happening in Greece in the 1980's. Unfortunately, political empowerment periods are rife with excesses and may temporarily slow the healing and create new fears.<sup>8</sup>

But even political incorporation is not the end of political healing because clientelism can remain entrenched in the practices of a Left party, just as easily as they were under a Right-wing or authoritarian regime. In addition, the incorporation process is costly and leaves economic and social costs that must be faced and paid. If political incorporation resulted in high indebtedness, a huge bureaucracy and a stagnant economy, policy adjustments may be needed. These adjustments will be more lasting, if they do not open new wounds and are discussed in a nonthreatening setting. Thus the structure of the political debate (milder rhetoric, calls for

professionalism for instance) between the political parties and in the mass media will indicate if meaningful healing is taking place.

International developments like the global economy in the form of the IMF, and the end of the fixed exchange system in 1974 contribute to this new consensus. The end of the fixed exchange system made all economies susceptible to global economic trends. The net effect is that socialist political systems have been increasingly unable to run up deficits and inflation in the name of distributing jobs and favors to the lower strata and to their political cadres. The IMF is reinforcing such trends whenever countries wish to borrow. Prevailing professional opinions about how countries develop and modernize, have a great impact on democratic developments. Argentina experienced its major political incorporation during a period when a major role for government in the economy was considered normal. All new nations after World War II, began operating through some variety of socialism.

Finally, the prevalence of the Cold War affected the healing of democratizing nations as on one hand indigenous communist parties were perceived as threats to national sovereignty and on the other hand excesses by the Right were excused as defense against external threats. This applies to Greece and a number of Latin American nations. The Cold War made political incorporation very difficult and prone to external manipulations.

The media penetration and the electronic (computers/ video recorders) revolution, minimizes the influence of party newspapers and radio stations of the Left or the Right. Workers acquire a middle class view of unions, and the power of large unions wanes. Media organs thrive on locating and revealing scandals and corruption on both sides of the political spectrum. Ideological rigidity begins to melt as average income workers find out how rich some of their socialist or union representatives can become.<sup>9</sup>

Political healing does not end with political incorporation as mentioned earlier. The extent to which Left or even Right of center governments, is able to dismantle the heavy government role in the economy and the strong power of unions varies from country to country. Most of the European continent with a few exceptions has yet to

undertake such a difficult task and Greece is a case in point. Two criteria then alternate in creating changes in government, the performance of the economy and the perception that the safety net may be weakening or that inequalities are increasing beyond what a country's culture may allow.

### III. Greek Society and Economy

At just 10.64 million population, Greek society is said to belong to a class of nations called the "semi-periphery"<sup>10</sup>. Greece is often described as the poorest member of the European Union, but the standard of living of its citizens would not differ much from that of Spain or Southern Italy<sup>11</sup>. Large poverty pockets are hard to find in large cities or even in remote villages in the 1990s. Finally, its social structure may be among the healthiest in the Western World, by any standard. Divorce rates (0.9/1,000 married women) are very low<sup>12</sup>, literacy at 93.2% is very high and enrollment for secondary education is close to 100%. Crime rates are the lowest in Europe.<sup>13</sup> Life expectancy (75 for men) is higher than ever in Greek history and almost the same as in France.<sup>14</sup> Even at the height of the poverty ridden postwar years, Athens had a theater and nightlife activity comparable to Vienna, Rome or Paris. The proliferation of newspapers of different political orientation indicated then as now a lively intellectual life.

The State plays an all-important role and dominates society. Greece is one of the most highly centralized political systems in Europe, although the weakness of its bureaucracy makes the state's dominance less overwhelming than observers like Legg and Roberts claim.<sup>15</sup> Although the State and its poorly professionalized bureaucracy foster clientelism, the domination of society is far from oppressive in the view of this author. Interest groups thrive, Greek local governments develop their own ways of acting independently<sup>16</sup> and the individuals ignore laws (e.g., zoning, taxes) with impunity. The Greek State became omnipotent because of the effort to reclaim parts of Greece that were in still in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Generally, external threats have been so constant as to require a strong central state. Observers like Legg and Roberts forget that the centralization model

has been preached to new nations throughout the last century. Greece borrowed largely from France, a highly centralized state in its own right until very recently. It is only recently that the belief in decentralization and privatization has begun to take roots.

The economy has been Greece's weak spot. The manufacturing sector has been weak since wages went up with unionization in the late 60's. Greeks do not create very large corporations. This has been attributed to a basic lack of trust<sup>17</sup> similar to that in other societies that do not produce large stock owned corporations (China, Taiwan) and extreme individualism. Businesses are family owned and often collapse after the father dies. There are comparatively few shareholder-controlled corporations. The practice is for many family-owned corporations to issue stock only for up to 49% of the company.<sup>18</sup> The high inflation of the 1980's had made most Greeks keep their money in high interest rate bank accounts. The more recent abatement of inflation has resulted in a healthy stock market. If the state divests itself of more stock in many large enterprises, Greece's economy may improve even more. Foreign takeovers of some Greek family firms and potential takeovers of previously public enterprises, has been a divisive issue among both major parties. The issue is ideally suited for demagoguery. Cries of "Foreigners taking over the country" make excellent campaign fodder and help forestall reform, decentralization and privatization. These have been used by politicians of all stripes.

The weakness of the economy is not so much the small size of enterprises as the dependence of many Greek firms on contracts with the all-important State (the "Vulture with teats").<sup>19</sup> Taiwan has shown that in a modern highly technological economy small industries can emerge and fail, but the economy thrives as long the state does not bail them out in the name of economic development or because of political linkages. In Greece, even relatively small firms fear the free market. Every shop owner thinks his/her connections are indispensable.

Still economic prospects are not hopeless, the European Union has filled a bit of the economic gap with large public work grants and is promising even more. It is forcing some privatizations and will help in

rationalizing the economy. By the year 2005, all sectors of the Greek economy, including telephone services and electric utilities, where the state share is still very high, will be subject to competition from any European company willing to offer similar services. After some initial foreign policy mistakes in the Balkans,<sup>20</sup> Greece has emerged as a major investor in that area. Many American and European corporations seek out Greek firms and banks to penetrate the privatizing economies of Bulgaria, Roumania and even Macedonia.<sup>21</sup> Albania's economy is already an extension of the Greek. Greece is such an attractive labor market that immigrants from the third world, are pouring into its labor market<sup>22</sup>.

Greek social cleavages are not as clear-cut as those of other polarized nations. Although the clergy has sided with the imported royalty, anti clericalism has never been a strong movement like it was in France, Mexico or Spain. All Greeks are baptized, marry and laid to rest through the Orthodox church.<sup>23</sup> Cleavages have no geographical basis either, they have been based purely on economic status and the respect it entails. Extreme individualism however results in envy among some in the middle classes who might not have succeeded as much as they hoped.

The lack of trust and the extreme individualism, mentioned above, also intensify the nature of political conflicts. A history of change through violence characterized the early years of the modern Greek state. External interference (British) created a royalist/anti-royalist cleavage, which was also viewed as a clash between those that had foreign support and those that paid for it. This encouraged a willingness to believe in conspiratorial theories that often depicted national leaders, as traitors. Foreign influence made use of the use of the military in various intrigues. In the post war era, a polarization developed which pitted the wealthy business and farmer classes, the military and the high clergy against workers, small businessmen and poor farmers. It was given greater depth by the international machinations which created a horrible civil war and a right wing reaction. The Cold War intensified the right wing reaction in the name of fighting Communism, which in turn fueled

the intensity of the left wing reaction in the 1980s.

Greek defense spending has remained highest in percent of GDP (12%) than for most NATO countries in the last 40 years and as such hurts the economy and the maintenance of the safety net.<sup>24</sup> Social policy becomes more of a "zero sum game", when so much is spent on military needs.

#### IV. Modern Greek Politics: the Post-Junta and PASOK Domination Periods, 1974-1996

Greek postwar political history<sup>25</sup> is important in understanding the creation of cleavages and wounds as well as their subsequent healing. Put succinctly, the end of the Civil War (1950) brought a period of dominance by parties of the Right but no healing. Although the economy improved immensely under Constantine Karamanlis and the royalty, charges of voting irregularities, CIA interference and cronyism polarized the political system.<sup>26</sup> Center parties attempted to diffuse this polarization from 1963-67, but the royalty scuttled the effort until the Colonels intervened in 1967. After the Junta regime ended in 1974, a short six years stint by a weak "New Right" regime, led to an eight-year PASOK rule. The party lost its grip for a while (1988-93), but came back again for three years under Papandreou. In 1996 it won a new mandate under a new leader. Since the civil war and military rule periods have been analyzed extensively, I will focus on the major events in post dictatorial Greece. There are two major period, the post junta and PASOK domination period and the post Papandreou period which has yet to be analyzed adequately.

The first post-junta period includes what is considered a short six year period of the "New Right" in power and a second much longer one of Left domination. The first government in power was headed by Karamanlis who had held power in the 1950's and had come back from self-imposed exile in a De Gaulle style return, as the Junta fell. He created a new constitution which legalized the Communist Party, he officially abolished the monarchy through a referendum, expanded the welfare state and nationalized

even more banks, shipyards and airlines. The "New Right" called itself New Democracy (ND) and sought to occupy the center. Karamanlis and his supporters hoped they could make up for the stigma of the Colonels by showing that this new right could be thoroughly centrist and compassionate for the masses. This was a battle ND could not win as PASOK still remained even more radical, and fueled extreme nationalism and anti-Americanism. Karamanlis's coalition may have jailed all the Junta leaders, but the party still included the business elements that benefitted from the state. An old practice of coddling economic enterprises even if unprofitable, continued. A tendency for wealthy individuals to play it safe and invest in real estate and land also continued. So being on the right remained a dirty word for the young generation.

During the period between 1974 and 1981, PASOK managed to establish itself as an entirely new party with a new political identity. The party emerged as the champion of anti right-wing forces and represented society as split by the fundamental division between an all-embracing "non privileged" majority; which it claimed to stand for, and a tiny "privileged" oligarchy; of foreign interests and domestic monopolies, identified as the enemy. The party's claim was that its main goal was nothing less than the socialist transformation of society through a "third road to socialism."<sup>27</sup>

The party managed to develop a well organized and highly active mass-base in every village and every neighborhood. New Democracy was to imitate this mass base organization which is needed in the transition to modern politics. Yet it is characteristic of the remaining lack of internal democracy inside parties, that during its first sixteen years, PASOK held only two national congresses; the first in 1984; the second in September 1990. The third one just took place in June of 1996 after Papandreou's death. ND is not much better in giving the electorate more influence than the parliamentarians in internal politics. Some conventions do take place, but the parliamentarian group still dominates.

In October 1981, began an eight-year reign by Andreas Papandreou. PASOK which gained 48.1% of the vote (highest ever by a

party in the post war era) and a majority in Parliament. It won again in 1985. PASOK thrived by weakening most parties on the left. Greece's third road to socialism experiment displayed some marks of a hard Socialist ideology. Squeezing the size of the private sector did not take the form of nationalizations, since most banks were already owned by the government. The attack on the private sector took the form of a series of far more subtle, but effective measures.

Among these was a 25% hike in all salaries, private and public, indexing of all salaries and pensions to the rate of inflation. One law forbade private firms to fire more than 20% of their employees. Loans became very difficult in an inflationary economy. Inflation inched up to 16% and interest rates reached 32%. Governmentally controlled banks lent to agricultural cooperatives controlled by PASOK and to state managed firms, but rarely to businesses that did not have a link to the party. Occasionally, the war against businesses that refused to give to the party took the form of measures specifically aimed at creating bankruptcies.<sup>29</sup>

Farmers were made to understand that the only way they could get loans would be through joining the cooperative or the party. In a few years, even independent farmers joined the party, which could distribute large European Union subsidies. The subsidies were ideally suited to get the sympathies of farmers and peasants who in the past had tended toward conservative views. PASOK's operatives in every village and small town made it known that Common Market money and state subsidies would go strictly to the party faithful. This was a major addition to PASOK's electoral base.

On the positive side, women's rights were expanded in all realms. Aid was to be given to poor women who needed a dowry to get married. Women were also granted rights to receive pensions if divorced. Women's employee rights were also reinforced. Finally the welfare system was expanded. Health care became more systematic throughout Greece, with the building of clinics in remote areas. The government's social reforms in the areas of health, education and social security, though extremely popular with the middle and lower strata, were based on borrowed money and the creation of new state/party controlled

agencies.

Though most of these measures were taken during PASOK's first year in office and the government was later obliged to revert to an austerity program, they created the image of a responsive government. Soon new productive investments and industrial growth declined, while unemployment and inflation increased. To cope with the deteriorating economic situation, PASOK had to turn to foreign loans. The unions rebelled against anti strike measures.

The fate of the media deserves particular attention. An invective tabloid style emerged in the 1980s, created by one of PASOK's newspapers known as "Avriani." Eventually many of the middle-of-the road media outlets imitated the style and became supporters of the party. Some right-of-center papers were bought and turned into milder versions of "Avriani." The remaining right papers such as "Apoyievmatini" copied the tabloid style of "Avriani". Some of the methods employed to subvert the media, included the use of secret funds in governmental agencies or state banks to subsidize the friendly press, the granting of preferential treatment (advertising) to these papers or those being asked to be neutral toward scandals emerging in the government. Selective leaks to friendly papers were another tool. Some newspaper owners ventured into the construction field to benefit from contracts from the government and public works subsidized by the European Union. Nonetheless a few serious papers like "Elevtheros Typos" remain.

The combination of strategies paid off in electoral terms, as PASOK maintained an electoral base of about 38%, even in the middle of huge corruption trials in 1990-91. The scandals and PASOK's mistreatment of unions seeking to strike, brought about a strange coalition between the Communist Party and ND, which took office with the express purpose of allowing an impartial inquiry into the scandals and the corruption. Some of the accusations reached all the way to the top, to Papandreou who was indicted. This strange alliance lasted just one year, to allow for a tribunal to be selected and new elections were held the following year.

Mitzotakis and N.D. won with a 46% of the vote in 1991. Although this plurality would have given room for effective

governance, the strict proportional electoral system adopted by PASOK gave Mitzotakis a majority of only one. Mitzotakis proceeded to change the system to favor the larger and smaller parties, but demurred from calling elections right away, as he could have. New Democracy began to show the split between old right politicians content with state contracts and those dedicated to true free market capitalism group which bedevils it to this very day. The Macedonia issue also proved divisive by unveiling yet a third element, which can only be described as chauvinist. A young and charismatic foreign minister Antonios Samaras who had resigned over Mitzotakis's attempts to moderate the fury over Macedonia eventually left ND. He founded a new party called "the Political Spring" in October of 1993, precipitating the fall of the government, new elections and a smashing victory by PASOK. The percentage of the vote for PASOK was not higher than 43%, but the electoral system devised by Mitzotakis gave PASOK a comfortable majority of 180 seats (30 more than needed for a majority).

Throughout 1994 and 1995, Papandreou's health, made the country wonder if he really was in charge. The second arrival of PASOK to power served only to reinforce the trends described earlier. The newspapers continued to reflect a style full of invective and bias. Brussels's officials learned to be more careful that contracts for infrastructure did not go to unqualified PASOK supporters. They requested that grant applications be specific and detailed. They released the money gradually and only when projects were completely thought out. This has resulted in a delay in the granting of contracts, so much so that by 1997 the government admitted to using only 77% of the grants it could have had from the E.U. The government has blamed the underutilization on civil service problems. Others have shown that in many cases, the government's stubborn refusal to include private (and sometimes foreign) contractors in some projects were the cause of the delays. The two most celebrated cases of such delay are the new Athens Airport and the new Athens Mass Transit system (the Metro). Ironically the socialist government eventually allowed the same contractors to play the

major role in running each of the projects. Few of these developments seemed to indicate that moderation would prevail after Papandreou's death. After five months in the hospital, he eventually relinquished the prime-ministership to previous Minister for the Economy (in 1986) Constantine Simitis. Papandreou died soon after in May 1996.

### V. The Post-Papandreou Era: a New PASOK in power

Polls before Papandreou's hospitalization had been showing PASOK as losing ground with only 38% of the electorate. Many commentators had predicted the breakup of the party, if the old man died. They were wrong. Fortunately for Simitis, Papandreou died a few days before the party was to hold an important convention. This allowed Simitis to face and defeat four of his challengers and emerge as undisputed leader of the party and the government. His main sources of support were the union chiefs who immediately gained government posts. Today his support comes also from some large corporation leaders who see in him as a centrist.

Turkish provocations in the Aegean in the summer of 1996 tested the new regime and helped its popularity. Soon after that, Simitis called for early elections on September 22. ND under Miltiadis Evert ran a simplistic tax cut campaign with exaggerated nationalistic tones. The business community felt more comfortable with Simitis's austerity promises. PASOK and Simitis won by a 3% margin (41-38%). The same electoral system that exaggerates the margin in Parliament, gave PASOK a majority of 160 deputies over 102 for N.D. On the other hand, the small parties of the left increased their strength, while Samaras and his "Political Spring" party were shut out. Simitis had a new mandate to cut back the public sector and reduce the colossal debt accumulated by his party over the years. Miltiadis Evert was reelected as leader of ND, but after continual rumblings of dissatisfaction, a special ND convention in March of 1997 elected a young backbencher named Karamanlis, the old president's nephew.

The latter demonstrated his neophyte status (he is only 40 years old), when upon

the advice of some of the old mandarins of the party, he read out of the party three deputies associated with free market ideas over a bill seeking to reform public enterprises and weaken union rights proposed by Simitis. This recent (February 1998) development, proves that the conservative party is searching for its soul. From another perspective however, the political system was showing signs of dealing with the clientelistic patterns of the past.

Simitis has restored some confidence in the Greek economy by pledging to prepare Greece for entering into the European monetary union in 1999. Austerity measures have included a salary freeze and some efforts at privatization. Inflation has abated (down to 8% from 22 in early 1997, to 4% by mid 1998) and the economy is showing signs of revival. Greek deficit is down to 4% of GDP, yet unemployment is better than in France or Spain who also seek to enter the European Monetary Union.

There are several indicators of healing. The confidence gained by Simitis among even right of center voters that his government will not yield to American or European pressures about Turkey, shows that for the first time in Greece, few will accuse the government or the opposition of being influenced by foreign powers as was so much the case in the past. This became even more evident when 34 PASOK deputies threatened to walk out of the government in 1997 when some suspected that some concessions may be given to the Turks.

The goal of full Europeanization is tied to national security considerations and no group is likely to derail it. The argument has been made that full entry into the European system is the best way to protect the country's borders. Even though the European Union has not ventured to say that an attack on any member country is tantamount to an attack on the whole Union, the implication is that once Greece is thoroughly integrated into Europe, it will be even more difficult for Turkey to attack or challenge Greece's borders.

Even before Simitis, there were signals that this democracy was going to survive its costly political incorporation under Papandreou. Despite all the negative features of the Greek press (the prevalence of

demagoguery and yellow journalism described above), it was the same media outlets that opposed Papandreou's effort to silence all opposition.

The civil service remains a weakness with which Greeks have not coped. Clientelistic practices will prove hard to dislodge. Many members of PASOK in the universities concede of the need for such a reform. It is hoped, that as the E.U. extends professional standards to business and the economy, notions of "neutral competence" will spread. In American social history, the spread of civil service in the American states (including the Southern states) was brought about by federal social security regulations. Sheer economic rationality within a European Union which forbids government subsidies, will eventually force the dismantling of the huge governmental machinery.

Austerity measures have caused some disruption. Already, the farmers shut down the country once in 1997 and twice in 1998 in a massive protest against the reduction in their subsidies. The Simitis government did not give in. The unions and left elements (youth organizations) have characterized as "Thatcherite" the new stance of Simitis toward the public problematic industries, but he has not budged. Greece will remain in the hands of the left, but to a more responsible left and because the opposition has little to offer.

## VI. Conclusions

What are the prospects for more political healing in this democracy? The rhetoric and even the excesses of PASOK have resulted in a sense of inclusion among the lower middle classes. Many among them feel they have gotten their revenge for past real or perceived injustices. The healing process is continuing because the excesses of PASOK have created a consensus that extreme policies of the right or the left are dangerous and costly. While as elsewhere, there is disappointment with the big parties, the results of recent elections allow for greater pluralism than in many Western nations. Opposition newspapers have been functioning. Many television channels have developed a neutral professional style, that were rare commodities in the 1980s.

Greece needs tax reform so as to fund an adequate safety net. Again as in other countries,

conservatives must decide on which conservatism they will present to the Greek people. Are they an old fashion right party with clientelistic favors or a new party seeking to liberalize the economy, without harming the social safety net? Both parties must show how to address the problems of 21st century mature democracies, which Moynihan (1996) has identified as primarily social (families, unwed motherhood and crime, drugs). These are not yet as pertinent in Greece, but a watchful eye is needed lest Greece finds itself down that same "maturation" path. While strong on family values, Greece does not have to cope with the demands of a Christian fundamentalist or anti-immigrant movement

Groups like unions, media organs, farmers' collectives and even businesses still need to sever their dependence on the state which were some of the byproducts of the one-party dominance of the 1980's. The political incorporation of the masses and outside groups brought greedy and power hungry political entrepreneurs in all areas of the public sector. Yet this is not unusual in many mature democracies.

Greece's example shows that prospects for political healing in democratizing nations are far from hopeless. It is not possible to exaggerate the great impact of long periods of prosperity and peace. The perpetuation of a strong global economic system and international institutions like the IMF and the E.U. which insist on transparency in economic transactions and unfettered economic competition creates an atmosphere of hope. If local patrons lose their ability to remain in entrenched positions through all sorts of illegitimate favors (see Korea as the best case scenario), middle and lower classes may be willing to wait for the political incorporation that will vindicate them.

The prevalence of belief in democratic values of free elections and neutral professionalism, and its propagation by a very powerful media efforts means that ideas cross boundaries. It is possible to reduce the length of stages such as safety net construction and incorporation as long as protracted church/state battles do not intervene (see Algeria today, France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century).

Democratic healing is not feasible just anywhere. In countries with weak economies

and new national identities, democratic development is still in its infancy. If corrupt patrons are allowed to amass wealth by those who control the international monetary system, while pauperizing their lower classes, some democratic developments (see Indonesia for the worst case) will have a more tumultuous future.

## Notes

1. Greece's modern history is well documented see among many: D. Eudes, *The Kapitanios: Partisans and Civil War, 1943-1949* (London: NLB, 1965); J.A. Katris, *Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power* (St. Louis, MO: New Critics Press, 1971); E.S. Forster, *A Short History of Modern Greece, 1821-1956*, 3rd Edition Revised by Douglas Dakin (London: Methuen & Co). More recently Keith Legg & John M. Robert, *Modern Greece: A Civilization on the Periphery* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), and G.T. Allison & K. Nicolaidis Eds., *The Greek Paradox* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
2. Clientelism is a concept that has been applied to a number of transitional societies and is said to harm the development of democratic institutions like parties and interest groups. See Carl H. Lande, "Political Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospects," *International Political Science Review*, Vol.4 (1983): p. 43-54.
3. See Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); see also his *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).
4. Cultural explanations have been popular in comparative studies for a long time. Such explanations have often been susceptible to national character descriptions and almost racist views. They have been given a new impetus with Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). Yet cultures do change.
5. Many other studies associate any kind of major social transformation with violence, see K. Ivo & Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, n.10 (September 1966): p.253-254. Even England's first transformation under Oliver Cromwell was quite violent.
6. Clientelism is contrasted with political relationships in "ideal democratic societies" where individuals relate with those more powerful than them through associations and interest groups that give them the ability to negotiate as equals with those in position of authority or power.
7. The concept of "political incorporation" is often used in the American urban literature to denote the coming to power of African-American, Hispanics and some white non-elites. See Richard De Leon, *Left-Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 1975-1991* (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas.



- 1996); Rufus Browning, D. R. Marshall & D. Tabb, **Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics** (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), but it has also been used by students of transitional societies see C. Lyrintzis, "PASOK in Power: From 'Change' to Disenchantment" in R. Clogg ed., **Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade** (New York: St. Martin's Press).
8. C. Lyrintzis, "Pasok in Power" maintains that the project of political incorporation is now complete.
  9. This is the case in Greece, where the wealth of socialist deputies is the grist of local dailies.
  10. The Semi-Periphery is defined as nations that have acquired a large number of Western traits (market economies, democratic institutions) in the Post-Cold War Era, but have struggled economically and politically to reach the status of Western European societies. See N. Mouzelis, **Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America** (London: Macmillan, 1986). They include Spain, Portugal, Italy and some of the democracies of Latin America. See also E. Stephen Larrabee, "The Southern Periphery: Greece and Turkey," in Paul F. Shoup, ed., **Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe the 1980's** (Washington DC: Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 176.
  11. Large parts of the middle class own second homes and like to go out more than twice a week.
  12. Italy, the next lowest in Europe has a divorce rate of 2.6% and most other counties in Europe hover around 5.0 per one thousand married women). Compiled from the Statistical Office of the European Communities **Demographic Statistics, 1988 and 1990**.
  13. According to data provided by Interpol, Greece's crime rate is 2%, with an E.U. average of 4.2%. Germany comes at 14%. Homicide rate in Greece is listed at 2.05% with an E.U. average of 4.2%. Robbery rates are even lower (1%).
  14. See **The Economist**, Special Reports, 1995.
  15. Keith Legg & John M. Roberts, **Modern Greece**, ch. 5.
  16. See P. Christofilopoulou, "Professionalism and Public Policy making in Greece: The Influence of Engineers in the local government reforms", **Public Administration**, Vol. 70 (Spring 1992): pp.99-118.
  17. See Francis Fukuyama, **Trust** (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
  18. The state under PASOK rule has followed the same practice in its form of privatization. However the lure of investing in a still state controlled corporation is not as attractive to potential stock owners.
  19. This expression is found in Legg & Roberts, **Greece: A Civilization...**
  20. See the Macedonia débâcle. Even though the policy toward that country was unavoidable given the... part of the electorate (90%), the policy was clearly costly, see Stearns, "Greek Security Issues" in G.T. Allison & K. Nicolaidis eds., **The Greek Paradox** (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 61-72.
  21. See numerous reports in Athens News throughout 1996 and 1997. In 1998, the Greek National Bank was a major partner in the privatization of the Bulgarian National Bank.
  22. Yet contrary to other nations, aliens and refugees are now protected by new regulations that grant them the same rights as those of Greek laborers. The Greek labor unions do not want to see their own standard of living threatened by the low wage devices used in the United States.
  23. See Legg and Roberts, **Op. Cit.** Chapter 6.
  24. It is now down to 7%, but will increase again as a result of the crisis in the Aegean. The Greek government is committed to a large purchase of up-to-date planes to meet the Turkish threat.
  25. See for instance J. P. Carey & A.G. Carey, **The Web of Modern Greek Politics** (Columbia, N.Y. 1968); R. Clogg, **A History of Modern Greece** (Oxford, England: 1980); R. Macridis, **Greek Politics at a Crossroads: What Kind of Socialism** (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984); E. S. Shinn, **Government and Politics, Greece: A Country Study** (Washington DC: American University, 1985).
  26. The United States has played a disturbing role in Greek democratic development. After saving Greece from becoming a Soviet satellite, it supported right-wing governments including the Junta, bankrolled violent groups and meddled incessantly in Greek affairs all in the name of fighting communism.
  27. See C. Lyrintzis, "Pasok in Power."
  28. It was to be labeled populist later, mainly because of its opposition to other parts of the left, its behavior toward unions. See R. Clogg ed., **Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade** (New York: St. Martin's Press 1993). The effect of its policies seemed to enrich its top members.
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
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# SAINT LEO COLLEGE



## THE COLLEGE

A Catholic, co-educational, liberal arts college, Saint Leo College was founded by the Benedictine Order and chartered by the state of Florida in 1889. In January 1969, the Order of Saint Benedict transferred title and control to an independent board of trustees.

## THE CAMPUS

The main campus consists of 170 rolling acres in East Pasco County, 40 miles north of downtown Tampa.

## THE STUDENTS

Approximately 1,000 students are enrolled on the main campus of Saint Leo College. Sixty percent of these students are from Florida. The rest come from 34 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and 27 foreign countries.

## THE FACULTY

The student/teacher ratio is 17/1.

## ACCREDITATION

Saint Leo College is accredited by the Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to award the associate's and bachelor's degrees and is a

Candidate for Accreditation to award the master's degree. Saint Leo College's program in Social Work is accredited by the Commission on Accreditation of the Council on Social Work Education (BSW level). Saint Leo College has Teacher Education Program approval by the State of Florida Department of Education.

## DEGREES AWARDED

Saint Leo awards Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Social Work, and Master of Business Administration degrees. Also, the Center of Distance Learning offers weekend and evening college, directed study classes and a Pastoral Institute center program that extends from Key West to Virginia with courses offered at 11 military bases.

## ACADEMIC DIVISIONS

Liberal Arts and Sciences  
Professional Studies

## SPORTS

Saint Leo College is a member of the Sunshine State Conference of NCAA Division II, and offers Basketball, volleyball, soccer, tennis, softball, and baseball on the intercollegiate level. The College also has intramural athletic programs in basketball, volleyball, softball, tennis, racquetball, swimming, touch football, golf, soccer, and archery.

## SPECIAL PROGRAMS

Other special programs students may participate in at Saint Leo College include: Campus Ministry; more than 40 student organizations for social, cultural, and recreational enrichment; Freshman Studies; Honors; theatre performances; dance and music concerts; Oratio Chorus; and a regular program of guest speakers, artists and performers.

## DIRECTIONS TO CAMPUS

Take exit 59 off of I-75. Go four miles east on highway 52 and Saint Leo College will be on your left. Call (352) 588-8432 for general information.

*Saint Leo College is committed to policies and practices that assure that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race, color, creed, religion, national origin, or handicap.*



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