

Political Chronicle

Number 2

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Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

Political Chronicle

The *Political Chronicle* is the official journal of the Florida Political Science Association. We offer an insightful, readable journal addressing topics on U.S. government and international affairs, as well as timely topics of interest to the general reader. Articles by Florida academicians and analysis of Florida politics is an additional feature.

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BRADLEY'S FAILURE, MCCAIN'S MICHIGAN SUCCESS: THE PREPRIMARY CAMPAIGNS OF 2000

Jeremy D. Mayer and Alexander Sarupu

Five months before the Michigan presidential nominating contest, it appeared that Al Gore was in trouble and George Bush would sail to victory. When the dust settled, Bill Bradley had failed to exploit Gore's weaknesses, while John McCain stunned the political establishment with a solid victory over the favored Bush. Using exit poll data from the preprimary period, we examine why one nomination fight momentarily became a true contest, while in the Democratic Party, Gore easily won the prize. In the end, in both parties, the winner of the "preprimary" campaign of fundraising and national polls became the nominee, as has happened almost every year since 1980. McCain's strong challenge however does suggest that the frontrunner will not always win the nomination in the future.

Introduction

Since the early 1970s, when the McGovern-Fraser reforms went into effect, presidential candidates for both parties have largely been selected through primaries and caucuses. According to political scientist William Mayer, winner of the informal "preprimary" who leads in fundraising and polls at the start of the primary season almost inevitably wins the primaries. In this paper we examine how the nomination fights of the two parties looked from the view of one small midwestern city. Using an exit poll conducted during municipal voting in Kalamazoo, Michigan in November of 1999, we examine the strategic environment of the preprimary campaigns of George W. Bush, John McCain, Al Gore and Bill Bradley. From the data we gathered, it appeared that Bradley had the potential, at least in Kalamazoo, to surprise the frontrunning Al Gore, while McCain posed little threat to the Bush juggernaut. When the ballots were counted in the Michigan Republican primary in February, McCain had won a stunning victory. By the time the Democratic caucuses were held in March, Bradley had withdrawn, largely because he had failed to beat Gore in a single contest. This paper attempts to explain the February and March outcomes

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through examining the preprimary exit poll of November 1999. In comparing the exit poll data with the actual outcome we show why Bradley's good chances evaporated so quickly. In addition, we will examine how McCain went from having very little support in November to winning the Michigan Republican primary in late February.

Presidential Nominations and "Front-loading"

In the past, the nominating process has been viewed as a chaotic and unpredictable event with few or no regularities. Caesar argued that "no systematic theory about primary voting is likely to develop because each campaign is so different" (Bartels 1988). The reluctance of many political scientists to form prediction models for primary elections is evidence of this dominant thought. Mayer, however, argues that in recent presidential nomination contests (from 1980 to 1992) two factors emerge as reliable predictors of presidential nominations: a candidate's standing in the polls of the national party electorate and the candidate's relative success in raising money (1995). These two factors successfully predicted five out of the six contested nominations even before the first nomination contest. Indeed, in every election from 1980 to 1996, the candidate that was ahead in the polls and in fundraising before the first nomination event won the party nomination (Maisel 1998).¹

Horse race coverage by the media exacerbates the importance of early contests (Arterton 1984; Brady and Johnston 1987). Not only do the media have immense influence on electoral success in presidential primaries (Traugott 1985), the media's judgment of political viability in early contests has a tremendous impact on candidates' ability to raise funds, the mother's milk of politics (Mutz 1995).

The recent trend of "front-loading" has made leading the national polls and raising large amounts of money even more important. After 1976 a pattern emerged in which an increasing number of candidates withdrew from the election shortly after the Iowa and New Hampshire nomination contests (Hagen and Mayer 2000). As a result, the later nomination contests were largely unimportant since the nomination had already been decided. In response, many states began to move their primaries and caucuses forward in the nomination calendar. The front-loading accelerated greatly after 1976. In 1972 no primaries were held in February and only three were held in March (Hagen and Mayer 2000). In 1988, 22 of the 37 primaries were completed by April 1. The trend continued throughout the 1990s; in 1996 the Republicans selected over 70% of their convention delegates in 37 primaries and caucuses before March 26 (Shapiro 1999). Following the lead of other states, Michigan also moved its primary to an earlier date in 2000. The Republican primary was held on February 22, making Michigan the first major industrialized state to hold its nomination contest. The Democratic caucus was held on March 11.²

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Selection rules structure the strategic environment in which candidates compete (Lengle and Shafer 1980; Polsby 1983; Price 1984). After the 1996 election, the Republican Party in particular looked at adopting different rules. The primary impact of the rule changes nationwide was to place even more emphasis on front-loading (Bush 2000). One of those changes was a move forward in the date of several large state primaries, including California and Michigan (Broder 1996). At the state level, Michigan's two parties chose different methods to express their presidential preferences. The Republicans stuck with the primary, which by state law must be open to participation by any registered voter. The Democrats chose to change to the caucus format, and opted for a different day, Saturday, for their contest.

The Democratic Party of Michigan made its choice because of the embarrassing outcome of the 1998 gubernatorial primary. In that year, gadfly populist Geoffrey Fieger, perhaps best known as Jack Kevorkian's attorney, won the nomination for governor with a great deal of support from Independents. There were also allegations of malicious crossover voting by Republicans, eager to support the most vulnerable opponent for incumbent Republican Governor John Engler.³ The Democratic leadership, chagrined by a near total electoral collapse with Fieger at the top of the ticket in 1998, therefore chose the caucus format for 2000, which would allow them to restrict the voting to those who pledged Democratic allegiance. Moreover, the caucus format naturally tends to draw the more committed party members. The national Democratic Party, however, did not give Michigan permission to hold a February caucus, and thus the Democratic caucus took place March 11, three weeks after the February 22 Republican primary. By that time, Bill Bradley had already withdrawn from the race, leaving Michigan Democrats with no real influence on the outcome.

The Republican primaries, by contrast, were quite prominent in the McCain-Bush contest. Early on, the belief was that Governor Engler, one of the earliest and strongest Bush backers, had turned Michigan into the final firewall for Bush. If New Hampshire and South Carolina had not won Bush the nomination already, then February 22 would be Engler's chance to anoint Bush as the nominee. Michigan was seen as a relatively safe state for Bush because Engler had successfully dominated the Republican Party of Michigan for more than a decade. Moreover, Michigan's Republicans chose to run a winner-take-all primary, which would leave no delegates for the presumably second place McCain. Given the opposition of the Engler machine, and the lack of any reward for second place, Michigan appeared to be hostile ground for McCain.

This paper will compare exit poll data collected in Kalamazoo at a City Council election in early November with the actual results of the Republican primary in late March. In addition, we will use the exit poll data to examine the Democratic contest. In short, we will examine what shifts occurred during the four-month period that led to the actual outcome. Within this discussion we will

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attempt to answer two fundamental questions: why did Bradley's support drop in Michigan and why did McCain's numbers rise significantly?

From this analysis we hypothesize that one of Bradley's fundamental failures in Michigan was his inability to win the support of the Independent voters. On the Republican side, we expect that the high turnout of Independent voters and Democrats that voted in the Republican primary significantly contributed to McCain's success. In addition, we expect to find evidence to suggest that McCain's victory in Michigan also resulted from the "swing" of Independent voters who had supported Bradley in November but voted for McCain in February.

Data and Methods

Data for this analysis were compiled from a self-administered exit poll conducted during a City Commission election in Kalamazoo, Michigan on November 2, 1999. The survey was administered to 1,419 voters at nine different precincts. Collecting data from the City Commission voters was appropriate because the same type of voters participate in the low turnout off-year commission races as in primaries and caucuses.

Kalamazoo is a small midwestern city of about 80,000 residents. Its economy revolves around pharmaceuticals (Pharmacia-Upjohn), medical supplies (Stryker), education (Western Michigan University and Kalamazoo College), and banking. Politically, it is a Democratic island in the largely Republican ocean of western Michigan. Kalamazoo does, however, reflect many statewide demographic and political trends. Its unionized percentage of the workforce is close to the statewide average, and its median income is likewise reflective of the state average. Most importantly, the election returns in Kalamazoo City have largely reflected the total outcome of the state as a whole in the last three presidential and presidential primary elections.

The precincts selected for polling were chosen based on the following criteria: Percentage of black voters, percentage of Republican voters, and if the precinct was a "bellwether." We oversampled blacks and Republicans in order to accurately predict the city commission election for a local CBS news affiliate. This was done by comparing a 1990 Census data tract map with a Kalamazoo City precinct map; the three precincts that had the highest percentage of blacks were surveyed. In order to oversample Republicans we selected precincts based on the 1998 Kalamazoo County primary, the three precincts that had the highest number of Republican ballots cast were selected for our study. Finally, we surveyed at three "bellwether" precincts. A bellwether precinct is a precinct whose results are usually similar to the overall election results. These precincts were selected by analyzing the results from the 1997 City Commission election and choosing the three sites whose outcomes were most similar to the overall outcome.

The self-administered survey consisted of 12 questions. Voters were asked basic demographic questions about their age, sex, and race. In addition, voters were asked to indicate their partisan identity and their ideology. Voters were also asked to indicate how often they attend religious services and their opinion on enacting stronger gun control laws. Opinion on abortion was measured by giving the voter four options on abortion policy to choose from ranging from illegal in all circumstances to legal in all circumstances. In an attempt to measure "Clinton fatigue," voters were asked two questions: "Do you approve of the job President Clinton is doing as president?" and "If it were possible, would you vote for President Clinton for a third term?" Finally, in order to measure the voters' preference for an individual candidate, the participants were asked to indicate in which nomination contest they planned to vote and which candidate they planned to support.

Because we oversampled blacks it was necessary to weight the data for the Democratic analysis. In addition, we collapsed all of the minority respondents into one category, nonwhite (there were very few Asians and Hispanics surveyed). In our exit poll data, minorities accounted for 29% of the sample. In Kalamazoo, we estimated that minorities would account for about 20% of the Democratic caucus vote. Thus, we had to weight the data to get a sample that more closely represented the likely caucus composition.

Democratic Caucus

At the time of our exit poll, national polls showed Gore leading Bradley among Democratic voters by 25% (CNN Poll). The numbers from our exit poll, however, showed that Gore led Bradley among probable Democratic caucus voters by only 4% (30% to 26% respectively; 45% undecided). Gore had failed to "lock up" the Democratic contest in Kalamazoo and Kalamazoo Democrats had not made up their minds about whom they wanted as their presidential candidate. Gore's failure provided Bradley with the opportunity to gain the support he needed. Yet, Bradley did not seize the opportunity presented to him by Gore. Four months later Bradley withdrew his bid for the Democratic nomination amidst major defeats on Super Tuesday. Bradley failed to damage Gore in either Iowa or New Hampshire, and that had a crushing effect on his chances; almost every eventual nomination winner has won one or both of those contests since 1972. Thus, many are asking the question, where did Bradley go wrong? Specifically, how did the Bradley campaign move from having a good chance of beating Gore in November to needing a miracle in March?

Part of the answer, according to our Kalamazoo data, can be found by comparing the undecided respondents with the Gore and Bradley supporters. Dividing the respondents into these three groups and then comparing their mean responses to questions about religion, gun control, abortion, ideology, and support for Clinton suggests that the only significant difference between these three groups is their level of support for Clinton or "Clinton fatigue" (see Table 1).

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Table 1
Characteristics of Support in Democratic Contest (Compare Means Analysis)

	Religion	Gun Control	Abortion	Ideology	Clinton Fatigue**
Bradley	1.2988	0.1228	0.6833	0.4926	0.7164
Gore	1.2416	0.1095	0.8674	0.5525	0.1876
Undecided	1.298	0.0989	0.8592	0.595	0.4731

Note: Religiosity was measured on a four point scale indicating frequency of church attendance, ranging from "never" = 0 to once a week or more = 3. Gun control opinion was measured as a simple yes/no, with advocating more gun control laws = 0, opposing = 1. Abortion opinion was measured on a four point scale with 0 = legal in all circumstances, 1 = legal except for partial birth abortions, 2 = illegal except for rape or incest, 3 = illegal in all circumstances. Ideology was measured on a three point scale with 0 = liberal, 1 = moderate, and 2 = conservative. Clinton fatigue was measured among Democrats by willingness to vote for Clinton for a third term, with yes = 0, 1 = no. Thus, higher values indicated, respectively, secularism, favoring more gun control, being pro-life, conservatism, and level of Clinton fatigue.

** $p < .01$

We operationalized Clinton fatigue by supplementing the standard presidential approval question with the question about voting for Clinton for a third term, if it were possible. Those who did not approve of Clinton's job performance, and who would not vote for him again, were classified as Clinton haters. Those who approved and would vote for him again, were Clinton supporters. Those who approved of Clinton, but would not vote for him again were classified as "Clinton fatiguers." Many Bradley supporters were Clinton fatiguers; most Gore supporters were not. Undecided voters were divided over whether they would vote for Clinton for a third term. In short, those who supported Clinton preferred Gore; voters who exhibited Clinton fatigue preferred Bradley; and voters who were unsure about their support for Clinton remained undecided. Our data also shows that Bradley failed to attract a base of support that was distinct from Gore's on any of the issues that we surveyed (gun control and abortion). The distinct differences between Bradley and Gore supporters in terms of their support for Clinton, however, suggest that Bradley's potential success in Kalamazoo rested, in some part, on his ability to convince the undecided respondents that a vote for Gore was a vote for the continuation of "Clinton scandals." While many of Bradley's supporters perceived Bradley to be a candidate of change from Clinton early in the campaign, he failed to solidify the message. As one political consultant notes, "the kinds of things we thought he was—the outsider, the reformer, the solution to the Clinton problem—if he was ever those things, he is none of those things right now" (Gellman and Russakoff 2000).

A multinomial logistic regression model of voting among likely Democratic caucus participants in Kalamazoo was also specified. MNL regression

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allows multivariate analysis of categorical data with more than two dependent choices. This model confirms that even when other variables are controlled for, the most important difference between Bradley and Gore supporters was their level of "Clinton fatigue" as measured by their willingness to vote for Clinton again, were it constitutionally permissible. This was the only variable to affect both Bradley and Gore supporters, in opposite directions. Moreover, it was, by Wald score (not shown), the strongest influence on Gore voters, and the second, after sex, among Bradley supporters. Women voters were more undecided, with men favoring Bradley slightly more than Gore. Bradley, unlike McCain, did appear to win support from Independents, while partisanship did not affect Gore support. The more liberal respondents were, the more likely they were to be decided, and the effect was greater upon Bradley support. Clinton approval was more common among Gore supporters, who also tended to be older. Finally, there was a marginal effect of secularism upon Bradley support (as measured by church attendance), and minority voters appeared unlikely to support Bradley.

Table 2
Candidate Support Among Likely Democratic Caucus Voters:
Multinomial Logistic Regression


Variable	Bradley	Gore
Age	0.111	0.142**
Religiosity	-1.25*	-0.062
Gun control	0.159	-0.024
Ideology	-0.682***	-0.328*
Party ID	0.765***	0.224
Abortion opinion	-0.096	-0.013
Clinton approval	0.115	-1.77***
Vote for Clinton again	0.902***	-1.12***
Sex	-1.25***	-0.688***
Race	-0.655*	0.153

Note: N = 599.56. Weighted by race. Model Chi Square = 180.2. Final Log-Likelihood 975.659
 McFadden Pseudo R Square = 0.139. B Coefficients are compared to omitted group of undecided voters.

* = .10 ** = .05 *** = .01

The MNL regression model on the Democratic side suggests that Bradley had appeal for voters who suffered from Clinton fatigue, were more liberal, and were more independent. Bradley was at least partially successful in distinguishing himself as a leftwing alternative to Gore. For example, in a logistic regression model of Gore/Bradley support (with undecideds omitted), the probability of supporting Bradley over Gore was related in an almost linear fashion to ideology, when controlling for nine other variables (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
Gore Support by Ideology Among Likely Caucus Participants



Note: Line represents the mean probability of Gore Support computed from a logistic regression of Gore/Bradley.

As we shall see, it would appear that in November of 1999, Bill Bradley had gone further towards establishing an ideological and issue base with which to attack Al Gore, than John McCain had in establishing a rationale for his campaign against George W. Bush.


Republican Contest

The results of our exit poll in Kalamazoo showed that George W. Bush held a commanding lead over John McCain. Fifty one percent of the probable voters indicated that they were planning to vote for Bush in the Republican primary while only 13% of the voters said McCain.⁴ A national poll conducted at the same time indicated that Bush led McCain by 52% (60% to 8%, respectively). The results of the February Michigan primary, however, did not resemble the early national numbers or the results of our November poll. Indeed, McCain won the primary 51% to 44%.

One theory behind McCain's change in fortune from November to February is that he simply expanded the electorate by attracting more Democrats and Independents to the Republican primary. Surely this is true; exit polls and the number of ballots cast confirm that more Michiganders voted than ever before, and that more of them were Democrats (17%) and Independents (35%) than any Republican primary in memory. Indeed, Republicans (48%) were a minority in their own primary, a fact much bemoaned by Governor Engler and other prominent Bush supporters. Moreover, exit polling showed that the new, non-Republican voters were strongly for McCain.

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However, was the expansion of the electorate the only explanation for McCain's triumph? Among those who answered that they intended to vote in the Republican primary, our survey found that 88% were Republicans, 8% were Independents, and 4% were Democrats, far different from the statewide results in February. Taking the November exit poll data, we weighted the various partisans in the survey to simulate what the outcome would have been if the actual primary ages had held true.⁵ In our simulation, however, Bush still wins, although his numbers drop from 51% to 43% and McCain rises from 13% to 15%. Bush's 43% in our simulation is nearly the same as his statewide total of 44%, but McCain's 15% is still far from his February total of 51%. Thus, our data from Kalamazoo suggest that there was more to McCain's success than simply bringing in more non-Republicans. Comparing our results of November to those of the primary exit poll conducted by the Detroit News, McCain doubled his support among Republicans, and greatly increased the margins of his victory among Democrats and Independents. To win in Michigan, McCain changed the composition of the electorate, surely, but he also changed the minds of many undecided voters, previous Bush supporters, and supporters of other candidates.

Thus, if we conclude that McCain's victory was not simply the result of a change in the composition of the electorate then we must examine other factors that may account for McCain's victory. One hidden advantage that McCain may have had was the political culture of Michigan. It is a state that has been friendly to maverick challengers to the political order in the past. In addition to the surprise strength of Fieger in 1998 discussed above, George Wallace's populist campaign in 1972 shocked the Democratic establishment when he won an absolute majority against a crowded field. Crossover voting by former Wallace voters was also instrumental in Reagan's strong challenge to Gerald Ford in the 1976 Republican primary. Michigan may simply have been fertile ground for McCain's message of anti-establishment, maverick populism.

Another possible explanation for the increase of McCain supporters may be found among the 26% of undecided Republican voters. When we compare the mean responses of Bush supporters, McCain supporters, undecided respondents, and those who voted for one of the "right-wing" candidates (Hatch, Keyes, Forbes, Bauer) to questions that measured religiosity, support for gun control, and a voter's level of support for abortion, an interesting pattern emerges. As expected, the supporters of the "pro-life" candidates were the most ideologically conservative (1.8) and the most conservative in terms of their opinions on abortion (2.1). Those who supported Bush were less conservative than the pro-life supporters but were more conservative than McCain voters both ideologically (1.5) and in terms of their opinions on abortion (1.7). The most important discovery is that McCain voters and the undecided voters were similar in terms of ideology and in terms of their opinion on abortion. The mean responses for McCain voters on abortion and ideology were 1.5 and 1.3 respectively. Similarly, the mean responses for the undecided voters were 1.5 for the abortion

Table 3
Characteristics of Support in Republican Contest (Compare Means)

	Religion	Gun Control	Abortion*	Ideology*
Rightwingers	0.5641	0.5946	2.1026	1.7692
Bush	0.7914	0.4649	1.6833	1.4706
McCain	0.7174	0.4043	1.4792	1.3111
Undecided	0.8298	0.4022	1.5	1.3936

Note: Higher values indicate, respectively, secularism, favoring more gun control, being more pro-life, and conservatism.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

question and 1.4 for ideology (see Table 3). This analysis reveals that the undecided voters "looked like" McCain supporters on at least a few indicators. Thus, it is possible that much of McCain's increased support in the February primary came from the voters who were undecided in November but were swayed into voting for the candidate who was closer to them on several key issues.

The results of an exit poll conducted by CNN during the Michigan Republican primary support the conclusion that those who support McCain tend to be less ideologically conservative and more liberal in their opinions of abortion. Seventy-eight percent of liberals voted for McCain compared to 16% of liberals who voted for Bush. Sixty-six percent of the voters who felt that abortion should be "legal always" voted for McCain. On the other side, 62% of voters who said that abortion should always be illegal voted for Bush.⁶ The Kalamazoo exit poll numbers show that Bush won the pro-life vote there. In addition, since Bush's support tended to be more pro-life than McCain's support, Bush probably benefited from the departure of Forbes, Bauer, and Hatch.

To get a more sophisticated look at the exit poll data, we used multinomial logistic regression to see how the race looked in November in Kalamazoo. The preferences were again divided into four groups (Bush, McCain, Right Wing, and Undecided). Essentially, the multivariate analysis confirms the story of the univariate means analysis. When other factors were controlled for, a supporter of the right-wing candidates was more likely to be conservative and pro-life. A Bush supporter was also more likely to be pro-life and male. Perhaps the most interesting finding in the MNL regression model is that McCain supporters, in addition to being older and more likely to be male, were more likely to approve of President Clinton's performance in office. Among McCain supporters, 38% approved of the job Clinton was doing as president, almost twice the percentage found among all likely voters in the Republican primary (see Table 4).

Table 4
Candidate Support Among Likely Republican Primary Voters:
Multinomial Logistic Regression

Variables	Right Wing (Keyes, Forbes, Bauer, Hatch)	Bush	McCain
Age	0.243	0.089	0.422***
Religiosity	0.181	0.156	-0.114
Gun control	0.634	0.135	-0.082
Ideology	1.34***	-0.074	0.249
Party ID	-0.721	0.543	-0.235
Abortion opinion	0.562**	0.414***	0.151
Clinton approval	-0.543	-0.136	-1.24**
Sex	-0.448	-0.630**	-1.389***

Note: The variables for race and voting for Clinton again were removed because of a lack of variance among likely Republican primary voters. N = 289. Model Chi Square = 56.80. Final Log-Likelihood 543.95. McFadden Pseudo R Square = 0.084. B Coefficients are compared to omitted group of undecided voters.

* = .10 ** = .05 *** = .01

Among Republicans, men were more likely to favor Bush and McCain, while sex played no role in the support of the right-wing candidates. The MNL regression model compared the three groups of supporters against an omitted group of undecided. Thus, it appears that female Republicans were more likely to be undecided in November, while men favored Bush and especially McCain (based on a comparison of the B coefficients and the Wald scores, the effect of sex was stronger on the McCain group). This is perhaps because none of the Republican candidates made an effort to appeal to women voters on issues such as childcare, education, or abortion. However, since men were also more likely to have decided in the Democratic race as well, it may merely indicate a gender difference in willingness to admit to uncertainty.

Essentially, the MNL regression model suggests that McCain in November had not yet distinguished himself on any issue, while Bush had solid support from the pro-life movement among Kalamazoo voters, as well as some indication that Republican identifiers favored Bush over other options. McCain's strengths came from those who approved of Clinton's job as president, were older, and were male.

Conclusion

While our November poll showed Bush with a commanding lead in the Republican contest and Bradley trailing Gore by a slim margin, the actual results of the Michigan contests were far different—McCain won the Michigan primary and Bradley dropped out before the Democratic caucus. What happened

between November and late February that caused our poll numbers to be different from the actual results? In other words, why did Bradley's support drop while McCain's support skyrocketed? In the Democratic contest, part of our answer is that while Bradley had the support of Independents in November, they voted for McCain in February. Bradley's higher level of support in November also resulted from Gore's failure to lock up the Democratic vote; 45% of Kalamazoo Democrats were undecided in November. In short, Gore's failures resulted in early opportunities for Bradley, but Bradley failed to capitalize. In the end, Gore walked away with the nomination.

In the Republican contest, part of the answer is that while our November poll numbers may have accurately reflected the level of Bush support among Kalamazoo Republicans, it did not reflect the composition of the people who eventually voted in the Republican primary. What made our numbers differ from the actual primary results is the shift of the Independent support from Bradley to McCain and the large independent and Democratic turnout. In addition, it appears that McCain gathered greater support among early Bush supporters and the voters who were undecided in November. Finally, McCain also benefited from Bradley's failure to keep the support of the Independent voters. The influence of the rules changes in Michigan and the failure of the national Democrats to permit a change in date is also a key explanation of McCain's success. If Michigan Democrats had had a primary on the same day as the Republicans, surely many Democrats and Independents would have flocked to the polls to participate in a hot battle between Gore and Bradley. Had they done so, statewide surveys and our own exit poll suggest that Michigan would have been the firewall for Bush that many Republicans had expected it to be. The unforeseen consequences of state rule changes are an example of the idiosyncrasies of primary politics that lead many political scientists such as Jim Caesar to reject systemic theorizing about primary elections.

Yet still the Michigan 2000 races do contain some implications worthy of further study. From both contests it appears that much of the change can be explained by the shift in the Independent vote. As analysts have argued, the Independent voters who are unattached to either political party were the key to victory for McCain and Bradley. As commentator George Will explains, "there are not enough of those people (independents) to divide into two groups each capable of substantially determining each party's nomination. This year, either Bradley or McCain could win the contest for this free-floating constituency" (2000). When all of the Independents from our poll are compared, the results suggest that McCain's good fortune may have been Bradley's downfall. In November, 38% of the Independents indicated that they planned to vote for Bradley while only 6% favored McCain. In addition 34% of the Independent voters were undecided. From the CNN exit poll in Michigan and national polls it appears that Independents largely favored McCain. Yet, our poll suggests that in November the Independents favored Bradley. Thus, one possible expla-

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nation for McCain's victory and Bradley's defeat is that a dramatic shift in the Independent vote, from Bradley to McCain, occurred between November and March. In addition, Independents who were undecided in November largely supported McCain in the Republican primary. This analysis shows that one of the key determinants in the 2000 Michigan nomination contest was the Independent voter.

Our examination of the primary contests in Michigan has led us back to the assertion made by Mayer at the beginning of this paper—the candidate who is ahead in the polls before the first primary almost always wins the party nomination. Indeed, despite McCain's victory in Michigan and New Hampshire, and Bradley's opportunity in early November, the two candidates that led in the national polls before the first vote won the nomination. The continuing trend of front-loading has led to a primary system in which the candidate who leads in the national polls and has amassed the most money before the first primary contest almost always wins the party nomination. Do we benefit from a system in which we can predict the winner of the nomination by January 1 of a presidential election year? Others may argue, however, that Bradley's early opportunity in November and McCain's movement from having a slim chance in November to winning the Republican primary in Michigan show that the winner of the nomination contest is not decided before the first vote is cast. Until a preprimary frontrunner actually loses the nomination to a challenger, however, the smart money will be bet on the candidate anointed by money and poll standings on January 1 of the election year.

Notes

- 1 The one exception was Gary Hart in 1988, who led in the polls, but was forced to withdraw over a sex scandal.
- 2 The national Democratic Party rejected the strong appeals of Senator Carl Levin and other Michigan Democrats for an earlier caucus date. In the end, while well over 1 million voters took part in the Republican primary; the Democratic caucus had the lowest turnout of any presidential caucus in Michigan memory because of its late date.
- 3 A top Republican state party official confirmed to one of the authors that cross-over voting for Fieger was actively encouraged by the state party.
- 4 All of the other candidates, who were running at the time (Forbes, Hatch, Bauer, and Keyes) each received less than 5% of the vote.
- 5 Obviously, this makes the questionable assumption that the exit poll data for Republicans in the entire state of Michigan reflected similar changes in the Kalamazoo Republican electorate. It is unlikely that the eastern portion of the state experienced higher level of Democratic turnout, because it was in those areas that Democratic elites such as former gubernatorial candidate Geoffrey Fieger and a Detroit state senator organized Democrats to vote for McCain, in an effort to humiliate Governor Engler.
- 6 Ironically, there was very little difference between Bush and McCain on abortion. Indeed, every Republican running was pro-life, although the four right-wing can-

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didates were more so. Still, some national surveys suggested that McCain was perceived as more pro-choice than he actually was. This may help explain why abortion opinion divided supporters of the candidates despite the relative uniformity of their stances.

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THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION DIFFERENCES ON VOTER CHOICES IN A CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION

C. David Moon

Information differences matter in the way people evaluate candidates. This paper extends earlier work examining these differences in presidential elections to a particular congressional election. In this election, the only cue to vote choice found to matter at all levels of information voters were both direct and second-hand casework contact, while high information voters were affected by the issue positions adopted by the candidates. Voters at the medium information level appeared to take incumbent job performance into account, while both high and medium information voters were affected by perceptions of the candidates' personal characteristics. Voters at high information levels were more predictable in their choice of candidates than those at medium levels, who were, in turn, more predictable than their low information counterparts.

Introduction

Presidential and congressional elections have generally been studied separately. There is some justification for this, since there are substantial differences between the two kinds of elections. Presidents are responsive to the entire nation, while members of Congress are locally-oriented (Mayhew, 1974, 53-59). Responsibility for federal policy is much more clearly attributable to presidents than to individual legislators. The nature of a congressional campaign is different from that of a presidential campaign, as well. For example, media coverage of presidential races is more extensive than the coverage of races for individual seats in Congress. Presidential campaigns carry a burden of expressing a vision of the national purpose that congressional campaigns may not have to bear. These differences may lead voters to evaluate presidential candidates differently than congressional candidates. For example, retrospective evaluations of national economic performance, which appear to greatly affect the evaluation of incumbent presidents, may not have much impact on congressional incumbents. By the same token, presidents cannot expect to gain the same benefit from casework that members of Congress appear to derive.

At the same time, it is unreasonable to think that there is no connection between presidential and congressional elections. Together, they compose the

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elected policymaking system for the nation. Congress, as a whole, has the same constituency as the president. Perhaps most importantly, the same voters, for the most part, cast their ballots for president and for Congress. Unless we are willing to believe that the same voter uses one sort of approach to choosing a president and an entirely unrelated approach to choosing a member of Congress, there should be similarities, as well.

One of the problems with examining the differences and similarities between presidential and congressional elections has been the tendency to use different types of data in analyzing voting behavior in the two contexts. Most presidential election studies rely on individual-level survey data on the voters' perceptions of the candidates. Congressional election studies, on the other hand, have tended to emphasize aggregate-level data (Wright 1978; Conover and Wycoff 1980) or limited survey data (Johannes and McAdams 1981). In recent times, the National Election Study has begun to make appropriate individual-level data available at the national level. However, there are some limitations to the NES data that limit its use for this particular approach. Therefore, this study examines a single election in a single congressional district in order to utilize a model similar to that employed in presidential election studies. While this approach limits the scope of the sample to a single district, it has the advantage of allowing a model of vote choice to be employed which is directly analogous to that used in earlier studies of presidential election behavior (Moon 1990, 1992b, 1993). Before proceeding to the model, though, it is necessary to develop a theory of vote choice that is equally applicable to the presidential and the congressional contexts.

Theory

Begin with the assumption that each voter wishes to choose the candidate who will most nearly serve that voter's interests.¹ It is not necessary to restrict the conception of a voter's interests to narrow or economic self-interest (although those things undoubtedly play a significant role). Voters may quite reasonably take into account the interests of others they care about and the collective interest (as they conceive it) of the nation as a whole. The voter's conception of these interests may be seen as a set of preferences over outcomes or potential future distributions of costs and benefits. Another way of describing these relatively basic orientations is to refer to them as tastes or values. Thus, a voter may care not only about things such as how government policy affects his or her pocketbook, but about whether or not abortions can be legally obtained and about this nation's relationships with foreign countries, as well, even when the latter two don't seem to have a direct impact on the voter's personal well-being.

The problem voters face is in determining which of the available candidates best serves those interests. The first source of uncertainty is the difficulty

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of predicting what a given candidate will do after the election. Voters are forced to rely on probabilistic predictions (guesses) about the prospective behavior of candidates if elected.² The second source of uncertainty is the difficulty of knowing what should be done by government to maximize the satisfaction of a voter's preferences over outcomes (or tastes or values). The effects, particularly on a given voter, of government policies are difficult to predict with precision. Thus, a voter's preferences over policy depend both upon the tastes or values of that voter and upon the way in which the voter believes specific policies will or will not satisfy those preferences over outcomes.

Information has the effect of reducing uncertainty in this context.³ Relevant information is anything that would allow a voter to make linkages between the voter's preferences among outcomes, on the one hand, and the candidate choices available, on the other. Such information would certainly include data regarding the direct relationships between policy choices and outcomes or between candidates and policy choices. However, it would also include anything upon which inferences about the connections between candidates and outcomes might be based, such as clues about candidates' preferences over outcomes, like regional or ethnic background, and appeals made (explicitly or symbolically) to values the voter may (or may not) share. Inferences might also be based upon knowledge of the past behavior of candidates, especially with regard to outcomes which arose while an incumbent was in office, as well as on the support which others (whose interests, or tastes, are known to the voter) give to the candidate. Thus, a voter with a high level of information about candidates, parties, issues, recent events, and patterns of support will have a higher probability of choosing the "correct" candidate (Palfrey and Poole 1987).

The value of choosing correctly (that is, satisfying the voter's preferences) is limited by the collective nature of many of the benefits potentially derived from voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). In other words, even if a voter is both objectively and subjectively certain which candidate is truly "better," his or her vote is unlikely to allow him or her to obtain the desired benefits, since the winner of the election is determined collectively by all those casting a vote. Nevertheless, for at least some voters, there will be a positive value placed on information gathered for electoral purposes for the same reasons that people choose to vote in the first place (Moon 1992a). Some citizens feel obligated to make "good" choices between the candidates, so they gather information until they feel "sure" of their choice, or until the costs of doing so exceed their sense of obligation. At the same time, some information will be available without paying additional costs (Dahl 1961, 280; Patterson and McClure 1976; Gant and Luttbeg 1985; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986). The value of electoral information and the availability of "free" information will vary across individuals. The unit costs associated with information will vary across individuals depending on the availability of subsidized information and opportunity costs

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(Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Moore 1987). Finally, even "motivated" voters will cease to gather information once they have satisfied their sense of responsibility to distinguish accurately between the candidates (Hinckley 1981, 13), so that in some contexts (i.e., an election in which the voter highly approves of the incumbent) little new information is sought out. Different voters approach the moment of electoral choice armed with varying amounts of information because they have varying levels of motivation and varying degrees of relevant resources available to them.

Just as significantly, not all kinds of electorally-relevant information are equally easy to obtain and use. Information about the policy positions of candidates, for example, requires more effort to obtain and to analyze than, say, the partisan affiliation of a candidate for a partisan identifier. The result is that some cues to vote choice (issue positions taken, retrospective evaluations, ideological arguments and labels, endorsements, party labels, candidate appearance and personal characteristics, etc.) are more likely to be used by sophisticated, high-information voters, and are less likely to be used by voters further down the information continuum.⁴ In essence, voters make the best use they can of what they have. From the perspective of the individual voter this is not only rational and efficient (Gant and Davis 1984), but produces consistent approximations of the preferences over candidates that would have been generated if all available information had been acquired (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986), as well. These "consistent approximations" mean that even voters who choose with a fairly high degree of "error" still cannot be safely ignored by candidates, since the voters' behavior is not random, but linked in some roughly systematic way to the interests voters wish to see served.⁵

It seems reasonable to suppose that differences in offices and campaigns would affect the kinds of information voters deem relevant and have available to them. We would expect, for example, that issues such as national defense would play little role in a city council election and that the impact of partisanship would be muted in a formally nonpartisan contest. By the same token, the different responsibilities of the president and Congress and the differences in the campaigns for the two offices should create two different informational contexts for voters. Nevertheless, the basic approach of voters should be very much the same in the two kinds of elections. They should attempt, insofar as the information they happen to have available to them allows, to choose the candidate who seems most likely to most nearly approximate their preferences over outcomes. In the case of presidential contests, those voters with higher levels of information place more emphasis on cues that are more difficult to obtain. High information voters are also more predictable in their preferences over candidates based on their perceptions of the cues they possess than those at lower levels of information (Moon 1990, 1992b, 1993). This paper shows that the same pattern holds true in congressional elections, even though some of the cues are different, and even though the entire campaign is probably conducted

at a lower level of general voter interest and awareness than in the case of the presidency.

Research Design

Over a three week period in the fall of 1990, 821 telephone interviews were conducted with constituents whose names were provided by a congressional office. The names were randomly drawn from two categories: beneficiaries of casework and registered voters who had *not* had casework performed.⁶ Anonymity was promised to the member of Congress in order to secure cooperation. The survey questions were similar to those used in the National Election Studies: forced-choice questions designed to produce scales as variables.

A methodological concern that should be addressed here is the appropriateness of generalizing from a single congressional district. Although the congressional district is not representative of all 435 districts, there are reasons for believing that we can make worthwhile generalizations from a study focusing on this particular district without seeming recklessly speculative. First, a comparison of district respondents with socio-demographic data from the *1990 Statistical Abstracts of the United States* leads us to believe that the underlying relationship between congressional behavior and constituent reaction is not fundamentally different in this particular district than it is in other districts.⁷ Second, a district-level study allows the construction of a model which is essentially similar to those used for presidential elections, and for a direct comparison to earlier studies of the effects of information differences in presidential elections (Moon 1990, 1992b, 1993). Not only are some of the specific variables with regard to candidate image not available in the National Election Study data, but there are significant problems with some of the candidate-specific variables. Since the sample size from any given district will be small (in some cases, $N = 1$), using a measure of central tendency to "locate" the position of a candidate on an issue or other scale is not particularly useful. This is important in order to avoid problems with voter projection.

Model

The model used in earlier studies of information effects on presidential vote choice considered the following factors: relative issue proximity of the voter to the two candidates' median placements, relative ideological proximity of the voter to the two candidates' median placements, approval of the incumbent's performance in office, a measure of identification with groups that were predisposed toward one candidate or the other, relative assessments of the two candidates' morality, competence and leadership, and partisan identification. Table 1 shows the results of applying this model in 1988 to three levels of information (see Moon 1992b for details).

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Table 1
1988 Presidential Election Choice by Information Level

LOW INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-1.329**	0.299	-4.445
Issues	0.008	0.005	1.523
Ideology	0.074	0.061	1.224
Approval	0.409**	0.077	5.301
Group	0.304*	0.121	2.518
Party ID	0.293**	0.053	5.428
Candidate	0.014*	0.004	3.453

Note: N = 273. Percent correctly predicted: 87.9. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 52.0. Percent reduction in error: 74.8.

* = .05 level ** = .01 level

MEDIUM INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-1.259**	0.318	-3.964
Issues	0.015**	0.005	2.852
Ideology	-0.028	0.063	-0.441
Approval	0.388**	0.084	4.682
Group	0.035	0.123	0.285
Party ID	0.314**	0.063	4.986
Candidate	0.023**	0.005	4.430

Note: N = 337. Percent correctly predicted: 90.2. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 59.4. Percent reduction in error: 75.9.

* = .05 level ** = at .01 level

HIGH INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-1.217**	0.261	-4.685
Issues	0.011*	0.005	2.499
Ideology	0.144*	0.057	2.508
Approval	0.276**	0.072	3.849
Group	0.192	0.122	1.577
Party ID	0.372**	0.059	6.323
Candidate	0.032**	0.005	6.806

Note: N = 544. Percent correctly predicted: 92.5. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 50.2. Percent reduction in error: 85.7.

* = .05 level ** = .01 level

No measures for ideological placement or group identification (other than for parties) were obtained in the congressional survey used in this study. An additional measure, based on exposure to casework by the member of Congress (see Serra and Moon 1994 for additional details) was added to the model, producing the following:

Vote = Issues + Satisfaction + Approval + Party ID + Candidate

- Vote: the decision of the voter to vote for the incumbent or to vote for the challenger.⁸
- Issues: the relative closeness of the voter to the incumbent, as opposed to the challenger, on three issue scales.⁹
- Satisfaction: the degree of satisfaction with casework.¹⁰
- Approval: the degree to which the voter approves of the incumbent's performance in office.¹¹
- Party ID: the degree to which the voter identifies with the incumbent's party.¹²
- Candidate: relative assessment of each candidate's character (morality, competence, and leadership).¹³

In order to assess the degree to which voters possess campaign-related information, respondents were divided into three groups, based upon their ability to correctly name the incumbent member of Congress in the district, their ability to place the candidates on issues scales in the correct order (that is, in the same order as the majority of other respondents), and an interviewer assessment of their overall level of information (Zaller 1990). Probit analysis was used to estimate the relationship between each of the independent variables and the vote choice. This technique recognizes the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable and is an appropriate means of assessing the significance of relationships in a multivariate analysis.

Hypotheses

Based on the pattern observed in the presidential context, the coefficients for all five independent variables should be significant and positive for high information voters. The theory strongly suggests that high information voters

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will be able to assess the differences in issue positions between the candidates, will have enough information about the incumbent to make a meaningful assessment of his performance in office, and will know enough about the two candidates' personal characteristics to draw distinctions between them. There is no *a priori* reason to believe that casework satisfaction will not influence these voters (and they may be more likely to seek assistance). Finally, partisan identification should certainly be relevant, although the relative strength of this relationship may be lower for high information voters than for the other levels of information, precisely because they have other avenues to assess the candidates.

For medium information voters, these relationships should hold for all of the independent variables except *Issues*, based on the presidential results. In the congressional context, however, the ubiquity of information about the candidates' personal characteristics that is a major feature of the presidential campaign may be lacking. Therefore, we would expect the coefficient for *Candidate* to be smaller for medium information voters than for high information voters. Likewise, lack of specific knowledge about the incumbent may reduce the size of the coefficient for *Approval* relative to high information voters.

For low information voters, *Approval* and *Candidate*, in addition to *Issues*, may well have dropped out of consideration altogether, for the reasons cited above. That leaves casework satisfaction and partisan identification as the only two predicted influences on low information voters. In the absence of other factors, the coefficient for partisan identification will probably be highest for low information voters, compared to the medium and high information groups.

In general, the ability of the model to predict how individuals will cast their votes should be greatest for the high information voters and least for the low information voters. In other words, the percent reduction in error (the difference between percent correctly predicted and the percent correctly predicted by the modal response, divided by the percent not correctly predicted by the modal response) should be relatively high for high information voters, relatively low for low information voters, and somewhere in the middle for medium information voters.

Results

As Table 2 indicates, the results generally bear out the hypothesis outlined above. The model was best able to predict the choice of high information voters (94.5% of the cases, 67.6% reduction in error), even though their variance on vote choice was slightly higher than that of the low and medium information voters. Medium information voters were more predictable than low information voters (89.4% to 84.7%) and the percent reduction in variance was also greater (32.5% to 0%).¹⁴

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Table 2
1990 Congressional District Election Choice by Information Level

LOW INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	0.071	0.884	0.081
Issues	0.020	0.034	0.580
Satisfaction	0.716**	0.272	2.635
Approval	-0.173	0.220	-0.783
Party ID	0.416**	0.098	4.231
Candidate	0.014	0.012	1.208

Note: N = 111. Percent correctly predicted: 84.7. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 84.7. Percent reduction in error: 0.0.

* = .05 level ** = .01 level

MEDIUM INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-0.388	0.492	-0.789
Issues	0.029	0.020	1.477
Satisfaction	0.030	0.131	0.232
Approval	0.313**	0.111	2.807
Party ID	0.241**	0.061	3.985
Candidate	0.027**	0.007	3.963

Note: N = 236. Percent correctly predicted: 89.4. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 84.2. Percent reduction in error: 32.5.

* = .05 level ** = .01 level

HIGH INFORMATION VOTERS			
Independent Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-2.030*	0.895	-2.267
Issues	0.072*	0.036	2.003
Satisfaction	0.004	0.194	0.020
Approval	0.239	0.189	1.262
Party ID	0.444**	0.102	4.353
Candidate	0.079**	0.017	4.614

Note: N = 218. Percent correctly predicted: 94.5. Percent correctly predicted by modal response: 83.0. Percent reduction in error: 67.6.

* = .05 level ** = .01 level

A closer examination of each group's results reveals some interesting differences. For low information voters, partisan identification was a clearly significant determinant of vote choice, just as the congressional elections literature would lead us to expect. The only other significant variable was *Satisfaction*. Of this group, only 28.5% had actually had contact (as opposed to about 50% of the whole sample). In terms of second-hand contact, only an additional 2% had heard of someone else's casework experiences. The relative few who had any form of contact, however, were much more likely to vote for the incumbent. It is also interesting that *Approval* had no discernible effect (indeed, the coefficient has the "wrong" sign). Many in this group (30.6%) were unable or unwilling to rate the incumbent's performance at all. Of those who did, very few either strongly approved or strongly disapproved (12.8% in both categories combined). In the absence of knowledge about issue positions, or even the candidates' personal characteristics, and given a lack of confidence about their assessments of job performance, low information voters appear to have fallen back on party identification, and to have been very responsive to casework.

For medium information voters, incumbent approval, party identification and candidate character assessments appear to have mattered most. Only 9.5% of medium information voters refused to rate the incumbent's performance, while almost 28% of them felt strongly about it one way or the other, so that it is not surprising that *Approval* has a larger impact than it had for low information voters. The lower magnitude of the coefficient for *Party ID* is in line with the hypothesis that partisan identification matters most for those with the least information. Unlike low information voters, medium information voters appeared to know enough about the personal characteristics of the candidates to have it affect their vote choices. The fact that issue positions still bore little weight for medium information voters is in line with our expectations, but it is surprising that *Satisfaction* appears to have a very modest (and non-significant) effect. It suggests that casework has less effect when constituents have independent means by which to assess the candidates.

High information respondents were most influenced by *Issues*, *Party ID*, and *Candidate*. It is quite surprising that *Approval* fails to achieve significance (although the magnitude of its coefficient is not much lower than was the case for medium information voters). This group of voters was almost universally willing to rate the incumbent's performance (97%), and many felt strongly about their ratings (43%), but job performance appeared to take a back seat to evaluations based on issues, the candidates' personal characteristics and even partisan identification. The results with regard to *Satisfaction* appear to reinforce the suggestion that the impact of casework is greatest among low information voters. Even though many in this group (65.6%) had direct casework contact with the congressional office, other factors appeared to matter more to these relatively information-rich respondents. It is not surprising that *Issues* would have the greatest impact with high information voters or, in the congressional

context at least, that the coefficient for *Candidate* is over twice as large for high information voters as for medium information voters. However, the apparent trend towards a lower influence for *Party ID* as we go higher up the information ladder is reversed. The coefficient for high information voters is 0.444 (higher even than for low information voters), while the coefficient for medium information voters is only 0.241.

Conclusion

Earlier studies of presidential elections suggested that more cues are added to the pool relied upon by voters as more information is added (Moon 1990). Even when between-election differences were taken into account, showing that some cues are more important in some years than in others (Moon 1992b, 1993), the general tendency with more information is to add cues without disposing of others. In the congressional environment, this preliminary study suggests, the process may work somewhat differently. There appears to be more discounting of information going on here. As a "better" cue is added, a "lesser" cue may well be discarded.

It is also interesting to note the pervasiveness of the *Candidate* variable in the mass-media-oriented presidential setting, as compared to its lack of significance for low information voters here. It is probably difficult not to form an impression of the presidential candidates in the days leading up to the first Tuesday in November, but it was apparently somewhat difficult to judge the personalities of the candidates in this congressional contest. Given that many Americans express a desire to vote for the person, rather than the party, it is perhaps not surprising that so many of these low information voters fell back, perhaps unwillingly, on party. The apparent greater salience of party in congressional elections in general may be largely due to the lack of candidate-specific information many voters possess. The irony, of course, is that the more locally-oriented members of the House are supposed to be closer to the people, yet are much less well-known to many individual voters than the "remote" president.

The biggest contrast between presidential and congressional elections may well be in the richness of the information context. If, in fact, voters rely largely on the information that is most easily available to them, it's probably not surprising that the lowest information voters appear to have so little to base their vote choice upon. Even the most inattentive of voters almost certainly knows more about the candidates in a presidential contest. This affects not only the image-related *Candidate* variable, but the salience of candidate performance and issue positions, as well. Another striking suggestion from this study is the possibility that casework matters most to those who know least. Thus, both the conventional wisdom that party matters more in congressional elections and the assertion that casework is a major tool for incumbents seeking reelection may ultimately rest on the relative lack of information generally in the congressional context.

Nonetheless, the principles of how information differences affect individual voters appear to be consistent between congressional and presidential elections. Higher information respondents were more likely to vote, and were more readily predictable when they did vote, than were lower information voters. Higher information voters were, likewise, more likely to rely on cues that have been held to be "better" (like issues) than were lower information voters. Information levels matter in both kinds of elections. The impact is, if anything, more dramatic for congressional elections than for presidential elections.

Notes

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- 1 In other words, this is an expected utilities model.
- 2 In this context, the distinction between prospective and retrospective voting breakdown. Retrospective voting can be viewed as a means to the end of making better prospective choices at lower costs.
- 3 Uncertainty in this situation is both real (or objective) and perceived. Regardless of the amount of information a person has, there is objective uncertainty regarding the future actions of candidates and the future effects of policy. Additional information should have the effect of making predictions about the future more accurate. At the same time, the effect of information on the voter's confidence in his or her predictions (subjective uncertainty) should be in the same direction.
- 4 This idea can be extended to individual voting cues (determinants of vote choice) That is, it is likely that different voters use the cues they possess differently depending on a number of information-related factors. First, the other cues of which a voter possesses knowledge will temper the use of any given cue, as he or she attempts to develop a cognitively-consistent view of each candidate. Second, the content of the cue may be more or less rich depending on the amount of relevant information a voter possesses. Finally, the ability of a voter to utilize a cue may be affected by the contextual knowledge he or she possesses, as well as by the voter's level of cognitive complexity.
- 5 Of course, the error in the estimates may not be truly random (that is, based on sample error in the information to which one is exposed). The tastes, or values, of the voter may cause them to systematically emphasize some information, while discounting other information. A prudent candidate will recognize these "biases" and will attempt to turn them to his or her advantage. At the same time, even the sample error may not be random, since candidates have some influence over what information reaches voters. The end result may be "estimation error" that is at least somewhat systematic and which favors the more skilled candidate. Nevertheless, even among low information voters, it seems unlikely that even the most skilled politician can "fool all of the people all of the time."
- 6 This survey was used for several studies involving congressional casework. The split-sample design allowed enough cases of casework to be included to allow valid comparisons.

- 7 Thirty-nine percent of the national population graduated from high school (with no further schooling); 17.3% completed some college; and 21.1% completed four years of college or more. Twenty-five percent of the district respondents graduated from high school (with no further schooling); 33.5% some college, and 34.2% completed four years of college or more. In income and occupation, we see that the mean family income (\$38,000) and the proportion of white collar workers (52%) for the targeted district are modestly lower than the mean income for households in the United States (\$42,652) and the proportion of white collar workers in the current population.
- 8 Vote choice is whether the respondent voted for the incumbent (1) or the challenger (0), based on the respondent's self-report. Abstentions were excluded, in keeping with the practice in similar earlier studies examining presidential elections.
- 9 Issue proximity was measured by taking the absolute value of the difference between each respondent's self-placement and the mean placement of each candidate on three scales:
- (1) 1 - Provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot
7 - Provide many more services, increase spending a lot
 - (2) 1 - Try to cooperate more with the Soviets
7 - Get much tougher with the Soviets
 - (3) 1 - No legal abortions
2 - Legal abortions only in the case of rape, incest or danger to the life of the mother.
3 - Legal abortions for other reasons, but they must be clearly established.
4 - Abortion should be a matter of personal choice.

The issue proximity to the incumbent was subtracted from the issue proximity to the challenger to determine the relative proximity on each issue. The actual value for *Issues* is the predicted value obtained by regressing the relative proximity on each issue on the difference in the candidates' thermometer scores. Using the predicted value of the regression captures only that portion of the variance in the thermometer score difference which is due to issue proximity. It avoids the problem of combining different issue scales and, more importantly, allows issues to be weighted by their average salience to voters (Moon 1990, 1993). Missing data were substituted for by using Dempster's EM Algorithm, in which a random variable with the same mean and standard deviation as the known cases of the substantive variable are substituted for the missing data.

- 10 *Satisfaction* combines two measures of the effects of congressional casework. Casework satisfaction was measured by asking those who were in the contact sample how satisfied they were with the experience (dissatisfied, satisfied, very satisfied). Second-hand contact was measured by asking those respondents who said they knew someone who had casework performed by the congressional office whether or not that person was satisfied with the experiences. Those who had contact were coded -1 if dissatisfied, +1 if satisfied, and +2 if very satisfied. Those who had not had contact were coded -1 if they had second-hand contact which was dissatisfactory; 0 if they had no second-hand contact; and +1 if they had second-hand contact with which the person having the actual casework performed was satisfied.

- 11 Respondents were asked if they strongly approved (+2), approved (+1), disapproved (-1) or strongly disapproved (-2) of the incumbent's overall job performance since taking office. Missing cases were coded 0 for neutral.
- 12 Using the standard NES 7-point scale (and questions) strong Republicans (incumbent's party) were coded +3, weak Republicans were coded +2, leaning Republicans were coded +1, pure Independents (and missing cases) 0, leaning Democrats -1, weak Democrats -2, and strong Democrats -3. An alternative coding which reversed the order of weak identifiers and leaners proved less predictive of vote choice in a bivariate test.
- 13 Respondents were asked how well each of three characteristics (competence, morality and leadership) fit each candidate using the following scale: extremely well, fairly well, not too well, or not well at all (coded 4, 3, 2, 1, respectively). The difference in the two candidates scores was then regressed against the difference in their thermometer scores, and the predicted values were used as the values for Candidate. Missing data were substituted for by using Dempster's EM algorithm.
- 14 The percent reduction in error reported in Tables 1 and 2 was calculated by taking the error produced by predicting the modal response (in all cases a vote for the incumbent), subtracting the error in the predicted response of the model, and dividing by the error using the modal response.

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COMMUNIST SUCCESSOR PARTIES AND PARTY IDENTITY CHANGE IN POSTCOMMUNIST POLITICS

John T. Ishiyama

Since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the communist successor parties have followed very different paths in adjusting to new competitive circumstances. Some have changed their political identities and embraced capitalism and democratic competition; others cling to the ideals of state ownership and democratic centralism. What affected whether these parties changed their identities? Did parties which changed their identities perform better electorally than parties which did not change their identities? These questions are investigated in light of the evidence from 21 communist successor parties in Eastern Europe. In general, it was found that internal rather than external factors were most important in explaining why the successor parties changed their identities, but changing identities had little effect on electoral performance.

Introduction

In the general literature on political parties there has been a considerable amount of interest in party identity change, or the "face" which the party presents to the electorate (Budge et al. 1987; Janda et al. 1995). By and large, this literature suggests that the principal factors which explain party identity change are external to the party. In other words party change "does not 'just happen'" (Harmel and Janda 1994, 261) but results from changes in the political environment or from the electoral failures of the party.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the transformation of the formerly dominant communist parties provides an opportunity to further test the propositions regarding party identity change. Indeed, there has been quite a bit of variation in how the communist successor parties have adopted to the fundamentally altered political environment of the post cold war era. Some have changed their political identities and embraced markets, capitalism and democratic competition, rather than state ownership and democratic centralism. Others continue to cling to ideological purity and Marxist Leninist values.

To what extent can the current literature on party identity change explain the variety of paths followed by the communist successor parties? Although there have been several recent works which have investigated the development

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of the communist successor parties, these have tended to either focus on the extent to which the successor parties have been politically successful (Ishiyama 1997; Moraski and Lowenberg 1999; Orenstein 1998;) or how they have adapted organizationally since the collapse of communism as a political system (Bozoki 1997; Ishiyama 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Mahr and Nagle 1995; Urban and Solovei 1997). Some studies have investigated identity change, but these have been conducted mainly at the level of individual parties (Wilson 1997) or used a small number of cases (Grzymala-Busse 1999; Oates 1998; Pop-Eleches 1999; Ziblatt 1998).

This paper seeks to broadly assess the extent to which external or intraorganizational factors best explain the identity change of the communist successor parties. In addition it addresses the related question of whether such changes affected the degree of electoral success of the communist successor parties after changing identities. In other words, did parties which changed their identities generally perform better electorally than parties which did not change their identities? I investigate these questions in light of the evidence from a sample of 21 successor parties. The "communist successor" party was identified as those parties that have as "their legacy the former communists' property, membership, political elite or a combination of these, or else are legal successors" to the formerly dominant communist party (Bozoki 1997, 57; see also Ishiyama 1995).

Two criteria justified the inclusion of the cases. Each case had to have some experience with democracy, with at least one free and competitive national election between 1991 to 1995. Moreover, to be included the case could not have experienced a major violent upheaval during this period which interrupted civilian rule. These criteria excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan, all of which have had elections which have been essentially rigged or where competition was extremely limited. The list of the 21 successor parties is reported in Table 1.

Literature and Design

Environmental Factors Affecting Party Identity Change

What are the factors which cause party identity change?¹ On the one hand, party identity change can be seen as a result of environmental influences (Janda 1990; Janda et al. 1995). For instance, Janda (1990), Harmel and Janda (1994), and Janda et al. (1995), have argued that party identity change occurs as the result of parties reacting to changes in the political environment. From this perspective, parties are assumed to be conservative organizations that are unlikely to change unless forced (Harmel and Janda 1994). Thus, party change is viewed as a rational and purposeful move by the party, in response to specific stimuli.

Table 1
Communist Parties and Their Successors

COUNTRY	COMMUNIST PARTY	SUCCESSOR PARTY
Albania	Albanian Party of Labor	Socialist Party of Albania
Armenia	Communist Party of Armenia	Armenian Communist Party
Azerbaijan	Communist Party of Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan United Communist Party
Belarus	Communist Party of Belarus	Communist Party of Belarus
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Communist Party	Bulgarian Socialist Party
Croatia	League of Communists of Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia-Party of Democratic Reform
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
Estonia	Communist Party of Estonia	Estonian Democratic Labor Party
Georgia	Georgian Communist Party	United Communist Party of Georgia
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party
Latvia	Communist Party of Latvia	Latvian Socialist Party
Lithuania	Communist Party of Lithuania	Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
Macedonia	League of Communists of Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
Moldova	Communist Party of Moldavia	Socialist Party of Moldova and Party of Moldovan Communists
Poland	Polish Socialist Workers Party	Social Democracy of the Polish Republic
Romania	Romanian Communist Party	Party of Social Democracy of Romania
Russia	Communist Party of the Soviet Union/Russian	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
Slovakia	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia/Communist Party of Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left
Slovenia	League of Communists of Slovenia	Party of Democratic Reform
Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine
Yugoslavia	League of Communists	Socialist Party of Serbia Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro

For Janda one of the most important influences which necessitates party identity change is extreme competition which results in poor electoral performance (1990). Janda et al. (1995) tested the hypothesis that parties will change only if they do poorly in elections. The authors defined five changes which may occur only if parties do poorly in elections. Also the authors defined five different kinds of elections as perceived by the party's activists: calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifying and triumphal (Janda et al. 1995). They found that generally calamitous or disappointing elections were associated with the greatest degree of party identity change, indicating that parties only try to change their identities when voters reject the policy face they had presented in the previous election.

However, other scholars have noted that other external challenges short of electoral defeat, such as the existence of competition from ideologically similar political alternatives to the party can cause parties to change their identity (Cox 1987). Positive political theorists working on spatial models of electoral competition, have noted that in a multiparty system the presence of several parties may exert a "squeezing out" effect on political parties, compelling individual parties to "jump out" from the "pack" and present a different face to the electorate so the electorate can distinguish them from other ideologically similar parties. This squeezing effect depends to a large extent on the electoral law and the structures of the political system. When there are incentives present to broaden the party's appeal (such as under a plurality electoral rule) there is often a "crowding" effect which squeezes out smaller or weaker competitors compelling them to adopt extremist positions in order to differentiate themselves from other competitors.

On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that the more external challenges a political organization faces, the more likely the followers of that organization will seek to reaffirm its ideological purity (Stewart 1991). As the party faces greater external challenges there is greater pressure to reaffirm the movement's identity, because as Richard Gregg (1971, 74) argues there is a need for followers for "psychological refurbishing and affirmation." This usually involves a greater attempt to identify the members of the movement as being different from others. This is a way, as Gregg (1971, 76) notes, to establish selfhood by "identifying against another" establishing one's identity through contrast. Thus, the greater the external competition, the more likely the party will seek to maintain its ideological roots (see also Stewart 1991).

Thus the above literature suggests that the extent to which parties seek to change their political identities is a function of the electoral performance of the party (or the expected performance of the party) and the degree of competition the party faces from other ideologically similar parties. To measure "electoral performance" I examined the performance of the communist successor parties in the first competitive legislative elections in terms of seats won in the lower house of the legislatures. A focus on only the lower house is justified for two reasons: First, not all of the emerging constitutional orders of Eastern Europe

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and the former Soviet Union are identical— some are unicameral, as is the case in Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Baltic States; others, such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, Russia, Poland and Romania have bicameral legislatures. Yet in all of the latter the more powerful house is the lower house. Therefore, for the sake of comparability, I concentrate only on the lower houses of the legislatures. Second, I focused on legislatures instead of presidencies because, although in many of these postcommunist political systems a relatively powerful and directly elected executive exists, the executive throughout postcommunist Eastern Europe has sought some accommodation with the lower house of parliament.

“Competition” was measured by assessing the strength of “left-wing competition.” Although the strength of left-wing competition has been cited as an important variable affecting the performance of the communist successor parties (Kopecky 1995; Waller 1995) the concept “left wing,” or the entire political spectrum in postcommunist politics for that matter, is notoriously difficult to measure. The issue, however, at least from the perspective of this paper, is not to provide indisputable criteria for categorizing a “socialist” from a “nonsocialist” party, but to identify those parties which might compete with the communist successor parties for the same constituencies on the ideological spectrum. To address the measurement of the strength of the left-wing competition facing the successor parties, two criteria were used. First, a left-wing competitor must have won seats in the most recent legislative election. Second, the party must tend to compete for the same constituencies as the communist successor parties. Whether the party competed for the same niche on the ideological spectrum was discerned by identifying the largest parties which won seats and labeled themselves as either communist, socialist or social democratic and determining the percentage of seats won by the largest leftist competitors in the lower house of parliament in the first competitive legislative elections.

Organizational Legacies

It has also been argued that factors internal to the party impact on the ability of the party to change its identity (Harmel and Janda 1994). Epstein (1968) and Panebianco (1988) have noted that different kinds of parties are more likely to adapt than others. For Epstein in particular, parties which are organized along “mass” (programmatic) lines tend to be less able to change than are parties which are organized primarily to win election (or what Duverger referred to as “cadre” parties). This is because as Ishiyama and Velten (1998) note mass parties place greater internal constraints on leaders in their ability to react to incentives generated by a political environment: “one can imagine the situation where an institutional incentive to moderate a party’s political position.... may have little effect on a party leadership whose range of movement is constrained by the presence of a significant number of ‘hardliners’ in the ranks of the organization.”

Several scholars of party organizations have contended that the organizational features of parties impact their ability to react to new political circumstances. Much of this work is based on the concept of *organizational institutionalization* which is generally conceived of as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1965, 394). Huntington proposed to measure the level of institutionalization for a particular organization "by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence" (1965, 394). Although useful, Janda (1980, 19) notes that Huntington's approach to measuring the degree of institutionalization fails to recognize party organizations that are clearly institutionalized. For instance he notes that "a party can be highly institutionalized but lack the independence of other groups (Huntington's 'autonomy')—as the Labour Party in Great Britain." Rather, for Janda an institutionalized party is "one that is reified in the public mind so that 'the party' exists apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it" (1980, 19).

Based upon both Janda and Huntington, I employ three measures of internal organizational characteristics: the *number of name changes in party's history prior to 1989*, the *average leadership duration in the previous regime*, and the *degree of organization*. As Janda notes, party name changes are often made to establish new links with the electorate, as well as responding to confusion about the party's identity within the citizenry as a whole. Thus the magnitude and frequency of name changes relates to the degree of institutionalization of the party organization; the greater the frequency and magnitude of changes indicates less institutionalization.

In keeping with Janda's measure, the magnitude of name changes was assessed in terms of minor and major changes. A minor change was defined as one that involves the repetition of one or more terms (not including prepositions) in both the previous name and the changed name. A complete change involved the repetition of no terms. The measure of magnitude was combined with the frequency of name changes to produce the measure, *number of name changes in party's history*. This variable was coded as an ordinal measure ranging from 0 to 3 where 0 indicated "no name changes"; 1 indicated "one minor change"; 2 indicated "two or more minor changes or one complete change"; and 3 indicated "more than one complete change, including one minor and one complete" (see Janda 1980, 22)

Another measure of institutionalization which relates to both Janda and Huntington is the "generational age" of the party organization. This measure assumes that the lack of leadership change leads a party to become closely identified with an individual leader and heightens the propensity for the development of a "cult of personality." Thus the fewer the number of leadership changes the less adaptable and hence less institutionalized the party is as an organization. To measure generational change, I first determined the number of different chief executive officers the party had up until 1989 (in most cases this was the Gen-

eral or First Secretary, although occasionally it was the party Chairman) and then divided this number by the number of years the party was in existence (dating to its founding). The resulting number measures the average leadership duration in the communist party; the higher the number the longer the tenure of the party leader, and hence the less likely the party was historically "institutionalized."

An additional measure of the degree to which a party organization is institutionalized relates to the complexity of the organization. As Harmel and Svasand (1993) argue the more organizationally complex the political party the more institutionalized it is. To measure the degree to which a party organization is complex, I borrow from Janda (1980) who noted that organizational complexity involves two dimensions: *intensiveness* and *extensiveness*. Intensiveness refers to the smallest unit in the party structure, while extensiveness denotes the geographical coverage of the party organization (Janda, 1980, 101).

To measure intensiveness, I employ a modification of Janda's measure which has six discrete categories and ranges from "no observable organization" on one extreme and "cell units" on the other. As Duverger (1964) noted the smallest organizational unit in the party is indicative of the type of party. In particular the "choice of the cell as the basis of organization entails a profound change in the very concept of the political party. Instead of a body intended for the winning of votes... the political party becomes an instrument of agitation" (1964, 35). To measure intensiveness I reconfigured Janda's measure into four categories where 1 is coded for organizations which either have no institutionalized organs or are only apparent at the national level. The value 2 is assigned where no institutionalized party organs exist below the constituency or municipal level; the value 3 is associated with party organs existing in geographic locations at the precinct level; and finally the value 4 is reserved for party organizations which exist at the cell level (usually involving units of less than 100 party members).

The second dimension which comprises the complexity of the organization (which Janda labeled the "degree of organization") is the extensiveness of the party organization. Janda conceived of this as involving the geographic coverage of the party, which was determined by whether the party maintained local organizations throughout the country. This measure, however, proved problematic in application to the communist parties. Hence information on the internal organizational structure of these parties was extremely limited. Thus rather than employ Janda's measure of extensiveness, I employ a measure of membership density as a rough surrogate. This involves dividing the estimated party membership in 1989 by the population of the country and multiplying by 100. The reasoning here is that the larger the estimated membership the more likely the organization has the wherewithal to maintain local organizations throughout the country.

To calculate a composite measure of organizational complexity, I multiplied the intensiveness score by the membership density score and divided the product by 100 to render a value which estimated the *degree of organization* of the communist party before the collapse of communism in 1989.

The final internal organizational variable related to the extent to which the party was dominated by political pragmatists at the moment of the transition, who were willing to dump the ideological baggage of the past and present the party as a credible alternative. As Samuel Huntington (1991) notes the key to the ability of the incumbent authoritarian regime to adapt to new circumstances depends on who initially "won" the struggle between "standpatters," "liberal reformers" and "democratic reformers." These groups are, for Huntington, defined in terms of their basic attitudes toward democracy. The standpatters pay lip service to reform, but essentially wish to retain the system as it is, without major revision. In communist systems standpatters were associated with the Stalinist or Brezhnevite wings of the party. Liberal reformers, on the other hand, supported a substantial restructuring of the party, but often framed democratization in terms of intraparty liberalization, rather than fundamentally transforming the party into one prepared for electoral competition. In the Eastern European communist parties, liberal reformers were associated with the Gorbachev wing of the party. Democratic reformers, meanwhile, favored the complete overhaul of the party, often with the goal of transforming it into a social democratic party. For Ishiyama (1995) the key to the ability of the communist parties to adapt to new circumstances depended heavily on whether the liberal and democratic reformers in the government coalition were able to fend off the antidemocratic standpatters within the communist party.

This variable was measured based upon Ishiyama's (1995) assessment of the successor parties leadership at the moment of the first elections. The case was coded as a 0 if standpatters dominated the party leadership; 1 if the party was dominated by liberals; and 2 if the leadership was comprised of democratic reformists.

Dependent Variable: Party Name Change

Turning to the dependent variable in this study, identity change is measured by whether or not the party changed its name around the time of the first legislative election following the collapse of communist systems in Eastern Europe from 1990 to 1991. This includes both the situation where the successor party changed its name prior to the first election or after the first election. This is because not only may the party change its name in response to actual performance in elections, but in anticipation of poor performance prior to the election.

Party name change rather than the analysis of party electoral programs (as Budge et al. 1987 and Janda et al. 1995 have done) is used as an indicator of party identity change for two reasons. First, a change in name would signify the

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party's attempt at identifying itself with another constituency, and hence is an indicator as to the extent to which the party seeks to accommodate new political circumstances. The party's name is what the electorate sees on the ballot, and is the most visible aspect of the party's public face, not the party's electoral program. Second, party name changes are considerably more difficult to enact than are changes in electoral programs. Such name changes in the case of successor parties signal a break with the past and a shift to an entirely new identity. Thus rather than employ content analyses of party electoral programs, I focus on changes in the name of the party as a measure of identity change.

However not any name change qualifies as a significant shift in identity. The focus here is only on changes which involved fundamentally altering the party's identity. Such a change is indicated when the party drops "communist" or "workers" from the party's name—this signifies that the party has broken with its past, or at least this is the "face" the party would like to present to the voters. Thus the dependent variable is measured dichotomously, with 0 representing no change and 1 representing the situation where the party drops "communist" or "workers" from the party's name.

Results

To assess the relationships between the six independent variables and the dependent variable of whether the party had changed its name around the time of the first legislative election, Table 3 reports a set of Spearman bivariate correlation coefficients.² As indicated, the strongest relationships are exhibited between the degree of organization and whether the party changed its name (i.e. whether the party dropped "communist" or "workers" from its name) which stood at 0.50 and was statistically significant at $p \leq .05$, and the extent to which the reformists dominated the party internally and whether the party changed its name ($r = 0.75$ at $p \leq 0.01$). The former finding is somewhat contrary to the literature which suggested that parties with more mass-like characteristics were less likely to change their names; indeed it appears that the more organizationally complex the party *the more likely that party changed its name*. However, it does tend to support the notion that communist successor parties which emerged from organizationally complex parties are more willing to adapt to new political circumstances than are parties which are not organizationally complex (Harmel and Janda 1994; Huntington 1965). The latter finding supports the argument made by Ishiyama (1995, 1997) that the most important factor explaining the evolutionary trajectories of the successor parties was the internal developments within the parties at the time of the transition.

On the other hand, the two other internal factors (*average leadership duration in the previous regime* and *number of name changes in party's history*) are not really related to the likelihood that the party changed its name around the time of the first election. In the case of the average leadership

duration in the previous regime, the sign of the relationship is in fact opposite to that suggested by the literature—the longer the average duration of the leadership in the old communist party (which implies less institutionalization) the greater the likelihood the successor party would seek to fundamentally change its identity. However, since the relationships are not statistically significant, nothing conclusive can be said.

Table 2
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for Seven Variables

Party's performance in first election (a)	.25						
Performance of principal left challenger in first election (b)	.05	-.50*					
Degree of organization (c)	.50*	.18	-.19				
Average leadership duration in previous regime (d)	.46	.28	.02	-.08			
Number of name changes in party's history (e)	.34	.07	-.27	.08	.14		
Internal faction dominant at time of first election (f)	.75**	.14	-.01	.27	.07	.10	
		Party Changed Name	a	b	c	d	e

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

As to the environmental factors (*party's performance in the first election* and *performance of principal left challenger in the first election*) neither appears to be significantly related to whether the successor party changed its identity around the time of the first election. However, it should be noted that the results in Table 2 include situations wherein parties changed their names prior to the first election or after the first election; therefore this is not a direct test of the proposition that parties respond to the *results* of the first election. To test this proposition more directly, another set of correlations was run between the environmental variables and whether the party changed its name, focusing on the parties which changed their names only after the first election. These included 3 of the 21 parties (in Armenia, Georgia and Albania). Although the sign of the coefficient was in the predicted negative direction at -0.19 for the party's performance (i.e. the better the performance of the successor party in the first election the less likely the party would change its name), it was in the opposite direction (-0.23) for the performance of left-wing challengers (i.e. the better the performance of left-wing challengers, the less likely the successor party would change its name). However these relationships are not statistically significant; hence in support of the results reported in Table 2, it appears that performance and competition have little bearing on the successor party's decision to change its name and hence change its identity.

Finally in Tables 3 and 4, I assess the effect changing the party's identity had on its electoral performance. Table 3 reports the results of crosstabulating whether the party had changed its name by dropping "communist" or "workers" from its name and the success the party enjoyed following the first legislative election. The degree of success was measured using three categories: where the party won no seats in the first election, where it won some seats (from 0% to 9.99% of the total seats in the lower house of the legislature) and finally where the party was most successful (winning 10% or more of the seats). As is indicated, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship (Kendall's Tau C = -0.03) between the degree of party identity change and performance in the first legislative election. Although 6 of the 13 parties which had changed their names prior to the first election won 10% of the legislative seats or more, so did 7 of the successor parties which had not dropped "communist" or "workers" from their names prior to the first election.

Table 4 reports the relationship between early party identity change and *change in performance from the first to the second legislative election* for 20 of the 21 cases (Belarus had not yet had a second free national election by the time of this research and is unlikely to do so given its intent to unite with the Russian Federation). This allows for assessment of the longer term effects of party identity change on electoral performance. In this table, the dependent variable is reconfigured into two categories, where the first includes either the situation where the party lost seats in the second election or there was no change. The second includes parties that experienced an increase in its share of legisla-

Table 3
Crosstabulation of Electoral Performance in First Election by Whether Party Changed Name

	Did Not Drop "Communist" or "Workers" From Name Prior to First Election	Dropped "Communist" or "Workers" From Name Prior to First Election	Row Total
Won no seats in first election	Azerbaijan Georgia	Estonia Slovenia	4
Won from 0.01 to 9.99%	Armenia	Croatia Hungary Latvia Romania	5
Won 10% or more	Albania Belarus Czech Republic Moldova Russia Ukraine	Bulgaria Lithuania Poland Slovakia Yugoslavia Macedonia	12
Column Total	9	12	21

Note: n = 21. Kendall's Tau C = -0.03

Table 4
Crosstabulation of Change in Electoral Performance from First to Second Elections by Whether Party Changed Name

	Did Not Drop "Communist" or "Workers" From Name Prior to First Election	Dropped "Communist" or "Workers" From Name Prior to First Election	Row Total
No change or lost seats from first to second election	Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Czech Republic Georgia	Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia & Slovenia	12
Increased share of seats from first to second election	Moldova Russia Ukraine	Bulgaria Croatia Hungary Macedonia Yugoslavia	8
Column Total	8	12	20

Note: n = 20 (Belarus did not have a second election). Kendall's Tau C = 0.01

tive seats when comparing the first and second elections. Again there appears to be no relationship between the degree of party identity change and the party's electoral success over time (Kendall's Tau C = 0.01). Thus early change in a successor party's identity did not translate into improved electoral performance over time.

Conclusions

If changing identities signified by name changes are not related to improved electoral performance, then why did the successor parties change names at all? As indicated above, part of the answer may lie in the fact that the successor parties did not change their names in response to external political pressures, but rather as a result of internal organizational dynamics. Indeed, from this perspective, the reason the party changed its identity in the first place had little to do with electoral performance. Rather changing identities had more to do with the internal configuration of political forces within the party, particularly the extent to which the "democratic reformists" had won the battle for control. Successor parties in which the democratic reformists had "won" the internal struggle were more likely to change the parties' identities, regardless of electoral performance. This would tend to reinforce the argument that Ishiyama (1995, 1997) has made regarding the crucial importance of the dynamics of internal transformation on communist successor party change and adaptation.

This finding calls into question the "exportability" of the assumption that parties are rational, purposive organizations which respond to external stimuli, to the postcommunist context. Rather, it appears that the internal organizational dynamics are relatively more important in explaining changes in political identity. This finding, however, may not be entirely incompatible with theories that emphasize the reactive nature of parties. It can be argued that party organizations in postcommunist Eastern Europe may not be consolidated sufficiently to be the "conservative" reactive organizations that exist in the West. Indeed, identities are malleable in organizations in flux. Although the successor parties are less in flux than many other postcommunist parties, they are much more so than western parties. What exists for Eastern European successor parties, then, are the beginnings of new identities which must first develop before they can be "conserved." Thus, it is not surprising that the process of identity formation is largely a function of internal organizational dynamics.

Notes

- 1 *Party identity change* here refers to change in the party's name. There are two reasons why I use this to conceptualize party identity. To be sure, other elements of change are as important in the development of the communist successor parties, such as leadership change (see Ishiyama, 1995 and 1997) but the party's name provides the clearest message of what

identity the party wishes to present to the electorate. Secondly, this measure has been used extensively in the literature on party identity change (see Janda, 1980 for example).

- 2 The Spearman's bivariate correlation procedure was employed because: (a) in order to test whether a systematic relationship exists between the variables when constrained by a very small number of cases, a simple bivariate correlation reduces the degrees of freedom problem faced when using few cases in multivariate models; and (b) the Spearman's procedure is the appropriate technique for both interval variables which do not fulfill the "normality assumption" and/or categorical variables.

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GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

He Li

This is a crossnational empirical study of the relationship between globalization and democracy with democracy being measured as the degree of political rights and civil liberties. A longitudinal design was used to assess the effects of globalization on democratization in the developing countries. The results found in this study are mixed. First, there is no significant relationship between free trade and democracy. Second, the multiple correlation results show that there is no significant relationship between inflow of foreign capital (the prime mover of globalization) and democracy either. Yet, freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners has a strong association with political freedom because there is a positive relationship between economic freedom and political freedom. The study indicates that the path to democracy today, as in the past, is mainly shaped by many factors. Globalization alone is not a sufficient condition to bring about democracy in the Third World. The key to a successful transition to democracy lies in domestic politics and policies.

Introduction

In the last several decades, the world has experienced a democratic explosion. By 1996, 66% of the world's nations were using elections to choose their top leaders. In contrast, in 1974 only 25% of the world's independent nations had democratic governments (Schwartzman 1998, 159). Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries underwent democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). At the same time, many developing countries have opened up their economies to the global market. They have privatized and deregulated their economies and opened them up to foreign trade and investment.

The rapid growth in world trade, foreign direct investment, and cross-border financial flows over the past decade has been the main manifestation of the increasing "globalization" of the world economy. This phenomenon has been driven primarily by a worldwide wave of economic liberalization—the lowering of tariff and nontariff barriers to international trade, the encouragement of foreign investment, and the deregulation of financial markets. At the same time, technological developments have magnified the effects of this liberalization by reducing the costs of transportation and communications, and expanded

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the scope and volume of goods and services that are internationally tradable. New technologies are making the world much more interdependent. These technologies are accelerating the movement of goods, services, ideas, and capital across national boundaries.

The globalization of production involves a hitherto unseen integration of national economies and brings with it a tendency toward uniformity, not just in the conditions of production, but in the civil and political superstructure in which social relations of production unfold. A new "social structure of accumulation" is emerging which is for the first time global (Robinson 1996). In many respects, these changes have encouraged the spread of democratic values and practices. In other respects, these changes may have hindered the spread of democracy. These developments in the Third World raised new questions and posed new challenges for the scholarly community. A major concern, for many, is the problematic relationship between globalization and democratization. Does globalization lead to democracy? To what extent is globalization related to democracy? Are rising levels of trade, capital flows, and deregulation helping the developing countries to move toward democracy? These are the major questions to be examined in this paper.

This is a crossnational empirical investigation of the relationship between globalization and democracy with democracy being measured as a degree of political rights and civil liberties. A longitudinal design was used to assess the effects of globalization on democratization in the developing countries. The study is organized into four parts. The first section briefly reviews previous research in the area. The second section discusses the research design. The third section summarizes the empirical results. Finally, the fourth section provides some concluding remarks.

Theoretical Debates in the Literature

The literature on globalization has been mushrooming since the mid-1980s. The comparative politics literature is replete with analyses of the relationship between economic conditions and democratic politics. Social scientists have explained the problems of democratization from many perspectives and have come to different conclusions on the impact of globalization on democratization (Armijo 1999; Fukuyama 1992; and Martin and Schumann 1997). Some scholars suggest that in today's world, external influences fostering democratization have become more important than in the past, making internal preconditions for democratization less salient (Whyte 1992, 68-69). This section will review the contending perspectives on democracy and globalization, namely, neoliberal, dependency, and Marxist interpretations.

Neoliberals hold that globalization has been the inevitable result of technological change; and democracy is strengthened by global economic liberalization. The neoliberals believe their preferred form of globalization is the single

best strategy for promoting stable and high quality democracies throughout the world. The leading proponent of this view is Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992). He renders his argument in terms of the inevitability of global political and economic homogenization, which forces liberal democracy as the only choice for modern states. Couched in terms of a prophesy, Fukuyama affirms that history has become one for all of humankind and that liberal democracy constitutes the end of societal evolution. Whatever unfinished business of history may still remain will, according to him, soon be achieved with liberal democracy and the market economy being coupled together as a permanent arrangement for all societies worldwide, within which human beings can pursue their desires and aspirations. The empirical results of Williamson (1996) lead to the conclusion that there is an unambiguous positive correlation between globalization and convergence in the standard of living. He finds that when the pre-World War I years are examined in detail, the correlation turns out to be causal with globalization critical to the convergence.

In addition, neoliberals believe that globalization would open up society to democratic tendencies, while economic liberalization would provide the material bases (across a wider spectrum of society) for democratic consolidation. Spokespersons for several U.S. administrations have also seen the expansion of global capitalism as linked positively to democracy (Centeno 1994; Cutter, Spero, and Tyson 2000; Ikegami 1999; Robinson 1996). In a similar vein, Samuel Huntington (1991) claims that with increasing levels of globalization, the world is now undergoing a "third wave" of democratization in which the spread of democratic norms and practices is replacing authoritarian ones in many countries around the globe.

In contrast, dependency scholars challenge the assumption of the neoliberals. The mainstream development theorists posit a linear notion of development from a primeval condition of predevelopment. The dependency scholars counter that underdevelopment was not an original condition but one that represented a relationship beginning in the sixteenth century and culminating in the consolidation of the twentieth century capitalism. There are various definitions of dependency, however, most writers on dependency would subscribe to Dos Santos' definition with slight modification of wording. As Dos Santos (1993, 194) put it: "by dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected."

According to dependency theory, global capitalism was the cause of underdevelopment in Third World countries, and implicitly, of the lack of democracy (Dos Santos 1993; Wallerstein 1982, 1993). In this view, underdevelopment was not due to endogenous factors such as the persistence of traditional institutions or the lack of a Protestant work ethic, insufficient capital, or inadequate resources. It was due to the underdeveloped country's long-term external relationship to foreign capital.

In the 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein formulated the world system as a broad framework for analyzing global development over the past five hundred years. In Wallerstein's view, state and social classes are subordinated to the capitalist world economy. He stresses that domestic transformations are situated in a worldsystem in which core trajectories have inescapable ramifications for the economic and political regimes of noncore nations. Wallerstein identifies class conflict as the social mechanism linking world-system processes to national political dynamics. In his framework, domestic political structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of economic relations. The universalisation of capitalism is not a new thing. It was always global, only now it is more so.

Dependency theory argues that the integration with the global economy is the principal reason for underdevelopment in the developing countries. Osvaldo Sunkel (1973) proposed that transnational integration and national disintegration go hand in hand, as the process of globalization goes on and deepens, thus threatening the stability of transnational projects of integration.

Cardoso examined three alternative notions: dependency, autonomy, and revolution. For him, in the struggle to eliminate obstacles to national development, dependency can be overcome through autonomy and incremental change (Chilcote 1981, 297). Furtado essentially favored autonomy as a solution to national development. He opposed imperialism and foreign penetration into domestic economy (Chilcote 1981, 288). Dependency scholars maintain that development can be realized only by achieving economic autonomy and freeing the society from the international capitalist order. Once this is achieved, democracy, equity, growth in the sense of true development, and social stability necessarily follow (Frank 1984; Amin 1987). However, as Tatu Vanhanen (1997) states, it is difficult to test the assertions of the dependency theorists because their hypotheses were never clearly stated.

Globalization, as Marx argued 150 years ago, represents the tendency of capitalism to eliminate all spatial barriers to the production and accumulation of capital and to reconfigure the territorial organization of production and exchange without eliminating the uneven and unequal development of that mode of production within and between nation-states (Dupuy 1998). Neo-Marxists suggest that neoliberal globalization as a whole would dilute and weaken democracy (Martin and Schumann 1997). The globalization process is seen as a "trap" for democracy, as it is undermining "democratic stability" and a "state's ability to function" (Martin and Schumann (1997, 9).

From the orthodox Marxist perspective, globalization can only be understood by investigating such factors as state, class, the power relations underpinning institutions, the sources of values and norms, the rules of international society, and the power politics of the supposed transnational civil society (Wood 1997; Tabb 1997).

Some Marxist analysts maintain that the process of economic globalization has intensified class conflict on a world scale. According to them, international economic integration under neoliberal rule will tend to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of those who already have it, eroding the quality of democratic politics, and with it, the legitimacy of democratic political institutions. Where equality and legitimacy are already low, further erosion threatens to undermine the stability of democratic institutions as well. According to Robinson (1996), global capitalism is polarizing the world's population between a narrow elite which controls most of the world's resources—some 400 transnational corporations own two-thirds of the world's productive assets—and the rest of the population, which is increasingly impoverished.

In sum, current analyses of globalization can be seen as the successors to earlier theories that explained the world as encompassed by a single system. In spite of the potential importance of examining democracy and globalization in the developing world, few studies have effectively specified, formalized, and statistically analyzed the dynamics of democratic transitions (Kugler and Feng, 1999). Explanations for the recent surge in the processes of democratization and globalization, and for the forms they have taken, remain fragmentary. In this study I aim to fill this gap by including variables of free trade, inflow of foreign capital, and financial liberalization in an analysis of democracy in the developing world.

Data and Methodology

As mentioned earlier there are few careful crossnational empirical analyses of the relationship between democracy and globalization (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989; Gasiorowski 1995). One of the problems encountered is how to quantify the variables. In this paper, political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) will be used as indicators for the dependent variable, i.e., democracy. The term "democracy" has different meanings in different contexts, as the burgeoning debate about "Asian" versus "Western" models of democracy attests (Rowen 1995). To measure the Western liberal democracy, Freedom House annually assesses the actual status of political and civil rights in every nation of the world. By the Freedom House definitions, political rights "enable people to participate freely in the political process"; civil liberties "are the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state." By combining PR and CL, Freedom House constructs a variable, PRCL. This variable indicates the aggregate level of political rights and civil liberties, running from 1 (free/democratic) to 7 (least free/democratic).

Globalization has been made possible by the establishment of worldwide information and communication networks. New telecommunication computer networks are overcoming the barriers of time and space, allowing corporate and financial interests to operate on a twenty-four-hour basis across the planet.

Many see globalization in terms of the new possibilities opened up by global communications, global travel, and global products. Cultural globalization, associated with flows of media and communication, but also with flows of migrants, refugees, and tourists, has brought to the fore questions of cultural identity (Kuper 1996).

In both academic and popular discourses, "globalization" became one of the catch words of the 1990s. In fact, globalization is a short form for a cluster of related changes. Economic changes include the internationalization of production, the harmonization of tastes and standards and the greatly increased mobility of capital and of transnational corporations. Ideological changes emphasize investment and trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. New information and communications technologies that shrink the globe signal a shift from goods to services. Finally, cultural changes involve trends toward a universal world culture and the erosion of the nation-state (Laxer 1995).

There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished: economic globalization, political globalization, common ecological constraints, cultural values and institutions, and globalization of communication. The focus of this study is on the relationship between economic globalization and democratization.

Multiple indicators are used to measure economic globalization. The first indicator is openness to international trade (percentage of export/import in GNP). The second indicator is inflow of foreign capital, i.e., aggregate net resource flows (percentage of GNP), which are the sum of net flows on long-term debt (excluding use of IMF credit), plus official grants (excluding technical assistance), net foreign direct investment, and net portfolio equity flows. The third indicator for globalization is the freedom to engage in capital (investment) transactions. In the rating, countries with fewer restrictions on this freedom are rated higher; 10 represents the most free and 0 the least free (Gwartney 1996, 308).

In addition to the three factors described above, in my multivariate analysis, economic development and education variables are included because significant relationships have been found between the level of per capita income and education on the one hand and political development on the other (Lipset 1959). In this paper, gross national product per capita (GNP) measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) and literacy rate will be used as indicators for economic development and education. The design lags the dependent variable one year/two years depending on availability of data to reduce the problem of simultaneity and to account for changes over time.

Given the interrelationship between the economy and politics, globalization could produce significant political consequences and make the change of the political system inevitable. The study was designed to address the following hypotheses. First, it was predicted that increased levels of foreign trade would contribute to democracy. Second, the study predicted that increased flows of

foreign capital would contribute to democracy. Furthermore, it predicted that freer movement of foreign capital would contribute to democracy. The outcomes of the hypothesis test will provide some answers in the controversy over the relationship between democratization and globalization.

Although the above hypotheses sound theoretically plausible, they must be tested on the basis of reliable evidence and a scrutiny of relevant historical experience and political theories. This is a crossnational empirical study of the relationship between democracy and globalization. A longitudinal design was used to examine the impact of economic globalization on democratization in the developing countries. The sample consists of 85 developing countries as defined by the United Nations (see Table 1). Several developing countries (such as Cuba and Afghanistan) are excluded from the analysis shown here because of the lack of comparable data. Empirical data for 1980 and 1995 were gathered for our analysis. In this study we utilize a multiple correlation model to explore the linkage between democracy and globalization. Correlation analyses are used to indicate the strength of hypothesized relations between democracy and indicators of globalization.

Table 1
Data for Selected Variables by Country

Country	PRCL		OPEN		FI		FT		GNP		ED	
	81	96	1980	1993	80	94	80	93-94	80	94	77	95
Algeria	6	6	64.7	52.8	3.1	3.4	0	2	1870	3076	35	62
Benin	6.5	2	66.3	56.4	7.2	12.9	0	0	310	1630	25	37
Botswana	2.5	2	116.4	106	20.3	-0.5	5	5	X	5210	X	70
Burundi	6.5	6.5	32.1	39.2	8.1	28.1	0	0	200	700	23	35
Cameroon	6	6	51.3	40.6	9.6	9.5	0	0	670	1950	X	63
C African R.	6.5	3.5	68.9	33.6	10.7	16	0	0	300	1160	39	60
Chad	6	5.5	65.1	56.4	3.4	19.4	0	0	120	720	15	48
Congo, P Rep	7	4	120.1	87.4	35.5	9.1	0	0	900	1900	X	75
Cote d'Ivoire	X	5.5	76.2	61.5	11.7	28	0	0	1150	1370	41	40
Ethiopia	7	4.5	X	X	8.2	18.2	X	X	140	430	15	35
Gabon	6	4.5	96.4	77.8	-1.9	2.5	0	0	X	3983	X	63
Gambia	2	6.5	X	X	35	13.9	X	X	X	1100	X	39
Ghana	2.5	4	17.6	42.8	4.1	24.2	0	0	420	2050	X	64
Guinea	7	5.5	X	X	X	9.6	X	X	290	604	20	36
Guinea-Bissau	6	3.5	X	X	98.4	29.3	X	X	X	820	X	55
Kenya	4.5	6.5	67	54	8.8	1.6	0	0	4200	1310	50	78
Madagascar	6	3	43.1	41.1	8.7	12.2	0	0	350	640	50	X
Malawi	6.5	2.5	63.7	63	15.7	24.3	2	2	230	650	25	56
Mali	6.5	2.5	51.1	46.8	12.1	16.5	2	2	190	520	9	31
Mauritania	6.5	6	X	X	29.4	20.5	X	X	440	1570	17	38
Mauritius	3	1.5	112.6	128.3	8.3	3.5	2	2	X	12720	X	83
Morocco	4	5	45.3	52	7.4	3.9	2	5	900	3470	28	44
Mozambique	7	3.5	X	X	3.8	73.8	X	X	230	430	28	35
Namibia	X	2.5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	4320	X	X
Niger	6.5	4	65.9	32	12.9	19.2	0	0	330	770	5	14
Nigeria	2.5	7	48.0	73.7	0.7	5.7	0	0	1010	1190	30	57
Rwanda	6	6.5	40.8	29.4	9.3	106.1	0	0	200	330	50	60

Country	PRCL		OPEN		FI		FT		GNP		ED	
Senegal	4	4.5	72.3	50.7	9.0	13.8	0	0	450	1580	10	33
Sierra Leone	5	6.5	65.7	50.4	5.5	21.5	0	0	270	700	X	31
South Africa	5.5	1.5	64.7	43.8	X	X	2	2	2300	5130	X	82
Sudan	5	7	X	X	X	X	X	X	410	725	20	46
Swaziland	5	5.5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	3010	X	73
Tanzania	6	5	39.5	85.8	16.4	22.7	0	0	280	620	66	68
Togo	6.5	5.5	107.4	67.7	12.7	11.3	0	0	410	1130	18	52
Tunisia	5.5	5.5	85.8	81.1	7.2	2.8	0	5	1310	5020	62	67
Uganda	5	4.5	44.7	25.2	9.7	19.4	0	0	300	1410	48	62
Zaire	6	6.5	32	X	X	X	2	2	220	526	58	67
Zambia	5.5	3.5	86.8	66.7	14.6	14.8	2	2	560	860	44	78
Zimbabwe	3.5	5	63.6	74.8	4.2	6.7	2	2	630	2040	74	85
Bangladesh	3	3.5	24.1	26.6	13.5	5.9	0	0	130	1330	26	38
Bhutan	5	7	X	X	X	X	X	X	80	1270	X	42
China	6	7	X	X	1	9.6	X	X	290	2510	66	81
India	2.5	4	16.6	21.2	1.4	2.4	2	2	240	1280	36	52
Indonesia	5	6.5	53.3	55.8	2.5	5.4	2	2	430	3600	62	84
Malaysia	3.5	4.5	112.6	154.2	8.7	10.2	5	5	1620	8400	X	83
Mongolia	7	2.5	X	X	0	14.4	X	X	X	2443	X	X
Myanmar	6.5	7	X	X	4.7	0.2	X	X	170	772	70	83
Nepal	3.5	3.5	30.3	48.7	6.5	8	5	0	140	1230	19	17
Pakistan	6	4	36.6	41.6	5.4	6.4	2	2	300	2130	24	38
Philippines	5	3	52	62.3	3.9	6.9	2	2	690	2740	75	95
Singapore	5	5	423.3	340.8	X	X	8	10	4430	21900	X	91
Sri Lanka	2.5	4.5	87	71.6	10.6	5.7	0	0	X	3160	85	90
South Korea	5.5	2	75.5	58.7	4.6	2.1	0	5	1520	10330	93	99
Thailand	3.5	3.5	54.5	77.1	6.5	3.3	2	5	670	6970	84	94
Vietnam	7	7	X	X	X	6.5	X	X	X	665	97	94
Egypt	5	6	73.4	65.1	14.2	6.2	0	0	580	3720	44	51
Iran	5	6.5	29.7	31.1	-0.3	-2.1	0	0	X	4161	50	72
Iraq	6.5	7	X	X	X	X	X	X	3630	3347	X	87
Jordan	5	4	146.6	135.2	X	4.4	2	2	1420	4100	70	87
Kuwait	6	5	X	X	X	X	X	X	19830	24730	60	79
Lebanon	4	5.5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2500	X	92
Oman	6	6	X	X	3.3	4.5	X	X	X	8590	X	X
Saudi Arabia	6	7	X	X	X	X	X	X	11260	9480	16	63
Syria	5.5	7	53.7	64	X	X	0	0	1340	4955	58	49*
Turkey	5	5	20.6	44.4	3.7	1	0	0	1470	4710	60	82
UAE	5	5.5	X	X	X	X	X	X	26850	15784	56	79
Argentina	5.5	2.5	11.6	14.8	4.6	3.2	0	10	2390	8720	93	96
Bolivia	6	3	37.7	40.4	14.1	9	2	5	570	2400	63	83
Brazil	3.5	3	20.4	16.5	2.8	1.8	0	0	2050	5400	76	83
Chile	5.5	2	49.8	60.0	8.7	8.2	2	5	2150	8890	X	95
Colombia	2.5	4	31.8	35.3	2.9	2.3	0	5	1180	5330	X	91
Costa Rica	21	1.5	63.3	82	9.2	0.3	2	5	1730	5480	90	95
Dominican R.	2.5	3.5	48.1	64.5	7.1	1.0	2	2	1160	3760	67	82
Ecuador	2	2.5	50.6	59.2	7.4	5.3	2	5	1270	4190	81	90
El Salvador	5	3	67.4	42.8	3.2	1.9	2	8	660	2410	62	71
Guatemala	5.5	4.5	47.1	45	2.8	1.9	5	8	1080	3440	X	56
Haiti	6	5	52.1	34.4	5.2	37.2	0	2	270	930	23	45
Honduras	3.5	3	80.3	65.3	11.7	14.7	0	5	560	1940	60	73
Mexico	3.5	3.5	23.7	30.7	4.8	4.6	2	5	2090	7040	81	90
Nicaragua	5	3.5	67.5	13.8	13.8	27.4	0	0	740	1800	90	66
Panama	4	2.5	91.6	75.6	4.1	8.4	10	10	1730	5730	X	91
Paraguay	5	3.5	44	61.7	3.6	2.3	5	5	1300	3550	84	92
Peru	2.5	4.5	41.6	22.4	1.8	7.7	2	8	930	3610	80	89
Uruguay	5	2	35.7	42.7	5.3	3.3	10	10	2810	7710	94	97
Venezuela	1.5	3	50.7	54.3	2.6	0.9	8	5	3630	7770	82	91

Source: Freedom House 1996. Ranking system was developed by Dr. Raymond Gastil and has been modified by current Freedom House staff, (PRCL); World Bank 1996, (FI, GNP and ED); and Gwartney, James et al. (OPEN and FT).

* Female literacy of 1990. X: missing data.

Legend for Table 1: PRCL: Political Rights and Civil Liberties; OPEN: Openness (exports + imports)/GNP (Gross National Product); FI: Aggregate net resource flows (% of GNP) are the sum of net flows on long-term debt (excluding use of IMF credit), plus official grants (excluding technical assistance), net foreign direct investment, and net portfolio equity flows; FT: Freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners; GNP: Per capita gross national product; ED: Literacy rate.

Empirical Findings

Available data established the following crucial variables for 1980 and 1995 (by country): (PRCL) political rights and civil rights, (OPEN) openness to international trade, (FI) inflow of foreign investment, (FT) freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners, (GNP) GNP measured by PPP, and (ED) education. Table 1 presents the data and documents the sources used. An examination of data (see Table 2) reveals there are several statistically significant relationships (those with asterisks). The hypotheses were tested by calculating multiple correlation statistics.

Table 2
Multiple Correlation Coefficients for Time 1 (1995) and Time 2 (1980)
(Time 2 data are in parentheses)

	PRCL	OPEN	FI	FT	GNP	ED
PRCL	1.00 (1.00)	-0.074 (0.128)	0.126 (0.189)	-0.453** (-0.311**)	-0.273** (-0.341**)	-0.297** (-0.446**)
OP	-0.074 (0.128)	1.00 (1.00)	-0.069 (0.377**)	0.117 (0.024)	0.190 (0.153)	0.216* (-0.081)
FI	0.126 (0.189)	-0.069 (0.377**)	1.00 (1.00)	-0.426** (-0.158)	-0.656** (-0.277*)	-0.549** (-0.252*)
FT	-0.453** (-0.311*)	0.117 (0.024)	-0.426** (-0.158)	1.00 (1.00)	0.617** (0.288**)	0.614** (0.294*)
GNP	-0.273** (-0.341**)	0.190 (0.153)	-0.656** (-0.277*)	0.617** (0.288*)	1.00 (1.00)	0.662* (0.555**)
ED	-0.297** (-0.446**)	0.216* (-0.081)	-0.549** (-0.252*)	0.614** (0.294*)	0.662** (0.555**)	1.00 (1.00)

n = 85.

Legend for Table 2: PRCL: Political Rights and Civil Liberties; OPEN: Openness (exports + imports)/GNP (Gross National Product); FI: Aggregate net resource flows (% of GNP) are the sum of net flows on long-term debt (excluding use of IMF credit), plus official grants (excluding technical assistance), net foreign direct investment, and net portfolio equity flows; FT: Freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners; GNP: Per capita gross national product; ED: Literacy rate.

* 0.05 level (1 tailed)

** 0.01 level (1 tailed)

Foreign Trade and Democratization

The third wave of democratization sweeping the developing world has occurred in tandem with market and export-oriented shifts in economic policy. It is a common notion that integration with the international market often brings about social and political changes, because an open economy cannot avoid the persistent inflow of foreign ideas and trends (Huntington 1991; Vanhanen 1997). Technology that is being introduced and trade that is being exchanged carry with them democratic values. Huntington (1991, 101) thinks that greater snowballing in the later phase of the Third Wave is due to the expansion of global communications and transportation, particularly satellites, computers, and faxes.

Between 1980 and 1995, considerably more countries have established (more or less) democratic forms of governance than ever before—75 in 1996, by the count of Freedom House (1996). During the same period of time, many developing countries have integrated their economies into the global market. It appears that an open trade system could be an important factor to promote democracy in the developing region. Yet a review of the multiple correlation statistics at both Time 1 (1995) and Time 2 (1980) suggests the lack of a statistically significant relationship between the level of democracy and free trade.

As Barber (1992, 1995) has written, multinational corporations sometimes seem to prefer doing business with local oligarchs, inasmuch as they can take confidence from dealing with the boss on all crucial matters. Regimes that massacre their own populations are no impediment, so long as they leave markets in place and refrain from making war on their neighbors. In trading partners, predictability is of more value than justice. In their recent studies on NAFTA and Mexico, Heredia (1994) and Barkin (1997) did not find any correlation between increasing percentages of foreign trade and increasing levels of democratization in Mexico. In the case of China, currently 40% of China's GNP is in trade, a percentage higher than that of Japan and the United States, yet China's record for human rights is still far from satisfactory.

Foreign Investment and Democratization

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important part of an increasingly integrated global political economy (McMillan 1999). In the post-Depression and World War II periods, direct investment came to supersede trade and territorial expansion as the leading vehicle of transnational competition: The British flag of free trade was replaced by the American flag of free enterprise. Flows of FDI are forging increasingly strong economic links between developing and industrialized countries, and also among the developing countries. Foreign direct investment flows to the developing countries have increased nearly four-fold in the 1990s and now account for almost 40% of global FDI, reaching some \$120 billion in 1997 (World Bank 1998).

The relationship between direct foreign investments and the political, social, and economic conditions found in the developing countries is one of the most hotly contested and frequently debated topics in the field of international political economy (Mayer-Serra 1999; Rothgeb 1996). Contrary to what neo-liberals hold, at both Time 1 and Time 2 there were no significant associations. In other words, the prediction that increased flow of foreign capital leads to democracy is not supported. This further indicates the unimportance of foreign direct investment on democracy.

In some cases, political and civil rights violations increase along with the inflow of foreign investment. There are at least two possible explanations for this fact. First, according to a recent study (Rothgeb 1996), the penetration of the developing countries by multinational corporations leads to increased levels of domestic political conflict because it creates a degree of deprivation that at least some members of the local population find intolerable. Further, several studies (Heredia 1994; Rothgeb 1996) show that corporations' primary interests are in the markets, the workforce, and the natural resources that may be acquired in any particular country.

According to a recent study (Armijo 1999), if a country's current leaders are authoritarian, increased influence of foreign business promotes some political liberalization, but not full transition to democracy. For a long time, external forces have been on the side of repression, both directly and indirectly. Where democratic elections produced governments that were hostile to Western interests, as in Guatemala, Iran, and Cuba in the 1950s, and Chile in the 1970s, the Western powers were quick to subvert them and sustained their authoritarian successors.

The nature of the state and its role in growth are central issues in the political economy of development. One of the most controversial questions is what type of regime best facilitates economic growth (Feng 1996). Fukuyama (1993) pointed out, "Many of the most impressive economic growth records in the last 150 years have been compiled not by democracies, but by authoritarian states with more or less capitalist economic systems." Although there is no solid empirical evidence to show a definite relationship between authoritarianism and economic growth, it is generally believed that authoritarian regimes exhibit a larger variation in economic growth than democracies. As Alesina and Perotti (1992) observe, "certain dictatorships which score very low in terms of political rights because they do not allow for free competitive elections, have grown very fast and have created the necessary environment for market activities to prosper. Other dictatorships have performed very poorly."

In fact, foreign investment received by an authoritarian government strengthens dictatorial rule. China is one of the most attractive locations of FDI. China accounted for 38% of all foreign direct investment flows to developing countries, net FDI has risen from less than \$5 billion in the early 1990s to \$37 billion in 1997 (World Bank 1998). Yet, the increase of FDI has not brought

about significant improvement of human rights in China. In sum, driven by a preoccupation with maximizing returns, multinational corporations are the primary agents of globalization, working through control of information, markets, investment, final flows, and employment practices. However, these MNCs cannot be considered the forces of forging democratization in the developing countries.

Foreign Capital Control, Liberalization and Democratization

Financial globalization has been proposed as the single most important characteristic of the contemporary international political economy. Conventionally, this means that financial markets of different nation-states are more integrated than ever before (Ikegami 1999; Rothgeb 1996). From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s the daily turnover of the foreign exchange markets climbed from \$1 billion to \$1.2 trillion a day, close to 20 times the value of daily trade in goods and services (Veltmeyer and Petras 2000, 6). Over the past decade, the United States has had a strong ideological commitment, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, to the desirability of the free movement of capital. This ideology maintained that the free circulation of financial capital would benefit the majority of people in the world, not just in North America (Ikegami 1999). Meanwhile many developing countries, especially those so-called "emerging market" states, have removed various restrictions on capital movement across their borders (Armijo 1999).

Our review of the multiple correlation statistics suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship between democratization and freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners (FT). The correlation for Time 1 (1995) was 0.453 ($p < .01$) and Time 2 (1980) was 0.311 ($p < .01$), although some variance remained unaccounted.

The countries with fewer restriction on foreign capital (such as Latin America and some East Asian countries) enjoy greater political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 1996). Many Latin American countries experienced far-reaching political transformations that resulted in the most extensive of competitive elections in the region's history. Not only did every Latin American democracy survive the 1980s, but the number of democracies steadily increased over the course of the decade (Remmer 1991, 1993; Kelly 1998; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989; Diamond 1992, 1993). Much more than in other developing regions—Asia, Africa, and the Middle East—democracy has become the norm in Latin America. On the political front, the authoritarian governments so prevalent in Latin America at the end of the 1970s have become a distant memory. Today, all countries (except Cuba) have democratically elected governments. The democratic process has been extended to local governments as well: Mayors in 17 countries are now elected by popular vote, while in 7 others these officials are appointed by elected municipal councils.

Although economists and policymakers have eagerly analyzed the causes and implications of the Asian financial crisis, social theorists have rarely discussed the ramifications of the emerging "financial globalization" on the future of democracy in general. There are very few empirical studies on the relationship between democracy and financial liberalization. Most of these works are case studies (Armijo 1999; Hirsch 1997; Ikegami 1999). It seems quite possible that the correlation between financial globalization and democracy is due to the fact that there is a positive relationship between economic freedom and political freedom (Barlett and Lyniuk 1995; Farr, Lord, and Wolfenbarger 1998; and Gwartney, James et al. 1996). Yet history cautions against easy generalizations. What Moon (1996, 10) writes about South Korea has been written by many: "democracy and globalization have not been necessarily complementary. They have often produced ambivalent and conflicting implications."

The results of this study (see Table 2) confirm that economic freedom (including freedom to engage in capital transactions) would open up society to democratic tendencies, while economic development would provide the material bases (across a wider spectrum of society) for democratic consolidation. In other words, democratization may likely be a consequence of the sustained economic development that produces diversity, mobility, and political participation. A quick glance at Table 2 shows the strength of the correlations between economic growth and democracy at both Time 1 (1995) and Time 2 (1980) as 0.273 and 0.341, respectively.

Across a wide range of studies, with a great variety of samples, time periods, and statistical methods, the level of economic development—or, as Diamond (1992) has slightly reformulated it, the level of "human development"—continues to be a powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy. The results of this empirical study indicate that there are moderate associations between education and democracy at both Time 1 (1995) and Time 2 (1980). These are 0.297 and 0.446, respectively.

Among the three indicators of globalization (openness of foreign trade, inflow of foreign investment, and freedom to engage in capital transactions) examined in this study, freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners is the only variable associated with the process of democratization. It appears that the higher the level of socioeconomic development, the more popular support there is for a democratic change, and the more favorable the social condition for democracy or the consolidation of democracy. Of course, a correlation may mask a spurious causal relationship, and variables other than the ones here chosen may be more powerful in explaining relationships among the variables.

Conclusion

Democratization and globalization characterize many developing countries in the last two decades. The potential interplay among democracy (political rights and civil liberties), globalization (increased level of foreign trade, for-

eign investment), economic development (GNP per capita) and human development (level of education) is numerous. The results found in this study are mixed. First, there is no significant relationship between free trade and democracy. Free and open market systems can coexist with authoritarian regimes; countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Brazil under military control point to this conclusion. Second, the multiple correlation results show that there is no significant relationship between the inflow of foreign capital (the prime mover of globalization) and democracy either. Yet, the freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners has a strong association with political freedom. In other words, financial liberalization may have a direct impact on the spread of democracy due to the fact that there is a positive relationship between economic freedom and political freedom.

This study demonstrates that the path to democracy both in the past and the present is mainly shaped by many factors. Globalization alone is not a sufficient condition to bring about democracy in the Third World. There are several other factors that contribute to democratization, such as education, economic development, and civil society (Lipset 1994). Several studies have shown that external actors could impose or help to graft a democratic system onto another nation, regardless of the latter's economic conditions (Carothers 1991; Karl 1986; Whitehead 1986). Yet, the results of this study appear sufficiently to reject the neoliberal wisdom of a necessary link between a high level of globalization and democratization. In other words, an external economic factor is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratization. Globalization will not automatically lead to enhancement of political freedom.

Dependency theorists' assertions about the detrimental effects of globalization on democracy are not empirically supported. The global economy is undergoing rapid and fundamental changes that are reshaping political and social relations in many nations around the world. In many respects, these changes have encouraged the spread of democratic values and practices. In other respects, these changes may have hindered the spread of democracy. Similarly, results in this paper provide no support for the neo-Marxist statement that globalization as a whole will dilute and weaken democracy. It has become apparent that in terms of methodology, the approach of orthodox Marxists, which argues that fundamental forces for social change lie internal to the Third World, makes more sense. In the final analysis, despite the importance of the international environment, the key to a successful transition to democracy lies in domestic politics and policies.

Notes

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BEST OF BOTH WORLDS?: WEB-ENHANCED OR TRADITIONAL INSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

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The phenomenal growth of Web-based and Web-enhanced courses is redefining, if not revolutionizing, the nature of instruction in university settings. As with most revolutions, the vision of the future—from an instructor-centered to student-centered environment, from passive absorption to active learning, from individual achievement to collaborative dynamics—is indeed compelling. Yet the empirical questions raised by this model are compelling as well. What learning experiences take best advantage of the new environment? Do students in Web-based settings perform better? Do they alter their approaches to learning? What sorts of students are attracted to Web-dependent courses? Which students might best succeed in this new instructional setting? The issues are many. In this study we explore two: (1) the rationale for on-line instruction and the creation of learning tools that may best utilize the new technology, and (2) the observed differences between students who choose a Web-enhanced setting and those who opt for a traditional mode of instruction.

Background

Our discussion and analysis are based on learning modules and descriptive data being developed by the University of Central Florida for the Pew Grant Program in Course Redesign. One of the main purposes of the grant is to evaluate the effectiveness of UCF's M model mixed-mode courses based partly on face-to-face class meetings and partly on Internet instruction. As part of this project, the Department of Political Science, beginning in Spring 2000, offered a redesigned version of its large-enrollment general education course in American National Government (POS2041). This M version is based on a 50% reduction in face-to-face interaction (or, in institutional idiom, 50% "reduced seat time"). Thus far in the project, we are laying the groundwork for controlled comparisons between M and non-M formats on several student-centered dimensions, one of which (student selection of M or non-M formats) is considered in this paper.¹ On the substantive side, we have developed a range of mixed-mode learning modules, a full repertoire of which are available for Fall

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2000. We turn first to a consideration of these learning tools. Second, we report preliminary findings on format selection obtained from a student survey administered during the first week of the Spring term.

M-Based Learning Modules: Rationale and Examples

In many traditional, face-to-face classrooms, the role of the students is primarily that of passive recipient of information delivered by the instructor, supplemented by written materials. While lecture-based instruction condenses and communicates large amounts of substantive material, students may retain little of this information. To overcome this problem, many instructors use strategies such as one-minute-papers, short group discussions, or question-and-answer periods to reinforce the material covered, thus interrupting the focus on the professor during lectures. Nonetheless, many students remain passive, failing to actively engage in discussions either with their peers or with the instructor. Lectures thus tend to reinforce students' passive roles rather than encouraging them to reflect critically on the information presented (Kuzma 1998). While motivated students may have a higher retention rate than those less interested in the subject matter, they do not necessarily acquire critical thinking skills, apply what they learned, nor do they embrace the idea of lifelong learning (Oblinger and Maruyama 1996:2-3; 10).

Using the Internet solely as a supplement for instruction does not change this (admittedly somewhat simplified) scenario of the traditional, lecture-based classroom. Sending students to Web sites in addition to, or instead of, textbook chapters or articles will not, by itself, increase active involvement or critical thinking. It simply makes the Internet another source of information. An appropriate learning exercise, therefore, would be designed to help students obtain, organize, and critically evaluate subject-specific information. Such exercises, moreover, will help develop generally applicable skills, as more information of all kinds becomes available (see Mather 1996a).

We have found that the wealth of information contained on the Internet can be put to productive use in the M-course design, particularly in political science courses. Useful political science information that is quickly obtained at no charge includes, but is not limited to, newspapers (both U.S. and foreign), government documents, election results, information about parliaments in numerous countries of the world, information by international organizations such as the United Nations, and scholarly research papers and journal articles. Many Web sites are regularly updated, and information is available before printed material reaches the public. Though the common pitfalls of Web sites are well-known (Kuzma 1998), academic disciplines increasingly rely on subject-specific information available on the Internet and circumvent the cumbersome and costly retrieval process of using printed sources. Accordingly, many instructors acknowledge the importance of introducing their students to discipline-specific information on the Web, and they design assignments that familiarize students

with relevant Web sites and search engine processes. Guiding students to these sources is a valuable use of the Internet that will, doubtlessly, play an increasing pedagogical role.

Yet the role of computers in instruction need not be limited to using search engines as part of a fact-finding mission. Instead, their potential for communication allows instructors to design assignments that turn students into active learners who sharpen their critical thinking skills. This instructional technology may be better suited for a "more efficient and effective learning environment: cognition, collaboration, communication, and computing" (Oblinger and Maruyama 1996:5). If the goals of instruction include the "ability to think clearly and critically, to effectively solve problems, and to construct knowledge" (Kuzma 1998), the Internet can have a useful place in education. By assisting students to become active learners, the role of the teacher becomes less focused on providing information and more concerned with facilitating the learning process—one of the defining components of "constructivist" pedagogy (Mather 1996b). Since the Internet holds promise as an instructional tool and as a means for interpersonal, asynchronous communication, strictly "fact-finding" assignments may not fully exploit its potential.

The learning modules discussed below, therefore, combine three related functions of the Internet—information, instruction, and communication—and are designed to increase student participation, enhance written communication skills, and focus the learning experience on critical thinking and reflection. In the redesigned American National Government format (the M model), which is conducted partially via the Internet, the instructor relies on the Internet to provide course material, post and direct assignments and readings, and obtain feedback and assignments from students. Using the computer as a partial substitute for classroom instruction means that the course material and its delivery must be adjusted to the new medium. Furthermore, the student has to take a more active role in learning. Students are required to read, process and analyze information, discuss, and complete assignments, and thus to change their role from passive recipients of information to active participants. Finally, since computers facilitate communication among students and between students and instructor, group assignments are the most appropriate application of the technology. Group assignments expose students to a wide variety of opinions among their peers and enhance their capacity to collaborate, a skill that is increasingly necessary for a successful professional career. This can be especially advantageous in large classes, such as the American National Government sections under study here, in which students' direct participation in face-to-face settings is generally low.

Examples of Internet Assignments

In this section, we present some of the Internet instruction assignments we have utilized in the redesigned American National government class that

reflect our goal of turning students into active learners. Some assignments require students to reflect critically on material presented on the Internet, some are interactive, and some require that they apply class content to Internet material. Other assignments are designed to stimulate virtual group discussions that can be monitored more effectively than in-class discussions. In the following section we present two representative modules that are done by students online.

Example 1: Senators' voting records. Students do this module after they have heard lectures and read about the nature of the Senate, political parties, and interest groups. The exercise allows students to familiarize themselves with their elected representatives to the U.S. Senate and allows them to study their two senators' recent voting records on eight important issues.

By scrutinizing the votes on bills and amendments to bills students gain an appreciation for the complexities of government and for politicians' need to rely on their staff, parties, and interest groups in formulating their opinion on issues on which they vote. The assignment also helps students understand that in American national politics very few issues are clear cut. In the Florida case the two senators (one Republican and one Democrat) have similarly very mixed voting records on key issues.

Students complete a table with their results that they submit in person at the start of the following class (this also encourages students to attend the regular class meetings). Using a tabular protocol for the summary of the results allows the instructor to grade the assignment easily, even though students spent a considerable amount of time assessing the voting record of the senators. The module could be set up so that WebCT would grade the voting records assignment automatically, thus further reducing the professor's workload.

Example 2: Understanding civil rights and civil liberties. A second assignment requires students to read the civil rights and civil liberties chapters of their textbook, attend a class presentation on the two concepts, and read an online article *Blacklash?* by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. This short article, originally published in the *New Yorker* magazine, addresses the similarities and differences between the contemporary issue of gay civil rights and the struggle of African Americans for their civil rights.

Because American National Government sections generally enroll approximately 90 students, meaningful class discussion of these issues is difficult. Instead of devoting class time to discussing the issue, an asynchronous web discussion forum is used. The class is split into small groups of approximately 8 to 10 students per forum. The small size of the groups encourages participation and makes meaningful debate possible. In their small online forum groups, students are asked to discuss the following questions and issues with each other: "Do you agree with Dr. Gates' argument? Do you think that gays are entitled to the same civil rights protections as other minority groups in society? You should explain your reasoning. Grade incentives and penalties are established to encourage student participation in the discussions. While students are required to participate at least five times in the forum discussion, we have found

that most students contribute much more frequently (the average number of postings per student is about eight).

The assignment introduces students to a relevant Web site, but it also makes them reflect on the material and how it relates to larger issues in American politics, civil liberties and civil rights. Analysis and critical reflection of the material is reinforced through the discussion, where students respond to other students' opinions and arguments. This small group atmosphere is designed to foster the development of learning communities and may, in turn, increase learner success and boost retention rates (Dziuban et al.).

Format Selection

Clearly, our learning modules place different and unfamiliar expectations on students. Although the casual evidence supports the efficacy of these learning experiences, we ultimately want to evaluate their effects, controlling for other factors that may influence performance. Barring the random assignment of students to M and non-M formats, self-selection—the process through which students consciously choose one instructional style instead of another—becomes a potential source of bias in interpreting pedagogical outcomes. Happily, it is also an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The links between five factors and self-selection are of particular interest.²

1. *Learning styles.* Building on the theoretical and clinical work of Long (1985), pioneering research by UCF investigators reveals systematic differences in student approaches to learning (see Dziuban 1995; Dziuban and Dziuban 1997; Dziuban, Moskal, and Dziuban, n.d.). These differences, which are based on two psychological dimensions (aggressive/passive and independent/dependent) have been shown to be strongly related to student assessments of distance learning. All four learning types—aggressive-dependents, aggressive-independents, passive-dependents and passive-independents—expressed post-course satisfaction with most on-line features (Dziuban, Moskal, and Dziuban, n.d., 21). Particularly relevant for our present purpose, however, the two passive types comprised a small proportion of the students who selected the on-line environment (Dziuban, Moskal, and Dziuban, n.d., 27). The Long-Dziuban typology, included in the student survey, gives us empirical leverage on this potential basis of self-selection.

2. *Computer competence and experience.* Students vary in the levels of technological competence they bring to the university setting. To what extent do these resources influence students' choices of course format? Our pre-course survey allowed for the measurement of two variables tapping the sort of technical competence that may be relevant to format choice. One of these, *computer literacy*, is based on a straightforward self-assessment query: "If you had to 'grade' your level of competency with using a computer, what would your grade be?"³ A second variable, *computer experience*, was created by summing student responses to four yes/no questions about Web familiarity and

computer ownership and use.⁴ Not surprisingly, these two variables are fairly strongly related—as reported experience increases, so does self-assessed competence ($\gamma = 0.41$).

3. *Convenience.* Ease of access is perhaps the most visible feature of mixed-mode courses—and one that holds perhaps the greatest attraction for university planners. But how strongly does it shape student selection? The pre-course survey included two relevant questions, one motivational and one “situational.” In terms of motivations, we wanted to know whether *frequency of class meetings* had differential effects on choice. Reduced-seat-time students were asked if the statement, “I like taking courses that meet just once a week,” was a good description (or not) of their motivations for taking the course. (Naturally, the question had a different frame for students in traditional sections: “I like taking courses that meet more than once a week”). Since, as a situational matter, students living farther from campus might be more strongly drawn to M-type courses, we examine the relationship between *commute time* and instructional setting.⁵

4. *Substantive resources.* The course under study, American National Government, is one of two options in UCF’s General Education Program. (Students may also choose an economics course to fulfill the requirement.) Thus, it may be reasonably assumed that students with prior interest in or knowledge of American politics will be more likely to opt for POS2041. But does this substantive interest affect student choices between M and non-M formats? To gain insight into this question, we constructed two variables. *Political attentiveness* measures the extent to which the respondent “follows what’s going on in government and public affairs.” *Political knowledge* is a simple summative scale based on student responses to eighteen factual questions about basic features of American government and politics.⁶

5. *Demographics and aptitude.* Other background bases of self-selection can be important if not decisive in shaping the aggregate student profiles of M and non-M courses. Here we examine the relationships between *gender*, *race/ethnicity*, and *age* and instructional setting. Our interest in these variables is somewhat exploratory, but it may be that their effects are mediated by other variables described above. We eventually want to know, for example, whether female students differentially opt for non-M sections and, if so, whether this behavior is structured by lower self-assessed computer skills.⁷ In addition to demographics, our analysis examines the relationship, if any, between standardized test scores (SAT) and format choice.

Preliminary findings. These five selection factors, modeled as independent variables, were cross-tabulated with format choice.⁸ Table 1 reports the percentage of students, categorized by learning style, who enrolled in non-M and M sections of POS2041. These numbers reveal some interesting differential selection effects. Aggressive Dependents, the most prevalent type overall (48.2% of all respondents), were more likely than other students to select the M

model (47.5% of ADs chose this mode). By contrast, those theoretically most likely to benefit from the group dynamics of the new technology—Passive Independents and (especially) Passive Dependents—selected in higher proportions into traditional face-to-face settings.

Table 1
Format Selection by Learning Style

Course Format	LEARNING STYLE				Totals (N)
	Agressive Independent	Passive Independent	Aggressive Dependent	Passive Dependent	
M (N)	43.5% (20)	40.3% (25)	47.5% (58)	34.8% (8)	43.9% (111)
Non-M (N)	56.5 (26)	59.7 (37)	52.5 (64)	65.2 (15)	56.1 (142)
Total % (N)	100% (46)	100% (62)	100% (122)	100% (23)	100% (253)
Row %	18.2%	24.5%	48.2%	9.1%	100%

Note: Total percentage (N) of respondents in M sections is 43.9% (111), in non-M sections, 56.1% (142).

For computer competence and format convenience (Tables 2 and 3), the relationships are, by and large, generally predictable. Students with higher self-assessed literacy are attracted in greater percentages to mixed-mode sections, though reported experience is unevenly related to format type—students at the extremes being relatively more likely to choose an M course than those with moderate computer familiarity. Convenience, however, is obviously a key discriminator: Of those students who cited frequency of class meetings as an important motivation, over half found their way into M-course sections. And, clearly, commute time is a powerful incentive, though the aggregate effect of this variable is muted by the relatively small number of students who live farther away from campus.

Table 2
Format Selection by Computer Literacy and Experience

Course Format	SELF-ASSESSED LITERACY			EXPERIENCE		
	A	B	C/D/F	High	Moderate	Low
M (N)	51.3% (40)	40.3% (54)	41.5% (17)	45.2% (33)	34.0% (36)	56.8% (42)
Non-M (N)	48.7 (38)	59.7 (80)	58.5 (24)	54.8 (40)	66.0 (70)	43.2 (32)
Total % (N)	100% (78)	100% (134)	100% (41)	100% (73)	100% (106)	100% (74)

Note: Total percentage (N) of respondents in M sections is 43.9% (111), in non-M sections, 56.1% (142).

Table 3
Format Selection by Convenience

Course Format	FREQUENCY IMPORTANT?		COMMUTE DISTANCE	
	No	Yes	Near	Far
M	29.2%	52.9%	40.5%	58.3%
(N)	(28)	(83)	(83)	(28)
Non-M	70.8	47.1	59.5	41.7
(N)	(68)	(74)	(122)	(20)
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(96)	(157)	(205)	(48)

Note: Total percentage (N) of respondents in M sections is 43.9% (111), in non-M sections, 56.1% (142).

The patterns for technical competence and format convenience are, thus, easily understood. The relationships between our measures of substantive resources and student choice, however, are more difficult to interpret (Table 4). Students with lower initial levels of politically-relevant skills and attitudes were much more likely to opt for M-format sections. Those more attentive to politics and having higher objective knowledge of government ended up, disproportionately, in traditional lecture formats.⁹ Beyond the obvious methodological impact on our before-and-after design—M course students will likely show greater regression effects in the post-assessment—we are unaware of any model that would explain this selection bias.

Table 4
Format Selection by Substantive Resources

Course Format	POLITICAL ATTENTIVENESS		POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE		
	High	Low	High	Medium	Low
M	41.5%	47.9%	36.7%	47.7%	48%
(N)	(66)	(45)	(33)	(41)	(37)
Non-M	58.5	52.1	63.3	52.3	52
(N)	(93)	(49)	(57)	(45)	(40)
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(159)	(94)	(90)	(86)	(77)

Note: Total percentage (N) of respondents in M sections is 43.9% (111), in non-M sections, 56.1% (142).

The advent of computer-based instruction has raised equity concerns, especially on the basis of sex (see Garson, 1995). Indeed, Table 5 reveals a large gender difference (9%) in self-selection. Since women outnumber men (147 to 106) among respondents, the selection bias translates into a sizable aggregate

effect. Though our research is ongoing, we also have found marked sex differences in computer literacy (women are less likely to score high) and learning styles (women are greatly under-represented in the independent categories) two variables that, as we have seen, shape format choice among our student respondents. Race and ethnicity (Table 6), on the other hand, shows that African-Americans are somewhat more likely than whites to enroll in the M sections, though Hispanics opt for mixed-mode settings in below-the-base percentages.

Table 5
Format Selection by Gender and Age

Course Format	GENDER		AGE	
	Male	Female	< = 19 yrs	> = 20 yrs
M	49.1%	40.1%	45.2%	40.3%
(N)	(52)	(59)	(84)	(27)
Non-M	50.9	59.9	54.8	59.7
(N)	(54)	(88)	(102)	(40)
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(106)	(147)	(186)	(67)

Note: Total percentage (N) of respondents in M sections is 43.9% (111), in non-M sections, 56.1% (142).

Table 6
Format Selection by Race/Ethnicity and SAT Scores

Course Format	RACE/ETHNICITY				SAT SCORES			
	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	< = 1000	1010-1080	1090-1150	> = 1160
M	53.9%	56.3%	48%	57.1%	51.9%	51%	60.3%	48.8%
(N)	(146)	(18)	(24)	(12)	(40)	(53)	(41)	(42)
Non-M	46.1	43.8	52.0	42.9	48.1	49	39.7	51.2
(N)	(125)	(14)	(26)	(9)	(37)	(51)	(27)	(44)
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(271)	(32)	(5)	(21)	(77)	(104)	(68)	(86)

Note: For Race/Ethnicity, Total N = 374; 53.5% are M students, 46.5% are non-M. For SAT scores, Total N = 335; 52.5% are M course students, 47.5% are non-M.

Conclusions

We have argued that using computer technology for instructional purposes has the potential for offering teaching strategies that traditional, face-to-face instruction cannot provide. For example, students tend to learn not just from written subject material and the instructor, but also from other students in the

class. Students are, by necessity, more actively involved in the learning process. And instructional technology can also enhance students' critical thinking skills. However, it is imperative that the use of the Internet is in accordance with the stated learner objectives for the course. That is, it is important and necessary that technology is not just used for the sake of using technology. Instead, Internet segments or entire courses need to be designed in such a way that the learning process is enhanced and not compromised when compared with traditional, face-to-face courses. As Schneider (1994) pointed out, teaching and learning is best done when it involves "doing something" and when it follows an "instructional goal." The use of the Internet in teaching Political Science gives instructors more opportunities to design activities that involve students' direct participation, and to follow clearly set instructional goals.

Notes

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- 1 Our research is designed to facilitate comparisons between M and non-M courses having the same instructor, same text, and (by and large) the same exams. For the pilot phase of the study, currently in progress, two instructors each were assigned a non-M and an M section of POS2041. These instructors' two non-M sections total 154 students; their M sections, 108. In addition, an author of this paper (Wilson) is running two M sections of the course, with a total of 53 students.
- 2 The findings reported below are based on responses to the American National Government Student Survey administered to students in four M and two non-M sections of POS2041 (N = 315). In these preliminary findings, we compare students enrolled in traditional non-M settings (N = 154) with their mixed-mode counterparts (N = 161).
- 3 The percentage distribution of student self-assessment (N = 315): 27.94% gave themselves "A," 53.97% "B," 16.51% "C," and 1.59% "D" or "F." The C and D/F responses were collapsed, resulting in a three-category variable.
- 4 Respondents were asked if they (a) had ever taken a course based entirely on the Web, (b) had ever taken a Web-enhanced course, (c) owned a computer at home, and (d) regularly used a computer at a location other than at home. The resulting summative scale was collapsed into three categories of experience and use: low (0 or 1 "yes" response), moderate (2 "yes" responses), and high (3 or 4 "yes" responses). Of the 315 students surveyed, 30.79% scored "low," 40.32% "moderate," and 28.89% "high" on the variable.
- 5 Responses to this five-category response variable were highly skewed (89.1% live on campus or within a 15 minute commute), so we collapsed it into two categories "near" (within 15 minutes from campus) and "far" (more than 15 minutes).
- 6 Political attentiveness, originally a four-category variable (ranging from "most of the time" to "hardly at all") was collapsed into two categories. The 18 political knowledge questions appear as questions 23 through 40 in the survey instrument, available upon request. In creating the political knowledge scale, respondents were

scored 0 for each incorrect answer and 1 for each correct response, resulting in possible scale scores of 0 through 18. (As an empirical matter, our respondents' scores ranged from 2 to 16). Here we collapsed political knowledge into three categories. A five-category question gauging self-assessed knowledge ("How would you rate your knowledge of American government and politics right now?") is not analyzed separately here. Reassuringly, however, we can report that its relationship with actual knowledge is strong and monotonic: mean knowledge scores 5.94 (for students whose self-assessment was "very weak"), 7.38 ("weak"), 8.72 ("moderate"), 11 ("strong"), and 13.2 ("very strong").

- 7 Preliminary analysis does reveal some pronounced gender-based differences. Female respondents have lower levels of computer literacy and experience, and they score lower in political knowledge and are somewhat less attentive to politics.
- 8 With the exception of two variables, race and SAT scores, all percentages described in this paper are based on data from the pre-course survey. Sixty-two student respondents, who registered at a time when only one section of the course was available, have been dropped from this part of the analysis (since, for these individuals, format choice was not an option), leaving a working N of 253. Data on race and SAT scores (presented in Table 6) were obtained from administration records for all registrants of the sections under study. The percentage base for these variables is, therefore, slightly different.
- 9 We obtained similar results for our measures (not discussed in this paper) of civic orientations. For example, students expressing deep distrust of "the government in Washington" were more likely to choose M sections than were students with higher levels of political trust.

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