
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

Fathers and Citizens: Locke and the Problem of Democratic Authority

Laura Greyson (Rollins College)

A New Reality: Prospects for S.D.I.

Susan Stoudinger (University of South Florida)

U.S. - U.N. Policy After the Reagan Years

Fred Gareau (Florida State University)

**Linkages Between Sunni and Shi'i Radical Fundamentalist Organizations:
A New Variable in Recent Middle Eastern Politics?**

Bernard Schechterman and Brad McGwinn (University of Miami)

Prologue

The inauguration of a new journal is a special occasion. After three plus years of planning and working toward this moment, it is time for rejoicing and extending plaudits to those who made it possible. Saint Leo College's gracious role in offering to publish and distribute the journal reflects an identification with higher education's finest efforts to contribute to academic excellence. Professors Joseph Cernik of Saint Leo College, our Managing Editor, has served as a pillar of strength in facilitating the schools's positive commitment to the new enterprise. The Florida Political Science Association, under the leadership of its recent presidents and executive boards, have given the broad encouragement and direction needed to move from an idea to an established fact. As a wish, may this marriage of visionaries endure for years to come. It is truly a proud moment for the political scientists of Florida to enter the national and international arena of information and analysis. Together I anticipate we will make the journal a great success story.

For our diverse audience at the receiving and contributing end of the journal, we look forward to serving you with two editions a year and hopefully, an occasional special edition devoted to a current topic in the discipline. We encourage our broadly-based audience to participate in making this journal a great success by subscribing, submitting essays and articles, and sending in constructive suggestions for improvement of the journal. A personal note of thanks is extended to the Editorial Board and the numerous Florida political scientists (they know who they are) that serve as "anonymous reviewers," an essential backbone to the selection, determinations and quality of the journal.

Bernard Schechterman, University of Miami
Editor

Introduction

In April, 1988, the Florida Political Science Association convened its annual professional conference in the Greater Fort Lauderdale area (Airport Hilton Hotel). As is customary, nine months of planning by the FPSA President, Executive Board and Program Director (Rick Fogleson, Rollins College) went into setting up the panels and their participants. The focused theme of the 1988 Conference was "The Post-Reagan Years," an attempt to envision critical international, national and Florida developments in the aftermath of President Reagan's departure from the political scene. Nine panels with three to five participants, including the chairperson, usually the organizer, made presentations over a day-and-a half period of time. All participants were given the opportunity to submit their papers in finished form for competitive and anonymous evaluation during the summer of 1988. After the review verdicts were in, the following papers were adjudged worthy of publication. This practice of utilizing one issue of the journal to highlight the scholarly activities of Florida political scientists is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. It is more likely to persist if the journal moves on to a quarterly status.

Professor Greyson's essay "Father and Sons" fit in well with a panel centered on "Allen Bloom's Educational Views." In a novel departure for most students of John Locke, Greyson examines the concept of "citizenship" as envisioned by the philosopher. By so doing, she transcends the mere question of what constitutes citizenship and raises the prime issue of how one prepares for this role. Aside from identifying inherently contradictory tendencies (democracy vs. authoritarianism) on this matter in Locke, the author provides argumentation for competing educational theories in the public realm.

Two of the papers presented on the panel dealing with United States foreign policies in the post-Reagan era delved into current but anticipated ongoing issues confronting the next and conceivable future administrations as well. Professor Stouinger focuses on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more popularly referred to as Star Wars. After carefully summarizing the SDI particulars and the debate surrounding the program, she offers a projective evaluation of SDI's future. It ranges between serving as a "bargaining chip" and in altered form in some R & D program, varying with external relations and circumstances.

Professor Gareau's essay "The U. S./U.N. Policy after the Reagan Years" develops the United Nations as an arena for North-South conflict with the United States as an object of critique and attack. For the Reagan Administration period, it is evident that the United States has fought back both politically and especially financially where it carries the greatest weight. By inference, Professor Gareau indicates the UN will continue to be an arena of differences between the more radical underdeveloped states and the United States, with continued support for the organization, but minimally at best.

From the Middle East panel that centered its concern on "Post-Khomeini Iran," assumedly also the post-Reagan era, came a paper presentation by Bradford McGuinn, Ph. D. candidate, though jointly authored with Professor Schechterman. The paper "Linkages Between Sunni and Shi'i Radical Fundamentalists: A New Middle East Variable?" strikes out in a new direction from the commonly emphasized distinctions and contradictions between the two Islamic sects. At length, it supports the thesis of coalition-building by seemingly contradictory actors, using violence and threats of violence to achieve political objectives. Iran under Khomeinism is identified as structurally and actively positioned to engage in long-term terrorism after Khomeini's death as an option to carry out its regional and extra-regional foreign policies.

Bernard Schechterman

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Manuscripts submitted for consideration can only be returned if accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. All manuscripts should be double-spaced with wide margins. The standard length for articles is 4,500-6,500 words. For style and footnoting authors should refer to the **Chicago Manual of Style**. When a manuscript is accepted for publication, authors will need to submit a copy on a floppy-disk.

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Fathers and Citizens: Locke and the Problem of Democratic Authority

Laura Greyson

John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* defends political liberty against the claims of established authority. It is called to arms that would replace an inegalitarian regime with one built on individual rights and relations of equality. As such, it is generally seen as an essay on political freedom. From another perspective, however, it was the problem of authority that preoccupied Locke in the *Second Treatise*. Specifically, Locke sought to distinguish those forms of authority which belong in political life from those which do not. There is a difference, he wrote, between "a Ruler of a Commonwealth, a Father of a Family, and a Captain of a Galley."¹ The latter two rule over those who are not their equals. Their authority rests on relations of domination and subjection, and consequently has no place among free men. What form of authority, then, coincides with popular rule and political freedom? Given Locke's emphasis on natural rights and individual liberty, what part can authority play in his society?

These questions bear significantly on modern democracy. Locke, of course, was no democrat. Yet no other thinker serves so prominently as the ancestor of today's liberal democratic institutions. If American society has enfranchised a far wider segment of the population than Locke envisioned in 1687, if we have held out the promise of natural rights and political liberty to classes of men that he did not expect to play an active role in political life, we have done so because we share his belief in the legitimacy of an egalitarian and representative politics. We often forget, however, that we do not share the underlying assumptions about social relations on which Locke's political theory rests. Locke's vision of citizenship and his emphasis on political liberty cannot be understood apart

from those assumptions. They act as the foundation for liberal democracy. To appreciate fully Locke's political theory, we must evaluate his explanation of the proper place of authority in civil society. This essay analyzes Locke's resolution of the problem of authority and the implications of that resolution for democratic politics.

Because it presupposes equality, democracy would appear to leave no room for authority. And, indeed, political thinkers from Plato through Mill have noted the leveling tendencies of democracy--the democratic distaste for anything resembling preference, distinctiveness, superiority. Observing America in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville warned of the democratic passion for equality which, he feared, would devour the political liberty Americans so valued. Egalitarian regimes, he realized, could sponsor forms of despotism more terrifying than those of the ancient world. The love of equality notwithstanding, human beings cannot live long without structures of authority.

John Locke understood that popular regimes, like less egalitarian forms of rule, depend upon authority. He knew the teaching of Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Unlike his predecessor, he did not intend his commonwealth for men with restless and insatiable cravings for power. He recognized that "Beasts of Prey" cannot govern themselves--that human beings do not always act rationally or virtuously, that they often appear unfit for self-government. Those who want to govern themselves must know how to control their passions, to respect the liberty of others, to care for justice. Their good citizenship rests upon a civic education; and that education is the proper object of authority.

Yet not all forms of authority enhance political freedom. Democracy presupposes not just equality, but an

active and vigilant citizenry. Citizens must learn that liberty is a public responsibility as well as a private right. Can they be taught this lesson, however, in a manner that does not jeopardize the very liberty it would promote? That question concerned Locke deeply, for he knew that men who exercised their liberty reluctantly would never fight for their rights against an unjust king.² Passive and obedient subjects can not lead revolutions. Democratic regimes thus face a unique dilemma: they must discover relations of authority that promote rather than inhibit freedom.

Locke rejected Sir Robert Filmer's contention that divine will entitles kings to the exercise of patriarchal authority. Like Hobbes before him, he believed that popular will alone provides the foundation for political power. Governments, he contended, are established through the agreement of morally autonomous and psychologically independent individuals. They are built to serve the interests of those individuals as they define them--not to meet the purposes of rulers or of some higher order of justice. Accordingly, no government can rightfully presume to change the characters of its citizens, or to guide them to ends not of their own choosing.

Hence Locke rejected patriarchal rule in favor of egalitarian civic relations. Yet a long chapter on paternal power in the *Second Treatise*, along with arguments in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, indicate that democratic rule and political freedom can be sustained only through certain forms of patriarchal authority. This essay suggests that Locke resolved the problem of democratic authority by relying upon the lessons of fathers--that he required the patriarchal family to lay the foun-

dations for a state premised on relations of equality. From this perspective, political freedom rests on the efforts of fathers, and we must evaluate their efforts if we are to determine the possibility of democratic government. What must the fathers of Locke's state teach their sons to educate them for citizenship? What methods should they employ? How effectively will their lessons promote political freedom?

Recent scholarship, such as the work of Nathan Tarcov, points to the relevance of Locke's educational doctrines for his political theory.³ The effort to synthesize Locke's thinking provides valuable insight into his view of the relationship between democracy and authority but does not illuminate equally well the question of whether Locke's pedagogical methods adequately suit his political ends. Does the authority of the patriarchal family effectively instill the virtues of citizenship into the citizens of Locke's commonwealth? To the extent that liberal democracy requires the sustenance of authority, this question is critical.

I

In describing the state of nature, Locke notes that "perfect freedom" is found "within the bounds of the Law of Nature."⁴ Knowledge of natural law enables the inhabitants of this state to make a distinction between liberty and license, an ability upon which democratic rule depends. Knowledge of natural law--and the willingness to obey that law--are thus the prerequisites of citizenship in Locke's commonwealth. Because he believes that citizens can fulfill these requirements, Locke rejects patriarchal rule. The citizen's liberty, he observes, "is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will."⁵ Reason serves as the bastion of freedom, and individuals can discover for themselves all that they must know as citizens. If they could not, as "Lunatics and Idiots" cannot, they would be perpetually subject to the wills of others. The citizens of

Locke's commonwealth need neither kings nor priests to rule over them because the law of nature teaches them to govern themselves.

Yet Locke also tells us that governments are required because human beings fail to obey the natural law. The absence of government leads to great "inconveniences," for they judge badly in their own cases. Interest makes them "partial to themselves and their Friends," and "Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in punishing others."⁶ Few are "strict Observers of Equity and Justice."⁷ Their capacity for reason notwithstanding, the law of nature is not a particularly effective force in the state of nature, and that state is "not to be endured."⁸

Hence Locke presents us with a paradox. On the one hand, democratic rule is possible because the citizens of his state know the limits of their freedom. On the other, that state is necessary because they do not act as if they recognize those limits. To be free, citizens must learn to recognize the law of nature, but nature apparently does not invest this knowledge in them. Egalitarian civic relations require more than untutored nature for their sustenance. How, then, do citizens fulfill the prerequisites of citizenship? How do they acquire knowledge of natural law?

These questions defy easy answers, because Locke's treatment of natural law is fraught with ambiguity. Nowhere does he clearly define that law.⁹ Nor does he reveal the process through which human beings learn its specific content. In the *Second Treatise*, he argues that the law of nature is discovered through the exercise of reason. Other works suggest that the application of reason to sense-experience should provide a "science of morality."¹⁰ Our senses can demonstrate the order of the physical universe to us, and it is unlikely that the human community is "an exception to the rule that all other creatures of the earth follow."¹¹ It, too, must be governed by law. In the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, however, Locke admits that reason reveals moral law less successfully than

he might have hoped. "Though a man with his eyes open in the light cannot but see," he writes, "there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into." Overwhelmed by passion, some refuse to reason as a "curb and restraint" to their "exorbitant desires."¹² Others, "enslaved to the necessities of their mean condition," can ill afford the commitment of time and energy that moral education requires. Most importantly, though, reason fails to provide individuals with moral knowledge because it lacks the data which are required for certain conclusions. The evidence of our senses cannot give us the information that we need to determine the content of an objective moral law, because our senses do not give us a broad enough vision of the world around us. They offer us only a partial knowledge, for their reach extends merely to the world of appearances. The "real essence" of the world is hidden from them.¹³

It is fortuitous, then, that human beings have more than "accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery." Though our "certain knowledge" is "very short and scanty," we need to remain "utterly in the dark."¹⁴ We have an alternative means of acquiring at least a partial knowledge of moral law. That alternative is found in the testimony of our fellows.¹⁵ In Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the "law of opinion and reputation" substitutes for the moral knowledge which our senses do not give us. All societies, Locke suggests, teach their members to admire some forms of behavior and to hold others in contempt, and it is "by this approbation or dislike" that they establish standards of virtue and vice.¹⁶

What we call virtue and vice, in other words, are only those actions which are held in good or ill repute by individuals of particular societies. But these moral standards are not simply arbitrary. To Locke "esteem and discredit...everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath es-

established.¹⁷ The moral standards of any particular society correspond "in great measure" to natural law, even if they cannot be understood as mirror images of it. By acquiescing to the judgments of our peers, we accept a common definition of right and wrong, a common vision of the good life. More importantly, we can be confident that, on the whole, in adapting ourselves to the standards of private individuals, we are acting in accordance with the law of nature.

To Locke, the law of opinion operates with great force. Most human beings, he observes, "govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company."¹⁸ Most crave the esteem of their peers and long to escape the "punishment of their censure and dislike."¹⁹ They conform to the moral standards of their societies because they dread the loss of their reputations and the displeasure of their neighbors. The force opinion thus ties otherwise autonomous individuals to each other and subjects all to the rule of society. Hoping to avoid the reprobation of their fellows, they bind themselves into one community and relinquish their powers of judgment to it. "All private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties..."²⁰

From this perspective, it is Locke's sense of the "stolid dependability of society" that makes it possible for him to advocate democratic rule.²¹ The submission of will required when individuals give their powers of judgment over to civil society is such that those powers "never again" revert to their hands. Instead, writes Locke, those powers "will always remain in the Community; because without this, there can be no Community, no Commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement."²² Although individuals establish civil society through an act of consent, society--once established--rests on more than consent alone. Particular governments might be abolished, the bonds of political life

severed and then forged anew. Membership in society, however, is not so easily terminated. Individuals can never regain the freedom or the power that they surrendered when they entered civil society, for the love of reputation that binds independent men to the laws of a community does not depend on an act of will.

To Locke, then, civil society, and the conventions of civil society, teach citizens the distinction between liberty and license on which self-rule depends. The law of opinion, which binds citizens to social convention, channels and restrains their behavior, thus making it possible for them to be secure in their expectations of one another. In this sense, the liberty of the state of nature is an illusion, at most a promise. Only when individuals enter civil society do they replace a potential power with a real one, and a freedom that cannot be enjoyed with one that can. Because convention teaches them to govern themselves, the citizens of Locke's commonwealth can exercise the freedom that is promised them at birth.

This emphasis on public opinion, of course, indicates at once the complexity of Locke's political theory. An analysis of political life that begins with the individual ends in majoritarianism, for Locke is more interested in the contract between society and government than with that between individual and society. Though he suggests the danger of relying too heavily on the opinions of our fellows, he largely ignores the problem of social tyranny that would so concern Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville. The *Second Treatise* defends political and not social revolution. Locke does not want to create the conditions for social upheaval. Quite the contrary, even while supporting that ultimate expression of free choice, he wants to show that political freedom can be sustained only by citizens who recognize the bonds of law and convention. In the absence of those bonds, freedom degenerates into mere license, and--as Hobbes argues--only absolute rule is possible.

Such a solution to the problem of democratic authority lends credence to the value that conservative social critics place on traditional institutions of authority such as the family and the church. In their efforts to renew these institutions, today's conservatives demonstrate that, like Locke, they fear the chaos that might result where human nature--and human reason--remain uninformed by a shared moral understanding. If we take Locke as our guide, such institutions would appear to provide the foundations for political freedom, and we should make all efforts to support them.

Locke's answer might not suffice for modern democracy, though. How adequately does his emphasis on the law of opinion address the problem of democratic authority? Since the time of Socrates' trial, philosophers have written of the power of public opinion. Because ancient thinkers knew well the importance of law and convention in shaping human behavior, they wanted to place control of these forces solely in the hands of the wisest men. The political thinkers of the ancient world aimed to subject citizens to the rule of virtue, however, not to establish the conditions for political freedom. "Of all the 'willful and proud' creatures of the earth," notes Locke, none are "half so desirous to be masters of themselves and others, as man."²³ Civic education must teach citizens restraint and self-mastery, and the love of reputation might keep them from acting like tyrants. But civic education must not make them slaves.²⁴ To what extent does the impersonal authority of social convention enhance political freedom? Does it in any way threaten the freedom that Locke would promote?

We can find answers to these questions in the process through which citizens learn the love of esteem. The *Essay* indicates that this passion is natural; but in others of Locke's writings he shows that he does not trust nature to teach such a critical lesson. Certainly there is no evidence that the inhabitants of the state of nature concern themselves with their reputations among their fellows. How, then, do citizens learn the love of reputation

that inclines them to cooperate with their neighbors? What secures their obedience of the law of opinion? This is the lesson that fathers must teach their children. In the privacy of the family, patriarchal authority teaches the requisite virtues of citizenship. Hence, the remainder of this essay examines the successes and failures of the fathers' efforts at civic education.

II

In Chapter IV of the *Second Treatise*, Locke admits that human beings are not born into a state of independence. Only Adam, he writes, "was created a perfect Man,...capable from the first instant of his being to provide for his own Support and Preservation." Others, who came into the world "without Knowledge or Understanding," must learn to provide for themselves.²⁵ If they yearn for the independence of the state of nature, they must grow into that condition. It is not given to them at birth. For this reason, the subjection of one will to another, though inappropriate in political life, is entirely appropriate within the confines of the family. Locke insists that "natural Freedom and Subjection to Parents" are founded on the same principle. The subjection of a son to his father's will is intended "not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom." Children have no knowledge of the law of nature, and "where there is no Law, there is no Freedom." If they are to be free, their parents--and particularly their fathers--must educate them. Only insofar as they perform this duty are fathers due their honor and respect.²⁶ Paternal power "goes along with their Nourishment and Education," Locke writes. Indeed, education represents "the first part" of paternal power, the sole justification for its exercise.²⁷ The family is the seat of authority in Locke's commonwealth because it is the locus of this education. Paternal power is consequently limited in both purpose and duration. Robert Filmer portrayed monarchial authority as a reflection of paternal authority. Comparing the structure of power in the state to that in the family, he held that

the king's subjects owed him the same obedience that children owed their fathers. The authority of the king, he argued, was absolute. Locke disagrees. Contrary to Filmer, he cannot construe even the father's authority over his children as absolute. Fathers acquire their authority from God, he insists. "Those who desire and design Children are but the occasion of their being," and contribute no more to their creation "than Ducalion and his wife in the Fable did towards the making of Mankind, by throwing Pebbles over their Heads." Fathers ought not to forget that God alone is the "Author and Giver of Life." Their power over others of his creatures extends only as far as his purposes allow; and those purposes do not include one human being's perpetual subjection to the "Arbitrary Will" of another.²⁸ To Locke, such a condition can only be defined as slavery.

Thus even while fathers have a limited jurisdiction over their sons' wills, Locke holds that they must relinquish that authority when their sons reach maturity. "When he comes to the Estate that made his Father a Freeman, the Son is a Freeman too," he notes.²⁹ The distinction between paternal and political authority is central to the argument of *Two Treatises*. From Locke's perspective, Filmer was wrong not only in his understanding of nature of paternal authority, but in his belief that the father's rule could possibly serve as the model for political life. If the family is a hierarchical community, the political community is composed of equals. Those who want to participate in the political community must therefore be schooled for relationships of equality. Accordingly, the father's ultimate goal is to make himself superfluous. His task is to instill in his son principles of virtue that will make his personal authority unnecessary; for only by so doing does he prepare him for citizenship. If he hopes to make his son a free man, he must teach him to make the transition from the authoritarian family to an egalitarian society.

Fathers prepare their sons for that transition by instructing them to sub-

stitute the impersonal authority of law for the personal authority of one-man rule. In the *Second Treatise* Locke promises that this will be an education in the use of reason--that fathers will teach their sons to rely on their own rational faculties in their search for moral knowledge. Yet he also suggests the impotency of reason unsupported by other forces. Because reason is the "concomitant of prudence and age, and not of childhood," moral education must rest on other foundations.³⁰ As we have seen, the law of opinion provides those other foundations. For Locke, the "great secret" of education lies in teaching the mind to "relish" the incentives of esteem and disgrace.³¹ Locke does not leave nature to her own devices. Fathers make their personal authority superfluous by instilling in their sons the love of reputation and the power of opinion. Education thus makes the passion for "praise and commendation" stronger than any other.

The father conveys this lesson by, first, establishing his authority on the basis of "fear and awe."³² Children love dominion, Locke writes. "This is the first original of most vicious habits, that are ordinary and natural."³³ Like Hobbes' masterless men, they are strong-willed and tyrannical--and ill-suited for lives with other human beings. The first goal of education is for children to learn that they are not lords of the world, that they are dependent on that world even while it has no need of them, that they cannot expect the world to bend to their whims. "He that has been used to have his will in everything, as long as he was in coats" will "desire it and contend for it still, when he is in breeches."³⁴ Until the child has learned restraint, he requires the "imperiousness and severity" of his father's rule.³⁵

After the lesson of restraint, the father can habituate his son to the practice of virtue. A practice of virtue that rests on fear of paternal power alone will only leave a child "ill and wicked in private." The father must instill principles that will sustain virtue even outside the purview of his gaze. "Every man," Locke observes, "must some time or other be trusted to himself, and

his own conduct; and he that is a good, a virtuous, and able man, must be made so within." Over the long term, good habits, which make an instinct of the practice of virtue, serve as much more effective guides than fear of a father's anger. Where the performance of virtue becomes habitual, it will become "natural" to him, resting on something prior to conscious thought.³⁵

Habits of virtue do, however, rest on a kind of fear. Locke rejects the rod as a "lazy sort of chastisement" which serves only to enhance the child's "natural propensity" to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Virtue requires more sophisticated rewards and punishment. The fear of disgrace inspires the practice of virtue far more effectively than either the fear of physical punishment or fear of a father's anger in a more general sense. Locke offers the incentives of a good reputation and the sanctions of disapproval. The child's first exposure to the law of opinion and reputation comes within the family, where he learns the value of being well-liked and the danger of being held in ill-repute. Like the rod, of course, these sanctions and incentives rest upon coercion. In Locke's commonwealth, habit might support virtue, but the "apprehension of fear and disgrace" lay the foundation for it.³⁷ Habit masks its origin: the fear of "censure and dislike" provides the cornerstone of virtue in Locke's state, compelling children to obey the law of opinion.

Much of Locke's discussion of education focuses on that lesson. His *heuristic* consists of association, i.e. those actions which the father considers virtuous must constantly be rewarded with praise by everyone close to the child. Similarly, when the child behaves badly, he must be punished with displeasure. All whom he knows and loves should reward him with "cold and neglectful" countenances. A child whose behavior consistently meets with such responses, asserts Locke, will quickly discover the differences between praise and blame, virtue and vice. Moreover, his father should brand this lesson deeply and permanently on his mind by teaching him

to associate other pleasures with the esteem of his neighbors and other pains with their distaste. The realization that everything he loves comes from those who are held in high repute will impress on him value of praise, just as the knowledge that shame and disgrace bring with them the denial of other pleasures as well, will reinforce the fear of blame.³⁸

Thus Locke suggests that the citizen of a liberal democracy must internalize his father's authority by adopting his anxieties. While Locke hopes that he will act virtuously out of habit, that custom and experience will encourage him to do what is right, he clearly knows that habit does not always stand against the force of strong passion. So he relies, instead, on the tenacity of one particular love: he reinforces the citizens' good habits with their fears of the consequences of non-conformity. Long before they acquire the full use of their rational faculties, their fathers prepare them for submission to the rule of convention.

The public welfare requires this teaching. The father has control over his child's will when it is the most pliable; he therefore must take responsibility for the formation of his child's character. By teaching their sons to govern themselves by law, fathers enable them to meet the prerequisites for citizenship in the larger community. As long as they fulfill these parental responsibilities, the commonwealth needs neither medieval monarchs nor absolute sovereigns. Should their efforts fail, though, Locke argues, "all other efforts will be in vain."

If the innocence, sobriety, and industry of those who are coming up be not taken care of and preserved, it will be ridiculous to expect, that those who are to succeed next on the stage should abound in that virtue, ability, and learning, which has hitherto made England considerable in the world...I think it impossible to find an instance of any nation, however renowned for their valor, who ever kept their credit in arms, or made themselves redoubtable amongst their neighbors, after corruption had once broken through,

and dissolved the restraint of discipline.³⁹

Locke notes that there comes a time when commonwealths presume that men are free.⁴⁰ That presumption depends upon the expectation that the fathers of those men have adequately trained them for civic life--that they have successfully bent their wills before the law of fashion.

How effectively does this lesson promote political freedom? Despite the best efforts of fathers, the citizen of Locke's commonwealth could live as a secret tyrant. What sustains the fear of paternal power, in that one's fellow citizens can enforce the law of opinion long after the father's control over his offspring has weakened. Still, any citizen has the option of being "ill and wicked in private." Like Plato's Gyges, Locke's citizens will learn to play the part of a virtuous citizen. But in private, where his vices are hidden, what regulates or restrains him? His public appearance may well hide a child's longing for domination and mastery.

The *Second Treatise* indicates that citizens' understandings of the distinction between liberty and license need to be buttressed by a threat more concrete than that of disgrace. Property is "no small Tye on the Obedience of Children." Those who would inherit their fathers' property must take it on the "terms" and "conditions" that are attached to it.⁴¹ Yet the threat of receiving a "sancty portion" seems to have emperal utility. Once the citizen has inherited family property, what guarantees his acceptance of those terms and conditions that property ownership implies? Locke's emphasis on the law of fashion suggests that only his fellows' vigilant attention secures the fulfillment of his obligation. The fear of disinheritance can sustain virtue, then, only when supported by the fear of disgrace.

The citizens of Locke's commonwealth, however, might not pay such vigilant attention to one another. Locke argues that human beings find social life intrinsically appealing. God gave man "strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclina-

tion to drive him into Society," he writes.⁴² Nonetheless, his discussion of property in the *Second Treatise* demonstrates his belief that human beings preoccupy themselves not with social relations but with property. By mixing his labor with nature and making the earth his own, Locke's citizen enhances both private happiness and the public welfare; for through the "Labour of his Body" and the "Work of his Hands," he improves the earth for his fellows as well as for himself.⁴³ He therefore finds much of what he values in life in isolation from other human beings. Indeed, Locke speaks rarely of the joys of fellowship and frequently of its detractions. Our fellows might sometimes draw us to them; more often, they appear to endanger our property. While convenience, and possibly even necessity, dictate that we join forces with them in civil society, that association serves the most limited purposes. Our commonality consists above all in the mutual desire for protection. However we forge the bond between us, we accept it only to the degree that it insures that property against the threat that we pose to one another. If we could secure our private well-being without the help of our fellows, or in a manner that did not permit their observation, so much the better. We would be independent of them if we could.

Furthermore, Locke could never bring himself to advocate a blind obedience to social customs. Viewing convention as no more than an imperfect reflection of a higher moral law, he could not recommend that human beings follow it unreservedly. Where we want certain moral knowledge, he insists in the *Essay*, we must continue to experiment for ourselves.⁴⁴ Although Locke asks us to use opinion as a guide, he still advises us to retain our faculties of judgment and to make our own decisions about right and wrong. Yet he gives no indication of how we should do this. Given the limitation of individual knowledge, we have no means of knowing which conventions we should follow and which we should ignore. Once we decide to reject one custom, why not reject them all? Why

not avoid the counsel of opinion altogether and rely strictly on our individual powers of reason? Isolation from society attracts the citizens of Locke's commonwealth anyway. The lure of private pleasure teaches them the value of self-reliance, and their belief in the inadequacy of custom can only justify a quest for greater independence.

Clearly Locke's insistence on the need to question the judgments of our peers undermines the authority of opinion. For the sanctions of the law of opinion restrain the citizen only as long as he cares for the esteem of his fellows. If reason and experience teach him that their opinions are of little value, the law of fashion will cease to control him. In the absence of such control, he will be left with not other guide than his own will, with no objective means of distinguishing between liberty and license. Like his emphasis on property, then, Locke's persistent emphasis on the power of reason tends to subvert the only foundation for a common life he has to offer us. In Locke's commonwealth, individualism counters the love of reputation. The psychology of his citizen undermines the power of opinion.

From this perspective, the danger of Locke's teaching on authority is that the lesson of fathers might not be fixed firmly enough on their sons' characters--that they will ultimately fail to surmount the passions Locke intends them to control. Locke understands that a community whose members recognize no obligation other than that to the self cannot long survive. Consequently, he draws upon the fear of disgrace in the hope of creating and sustaining bonds between one citizen and another and of limiting the expression of self-interest. But if these citizens discover that "all the things they delight in" do not really result from a good reputation, the sanctions of the law of fashion will not contain their striving for mastery. If fathers fail to leave the marks of their authority on their children, they risk the possibility of creating tyrants rather than citizens. Equally alarming, however, is the possibility that fathers might succeed too

well. Locke hopes to use the love of esteem to establish and then preserve a space for public action and political freedom. Citizens who view that space as a battleground for dominion threaten to close it off to all who are not victorious in their struggles. In his teaching on opinion, Locke attempts to prevent such contests, and thereby to preserve access to public life.

Paradoxically, though, the effect of his teaching could be to limit rather than facilitate entry into the public arena. A lover of private well-being, the citizen of Locke's commonwealth hides from his fellows more readily than he seeks their company. While he values his good name, the temptation of property interests inflames his passion to acquire the fruits of the earth. Where the practice of virtue inhibits the satisfaction of that desire, he will be inclined to resist the commands of conscience. If he can sacrifice virtue without sacrificing appearances, little in his training counsels against his doing so. By withdrawing into private life, he can have it both ways. In private, he can disguise his activities--doing as he pleases and still maintaining the appearance of virtue. The joys of ownership and acquisition compensate for whatever sense of loss he might otherwise experience when he removes himself from the company of his neighbors, and he can tell himself that if he is but left alone, he can enjoy the advantages of reputation without sacrificing private happiness.

But private happiness is not so easily secured. Quite the contrary, Locke insists that private advantage must be sought in the public welfare. He suggests that citizens can guarantee their private well-being only by fighting for it publicly, that they must vigilantly guard the public realm if they are to be certain of benefiting from the fruits of private life. Those who refuse to exercise such vigilant attention cannot be assured of their freedom. They will not need tyrants to deny them access to the public realm, for they will withdraw from it of their own accord. In this sense, their passivity poses a threat to public life and personal well-being as great as the longing for mastery. If

fathers must keep their sons from becoming secret tyrants, they must also teach them to shoulder the burden of public life.

Locke fears that citizens might not learn this lesson, and that in failing to learn it they will subject themselves to the rule of a tyrant. He admits that history supports patriarchal and not democratic rule. Secure in their fathers' affection and habituated to their rule, men find monarchy the "most natural" form of government. The experience of paternal authority suggests to them that the rule of one man is "both easie and safe." Unless they have known the "Oppression of Tyrannical Dominion," they could not know the value of confining political power within prescribed limits.⁴⁵ Thus only when "Ambition and Luxury" teach kings "to have distinct and separate Interest from their People" do their subjects discover the need to restrict political power.⁴⁶ Yet Locke worries about more than just the abuse of power. He distrusts the reign of a good king even more than the reign of a tyrant, for he suspects that human beings find it all too easy to hand the burdens of political life over to a king who appears to rule in their interests. Too frequently, the prerogatives of rule are expanded under good rulers--and then must be forcibly retracted when more ambitious ones abuse their positions. In this manner, the just king endangers his subjects more than a tyrant does; for he encourages them to act like children.⁴⁷ The good citizen does not seek a replacement for his father in political life. Willingly taking up the responsibilities of adulthood, he resists the temptation to be ruled by another.

Locke relies upon the love of opinion to initiate citizens into adulthood. Such reliance poses the danger that they will come to be slaves of opinion, as is evident in Locke's discussion of revolution at the end of the *Second Treatise*. Who shall be the judge of "whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust?" asks Locke. To exercise his right of revolution, the individual citizen must persuade a majority of his fellows to act with him. And this might not be easy

to do. As Locke observes, "the People, who are more disposed to suffer, than right themselves by Resistance, are not apt to stir."⁴⁸ Anxious to pursue private pleasure, timid when confronted with opposition from their fellows, and insecure about their chances for success, they enter the political arena with the greatest reluctance. Often they find it easier to live under the rule of a tyrant than to risk the consequences of rebellion. For this reason, Locke notes, revolutions seldom occur. The people will endure many evils "without mutiny or murmur" before they "rouse themselves" to action.⁴⁹

Should a tyrant arise, then, will the citizens of Locke's commonwealth exercise their right of revolution? The people are entitled to revolt, but the law of reputation constrains them. Who will persuade them to act? Concerned as they are with the esteem of their fellows, few will want to act without the majority's consent. Those who fail to get that consent can properly be destroyed as the "common Enemy and Pest of Mankind."⁵⁰ To call for revolution is therefore to risk not only the enmity of one's government, but the displeasure of one's peers and the punishment that follows upon their ill will. In this sense, the law of reputation tyrannizes. Those who would overturn their governments must do so without rattling the chains of opinion too loudly. Where they cannot do so, they remain subject to the wills of others. They must acquiesce to the rule of the community as they once acquiesced to the rule of their fathers.

If fathers play their part as civic educators, Locke suggests, paternal authority can be confined to the home. In the *Second Treatise*, he holds that political life is defined by its absence because they do. The rulers of Locke's commonwealth do not have absolute power. Like their fellow citizens, they are the subjects of society's will and of the law of fashion that society enforces. Society, rather than any one individual or group of individuals, serves citizens as their common judge. As long as political leaders act as public servants who represent the public will, they ful-

fill their trust, the people they serve must replace them with others who better represent their interests. Locke's confidence in the people's ability to gage their interests accurately--and to act upon those interests--rests on his conviction that the law of opinion will bind them into a community of active citizens who, when necessary, can act collectively to protect the public interest.

But if fathers do not succeed in teaching their sons to avoid the extreme of slavery as well as the extreme of tyranny, it will not be safe to trust them with public life. The fear of disgrace, unfortunately, does not necessarily teach this lesson. For the citizen of Locke's commonwealth, civil society is of no more than instrumental value in the pursuit of private happiness. He is consequently more likely to fear disapproval than to love commendation; he will probably dread his neighbors' displeasure more than he covets their applause. The fear of disgrace, when combined with the love of private well-being, might drive him out of the public realm altogether. Unless he cares more for his reputation than for his private goals. If he can find someone to take on the responsibilities of political life for him, he will happily relinquish his place in the public arena. In this manner, often without realizing it, he will offer the tyrant his opportunity. He will exchange citizenship for slavery.

Fathers, then, can teach their sons the requisite virtue of citizenship only as they can instill in them the passion for what Rousseau calls "public happiness." Where citizens perceive the activities of public life simply as means to an end, they will tend either to want to dominate public life or to withdraw from it completely. Distrustful of their fellows and anxious to remove any impediments to the satisfaction of their private ambitions, they will vacillate between anarchy and oppression. Locke's discussion of revolution indicates that their choice will be for the latter. Absolute government appeals to those who are eager for private gratification, for absolutism brings with it a release from responsibility. The

citizens of Locke's commonwealth are reluctant to fulfill their civic duties. Locke anticipates that they might choose a subjection which permits private happiness over a freedom which would require public responsibility. If they make that choice, he knows, they will find that the promise of democratic citizenship will remain beyond their grasp.

Locke hopes that fathers will prepare their sons to realize that promise, but he is convinced that their efforts will succeed. To the extent that they do not, the problem of democratic authority remains unresolved. Locke's egalitarian political institutions rest upon a civic education found within the family and supported by the social conventions of a larger society. Yet even he cannot promise that this civic education will create the vigilant and public-spirited citizenry necessary to sustain healthy democratic institutions. We must therefore look elsewhere for that form of authority which coincides with democratic rule and political freedom. In the absence of a more compelling teaching about the value of public life, the possibility of freedom rests on their efforts alone, then the possibility of freedom is remote indeed.

Notes

1. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Mentor, 1965), p. 308.
2. See Richard Ashcraft, "Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government: Radicalism and Lockean Political Theory," Political Theory, Vol. 8 No. 4 (November, 1980), pp. 429-485 for a discussion of Locke's association with radical politics in seventeenth century England.
3. See Nathan Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
4. Two Treatises, p. 309.
5. Two Treatises, p. 352.
6. Ibid., p. 316.
7. Ibid., p. 395.
8. Ibid., p. 316. Indeed, men from civil society because they lack a common law. In their original condition, they need "an established, settled, Known Law, received an allowed by

common consent to decide all Controversies between them" (p. 396). By the time Locke completes his description of it, the state of nature has degenerated into a state of war that cannot be distinguished from the one which, to Hobbes, required the imposition of absolute rule. Unlike Hobbes, however, Locke does not believe that the remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature lies in tyranny.

9. See J. W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy, "The Law of Nature" (Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 18-23; John Yolton, "Locke on the Law of Nature," Philosophical Review, Vol 67 (October, 1958), p. 488; and Peter Laslett, "Introduction," to the Two Treatises, p. 95. Locke's "inconsistencies" are certainly celebrated. His most sympathetic commentators indicate that he had difficulty reconciling his natural law doctrine with his mature political theory--and that, in the end, he treated the idea of nature as a premise of his political thought without ever subjecting it to the philosophical analysis that he applied to other forms of knowledge. See the Two Treatises, pp. 94-96; Gough, p. 16; and W. Von Leyden, "John Locke and Natural Law," in Life, Liberty, and Prosperity, ed. by Gordon Schochet (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), p. 16. Gough, along with Abrams in his "Introduction," Two Tracts on Government, suggests that natural law must be understood as a matter of faith which cannot be established on "rational grounds alone." (See Gough, p. 10, and Philip Abrams, "Introduction," Two Tracts on Government [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967]). Other critics are less friendly. Leo Strauss, for example, argues that Locke's rhetoric masks a teaching which is fundamentally Hobbesian in character. To Strauss, Locke's political order rests not on man's knowledge of any God-given moral law, but--like Hobbes' Leviathan--on the most base calculations of self-interest. (See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971], p. 247.)

10. See John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Everyman, 1974), Book IV, pp. 295, 154. In his early years, Locke found the proof of God's existence in the beauty and order of the world. Such a perfect structure, he insists, could not have come into existence merely by chance. See his Essays on the Laws of Nature (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 117, 153. Later Locke suggests that we need look no further than ourselves to find proof of the existence of an eternal, intelligent being. We know that we exist; and we know "by an intuitive certainty" that nothing cannot produce anything real. (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, p. 218).
11. Essays on the Law of Nature, pp. 109, 123.
12. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, pp. 246, 157; Book II, p. 221; Book I, p. 34.
13. Ibid., Book IV, pp. 188, 189. See also Book II, pp. 245, 191; and John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 1969), p. 22, Note #1. Dunn suggests that the law of nature can be recognized through Christian doctrine, and therefore "is only likely to be known as obligatory at all widely in a Christian country, even though it could in principle be known anywhere and is in fact obligatory everywhere."

Locke does offer one other alternative. Without the insight of divine revelation, we have access to the moral knowledge that we create in our minds. Our moral ideas, "being archetypes themselves and so adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge." In this sense, moral truth--like mathematical truths--are the product of our rational faculties. Their validity does not rest on sense-perception, for they are abstracted "from the lives of men and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat." (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, p. 169.) But Locke also indicates that no abstract system can rest solely on the constructs of our minds. At the very least, our first premises are derived from our perceptions of the world outside our minds. (See Essay, Book IV, pp. 167-8.) If so, this alternative means of acquiring moral knowledge is also subject to the limitations of sense-perception.

14. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, pp. 298, 191, 247-8, 249, 231-2.
15. Ibid., pp. 252, 231-2, 257.
16. Ibid., Book II, p. 297.
17. Ibid., Book II, p. 299. There is, of course, a danger in assenting to the opinions of others. The testimonies of our fellows are often inconsistent. Accounts of historical events differ, as do the observations of those around us. Truth therefore appears to vary according to era and locality. To Locke, though, natural law transcends custom. Its content does not change with human experiences. Those who rely too heavily on custom as a source of moral authority forget that their neighbors' feet, like their own, are made of clay--that "no probability can rise higher than its first original." (Ibid., Book IV, pp. 307, 252, 258.) Yet too many do forget. Thus "when Fashion hath one Established, what Folly or craft began, Custom makes it Sacred, and 'twill be thought impudence or madness, to contradict or question it." Becoming "professors of and combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of," human beings often allow themselves to accept and then to espouse opinions that reason might never have tested. (Two Treatises, p. 219; Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, p. 308.) Locke worries that the opinion of our neighbors is "likely to mislead;" but he indicates that their opinion is still one of our better guides.
18. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, p. 300.
19. Ibid.
20. Two Treatises, p. 367. See also Mark Glat, The Political Anthropology of John Locke, an unpublished doctoral dissertation (New

unpublished doctoral dissertation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1978). Dr. Glat's research first suggested to me the idea that the law of opinion could serve as a substitute for the law of nature in Locke's work.

21. Dunn. p. 80
22. Two Treatises, p. 477.
23. Some Thoughts Concerning Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971), p. 28.
24. See John Yolton, Locke: An Introduction (Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 32. Might not Locke's emphasis on social conformity, Yolton asks, stifle "individual initiative and decision?" Yolton believes that for Locke, "a free, responsible person can only be one who is rule-following, where the rules are the measure of rationality and virtue." He argues that Locke finds the secret to promoting such responsibility in the rational treatment of children.
25. Two Treatises, p. 347.
26. Ibid., p. 348. Most of Locke's discussion of parental authority focuses on the role of fathers. Despite his emphasis on political equality, Locke argues that only one parent can rule the family--and that this parent should be the father. At the same time, however, Locke admits that the mother's title to rule is equal to, if not greater than, the father's; for the mother cared for the child "a long time in her own Body out of her own Substance." (Two Treatises, p. 216)
27. Ibid., p. 352, 356. The authority of the Lockean father is thus, as Gordon Schochet suggests, founded not on generation but on education. See Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 248, Note #19.
28. Two Treatises, pp. 215-216, 324.
29. Ibid., p. 349.
30. Thoughts Concerning Education, p. 41.
31. Ibid., p. 36. See also Robert H. Horwitz, "John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Education" in The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977). Horwitz also explores the role played by the law of opinion in Locke's civic education, though his conclusions about the impact of his teaching differ from mine.
32. Thoughts Concerning Education, p. 27, 30.
33. Ibid., p. 76.
34. Ibid., p. 27.
35. Ibid., p. 29.
36. Ibid., pp. 31, 41.
37. Ibid., pp. 33, 36.
38. Ibid., p. 37.
39. Ibid., p. 53.
40. Two Treatises, p. 351.
41. Ibid., p. 358. Schochet argues that inheritance is the strongest bond connecting the generations in the Lockean state. "Locke incorporated genuine social continuity into an essentially individualist political theory by joining tacit consent to inheritance," he writes. (Patriarchalism, p. 353). I want to suggest that Locke attempts to use inheritance to cement a bond that is forged through education.
42. Two Treatises, p. 362.
43. Ibid., p. 329. See also p. 336.
44. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, p. 257. See Note #23.
45. Two Treatises, p. 382.
46. Ibid., p. 387.
47. Ibid., pp. 387-388, 423-425.
48. Ibid., p. 466.
49. Ibid., pp. 462-463.
50. Ibid., p. 467.

A New Reality: Prospects for S.D.I.

Susan Stoudinger

The purpose of this essay is to consider the fate of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a ballistic missile defense program dramatically announced by and intimately associated with President Ronald Reagan. Speculation about SDI, of course, abounds. Some observers say that SDI is a child of the Reagan presidency and will be abandoned when a new administration assumes power. Others suggest that SDI has a modicum of appeal and will remain, albeit in altered form. Still others assert, often with considerable vigor, that certain components of SDI will be deployed during the nineties.

This essay offers two major criteria to employ in the selection of a post-Reagan ballistic missile defense program. The first criterion is "military utility" which evaluates the military requirements of modern strategic defensive and offensive weapons systems. Any weapons system which ranks high in terms of military utility fulfills an explicit military mission. Identifying that mission, then, is vital to assessing SDI's military utility. The second is "political utility," suggesting an evaluation of the base of political support, both domestic and international, for a ballistic missile defense program. Generally speaking, the broader and deeper the base of support, the higher the political utility of the program.

In addition to the discussion of military and political utility, this essay outlines several policy options available to the country's next president as he and his advisors reflect upon strategic defense. This essay also tenders recommendations and conclusions about the course of post-Reagan SDI policy. However, to place these policy questions in context, the first part of this essay provides a brief description of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative as it has developed since 1983.

The SDI Program. The Strategic Defense Initiative (so named in 1984 when the administration was casting around for an alternative to the discredited term "ballistic missile defense" and to the pejorative term "star wars") is a controversial military program that seeks "to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies."¹ Funded by Congress at the level of \$10 billion since 1984 (with \$37 billion projected for the next five years), SDI is an array of programs administered by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) of the Department of Defense.² Air Force Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, and Aeronautical engineer and self-described "technologist," has headed the agency since its establishment in 1984.³

There are, interestingly, two contending broad "versions" of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The first version is the president's own vision of a world in which nuclear weapons are rendered impotent and obsolete because a leakproof shield to protect the entire country (and numerous allies, too) has been constructed--the "total defense" system.⁴ The second version, called the "thin" system, envisions a defensive system which is deployed to protect critical military sites and installations, including land-based missile silos and command-and-control centers.⁵ Some wags contend that President Reagan is the only one who continues to subscribe to the first version.

The strategic defense program currently pursued by the United States is based on the broad concept of ballistic missile defense, a concept which arose in the 1950s when missile technology was emerging. The fledgling missile, armed with nuclear warheads, soon be-

came the major strategic (offensive) weapons system in both the American and Soviet arsenals. Early BMD systems consisted of radars, nuclear-tipped antiballistic missile missiles, and computers. Designed to identify, track, and intercept an enemy rocket, these functions are replicated in today's more sophisticated version of BMD.

The trajectory of a missile is divided into four phases: boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal. While earlier BMD systems centered on the terminal phase, SDI focuses on the boost phase because a missile is especially vulnerable during this period. The boost phase lasts approximately five minutes; the next phase lasts approximately five minutes, too. The goal of SDI is to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase. If any rockets "leak" into the next phase or zone, other defensive systems will be activated. Interception of enemy missiles will utilize either nuclear or non-nuclear devices.

SDI rests on new weapons technologies, often referred to as exotic technologies. Kinetic kill technology, laser technology, particle beam technology-- all are widely discussed in the public literature about SDI.⁶ The most commonly cited technologies are laser and particle beam. Research is underway on space-based lasers and space- or ground-based charged particle beams.

Battlefield management is another aspect of contemporary SDI; it refers to the need for a large array of sophisticated computers to handle the complex and innumerable data needs in an attack situation. The human mind, it seems, is simply not adequate to meet the needs of post-modern warfare, so computer and computer programs are being designed to manage the battle.

The public or official goal of SDI is to provide "a thoroughly reliable and

Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger). But, as noted above, many government officials speak today of partial or intermediate defense. In other words, rather than constructing a leakproof shield to protect the entire population from attack by enemy missiles, the operational goal has shifted to constructing a shield to protect selected military sites and installations.

To be sure, a vocabulary unique to SDI has developed over time. Such words as hardbody, rubber mirror, red team, space mines, smart rocks, and pop-up have surfaced as part of what *Time* labels "Starspeak."⁷ The rudiments, however, of ballistic missile defense have not changed since the 1950s-- identify, track, intercept--although the technologies have radically changed.

Looking at SDI from another perspective, its programmatic and bureaucratic development has indeed been impressive. It began in March 1983 when Reagan--in what White House insiders dubbed the "Star Wars add-on" to a nationally televised address about the defense budget--outlined his vision of strategic defense. The announcement surprised most people, including the Cabinet and bureaucracy, the Congress, the scientific and policy communities, the country's allies, and the Soviet Union. Surprise is not a common ingredient in the formation of public policy issues and its use was calculated in this case. The White House, ever mindful of public strategies and public relations, figured that it added to the impact of the announcement and contributed to the glamour of its initiation.⁸

SDI grew conceptually and matured programmatically in the mid-eighties. The evolution of the program is summarized in Chart 1.

Chart 1: Stages of the SDI Program

Period	Stage
1983	Conceptual
1984	Planning and Implementation
1985	Momentum
1986	Consolidation
1987	Urgency
1988	Status quo

These stages began with the announcement which, in turn, led to formal studies of the concept of ballistic missile defense, one focusing on technologies and the other on political and strategic issues. With the formal establishment of a strategic defense bureaucracy and program in 1984, the stage of advanced planning and early implementation was ushered in. Momentum was established in 1985, with an array of programs underway and allied countries joining the effort.

By contrast, 1986 was a year of consolidation with the revision of goals and the reassessment of major political problems, in particular the relationship between SDI and arms control. But when the Reagan presidency entered its last years, especially late 1986 and 1987, pro-SDI advocates sought to institutionalize the program, applying their talent and energy with a sense of urgency. These efforts to secure deployment of a defensive system, however, were not successful. The election year 1988, moreover, discouraged new SDI ventures while emphasizing arms agreements in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

SDI's Military Utility. To be sure, the question of the military or strategic utility of SDI has been widely discussed and debated since the president's speech in 1983.⁹ Many different answers were provided, of course, to the questions--answers which were often contentious and always provocative.

The chief argument developed (eventually) by the Reagan administration to address the issue of SDI's military utility centers on the relationship between SDI and deterrence. According to the administration, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the strategic utility of SDI is measured by its ability to enhance deterrence.¹⁰ Three reasons are cited to explain the linkage between SDI and enhanced deterrence. The first rests with the enemy's uncertainties about the number of missiles which might penetrate the defensive shield. As these uncertainties mount, confidence in a successful attack decreases, and the enemy is less likely to attack. The second

reason, an off-shoot of the first, suggests that the incentive for a first strike is diminished or eliminated with the existence of the uncertainties. The final reason is that SDI, combined with an air defense program, "could help reduce or eliminate the apparent military value of nuclear attack to an aggressor."¹¹

It is worth pointing out that the Reagan administration's position on strategic doctrine and SDI has often shifted. For example, many hardline conservatives within the government hailed SDI at the outset as a means to abandon the dreaded doctrine of assured destruction and to regain nuclear superiority. Politically (and strategically) moderate elements, however, prevailed when the notion of enhanced deterrence was formally embraced. The struggle was evidently long and difficult.¹² In the mean time, however, Reagan endorsed numerous rhetorical views of the relationship between SDI and deterrence.¹³

1. "Providing a better, more stable basis for enhanced deterrence is the central purpose of the SDI program."
2. "The purpose of SDI is to strengthen deterrence to lower the level of nuclear forces."
3. "...a better way of maintaining deterrence."

Instead of reliance on SDI, are there other ways to make the nuclear world safer? Yes, say many observers.¹⁴ They argue, for instance, that the strategic value of SDI is both questionable and ambiguous. They say that SDI is not adequately grounded in strategic theory and point to the administration's search for strategic justification as evidence for this assertion. Some even claim that to make SDI a strategic cornerstone is to court tragedy. Further, they suggest that if enhanced deterrence is a strategic goal, there are ways other than SDI to satisfy the goal.

To make the world safer, critics submit, reliance must be shifted from strategic defense to arms control treaties and arms reduction agreements. Renewed interest, vigor, and spirit must be directed toward arms negotiations. Treaties and agreements, rather than defensive weapons

systems deployed in space, are the preferred and better policy alternative.

In conclusion, the next president should focus on the SDI's military utility before deciding the vast program's fate. Perhaps the question will be posed in these terms: What military requirement(s) does the SDI program meet? A military requirement--a purpose, a mission--must exist for all weapons systems, offensive and defensive, and is formally assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In my opinion, there is no sound military requirement for SDI. It seems to me that there is no necessary and sufficient set of strategic conditions which require the development and deployment of a ballistic missile defensive system. Such conditions did not prevail in the fifties, the late sixties, or the early seventies--periods when the notion of BMD was also entertained. Furthermore, the deterrence-enhancing requirements is at best contrived since the president's original notion forsook deterrence. Moreover, there are other, less dangerous paths to a safer nuclear world. In particular, the process and substance of arms control/reduction negotiations must be restored to a prominent place on the nuclear and policy agendas. To me, there is no more important task than the revival of nuclear diplomacy.

SDI's Political Utility. The political utility of SDI has been assessed from many perspectives--each of which will be evaluated (again) by the next president. Looking first at public support, opinion polls indicate that support for SDI has been and remains fairly high.¹⁵

From 1984 to the present, a majority of Americans have expressed support for the program. Such support is not unqualified, however. When asked about SDI's cost, for instance, or whether money should be spent for SDI as opposed to domestic programs, responses show that support for SDI goes down. Thus, public support for SDI, while strong, tends to erode when linked to the issue of affordability.

From the perspective of Congress, SDI has earned mixed reviews over the years. Although SDI's support base currently appears "thin" on Capitol

Hill, enthusiasm was very keen initially. Support began to fade, however, in 1985 and intensified when the Office of Technology Assessment released a report highly critical of SDI. The OTA report concluded that implementing a leakproof defensive shield to protect American cities without "a substantial degree of Soviet cooperation," albeit unlikely, "could bring on an offensive and defensive arms race."¹⁶

Another indicator of the degree of legislative support for SDI--a widely used barometer to measure Congressional support for policy initiatives--is the amount of money appropriated for the program each fiscal year. Reports indicate that the president's budget requests for SDI have not been fully funded. Congress, it seems, often cast a skeptical eye toward the SDI program even though legislators representing districts rich with SDI contracts continue to be favorably disposed toward the program.¹⁷

Bureaucratic support for SDI is another angle from which to view the political utility of the program. For instance, the military bureaucracy has not fully supported the SDI program. Not fully consulted before SDI was promulgated, busy with modernization programs announced a few months before (November 1982), and increasingly wary of SDI's strategic and military implications, the Department of Defense has not been a staunch advocate of SDI within the bureaucracy or on Capitol Hill (although former Secretary of Defense Weinberger, of course, was a "true believer" in strategic defense.) The SDI program, according to DoD, competed for scarce resources and, in an era of spending cutbacks and deficits, it was not a welcome participant.¹⁸

Yet another dimension by which to assess SDI's political utility is this symbolic appeal. It is clear that strategic defense strikes a sympathetic (affective) chord with many Americans. SDI's message appeals to the human desire to make the world safer while also manipulating generalized fears of nuclear war. To be sure, symbolism has been an important--and successful--element in the efforts to promote

and implement SDI. For instance, in the 1983 speech which launched SDI, Reagan grasped the symbolic power of SDI when he promised a new age of hope based on a mysterious and revolutionary technology. SDI's symbolic appeal has been and remains high.

All in all, the next president is likely to conclude that SDI sends mixed political signals. Not clearly positive; not clearly negative. Within the domestic political context, for example, the issue of affordability tilts against SDI. Within the international political context, moreover, the Soviet Union remains opposed to SDI--casting a shadow on US-USSR relations in general and hampering bilateral strategic arms negotiations in particular. Furthermore, American allies are divided in their opinion about SDI although some allies, including West Germany and Great Britain, are participating in a multilateralized SDI program. But the symbolic appeal of strategic defense--grounded in the politics of hope--is positive, popular, and powerful.

It seems to me that if relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improve, then domestic support for SDI, including both public and legislative, will decline. In addition, if affordability remains an important issue to the American public, then support for a vast SDI program will vanish. Thus, SDI is likely to lose so long as deficit problems linger and if relations with the Soviet Union improve.

Options. The next president faces numerous options with respect to the SDI program. These options are summarized in Chart 2.¹⁹ Seven alternatives are outlined, ranging from no BMD research and development program to deployment by both the US and the USSR of full-scale SDI-type defensive systems. To reiterate, it seems to me that the next administration will face these options as it considers the future of ballistic missiles defense.

Chart 2: Post-Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Options

- No research and development program
- Minimal research and development program
- Modest research and development program
- Maximum research and development program
- Deployment of "thin" defense system
- Deployment of deterrence-enhancing defensive system
- Bilateral deployment of full-scale defensive systems

In my opinion, the next chief executive will be staring at constraints and limitations, too, as he and his staff review SDI. The first constraint will be technological. Technology has rendered some SDI elements practical and feasible, according to scientific experts. Other elements, however, remain outside the grasp of technology. The next president must be realistic, willing to acknowledge the limits of science and technology. In addition, the second restraint will be economic. The cost of a new defensive system has been and will be scrutinized in light of the domestic economy, the federal budget, and the deficit. The next president may well conclude that the country cannot afford to deploy a defensive system. The third and final restraint is political and has both domestic and international ramifications--should the ABM Treaty be abrogated, altered, strengthened, maintained? While the next president inherits a battered treaty, its future appears uncertain.

Conclusions and Recommendations. If my argument is persuasive--that there is little military need or strategic merit associated with SDI and that its political base of support is relatively weak--then what is SDI's fate? My best guess is that the next president, facing the options outlined above, is likely to favor a two-track approach: (1) restructure the sweeping R&D program to conform to more modest goals (for instance, as a hedge against Soviet breakthroughs in the area of strategic defense); and (2) emphasize arms control/reduction negotiations, with verification, to conform to rather

ambitious goals (to make the world safer and less threatening).

The fate of SDI will also depend on two other factors which are themselves linked: the overall relationship between the US and the USSR and the nature of strategic arms negotiations. If both improve, then I suspect SDI decisions would favor some form of modest R&D program. If both deteriorate, then some type of deployment scheme would be favored. If one erodes while the other improves, then SDI decisions would be postponed and SDI would again become a bargaining chip.

New realities present themselves to the next president. In my view, SDI will endure, however, in an altered form as the basis of a R&D program and as an impetus to a modernized arms control regime.

Notes

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2. The five-year projection was provided by Rosy Nimroody, Council of Economic Priorities, in her remarks in a panel entitled "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Issues and Values," Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis (March 31, 1988).
3. Charles Mohr, "General to Head Missile Program," New York Times (March 28, 1984), p. 1.
4. Consult 1983 speech in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (March 28, 1983), vol. 19, no. 10, pp. 364-370.
5. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon Officials Now Envision Sharply Curtailed Star Wars Plan," St. Petersburg Times (April 3, 1988), p. 7.
6. See, for example, William J. Broad, "Science Showmanship; A Deep 'Star Wars' Rift," New York Times (December 16, 1985), p. 1.; Carl Sagan, "Star Wars: The Leaky Shield," Parade Magazine (December 8, 1985), p. 11; Charles Mohr, "Antimissile Plan Seeks Thousands of Space Weapons," New York Times, (November 3, 1985), p. 1.
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8. Robert C. Rowland and Rodger A. Payne, "The Effectiveness of Reagan's 'Star Wars' Address: The Three Audiences of Defense Policy Rhetoric," Political Communication and Persuasion, Vol. 4, No.3 (1987), 161-178.

9. For a good analysis of strategic issues, consult Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, The Last Frontier: An Analysis of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986).

10. 1985 statement (note 1).

11. 1985 statement (note 1).

12. See, for instance, Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Works (New York: Random House, 1988).

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17. Contained in Rosy Nimroody's remarks (note 2).

18. See Smith, op. cit. 19.

19. Based on remarks by Peter Clausen, Union of Concerned Scientists, in a roundtable entitled, "U.S.-Soviet Strategic Defense," Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis (March 31, 1988).

The U.S./U.N. Policy After the Reagan Years

Fred Gareau

This essay requires predictions about American foreign policy, a prospect which easily appear brash and foolhardy. Social science does not predict well; indeed, it often does not even analyze well. There are three certainties; the first is that we will not reassemble in the future the predictions made here. The second is that interests greatly influence foreign policy and that the parts of the United Nations under study here will stay under the control of the third world which now dominates them. The third is that the U.S. government will continue to be controlled by the current dominant elites and that U.S. administrations will continue their same secular oscillations between the parameters of liberal/conservative, Democratic/Republican. Our analysis argues that national interest (as defined by dominant elites) provides a more or less firm secular foundation about which the politics of given administrations oscillate. The U.N. policy of the Reagan years was no exception, but here the oscillators were almost all in a negative direction. The post-Reagan years will probably dance to the same essential tune, with the chance that the oscillations will veer more toward the positive.

Before turning to analysis, a few preliminary definitions and remarks are in order. The term "United Nations" as used in this essay is the United Nations system minus the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The United Nations system is a conglomerate, composed of that central parent agency which was founded at San Francisco, plus the Specialized Agencies and special programs which are affiliated with it. A usual characteristic of the institutions members of the conglomerate is one state one vote, with the result that third world countries now control the great majority of the institutions. The exceptions are the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund, whose voting is by capital subscription, viewed as a blessing and the means of domination for the rich first world countries. These institutions are used by first world elites, especially by American elites, to enhance their power and interests in the world, especially in the third world. This essay analyzes U.S. policy toward the United Nations system, minus the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This analysis assumes that the substantial interest which motivates the dominant elite of a state to join and to support international organizations is to fashion their services and output so as to promote that elite's policy. These outputs and services have been divided according to several typologies. One looks to categories such as conflict resolution, economic development, etc. We adopt a five fold classification: information, conference diplomacy, standards, material aid, and field services. This is not the time or the place to elaborate upon these type outputs, but they have potential utility or disutility for the promotion of a foreign policy. The United States government hardly needs additional sources of information, but that government does feel the need from time to time to use other outputs and services of the world organization. At the very time that the Reagan Administration and Congress were collaborating in a joint effort to starve the United Nations financially, the Administration launched a campaign in the Security Council to put pressure on Iran, so as to bring the Iran-Iraq war to a conclusion. The administration found the conference facilities of the United Nations useful for promoting this policy. The other superpower lost sight of this principle in the first half of 1950 when it boycotted the Security Council, and thus it denied itself the use of the veto. This allowed the United States to use

the world organization to legitimize its support for South Korea in the civil war in which that part of Korea was involved in the early fifties. The legitimizing function of the World Organization refers to that aspect of standard setting by which the institution lends its legitimacy to the policies or the regime of an outside party, usually a state. Unfortunately, the constant granting of legitimacy by the international institution to one side in a conflict can delegitimize the organization with the other side of the conflict. This process is at work at the present time -- the third world uses its "automatic majority" in the world organization to legitimize its policies, but this delegitimizes the organization in the United States and other first world countries.

The Golden Years and Their Demise

This section of the essay features the golden years of United States control of the the United Nations in the immediate postwar period, and the loss of this control to the third world, i.e. the demise of the golden years in the 1960s and 1970s. United States dominance in the world organization corresponded to her dominance outside the organization in the so-called "real" world. She was the foremost superpower by any measure, the head of what became a series of bilateral and multilateral alliances of what were at first terribly dependent and what appear in retrospect to be wonderfully loyal allies. These allies voted with almost monotonous regularity for American backed resolutions in the organs of the United Nations. U.S. power within the world institution reflected her awesome power on the outside. There were some deviations, but it is surprising how few they were, even for Latin America -- the only important third world group of consequence in the

early golden years. Criticism was leveled at Washington for not using the United Nations more, but use was made of it on many occasions. Much of this was to legitimize the U.S. position in the Cold War and to delegitimize that of the Soviet adversary. Examples are criticism of the Bloc's record on civil rights, the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, and the use of the legitimizing functions of the world organization to buttress and to sanctify the policies of the Truman Administration as it fought the North Koreans and the Chinese in the Korean Peninsula. Alexander Dalin argues that the Soviet absence from the Security Council at the time was part of a larger Soviet policy of disengagement from the world organization.¹ Evidently, the United States had been so successful in utilizing the world organization against the Soviet Union that the organization had been almost completely delegitimized in the Kremlin. Robert Riggs analyzed 86 General Assembly roll-calls on political issues from 1946 to 1954. He found that the General Assembly agreed with the United States on 70 of these and disagreed with only three.² The world body agreed with the Soviet Union on only 24 -- the worst record of any group in the organization. The present author made a study of United Nations General Assembly roll calls in the period 1947 to 1967. He found 330 of them voted on in committee or in plenary which had a bearing on the Cold War. Not one passed in plenary which favored the Soviet position. The study revealed that the votes viewed in the aggregate were more than three to one against the Soviet position.³ The Soviet Union of the early postwar period was under Stalinist administration, a situation which also worked against Soviet support for the world organization. The Soviet Union refused to join several Specialized Agencies, notably the "controversial" UNESCO and the ILO, until after the death of Stalin. A Stalinist Soviet Union adhered to a two-camp thesis: third world countries were the enemy -- allied to the first world.

The United States lost its "automatic majority" in the General Assembly and similar organizations, not to the Soviet Union, but to third world countries. This was a plus, if an indirect one, for Soviet policy, because the chief target of the third world has been the United States. Nonetheless, Soviet policy toward the world organization did not undergo a major shift under Gorbachev. The shift to third world control occurred in great part because of the increased membership of the third world countries in the organizations under review and because of their mobilization. The mobilization occurred in the so-called "Group of 77" within the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development and within the Non-Aligned Movement. The membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (the NAM) has grown to some 100, including two non-state members, the PLO and SWAPO. It has a diverse membership, reflecting this characteristic of the third world -- from the feudalism of Saudi Arabia to the communism of Cuba. The organization is misnamed. It is a diverse lobby with interests which extend beyond non-alignment to include support for the South over the North, the Arabs over Israel, and the Blacks of South Africa over the white ruling elites. The members do not take the same view of these matters, but they bury their differences in hopes of forging common policies and agreement on United Nations resolutions. They usually come to agreements on these subjects, with positions opposite to those of the United States government.

Their policies on North/South issues are "radical", not acceptable either to American conservatives or liberals or to mainline Democrats or Republicans. Furthermore, the third world, mobilized in the Group of 77 or by the Non-Aligned Movement, insists on legitimizing its policies through acceptance by United Nations institutions. Its overwhelming success in this endeavor has delegitimized the United Nations with U.S. governments. The NAM has many Arab members including the PLO. This assures that the or-

ganization will adopt the Arab position against Israel, whose closest ally is the United States. African states make up a large part of the NAM and take a view of South Africa contrary to that of American administrations. Notice that our view of the NAM is a broad one, not the narrow one suggested by its name. It refers to this broad ideology or large movement of mostly African-Asian states, but others including Latin American are included.⁴

Just when the United Nations transferred from U.S. hegemony to that of the third world is not clear. Perhaps the breakpoint should be identified as October 25, 1971, the date when Peking received the China seat in the General Assembly, and Taiwan was expelled from the organization. This marked the failure of American policy, which had succeeded for over 20 years in keeping Peking out of the organization. Another possibility for marking the transition would be the first veto cast by the United States by the Nixon Administration, in defense of the white racist regime in Southern Rhodesia. By now the United States is the greatest invoker of the veto, having used this instrument 36 times of the 68 vetoes registered between 1981 and 1986.⁵ The U.S. crusade to restrict the scope of the veto is now a thing of the past, and this cause has now been taken up by the NAM. The U.S. crusade was launched immediately after the founding of the United Nations, during the golden years. At that time the United States avoided use of the veto whereas the Soviets were number one in its use. Now that the United States is number one, administration proposals for reform have taken a different turn. Whenever the shift in hegemony occurred, it was long before the advent of the Reagan administration. Moreover, the techniques and the antics of the Reagan administration were practiced before the installation of this administration. The United States left the International Labor Organization from late 1977 to early 1980. A major reason was the threat to tripartism represented by Soviet membership.⁶ Ironically, this tripartism, with its implicit denial of the class

struggle, kept the Soviet Union out of the organization during the Stalin years. The U.S. squabbled over its contribution to the U.N. budget, long before the Reagan administration withheld funds so as to get control of the United Nations budget. She did manage to get her assessment quota reduced from almost 40 percent to 25 percent.⁷ If Reagan had Kirkpatrick as his in house professor and ideologue to put down third world radicals, his predecessors had Moynihan to do the same.

The Reagan Years

The Reagan administration came to power well stocked with precedents on how to play hardball with the United Nations. This administration was elected in the wake of the nationalist fever sparked by the media's handling of the excesses of the Iranian Revolution. Nationalist self-assertion became a central feature of the new dispensation. A target was the United Nations and a target within the organization was the third world, more specifically the "totalitarian leadership" of the Non-Aligned Movement. The two targets tended to be fused together because of NAM dominance in the world organization. The major contribution of the Reagan administration was the systematic and ideological way in which it organized and fought the battle within, and against, the United Nations. An ideologue of the right was chosen as the spokesperson in the world organization. Dr. Kirkpatrick put great emphasis upon the spoken word -- an emphasis characteristic of professors and ideologues. She made it a point to answer in kind charges made against the United States. She drew a stark distinction between the United States as the representative of the forces of good and the Soviet Union as representing pure evil. The moral chasm which separated them justified, actually required, support for the strengthening of one over the other. Perhaps her greatest intellectual contribution to the Reagan Administration was the distinction she made between Marxist dictators and the "traditional" dictators of

the likes of the Shah of Iran and General Somoza. She rehabilitated these latter, arguing that they offer the hope of gradual democratization.⁸ She was hardly a friend of the United Nations, arguing that it tends to exacerbate conflicts. She combined these ideas with a certain naivete. She complained that even the Security Council was being politicized.⁹ The context of her complain suggests that what she thought should exist is an even-handed, non-political U.N. institution. She saw the United States in the United Nations as a virgin in a white dress, not even a member of a caucusing group.

Kirkpatrick's style at the United Nations was confrontational -- confrontational with the non-aligned majority. Actually this represented a return to the tactics of Senator Moynihan. She utilized what has been called at the world organization "the soap box." She took little part in informal conversations in the corridors of the institution. In fact, she spent much of her time in Washington in the Cabinet and on the National Security Council.¹⁰ She filled the majority of places in the mission with fellow neo-conservatives at the expense of "professionals." This was changed by General Vernon Walters, who in May 1985 took over as Kirkpatrick's successor. He is a linguist, a former CIA official, well known for his special missions for the president. He in effect had put into practice, at least in Brazil, what the philosophy by Professor Kirkpatrick could lead to easily. He was the American military attache in Brazil in 1964, part of an American team which stood ready to help the local military subvert Brazilian democracy -- help which, so it turned out, the generals did not need.¹¹ The Johnson administration sent a fleet with the guns and the petroleum supplies which the conspirators estimated that they might need. Since the putsch proceeded better than had been expected, the supplies were not needed. The fleet was called back, pretending that it had been on maneuvers. In his memoirs, Walters sets forth the strange thesis that the putschists were defenders of the fatherland and guardians of its fun-

damental values -- against far leftists in the then current government.¹² Brazil suffered 20 years of military rule after the putsch. Walter's approach at the United Nations was much less confrontational than that of Kirkpatrick. He has also made an effort to cultivate other delegates. It could be said that in this respect he was more effective.

A unique feature of the Reagan years was the "grading system" created for judging the extent to which members of the General Assembly agree with the United States. The system was inaugurated in 1983, pursuant to Congressional mandate, and it is made up of resolutions of record compiled by the United States mission. For example, in 1985 Israel voted with the United States on 91.5 percent of the roll calls chosen, Angola 3.5 percent of the time.¹³ These represent the two extreme scores, the range for the distribution. The mean for the whole membership for 1985 was only 22.5 percent. In 1986 this mean rose slightly to only 23.7 percent.¹⁴ The figure did not rise much after Kirkpatrick left, and her place was taken by Walters, a quieter, more tractable and more agreeable diplomat. The figures thus seem to reflect, not so much diplomatic style as the isolated minority position of the United States in a hostile third world environment. The third world controls the agenda of this environment, just as the United States did during the "golden years." Then the Soviet bloc served as minority. Now it is the United States, Israel, and South Africa. The Reagan administration decided to fight back. In November 1981, a few months after having assumed power, it initiated an 18-month study of the American position in international organizations.¹⁵ The policy priorities applied as the basis for the study included zero growth in the budgets of these organizations, plus the reduction in the number of expensive conferences to be held. Two other priorities were to reassert American leadership in multilateral affairs and to enhance the role of the private sector in international relations. The review, completed in May 1983, had three main conclusions, all of them

critical. International organizations were faulted for their high levels of budgetary growth, their statist approach to solving problems, and the U.N. Specialized Agencies were singled out for special reproach because of their alleged statist approach.

The Reagan Administration implemented an anti-United Nations policy, the reasons given being mainly those listed above. It left UNESCO in December 1984, giving as reasons the politicization of the specialized agency; its poor management practices; budgetary expansion; and its alleged hostility toward free institutions, especially the free market and a free press.¹⁶ This administration is at present leading an attack upon the Food and Agricultural Organization, its declared reason being the alleged improper management practices of its executive secretary.¹⁷ The cutting edge of this attack is by now the familiar tactic of the withholding of funds. This was the tactic used also against the United Nations Populations Fund (UNPF). In this latter case the administration was catering to the pro-life movement, which alleged that UNPF funds were being used by the Peking (Chinese) regime to impose abortions upon its citizens. The most famous use of this technique, by the Reagan administration was when it forced the General Assembly to give up its control over the United Nations budget in return for the resumption of U.S. payments. The "surrender" of the General Assembly was expressed in a resolution of December 19, 1986, when the General Assembly voted to yield a large share of its control over the budget to the 21-member Committee for Program and Coordination.¹⁸ It was agreed that the authority in this body over the budget would be by "consensus," thus giving the large contributors represented in its committee, such as the United States, a veto over the budget. The U.S. withholding of funds was supplemented by the Kas-sebaum Amendment as the threat which succeeded in forcing its will upon the General Assembly. Passed in July 1985, this amendment provided that if the United Nations did not come

up with a weighted voting system for financial decisions by January 1987, the United States would unilaterally reduce its assessment from 25 to 20 percent of the U.N. budget. The facedown of the General Assembly in December 1986 was thus a joint administration/congressional undertaking. At one point, the administration feared that Congress was withholding too many funds, and it countered this with a campaign claiming that the United Nations as a key for promoting American foreign policy.¹⁹

After the Reagan Years

Predictions for the future of U.S. policy are based upon the assumptions that: 1) the U.S. government will remain under elites which vary between being liberal or conservative or, stated otherwise, U.S. governments by Democrats or Republicans; 2) that the third world revolt will continue; and 3) that third world nations will continue to control and to use the United Nations to legitimize that revolt. The third world revolt is of historic proportions, not something that will disappear soon. Its goals have grown in the postwar period from initial political independence to liberation in the spheres of economics, culture, mass communications, etc. The third world revolt represents a radical attack upon the world capitalist system as it is presently dominated by the United States and other first world countries. It is illegitimate to the controlling American elites, outside the acceptable ideological contours of liberal/conservative or Democratic/Republican. Thus surprisingly little opposition arose in the United States when the Reagan Administration pulled the U.S. out of UNESCO. This organization had been attacking what the administration chose to call the free market and freedom of the press. It had been delegitimized in the United States. From the third world perspective, the attack was upon monopoly capitalism and first world control of mass communications. Such attacks should continue, and with them the

continuing delegitimization of the United Nations in the United States.

It is unrealistic to expect third world countries to stop using the world organization to legitimize their policies. These states are notoriously weak and have few other ways of promoting their policies. The world organization has been their favorite arena, and victories there have nurtured their self-esteem and worked against the traditional fatalism of the poor and weak. Richard Jackson argues that the United Nations represents for these nations a fulcrum for their demands, justification for their existence, and a gauge of their strength.²⁰ The NAM is the largest voting bloc in the United Nations, and its members will be loathe to throw away such an asset. Despite its power, the United States during the golden years never seemed to tire of using the world organization to legitimize its cold war policies. Our conclusion is that future administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, liberal or conservative, will not at some future date become sanguine about the world organization. There is no prospect of the United States' regaining the control of the world organization and becoming content about the organization -- future third world hegemony seems secure. Liberal/Democratic administrations or congresses thus will not be able to embrace the organization as before, even if they decide to treat it less abrasively than the Reaganites. In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations oppose U.S. policy toward Israel, another reason for alienating Liberal/Democratic Americans. Liberal/Democratic regimes may appoint a professional from the State Department or even an Andy Young as ambassador to the United Nations, rather than an ideologue of the right such as Kirkpatrick or Moynihan. Future American opposition may not be so organized, so systematic as during the Reagan years. This would be another point in the organization's favor, but not a major shift in policy. Liberals will be more likely to listen to the complaints of the

NAM, but they are just as likely to defend American national interests.

Future American policy will certainly demonstrate some support for the United Nations. The preference will be for a lean institution, but not a cadaver. Some support is indicated, because every nation, particularly a superpower, from time to time needs U.N. outputs, or it determines to block such outputs. Witness the current U.S. diplomatic attempt through the United Nations to bring the Iran-Iraq War to a close by putting pressure upon Iran. The Soviets seem to have learned that their boycott of the Security Council in 1950 was counterproductive. They have not repeated this tactic. The expectation is that this lesson will not be lost upon even the Republicans/conservatives, at least enough of them, so that the U.S. will continue to provide a minimum of support for the world organization. Friends of the United Nations must be encouraged by Gorbachev's recent shift in favor of the United Nations. In terms of power politics analysis, the shift is late, but even so it is logical in these terms. After all, the world organization shifted from United States to third world control some time ago. Our estimate for continuing weak U.S. support for the U.N., but support nonetheless, must be considered a social science production. Its epistemic value is much less than that of natural science.

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Linkages Between Sunni and Shi'i Radical Fundamentalist Organizations: A New Variable In Recent Middle Eastern Politics?

Bernard Schechterman and Bradford R. McGuinn

Introduction

In recent years, the already violent currents of Middle Eastern politics have been more forcefully agitated by the radical version of Islamic fundamentalism. Currently there are over two hundred Islamist fundamentalist organizations in the region. They vary in composition and degree of militancy. But, among all such groups is the desire to effect Islamic rule and restore the fundamentalists of faith to their societies. While for most Muslims and fundamentalists this effort prompts only a greater personal or individual resolve, with benign consequences, for a highly visible minority it necessitates violent undertakings.

The radical tangent is represented in each of Islam's primary sects. Although the smaller Shi'i faction has received much more attention, radical fundamentalism also occurs within the Sunni sect. The multitude of Sunni and Shi'i revolutionary organizations have been subjected to considerable analysis. Yet, one area that has been largely overlooked are the inter-sectarian alliance partners, especially in the furtherance of their radical goals. Ironically, while there is a danger that Islamic fundamentalism as a whole may be overanalyzed, the question of actual (and potential) organizational linkage between radical Sunni and Shi'i groups grouped have attracted little attention. This is largely due to the oft-stated view as to their distinctions as epitomized by quotes from Shireen T. Hunter and Bernard Lewis respectively:

The other important factor has been the increasing schism and divisions within the fundamentalist movement. Most significant is the division between Sunnis and Shias. their common commitment to the goal of establishing Islamic rule has intensified their age-old animosity, instead of uniting them. Some Sunni fundamentalists in the Gulf even openly accuse the Shias of heresy.¹

In their own perception, the Shi'a were the opposition in Islam, the defenders of the oppressed, the critics and opponents of privilege and power. The Sunni Muslims, broadly speaking, stood for the status quo—the maintenance of the existing political, social, and above all religious order.²

This essay addresses the contemporary deficiency in examining linkages and cooperative efforts, in particular both the intent and the extent for both radical Sunni and Shi'i organizations. This is to say that such groups have acted in concert on the basis of particular mutual self-interests or perceived universal goals. This essay proceeds by means of several levels of analyses. The first section provides an overview of the emergence of radical fundamentalism as a variable in Middle Eastern politics, particularly with an eye towards backgrounding the main thesis of this essay. A section is specifically devoted to materials on linkages and cooperative efforts by Sunni and Shi'i radical fundamentalists in various locations and in varying degrees of activities, as well as failures and successes. Special attention is devoted to the operational effort of Iran under the influence of Khomeinism to attain and sustain the cooperative ventures. Finally, in the conclusion, a judgment is rendered regarding the significance of the phenomenon and a number of contentions are offered regarding its potential for the near future.

The Emergence of Contemporary Radical Fundamentalism:

An Overview

In his famous essay "The Return of Islam," published in 1976, Bernard Lewis asserted that: "Islam is still the most effective form of consensus in Muslim countries...."³ Several years later, amid the tumult of Islamic revolutionary activism throughout the

Middle East, his analysis would become an article of modern prophecy. Lewis grasped the salience of religion in the area where others did not, because in part, he recognized the shallow roots of its modern ideological competitors. The ideologues of pre-World War Two western-type liberal nationalism, Bandung Generation Arab (integral) nationalism, and Marxist or non-Marxist Third Worldism reflected the views of narrow elites, not a popular following.⁴ That western observers often failed to appreciate the extent of this cleavage betrayed their secular and even melioristic bias.⁵ Many were therefore taken by surprise when, in the late sixties and the seventies, several elites, disillusioned with secular ideologies, reverted back to the language and ideas of Islam.⁶

Yet, the urge to return to faith was a common theme in the Arab-Islamic experience.⁷ To other observers, the Islamic reassertion, in its benign and violent manifestation, is best viewed as a development phenomenon.⁸ For example, J.C. Voll has stressed the importance of continuity and change.⁹ In his analysis, various "styles" of Islam such as pragmatic adaptationism, conservatism, fundamentalism, and individualism, advance and retreat in different eras.¹⁰ During the latter seventies it was fundamentalism, in its radical form, which appeared to be ascendant. While there is much disagreement regarding the reasons behind the reemergence of this style of Islam,¹¹ there seems to be a general consensus that it had much to do with the severity of what R. Hrair Dekmejian terms the "crisis milieu."¹² This rubric covers a range of negative features and developments: from identity, legitimacy, and cultural crises to misrule, coercive abuse, class conflict and military impotence.¹³ Taken as a whole, this milieu points up the

profound social and intellectual crisis that has held the Arab/Islamic Middle East in its grip for several hundred years.¹⁴ Radical Islamic fundamentalism was thought to represent the most authentic way out of the recent past.¹⁵

The viability of the fundamentalist approach was greatly enhanced with the advent of the Islamic state in Iran. Although radical fundamentalists were active throughout the region,¹⁶ it was in Iran where the cause triumphed, that the movement was able to topple the secular-oriented Pahlavi dynasty, humiliate the United States, and in the process served to foster an atmosphere of forward momentum and invincibility around their leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.¹⁷ The Iranian Islamic Republic became a model and inspiration for Islamic revolutionaries, both Shi'i and Sunni, the world over.¹⁸

But it soon became apparent the Khomeini regime aspired to a role greater than that of a mere example.¹⁹ Indeed, it was unambiguous in its desire to spread Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East.²⁰ In a book published by the then Iranian Ambassador to the Vatican, Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Hadi Khosrow-shahi, stated: "The Islamic movement in Iran is the vanguard of the world-wide Islamic movement;" also "Khomeini is one of the lamps in the gloom of this black night;" and finally "A powerful state will be born in Iran that will be an essential party in determining the fate of the region."²¹ To this end, as will be delineated subsequently, Iran has served as an organizational center, a sponsor, a supporter, and even as a participant on behalf of various radical fundamentalist groups engaged in insurrectionary and terrorist activities.²²

Prospects for radicals' success seemed to be enhanced by the fact that most rulers in the region are narrowly based and considered to be illegitimate by segments of their populations.²³ The Middle East was, in fact, shaken by fundamental activism. This was evident in the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the organized upheavals in eastern Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa,

in that assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, and the numerous terrorist acts in Kuwait and Lebanon.²⁴ While Iran was not always organizationally linked to the groups behind these events, it often served as the inspirational and aspirational model through continuous and extensive rhetoric.

Yet, by the mid-eighties, a full decade after the publication of Lewis' article, some analysts were wondering whether the Iranian-inspired activities were, perhaps, a spent force.²⁵ The reign of terror inside Iran, the war with Iraq, and the ability of even the most narrowly based regimes to hold on to power, all seemed to militate against the spread of the "Islamic tide." An assumed factor, as earlier indicated, has been the salience of the Sunni-Shi'i cleavage. Some contend that the division has been exacerbated by the Gulf War, an event which is thought to have limited the effectiveness of Khomeinism in the overwhelmingly Sunni-dominated Middle East region.²⁶

However, careful examination of the emergent radical fundamentalism from the latter seventies to the present, raises the prospects of an alternative conclusion. Although it still appears unlikely that an Islamic monolith emanating from Teheran will engulf the entire region, it seems possible that in many areas of the Arab/Islamic World, given the state of instability, the impact of radical fundamentalism, as inspired and/or directed by Iran, could be great.²⁷ It is conceivable that the anarchic dynamics of these same areas will produce an atmosphere increasingly conducive to Sunni and Shi'i radicals cooperating for specific and limited objectives.

*Given the extensive presentation and argumentation elsewhere as to the theoretical and practical weaknesses for a cooperation or linkage hypothesis,*²⁸ one must still consider the sources for convergence among radical Sunni and Shi'i fundamentalists, especially emanating from the Iranian influence.

Usage of the term "ideology" in modern comparative politics often represents a form of intellectual pres- tidigitation. As a product of western

thought and experience, the concept of ideology is transposed onto such areas as the Middle East at the price of substantial loss of meaning.²⁹ While the tendency of western observers to engage in this practice has been widely noted, its mirror image, the tendency of indigenous groups to coopt the activist categories of western thought merits equal attention. Ironically, one of the most conspicuous of such groups in the Middle East are the radical fundamentalists.³⁰

Although much of their rhetoric is predicated on the perniciousness of modern and alien influences, fundamentalist ideologues borrow heavily from the fashionable ideologies of the west.³¹ The effect of this process has been what Daniel Pipes has termed the "ideologization of religion."³² Ideology is therefore a major component of contemporary militant Islam. It is also a principle source of convergence between Sunni and Shi'i fundamentalist movements. This is evident in the five major components of the Islamist activist ideology.

In Islam, unlike Christianity or Judaism, there is no separation between religion and politics.³³ For Islamic fundamentalists, the faith is "...regarded as a total system of existence...."³⁴ In the form of radical Islamist ideology this concept translates into a totalistic world view, with totalitarian political implications.³⁵ In their study of fundamentalist Iran, Cheryl Bernard and Zalmy Khalilzad detect this tendency in Khomeinism:

It is totalitarian, encompassing all areas of life, seeking to regulate behavior, impulses, and interactions of the private as well as the public sort and dividing the world into good and evil.³⁶

This uncompromising inclination is also found in the writings of the Egyptian Sunni ideologue Sayyid Qutb. In his imagery "...there are two parties in all the world: the Party of God and the Party of Satan."³⁷ Their respective dogmatism in thought and intolerance in practice thus reflects a common totalitarian tendency inhering in Sunni and Shi'i radical ideology.

The high voltage zeal exhibited by Islamic militants is attributable, in part,

to their millennialist expectations.³⁸ To be sure, all movements, whether religious or secular, are charged with a measure of chiliasm.³⁹ Eschatology, it may be argued, is what provides the necessary pull or direction to human endeavor. Yet, it may also be the vehicle for radicalism. By exploiting the hopes and symbols of Islam, militant ideologues seek to convert the idea of chiliasm (or Mahdism) into social and political levers of power seeking and attainment.⁴⁰ In their pursuits of the millennium, Sunni and Shi'i radicals represent an extreme version of this phenomenon nowadays.⁴¹

If radical fundamentalist ideology is totalist and militantly chiliast, it also has its populist dimensions.⁴² In the Middle East, as in other societies, the locus of the conspiratorial outlook, distrust of elites, and modernity (change) may be found in the countryside as well as among recent rural migrants to the cities.⁴³ A number of scholars have indicated that the appeal of radical Islam is greatest among these groups.⁴⁴ In fact, some observers have suggested that the recent Islamic surge is essentially a populist movement.⁴⁵ It is therefore not surprising that Khomeini should attempt to cultivate a populist language, "...the language of the ordinary man, attacking intellectuals and eggheads, the rich and the elite...."⁴⁶ One of the critical perceptions of the "ulema" (clergy) is their role and connection with the people in the streets.

In his endeavor, Khomeini symbolizes another aspect of radical Islamist ideology, the centrality of a charismatic leader.⁴⁷ In the fundamentalist context, where the energies of religion and politics are merged, the role of the charismatic, capable of mobilizing the passions and support of a mass constituency, is vital.⁴⁸ Among the Sunnis, Juhayman al-Utaybi, leader of the Grand Mosque uprising and Salih Siriyah, head of the Egyptian Islamic Liberation Organization fit the model. Baqir al-Sadr, who until his execution in 1980, led the Iraqi Hizb al-Dawah and Hussein Musawi, currently leader of the Islamic Amal in Lebanon, represent the Shi'i charismatic form.

As the violent activities by fundamentalists in Lebanon under score, the most important dimension to militant Islamic ideology is the justification for extreme behavior. This tendency emerges from a radical interpretation of the "jihad" concept.⁴⁹ For most Muslims *jihad* refers simply to an exertion, usually mental, on behalf of the faith.⁵⁰ The fanatical Muslim, sword in one hand, Quran in the other, is more a product of western imagery rather than Islamic history.⁵¹ However, radical ideologues such as Qutb have challenged the benign interpretation.⁵² He employed a militant version on behalf of his Islamic version of "Liberation Theology."⁵³ In fact, for Qutb, *jihad* represents a "liberating struggle" (not dissimilar to Franz Fanon's secular concept).⁵⁴ The extremist implications of his thought became apparent when he spoke of the fate awaiting those persons or institutions that stood in the way: "(f)or Islam to establish its divine system," Qutb declares, "it is inevitable that these material powers be destroyed and the powers that administer the systems that resist the divine way be annihilated."⁵⁵ The abundance of violent acts committed by both Sunni and Shi'i radical groups in recent years demonstrates the ease by which thoughts and ideas have been translated into actions.

On the more theoretical level the strongest source of convergence between radical Sunni and Shi'i organizations has been in the area of political activism. As with ideology, the belief "...in the promise of political action and the efficacy of violent political action..." are borrowed concepts.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, this viewpoint has become central to the outlook of contemporary radical Islamists.⁵⁷ The attainment and retention of power are basic preoccupations of these groups.⁵⁸ The ideological, or in this case, religious nexus, may serve to disguise or justify certain forms of behavior, which are actually formed by the desire for power.⁵⁹ This is often labeled the *Realpolitik* form of political behavior elsewhere, but is common in all societies and areas of the world. In the realist concept of politics, actors

create coalitions and develop alliance patterns based upon expediency and opportunities, rather than on the basis of abstract principles.⁶⁰ In the contemporary Middle East, the Syrian-Iranian relationship is a typical paradigmatic example of this phenomenon at the state level. Examples abound for Middle East indigenous elements to prove viability as well as acceptability.⁶¹

As with nations, the primary criteria for alliances among revolutionary movements is mutual interest. This was evident in Iran during the overthrow of the Shah when fundamentalists and communists were allied against the government.⁶² Typically these coalitions are limited (but not predictable) in duration and in objectives.⁶³ As Palmerston suggested, only interests are permanent; alliances are inherently transitory.⁶⁴ They are but opportunistic means and tactics to sought after common ends. For both Sunni and Shi'i Islamist radical groups their "...political thrust is directed against the governing classes, their elites at home, and foreign connections abroad," as well as toward the jointly held goal of achieving Islamic rule.⁶⁵

In the Islamic historical experience a number of elements have served to reduce the popular animosity between the Sunni and Shi'i sects and contribute to the prospects of cooperation in mutual interest situations. Two such agents have been Sufism and the geographic distribution of various Shi'i offshoots in predominantly Sunni areas. These mediums for convergence represent arenas where the conceptual bifurcation between the sects may be relaxed. They also afford opportunities for cooperation in militant radical behavior among fundamentalists.

The term "Sufi" is derived from the Arabic word "suf" meaning wool, which was an allusion to the garments worn by the itinerant mystics.⁶⁶ These were in Edward Mortimer's words "... pious Muslims who believed that through meditation and self-discipline they had attained a direct personal experience of God."⁶⁷ As developed through the centuries, *Sufism* has come to represent the individualistic dimension of Islam.⁶⁸ From this vantage point

Sufism has served as a force for coalescence between the Sunni and Shi'i sects. As Hamid Enayat observed:

That Sufism was made a medium for bringing the two sects together was natural enough. With its theoretical aversion to bigotry and prejudice, its exaltation of tolerance and humanity as virtues necessitated by the patient quest for the truth or right and its inherent dislike of any doctrinal regimentation. Sufism has always been in ideal framework for such exercises.⁶⁹

Of greater relevance to the contemporary milieu of radical fundamentalism has been the Shi'i offshoots serving as mediums of convergence between the two sects. The issue is whether the splinter and connected sects such as the Alawis, Zaidis, Druze, Isma'ilis, Nizaris, Musta'lians or Fatimids represent wellsprings of latent or actual Shi'i sympathy in predominantly Sunni countries.⁷⁰ Currently, the most intriguing possibility in this regard involves the Fatimids in Egypt.

Between the tenth and fifteenth centuries a number of "conquests empires were built around adherents to Shi'ite Islam."⁷¹ According to J. O. Voll, the largest of these was the Fatimid, which "...became established in North Africa in the tenth century and controlled a large empire centered in Egypt until 1171."⁷² The Fatimids claimed to be descendants of Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, and Ali, her husband.⁷³ Although this sect is presumed to have been politically dormant in Egypt for over eight hundred years, Egyptian Sunnis "retain, culturally, many traces of Shi'ism..."⁷⁴ As Helena Cobban suggests, this cultural and ideological heritage has served to attenuate the traditional sectarian cleavage among Egypt's fundamentalists.⁷⁵ They have been more favorably inclined toward Shi'ism in general and Khomeinism in particular than are sects in other areas.⁷⁶ More later.

Linkages, Cooperation and Efforts to Promote Shi'i-Sunni Collaboration

To support and evaluate the efficacy of the concept of inter-sectarian cooperative activities, several sets of

data, some more and some less developed than others are presented. The first deals with the most thoroughly documented example of Shi'i-Sunni organizational and behavioral linkage to date. From then on the available data base varies in comprehensiveness, not validity or reliability, because the area of subversive, terrorist and insurrectionary types of activities remain largely secretive.

On September 30, 1985, four Soviet officials were abducted in Beirut.⁷⁷ Although one of the Soviets was eventually killed,⁷⁸ the others were released within several weeks. In fact, given the routine chaos of Lebanon, the incident will perhaps only be remembered for the nationality of the victims.⁷⁹ Yet, there is strong evidence this event confirms the inter-sectarian hypothesis of this essay. The kidnapping operation was planned and executed through the cooperative efforts of Sunni and Shi'i fundamentalist groups, both sponsored by Iran.

For the antecedents of this incident one must look not to Shi'i controlled West Beirut,⁸⁰ but to Tripoli where Sunni radical fundamentalist prevailed.⁸¹ Since the mid-seventies politics in this northern Lebanese city have been dominated by Syrian issue.⁸² More specifically, the central political dynamics has been the tension between the Sunni Lebanese populace and the more recent arrivals, the Alawis, whose loyalties often extend toward their tribal kinsmen in secular (Ba'thi socialist) Syria.⁸³ In 1983 a major new force emerged in the Sunni community in the form of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban's Tawhid (Unity) Movement.⁸⁴ A charismatic radical fundamentalist, Sha'ban demanded that Lebanon be purged of all non-Islamic influences.⁸⁵ This was an indirect slap at Syria, whose Alawi leadership is held by many Sunnis to be heretical.⁸⁶ What distinguished Sha'ban from other anti-Syrian Sunni fundamentalists was his close relationship with and endorsement by Iran.⁸⁷ In fact, he is the "...only Lebanese or Syrian leader who is known to have been granted an audience with...Khomeini,"⁸⁸ repeated at length again the end of 1987, during

an anti-Saudi conference on the holy places of Islam^{88a}

During the weeks preceding the abductions in Beirut, Sha'ban's Sunni forces, allied with PLO elements (predominantly Sunni in background) loyal to Yasir Arafat, were engaged in a violent battle with Syrian-supported militias for control of Tripoli.⁸⁹ For Arafat it was to be his last stand on Lebanese soil, having been driven from the south earlier by the Israelis. It also reflected his disaffection with the Syrian support of dissidents in the PLO. Then, two weeks before the actual kidnappings, Syria initiated a full-scale assault on the city.⁹⁰ Even by Lebanese standards the ensuing destruction was extreme, no less the implications that even worse might occur. Various reports indicated five hundred people were killed from among the 200,000 remaining (500,000 having fled).⁹¹ The level of violence was said to have been the highest since the Civil War of 1975/76.⁹²

It was in this context that the four Soviets were abducted in Beirut. Two groups immediately claimed responsibility: the Islamic Jihad organization (Shi'i) and the hitherto unknown Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO).⁹³ The Islamic Jihad had been viewed all along as being linked to Iran.⁹⁴ The ILO was thought to be Sunni right from the beginning of its surfacing because its full name--the Khaled ibn al-Walid Forces---invoked a prominent Sunni figure in Islamic history.⁹⁵ It was assumed to be connected with Sha'ban's Tawhid Movement because the nature of the demands, reiterated and supported by Islamic Jihad, were clearly the same.⁹⁶ In its initial communique the ILO states: "We have kidnapped four Soviet diplomats and demand a halt to the advance on Tripoli and retreat of the heretic forces..."⁹⁷ The ILO indicated its expectations were that the Soviet Union, a patron state, would pressure its client, Syria, to end the fighting in Tripoli.⁹⁸ Unquestionably, the Tawhid Movement had a clear motive for involvement in the abduction. Moreover, logic dictates, that a Sunni group could not have conducted this operation in

Beirut without at least the approval of the preeminent Shi'i, no less their connivance.

To date the most detailed information concerning this group comes from the Kuwaiti daily newspaper *Al-Sayrasah*.^{98a} According to its political editor, the ILO emerged out of a deliberate Iranian effort to form a joint Sunni-Shi'i Islamic front in Lebanon. Its purpose was to counter the strength and influence of moderate elements such as the Amal and the Lebanese Mufti. Apparently Sunni groups such as Sha'ban's were well disposed to the idea, but some Shi'i leaders like Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, were either opposed or reticent. Interestingly, the Shaykh was not opposed on the basis of the other side being Sunni, but feared the impact such a union might have on their Syrian relationship. However, Khomeini was determined that the front be established, and Iranian representatives pushed forward with those agreeing to it, ignoring the rest. The end result was the ILO made up of 120 members--60 Sunnis and 60 Shi'a. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps then undertook responsibility for the training missions and supply of arms in an area west of the Beirut-Tripoli highway (Shi'i territory). Three sub-groups, each of fifteen members, moved to Beirut. One of these, the Khalid ibn al-Walid group, actually abducted the four Soviets. The newspaper suggested that organizational confusion caused both the ILO and Islamic Jihad to initially claim responsibility. Once this condition was remedied, the ILO assumed sole authority over the operation.⁹⁹ It was agreed that the ILO:

"...would be responsible for Muslim affairs in general and that the Islamic Jihad organization would devote attention to purely Shi'ite operations, provided that there is no contradiction between the operations of the two sides (emphasis added).¹⁰⁰

This stipulation certainly appeared to conform to the "limited objective model" that could satisfy both sects individually and together. That is, tactical cooperation was possible because the base and strength of the Sunni and

Shi'i movements were geographically separated. In other words., they could work in concert because neither represented a hegemonic or competitive threat to the other.

Lebanon provides several other examples of alliance patterns and operational unity between the two sectarian groups. As Hunter indicated:

Since the Lebanese war, there have been reports that an increasing number of Palestinian refugees--most of whom are Sunnis--have become disenchanted with their secular leaders and are turning to the mosque as a source of hope. Nor is there any doubt that the war and its aftermath, especially the occupation of southern Lebanon, have radicalized the Lebanese Shi'as, thus providing countries like Iran with opportunities to recruit new sympathizers and agents for subversion.¹⁰¹

The Sidon area, both before and after Israeli withdrawal, offered a great opportunity to invoke and exploit Islamic fundamentalism, especially its most radical version. Anti-Israeli posturing and behavior produced general agreement among all factions of "the national and Islamic ranks," especially in undertaking military activities in the South. The long-term, with its stress on "liberating Jerusalem" and eliminating Israel also serves as a unifying factor for diverse elements. In the Sunni Muslim camp there was a clearly definable group also objecting to the Syrian regime. Islamic thought is conceived of as a means of bringing Sunni and Shi'is together. Sidon has become an arena reflecting links with the Islamic Unification Movement (Tawhid) in Tripoli and became intertwined with the newer Islamic movements in the Beirut area--Grouping of Muslim Scholars, Hizballah and others opposed to Israeli negotiations or peacemaking. Among the leading figures found in the Sunni camp espousing and cooperating with Shi'a elements have been Shaykh Mahir Hamud and Shaykh Salah Arqadan, both members of the Grouping of Muslim Scholars, again a group transcending the respective sects. Expressive of the Shi'a side of the political collaboration is Shaykh Muhammed Hamdi Shams al Din, deputy chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, and

the Grouping of Scholars of Jabal 'Amil, most prominent group for their belief in complete civil resistance in the South.¹⁰²

Confusing the issue of Sunni-Shi'i linkages in Lebanon is the fact that collaboration takes on varying patterns of combinations. Secular Sunni leaders like Nazih Bizri and Nassirist Mustapha Saad have "developed a tenuous working relationship with the Shi'ite Amal movement." In local politics, which often takes precedent over divisions at other times, the Sunni-Shi' cooperation was directed against the Lebanese Forces (Christian and/or central government).¹⁰³ A common Islamic background was also helpful.

Another combination that surfaced in 1985 was the link between the Palestine liberation organization (Arafat-led wing) and the Hizballah (Party of God) Shi'a zealots. The common and tactical enemy in this case was the Shi'a Amal, a more moderate and less receptive group to Iranian Islamic radical fundamentalism. The PLO's hoped for gains in the alliance pattern were two-fold: protection against repeated Amal attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and the ultimate permission to return to southern Lebanon to continue their war against Israel, a mutually shared objective. As the Arafat-led faction Fatah explained the situation:

We were able to get on good terms with certain leading figures in Hezbollah...who opposed Arabs fighting each other.

The actual links remain "very limited, more on a personal than organizational level." The PLO provided both weapons and money to the Hezbollah, which were tendered to facilitate release of two Cypriot students kidnapped by the Shi'a group in Beirut. As much as Arafat and important segments of the PLO are often times characterized as "a traitor and infidel" by the religious fundamentalists, neither he nor they can overlook the essentialness of the Sunni religious background and factor among the Palestinian fedayeen and the refugees.¹⁰⁴ This was crucial to Arafat's last stand in Tripoli, where his alliance with

Tawid, Iran's Sunni ally, paid off temporarily.

Even more expected and confirmed is the collaboration between Hezbollah, representing the Shi'a, and anti-Arafat PLO radicals in southern Lebanon. Although Hezbollah is in its ultimate ideology anti-Syrian and the PLO radicals are Marxists and pro-Syrian, they do share a common enmity with Israel and towards "American imperialism," if not the West overall. There are evidences they have cooperated in terrorist attacks in European countries where recently the Palestinians were incapacitated because of surveillance by those governments.¹⁰⁵ The emergence of an Islamic Jihad or Hezbollah affiliate labeled "Organization for Revolutionary Justice to Liberate Palestine" seems to fit the PLO (Sunni)-Shi'a linking up for specific operations. Earlier events in the Middle East demonstrated the likelihood and viability of such alliances when the Khomeini revolution proceeded to turn the Israeli Embassy in Teheran over to the PLO. Although this was eventually reversed for political and ideological reasons by the Iranian government, it never precluded future contacts of convenience. Paradoxical behavior is common to the Middle East region and virtually all its inhabitants.

As early as 1979 Egypt's Islamic radicals, viewing themselves as an authentic indigenous force, derived both encouragement and sometimes material support from radical Islamic regimes outside Egypt. The refusal at that time to join oppositionist left radicals against the Sadat regime reflected an ego level belief in their chance for unilateral success in eventually winning power. The continuing successes on the higher education campuses, the penetration of governmental and military middle and lower ranks, led to their credible beliefs. Places like Minya and Assyut, both on the Nile, became hotbeds of militant demonstrations against the government.¹⁰⁶ Sadat's cooption of the old Muslim Brotherhood as a tactic against the threats of the left, unleashed a severe

negative reaction in radical fundamentalist quarters. They resented the conservatism of the Brotherhood and its connections with the regime. Former members and others gravitated to a series of new groups such as Jama'at al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, Jund Allah, Jama'at al-Jihad, Jama'at al-Muslimin li-l-Takfir, and Ansar Khumayni (The Followers of Khomeini). These groups represented a generational break with the radical fundamentalists of the 1950s and 1960s in several ways.¹⁰⁷ One, as the Arabic newspaper, *Al-Majallah*, characterized the 1970s on development:

The other trend that actually exists in the arena, although not obviously apparent, is the extreme religious trend organized within the Islamic groups. The image of bearded young men is once again spreading among young people in the universities and villages. This image was evident during the last days of al-Sadat's rule. The reemergence of young men of this type can only indicate specific things--that the fundamentalist Islamic trend has strongly reappeared among youth.

The paper goes on to say that "These groups believe that Khomeini's style is the most suitable and best among the styles that should be adopted in Islamic society." This included resort to violence.¹⁰⁸

Secondly, coming increasingly from better educated backgrounds, some have used their educations in the Gulf region (as a form of Egyptian exports) to earn income for the home country; others have returned under the strong influence of Iranian fundamentalism. That is why so much of the pent up Islamic radical fundamentalism exploded upon the Egyptian scene in the spring of 1985.^{108a}

The third factor that differentiates the new from the old Egyptian fundamentalism has been a climate conducive to religious activism by minority sects--Coptic Christians, Ismailis and Fatimids (Shi'a sects) etc. Both Shi'a offshoots are known to have adherents in the Minya and Assyut village areas, although most Ismailis are found in the Alexandria region of the Lower Nile.

Undoubtedly, cross-fertilization of views has taken place.

Finally, the most daring break by indigenous radical fundamentalists from old patterns, was to attend an international get-together sponsored by Iran to honor the seventh anniversary of her Islamic Revolution. The 1986 gathering was made up of Islamic radical fundamentalists from all over the Arab and Islamic Worlds, including the *Jihad* (Holy War) movements in Egypt (see previous listing).¹⁰⁹

South of Egypt is the Sudan, another country in which some evidence exists of the Sunni-Shi'i linkage in national politics. With an extended tradition of Islamic fundamentalism, dating to the Mahdist state of 1885, one would expect that the great grand son, Sadiq el Mahdi, head of the Umma party and leader of the traditional Ansar movement, would be in the forefront of current radical revivalism. Not so. The same holds true for the old version of the Muslims Brotherhood, an historical affiliate of the founding Egyptian organization, which has been reoriented to political compromise and is politically insignificant. The critical radical fundamentalists function nowadays under the name of The National Islamic Front (NIF), which was founded in 1985, and led by Hassan al Turabi. He views it as the "new" Muslim Brotherhood. It too, resembling the Egyptian setting, draws heavily from young fanatical students, and does well in urban areas among the middle class (former rural-migrants?). The party is funded by wealthy local businessmen, Saudi interests opposed to left tendencies and the Iranian government. It has unusually close connections with the Iranian-inspired El Jihad el Islami movement, whose leader, Hassan Haj Ali, is actually a NIF member. This is the same Jihad movement associated with Egypt's version and in turn connected to the Iranian government. With the critical exception of the South where Christianity and Animism are prevalent, the central and northern Sudan are Sunni in makeup. Despite its violent methods and orientations, NIF

* This group may be the same as the "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine," which is made up of Palestinians working in the larger Islamic Jihad.^{105a}

participated openly in the 1986 elections, fielding 18 candidates in the key capital city of Khartoum. The El Jihad movement may be shadowy, but the NIF is quite public, even given its Khomeinist tendencies.¹¹⁰

During 1984 Jordanian officials revealed the existence of several clandestine pro-Iranian groups. Leaders of these organizations were said to have visited Iran on several occasions.^{110a} While the groups were unnamed by the government, one of the Islamic societies identified by Dekmejian fits this description. The Harakat al-Tawhid (Movement of Unity) is thought to be a militant anti-Jordanian, anti-Iraqi, and a pro-Iranian Sunni group. Dekmejian even notes that it has ties in Israel, the West Bank, and the United States.^{110b} But no evidence suggests any linkage to any specific local Shi'i movement, not surprising because of the dearth of members of that sect.

In the Arabian Peninsula the data is much sketchier on linkages and cooperation, but at least some evidences have already surfaced to support the existence of this phenomenon. In Saudi Arabia, following a continuing undertow of anger by Islamic fundamentalists against the westernization of the incumbent regime, there has been continuous plotting and actions directed at the government. John Bullock, writing in the *London Daily Telegraph*, noted "that hundreds of people are reported to have been arrested in Saudi Arabia in recent weeks on suspicion of trying to organize an Iranian-backed coup against King Fahd...The attempted coup was to have taken place last month. According to reports from Riyadh, most of those involved were middle class officials, school teachers and minor professional men. Those involved were *mainly Sunni Moslems*...The plotters were said to be fundamentalists incensed by the "worldliness" of the present Saudi regime."¹¹¹ By inference, if they were not all Sunni, the others were probably Shi'a, especially since they are found in profound numbers in the Eastern (al-Hasa) Province of Saudi Arabia. They have been involved in demonstrations

many times heretofore, but have received their greatest notoriety during the annual Mecca pilgrimage, where Khomeini has encouraged them to be politically active amongst all Muslims.¹¹² Other rallying points for both Sunni and Shi'a radical fundamentalists have been the Iranian-sponsored Islamic Organization for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula¹¹³ and the Mujahedin movement of Saudi Arabia, which also attended the seventh anniversary celebration of international terrorists in Tehran in 1986.¹¹⁴

In the overall Persian Gulf region, Iran has maintained contact with the Aldaveh movement of the Gulf States and the Amal Shi'a of Bahrain. They too attended the anniversary celebration. However, if Sunni Muslims are in no way involved in the specific movements, they have been in touch with them via the intermediary of Iran, the instigator and sponsor in the different countries. At an international conference at least minimal linkage is evident by being at the same place at the same time. Even the Moro Communist front from the Philippines showed up at the international conclave. Since the Moro front is made up of predominantly Muslims and has regularly received aid and support from Libya and Saudi Arabia, both Sunni nations, Iran's participation indicates at least parallel, if not direct cooperation between Sunni and Shi'a support states.¹¹⁵ As indicated in the Sudanese case, both Saudis and Iranians are likewise funding an Islamic radical fundamentalist party (NIF) and movement in that country (see p.26).

In the case of Iraq, the evidence is highly circumstantial of any collaborative efforts by Sunni and Shi'a. The record is extensive on Iranian and Shi'a opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein, and in turn his brutalization of any opposition, secular and sectarian, right or left. But *The Economist* reports that:

Iraq is minus a town: Ad Dujayl, 40 miles northeast of Baghdad, has been erased from the map. This town, with a mixed (emphasis mine) Sunni and Shi'a Moslem population of about 2,000, was the

scene on July 11 (1982) of an assassination attempt on President Saddam Hussein. This was the second such attempt in Ad Dujayl. So Mr. Saddam Hussein decided to make an example of this center of disaffection. There were about 150 casualties in the two hours of fighting that followed the attempted assassination. After that 150 families simply disappeared. The remaining men were sent off to northern Iraq; the women and children were sent south. Bulldozers then demolished the town.¹¹⁶

Clearly, when no effort was made by the regime to sort out Shi'a, the traditional opponents, from the Sunni populace, then both were in common opposition to the government. And since fighting took place, both sects must have been contentious to have suffered the ultimate punishments of death, banishment and separation.

In a country like Senegal, where the ruling party is the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), past as well as current leaders have still had to rely on religious brotherhoods for basic political support. The struggle seems to be between the Mourides, previously influential via Leopold Senghor, and the Tidjanes, the current President Diouf's background. Because of the non-Islamic beliefs that have crept into the brotherhoods, Diouf has supported reformist tendencies. Still, this has failed to discourage formation and activities of Islamic radical fundamentalist groups, influenced by Iran. Two pro-Iranian publications, *Djamra* and *Wal Fadjri*, constantly attack the government with a radical Shi'ite ideology. The editor of one, Sidi Lamine Niassé, is the brother of the so-called Ayatollah of Kaolack, a center for great violent confrontations within the PS and a destabilizing factor in the general Casamance region. The radicalism is also propounded by the religious leader of the indigenous Lebanese community, Sheik Zein Mohsen and his acolytes at the *Centre Social Islamique*. Superficially one could conclude Iranian influence and connections exist only because of a Lebanese (and presumably Shi'a) community. However, most of the Senegalese are Sunni in background. Diouf's uncle, Badara Deme, and other influential leaders are marabouts, another term for Sunni identification.

Elizabeth Diouf, the President's wife, is half Lebanese and half local tribe, thereby bridging the barrier between the Sunni and Shi'a elements in Senegal. Furthermore, an effective radical appeal, to be acceptable, has to be directed at the Sunni-background population, regardless of its origin.¹¹⁷

To the North, Iran has demonstrated its ability under Khomeini to forego its zealotry when dealing with Mummar Gaddafi and Libya, overwhelmingly Sunni in religious background and in its radical fundamentalism. Since both countries have felt very isolated at times in the broader Middle East/North African region, obvious differences have been overlooked to sustain their links and cooperation. In 1980 the Iranian government contemplated an initiative of an investigating team to Tripoli to resolve once and for all the disappearance of the missing Lebanese-Iranian leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr. The trip was canceled at the last minute due to the intervention of Ayatollah Montazeri and ex-Foreign Minister Yazdi, both friends of the Libyans. Their argument put inter-governmental cooperation at the highest premium over Shi'a interests and radicalism. Thus a Sunni-based radical regime has been in fairly consistent alliance with a Shi'a-based radical regime.¹¹⁸ Since 1983 the Iranians have found an additional role for this cooperative venture--helping facilitate their own terrorist goals through the Libyan regime as a means of avoiding direct complicity or condemnation.¹¹⁹

Moving further West in North Africa we come to Algeria. Of the three main strands of Islamic fundamentalists, one has certain connections, despite a Sunni background, with Iran and Lebanon, and a second one has more indirect or less certain linkage with the Iranians. In the first instance, we are concerned with *Le Djihad Islamique* (Islamic Jihad), led by Cheick Sadeck al Moundhiri. A violence-prone organization, it may well have succeeded in infiltrating the army and the *Gen-darmerie Nationale* (National Guard). Like other North African Islamic Jihad's, it too is secretive, but in-

tegrates the two sects, at least by its external connections.

The second possibility is *Le Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie* (MDA), a modernist Islamic movement led by the perennial leader, Ahmed Ben Bella. With strong Berber support at home, both Libya and Iran have sought to use him against the incumbent regime which has recently shown a proclivity towards American contacts and anti-Gaddafi actions. The Ben Bella cooperation with Iran and Libya is a marriage of political convenience to the extent it exists, each using the other for separate and mutual goals of change in Algeria.¹²⁰

The most rapidly mushrooming case is evolving in Tunisia in North Africa, some distance from Iran and with virtually no Shi'a population. It also is one of the most heavily documented cases in terms of available evidence. As early as February, 1985, the Iranians were surprised to find a group of Tunisians among the delegates to the Islamic Revolutionary Council in the World meeting in Libya. They indicated they represented the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), led by Rashed Ghanouchi, who had been heading the organization since at least 1981 when he was arrested by the government and imprisoned for three years. Though the Iranians were enthusiastic about using Libya as a vehicle for promoting Islamic revolution in countries like Tunisia and Morocco, they wanted a purely Islamic approach as opposed to Libya's united front approach including leftists.

Al-Turayki (Iranian representative to the meeting) talked with one of the Tunisians, called Sadok Shimi, a representative of the Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement, and he informed him that the Iranian deputy foreign minister, who visited Tunis at the end of last summer, was able, during his stay in Tunis, to contact one of the leaders of the movement, notifying him of Teheran's decision to support the movement materially and morally.¹²¹

Because of surveillance and other problems they were unable to fulfill all their promises and needed Libyan geographic borders to facilitate movement into Tunisia proper. A lengthy

report then followed on MTI operations from Libya, including Gaddafi role and effort in behalf of the group.¹²² In May, 1985, MTI denied any contact with a foreign government or ambitions to cause a revolution.¹²³

In March, 1986, Kuwait's KUN reported that Tunisian security authorities had uncovered a religious *political* organization whose leaders had received special religious teachings in the Iranian city of Qom the year before (1985). Since the same report noted that Tunisian security had also uncovered a small, new Iranian oriented political party organization called Hizballah al-Mukhtar (Chose Party of God), the previous year group was most likely the MTI.¹ Even the newer group was Iranian-connected since the Jihad movement, which it was a part, also attended the now famous and oft-cited 1986 international terrorist conclave in Teheran.¹

In response to the MTI attack on *A Dustur*, the newspaper that comprehensively reported the story Teheran's relations in the first place used its staff in Europe to run down the particulars of the relationship. On June 15, 1985, they produced a *detailed report* corroborating the accuracy of their first allegations. Details covered the mechanics on both sides of the cooperation and linkages, and went far as to identify the further efforts at activities in neighboring Algeria and Morocco through religious organization branches also run from Iran.¹²⁶

All of the Sunni-Shi'a linkages a cooperation would be either limited or unlikely were it not for the promoter, fomenter and consolidator Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini. For most contemporary Sunni fundamentalist groups in the Middle East Iran serves as an inspirational aspirational model rather than as ally.¹²⁷ But as already indicated in ample after example, the line between model and ally has been crossed. This despite the cleavages wrought by the Gulf War. A theme of overriding commonality was echoed by Iran's President Khomeini when he declared:

It is slanderous to describe the revolution in Iran as a sectarian revolution. Our

revolution is the revolution of all Muslims, including Sunnis and Shi'is.¹²⁸

Indeed, Khomeini has gone so far to say: (t)he reasons which led Muslims at one time to become Sunnis and Shi'ites do not exist any longer...¹²⁹ Kalim Saddiqui, head of the Moslem Institute in Britain, a pro-Khomeini intellectual, summarized the prevailing situation, clearly exploitable throughout the Islamic world, this way:

Talk to the bus drivers and the rickshaw pullers in the Muslim world, Shia and Sunni alike, and you'll find that they approve of what Khomeini has done in Iran...They feel that Westernized elitist rulers have to go, in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, Indonesia, Sudan, Turkey, Somalia, and elsewhere.

Iran now defines itself in Islamic terms...Its frontiers are not physical but Islamic...National boundary lines are artificial...I don't know where the new revolutions will be, or when, but they are coming, some within the next 10 years.^{129a}

Obviously, these remarks underscore a preoccupation dually informed by idealism and *Realpolitik*. In a region overwhelmingly populated by the Sunnis¹³⁰ any hope for the spread of an Islamic revolution is tied to the interest and cooperation with Sunni radical fundamentalists. As such, the Khomeini regime has actively solicited their support as well as promoted their activism and influence. This is most evident in the institutionalized structure set up by the Iranian Islamic government, minimally a clearing-house for other militant Islamic groups,¹³¹ and maximally a proficient action-oriented vehicle forgetting its message across and facilitating terrorism as means to this end (see chart). Aside from an extensive overseas network arranged to deal with prominent Shi'a situations in places like Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf States, other instrumentalities were as much or more concerned with impacting all Muslims or especially Sunni elements. The most remarkable role was exercised by Hojjat ol-Eslam Seyyed Hadi Khosrowshahi in his capacities as Ambassador to the Vatican (using his European Islamic Cultural Center) and as founder of the Islamic League Against Arab States. In each instance he performed

the major tasks of dealing with and conveying the radical fundamentalist message to Sunni societies and groups whether in the Middle East, elsewhere throughout Asia, and among Muslim migrants in western Europe.¹³³

But the overseas network and facilities represented one side of the extensive process committed to propagating the Iranian view and the actual linkages and cooperative efforts. Over the course of the post-revolution period, evidence has mounted that Iran has become a critical meeting place and training center for subsequent political violence and activities by returnees to their homelands. Qom, Isfahan and Tehran have repetitively showed up on reports and analyses as waystations for terrorists and dissident causers from the Arab and non-Arab worlds. Dozens of Arab and Islamic nations have been represented at these gathering places. Put in perspective, given the distaste of Iranian fundamentalists for leftists, the obvious Shi'a segment expected and present, the solicitation of those with a Sunni background has been very obvious. The primary purpose of the various meetings and conferences was to agitate and inspire the Shi'a and Sunni participants to return home and work assertively in behalf of their common Islamic cause.¹³⁴ The end result has been the perception and labelling of Iran as one of the leading "terrorist states" in the world.¹³⁵


Conclusion

Based on the available documented evidence and the conceptual/theoretical argumentation, the verdict on the linkages and cooperation assertion is highly supportable. While it cannot be claimed that radical Sunni and Shi'i groups will always cooperate in limited objective situations, neither should it be wholly dismissed. At the present time it can only be stated that this phenomenon has been occurring throughout the Middle East and other regions of the world with some increasing frequency (at least until 1988).

Yet in the area of trend analysis, there are a number of factors which

lend support to the belief that the collaborative activities of Islamic radical fundamentalists, rather than being an isolated incident, could represent a new factor in Middle Eastern politics. The following trends support this projection:

- The regional "crisis milieu" will continue to determine the style of politics in the Middle East.¹³⁶
- Although Islamic fundamentalism may have lost some of its appeal among Middle Eastern intellectuals, it still remains the most potent radical force in the region.¹³⁷
- The continuing decline in oil revenues and concomitant decrease in remittance funds to such dependent countries as Egypt, Jordan, the Sudan and the Yemens, coupled with existing economic development problems portends political instability easily exploitable by extremist elements.¹³⁸
- The continued prospects of cooperation between radical Islamic and Palestinian terrorist organizations introduces the possibility of fundamentalist violence becoming an institutionalized variable in Middle Eastern politics.¹³⁹
- The indications that Ayatollah Montazeri, a leading advocate of revolution for export, could succeed Khomeini in Iran, suggests that regime's subversive and across border political activities will not abate.¹⁴⁰
- The continued ability of Iran to use a surrogate state like Libya as a vehicle of entre and assertive influence in other Sunni-populated states has initiative and deflective advantages and is therefore likely to persist.^{140a}
- A settlement of the Persian Gulf War in any fashion short of destruction of the Khomeini regime would further reduce intersectarian tensions and open up prospects of additional collaboration as well as Shi'a encroachment in Sunni societies.¹⁴¹
- While the outlook for peaceful political, economic and social development in the area has been negative for some time it is perhaps more appropriate nowadays to view



* Mohatashami took over the Islamic Center in 1985 and was replaced as Ambassador by Ahmed Dastmachi. The Islamic Center leader became Khosrowshahi early in 1987. He has reorganized its overseas operations.

the regional dynamics in terms of regression.¹⁴² Finally, it should be emphasized that there is nothing inevitable in the further deterioration of stability in the Middle East (or Islamic World) or in the prospect of cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'i. Negative determinism is no less fatuous than its positive variant. Iran, a key sponsor of inter-sectarian collaboration, in a post-war decision might turn inward rather than sustain its outward aggressiveness. But clearly this would reflect "the end of the Khomeini Revolution" rather than its success and continuity. Unfortunately, the crisis which has the Arab/Islamic Worlds firmly in its grasp, of which cooperation between radical fundamentalist groups across sectarian lines constitutes only one part, reveals no immediate signs of weakening. An attuned observer of the regional dynamics would be well advised to pay deliberate attention to continued Sunni-Shi'i linkages as a critical variable in understanding and interpreting events.

Notes

1. Shireen T. Hunter. "Islamic Fundamentalism: Currently on the Wane," The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1985, p. 32.
2. Bernard Lewis. "The Shi'a," N.Y. Review of Books, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 7.
3. Bernard Lewis. "The Return of Islam." Commentary, January, 1976, p. 48.
4. See Ibid., p. 40-41 and Elie Kedourie. The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1984) p. 384. While Lewis and Kedourie do not refer to these idea systems in particular, they indicate that western doctrines are anomalous to the Arab-Islamic experience.
5. See Kedourie, op. cit., p. 1 and Daniel Pipes In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983) p. 124. Kedourie suggests that western interpretations of the region are often informed by a melioristic orientation. Pipes indicates that a secularist bias among western observers has caused Middle Eastern reformers and secularists to receive "...a disproportionate share of academic attention." Also, for a discussion of Western attitudes regarding modernization and progress, see John Obert Voll. Islam: Continuity and Change in the

Modern World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 1-6.

6. On the question of intellectual disillusionment among Middle Eastern elites, see Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). In pp. 50-63 Ajami deals with the "Islamic Response" to the traumas of the post-1967 era.
7. See Voll, op. cit., pp. 354-357. Also, on the cyclical pattern of Islam, see R. Hair Dekmejian. Islam In Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 6.
8. Voll, op. cit., p. 354.
9. Ibid., p. 354.
10. Ibid., p. 12, 354-357.
11. There are major disputes regarding the historical continuity inherent in contemporary fundamentalism. For example, Pipes suggests that: "(i)n retrospect, the revival will appear as a curious aberration." Unlike Voll, Pipes links the revival with contemporary economic issues, especially oil. In this connection, see Robin Wright. Scared Rage. (New York: Linden Press, 1985), p. 256-257.
12. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 6-7.
14. See Kedourie, op. cit., p. 1.
15. On authenticity issue, see Yvonne Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival," in John L. Esposito Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 71.
16. Fundamentalists were particularly active in Syria and Egypt in the years before the Iranian Revolution.
17. On the appeal of Khomeini in this regard, see James A. Bill "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 1, fall 1984, P. 113.
18. See Pipes, op. cit., pp. 325-328.
19. Ibid., p. 328-330.
20. Ibid., P. 328. Also see Bill, op. cit., p. 118, as this issue obtains in the Persian Gulf region.
21. FBIS, September 26, 1955, p. 37.
22. See Wright, op. cit., pp. 32-36, and Pipes, op. cit., pp. 238-330.
23. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of such a regime is that of Syria's Hafiz al-Assad. Hanna Batatu notes that the ruling group represents just 2.3 percent of the states total population. See his "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Group and Causes for its Dominance," The Middle East Journal, Summer, 1981, p. 331.
24. For a listing of fundamentalist actions, see Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 3.
25. See Shireen T. Hunter, op. cit., p. 32.

26. Ibid., p. 32. Also see Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 165. However, Dekmejian notes that a decisive Iranian victory "...is likely to serve as a spur to both militant and evolutionary Sunni Islamists to emulate the Iranian revolutionary example. See p. 168.

27. This may hold true especially in areas where the Sunni and Shi'i fundamentalists are geographically removed from one another and lack strong feelings of antipathy.

28. For a discussion regarding the common and uncommon areas of faith, see Voll, op. cit., p. 23 and Bernard Lewis, "The Shi'a" The New York Review of Books, August 15, 1985, pp. 7-10. Lewis has suggested that similarities do not extend to the political traditions of the two sects. See the transcript of his lecture at the University of Tel Aviv's Shiloach Institute, June 25, 1980. On the question of ethos, see Hamid Enayat. Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 19. He notes in this regard that: "(t)he distinguishing features of Shi'ism in relation to Sunnism should be sought not only in its fundamental principles, but perhaps more importantly in its ethos..." See p. 19. The Sunnis constitute 80 percent of the world's total Muslim population. See Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary (California: ABC-CLIO, 1984) p. 80. Areas where Sunnis enjoy political ascendancy out of proportion to their numbers include Iraq and Lebanon. See G. H. Jansen. Militant Islam (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1980) p. 27. On the leadership issue, see James A. Bill and Carl Leiden. Politics in the Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 44. Also see John L. Esposito. Islam and Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984), p. 11. Esposito writes: "(a) fundamental political and legal difference between Sunni and Shi'i Muslims is the Shi'i doctrine of the imamate vs. the Sunni caliphate. In Sunni Islam, the Caliph is the selected/elected successor of the Prophet. He succeeded to political and military leadership of the community, but had only limited religious status." Also see Dekmejian, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 38-43, for Sunni Fundamentalism in the historical continuum. Representing approximately ten percent of the total Muslim population, the Shi'i are the largest and most important of Islam's dissident sects. See Michael D. Wormser, ed. The Middle East (Washington, D. C. : Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1981) p. 103. For example, Fouad Ajami notes that Karbala imagery was central to the thought of the Lebanese Shi'i leader Musa al-Sadr. See Ajami's "Lebanon and its Inheritors," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, no. 4, esp. pp. 783-784.

29. To be sure of its proper application in the western context is also a matter of great controversy.

30. Among the Sunnis this phenomena is evident in the thought of Sayyid Qutb. See Haddad, op. cit. And, among the Shi'i this may be detected in the writings of Ali Shari'ati. See Bernard and Khalilized, op. cit., p. 141.

31. On the question of intellectual borrowing, Dekmejian maintains: "... the ideological orientation of contemporary Islamist movements has been influenced by modern ideologies of development..." Yet, "(t)hese alien influences... are not commonly acknowledged by Islamist ideologies..." See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
32. Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
33. See Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *op. cit.*, p. 40 and Pipes, *op. cit.*, 40-43.
34. Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
35. This is not to say that as a "regime-type" Iran is totalitarian. There is, of course, much controversy regarding the efficacy of this concept in the Middle Eastern context. Yet, there is little question but that as a totalistic system of thought, radical fundamentalism, in both its Sunni and Shi'i tangents, has totalitarian political implications. For the Sunni orientation, see Haddad, *op. cit.*, p.90, and for the Shi'i view see Bernard and Khalilzad, pp. 113-125. In Dekmejian's analysis of the personality profile of the "true believer" dogmatism, that is to say, "extreme rigidity in beliefs" is a salient feature of the fundamentalist's "modal" personality. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34. Also, for a description on the generic aspects of totalistic thought and their relevance to the Islamist temper, see Bernard and Khalilzad, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
37. See Haddad, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
38. On Millennialism and radical Islamist ideology, see Bernard and Khalilzad, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-65, Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7, 42-43, 64, and Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 136.
39. The seminal treatment of millennialism in the Christian context is Norman Cohen's *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). For an analysis of this concept in secular thought, see Eric Voeglin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952).
40. See Halpern, *op. cit.*, p. 136, and Bernard and Khalilzad p. 62.
41. On Khomeini and chiliasm, see *Ibid.*, p. 65. For examples of Sunni militant chiliasm, see Israel Altman, "Islamic Movements in Egypt" *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no.10, Winter 1979, pp. 97-104.
42. On populism and radical fundamentalism, see Bill, *op. cit.*, p. 108, Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 21, Voll, *op. cit.*, p.278, and Gabriel Warburg, "The Challenge of Populist Islam in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1970's" in George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, *Middle East Perspectives* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1981), pp. 105-127.
43. For the most important treatment of this concept in the American context, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).
44. For example, see Hamied N. Ansari "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, pp. 130-136, 140-141.
45. See Bill, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-127.
46. Michael M.J. Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four levels of understanding," in Esposito, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 162. It has been widely noted that in the American context, a major feature of populist thought is anti-semitism. While there is much debate regarding the historical role of such sentiment in Islam, there is little question regarding the current Arab-Islamic posture. Obviously, this issue is complicated by the distinctions that are often made between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. However, in the fundamentalist ideology, it would appear that a number of the anti-Jewish concepts, developed in the west, have been coopted for use in the Middle East.
- For instance, Israel Altman contends that the attitudes of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers are "...very much influenced by the view that Jewry as both the driving force behind western capitalism and the most important agents of communism...". See Altman, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- On the question of anti-Jewish sentiment in the region, see Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), also Joan Peters, *From Time Immemorial* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
47. For analysis of Khomeini's manipulation of populist sentiments and symbols, see Bernard and Khalilzad, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-48.
48. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 45. Also, see Zonis and Brumberg, *op. cit.*, and Ansari, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.
50. See Pipes, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.
51. Lewis offers this imagery as indicative of some western conceptions of Islam and Muslims. See Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
52. See Haddad, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-85.
53. The phrase is Haddad's, see *op. cit.*, p. 81.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-85.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-85.
56. Elie Kedourie, "International Terrorism and Middle East Politics," *Contemporary Mideast Background*, August 22, 1984, p. 6.
57. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 45 and Zonis and Brumberg, *op. cit.*
58. This may be observed in the violent struggle between the secular Amal and the Islamic Amal for ascendancy in the Shi'i community in Lebanon.
59. On the question of violent behavior and ideas, P.J. Vatikiotis has written: "(t)he Islamic nexus only provides the perpetrators of terrorism with a basis for its rationalization and justification." See Vatikiotis, "International Terrorism and Middle East Politics." *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- For an analysis of power and politics, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). For Morgenthau, ideologies, though often genuinely felt, represent disguises, which conceal the true nature of policy. In his view, ideologies and abstractions aside, "(t)he goal of political action is power, and political power is power over the minds and actions of men." See Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-103.
60. *Ibid.*
61. On the question of alliances between states, Morgenthau notes: "(w)hether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is... a matter not of principle, but of expediency." See Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 201. Middle Eastern politics, where the "...life expectancy of the average coalition is only about two years," represents the most conspicuous contemporary example of this concept. See Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 154.
- Among sub-national groups in the region, this pattern of alliance building may be found within the Palestinian movement, of the Kurdish movement. The modern history of the various Palestinian movement, of the Kurdish movement. The modern history of the various Palestinian and Kurdish groups is replete with examples of opportunistic coalitions.
62. Regarding the apparent contradiction inherent in the alliance between the fundamentalist Khomeini regime and the secular Ba'th regime in Syria, Itamar Rabinovitch asserts that no such contradiction exists because it was a product of *Realpolitik*. See Rabinovitch quoted in the "The Khomeini Vortex," *The Jerusalem Post* December 28, 1979. For a current analysis of this alliance, see Richard Bernstein, "Syria and Iran are Nurturing a Wary, Ambiguous Alliance," *New York Times*, July 5, 1985.
63. See Bernard and Khalilzad, *op. cit.*, p. 33-34.
64. "We have no permanent enemies, we have no permanent friends, we have only permanent interests."
- This orientation was reflected in a recent statement by Khomeini. He called for friendly relations with "those who have no ill intentions toward Iran." He urged that individuals and groups not be "influenced by anything," but to "export the revolution." See *EBIS* "Lebanon," September 1985.
65. P.J. Vatikiotis, "Regional Politics," in Wise and Issawi, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
68. See J. O. Voll, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Also, for the significance of Sufism in Islamic history, see Jensen, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
69. Enayat, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
70. For an overview of these sects, see Mortimer, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
71. Voll, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

73. See Mortimer, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
74. Helen Cobban, "The Angry Children of Islam," *Middle East*, iss. 87, January 1982, pp. 17-19.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19. Especially is this true for those in the Arabian Peninsula. Interestingly, Cobban and others have noted that a number of Egyptian militants, including the brother of Sadat's assassin, were present or involved in the Grand Mosque takeover. Also see Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
77. See *New York Times*, October 1, 1985.
78. The body of Arkadi Katakov was found in West Beirut on October 2. See *New York Times*, October 3, 1985.
79. To be sure, this was not the first time Soviet have been attacked in the region. James Bill notes that "...over a dozen Soviet advisors were assassinated in 1980-1981 in Syria." See Bill, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
80. Shi'i forces assumed control of this area on February 8, 1984. See Thomas L. Friedman, "The Lessons of Lebanon: A Personal Retrospective," *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 17, 1984.
81. Tripoli is Lebanon's second largest city and has the state's largest Sunni concentration (80%). See Yosef Olmert "Lebanon," in Colin Legum, Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon, eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984, p. 670).
82. *Ibid.*, p. 670.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 670. According to *The Economist*, during the past two years, "...at least 5,000 Alawites have migrated from northern Syria into Tripoli, to add to the 50,000 Alawites already there. See *The Economist*, September 28, 1985.
84. In Islamic usage the term "tawahid" refers to the "oneness" of Allah. For information regarding the emergence of Sha'ban and Tawahid, see Olmert, *op. cit.*, p. 671.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 671.
86. Consistent with this anti-syrian orientation, Sha'ban is said to have lent support to members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. See Olmert, *op. cit.*, p. 671.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 671, See *New York Times*, December 26, 1987, p. 2.
88. See *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 2, 1985.
88. See *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 17, 1987.
89. The Beirut Voice of Lebanon indicated that 1,500 Palestinians from the Al- Jarmag Brigade, thought to be pro-Arafat, fought on the side of Sha'ban's Islamic Unifications Forces against the Syrian-backed militias. See *The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) "Lebanon" Sep-*
- tember 29, 1985. Also see *New York Times*, October 6, 1985.
90. See *The Economist*, September 28, 1985, p. 39, and *The Miami Herald*, September 15, 1985.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *The Economist*, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
93. Ihsan A. Hijazi, *New York Times*, October 2, 1985. Hijazi wrote; "(t)wo different organizations claimed responsibility today for the abduction of four Soviet diplomats here..." He identified one group as the Islamic Holy War and the other as the Islamic Liberation Organization-Khalid ben al- Walid Forces. See also A. R. Norton, "Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon," *Current History*, February, 1986, p. 62.
94. *Ibid.* On the connection between Islamic Jihad and Iran, see *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 17, 1985. Also a spokesman claiming to speak for Islamic Jihad claimed that it was "...coordinating its actions with the Islamic Liberation Forces of Kalid al Ibn al-Walid." See "Lebanon," *FBIS*, September 30, 1985.
95. *New York Times*, October 2, 1985.
96. *Ibid.* Also see, *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 2, 1985.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.* Also see John Kifner, "Syria in Lebanon Declining Fortunes," *New York Times*, October 2, 1985.
- 98a. This account may be found in *FBIS*, October 22, 1985. According to William Rugh, Al-Syassah's political orientation may be described as "moderate, pro-government, less emotional than others, and pro-Egyptian." See William A. Rugh, *The Arab Press* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 102.
99. *FBIS*, *op. cit.*, p. A3. This correlates with a report published in *New York Times*, June 31, 1985. This analysis indicates that: "(t)here are about half a dozen Sunni Moslem leaders in West Beirut now allied with the Party of God, and in Sidon, south of Beirut, earlier this month an Islamic Front has formed under the direction of a shi'ite cleric with strong ties to Iran, Sheik Maher Hammond, that united Shite and Sunni clerics cooperating with the Party of God." The pro-Iranian bearing of Sha'ban was noted in the same report. Also *New York Times*, June 31, 1985 indicates that such a Sunni-Shi'i front had been established in June. A report in *The Miami Herald*, October 31, 1985 asserted that the kidnapers were believed to be linked to the Islamic Council of Ulemas "...a coalition of extremist Moslem Clergymen." In addition, the confusion regarding the responsibility for the abduction as reported in Al-Sayyah correlates with the pattern of statements published in *FBIS*. See *FBIS*, September, 1985.
100. *FBIS*, *op. cit.*, p. A3.
101. Shireen T. Hunter, "Terrorism and Religion," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 7, 1984, p. 18.
102. *FBIS*, May 16, 1985, pp. 123-124; also see Note 99; R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Fundamentalist Islam," *Middle East Review*, Summer, 1985, p. 32.
103. A. R. Norton, "Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon," *Current History*, February 1986, pp. 61-62.
104. "Lebanon: The Shi'i Factor," *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, p. 11; Juan Tamay, "Shiite Zealots Link with PLO to Battle Amal, a Hated Foe," *Miami Herald*, October 12, 1986, p. 26a.
105. *Ibid.*
- 105a. *New York Times*, Chart, February 11, 1987.
106. Eric Davis, "Islam and Politics in Modern Egypt," SUNY-Binghamton Conference, March 13-14, 1981, pp. 12-15; "Egypt: Opposition to Sadat (II)," *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, Nov. 1-15, 1979, pp. 118-119.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 27-30; Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-33, especially p. 30.
108. *FBIS*, July 25, 1985, pp. 40-43.
- 108a. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25; Roger Owen, "Migrant Workers in the Gulf," *Middle East Review*, Spring, 1986, p. 25.
109. Brian Crozier, "The Problem of Crazy States," *National Review*, March 14, 1986, p. 24; "Egypt Arrests Key Islamic Cleric," *New York Times*, July 16, 1986; *FBIS*, July 13, 1987, c1-c2.
10. "Sudan. The Mahdi, Again?" *Africa Confidential*, March 12, 1986, pp. 2-3.
- 110a. See Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- 110b. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
111. "Potential Destabilizing Factors in the Saudi System," *Contemporary Mideast Background*, October 3, 1983, p. 5.
112. *Ibid.*, "Tehran Urges Pilgrims to be Activists in Mecca," *New York Times*, July 19, 1986; "Internal Islamic Division as a Central Focus of Ferment in the Middle East," *Weekly Media Abstract*, July 17, 1986, p. 4. Also see Bernard Schechterman, "Politics of Instability in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Review*, Fall/Winter, 1981-1982.
113. Crozier, *op. cit.*, also see Chart and citations in #132.
114. *Ibid.*
115. *Ibid.*; also Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
116. "The Iraq Internal Labyrinth," *Contemporary Mideast Background*, April 22, 1985, p. 5.
117. "Senegal: Handle With Care," *Africa Confidential*, February 27, 1985, pp. 4-6.
118. This anti-Iraqi coalition, known since 1978 as the "Front for Steadfastness and Resistance," was originally an anti-Sadat coalition. From the outset it was led by Syria. For a report on the joint Syrian-Libyan-Iranian terrorist connection,

see *The Wall Street Journal*, June 19, 1985; FBIS September 6, 1985, p.35.

119. FBIS, June 17, 1985, p. 32, 33.

120. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 198; "Algeria: Playing with Splinters," *Africa Confidential*, November 27, 1985, pp. 3-4.

121. FBIS, June 17, 1985, pp. 32-33.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

123. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

124. FBIS, March 17, 1986, Q8.

125. Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

126. FBIS, September 6, 1985, pp. 33-35.

127. For examples of this inspirational/aspirational phenomenon in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, the West Bank and within the PLO, see Pipes, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-327; David K. Willis, "Fundamentalist Islam" *Christian Science Monitor*, 1985, p. 15; see also Robin Wright, "Sense of Persecution Fuels Shiite Resurgence," June 21, 1985, p. 11.

128. Quoted in Martin Kramer, "The Divided House of Islam," in Legum, Shaked and Dishon, *op. cit.*, p. 240. Kramer notes that during January 1982, the Khomeini regime declared a week of Shi'i-Sunni unity to mark the Prophet's birthday. A small conference was held in Tehran attended by an undisclosed number of Sunnis. Given the dearth of information on this gathering, Kramer concludes that "...it was impossible to determine the extent of Sunni participation." Yet, it seems evident that unity was a major preoccupation for the regime.

129. Quoted in Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

129a. David K. Willis, "The Politics of Islam," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1985, p. 15.

130. To be sure, Sunnis are in minority position in such states as Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

131. See Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 27; also John Tagliabue "Terrorists Reportedly Trained in Iran," *New York Times*, December 30, 1985, p. 6.

132. Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 108-9; Amir Taheri, "The Fruits of Terror," *New Statesman*, November 22, 1986, pp. 6-7; Amos Perlmutter, "Containment Strategy for the Islamic Holy War," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1983; Gary Thatcher, "New U.S. data show terrorism ebbed in 1986," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 3, 1987, pp. 3-4; "Chart," *New York Times*, February 11, 1987, FBIS, June 17, 1985, p. 32; FBIS, September 6, 1985, pp. 36-38; Lee Grady, "Islamic Jihad and the War on the West," *The Miami Journal*, August 1985, pp. 11-13; "Ivan's new terror plan," *Foreign Report*, *The Economist*, January 22, 1987, for reorganization of overseas network.

133. FBIS, September 6, 1985, pp. 36-38.

134. Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-31, 33-35. Kramer indicates that Montazeri was a major force in the Shi'i-Sunni unity effort. See Kramer, *op. cit.*, p. 239. For a current discussion of Iranian involvement in PLO terrorist activities, see *New York*

Times, December 30, 1985. She writes: "...some 380 men with various religious and revolutionary credentials met at the former Hilton conference hall." In her view, this seminar "symbolized a turning point" in the regime's commitment to export its revolution.

135. Tagliabue, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

136. This style will likely be one of extremism. Regarding the future for Middle Eastern countries, Elie Kedourie writes: "(t)he long-term prospect in these societies is one of intellectual isolation, if not downright hostility, while the ideological style of politics which has made such inroads makes for activism and instability." See Kedourie, *Islam and The Modern World*, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

Regardless of its origin or causes, the crises which afflict this region preclude the possibility that moderation shall overcome extremism as the salient form of political expression—at least in the near future.

137. There is no indication that radical secular movements are regaining ascendancy over fundamentalism anywhere in the region. Even in Egypt, where a strong leftist movement once threatened the regime, Islamic militants constitute the principal opposition movement. See *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 14, 1985.

138. On the destabilizing ramifications of economic contraction in the Persian Gulf on such states as Egypt, Jordan, the Sudan and Yemen, as well as the potentialities for an upsurge in fundamentalism, see John Kifner and Judith Miller, "Wave of Arab Migration Ending with Oil Boom," *The New York Times*, October 5, 1985. Also see David K. Willis, "The Politics of Islam," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 25, 1985, p. 15.

139. See John Tagliabue, "Terrorists Reportedly Trained in Iran," *New York Times*, December 30, 1985, p. 6. Tagliabue indicates that it is widely believed that the terrorists responsible for recent attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports were trained in Isfahan, Iran. It is also suspected that the organizer of these operations, Abu Nidal, maintains training facilities in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. This is also the area where the Iranian-sponsored Shi'i fundamentalist organization Hizballah is thought to be located. In fact, it has been noted that some interaction between the Palestinians and Hizballah has occurred. See Elaine Sciolino, "Wide Mideast Backing Reported for Abu Nidal," *New York Times*, January 19, 1985. Also see p.

140. See *The Economist*, November 30, 1985.

141. See Dekmejian, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

142. Analysis of the former colonial areas of Africa and Asia may increasingly involve this concept. While meliorists will always deny the possibility that regression may occur as readily as progress, the post-colonial experience of these areas gives cause to doubt the efficacy of their confident judgments. For example, in Africa, expectations of progressive democratic political systems have been eclipsed by the gruesome

reality of tribal warfare, man-made famine, and corrupt despotism. By any account, the basic requirements of life are worse in the sub-Saharan region than they were at the time of independence.

The meliorists' vision does not appear to have fared any better in the Middle East. Obviously, to measure either regression or progress in this area by the standards of Western democracies would be pointless and unfair. Yet, as with Africa, the political, social, and economic achievements in these societies have been rather dubious. The inventory of such tribulations in this region, are by now well known. In fact, the power of radical Islam is often viewed as product of this condition. That the fundamentalist route may prove to be a dead end suggests not that a better route will be pursued, but that the situation there is indeed desperate.

