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In Florida
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Political Chronicle

The *Political Chronicle* is the official journal of the Florida Political Science Association. We offer an insightful, readable journal addressing topics on U.S. government and international affairs, as well as timely topics of interest to the general reader. Articles by Florida academicians and analysis of Florida politics is an additional feature.

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Editorial Inquiries

All essays for consideration should be sent to Dr. Waltraud Q. Morales, Editor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1356; (407) 823-2608, fax (407) 823-0051; morales@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu. For further information contact Megan A. Duncanson, editorial assistant; (407) 823-2608; mad02137@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu.

Submission Policy

The *Political Chronicle* is a peer reviewed journal. Manuscripts should be double-spaced, of moderate length, 20-25 pages preferred, (4,00-6,000 words) and follow the APSA style sheet. For further information on submissions please refer to contributors page or our web site at <http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~politics>.

A Welcome from the Editorial Team

With the New Year, a new decade and new century on the horizon, we welcome our readers and supporters to a renewal of sorts for the *Political Chronicle*. Because of the vision and the dedication of the journal's first editor, Professor Bernard Schechterman of the University of Miami, and the continuation of that professional service and leadership by the previous editors, Professors Michael Gibbons (co-editor) and Marco Rimanelli (co-editor and editor) of St. Leo's College, the *Political Chronicle* celebrates its tenth anniversary this year. Through its pages contributors and readers have enriched the discourse of Florida's Political Science Association and both academic and professional audiences of the Southeast. The cherished goal of the founding editor--to broaden the reception and impact of the journal to national readership--will continue to challenge me as your incoming editor, the members of the editorial board and association, and my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida (UCF), which will serve as the new host institution for the journal. Without the generous assistance of Dean Kathryn L. Seidel of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Central Florida this institutional commitment to the FPSA and the *Political Chronicle* would not have been possible.

Especially we need the continued loyal support and commitment of you our dedicated readers. As we search for a new look and renewed mission for the *Political Chronicle*, we invite your active involvement and service as authors, reviewers, members of the editorial board, and as subscribers. Let us know how you would care to serve. In return, and with your help, the new editorial team pledges to produce the best journal possible. As you read this new 1999 issue we welcome your reactions to changes planned and in place: the APSA style sheet, selected book review essays, point-counterpoint dialogue, and best graduate research article. Visit our web site and see the guide for submission, subscription page, and article abstracts of the current issue. In closing, the editorial team--Waltraud Q. Morales, editor; Housman A. Sadri, managing editor; Megan A. Duncanson, editorial assistant; and Ariam Ferro, webmaster--wish you happy reading.

THE CLINTON BREAKTHROUGH? PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS IN FLORIDA

Donald W. Beachler

A Republican base state in the 1980s, Florida was closely contested in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996. In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first Democrat in twenty years to win Florida's electoral votes. A surge of support in counties with large numbers of senior citizens and an improved showing among Latino voters contributed to Clinton's Florida victory. In general, Clinton improved on prior Democratic performance in the metropolitan counties of South and Central Florida. Clinton did not do well in the culturally and politically southern counties of North Florida. The emergence of Florida as a battleground state in presidential elections has implications for the competitive balance of future elections.

Introduction

In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first Democrat since Franklin Roosevelt to win consecutive presidential elections. Throughout his career in presidential politics, Clinton sought to disassociate himself from the liberal policies that were widely regarded as contributing to Democratic defeats in five of six presidential elections from 1968 through 1988.¹ In 1992, Clinton emphasized his support for the death penalty and for welfare reform that required public aid recipients to work. As president, Clinton also embraced the balanced budget timetable advocated by congressional Republicans and, in 1996, he signed the welfare bill passed by the GOP Congress.²

Despite his many shifts to the right, Clinton, in 1996, differentiated himself from Republicans by depicting his administration as the defender of popular government programs like Medicare, Medicaid, federal aid to education, and protection of the environment. Clinton also took strong liberal positions on social issues like abortion and gun control. Government shutdowns provoked by disagreements between the President and Congress over the federal budget and the ideological rhetoric of some congressional Republicans facilitated Clinton's centrist positioning. As he sought a second term, Clinton depicted himself as the moderate alternative to the conservative Republicans who controlled the Congress.³

As Clinton changed the nature of the Democratic appeal in presidential elections, it should be expected that he would improve on prior Democratic candidates electoral performance with some groups of voters and in some regions. Studies of electoral change would also indicate that changes in support for the Democratic presidential candidate would not be uniform. Clinton might actually lose support or, gain it at a much lower rate, among other groups of voters and in other regions.⁴ Changes in partisan support are rarely uniform across regions or sectors of the electorate. Candidates may increase their parties' percentage of the vote at very different levels in different communities.⁵ James Sundquist found

Donald W. Beachler teaches in the Politics Department at Ithaca College. He has published articles on congressional elections, presidential elections and racial gerrymandering.

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that in the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt increased Democratic support among urban voters in Pennsylvania, while losing support among some traditional Democrats in rural regions of the state. In 1996, Bill Clinton received a lower percentage of the vote in the declining industrial regions of western Pennsylvania than Walter Mondale had in 1984. Clinton ran much better than Mondale in the prosperous suburban counties around Philadelphia.⁶

This article analyzes partisan change in presidential elections in Florida between 1976 and 1996. With 25 electoral votes, the fourth largest total, Florida is an important state in presidential elections. After Texas, it is the most populous southern state. Florida is also interesting because, after several elections as a Republican bastion, the state had very close elections in 1992 and 1996. In 1996, Bill Clinton became the first Democrat in 20 years to capture Florida's electoral votes. This article examines changes in support for Democratic presidential candidates in Florida as the state changed from a Republican stronghold in 1984 and 1988 to a competitive battleground state in 1992 and 1996.

Florida's Political Evolution

Florida is always included in studies of southern politics.⁷ The geographical basis for regarding Florida as a southern state is obvious. As the state is changed by rapid demographic transitions, it is less clear whether such a designation makes social and political sense today. When V.O. Key wrote his pioneering study of southern politics in 1949, he noted that Florida was not a typical southern state. Florida was more urban and had a higher per capita income than other southern states. The 1940 census reported that a comparatively high 48% of Floridians had been born outside the state.⁸ In some important ways, Florida at mid-century, was very much a southern state. Racially, Florida was not atypical of other southern states. In 1940, Florida had a black population of 27.1% compared to a national average of just under 10%.

Politically, Florida was, for most of the first half of the twentieth century, like the rest of the South solidly Democratic.⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt got at least 70% of the vote in Florida in each of his four presidential election victories. The state's congressional delegation was entirely Democratic and the most competitive elections occurred in the Democratic primary. Republicans began to win major statewide offices in Florida in the 1950s and 1960s. Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon won Florida in the three presidential elections held between 1952 and 1960.¹⁰ Claude Kirk was elected Florida's first twentieth century Republican governor in 1966 and in 1968 Edward Gurney was elected the state's first post-reconstruction Republican United States senator.¹¹

Florida was transformed by rapid population growth.¹² Mass migration into the central and southern regions of the state meant that different parts of Florida often had the political configuration of the region where most migrants had originated. The heavy Republicanism of the Gulf Coast was attributed to the midwestern origins of many of the retirees and other migrants living there. The Miami region was made more Republican by a heavy influx of Cuban refugees, who were attracted by the anti-Communist positions of the GOP. Other parts of South Florida were made more Democratic by Jewish migration from the northeast. For example, in 1996, the nineteenth congressional district, located in parts of Broward and Palm Beach counties in South Florida, was the only House district in the nation, outside of New England, with a 90% white population, to give Bill Clinton at least

60% of the vote.¹³ North Florida, stretching from Jacksonville in the east to Pensacola in the west, was the region of the state that retained the cultural and political predilections of the South.¹⁴

Florida has experienced dramatic change in its racial composition in recent decades. The rapid influx of whites and Latinos has caused the percentage of Floridians who are black to decline significantly. With a 12.2% African-American population in 1990, Florida was slightly below the national average and had a lower black percentage than any other southern state. Indeed, Florida's black population was lower than that of Michigan, Illinois, and New York.

The Democratic victory in Florida in the 1976 presidential election was notable for its rarity. Florida was one of the most reliable Republican states in presidential elections from 1952 through 1996. Democrats won the state in only three of the 12 presidential elections (1964, 1976, 1996) held during this period.¹⁵ All three Democratic victories were by small margins.

During the presidential elections of the 1970s and 1980s, Florida was an essential component of the Republican electoral college strategy.¹⁶ Republicans counted on the substantial bloc of electoral votes they gained by carrying the entire South.¹⁷ A strong southern base allowed Republicans to dominate presidential elections for two decades, and Florida was a bulwark of the Republican southern strategy. In 1984, Walter Mondale did worse in Florida, with 35% of the vote, than in any other southern state.¹⁸ Like Mondale in 1984, Michael Dukakis made only a minimal effort to win Florida in 1988.¹⁹

After 1984 and 1988, scholars believed that the combination of old South conservatism in northern Florida, migration of northern and midwestern Republicans to the state, and strong Latino support for the GOP, made Florida a Republican base state in presidential elections.²⁰ In 1992, the *Almanac of American Politics* declared that, "Florida now seems to be the safest big Republican state in presidential elections."²¹

In 1992, Bill Clinton's strategists did not initially plan to compete for Florida's electoral votes.²² A late October effort brought Clinton within two percentage points of George Bush in 1992. Clinton won 39% of the vote to Bush's 40.9% and Ross Perot garnered a fifth of the popular vote.

While Republicans dominated Florida presidential politics for decades, Democrats continued to do well in high profile statewide elections by nominating moderate candidates. Republicans hoped to follow Richard Nixon's presidential election win in Florida in 1968 with victories in the state's gubernatorial and senatorial elections of 1970. However, the Democrats held both offices when moderate state senator Reuben Askew was elected governor and another moderate state senator, Lawton Chiles, was elected to the open U.S. Senate seat.²³ Chiles went on to win three terms in the Senate and was elected governor in 1990 and 1994. Bob Graham, another moderate Democrat, succeeded Askew in 1978. After two terms as governor, Graham won Senate elections in 1986 and 1992. Republicans also had successes in statewide elections during this period.

Lawton Chiles and Bill Clinton were among the founders of the Democratic Leadership Council, a group organized in 1985 to counter the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.²⁴ Despite its strong Republican predilections in presidential elections in the 1980s, Florida would seem to be a hospitable state for a moderate southern Democratic governor such as Bill Clinton.

Clinton and Presidential Politics in Florida

Table 1 presents a comparison of the popular vote in presidential elections in Florida and the nation as a whole from 1976 through 1996. Florida was slightly more Democratic than the rest of the country when Jimmy Carter headed the Democratic ticket in 1976. Democratic presidential candidates did worse in Florida than in the nation as a whole in each presidential election from 1980 through 1996. However, the gap between Florida and the nation narrowed considerably in the election of 1996 when it shrank to only 1.2%.

Table 1

Florida and the Nation in Presidential Elections, 1976-96

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
U.S.	50.1	41.0	40.6	45.6	43.0	49.2
Florida	51.9	38.5	34.7	38.15	39.0	48.0
Difference	+1.8	-2.5	-5.9	-7.1	-4.0	-1.2

Note: The number for each year in the U.S. and Florida rows is the percentage of the popular vote cast for the Democratic presidential candidate.

Florida had a greater shift to the Democrats between 1984 and 1996 than did the nation as a whole. The Democratic percentage of the vote in the United States in 1996 was 8.6% higher than in 1984. In Florida, the Democratic vote increased by 13.3% over the same 12 year period. Among the southern states, only Clinton's native Arkansas and neighboring Louisiana had a greater swing towards the Democrats than Florida.

To compare the electoral performance in Florida of the last six Democratic presidential candidates, table 2 presents a correlation matrix of the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote in Florida counties in the last six presidential elections (1976-96). The first election included was 1976 because Jimmy Carter was the last Democrat before Clinton in 1996 to carry Florida.

Table 2

Correlation Matrix of the Democratic Presidential Vote in Florida, by Counties

	Clinton 1992	Dukakis 1988	Mondale 1984	Carter 1980	Carter 1976
Clinton 1996	.931***	.898***	.854***	.314**	.185
Clinton 1992		.952***	.945***	.508***	.373**
Dukakis 1988			.934***	.488***	.376**
Mondale 1984				.640***	.498***
Carter 1980					.901***

** p<.01

*** p<.001

Clinton's vote in 1992 and 1996 correlates positively with that of Democrats Mondale and Dukakis. However, Clinton's 1996 county vote has a declining positive correlation with each previous Democrat. The correlation between the Democratic vote in 1976 and 1996 is a statistically insignificant .185. Clearly, Bill Clinton won Florida in a very different way than had Jimmy Carter. The overall pattern of the correlation matrix presented in table 2 indicates that there is a weak association in the patterns of county support for the last two Democrats to carry Florida in a presidential election.

An analysis of change in Democratic support by county is presented in table 3. A regression was run on the change in each county's vote from the 1984 to the 1996 presidential election. The dependent variable was calculated by subtracting Walter Mondale's percentage of the popular vote in each Florida county in the 1984 election from Bill Clinton's percentage of the vote in each county in 1996. Mondale's 1984 vote was chosen as a baseline for the Democratic vote because it was Ronald Reagan's 65% showing in Florida in 1984 that caused analysts to regard Florida as a Republican base state.²⁵ Because there was a .934 correlation between the 1984 and 1988 Democratic presidential vote in Florida counties, the 1984 vote would also seem to be representative of Democratic fortunes in the 1980s.

During his first term, Bill Clinton courted Florida's Latino voters by tightening sanctions against Cuba after a Brothers to the Rescue plane was shot down by the Cuban military. Clinton also signed the Helms-Burton legislation that punished foreign companies that traded with Cuba. Clinton further spoke against the provisions of the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill that restricted benefits for legal immigrants. Exit polls indicated that Clinton won 44% of the traditionally Republican Latino vote in Florida.²⁶ An independent variable for the percentage Latino of the county's population was included in the regression.

Medicare was a major issue in the 1996 presidential campaign as Democrats charged that the Republicans wished to impose deep cuts in the federal program that provides health

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insurance for senior citizens. In Florida, the state with the highest percentage of residents over age 65, Medicare was likely to be a salient issue.²⁷ A senior citizens variable, the percentage of county residents age 65 and older, was included in the regression.

If electoral trends in Florida are consistent with those in several large northern states, Democratic support should have increased most in metropolitan areas of Florida.²⁸ To measure differences between rural and metropolitan areas, a population density variable (population per square kilometer) was included in the regression. With his calculated appeal to moderate suburban voters, it would be expected that Clinton would do well in the more densely populated counties.

Most of Florida has experienced rapid population growth for several decades. A variable for population growth was included in the analysis. Population growth was measured as the percentage change of the population from 1980 to 1995. In some southern states, migration from outside the region has increased Republican electoral strength.²⁹ Because migration into Florida comes from so many sources, it is not clear what impact rapid population growth will have on a county's presidential voting.

The black percentage of the population of each county was included as a variable because race has proven to be a major electoral cleavage in recent presidential elections. Because of the constancy of black support for Democratic candidates over several elections, it is unlikely that the black population of a county will be correlated with a change in Democratic support from 1984 to 1996.

Table 3
Regression Analysis of County Level Swing from Mondale to Clinton (1996)

	<i>Swing 1984-96</i>
Latino % in Each County	.186*** .049
Black % in Each County	-.011 .044
County Population Density	.005* .002
Senior Citizens % in Each County	.176* .059
% Population Change in Each County, 1980-95	.014 .013
Constant	5.63** 1.76
Adj. R2	.381

Notes: The numbers in each cell are the unstandardized regression coefficient and the standard error. The dependent variable was the difference between the percentage of the popular vote in each Florida county received by Walter Mondale in 1984 and Bill Clinton in 1996.

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

The results of the regression are presented in table 3. Three variables are positively correlated with a positive change in the Democratic vote from 1984 to 1996. The population density of a county, the Latino population, and the percentage of the population age 65 or older were indicators of a change in support for the Democrats. Partisan divisions over immigration and federal programs to senior citizens appeared to benefit Clinton as he captured Florida, a state that had been regarded as a Republican base state in presidential elections. As in some large northern states, Clinton's greatest improvements on the 1984 Democratic presidential vote were in metropolitan regions of Florida.

The change in support for the Democratic presidential candidate is examined somewhat differently in table 4. The table lists the counties with the highest and lowest Democratic swings from 1984 to 1996. All counties in which the swing to the Democrats was at least one standard deviation from the mean are included in table 4.

Table 4
Presidential Vote Swing in Florida Counties, 1984-96

Counties with Highest Democratic Swing 1984-96		Counties with Lowest Democratic Swing 1984-96	
	%		%
Manatee (Tampa Area)	16.2	Lafayette (North Florida)	4.2
Dade (Miami)	16.7	Baker (North Florida)	4.9
Orange (Orlando)	17.1	Bradford (North Florida)	4.9
Sarasota (St. Petersburg)	17.1	Suwanee (North Florida)	5.3
St. Lucie (Atlantic Coast)	17.8	Hamilton (North Florida)	5.4
Palm Beach (Gold Coast)	20.1	St. Johns (North Florida)	6.0
Broward (South Florida)	20.4	Duval (Jacksonville)	6.9
Osceola (Central Florida)	20.8	Escambia (Pensacola)	6.9

Note: Figures represent the difference between Walter Mondale's percentage of the popular vote in 1984 and Bill Clinton's percentage of the popular vote in 1996. Counties with a swing of at least one standard deviation above or below the mean are included.

Mean change in Democratic vote, 1984-96: 11.51

Standard deviation from the mean: 4.06

The data presented in table 4 indicates that Clinton increased the Democratic vote the least in many counties of North Florida. All of the counties where the swing to the Democrats from 1984 to 1996 was at least one standard deviation below the mean were in North Florida. Two of the counties included in the list with a low swing to the Democrats, Duval and Escambia, have a large military presence. Nationally, Clinton's weakest region was the South. It is not surprising that he made the smallest gains in a region of Florida that resembles, culturally and politically, southern states like Alabama and Georgia.³⁰

The largest swings to Clinton occurred in some of the metropolitan counties of Central and South Florida. Among the counties with the strongest Democratic trends were all three of the Gold Coast counties of South Florida (Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach). Fast growing Orange County (Orlando) in Central Florida and Sarasota County on the Gulf Coast, which has a very high percentage of senior citizens, also had a strong trend toward Clinton.

Clinton's strength in Florida was in regions that had high concentrations of the types of voters with whom Clinton did well outside of the South. Clinton won over 80% of the vote among African-Americans across the country.³¹ He also garnered a substantial majority of the vote among Latinos across the country. In Florida, Clinton received 87% of the black vote in 1996 and increased his Latino support.³² Nationally, Clinton's vote increased most from that of Democratic losers Mondale and Dukakis in the major cities and suburbs of the Northeast and Midwest. In Florida, he did very well in the urban counties of the Gold Coast (Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach) that are populated by many migrants from the Northeast.

Conclusion

Florida evolved into a competitive state in 1992 and a Democratic state in the 1996 presidential election because Bill Clinton improved greatly on prior Democrats' performances in the metropolitan counties of Central and South Florida. Clinton made only modest gains in the culturally and politically southern counties in the northern portions of the state. The uneven surge in Democratic support is consistent with the existing literature on electoral change and is also consistent with Clinton's performance in the rest of the country. Because presidential elections are few in number, it is difficult to draw conclusions from them. Only time will tell if 1996 heralded the emergence of Florida as a competitive state in presidential politics or if, as Republicans hope, 1996 was an aberration.

Many of the issues that benefited Clinton in Florida in the 1996 election are likely to remain salient in future elections. Given demographic trends in the United States and the precarious long term fiscal projections for entitlement programs benefiting the elderly, it is virtually certain that there will be future political battles over the funding of Social Security and Medicare. Despite Republican attempts to back away from the politically damaging impact of the restrictions on government assistance to legal immigrants in the welfare reform bill passed in 1996, the GOP contains a strong nativist wing.³³ Republicans in several states are worried about the degree to which the party has alienated Latino voters. Battles over immigration, bilingual education, and English only laws are likely to be part of the American political agenda in the coming decades. As a largely urban state

with a fragile ecosystem Florida will face pressing environmental problems in the future. The politics of the environment are not likely to disappear from the national or state political scene. Democrats will likely have an advantage over Republicans among voters concerned about the environment.

None of the above trends guarantee that Florida will become a Democratic state in future presidential elections. They do portend the continuance of Florida as an electorally competitive state. Florida's evolution into a toss-up state in presidential elections would have significant consequences for American politics. The departure of the second largest southern state from the list of the states almost guaranteed to Republican presidential candidates in the 1980s, would give future Democratic nominees a much better chance at assembling the 270 electoral votes necessary to win the presidency. If Democrats nominate a candidate who runs as well, or nearly as well, as Bill Clinton did in the Northeast and Midwest in 1992 and 1996, Republicans will be further disadvantaged if they must fight hard to win Florida.

For analysts and scholars of southern politics there remains the question of the extent to which Florida should be regarded as a southern state.³⁴ Political scientist Susan McManus has suggested that Florida is now a microcosm of the United States.³⁵ Florida contains rural and small town southerners in the North, a large Latino community in South Florida, and many suburbanites in the fast growing Orlando and Tampa regions. Florida's 48% popular vote for Clinton was just 1.2% below his national average. Among the southern states, only Arkansas, Clinton's home state, and Louisiana gave Clinton a higher percentage of the popular vote than did Florida. (The Clinton-Gore ticket got the same percentage in the vice-president's home state of Tennessee as it received in Florida.) It is also interesting that Clinton won only 1% more in the popular vote in Pennsylvania than he did in Florida and that he won a slightly smaller share of the popular vote (.6 percent) in Ohio than in Florida.

Florida now has the lowest black population of the 11 states usually included in studies of southern politics. It has a larger Latino population than any southern state except Texas. If in future elections Florida votes more like the nation as a whole and less like many of the states of the South, perhaps it should no longer be classified as a southern state. Politically and culturally, states like Oklahoma and Kentucky, which are usually not included in studies of southern politics, more closely resemble much of the South.³⁶ Florida Democratic Senator Bob Graham implicitly acknowledged Florida's non-southern status in 1995 when he urged the Clinton campaign to concentrate on Florida in the 1996 election. Graham argued that Clinton "was almost certainly going to have some fall off in support from 1992, particularly in the West and South. In looking for electoral votes to replace those, Florida becomes the most possible to do."³⁷ Graham proved to be prophetic as Clinton lost Georgia, Colorado, and Montana, three states that he carried in 1992. However, he won Florida, which has one more electoral vote than the combined total for the three states that were subtracted from the Democratic column. Graham's comment is interesting because he argued that a candidate with political weakness in the South might compensate in Florida.

If Florida is a microcosm of the entire nation, the electoral trends evident in the state in 1996 are not surprising. Nationally, Bill Clinton's new Democratic appeal brought him significant electoral success in the Northeast, Midwest and on the West Coast. However, Clinton

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lost most southern states in 1992 and 1996. The New Democratic appeal did not benefit Democrats uniformly across the country. Likewise, Clinton did not do well in the regions of Florida that were culturally and politically southern. As migrants continue to pour into Florida, the state may be transformed into a bellwether state. Early in the twenty-first century a pundit may proclaim that, "As Florida goes, so goes the nation."

Notes

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- 3 Michael Nelson, "The Election: Turbulence and Tranquillity," in *The Election of 1996*, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997).
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- 6 Donald W. Beachler, "Presidential Politics in Pennsylvania, 1984-1996," forthcoming in *Commonwealth: A Journal of Political Science*.
- 7 Florida is included in the major studies that analyze the South on a state by state basis. See the works of Key, Bass and Devries, and Lamis cited in the references.
- 8 V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).
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- 12 Alexander P. Lamis, *The Two Party South*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- 13 Phil Duncan and Christine Lawrence, *Politics in America: The 105th Congress* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997).
- 14 Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, *The Almanac of American Politics* (Boston: Gambit Books, 1972). Florida has experienced such rapid population growth that Broward County, which the first edition of the *Almanac of American Politics* identified as Republican leaning because of the midwestern origins of many of its residents, has become a Democratic stronghold because of northeastern migration and white migration from Dade County (Barone, Ujifusa and Matthews, 1973; Barone and Ujifusa, 1993).

- 15 Despite Barry Goldwater's much publicized desire to privatize Social Security, Lyndon Johnson defeated Goldwater by a narrow 51-49% margin in 1964. Jimmy Carter won 51.9% of the popular vote in Florida in 1976.
- 16 Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969).
- 17 Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- 18 Mark Stern, "Florida," in *The 1984 Presidential Election in the South: Patterns of Southern Party Politics*, eds. Robert P. Steed, Laurence Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (New York: Praeger, 1986).
- 19 William Hulbarry, Anne Kelly and Lewis Bowman, "Florida: The Republican Surge Continues," in *The 1988 Presidential Election in the South: Continuity Amidst Change in Party Politics*, eds. Laurence W. Moreland, Robert P. Steed and Tod A. Baker (New York: Praeger, 1991).
- 20 Stern, 1986 and Hulbarry, Kelly and Bowman, 1991.
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- 31 *New York Times*, November 10, 1996.
- 32 Tenpas, Kelly and Bowman, 1997.

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- 33 Todd Purdum, "California GOP Faces a Crisis as Hispanic Voters Turn Away," *New York Times*, December 10, 1997.
- 34 The eleven states included in most studies of southern politics are those that once belonged to the Confederate States of America: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AND ITS RELATION TO PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL POWER, 1789-1900

Samuel B. Hoff

This essay reviews the constitutional principle of separation of powers as it relates to presidential removal power. The objectives of the study are to trace the lineage of the separation principle; to explain how the doctrine formed the basis of initial congressional debate on the removal power of the president; and to contrast presidential actions with legislative and Supreme Court responses to removals through the nineteenth century. The findings shed new light on this ignored but important source of executive influence.

Separation of Powers in Theory and Practice

Though the establishment of our constitutional government brought the first true application of separation of powers, the principle's theoretical roots were well established. Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle advocated a mixed state, combining monarchical and democratic elements, for political stability and societal harmony.¹ The Roman leader, Polybius, went further by suggesting that different organs of government be represented by distinct social classes, so as to promote both competition and balance.² Bodin, Locke, and Rousseau envisioned a government comprised of two main branches, but differed on which organ would possess supreme power: Bodin favored ultimate power in the executive, whereas Locke and Rousseau viewed legislative power as supreme; none held much regard for an independently functioning judiciary.³

Ironically, it was Montesquieu's erroneous analysis of British government which produced the first remnants of the separation of powers theory as we know it today. According to Vanderbilt, "Montesquieu was first to conceive of three functions of government as exercised by three distinct organs, each juxtaposed against the others. He saw the executive as monolithic, the bicameral legislature as aristocratic and democratic and the judiciary, perhaps because it did not fit in with this scheme, as 'next to nothing'."⁴ Montesquieu justified separating the executive and judicial functions because, "if the two powers were joined, the judge might act with the force and violence of an oppressor."⁵ Gwyn asserts that Montesquieu held a separation of powers was necessary to achieve legitimacy and to guarantee security among the people.⁶

Though Montesquieu's contribution to the separation principle was seminal, there was a more direct reason for its inclusion in the American Constitution. Frohnmayer contends that "there is now convincing evidence that separation of powers concept was not engrafted mechanistically from Montesquieu's theorizing, but had solid, pragmatic roots in

Samuel B. Hoff is ROTC Director and professor of history and political science at Delaware State University. Specializing in the presidency, Dr. Hoff has published over sixty articles and book reviews in academic books and journals. He served in three staff positions with the U.S. Congress and was an elected party committeeman in Suffolk County, Long Island, NY.

the American colonial experience."⁷ Whereas prerevolutionary colonial governments were for the most part controlled by the British through the governor, "the period from 1774 to 1787 demonstrates the degree to which the idea of separation of powers was based on a search for administrative efficiency," according to Fisher.⁸ He points to the unsuccessful committee system used by the Continental Congress to handle managerial duties and to George Washington's frustration with Congress in organizing for war as examples of the need for "more reliable government machinery."⁹

In defending the creation of the federal Constitution against those who advocated rigid separation, James Madison contended the principle as it was applied by the states illustrated the sharing and overlap of powers among the government departments. He believed that Montesquieu implied a balance of powers rather than complete distinctness, and did not regard the British Constitution as maintaining total separation.¹⁰ Madison elucidates his views on the separation of powers doctrine in *Federalist* 48: "It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it."¹¹

Frohnmayr states that "the criticism based on the alleged theoretical incompatibility between separated powers and the necessity for cooperation among coordinate branches is dispelled when it is demonstrated that complete separation never was intended and that overlapping functions were created deliberately."¹² Vanderbilt concurs, postulating that "the division of government into three branches does not imply, as its critics would have us think, three watertight compartments."¹³ Anderson examines the separation of powers doctrine using three concepts— independence, checks, and balance. Although the three national institutions were designed to be independent, they were not of the same influence.¹⁴ Checks were "incorporated in the structure of separation of powers to maintain the separation by keeping the branches independent, to work against hastily passed, badly considered laws, and ultimately to remove from office those who abused their public trust—all while preventing government deadlock."¹⁵ Anderson notes that "a check given to one branch to defend itself cannot be a power that department already possesses by nature."¹⁶ By sharing some power with the executive and serving as a counter force to the House of Representatives, the Senate added balance to the new federal structure and stemmed fears of legislative tyranny.¹⁷

Other framers of American government, while supporting the separation principle, also advocated a system of checks and balances. In *Federalist* 66, Alexander Hamilton asserts that: "The true meaning of this (separation) maxim has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of several members of the government against each other."¹⁸

John Adams opposed an absolute divorcing of powers between the organs of government such as that found in the 1780 Massachusetts constitution.¹⁹ Commenting on the

compromise reached at the 1787 convention, he said "it is by balancing each of these three powers against the other two, that the errors in human nature toward tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, and any degree of freedom preserved in the Constitution."²⁰ Fisher delineates Thomas Jefferson's evolving view on the separation doctrine: "His (Jefferson's) draft of the 1776 Virginia constitution specified that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches be kept forever separate. But as governor from 1779 to 1781, he came to appreciate the porous quality of those barriers between branches."²¹

Gwyn sums up the functions of the separation of powers concept as it was integrated into American constitutional government: to create greater governmental efficiency; to assure that statutory law is made in the common interest; to assure that the law is impartially administered and that all administrators are under the law; to allow the people's representatives to call executive officials to account for the abuse of their power; and to establish a balance of governmental powers.²²

Debate on the Removal Power

The Constitution specifies the powers of the president and Congress in the appointing process: "He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other policy ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments."²³

However, with the exception of the impeachment clause, the document was silent on removal of executive branch officials. Charles Thatch holds that the debates at the Constitutional Convention did not anticipate this question: "As to intended relations of the Senate and executive under the final plan, the evidence is even scantier. There was neither time nor desire to discuss the compromise fully, nor opportunity to discuss it all on its merits. It was accepted as it came from the committee, without any real effort to determine what its more remote implications were."²⁴

Hamilton, though he later revised his position, proposed a dual power of removal in the *Federalist 77*:

It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the cooperation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the offices of the government as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of the offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new president would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.²⁵

During the 1789 House debates on the establishment of executive departments, the question of the removal power was extensively discussed. Thatch contends that four theo-

ries regarding the removal power were advanced: (1) executive officers held office for life, and could be removed only by impeachment; (2) the removal power was a shared executive-Senate function; (3) Congress had the right to vest removal where it chose, though it should be in the president alone; and (4) the president inherited the sole right of removal by virtue of the Constitution itself.²⁶ Fisher adds that a fifth and sixth school of thought included letting the question be decided by the courts and procedural due process, or giving every displaced person a hearing.²⁷ Thatch states that most of the debate focused on either a shared removal power or an independent disposal power for the president, granted to him by Congress, since House members and delegates to the Constitutional Convention had assumed that the life tenure provision was reserved for federal judges. The proponents of an exclusive presidential removal power cited expediency, the right to choose subordinates, and the view that the president should control administrative organization. The representatives of a shared removal power between the Senate and the president argued that the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I of the Constitution permitted Congress to carry into execution all departments and offices.²⁸

The House vote on the removal power came on an amendment to a bill creating an executive department, which had proposed changing the phrase "to be removable by the president" to "whenever said principal shall be removed from office by the president of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy." Of the 29 representatives who voted in favor of the amendment, 6 were Constitutional Convention delegates, whereas only 2 of the 22 dissenting votes were House members who had attended the 1787 convention.²⁹ On the Senate side, Vice President John Adams broke two tie votes pertaining to the removal power, siding with those who advocated an independent executive prerogative of removal both times.³⁰ Six of ten senators who had attended the Constitutional Convention favored an exclusive executive power to remove secretaries of departments and other top administration officials.³¹

Fisher asserts that Madison opposed Senate participation in the removal power in that he "feared that additional blending, resulting from encroachment, would benefit the legislature and weaken the executive." Madison believed that the president would become a "two headed monster" deprived of responsibility, and presidential power would be reduced to a "mere vapor" should the Senate have a hand in disposing of top executive branch officials.³² John Adams' objections to sharing the removal power with the Senate were that executive responsibility would be lessened; the time of the Senate would be divided between legislative and executive functions; and that ultimately senators would be corrupted by it. Opponents to a sole power of removal vested in the president, such as Sherman, postulated that shared participation would prevent the president from becoming a despot, and would guarantee against any infringement of states' rights.³³

The 1789 removal power debate led to the following conclusions, according to Morganston: that the appointment power includes the removing power; that both power belong to the president, with the Senate simply having a negative on appointments; that where the tenure of office has not been provided for by the Constitution, the office is held at the pleasure of the appointing power; and that the heads of departments are not inferior officers.³⁴ Thatch observes that the events of 1789 "demonstrate the erroneousness of the commonly accepted explanation that the presidential control over administration is an acci-

dental result of the possession of the power of removal. The exact reverse is the true explanation. The power of removal was rather derived from the general executive power of administrative control."³⁵

Action and Reaction

Throughout the nineteenth century, presidents continued to claim an exclusive power to remove principal executive branch officials. Their espoused positions and actions uniformly led to congressional responses, and sometimes to Supreme Court decisions as well. A review of significant instances where the institutions struggled to define the contours of the separation of powers doctrine in this area follows.

President Andrew Jackson's removal of the Secretary of the Treasury in 1833 precipitated a bitter confrontation with Congress. Jackson had ordered Secretary Duane to withdraw all deposits from the Bank of the United States, which he declared was unconstitutional for the following reasons: Congress had no power to create a corporation; the Bank had withdrawn capital from the control of the states; it bought real estate without consent of the states; it created a monopoly of the money power; much of the Bank's stock was owned by foreigners; the bank essentially weakened states and strengthened the federal government.³⁶ When Duane ignored Jackson's instructions, he was fired. The Senate reacted by passing a resolution in March 1834 stating "that the president, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both."³⁷

A month later Jackson launched an impassioned protest with the Senate, claiming that the Senate was charging him with an impeachable offense though the House had not done likewise, that the vote on the resolution passed by less than two-thirds majority, and that the Senate was exercising a judicial function. Regarding the removal power, Jackson made these points:

The executive power vested in the Senate is neither that of nominating nor appointing. It is merely a check upon the executive power of appointment... The whole executive power being vested in the president, who is responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence that he should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the performance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be responsible for their acts... But if there were any just ground for doubt on the face of the Constitution whether all executive officers are removable at the will of the president, it is obviated by the contemporaneous construction of the instrument and the uniform practice under it....³⁸

At about the same time as the Senate resolution above, Henry Clay proposed four resolutions propounding that Congress should prevent removals except with the consent of the Senate. A year later, in 1835, John C. Calhoun introduced a bill to reduce presidential patronage. Though both pieces of legislation were defeated, they symbolized opposition to Jackson's interpretation of the Constitution.³⁹ Fisher notes that Jackson removed more officials—252—than all his predecessors combined, who had collectively discharged 193 executive branch personnel.⁴⁰

Presidents Fillmore and Pierce were involved in removal controversies during the 1850s. Fillmore suggested in his first annual message to Congress that presidents should exercise their power of removal in cases of "unfortunate administrative appointments."⁴¹ In 1854, the Supreme Court ruled that President Pierce's firing of a state supreme court chief justice was an administrative action, executive in nature, and out of the higher court's jurisdiction.⁴²

During the turbulent 1860s, differences over the extent of legislative inclusion in the removal power once again pitted the president and Congress against each other. For instance, in 1863, after several failed attempts, Congress passed a bill to establish a Bureau of Currency within the Treasury Department, whose chief officer was called the Comptroller of the Currency. According to the legislation, the comptroller was to be appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and would serve "for the term of five years unless sooner removed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."⁴³ Four years later Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act over President Andrew Johnson's strong opposition, of which the first section stated the following:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, that Secretaries of State, Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the president by whom they had been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.⁴⁴

In other sections the act stated that presidents may make appointments during a recess of the Senate, but must notify the Senate of the action within 20 days of its reconvening. The Senate then had the option of either confirming the recess appointment or reinstating the previous officer.⁴⁵

President Johnson's veto message emphasized that the bill was unconstitutional. It reviewed the First Congress debate on the removal power, particularly Madison's aforementioned position. Johnson claims "that the power of removal is constitutionally vested in the president of the United States as a principle which has been not more distinctly declared by judicial authority and judicial commentators than it has been uniformly practiced upon the legislative and executive departments of government...an exclusive power of removal by the president was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution..."⁴⁶

Congress overrode the president's veto on the same day it was issued, March 2, 1867. It didn't take long for the first test of the law to occur. On August 5 of that year Johnson sent Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who had become increasingly intransigent in implementing the administration's post-Civil War Reconstruction policies, a note recommending that he resign. When Stanton refused, Johnson suspended him on August 12, 1867, ordering him to "cease to exercise any and all functions" pertaining to his office and transfer authority to General Ulysses S. Grant. Stanton again refused in a message to the president, but for all intents and purposes Grant had assumed control.⁴⁷

In a December 1867 message to Congress, President Johnson revealed that upon seeking the advice of his entire Cabinet on the Tenure of Office Act, everyone agreed that it was

unconstitutional: "All spoke without doubt or reservation, but Mr. Stanton's condemnation of the law was the most elaborate and emphatic."⁴⁸ The president outlined the importance of the removal power being left in the hands of the executive:

I do not claim that a head of department should have no other opinions than those of the president. He has the same right, in the conscientious discharge of duty, to entertain and express his own opinions as has the president. What I do claim is that the president is the responsible head of the administration, and when the opinions of a head of department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the president in grave matters of policy and administration there is but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a severance of the official relation...The principal, upon whom such responsibility is placed for the acts of a subordinate, ought to be left as free as possible, in the matter of selection and dismissal. To hold him to the responsibility for an officer beyond his control; to leave the question of fitness of such an agent to be decided for him and not by him; to allow such a subordinate, when the president, moved by "public considerations of high character," requests his resignation to assume for himself an equal right to act upon his own views of "public considerations" and to make his own conclusions paramount to those of the president—to allow all this is to reverse the just order of administration and to place the subordinate above the superior.⁴⁹

Johnson's public airing of Stanton's views on Tenure of Office Act, together with his steadfast claim of an exclusive removal right for the chief executive, would culminate a few months later. On January 14, 1868, Grant turned the Secretary of War post back over to Edwin Stanton. The president, in a note to Stanton on February 21, 1868, "hereby removed" him from his position, ordering him to transfer authority to Major-General Lorenzo Thomas. On February 24, 1868, by a straight party vote of 126 to 47, the House of Representatives passed 11 articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, most relating to his alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act. The Senate trial began on March 5, 1868 and ended on May 26. The president was acquitted on the three impeachment articles on which the Senate had voted to convict—the eleventh, second, and third—by identical 35 to 19 margins, 1 vote short of the 36 necessary to remove him.⁵⁰

In answering the first House impeachment article, which accused President Johnson of violating the Tenure of Office Act, the president's lawyers argued that the first section of the act was unconstitutional; that the removal power had been settled by the First Congress vote and practices before him; and, "the Constitution of the United States conferred on the president, as part of the executive power and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers for cause to be judged of by the president alone."⁵¹

According to Benedict, the president's defense used four different strategies during the Senate trial; asserting the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional; insisting that Johnson had not succeeded in removing Stanton from the Secretary of War post; pointing out that the act had said that an appointed official's term ends one month after the president's term expires, so that Stanton was no longer protected by the act; and that the president, in seeking a Supreme Court decision on the legislation had manifested no criminal intent in his actions.⁵² Though Benedict concludes the charges against Johnson were largely justified on legal grounds, Frederick Hill offers another perspective: "So multifarious and divergent

were the accusations against the president that it is not surprising that some of the guests in the galleries supposed that the Chief Magistrate was on trial for inebriety, others that he had committed treason, and still others that he was an accessory to Lincoln's assassination, as had so often been loosely charged in the halls of Congress."⁵³

To illustrate the regularity of presidential removals in the years preceding the Tenure of Office Act, the president's lawyers introduced into evidence several charts detailing names, dates, and positions of those removed from various offices. These charts are summarized: 112 removals of superintendents of Indian affairs and of Indian agents from 1849 to 1861; 91 removals of registrars of land offices removed during recess of the Senate from 1849 to 1861; 83 removals of receivers of public monies during recess of the Senate from 1849 to 1865; 29 removals of receivers of public monies during sessions of the Senate from 1852 to 1866, where that body had advised and consented to the appointment of their successors; 29 removals of registrars of land offices during sessions of the Senate from 1849 to 1868, where the Senate had advised and consented to the appointment of their successors; 11 removals of surveyor generals during recess of the Senate from 1849 to 1865; 80 removals of surveyor generals during sessions of the Senate from 1855 to 1861, where the Senate had advised and consented to the appointment of their successors; total of 16 miscellaneous removals between 1849 and 1867, including 6 commissioners of public buildings, patents, pensions, Indian affairs, or general land offices; 5 wardens of the District of Columbia penitentiary; 3 registrars of deeds or wills; 1 general land office recorder; and 1 principal clerk of surveys in a general land office.⁵⁴

Ulysses Grant evidently viewed the Tenure of Office Act in a different light upon becoming president. In his inaugural address he urged its repeal, stating: "It could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution when providing the appointments made by the president should receive the consent of the Senate, that the latter should have the power to retain in office persons placed there by federal appointment against the will of the president. The law is inconsistent with a faithful and efficient administration of government. What faith can an executive put in officials forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has suspended for reason? How will such officials be likely to serve the administration which they know does not trust them?"⁵⁵

Instead the Republican-controlled Congress modified the act on April 5, 1869, by stipulating that civil officers who had been appointed by and with the advice of the Senate should hold office "unless sooner removed by and with advice and consent of the Senate, or by the appointment, with the like advice and consent of the Senate, of a successor in his place, except as herein otherwise provided." In other words, according to Morganston, there could still be no separate removal by the president.⁵⁶

The see-saw procedures on the removal power persisted, with Congress requiring that the Senate be involved in removals of the Postmaster General and his three assistants in 1872, and likewise for removal of all first, second, and third-class postmasters in an 1876 strengthening of the latter law. It was the 1876 version of the removal power jurisdiction of Congress which would be the subject of a wide-ranging Supreme Court case in the twentieth century (*Myers v. U.S.*, 1926).

Grover Cleveland's presidential tenure furnished needed momentum for a return to executive-dominated removal authority. According to Fisher, Cleveland suspended 643 personnel in his first 10 months in office, including 278 postmasters, 151 commercial posts,

81 public lands and Indian affairs agents, 71 financial officers, and 62 attorneys and marshals. It was Cleveland's suspension of George M. Duskin, U.S. District Attorney in Alabama, which led to a Senate request to review all documents and papers relating to the case.⁵⁷ In his first annual message to Congress on December 17, 1885, Cleveland denied the Senate's request, employing a separation of powers rationale: "Contemplation of the grave and responsible functions assigned to the respective branches of government under the Constitution will disclose the partitions of power between our respective departments and their necessary independence, and also the need for the exercise of all the power intrusted to each in that spirit of comity and cooperation which is essential to the proper fulfillment of patriotic obligations which rest upon us as faithful servants of the people."⁵⁸

When the Senate passed a resolution in January 1886 asking to obtain the papers and documents relating to Duskin's removal, Cleveland responded in a message to the Senate on March 1 that he believed "the power to remove or suspend such officials is vested in the president alone by the Constitution, which in express terms provides that 'the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of America' and that 'he shall take care that laws be faithfully executed'."⁵⁹ On March 3, 1887, exactly twenty years and one day after the Tenure of Office Act was passed over President Johnson's veto, the law was repealed by Congress, "returning the removal process to the condition that had prevailed from 1789 to 1867," according to Fisher.⁶⁰

The last major action of the nineteenth century in the area of presidential removal power involved the Supreme Court's ruling in *Parsons v. U.S.* Decided in 1897, the case pertained to another U.S. District Attorney removed by President Cleveland. Without addressing the question of whether Parsons' commission for a four year term had been illegally abridged, the Court "concluded in a unanimous decision that the president may remove an office 'when in his discretion he regards it for the public good, although the term of office may have been limited by the words of the statute creating the office.'"⁶¹

Conclusion

At certain intervals in the history of American government prior to the twentieth century, historian Kingsley Martin's observation that "no device was ever so hampering as the separation of powers" seemed true as it related to removal power fights between the president and Congress.⁶² The Supreme Court, by going "out of its way to evade the direct issue of the power of Congress to control removals" played a relatively insignificant role.⁶³ Rather, the legislative and executive branches seemed to be basing their interpretations on the original congressional debate about the framers' intentions on the extent of either exclusive or shared jurisdiction in removals. That debate was by all accounts a democratic exercise, and the differing positions staked out by those who held strong opinions on presidential removal would become familiar arguments.

There were some identifiable reasons for removal power controversies in the 1800s. Economic issues were catalysts for the 1834 and 1863 legislative responses to executive removals. The Tenure of Office Act was not isolated retribution against a determined if embattled president, but a likely outcome of congressional testing-of-waters on removal authority throughout the mid-century. However, by the close of the 1800s, the question was

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not whether the president had a right to remove principal executive branch officers, but whether the power was, or could be, extended to all subordinate personnel.

Two important changes in the nature of presidential removal power became apparent in the 1900s. First, the Supreme Court would be called upon much more to mediate removal battles between the president and Congress; the Court's decisions would establish important precedents in this area. Second, the emergence of the public presidency meant that public opinion would have to be considered along with personal, institutional, and legal factors by chief executives pondering removal of executive branch officials. The separation of powers doctrine would be severely tested due to the augmentation in power by all three national branches of government, and because of increasingly divided party government. The use and interpretation of presidential removal power in the present century provides a stimulating topic for future research.

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VIETNAM: ASIA'S NEXT LITTLE TIGER?

Robert L. Bledsoe

This essay provides an overview of the political and economic fundamentals of contemporary Vietnam as a means to speculate as to whether Vietnam is poised to learn from the mistakes of the other smaller Asian nations presently suffering economic setbacks or is instead likely to repeat their mistakes. If the Vietnamese are able to overcome some of their structural challenges and not regress from innovative moves recently undertaken, their penchant for absorbing things foreign and giving them a distinctive Vietnamese face could provide an alternative developmental model to those other Asian developing economies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland.

Asia's economic meltdown of 1997-98 tarnished the coming of the "Pacific Century." The much vaunted economic dynamos—both big and small—have had rough times recently and some of the "little tigers" of Asia have had their claws trimmed—several rather severely. Where once we spoke of Asian economic growth in a generic sense (including most of the major and smaller states in the same breath), we now must identify precisely of which Asian states we are speaking. Of the major Asian economies, only China's looks healthy at this time, while Japan's remains relatively flat. Of the little tigers, only the economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore remain attractive. The economies of the other little tigers—South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia—are in difficulty at present, undermined by endemic corruption in both the public and private sectors, risky investments, weak banking systems, overbuilding and hyperinflated real estate, overvalued currencies, and debt-burdened industries. While these little tigers' futures may still be bright, their near-term difficulties present lessons for other Asian tiger "wannabes." One such aspiring little tiger is Vietnam.¹

Legacy of the War for Reunification

In order to assess Vietnam's potential for rapid economic growth in the next millenium, one must take into account the long-term economic, environmental, and human costs and legacies of the long struggle for a free and unified Vietnam. Economically, when Hanoi absorbed South Vietnam in 1975, they acquired a shattered economy to append to their own severely stressed economy. The South Vietnamese economy was built upon sand—an economy of which 50% was a service sector dependent upon the American military presence. When one factors in the American departure, the 1973 oil crisis, and the exodus of Vietnamese who became expatriates in 1975 with the fall of the South, there was not much left for Hanoi to reap. In addition, Hanoi had the challenge of dealing with millions of refugees who had inundated the cities to avoid the battles in the countryside. While the North Vietnamese infrastructure (heavily damaged by American bombing campaigns between 1965 and 1972) had been largely rebuilt by 1975, that rebuilding had consumed all the capital that

Robert L. Bledsoe is professor of political science and department chair at the University of Central Florida.

Hanoi had available and there was none left to meet the economic challenges of the southern half of the newly unified nation. In addition, the war took a terrible toll on the environment. Over eight million tons of bombs (four times that dropped in World War II) and between 10 to 15 million gallons of chemical agents destroyed large portions of the countryside and its forests. While the jungle grew back quickly, not so its hardwood forests, which will take several generations to reestablish. And the war's legacy on Vietnam's human capital was even more devastating—estimates as high as two million dead and an even larger number wounded or handicapped, multi-generational genetic damage from chemicals (e.g., Agent Orange), and a sizeable percentage of the southern population either hostile to or distrustful of Hanoi's presence in their part of the country. Indeed, overcoming foreign influence upon the middle and upper class elites represented in the military, bureaucracy, industry, and the intelligentsia would require significant investment in the creation and operation of rehabilitation camps throughout the southern half of the country.²

While Hanoi's initial plan for reunification after 1975 was for it to proceed incrementally, the leadership quickly shifted plans in favor of a rapid absorption of the South to prevent southern elites from entrenching themselves and challenging the integration process orchestrated by the North. Thus, national elections were called for an all-Vietnam National Assembly in April 1976, the first anniversary of the liberation of Saigon, and one of the major tasks of the Assembly was formalizing the merger of the two Vietnams in July 1976 into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. A new constitution was then passed in 1980 (updated in April 1992).

Economic Development

To meet the challenges outlined above, the central committee embarked upon a series of Five-Year Plans, beginning in 1976. The initial (Second) Five-Year Plan envisioned a rapid march toward socialism throughout the newly unified country with the collectivization of agriculture in the South in the form of some 250 massive "new economic zones" (NEZs), each of which was to consist of some one hundred thousand people. This entailed a major redistribution of the population from the urban to the rural area, which would reverse the migration to the cities which was overtaxing urban resources and infrastructure. Failing to learn Mao's lesson from the Great Leap Forward in the latter 1950s, the Plan also called for rapid industrialization, both light to medium industry in the NEZs and heavy industry in the urban sector. It was also hoped that the expropriation of the assets of wealthy landowners, nationalization of the banking sector, and creation of a single national currency would have an immediate uplifting effect upon the standard of living of the populace. To fund this accelerated move toward socialism and ensure its success, the Hanoi leadership hoped for the aid secretly promised by former President Nixon as an incentive to agree to the 1973 Paris cease fire proposal, as well as from its traditional allies—Russia and China.³ Unfortunately, such aid was not to materialize and, to make matters worse, the incursion into Cambodia in 1977 and the 1979 border war with China consumed the bulk of the government's budget. In addition, collectivization was not working in the South, where much of the peasant population owned their land and ancestral worship tied them to that land. Their displeasure with the NEZs was reflected by an annual statistical decline in agricultural production.⁴

By 1981, the leadership acknowledged that the Second Five-Year Plan was a failure and with the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85) reversed their move toward collectivization, with a return to a more family-based rural agricultural economy and a modest reversal in the nationalization efforts in the business sector. In addition, the love affair with rapid industrialization had cooled. The Third Plan was, therefore, portrayed as one of nascent economic liberalization.⁵

In retrospect, the major year in the shift toward a more open economy was 1986 – at the beginning of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) – with a change in the political leadership (Le Duan died that year and the familiar names of Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Duc Tho were pushed to the sidelines by being “elevated” to the newly created Council of Elders) and with the introduction of the government policies of *cong khai* (a Vietnamese version of *glasnost*) and *doi moi* (which is variously translated as liberalization, renovation, or re-birth).⁶ What is significant about the *doi moi* program was its clear refutation of earlier economic policies. It called for the continued decollectivization of the agricultural sector, encouragement of private industry and decentralization of state industry (allowing for local planning but, in return, reducing government subsidies), phasing out price controls, and opening the country to foreign investments. To encourage the latter, the following year saw the enactment of the first Law on Foreign Investments (which since seems to be amended annually). Through its various permutations, the Law on Foreign Investments has evolved from Vietnamese controlled joint-ventures and production sharing arrangements to the present state of allowing for wholly owned foreign operations, with assurance of no nationalization of foreign plants and investments. This encouragement has led to some 16 hundred foreign investments in Vietnam worth over \$27 billion.⁷ To accelerate economic development and position Vietnam in the economic mainstream of the global economy, Vietnam had by the mid-1990s joined the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Thus, in a mere two decades, Vietnam has moved from an impoverished country to the world's third largest rice exporter with trade links with 104 countries (80% of its trade volume is in the Asia-Pacific region, with its major trading partners being Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and France),⁸ annual economic growth rates averaging more than 9%, a gross domestic product of over \$25 billion, and an inflation rate that has declined from 300% in 1986 to less than 4% in 1997.⁹ The Vietnamese currency – the dong – is today relatively stable. And the standard of living of the Vietnamese has noticeably improved (although there remains a disparity between the northern and southern portions of the country, with the living standard indicators higher in the South). In a single generation, they have moved from bicycles to motorbikes (over 75% of households), television sets are everywhere (95% of households), half the households have VCRs, and 75% have stereo systems. Disparities between the North and the South still exist, however, with five times as many households having telephones in the South as in the North, three times as many households in the South having washing machines as in the North, and twice as many having air conditioners in the South as in the North – for all these latter indicators, however, the total percentage of southern households having such items does not exceed 25%.¹⁰ Electrification has appeared in the rural areas (even if, from personal experience, it only operates for a few hours each evening), more roads are paved (although many remain rough and potholed, as was the author's experience in the trek toward Dien Bien Phu), the trains run

(if not always on time), and Vietnam Airlines flies all over Southeast Asia with modern A300/320 European Airbuses which have replaced the older Russian jets (and the service rivals anything provided by domestic American carriers). Rather than boat people leaving Vietnam, the government actively encourages Vietnamese expatriates (the *viet kieu*) to return to their homeland for a visit and even to stay permanently. With an estimated 20% of the two million Vietnamese living abroad having university and advanced degrees, the government has developed an active policy of encouraging their return. Indeed, the number returning to visit the homeland has doubled from the 1993 figure of 140 thousand.¹¹

But is Vietnam now ready to join the Asian little tigers? At the macro level, the present burst of the Asian economic bubble insofar as some of its little tigers are concerned results from weaknesses and vulnerabilities in many areas, including infrastructure, centralized management, insensitive bureaucracies, unfriendly legal and regulatory mechanisms, corruption, distorted political processes, risky banking practices, unstable or overvalued currencies, weak tax bases, and meager supplies of domestic capital. How does Vietnam stack up on these measures and is it learning anything from the errors of other Asian states presently paying the price for unsound practices? At the micro level, it is still very much a poor third world country but one which is having to grapple with the problems that attend increases in living standards, such as crime (historically more prevalent in the South but becoming more evident in the North as well), black markets, drugs and an attendant AIDS challenge (billboards prominently display "needles = AIDS" with a circle and "x" over them). Furthermore, Vietnam is not impervious to the recent economic downturn in Asia. Vietnam's present economic difficulties are both exogenous and endogenous. External investment was down by 40% by December of 1997 compared with 1996, thanks to the Asian currency crisis compounded by continued internal disincentives to foreign investment.¹²

Political Changes

Central to the ability of Vietnam to learn from its own errors and those of others in the region is the adaptability of the political system, a political system that carries with it the remnants of ideological baggage. Until recent power shifts, the central decision-making elite suffered from gentrification and, in some cases, insufficient levels of education. These were drawbacks to much further progress than achieved by the 1980s. However, the elections of the late 1980s and early 1990s placed Le Duc Anh (a military man) in the position of president, Vo Van Kiet (a reformer) as prime minister, and Do Muoi (a neoconservative) as party secretary. Although he was the architect of the *doi moi* economic policy, Do Muoi was committed to the state sector leading the economy and party dominance over the bureaucrats.

The fall 1997 elections by the National Assembly replaced Le Duc Anh (now 75) with Tran Duc Luong (former deputy prime minister) as president and Pham Van Khai (former first deputy prime minister) replaced Vo Van Kiet as prime minister. At ages 60 and 63 respectively, these "younger" men represent the movement toward a new generation of technocrats replacing old guard apparatchiki. But too much can be made of this at present, because of the 22 government ministries, only six ministry heads were replaced in last fall's shakeup and, of the five deputy prime ministers, just one is from the South (reflecting the continued

regional mistrust that has plagued Vietnam for centuries). And signals remained mixed on the movement to leadership by technocrats.

The latest shift came in December 1997, at a closed meeting of the party central committee, Lt. General Le Kha Phieu, aged 66 and a northerner, replaced the octogenarian Do Muoi as the party secretary. Formerly head of the army's political department and the deputy political commissar of Vietnamese forces during their stay in Cambodia in the 1980's, Le Kha Phieu is a party general rather than a professional field commander. Labeled a staunch conservative, his appointment is seen as a move to "keep firm ideological control over a communist country undergoing rapid economic and social reforms."¹³ His credentials as a loyal party member with little economic training are highlighted in a press release where he is quoted as saying that "imperialists" and "hostile forces" (read foreign investors) are increasing activities of "peaceful evolution" (read subversion through economic investment) to destroy the revolution and reforms underway by the government.¹⁴ And all of the aging leaders remain as senior advisers to the central committee,¹⁵ so they will be looking over the shoulders of the younger technocrats.

With this recent shift in power, how responsive will the government and party be to the necessary changes in strategy, structure, and behavior hopefully learned from those little tigers presently stalled in their economic growth from internal pitfalls brought about by their own designs? The following variables are important to Vietnam's economic future.

Trade Imbalances and Government Debt. Vietnam continually suffers a trade deficit as a typical importer of finished goods and exporter of raw materials. The trade deficit for 1997 was \$2.3 billion, although an improvement over the \$4 billion from the previous year.¹⁶ And unrelenting warfare over the decades since WWII generated major government debt. One vehicle to aid in normalization of relations with other countries is debt payment consolidation and rescheduling, which Vietnam has done with, among others, China (1991) and the United States (1997), as part of the normalization process and reestablishment of diplomatic relations. In April 1997, Vietnam signed a debt rescheduling agreement with the United States in which Vietnam agreed to repay some \$153 million owed by the former Saigon government. This was part of a larger strategy whereby the OECD (Organization for Cooperation and Development) agreed to assist Vietnam in addressing the country's overdue debts incurred by both the current and the former Saigon government in return for which Hanoi gained access to Saigon's assets held by foreign countries and international financial institutions. By terms of that agreement, Vietnam would repay all debts relating to economic development and social welfare projects on a debt rescheduling plan stretched out for 30 years, with interest-only payments for the first 12 years.¹⁷

Economic Infrastructure. The economic infrastructure is weak, remaining centrally managed by the government and suffering from serious mismanagement, an antiquated banking system, a very short supply of capital, and an absence of technology. Vietnam, for example, is still struggling with the creation of a national stock market. The State Bank of Vietnam first considered the idea in 1992 but, by 1998, has still done nothing conclusive. Part of this reluctance is the traditional communist view that stock markets are a "plague" to an economy (a view which the recent Asian meltdown reinforces in their eyes). Of the more than 6 thousand state-owned enterprises, only 10 have outside capital funding (6 of those in Saigon-

Ho Chi Minh City). The safer route preferred by the government is state-issued bonds but early offerings with 5-10 year terms were not successful, partly because the issues were non-transferable and interest rates were very low. More recently, it is reported that the government has offered bonds at higher rates backed by gold.¹⁸ However, large scale capital infusion into the country must await major changes in the legal, financial, and bureaucratic systems of the country.

These systemic impediments haunt outside industrial investment. Although the country moved in 1997 to encourage outside industry through the creation of a Vietnam Industrial Zone Authority (VIZA), results to date are reported as disappointing. For one thing, the government created too many economic zones. Thirty zones were set up and they compete with one another for as yet limited business. In addition, rents inside these zones are twice the national average per square foot; companies still deal with officials in Hanoi rather than locally; export-import issues and attendant legal matters remain nightmares; and each project must be individually approved by the government.¹⁹ Moreover, the "bad debts factor" in the banking sector that is centrally responsible for the present Asian economic crisis is not unknown in Vietnam either. Internationally accepted banking and auditing standards have not yet made it to Vietnam; instead, according to one foreign banking expert, "the overlap between what is an overdue loan and what is a non-performing loan is very flexible."²⁰ And the four state commercial banks (which account for 80% of the banking assets in Vietnam) are heavily laden with bad debts, most of it tied to state-owned companies. The World Bank has reported that "if they were forced to write off their bad debts it would wipe out their capital and reserves."²¹ Furthermore, the tax base is a very poor base, resulting in a serious shortfall in the government operating budget which, in turn, results in inadequate funding for education, health, and social services. Instead, the official government policy is "community self-help." For example, the government has cut funding for early education and families are required to pay for a portion of their children's education. The evidence of this is seen in the cities where throngs of children spend a portion of their day hawking postcards, stamps, coin collections, and stationary to raise money to pay for their next day's education. In a nutshell, capital is in very short supply for investment in technology, industrial development, and the infrastructure.

Legal Bureaucratic Environments. Vietnamese laws as well as the bureaucratic and regulatory environments are complex and continually changing. This is frustrating to foreign investors and is reflected in the decline in international investments from last year. A recent survey of American business executives in Vietnam by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reveals that 80% say that excessive bureaucracy is a hindrance to doing business in the country. While I was visiting Hanoi last spring, I met the wife of a member of Continental Oil who had been negotiating with the government for exploratory leases in the South China Sea and she excitedly announced that they had finally reached a deal after one and a half years of on-and-off negotiations with the government. And the inefficiency is compounded by corruption, which is endemic in Vietnam. The same chamber of commerce survey of American business representatives in Vietnam reported that 60% of those surveyed cited corruption as a major drawback to doing business in the country.

Labor Pool and Income. While Vietnam has a large population base from which to draw (72 million), the population growth rate (2.2% annually) is too robust for the economy to support. And much of that population represents unskilled labor, with 75% to 80% of the population in the subsistence agriculture sector. In addition, there remains a very high unemployment rate of 25% and, indeed, it is much larger than that if one adds the marginally employed to that figure. Per capita income is meager and there is a huge gap between rich and poor, with monthly wages averaging \$30 to \$40 (indeed, I was told by medical doctors that their monthly salary was about \$50 equivalent American).²² On the upside, the labor pool literacy rate is variously estimated at between 88% to 93% and the educational profile is improving (only 3% have no formal education compared to almost 40% completing secondary school and 16% completing college).²³

Environment. Only about 22% of the land is arable, while logging and slash and burn agriculture in the hills is producing deforestation, soil degradation, and massive water pollution. Moreover, the marine resources are being overfished and the reefs destroyed to sell coral to tourists (as the author experienced at Vietnam's breathtaking Halong Bay) and the foreign markets.

Communications and Information Exchange. The idea of free public discourse and open information sources are still ideals for Vietnam's future, as information remains warily overseen by the government and those who openly criticize the government are placed in an uncomfortable position. Witness the self-imposed exile at age 63 of Bui Tin, trained by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap at the end of World War II to fight the French as a member of the Viet Minh and later serve his country in the war against the Americans as a military newspaper journalist. Disillusioned by the road the government was taking after 1975, he tried to voice his concerns as a constructive critique but eventually felt compelled to leave his country for safety's sake and settled in France where he wrote his celebrated expose of the Vietnamese regime.²⁴ Nevertheless, today the government is moving away from the rigid police state of former years. Vietnamese can openly associate with foreigners and, in a liberalization move by the government some eighteen months ago, can even invite them into their homes in the evening; the uniformed military is hardly ever in sight; television appears to be in every home and a variety of channels are available; overseas telephone calls are a dialtone away; and duplicating machines and fax machines are commonplace. Although the neighborhood loud speakers are still visible on every block, more challenging is the information superhighway represented by computers and the Internet. Some small progress appears to be underway in this area. Last September, the Vietnamese News Agency announced that the government had launched the country's first intranet system, labeled VNANET. This will purportedly lay the foundation for eventual full-range access nationwide to the World Wide Web. But as of yet no government procedures have been approved and there remains very limited access to the Internet—largely e-mail and this on a limited monthly basis to government agencies and educational institutions.²⁵ There remains an evident preoccupation by the government with the spread of "negative influences from outside on its population" as portrayed by one newspaper (read non-native cultural influences and, particularly, pornography).

Conclusion

Clearly, Vietnam is at a critical juncture in its evolution. It would appear to be following in the footsteps of China - attempting to chart a path of economic liberalization regulated through party centralization and control. An illustration of this approach is the 1997 Draft Bank Reform Law, which defines the state bank's responsibility for setting monetary policy but also stipulates that the bank should contribute toward social development objectives. As noted by Nguyen Thac Hoat of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam, "we can't ensure solid loans if we also have to be responsible for social and economic development issues. The banks here will only grow when the two areas are separated."²⁶ Whether this attempt to unleash market forces but retain state control can succeed remains to be seen. Of the state's 37 thousand licensed businesses, only 64 hundred are state-owned. With an estimated 65% of Vietnam's GDP generated by the private sector, can the party retain control without reversing economic growth through clamping down on the inevitable clamor for more political freedom? Or will the party itself reform and liberalize politically in tandem with economic liberalization? Bui Tin is somewhat fearful, concerned that the party leadership will find itself more isolated and become more defensive and, potentially therefore, increasingly repressive.²⁷ There are, however, hints of things moving in a more positive direction, such as the recent move by the country's largest privately-owned company - Huy Hoang (which owns garment factories and construction companies) - to create a joint venture with the state and the government's move to allow shares in state-owned companies to be made available for foreign purchase. These newly surfacing arrangements illustrate a new model that the Vietnamese call the "state capitalistic economic model."²⁸ One thing is evident from both European and Asian experiences in dealing with the Vietnamese over the course of the past three centuries, the Vietnamese national traits of tenacity and nationalism can serve as catalysts for dynamic national growth and development if harnessed by their government through farsighted and progressive planning.

Notes

- 1 What follows are some preliminary thoughts on the present state of the Vietnamese experiment as a consequence of a trip to that country during the spring of 1997. A more developed series of analyses and conclusions will be provided in a forthcoming edited book on the economies of Asia. The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the University of Central Florida's College of Arts and Sciences, College of Engineering, and Office of International Studies which helped make that trip possible.
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RACE IS DEAD

Peter O'Brien

Implied in the work of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber is the declining significance of race in modernity. The field of cultural studies, led by the likes of Edward Said, sees race as constitutive of modern (European) identity. Oddly, however, Said's work is inspired by both Nietzsche's and Marx's thought. I explain this curiosity by arguing that, ironically, scholarly study of racism is actually made possible by its waning significance. Moreover, due to this increasing insignificance, students of racism must exaggerate racism's importance in order to justify their research.

Introduction

I intend the title to sound Nietzschesque. Like so many of Nietzsche's epigrams, this title seeks to provoke more than convince. I am interested in what we can learn if we, even despite evidence to the contrary, view our contemporary world as raceless at the core. This does not mean I suffer from some illusion that racism has disappeared. Rather, just as the great anti-Christ knew practiced religion was far from extinct when he proclaimed "God is dead," I know perfectly well that racism has hardly vanished. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche wrote: "After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown."¹ Similarly, racism can be expected to cast its gruesome shadow for a long time despite the death of race.

Max Weber ranked Nietzsche with Marx as the greatest interpreter of modernity.² Most of us today would not shrink from adding Weber to the celebrated list. These German luminaries devoted little attention to racism. And none made it a systematic part of his analysis of the modern experience. As I explain below, this had much to do with the fact that all three were racists. Yet, ironically, all three pundits' interpretations of modernity, however different and even opposing, imply the demise of race as a significant factor in modern life.

Scholars who work in the field of cultural studies have sought with some success to revive the role race has played in modernity. They see its persistent influence and declare racism constitutive of modern European identity. No one has made this claim as impressively and as famously as Edward Said. In *Orientalism*, for example, Said writes: "It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, and imperialist, and most totally ethnocentric."³ This remark implies, of course, that Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were racists, since all three had something to say about the Orient.

Curiously, though, Said's work is deeply inspired by at least two of these three great thinkers. As will be discussed in detail below, he openly acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche

Peter O'Brien is associate professor of political science at Trinity University. He has written extensively on racism, particularly postwar Germany. He is the author of *Beyond the Swastika* (London: Routledge, 1996).

and even refers to his own analysis of Orientalism as a "genealogy."⁴ And he has steadfastly refused to abandon, in his scholarly and political activities, Marx's goal of the eradication of human oppression.

Said, then, represents a most queer case: a non-racist himself who contends that race is constitutive of modern (European) identity but who shares much of the epistemology, methodology and politics of (European) racists whose work points to the ultimate insignificance of race for modernity. I hope to explain this seeming oddity by arguing that Said relies so heavily on racism precisely because he lives in the kind of world foreseen by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, that is, one where race is increasingly insignificant.

Race and Racism Defined

Race does not exist independently. It is a socially constructed meaning or significance and therefore always dependent on context.⁵ Racism begets race, not vice versa. For this reason, race can take on many forms from one context to the next. Thus, religion can determine race (the Jews); so too can ethnicity (the Poles), skin pigmentation (the Negroes), mother tongue (the Hispanics) or location (the Orientals), to name a few sources of race. Although race has many expressions, it has some characteristics which are the same across the different expressions. One normally inherits one's race at birth and has no choice in selecting it. One is born into a specific ancestral grouping which others deem socially significant. Race, in other words, is an ascriptive attribute.

Racism involves a move from tangible to intangible traits. The racist identifies a person as a member of a specific race by an obvious characteristic (skin color, wardrobe, name, accent) but then attributes to the person certain attitudes or aptitudes that all members of the race presumably share. "Jews are thrifty." "Poles are stupid." "Hispanics are lazy." "Orientals are shift." "Blacks are horny." For the purposes of this essay, each of these remarks is racist, even though the source of race in each differs.⁶ Racism tends to involve a belief in absolutes. "All Jews are thrifty all the time." The racist does not allow individual Jews a choice in defining themselves. Said often uses the adjective "essentialist" to characterize this attitude. The racist believes there exist immutable, insurmountable and, therefore, eternal differences between races. Thus, Westerners, according to Said, have long held the conviction that people from the Orient have a certain constitutive essence (which they can neither alter nor shake), while those from the Occident have a different essence. Julius Langbehn's remark that "a Jew could no more become a German than a plum could become an apple" invidiously but aptly expresses the kind of essentialist racism I have in mind in this essay.⁷ It is any and all forms of irrational essentialism—of belief in absolutes—that wane in the visions of modernity offered by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber.

Marx, Nietzsche and Weber

For Marx, capitalism knew no bounds. Nothing could resist it. "All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind."⁸ The driving force for change is, of

course, profit. But the unprecedented and relentless competition of the capitalist epoch forces all bourgeois incessantly to innovate, to abandon the old and create the new. Although originating in the economic sector or "productive relationships," the unstoppable drive to change spills over into other aspects of life, eventually transforming "with them all social conditions and relationships." Use of the word "all" had to be deliberate because it appears so frequently in Marx's passages concerning the impact of the bourgeois revolution on the world. Surely race would count among the "ancient... prejudices" capitalism would devour.⁹

For Nietzsche, not capitalism, rather nihilism represented the driving force in modernity. Nietzsche distinguished modernity from all other epochs because of its historicism – the awareness of the distinction between different epochs and cultures. Historicism bred nihilism because historical man perforce ceases to believe in transcendental and universal truths and identities because he has grasped their limits. Eventually scientific historicism will uncover even the unconscious contradictions at the foundation of modern man's own identity.¹⁰ In *Will to Power*, Nietzsche writes that nihilism is ultimately "unfaithful to its memories, it lets them fall, lose their leaves."¹¹ The scientific study of the species and its history will eventually overturn all convenient memories of the kind race is. Science aims "to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch humankind upon an infinite and unbounded sea of light."¹² Surely in that sea the dark irrational memory of race would drown.

From the perspective of Weber, rationality must one day become race's assassin. In his vision of modernity, the advance of rational authority defined and distinguished the epoch. Furthermore, "bureaucracy" represented the embodiment of rational authority. "Everywhere," Weber explains, "its origin and its diffusion have...had 'revolutionary' results... This is the same influence which the advance of rationalism in general has had. The march of bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no rational character..."¹³ For

bureaucracy is "dehumanized"...it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation....The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its supporting external apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly "objective" expert, in lieu of the master of older social structures, who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.¹⁴

Due to its "purely technical superiority over any other form of organization," bureaucracy is destined to triumph in all walks of life.¹⁵ Everything in modernity stands to be rationalized and bureaucratized. As is well known, Weber discerned and decried the inevitable "disenchantment" of the world, leaving our lives devoid of the irrational emotions, superstitions, and obsessions which make them worth living. Surely, racism counts among those enchantments doomed to expire in the "icy polar night" of modernity.

Three Racists

Marx, Nietzsche and Weber were doubtless each racist. They harbored the very kind of prejudices against non-Europeans that their theories imply are doomed for extinction. An

army of cultural studies scholars, following the lead of Said, have helped us to understand and uncover these unconscious biases operating in each to form their own identity and their understanding of European civilization. Said, for instance, refers to Marx as a "non-Orientalist [whose] human engagements were first dissolved, then usurped by Orientalist generalizations."¹⁶ And many others have shown how Marx's category of "the Asiatic mode of production" was steeped in racist presumptions.¹⁷ Weber fares no better by Said.

Weber's studies of Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism blew him (unwittingly perhaps) into the very territory originally chartered and claimed by the Orientalists. There he found encouragement amongst all those nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern and Western economic (as well as religious) "mentalities."¹⁸

We also know that Weber was a card-carrying member of the virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Polish Pan-German League. Said spares his hero Nietzsche the charge of racist but did indirectly implicate him in the passage cited above in the introduction. But other racist hunters have found Nietzsche easy prey. Michel Hulin concludes that "Nietzsche was ultimately a victim of the lacunae in his information concerning Indological matters, and a prisoner of a certain stereotypical image of India carried by the culture of his time."¹⁹ As brilliant as these men doubtless were, they nevertheless depended on ultimately racist notions about the differences between Europeans and non-Europeans in the formulation of their theories.

The three thinkers' racism should not, however, discredit their respective theories, even as they pertain to race itself. To be sure, racism vis-a-vis non-Europeans permeated the Europe of their day so thoroughly (for just the kind of reasons Said cites), that even minds as sharp and seemingly independent as theirs could not avoid its sway. Marx himself wrote that "the tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living."²⁰ Granted, the three were not only visionaries of the future but prisoners of the past as well. And the power of racist attitudes inherited from the past prevented each from fully working out the implications of their more general theories for race in particular. But this should not prevent others from drawing out those implications by extending the insights of the three, even if doing so means exposing racist attitudes in Marx, Nietzsche and Weber themselves. Doing so testifies to their genius rather than against it. So strong are these theories of modernity that they can be stretched beyond the horizons in which their authors themselves lived.

To put this line of thinking differently, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber lived in a less mature modernity than ours. Much like someone who sees in a child a certain trait and rightly judges that the trait will profoundly shape adulthood without, however, being able to predict the details of that adulthood, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber each saw critical qualities of modernity without discerning its full trajectory. Capitalism, nihilism, and rationality did, in fact, do little in the nineteenth century to erode the foundations of racism. But this did not mean that they would and could not do so as modernity matured in the twentieth century.

Non-Racist Said

Said lives in a more mature modernity (some would say in postmodernity). And Said is an avowed non-racist. He bluntly rejects all forms of essentialism, race and other. He sees his work as a continuation and extension of Nietzsche's "genealogical" approach to truth claims which reveals their inevitable cultural, historical and political situatedness or contingency. "No reading is neutral or innocent, and by the same token every text and every reader is to some extent the product of a theoretical standpoint, however implicit or unconscious such a standpoint may be...theory has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in and for it, responding to it..."²¹

Said's principal goal in *Orientalism* and its sequel *Culture and Imperialism* is to debunk the idea of essential, permanent differences between races by revealing the contexts and motives behind the representation of the differences. At the same time, he has resisted and rejected both "nativism" and "nationalism" as appropriate responses to Western imperialism on grounds that they too suffer from essentialism.²²

Despite his general rejection of transcendental truths and his particular criticisms of Marx's eurocentricity, Said has never been able fully to distance himself from Marx. He is drawn to Marx's compassion for the exploited and to his dream of universal human liberation. He has chastised Foucault and Derrida, who (he believes) wrongly abandon the possibility of human voluntarism.²³ He refuses to stop believing that "there is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society, and this is obviously what makes change possible."²⁴ And throughout his life, whether in his countless essays or his efforts as a member of the Palestine National Council, Said has struggled tirelessly for change in the form of national sovereignty for his Palestinian brethren.²⁵ Tellingly, he closes his magnum opus with a humanistic appeal against exploitation of all kinds:

No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and the distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about...It is more rewarding—and more difficult—to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about "us." But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how "our" culture or country is number one....²⁶

One could scarcely find stronger evidence supporting Nietzsche's, Marx's and Weber's readings of modernity than Said's own career. Said's claim to fame – his disclosure of the self-interested motives behind centuries of European assertions about the Orient – is blatantly "unfaithful to the memory" of entrenched Orientalism and clearly seeks "to abolish (its) limitations of horizon." If Orientalism once seemed "solid," it has certainly undergone considerable "melting" since Said's intervention. That unquenchable capitalist urge to change anything and everything to create new markets for new profits has led editors of books, newspapers, radio and television to see the "value" of Said's work. Today he is as well known, read, heard, seen, sold, admired, interviewed as any Orientalist. Said's rise to Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University stands as

erful testament to the Weberian nature of the academy. Apparently, in his promotion up the ranks, Said's non-Oriental colleagues had to eliminate "from official business, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation."²⁷

Said's Genealogy

Why then does Said so fervently insist that racism is central to and constitutive of the modern epoch? At one point in *Culture and Imperialism* he goes so far as to call "the biological distinction between the West and the rest of the world...so strongly felt and received...that we may consider these boundaries absolute."²⁸ Earlier he refers to the distinction as "the major, I would say determining, political horizon of modern Western culture."²⁹ The most obvious reply to the query is that Said focuses his research on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature; and there racism is indeed central. But his answer will not do, for Said deliberately and repeatedly stretches his argument far beyond the confines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European literature. In 1981, he published *Covering Islam*, which contends that distinctions fundamentally similar and related to those prevalent in European literature continue strongly to influence the media's coverage of Islamic peoples and governments³⁰ The final chapters of both *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism* (allegedly the work where Said was to excise the gross exaggerations of the earlier work) extend the argument about the centrality of racism to the present day.

The answer must be more nuanced. In fact, it must be "genealogical." In order to understand the genesis, function and (I would like to think) appeal of Said's work, we need to situate it. We need to grasp it "in the place and time out of which it emerges as a part of that time, working in it and for it, responding to it."³¹

As suggested above, Said is a non-racist and has led a life in which personally race has mattered far less than in the time of Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber. But the non-racist willy nilly needs racism just as the Occidental needs the Orient. If Europe's great self-defining mission was world domination, Said's is the eradication of racism. But that means Said needs racists and a culture of racism to subdue and reform just as Kipling needed non-whites to legitimize his great burden. But at roughly the same time as Said's enterprise has gathered momentum, racism, for reasons Marx, Nietzsche and Weber signaled, has been losing steam.

Full demonstration of this controversial assertion naturally exceeds the scope of this short essay. Many works exist which, to quote one prominent title, argue for the "declining significance of race."³² Here I limit my remarks to an area dear to Said: U.S. foreign policy.

The end of World War II marked a watershed in Western foreign policy. Not only did its leadership shift from European to U.S. shores, the experiences of the war profoundly modernized the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. By the end of the war, the Japanese and German peoples were as demonized in the West as Orientals had ever been. The representations, scholarly and popular, of these two nations presented in the West exhibited many of the same kinds of traits Said exposes in *Orientalism*. Theses of German and Japanese "backwardness, degeneracy, and inequality with the West" were rampant.³³ These representations too were designed to glorify the West and justify its domination of the Germans and Japanese.³⁴

As victory appeared imminent, the Western Allies had to decide what to do with their vanquished enemies. Had they followed the racist stereotypes prevalent at the time which suggested that the two races were immutable, they would have laid waste to both lands; and this option was seriously considered (for example, in the Morgenthau Plan to "pastoralize" Germany). The option was, however, ultimately rejected, and the Allied leadership opted to rehabilitate, re-educate and integrate the two polities and peoples into the "Western community."

Both the decision for and the experiences with the second option amounted to profound Marxian, Nietzschean and Weberian awakenings for the Allied leaders. The permanent crippling of Japan and Germany, for instance, also would have meant the loss of two giant capitalist markets and all the potential profits that went with their revival. The profit motive proved able to melt the seemingly solid enmity between the warring races. Nietzsche once wrote that "truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are."³⁵ The magnificent leaps forward in the science of warfare during the first half of the twentieth century made it impossible to maintain the convenient illusion that inveterate hatred of and ceaseless revenge against one's enemy were noble qualities. The recurrence of a world war, the Holocaust and Hiroshima generated a nihilism "unfaithful to the memory" of noble racism and nationalism. Weber entered the picture in the way of the solution. The modern era distinguished itself from others, he averred, in the predominance of acquired over ascribed traits. Perhaps the Germans and Japanese were not incurable after all. Perhaps they could learn new norms and values agreeable to the West.³⁶ Unprecedentedly massive re-education campaigns were launched in both occupied countries. The enormous success of these campaigns taught U.S. foreign-policy bureaucrats the benefits to be had from "eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements."³⁷

It would be just as silly to suggest that all traces of racism have disappeared from U.S. foreign policy as it would be to claim there remain no pre-capitalist characteristics in our economy, no religious dimensions to our secular culture, no irrational moments in our bureaucracies. But as our societies have become more capitalist, secular and bureaucratic, more modern in a word, so too has U.S. foreign policy. The handling of Germany and Japan after World War II established the precedent and led to modern foreign policy strategies ranging from détente through Nixon's visit to China, Camp David, opposition to apartheid, Oslo and the expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

Said has lived through all of these events and has experienced the decline in importance of racism on the global as well as personal scale. In order to keep his great project alive, Said has had ontologically to fashion "racism" by means of distortions and representations not wholly dissimilar from those Europeans used to create "the Orient." For instance, Said criticized Orientalists for the imperialistic scope of their studies. "A classicist, a Romance specialist, even an Americanist focuses on a relatively modest portion of the world, not on a full half of it. But Orientalism is a field with considerable geographical ambition...we must learn to accept enormous, indiscriminate size plus an almost infinite capacity for subdivision as one of the chief characteristics of Orientalism—one that is evidenced in its confusing amalgam of imperial vagueness and precise detail."³⁸

Yet, Said himself possesses considerable historical ambition, particularly in his claim that there exists an uninterrupted tradition of Orientalism stretching back to Homer.³⁹ As

ventures (way) beyond his own period, he remains prisoner to it. For it is well established that the idea of a direct link between modern Europe and the ancient Greeks is a twentieth-century invention with no basis in reality.⁴⁰ Said similarly stumbles when he moves beyond his discipline from the study of literature to the study of U.S. foreign policy. In literature it makes sense to seek an underlying meaning or motivation to a text because it is by a single author. But U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century can hardly be traced to a single compelling motive. Nor can it be explained by the intellectual influence of five men: Huntington, Pye, Verba, Lerner, Lasswell.⁴¹ In addition to their sweeping generalizations, Said's works are famous for their attention to detail where the author shows off his celebrated erudition. Though few can bring out the nuanced detail of *Mansfield Park* or *Aida*, Said, critics have fairly labeled his assertions that Austen's or Verdi's works are first and foremost about European domination of the Orient gross simplifications.⁴²

My aim here is not to question the validity or value of Said's scholarship. Rather, I seek to re-situate his ideas in his time, just as he suggests should be done with all theories. Said reports the extent of racism precisely because he has witnessed its decline in his time. By representing racism as virtually omnipotent, Said fashions a bigger-than-life adversary which in turn enhances the legitimacy and importance of his own struggle. By representing it as usually omnipresent, Said has encouraged countless followers in cultural studies and other disciplines to join him in putting in the hard work necessary to uncover racism in its many guises. Said has produced and achieved much of quality and worth in his lifelong mission to define and shoulder the non-racist's burden.

Conclusion

The essay's title has two intended meanings both of which merit some explanation. First, race not racism is dead. I mean this in the same way as Nietzsche meant God but not religion was dead. By Nietzsche's time, countless people continued to believe in God but they no longer could hold their belief with a sense of absolute, unshakable certainty. Too many atheists and agnostics lived perfectly normal, even happy lives for believers not to entertain some doubt about their faith. Too many atheistic and agnostic practices soaked into the fabric of society not to undermine in part even the zealot's sense of certainty. If God existed and was omnipotent, why would He not smite the heathens or halt secularism? Nietzsche realized that when God could no longer demonstrate his omnipotence, he lost his constitutive quality. Similarly race has failed racists. Its alleged characteristics have not proven eternal and immutable as racists wish to believe. As a result, they must now hold their ideology with inescapable doubts. Decades ago, before the death of race, a racist who believed whites and blacks should not conjugate could look everywhere in his world and not find a single interracial couple. Today he must hold his belief with knowledge of countless interracial couples (often quite visible ones like Kofi Annan and his wife or Rodman and Toni Braxton). Earlier a racist could maintain that a black should never hold a position of power over a white and look around and find no black bosses. Today they have to live with a nation's infatuation with Colin Powell. Racists today must repeatedly live humbling experiences of the kind Jesse Owens forced on Hitler in the 1936 Olympics in Berlin. Race as a factor one can count on always to produce the difference(s) attributed to it by racists is dead.

Second, the title is intended to provoke and not necessarily convince. Nietzsche wrote much of his philosophy in brief averisms. This style allowed him enormous license to express ideas without offering a lengthy traditional demonstration. Nietzsche's method hardly predominates in the sciences today. However, there are serious methodologists who advocate a methodological strategy not wholly dissimilar from Nietzsche's. Before his death Imre Lakatos warned that premature testing of new ideas could impede progress in the sciences. He opposed putting newer "research programmes" to the same tests expected of older, established paradigms. Proponents of the older paradigm, he complained, had had much more time to amass supporting evidence and could therefore most often easily refute a fledgling competitor. He endorsed a methodological protective shell to be wrapped around a new paradigm's core. In the core would lie protected from refutation the paradigm's key and founding assumptions. Eventually, if they wish to be taken fully seriously, proponents of a new, challenging paradigm must venture beyond the core and pit their evidence against that of their competitors. However, to do so prematurely could be needlessly detrimental to the new paradigm and the cause of progress as well.⁴³

In this essay I have tried to articulate the core of my idea knowing well that mountains of evidence exist to refute it. That core has two parts. First, scholarly focus on racism intensifies when racism begins to wane. It is as if we only notice it when it begins to fade. When it is strong and convincing, we take it for granted. This suggests that genuine racists cannot study racism; that one has to become a non-racist before one can study racism (just as one has to become agnostic to study rather than practice religion). Second, students of racism, precisely because it is in decline (in their own worldview at least by the fact that they study it), must artificially amplify its influence in order to legitimate their research. I have (freely no doubt) used this rather curious constellation of Marx, Nietzsche, Weber and Said primarily because it was in considering these authors that the core ideas came to me. Put differently, I have simply shared with readers the processes of my thought which led to the core ideas. I hope, therefore, that the reader will approach the essay as it was intended – as provocation more than proof.

Notes

- 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 3: 108.
- 2 Reported in David Owen, *Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity* (London: Sage, 1995), p.1.
- 3 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), p. 204.
- 4 Said, *Orientalism*, pp. 131-32 and 203-204.
- 5 For a thorough discussion of race and racism, see Marvin Harris, "Race," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (London: Macmillan, 1968), 13: 263-69.
- 6 There do exist ascriptive, outwardly visible traits around which persons are grouped but which do not fall under the rubric of race (for example, gender or age). We have common expressions to describe discrimination based on such traits ("sexist," "ageist") which distinguish them from racism. For whatever reasons we have not such common expressions for many of the traits I have included under race (for example, "religionist" or "ethnicist" or "languageist"). Hence, race and racism are broadly defined in this essay. We do, of course, have the common term "nationalist." Whenever "nationalism" involves the belief in immutable differences between nations of people, I consider it racist thinking (as in "The Japanese cannot be trusted.").

- 7 Quoted in Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), p. 295.
- 8 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 12.
- 9 For a more thorough account of Marx's views on endless change than is possible in this essay, see Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 87-130.
- 10 See Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in *Untimely Meditations*, trans., R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- 11 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 12.
- 12 Nietzsche, "On the Uses," *op. cit.*, par. 10.
- 13 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 244.
- 14 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 15 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 214.
- 16 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 156.
- 17 See, for instance, Anne Bailey and Josep Llobera, eds., *The Asiatic Mode of Production* (London: Routledge, 1981).
- 18 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 259. Also see Jack Goody, *The East in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-5, for a discussion of Weber's ethnocentricity.
- 19 Michel Hulin, "Nietzsche and the Suffering of the Indian Ascetic," in *Nietzsche and Asian Thought*, ed. Graham Parkes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 66.
- 20 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 595.
- 21 Edward Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 241-42.
- 22 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), pp. 275-76.
- 23 Said, *The World*, pp. 186-88.
- 24 Said, *The World*, pp. 246-47.
- 25 See, for instance, Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Vintage, 1979); or *Peace and Its Discontents* (New York: Vintage, 1996).
- 26 Said, *Culture*, p. 336.
- 27 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 28 Said, *Culture*, p. 108.
- 29 Said, *Culture*, p. 60.
- 30 Edward Said, *Covering Islam* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
- 31 Said, *The World*, pp. 241-42.
- 32 William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); for the European scene, see Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), or Peter O'Brien, *Beyond the Swastika* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 33 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 206.
- 34 See, for instance, Richard Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1943).
- 35 Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 46-47.

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- 36 In 1942 Talcott Parsons, the major purveyor of Weber to the English-speaking world, argued that the Germans could be changed if they were provided with the same institutions prevalent in the West: "The Problem of Controlled Change," reprinted in Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949).
- 37 Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, p. 216.
- 38 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 50.
- 39 Said, *Orientalism*, p. 56.
- 40 Martin Bernal, *Black Athena*, vol. 1 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).
- 41 Said, *Culture*, p. 290.
- 42 Neil McInnes, "Enough Said," *The National Interest* (fall 1993): 103-108; or John MacKenzie, "Occidentalism," *Journal of Historical Geography* 19 no. 3 (1993): 339-44.
- 43 Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

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COUNTERPOINT: IS RACE DEAD?

Dwight C. Kiel

Peter O'Brien's "Race is Dead" is an audacious piece. The title and the "core arguments" are intended to provoke, even rile. They do. To maintain that race is dead when racial tensions here and in many elsewhere abound seems preposterous. This is the century of racial killing. Clearly many peoples around the globe do not see an end to racial categories and, indeed, often endorse these categories for purposes of self and group identification. Furthermore, the categories of race drive many public policies and are part of the staple of research in the statistical social sciences. Surely students of racism will not be comforted by the claim that, just as they are finding institutional support, their subject matter is slowly disappearing (and/or is only a shadow).

"Race is Dead" is also a refreshing piece. O'Brien deploys sweeping arguments to reach counterintuitive conclusions. His claim that race, as opposed to racism, is dead

O'Brien claims that Marx, Nietzsche and Weber all envision a future where race is an irrational superstition that will be swept away or, at least, fade from human memory. For Marx, this claim is surely accurate.

because race is no longer an "enchanted" absolute is interesting and thought-provoking.¹ His use of Marx, Nietzsche and Weber to challenge Edward Said is insightful and amusing given Said's indebtedness to these authors, especially the first two. Finally, the two core arguments, elucidated most clearly in the final paragraph of the article, should produce some spirited replies and productive discussions.

"Race is Dead" is also a flawed piece. O'Brien's discussion of Nietzsche's idea of nihilism misses a central point in Nietzsche's criticism of nihilism. In doing so, O'Brien consequently misses a possible warning by Nietzsche about how dangerous race, in many of its expressions, can be and can become.

O'Brien claims that Marx, Nietzsche and Weber all envision a future where race is an irrational superstition that will be swept away or, at least, fade from human memory. For Marx, this claim is surely accurate. The rational forces of capitalism and the recognition by all people of their "species-connection" to all other people render race unimportant. Indeed, race is but an obstacle to class consciousness and it is an obstacle that will be overcome.² For Weber, this claim is largely accurate. The onslaught of rational bureaucracy will disenchant the world, and all people will be treated as soulless role players within the domain of an ever-expanding disciplinary machinery.³ Race will be meaningless. Weber does offer one

Dwight C. Kiel is an associate professor of political science at the University of Central Florida. He teaches courses in political theory and U.S. public policy. His research interests include environmental policy and seventeenth century politics and literature.

alternative though which I will examine very briefly after exploring Nietzsche's views on nihilism.

O'Brien argues that Nietzsche also foresees the death of race. The forgetfulness of nihilists and the searing heat of light produced by science kill race. However, I contend that neither alone nor in cahoots do these potential murderers have, according to Nietzsche, sufficient power to accomplish the deed. I concede that Nietzsche is occasionally optimistic about the possibility of nihilism. He hopes that the realization that all absolutes have evaporated might engender the creation of new values that will move beyond the present morality of good and evil. Those who can face the loss of absolutes, the "death of God," without nausea or terror might endorse values that they realize are the best for them while also recognizing these values are neither absolute nor universal. Nonetheless, nihilism is a most dangerous force.

Nietzsche does not believe that one can endorse the nothingness of nihilism for long.⁴ Nihilism temporarily disenchants the world, but people will find new enchantments. Most everyone, if not everyone, is unprepared for the freefall that nihilism induces. Nietzsche's aphorisms on "European Nihilism" in the *Will to Power* emphasize his fear that nihilism will not promote new thought, but exhaustion.⁵ Thus, new values will not be created, but instead people will return to old enchantments that offer some hope of solidity in the midst of so much evaporation. Facing a world without absolutes, people will grab the most accessible and possibly meanest anchors. What easier anchor is there to grab in modernity than race, especially in the form of religion, nationalism or ethnicity?

Even if we agree with O'Brien that nihilism begets forgetfulness, it is, according to Nietzsche, a selective forgetfulness. The full quote from *Will to Power*, from which O'Brien chooses just a snippet, reads:

The perfect nihilist. —The nihilist's eye idealizes in the direction of ugliness and is unfaithful to his memories: it allows them to drop, lose their leaves; it does not guard them against the corpse-like pallor that weakness pours out over what is distant and gone. And what he does not do for himself, he also does not do for the whole past of mankind: he lets it drop.⁶

My interpretation of this aphorism is that even the "perfect" nihilist remembers only the ugliness of the past as it appears in its corpse-like pallor. The nihilist is unfaithful to the memory of the past, but is not an amnesiac. The nihilist selectively forgets the leaves (the beautiful, the best and the most life affirming features) of the past. The nihilist must try to choose new values, but remembers only those values that were ugly. This is why Nietzsche fears that we are not ready for nihilism. We need lies to give the world meaning and we are all too ready to re-enchant the ugliest of past lies.⁷

Science, according to Nietzsche, is of very little help to nihilists. Science can create no values nor impart new meaningfulness. Science has served many masters, and it failed to offer any resistance to the values that left us unprepared for nihilism.⁸ To assume that it will protect us against the re-enchantment of race seems naïve.

Max Weber, despite his often sweeping claims that a disenchanted world cannot be re-enchanted, presents one scenario where conflict might resume even in the dullness of a rationalized epoch. He claims that conflict might resume when "the old plurality of Gods

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ascend from their graves, they are disenchanting and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain power over our lives, and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another.”⁹ Enchanted or disenchanting, race may not be dead.

Notes

- 1 Note that a “Doubting Thomas” can still believe in God and a doubting racist can still believe in race.
- 2 See Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 111-12.
- 3 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974), pp. 111-12. Mommsen argues quite effectively that for Weber history was a conflict between individual charismatic leadership and progressive disciplinization. Of course, in modernity the latter was winning.
- 4 This is the reason that Nietzsche presents the “Myth of Eternal Return.” See, Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans., Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 273-74.
- 5 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, trans., Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), pp. 9-82.
- 6 Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, p. 17.
- 7 Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, p. 451.
- 8 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals*, trans., Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1984), pp. 145-58.
- 9 Quoted in Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy*, pp. 114-15.

Politics in Florida, Thomas R. Dye

Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998: 234 pp.

Reviewed by Aubrey W. Jewett

Thomas R. Dye has made immense contributions to political science in American government, state and local politics, and public policy. In *Politics in Florida* he turns his analytical skills and gift for clear writing towards government, politics and public affairs in the Sunshine State. The result is a concise yet thorough treatment of the topic that is suitable as the core text in a class on Florida politics, a supplementary text for American national or state government classes, an excellent resource for scholars and a fine introduction for the general public.

In 12 chapters Dye covers politics and policy in Florida: political culture, the state constitution, public opinion, parties and elections, interest groups, the three branches of government, local government, criminal justice, education, welfare, growth management and taxation. Each chapter includes numerous charts, graphs and tables that bring clarity to the subject, supply visual reinforcement to the prose and provide a wealth of empirical data.

Dye's discussion of power and influence in Florida politics draws stylistically from his many decades of experience with elite studies—particularly his *Who's Running America* series.

The book stresses who gets what, when and how in Florida and does a particularly good job covering demographic, socioeconomic and political trends of the last several decades. Of course Dye also explains why changes have occurred and the impact that they have had and will have on the Sunshine State. Dye also emphasizes a comparative perspective throughout the book (a strength of the book and of the state politics field in general) comparing and contrasting Florida with other states: the 18 tables in the appendix that rank the 50 states on a variety of interesting characteristics are very insightful in this regard.

Diversity is a hallmark of Florida politics and policy and the book does a great job of highlighting the increasing political strength and policy preferences of African-Americans, Hispanics and senior citizens. Blacks make up about 15% of Florida's population, are primarily Democratic and have gained seats in the legislature and in the Florida delegation to Congress, yet still feel poorly represented in Florida government. Florida's Hispanics, primarily Cuban and Republican, who also make up about 15% of the state's population, have also been successful in winning legislative and even executive offices (i.e. Governor Bob Martínez) and generally pursue conservative policies except those pertaining to affirmative action. Seniors who make up close to 20% of Florida's population (the highest proportion in any state) are more Democratic than other Floridians but more conservative as well: they like social spending on programs like social security but also want to keep taxes low and so make it difficult to fund education.

State public opinion is tracked utilizing the Florida Annual Policy Surveys done annually since 1979 by the Survey Research Lab Policy Sciences Center at Florida State University. Floridians tend to be conservative or moderate (about 40% in each category over the

Aubrey W. Jewett is an assistant professor at the University of Central Florida. His research interests include American government and U.S. public policy.

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last 20 years) rather than liberal and have generally lost trust in their government over the last 20 years (and have less trust than the national average). Floridians are also demanding political consumers: they prefer more spending on several policy areas (education and crime for instance) but typically reject tax increases. Rapid population growth and migration have contributed to changes in partisan preference in Florida which moved from an overwhelmingly Democratic state in the early 1960s to a position of Republican dominance by the late 1990s. While Democrats still hold the lead in registration figures, party identification has favored Republicans since the mid 1980s and Republicans presently control the congressional delegation, the state legislature, and since the publication of the book in the spring of 1998, the executive branch.

Dye's discussion of power and influence in Florida politics draws stylistically from his many decades of experience with elite studies—particularly his *Who's Running America* series. Dye specifically lists the most important individuals and organizations in Florida's economic institutions, law firms, newspapers, associations, individual lobbyists, and PACs as he discusses the use of lobbying and money in the political process. Associated Industries of Florida is given special attention since it is rated as the most influential interest group in Florida in a poll of legislators and lobbyists.

Politics in Florida provides thorough coverage of the legislature and the executive branch and slightly less on the court system. The book covers the increasing diversity of legislative membership along gender (26% women compared to 20% nationally), racial, ethnic and party lines, the dominance of lawyers as an occupational group and the incumbency advantage that has led to term limits in Florida (eight year limits which will begin to affect members in the year 2000). It also covers the legislative process and the role of party, ideology and constituency in legislative voting (the parties are becoming ideologically polarized over time). Extensive coverage is given to the cabinet system and the weakness of the governor in this system (of course the cabinet system will be slightly adjusted to increase the power of the governor based on the constitutional amendments passed in the November 1998 elections). Nice profiles are also provided for most governors from Leroy Collins through Lawton Chiles.

Finally, as would be expected from one of the early leaders of the Policy Studies Organization, Dye provides extensive coverage of many policy areas. He examines Florida's dubious number one ranking among the 50 states in violent crime including public perception of crime (often listed as a top problem facing the state) and the challenge this presents to juvenile justice, law enforcement and corrections (a growth industry in Florida). Educational resources, performance, reform (the section on school choice is particularly relevant with the election of Governor Jeb Bush) and governance are thoroughly discussed as well. Various social welfare programs, reform movements and costs are covered as is the political clash between two conflicting goals deemed necessary for high quality of life: state economic development and growth management. Dye closes by analyzing taxing and spending including Florida's reliance on the sales tax (the state constitution prohibits an income tax) and the creative financing approaches (like lotteries and federal grants) that result from trying to reconcile the citizens' wishes to keep Florida as a low tax state (including several voter imposed tax restrictions) while demanding more services.

Florida's people, government and policy have changed dramatically in the last several decades and will continue to evolve into the next century. Dye does a superb job of describing and analyzing these trends and his book is highly recommended for anyone wanting to learn more about *Politics in Florida*.

Information for Contributors

The *Political Chronicle* is a bi-annual journal in political science research. The editors invite submissions in the fields of political and social sciences, history, public policy and international affairs.

CORRESPONDENCE

Articles for submission should be sent to Professor Waltraud Q. Morales, Editor, *Political Chronicle*, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida, P.O. Box 161356, Orlando, FL 32816-1356; (407) 823-2608 or 823-2040; fax (407) 823-0051; morales@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu. For general information contact Megan A. Duncanson, editorial assistant; (407) 823-2608; mad02137@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu.

Information regarding subscriptions should be addressed to, Professor Houman A. Sadri, Managing Editor, Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida; (407) 823-6023; hsadri@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu. The annual subscription fee is \$15.00. For on-line information visit: <http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~politics>.

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Manuscripts should conform to the APSA style sheet, and be typewritten or word-processed in English on one side of white paper (8 1/2" x 11") using generous margins on all sides. Contributors should submit four copies. Manuscript submissions cannot be returned. All text, including notes and block quotations, should be double-spaced. The manuscript should be reasonably subdivided into sections, and all pages numbered. Bibliographical references should follow the specific guidelines in the APSA style sheet and the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of all quotations and for supplying complete references. Manuscripts should be accompanied by a brief biography and an abstract of no more than 200 words. All manuscripts accepted are subject to editorial modification. To facilitate the anonymous review, please provide author's name, phone number, e-mail address and institutional affiliation on a separate cover page. Provide only the title as identification on the manuscript and abstract.

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