
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

American Federalism: Competition Not Partnership

Thomas R. Dye (Florida State University)

The Symbolic and Shamanistic Functions of the American Presidency

Thomas E. Cronin (The Colorado College)

Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Soviet Union

Leon Goure (Washington, D.C.)

Democratization and Authoritarianism in China

June Teufel Dreyer (University of Miami)

Religion at Center Stage: Political Theatre in the 1990s

Charles W. Dunn (Clemson University)

Consistent, Concurrent, Compact:

Florida's Search for a Rational Growth Management System

John M. DeGrove (Florida Atlantic University/Florida International University)

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Introduction

As the second issue of our journal we offer our audience a potpourri of essays delving into a diverse set of current issues confronting political scientists and interested parties in public affairs. Each of the authors, distinguished and nationally or internationally reputed, were invited to contribute an article focussing, in their estimation on a vital aspect of their academic subfield.

Professor Dye sets the tone of vitality and controversy by posing the thesis that the American federal system was constructed and intended to be a competitive system between levels of government. By virtue of this view, he challenges the recent stress (and perception) that intergovernmental relations, especially the national and state governments, were supposed to be cooperative partners.

Professor Cronin focuses on one of his favorite topics – the American Presidency and its role in American politics and society. Shifting from the traditional stress on the institutional, constitutional and political aspects, he elaborates sophisticated nuance roles identified with the high priests of civil religion and spokesmen and defenders of the shared democratic faith. The question of "presidential greatness" is an unavoidable ingredient of this analysis.

Professor Goure simplifies a complex set of events in the famous "riddle wrapped in an enigma" – the Gorbachev phenomenon and the Soviet Union. Aside from summarizing recent developments in Soviet institutional changes, he views them in light of the leading question as to directional change – democratization or authoritarianism? Changes and events are occurring with such rapidity, but they don't preclude him from speculating on the meaning of what has transpired and future possibilities.

Professor Dreyer rounds out the pictures of the two struggling communist giants by raising the same question vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China. By catching us up on recent events, their possible meanings and ramifications, we are forced to think in terms of distinctiveness or analogies between the two communist political systems – then, now and tomorrow. Though the picture may be clearer at the moment in China, the future still entails a speculative pose.

Professor Dunn not only recounts some of the crucial history of the relationship between politics and religion in American society, but raises some provocative questions with his projections into the future. In the course of the analysis we are reminded of the intra-religious bouts both recent and current and their ramifications for the politics of the 1990s. Failure to perceive will be as important as what to perceive in the role of religion in future American politics.

Professor DeGrove treats us to a summary analysis of an issue though defined in Florida terms, has a universal lesson to offer if understood and acted upon. The "environment" is both a matter of legacy and of political gamesmanship as evidenced by the variety of interests and actors involved. The author provides an insight into recent political dynamics and some serious thoughts about the ramifications and consequences of dealing and not dealing with the issue. Take note everywhere.

With the publication of this issue, volume one is complete for the 1989 year. We in the Florida Political Science Association and at Saint Leo College hope you have enjoyed our biannual publications. We look forward to your renewed subscription for the 1990 year. It is our hope that the journal will attract new subscribers as well as many new contributors. See the appropriate cited information on the inside front cover.

Bernard Schechterman
Editor

American Federalism: Competition Not Partnership

Thomas R. Dye

Federalism as Competition

The Founders of the American nation understood that "republican principles," while they should be nurtured and cherished, would not be sufficient in themselves to protect individual liberty. Periodic elections, party competition, voter enfranchisement, and political equality, may function to make governing elites more responsive to popular concerns. But these processes cannot insure the protection of minorities or individuals, "the weaker party or an obnoxious individual," from government deprivations of liberty or property. Indeed "the great object" of constitution-writing was to both preserve popular government and at the same time to protect individuals from "unjust and interested" majorities. "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control of government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."¹

Among the most important "auxiliary precautions" devised by the Founders to control government is federalism. According to the Founders, governments and government officials were seen as likely to act in their own self-interest.

Therefore constitutional arrangements must be devised so that the personal interests of government officials are made to coincide with the interests of society.

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?²

The solution to the problem of adjusting the self-interests of government of-

ficials to interests of the larger society is competition. Rather than rely on the "better motives" of statesmen, the Founders sought to construct a governmental system incorporating the notion of "opposite and rival interests." Governments and government officials can be constrained by competition with other governments and other government officials.

The Dismal Condition of Federalism Literature

In contrast to the Founders' ideas about the importance of creating "opposite and real interests" within the government itself, the contemporary orthodoxy among scholars of federalism stresses "partnership," "cooperation," and "sharing." Fifty years of this orthodoxy has succeeded only in rationalizing the centralization of government in the United States and the emasculation of the idea of federalism.

Federalism has lost its meanings in American politics, not only as a result of centralizing tendencies in the political system itself, but also as a result of the failure of scholars to nourish the idea of federalism. We should not be surprised that the Supreme Court emasculated the concept of federalism (*Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1985*),³ when we ourselves acknowledge our inability to develop a viable theory of federalism. We are certainly aware of our theoretical shortcomings. An important survey of contemporary scholarship on federalism concluded that "The theory of federalism has fallen into disrepair."⁴ Indeed, the notion of federalism has fallen on such hard times that some leading scholars have urged its replacement with simple descriptions of "inter-governmental relations."⁵ Rather than search for a viable analytic or normative model of federalism, it seems easier to simply provide empirical descriptions

of current relationships between national, state, and local governments.

Yet it is our task as scholars to build upon the insight of the Founders that intergovernmental competition — opposite and rival interests within the governmental system itself — is a necessary auxiliary precaution in the preservation of liberty. In doing so we must recognize that federalism is not only about federal-state relations, it is also about competition between and among state and local governments. Much of the modern political science literature on "federalism" focuses on relationships between the national government and the states. Interstate competition, and competition among community governments, is largely overlooked or even worse — treated as a problem which must be corrected by reform. In contrast, competitive federalism views competition among state and community governments as equally important as, and complimentary to, competition between state governments and the national government.

Federalism as Marketplace

Traditionally political science gave little attention to "market solutions" to questions of government. Concentrations of political power were not perceived in the same fashion as concentrations of wealth. Centralized government was not explicitly described as a "monopoly problem." Yet, it is not difficult to view centralized government as a monopoly problem, or to envision competition among rival governments for the voluntary affiliation of freely choosing individuals, as the solution.

Competitive federalism envisions a marketplace for governments, where consumer-taxpayers can voluntarily choose the public goods and service they prefer, at the cost they wish to pay,

by locating in the governmental jurisdiction which best fits their policy preferences. In this model of federalism, state and local governments compete for consumer-taxpayers by offering the best array of public goods and services at the lowest possible costs. The preferences of all individuals in society are better met in a system of multiple governments offering different packages of services and costs, than a single monopoly government, even a democratic one, offering a single package reflecting the preferences of the majority. The greater number of governments to select from, and the greater the variance in public policies among them, the closer each consumer-taxpayer can come to realizing his own preferences.

Competitive federalism, viewed as a marketplace model, is an extension of "the pure theory of local expenditures" described by economist Charles M. Tiebout many years ago.⁶ Automobiles and expressways had only recently extended the mobility of significant segments of the metropolitan population. The Tiebout model was designed for local governments and metropolitan location decisions. According to Tiebout, "The consumer voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position."⁷ The Tiebout model not only better satisfies the preferences of consumer-taxpayers, it also forces local governments to compete and thereby become more efficient.

A Theory of Competitive Federalism

The values of intergovernmental competition have been less well-understood than the values of federalism itself. Yet it is our argument that one of the great strengths of federalism is the opportunity it presents for the development of intergovernmental competition.

Information. Competition among governments, like competition in the marketplace, serves the interests of con-

sumer-taxpayers. One of the central problems in the provision of public goods and services is that of "demand revelation" — learning how much and what kinds of public services citizens really want. The absence of a price system and voluntary exchange make it difficult for public officials, even if they have no interests of their own to pursue in decision-making, to know exactly what citizens want and how much they are willing to pay for it. Election outcomes are notoriously poor indicators of the policy preferences of voters.

The absence of good information about the true demand for public services, together with the "natural tendencies" of elected officials and bureaucrats to expand their functions, powers, and budgets, produces an oversupply of public goods — more than citizen-taxpayers would choose for themselves if confronted with full knowledge of their costs and benefits.

Multiple governments offering different packages of services and costs to citizens in their jurisdictions provide information to citizens everywhere about what government services can be provided at what costs. This information itself is valuable to both citizens and officials. It allows them to compare governmental performances. The ability of taxpayer-voters to observe other governments and compare them to their own can be a powerful political force. Mobility is not absolutely essential to inspire efficiency; all that is necessary is comparative information for taxpayer-voters and, of course, competition for public office. Some public officials may welcome the challenge of comparison with other jurisdictions. Not all public officials consciously seek to obscure information in the fashion predicted by narrow models of bureaucratic behavior. Some want to do what is right, but simply lack information. And voters who are informed about comparative costs — even if these voters are a very small proportion of the electorate — can exert an influence on governmental performance.

Mobility. Information is an important product of intergovernmental competition, but the driving force in the competitive federalism model is mobility. Mobility, real and potential,

of people, industry, and capital, not only better satisfies the preferences of consumer-taxpayers, but also forces governments to become more efficient. And there is good reason to believe that America is the most mobile society in the world. Approximately 40 percent of the population of the United States changes residence at least once in a five-year period; nearly 20 percent move to a different county and nearly 10 percent move to a different state (see Table 1).

Table 1: Population Mobility in the United States

	Percent of Total Population Moving Over Five Years		
	1970-75	1975-80	1980-85
Total Movers	41.3	46.4	39.9
Different County	17.1	19.5	17.8
Different State	8.6	9.7	8.7
Different Nation	1.6	1.8	1.8

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1987, p. 25.

The mobility assumption is often viewed as the weakness of the Tiebout model. It is more difficult to "shop" from one municipality, school district, or state to another, than it is to wander around a shopping mall in search of bargains. But Americans are the most mobile people in the world. And mobility is much greater today than when Tiebout constructed his model. Family mobility is important; families are consumer-taxpayers. But perhaps even more important is the mobility of capital investment. Business and industry are also consumer-taxpayers. And there are many reasons to believe that industry and capital are more mobile today than at any time in the nation's history. Heavy industry, with bulky raw materials and finished products, was dependent upon water and rail transportation. But light industry, high tech enterprise, trade and services, finance and administration, are much more mobile. As transportation and communication systems have improved, mobility has increased. Thus, capital as well as labor, people as well as enterprise, are increasingly mobile.

Efficiency. Competition, information, and mobility combine to offer

protection against the oversupply of public goods and services. Monopoly government is far more vulnerable to the many supply-side forces inherent in governmental and political processes. It is possible, of course, that public goods are not really oversupplied — that growth of government is "a misplaced concern of ideological conservatives." If so, we still have nothing to fear from intergovernmental competition. In our theory, competition will reduce the supply of public goods only if they are in fact oversupplied relative to citizen preferences.

Responsiveness. Governmental competition inspires policy responsiveness. Whatever the theoretical deficiencies of the median voter model, variation in the levels of public services provided in the states is closely associated with characteristics of their populations. For many years the "determinants" literature in state and local government provided good predictive models of taxing and spending based upon income, education, organization, and other demographic characteristics of populations.⁸ These early studies even identified the distortions in these relationships created by federal aid.⁹ These cross-sectional relationships have persisted over the years. More importantly, changes over time in public spending in most of the states can be attributed to identifiable changes in the demand for services — notably education.¹⁰ It is true that bureaucratic, and institutional sclerosis are alive and well and influencing spending levels in state capitols; many cross-sectional comparisons confirm the importance of these supply-side forces. But there is equally compelling evidence that the demands of consumer-taxpayers in the states also shape spending policies. In very nearly all of the states, changes in spending over time can be estimated very well from a simple demand-side model — a model in which school age population is the driving force behind the largest functional component of state-local spending, education.¹¹

Policy responsiveness in the states is clearly not a product of competitive, policy-relevant, party politics. We would not have to concern ourselves so much about competition, information,

and mobility if we were certain that democratic processes within the states would insure policy responsiveness. But party competition and policy-relevant electoral politics are rarely found in the American states. The "responsible party model" — competitive policy-oriented parties whose election to office brings about significant policy changes — is notably absent from American state politics.¹² The absence of competitive parties, and the irrelevance of party control of state government to policy, reinforce the need for "auxiliary precautions" for popular control of government.

Constraints. Competitive federalism places revenue constraints on policy-makers. The range of variation in tax levels and burdens among the states is quite large. Moreover, tax burdens — state-local tax revenue as a percent of personal income — tend to change over time, with some states imposing heavy burdens in some years relative to other states, and then dramatically lightening their tax burdens to move toward the state median. The dynamics of these relative movements resembles the ship convoy analogy: Some ships move out ahead of the convoy for a while, and then perceiving the dangers, they fall back; other ships trail the flotilla for a few years, and then perceiving the deterioration of their infrastructure and the danger to economic growth it poses, they move back up into the pack.¹³

These revenue dynamics appear to conform to a competitive pattern — to a pattern likely to be produced by competition, information, and mobility among the states. But we might also speculate that the constitutional mechanisms for initiative and referenda have a very important role in tax policy. These devices facilitate closer relationships between taxpayer preferences and public policies. We emphasize their facilitative role, because referenda voting does not always lead to lower taxes. Indeed, the recent record of referenda voting shows as many defeats as victories for tax limitation initiatives, and even when these measures are approved, they are not always effective in lowering tax burdens.

Competition allows citizen-voters to compare revenue burdens and service levels among the states, and this comparative information itself constrains decision-making. And citizen-taxpayers have the additional option of moving or threatening to move, and knowledge of this option also constrains decision-making. Moreover, special institutional arrangements in state and local government — earmarked revenues, user charges, initiative and referenda voting, balanced budget requirements — place additional constraints on state and local taxing and spending, constraints which are largely absent in the federal government. The result is general moderation in the tax burdens imposed by state and local government, roughly proportionate in tax incidence, and tax revenues linked more directly to demands for public services.

Combating Fiscal Illusion. Smaller units of government prevent the costs of public services from being dispersed over so large a jurisdiction that their burdens are unnoticed. We know that interests groups seek to concentrate benefits for themselves and to disperse costs over such a wide segment of society that individual citizens have little incentive to inform themselves, organize, and devote resources to counter these special interest claims. We know that voters tend to credit their elected representatives for special interest programs that benefit them directly; yet seldom do they blame their representative for the taxes they pay for special interest programs for others. But competitive federalism helps to counter these expansionist tendencies of interest group activity by reducing the size of taxpaying constituencies and thus limiting the dispersal of costs. Would tobacco subsidies paid by Washington to North Carolina growers be voted by the residents of that state if they had to pay the full costs of these subsidies? The costs of special interest subsidies granted by state or local government cannot be dispersed over the entire nation in the fashion of federal government subsidies. By more closely matching costs with benefits, state and local governments are held to greater accountability by voter taxpayers.

Economic Development. Competition has inspired the states to be concerned with the impact of their taxing and spending policies on economic growth and to become directly involved in economic development activities. Only recently has international competition begun to inspire similar concern in Washington. Prior to 1981, discussion of federal tax policy was almost always centered on redistributional issues. Scholars and politicians who raised questions about the growth-retarding effects of federal tax policies were ignored or ridiculed. But developmental issues have long been central to debates over taxing and spending in state capitols and city halls. And it is competition which has kept developmental concerns in focus.

It is true that economic growth rates in the states are only marginally influenced by state and local government. So many other forces affect state economic development — change in world demand for specific products, changes in technologies, changing energy and labor costs, discoveries of new natural resources, developments in transportation, etc. — that it is difficult to sort out the independent effects of state tax and spending policies. Moreover, economic growth in the states occurs in spurts and lags. States which experienced the most impressive economic growth rates in the 1970s are not the same states which grew most rapidly in the 1980s. This complicates the search for general explanations of regional economic growth.

The growth-retarding effects of heavy tax burdens and high marginal rates in the states are only modest. Cross-sectional observations indicate that the states with the heaviest burdens and highest rates are not always the slowest growing states, depending on what time period is examined. But a different picture emerges from examination of time series regression on separate states relating tax burdens to economic growth.¹⁴ Raising or lowering tax burdens has had a very significant effect on economic growth in some states, notably the high tax states. California, New York, and Massachusetts were able to stimulate their economies in the 1980s with tax reduc-

tions because they had hindered economic growth with high taxes in earlier years. But low tax burden states such as Florida and Texas cannot stimulate growth by further reductions in taxes.

It is our view that competition itself prevents state taxes from having a major effect on business location and economic growth. No state can long afford to let its tax burdens "get out of line" with those of their neighboring jurisdictions. Tax burdens in the states may vary in cross-sectional comparisons in any given year. But competition itself will force states with the highest tax burdens at one point in time to moderate those burdens over time.

Innovation. Competitive federalism inspires policy innovation. Perhaps the most noteworthy state policy innovations in recent years have come as a result of state efforts to improve their economic position.¹⁵ Just as entrepreneurs compete with new ideas in the marketplace to find an advantage over their rivals, so also public officials in states and communities have been inspired by intergovernmental competition to seek innovations in public policy.

The effects of various state "industrial policy" are not easy to identify. The literature to date has failed to observe any significant aggregate growth effects for any direct state industrial development activities.¹⁶ But industrial policy follows a political logic, rather than an economic logic. When a state confronts any economic downturn, politicians are pressured to *do something*, whether the something they do is likely to be worthwhile or not. There are good theoretical reasons for predicting that direct state involvement in capital formation, as well as special tax treatments, will inevitably produce inefficiencies. By definition such policies seek to substitute political judgments for market competition. But competition among the states in industrial policies is self-correcting in the long run. States will gradually learn from their mistakes as they compare their progress with other states. Consider how much worse a national industrial policy would be — a monopoly government allocating capital, dispens-

ing subsidies, and granting special privileges and protections. Not that the federal government doesn't already do so in innumerable tax code provisions and subsidy programs, but a national industrial policy would legitimate and enlarge the scope of these subsidies, privileges, and protections. The only corrective to a national industrial policy would be international competition, and far more damage would be done to the nation before global competition would exert its correcting influence. Perhaps the results of the industrial policy experiments currently being conducted in America's "laboratories of democracy" will succeed in discouraging the federal government from pursuing a national industrial policy.

Competition and Public Policy

Most debates over federalism are only lightly camouflaged debates over policy. Philosophers and economists may assert a distinction between *constitutional* issues — deciding how issues should be decided — and *policy* issues — deciding the issues themselves.¹⁷ They may argue that constitutional rules should be decided behind a "veil of ignorance" about the immediate policy consequences of these rules; that the decision-making process should be established before policy choices are fed into the process; that individuals should be uncertain about the policy consequences of selecting a particular constitutional process before they do so.

But in politics constitutional decisions are never separated from policy outcomes. People do know what the policy consequences of various constitutional arrangements will be. Citizens as well as political leaders consistently subordinate constitutional questions to immediate policy concerns. Indeed, history is replete with examples of the same political leaders arguing one notion of federalism at one point in time to achieve their immediate policy goal, and then turning around and supporting a contradictory notion of federalism at a later time when it fits a new policy goal. No American politician, from Thomas Jefferson onward, has ever so strongly supported a view of federalism

that he ended up conceding a policy battle.

If competitive federalism is to be politically viable, it must be discussed in a policy context. Abstract debates about federalism or competition, devoid of policy implications, hold little interest for most citizens or politicians. "Most people have little interest in abstract debates that argue which level of government should be responsible for a given task. What most people care about is getting the policies they want."¹⁸ Wise politicians are intuitively familiar with the wisdom expressed by political scientist E. E. Schattschneider years ago: "The outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number of participants, every increase or deduction in the number of participants affect the results."¹⁹ Thus debates about federalism must acknowledge policy consequences.

The most serious challenge to the competitive federalism model arises in redistributive policy. Can multiple, competing governments undertake redistributive policies without creating unbearable free rider problems for themselves? Will states and communities be restrained from providing the welfare services they would otherwise prefer because of the threat of an inundation of poor people from less beneficent "free riding" jurisdictions? Insofar as competitive federalism resembles a market for government services, the under-provision of welfare services, as well as redistributive policies generally, may become a "failure" of competitive federalism. However, the empirical evidence in support of this objection is very weak. The poor are not very mobile, and when they do move it's more likely to be in search of job opportunities rather than higher welfare benefits. Sociologist Larry H. Long in a review of the relevant literature in 1974 concluded that "no study has presented empirical evidence for the hypothesis that welfare payments themselves have attracted large numbers of persons to states and cities with high benefit levels."²⁰ Long reached similar con-

clusions himself. However, Paul E. Peterson argues that there is a significant, albeit sluggish response of poor people to welfare benefit levels in the states.²¹ He concentrates his attention on migration patterns *after 1969* when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (in **Shapiro v. Thompson**) that states could not constitutionally deny welfare benefits to new residents. He calculates that increasing welfare benefits in a state increases the poverty population of the state. He assumes that increases in the poverty population are "almost certainly due to migrations rather than welfare-induced changes in labor force participation rates."²² "The research that we have reported is consistent with theoretical analyses which show that state and local governments in a federal system will tend to provide less redistribution than the society prefers."²³

The argument that capital investment and productive labor will migrate to states with lower welfare spending rests on somewhat stronger empirical support. Certainly the wealthy are more mobile than the poor. But this argument rests on the hidden assumption that individuals, families, and firms seek only to maximize their after-tax personal income, that they place little or no value on public services, especially welfare services from which they receive no direct financial benefit. But neither our competitive federalism model, nor its antecedent Tiebout model, is so narrow in its assumptions. The "utility functions" of individuals, families, and firms includes their physical, social, and cultural environment, as well as their after-tax income. Few of us want to see poverty, hunger, homelessness, ill-health, or deprivation, in our society, even if we do not expect to suffer these maladies ourselves. States or communities which aggravate these hardships would hardly look attractive to families or businesses seeking places to locate.

Competition encourages policy responsiveness. Welfare policies, like all policies, are more responsive to citizen demands when undertaken by multiple competitive governments rather than monopoly government. *The effect of competition is neither to*

lower nor to raise welfare spending but to bring it into line with citizen demands. Competitive governments must seek to match their welfare policies with both the compassion and the prudence of their citizens.

Welfare policies rest primarily on the equity preferences of middle-class Americans, rather than the poor themselves. Welfare spending in the state is not associated with proportions of poor, aged, or minority persons in their populations. Rather welfare policies reflect the economic prosperity of the states. Variations in welfare spending among the states are largely a function of income: welfare spending is higher in the high-income states than low-income states, and welfare spending goes up with increases in income.²⁴ The best hope for the poor lies in economic development — not only in opening up job opportunities, but also in raising welfare spending.

In short, while we acknowledge that competitive federalism raises some theoretical concerns about redistributive policy, we remain convinced the equity preferences of society are better served by multiple competing governments than centralized monopoly government. Welfare policies depend more upon the equity preferences of middle-class voters, than upon the voting power of the poor. Welfare spending correlates with wealth, not poverty. It is the wealthy who are mobile, not the poor. Whatever adverse effects competition may have on welfare policies, these effects are more than compensated for by the opportunities provided for policy diversity, responsiveness, and comparative experimentation.

Evaluating the Competitive Federalism Model

Competitive federalism is more a theoretical model than a description of the American federal system. The value of the model is helping us to think about potential constraints on Leviathan. It is comforting to know that there is at least a conceptual solution to monopoly government, to unrestrained power, to unchecked government growth.

Competitive federalism depends on a series of assumptions that are not fully

realized in the real world of government. Just as various "market failures" — externalities, monopolies, immobilities, and imperfect information — reduce the efficiency of the competitive market model, so also do various imperfections limit the utility of our competitive federalism model. To summarize, competitive federalism depends upon the following assumptions:

1. Autonomous state and local governments with significant independent responsibility for the welfare of the people living in their jurisdictions; governments which offer a wide range of public policies and vary the level of public goods and services.
2. Costs of government goods and services which are equal to the revenues collected from taxpayers in each jurisdiction.
3. Limited externalities, or spillovers, of either costs or benefits among jurisdictions, and no collusion among state and local governments to restrain competition.
4. The availability of good information to consumer-taxpayers about the services and costs offered by state and local governments throughout the nation.
5. Mobility of consumer-taxpayers and a prosperity to consider governmental services and costs as important criteria in locational decisions.

The failure of the American federal system to fully realize these assumptions does not destroy the model. Reality is seldom perfectly consistent with our models. The relaxation of these assumptions leads to various inefficiencies.²⁵ But the model remains important for analytical purposes to the extent that it describes behavior under specified conditions, and important for normative purposes to the extent that it identifies conditions to be changed to maximize the benefits of inter-governmental competition.

Our evaluation of the model also depends upon what the alternatives to competition may be. It is not sufficient to observe failures in our model without comparing them to failures in alternative models.²⁶ Public choice theory taught us that the existence of "market failures" does not justify government in-

tervention until it is shown that "political failures" are less damaging than market failures. So also we cannot dismiss our competitive federalism model until it is shown that the alternative — centralized, monopoly government — produces better outcomes. Competition among governments is not likely to be as efficient as competition among business firms. However, as economist Daphne Kenyon observes:

"...an evaluation of competition depends on what the alternative to competition is. If it is the adoption of a unitary system of government, with a uniform level of government goods and services throughout the United States, then even a somewhat inefficient Tiebout world is likely to be preferable."²⁷

The competitive federalism model is useful in directing our attention to the real world conditions which obstruct its function. If we view the model as normative as well as analytical, then we are provided with a guide to action — to recommendations for constitutional and policy changes which will shape real world conditions to better fit the model and reap its benefits. The competitive federalism model advises us to encourage intergovernmental competition, not cooperation; rivalry, not partnership.

Notes

1. *Federalist paper*, Number 51.
2. *Ibid.*
3. **Garcia V. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority**. 469 U.S. 528 1985.
4. David Beam, et. al., "Federalism," in Ada Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, American Political Science Association, 1983).
5. Deil S. Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations* (Belmont, Wadsworth, 1978).
6. Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 64 (October 1956), pp. 416-424.
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The Symbolic and Shamanistic Functions of the American Presidency

Thomas E. Cronin

The American presidency is more than a political or constitutional institution. It is a focus for intense emotions. The presidency serves our basic need for a visible and representative national symbol to which we can turn with our hopes and aspirations.

Presidents are the nation's number-one celebrity; almost everything they do is news. Merely by going to a sports event, or a funeral, or in the celebration of a national holiday, or visiting a particular nation, presidents not only command attention, they convey meaning. By their actions presidents can arouse a sense of hope or despair, honor or dishonor.

Although Americans like to view themselves as hardheaded pragmatists, they — like humans everywhere — cannot stand too much reality. Man does not live by reason alone. Myths and dreams are an age-old form of escape. People will continue to believe what they want to believe. And people turn to national leaders just as tribesmen turn to shamans — yearning for meaning, healing, empowerment, legitimacy, assurance, and a sense of purpose.

Americans expect many things from their presidents — honesty, credibility, crisis leadership, agenda-setting and administrative abilities, and also certain of the tribal leader or priestly functions we usually associate with primitive or religious communities. A president's personal conduct affects how millions of Americans view their political loyalties and civic responsibilities. Of course, the symbolic influence of presidents is not always evoked in favor of worthy causes, and sometimes presidents do not live up to our expectations of moral leadership. Still, a great many people find comfort in an oversimplified image of presidents as *warrior-captains* firmly at the helm of the ship of state, as *emancipators* or *liberators* in the exodus tradition, as

priests and prophets of our civil religion, and as *defenders of the democratic faith* and *evocative spokesmen* of the American Dream.

United in this one institution are multiple roles that are on the surface confusing and conflicting. A president's unifying role as a head of state and symbol-in-chief, especially in times of crisis, often clashes with his advocacy of program initiatives and partisan responsibilities. Further, presidents invariably take advantage and borrow from their legitimacy as representative and symbolic head-of-state to expand their political and partisan influence.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution did not fully anticipate the symbolic and morale-building functions a president would have to perform. Certain magisterial functions such as receiving ambassadors and the granting of pardons, were conferred. The job of the presidency demanded symbolic leadership from the very beginning. Washington and his advisors would readily recognize that in leadership at its finest, the leader symbolizes the best in the community, the best in its traditions, values and purposes. Effective leadership infuses vision and a sense of significant meaning into the enterprise of a nation.

The Importance of George Washington

The American Constitution, as drafted and ratified in the late 1780s, was a splendid document. Yet it did not guarantee that the American presidency would work and that Americans would enjoy both representation and effective government. Much depended on how George Washington interpreted the Constitution and how his countrymen would respond to his leadership. He would carefully have to ease the distrust of Americans to a centralized leadership institution and

earn respect and legitimacy for the fledgling Republic.

George Washington was one of the few continental figures of his day. He was already a warrior-hero. He had commanded with distinction the revolutionary patriots for more than an eight-year period. In victory he became a prime symbol of that crusade. His integrity, judgment, lengthy service both in and out of uniform to his country and his devotion to his troops and his countrymen set him apart from his fellow founders.

Washington wasn't a great philosopher, orator, lawyer or even organizer. Even his military abilities have been questioned. His mind was keen yet it was slow in operation, being little aided by invention or imagination.

Yet the nation needed a hero. America had had no heritage of celebrated public servants, other than those in England, and hence it was essential for national pride to endow our first hero with lavish praise. His countrymen did precisely this. And Washington understood their need and not only accepted it graciously, he used it as a means of legitimizing both his new office and the new national government he had labored so long to bring into being.

No matter how ably others had explained the Constitution, and especially the provisions for presidential leadership, it was now up to President Washington to carry out the promise of the office, and establish the precedents to be followed as long as the country survived. Washington was fully aware that the process of making the Constitution work had only just begun. He knew that written documents do not implement themselves. He appreciated that a living, real constitution includes customs, traditions, practices, interpretations and precedent setting to fill

out the vagueness of the written provisions.

Among President Washington's many legacies to our political system was his acting out superbly the head of state and symbolic functions we now regularly expect of presidents. When the founders decided to grant the chief executive the additional responsibilities of receiving ambassadors and other foreign dignitaries they in effect made the president our head of state and chief symbolic leader as well. Our constitution framers seem not to have devoted much thought to these head of state obligations. It was one of the many unfinished aspects of their work.

The framers may not have spelled out the symbolic roles of the presidency for two reasons. First, they yearned to devise a system that was a government of laws rather than a government that depended on indispensable individuals. More than anything they were trying to invent new forms of government and constitutionalism that moved away from the British model. On the other hand, the availability of Washington and the expectation that he would serve as the first president doubtless also had much to do with their leaving these aspects of the presidency underdefined. For in Washington they realized they had a person of commanding presence — a person of considerable optimism, vision and self-confidence. His friend and sometimes antagonist, Thomas Jefferson, captures the genius and uniqueness of Washington's character.

[Washington] was incapable of fear..Perhaps the strongest feature in his character was prudence...but when once decided, going through with his purpose, whatever obstacles opposed, his integrity was most pure, his justice the most inflexible I have ever known...He was, indeed, in every sense of the words, a wise, a good, and a great man.

Washington interpreted his new position as having important semi-royal responsibilities. He would travel through the nation as a symbol of the new government. He would appear with the American troops to lend morale and legitimacy to their missions. He would demand respect from the of-

ficers in both the executive and legislative departments of government. In short, he was ever sensitive to the realities that he was expected to be far more than a national city manager. He had to symbolize both the past glories and the future greatness of his new nation. He had, in addition, to win respect and establish credibility and even a certain amount of mystique in this new institution called the American presidency.

In some ways Washington became the nation's first secular priest or societal shaman. In helping his fellow countrymen to transcend their ordinary definitions of reality he helped instill a new nationalism and a new sense of purpose. His combination of *warrior* and *priest*, *liberator* and *definer* of a national vision presaged additional extra-constitutional responsibilities for future American presidents.

The Warrior-Symbol

In deciding to make the executive office also the place for commander-in-chief responsibilities, the framers fused together the roles of executive leadership and military or security leadership. This unification, which had been absent under the Articles of Confederation and especially during the American Revolution, guaranteed that Americans would expect presidents to know about war, be capable of war-time leadership and, if possible, have military experience.

Not surprisingly, then, we have elected several military heroes. Washington, Jackson, Grant, Teddy Roosevelt to a lesser extent, and Eisenhower were in this tradition.

Americans honor their heroes and we want presidents to be heroic at the same time we want them to be representative. We have always revered the explorer-risk-taking entrepreneur. Thus Christopher Columbus, Charles Lindbergh and John Glenn were all put on a pedestal. So also these presidents who had demonstrated valor in service to their country.

Washington, Jackson, Grant, TR and IKE all benefited from their military achievements and these enhanced their legitimacy as presidential candidates. And the presidency itself — because of these warrior-presidents — took on ad-

ditional meaning because of their presence. Each brought to the office some of the aura of legend and the charisma of reputation and authority earned in defense of the nation-state. This never guaranteed effectiveness in presidential performance, something it quite notably did not do for Grant, yet it expanded the public's acceptance of their authority — and in four of their cases it helped achieve for them rather high evaluations for their presidencies.

Part of the symbolic responsibility of the American president is to preside over the cultural and ritual observances of the nation. Memorial and Veteran's Day ceremonies are prime illustrations. So also the centennials and anniversaries of the conclusions of past wars. Then, too, the modern president is required to assure the nation of its military strength.

George Washington's personal leadership in helping to end the Whiskey Rebellion in 1793 and Dwight Eisenhower's famous pledge, "I shall go to Korea," are examples of personalized presidential military leadership. The legend of Jackson and the victory at New Orleans, of Grant and his military effectiveness in ending the Civil War and of Teddy Roosevelt and his Rough Riders at San Juan — all add to the memory and cumulative symbolic legacy of the presidency at large. TR's pugnacious temperament as a glory seeking president in the build-up of sea power and the building of the Panama Canal also reinforced his exuberant and expansive use of presidential power.

Military heroes rise to leadership roles in every society and ours is no exception. On balance, the military types who have become presidents have bent over backwards not to unnecessarily militarize the presidency. Yet the emergence of the nation as the leading military power in the world necessarily blurs the distinction between the job of the president as political and national security leader. Once merely one of the jobs of the president and only an occasionally demanding aspect of the job, the modern president is compelled to spend at least half of his time planning national security strategy and presiding over a sprawling military complex, often with as many as 500,000 troops in

uniform stationed in all reaches of the world.

The Emancipator-Liberator Symbol

The Exodus or emancipator "paradigm" or theory of emergency leadership is one that is deeply embedded in the cultural consciousness of the West. One writer describes the Exodus as an account of deliverance or liberation not only in religious terms, but also in a secular, this-worldly account. The Exodus paradigm is one of liberation, of a march to freedom. Just as the Exodus for the Israelites was a journey forward, a march to a goal, a moral progress, a transformation, so also in their own way Americans have had to march, and have had to have leaders, and discipline, to free themselves from oppression and depression.

The American Revolution itself, although in many ways a conservative revolution, was a war of liberation and a determined, disciplined, focused striving to bring about a deliverance. If an aspiration, hope and promise motivated that rebellion, forceful and committed leadership was needed to help realize the triumph. And the story and legend of George Washington are inextricably linked to this, our own story of liberation.

Yet perhaps it is the story of Abraham Lincoln that epitomizes the liberator-emancipator role of the American political leader. Political scientist Clinton Rossiter once wrote of Lincoln as the supreme American myth, the richest symbol in the American cultural experience. "He is," wrote Rossiter, "the martyred Christ of democracy's passion play. And who, then, can measure the strength that is given to the President because he holds Lincoln's office, lives in Lincoln's house, and walks in Lincoln's way?" Rossiter goes so far, further than many of us would want to go, as to say the final greatness of the presidency lies in the truth that it is not just an office of incredible power, but a breeding ground of indestructible myth.

Lincoln's special role in American civic and cultural life comes not from his revelation of God's will, but because he revealed and unlocked the higher aspirations and promise of America. In his ability to be both a common man

with uncommon instincts he preserved the nation, presided over our worst ordeal and encouraged the rebirth and liberation the nation so urgently needed.

So what if the nation often lavishes too much meaning and too much praise on the man in the White House at that time? Even a free people need their heroes and it is our fortune that our foremost heroes have been those who by empowering us helped us transcend our flaws and deficiencies. If the real Lincoln was not exactly a saintly Emancipator, neither was he a racist. He grew as he rose to power and he grew also once he attained power. The flawed, fatalistic and politically ambitious Lincoln struggled with himself and in doing so helped his country struggle and resolve the haunting moral paradox of slavery in a nation based on the Declaration of Independence. Ultimately, Lincoln provided transcending liberating leadership. Thus in late 1862 he would remind the Congress and the nation that the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. "The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country." "Fellow citizens," Lincoln went on, "we cannot escape history....The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation....In giving freedom to the slaves, we assure freedom to the free — honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth."¹

Lincoln, caught up in the turbulent social forces of his time, helped point the way to a resolution of the nation's most perplexing moral problem. The Lincoln myth is not that he was a political saint, but rather that he acted so as to encourage the country toward self-improvement and the liberation of the nation's more generous impulses toward one another.

In his actions, and even more in the legends that developed around him after his death, the Lincoln story is rich in meaning and symbol. Lincoln

helped his nation renew human hopefulness. Lincoln also added considerably to the legitimacy of the presidency and expanded the public's expectations of the possibilities of presidential moral leadership.

Eighty years later, Franklin Roosevelt's determined personal leadership designed to cope with the devastation of the Great Depression also fit the emancipator-liberator symbolic role. Again the legend and myths that developed are often enlarged out of proportion. Yet in politics — the perception of the image is usually as important and more lasting than the reality. Nowadays Roosevelt is remembered for his willingness to risk his political career to stake out bold new measures needed to rescue the nation from its worst economic disaster.

Through all his New Deal years FDR recognized the nation needed renewal and hope. His "We have nothing to fear but fear itself" statement, his reassuring fireside chats, his contagious self-confidence and his often unwarranted optimism telegraphed to the American people that things would improve.

This son of the upper class would cast his lot, or so it seemed, with the common people. He would institute safeguards against the manipulators in the marketplace and he would put people to work and introduce social security and countless other measures to spur economic recovery. And for all this FDR would become idolized by the working classes as a semi-savior, as a renewer of the system, as a liberating-leader.

Similarly, his risking all to come to the aid of the Allies in defeating Fascism is also interpreted as leadership of liberation. Somehow, whether during the after shocks of Pearl Harbor, the invasion of Normandy or Roosevelt's personal diplomacy and personal visits to the troops in North Africa — Roosevelt seemed to be engaged in bringing new meaning to the mission of America. While a wide variety of meanings were doubtless conveyed, the emancipator-liberator, the leader in defense of freedom, always loomed large and forms the FDR legends today — "A Soldier of Freedom" as one of his biographers puts it, and, we might add, the

foremost architect as well of the modern American presidency.

Presidents as Defenders of the Faith

Every four years Americans elect a politician to serve as president. Yet we also yearn for a high priest of sorts, because despite our separation of church and state, we need performed for us some of the same functions that shamans, medicine men and other practitioners of ritualistic arts perform in other societies.

From Jefferson to our day, presidents have personalized the job and helped remind Americans of the meaning and promise of the Republic. Each president is asked, in some way, to help remind us of the greatness of our past and define the promise of even a more exalted future. Some are good at this and others, of course, are not.

Jefferson's inaugural addresses illustrate this healing and symbolic meaning. His exhortations to us to be the best we could be and his repeated reiteration of his belief in the Democratic Faith is an evocation of this tradition.

Woodrow Wilson's conception of the presidency was plainly in the Jeffersonian mold. His moral preachings and his optimism in a more assertive role for the national government and his idealistic faith in the promise of a League of Nations underscored his notions of a president as decidedly more than just a prime minister. Wilson often acted as if he were a prime minister or priest as he went about setting moral standards by which to guide both national and international behavior. Wilson came to office with a capacious view of presidential leadership:

His is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of force will easily overpower him. His position takes the imagination of the country. He is the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people.

He may be both the leader of his party and the leader of the nation, or he may be one or the other. If he leads the nation, his party can hardly resist him.

His office is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it.

Some of our presidents have deliberately held themselves off from using the full power they might legitimately have used, because of conscientious scruples....The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can.

His is the vital place of action in the system, whether he accepts it as such or not, and the office is the measure of the man — of his measure as well as of his force.

President John F. Kennedy also fits the defender of the faith and the renewer of the dream symbols so closely associated with the symbolic Presidency. In part it was his glamor, style, youth and wit. Yet it was also part of the Kennedy message. He viewed America as having a special mission. He kept insisting that to say one is an American is a proud boast and that we had a lot to do to live up to that claim. "We can do better" was his impatient plea. He liked to stress that his country "cannot afford to be materially rich and spiritually poor." We must complete the unredeemed pledges of the Roosevelt-Truman period and we need to reclaim our political and military dominance in world affairs, Kennedy said. His Peace Corps, man-to-the-moon program, overseas economic development initiatives, belated but significant civil rights action, and similar actions were intended to recapture the spirit and idealism of distinctive aspects of the American Dream.

The real Kennedy irretrievably vanished in late November of 1963. In death the Kennedy legend is enlarged many times over and we remember him less for what he did than for what he symbolized, what he began, what he talked about — and for the promise of what might have been. Although the expert historian and political appraisers evaluate Kennedy as merely an above average president, the American people remember Kennedy in a different and more reverential way. They remember the self-confidence, the optimism, the enthusiasm, the idealism and the visions he shared — and the ritual of his mourning will never be forgotten by those who lived through it. It

is one of the paradoxes or ironies of the Kennedy presidency that although he often lacked passion and moral commitment in a clear intellectual way, and he was most assuredly not a Churchill or an FDR, his personal impact on countless millions of Americans and others around the world was of a heroic and transcending kind and his words, his hopes and his example for a time helped lift people up from the everyday mundane realities that otherwise faced them.

The Reagan presidency was plainly also rich with symbolism and meaning for many Americans. Reagan came to the White House promising a new American Dream — a dream that spoke of more freedom from government, lowered taxes, and less regulation of the entrepreneurial impulses of the nation. Reagan's definition of the American Dream differed in many ways from Roosevelt's, yet like Roosevelt, Reagan's initiatives often polarized the nation. In common with Roosevelt, Reagan received unusual public support and won impressive reelection, perhaps in part because he was willing to take a stand, willing to defend his version of the American faith, American Dream, American mission. If Reagan's was more of an act of restoration or redirection than an act of rebirth or liberation, some of Reagan's more ardent supporters view his role as very much as significant as the visionary, transcending leadership of a Lincoln and a Roosevelt.

Plainly, Reagan had an uncanny understanding of the symbolic roles a capable president must perform. He had a conscious appreciation of the need for the president to reaffirm our basic goals, to celebrate liberty and freedom and to participate fully in the rituals that both give meaning to American life and help people understand the larger events of which they are a minor part. Few presidents have been better than Reagan at helping the nation observe its ritual observances such as Memorial Day, July Fourth, Thanksgiving, Veteran's Day, our participation in the Olympics, summit diplomacy and similar ceremonies. No one was better at performing national chaplain services — as Reagan did in comforting

Americans after the Challenger disaster or as he grieved with and gave meaning to those who mourned the tragic deaths of U.S. Marines in Lebanon, or the army troop downed in a transport crash in Canada as they returned from the Sinai. Reagan understood that Americans have a civil religion and semi-sacred symbols and these reflect our human need to make sense out of eclectic experiences, and give meaning, form, order and assurance.

Implications and Discussion

Much of this comingling of the political and of the culturally symbolic in presidential performance is an altogether understandable human response to societal yearnings. Leaders sometimes have no choice but to fulfill tribal roles, no matter how pragmatic, educated, sophisticated or secular the society. Rituals are ceaselessly reinvented by the human heart.

It may be, in fact, that Americans need more symbolic or ritualistic leadership than many societies simply because we prohibited royalty and the establishment of a state religion. Even many of our Western democratic allies find it desirable to separate their head of state functions from their legislative and political leadership functions. Thus England has her queen and her prime minister. Germany has a president to perform head of state roles and a chancellor as politician-in-chief. Even the Soviet Union differentiates many of its hierarchical functions, distributing them to the Communist Party's general secretary, a president and others (although Mikhail Gorbachev appears to be assuming many if not all of these roles as we enter the 1990s).

We do it our own way — and we may pay a price for this union of sometimes conflicting roles in the same office. Indeed, the rise and enlargement of the symbolic features of the American presidency raise a number of problems.

First, presidents are sometimes tempted to engage a bit too much in symbolic leadership at the expense of political leadership. Understandably, presidents enjoy the symbolic and ceremonial duties. In the performance of these functions they represent the whole people. As political and partisan

leaders they often have to divide us. Much of the job of a president requires setting priorities, building new coalitions around these priorities, hiring and firing top personnel, bargaining with Congress, persuading interest group leaders and, in general, negotiating compromises with other prominent leaders at home and abroad. These tasks require a president to take controversial stands and make tough political decisions. They also require a president to work closely with party leaders and implement party platform ideas. In short, they require a president, not just to preside, but to take risks, not just to attend ceremonies and give sermons, but to engage in conflict. As head of state and symbol-in-chief, a president seeks to unite us, reassure us and emphasize order, stability and continuity. As a political executive a president has to confront problems and antagonize opponents and stir us from our complacency.

The relationship between these presidential responsibilities is uneasy. Most of the time a president manages to combine the offices of chief of state and political and party leader without too much difficulty. Most Americans probably understand that a president holds these diverse roles, moving from one to the other as conditions demand.

There is nothing wrong with the symbolic powers that come with the job. They can become a problem, however, when they lead the public to believe symbolism equals accomplishment, or when ceremonial and symbolic requirements keep presidents from performing their other demanding duties.

Second, sometimes a president invokes the warrior, priest, defender of the faith images that come with the job and help legitimize presidential authority to give credibility to decisions or actions that are not deserving our approval. Perhaps Richard Nixon's enemies list, his deceptiveness in obstructing the judicial investigation of the Watergate break-in, and his extensive invocation of executive privilege best illustrate abuse of the office. Nixon portrayed himself as a leader, like Lincoln, embattled in crisis and needing more deference, loyalty, secrecy and imperial authority. For a while he was

able to get away with this. Fortunately, some of the accountability mechanisms in our system rose to the challenge — but not without considerable difficulty and delay.

Third, the amplification of the symbolic roles of the American president may do a disservice in diminishing competing forms of democratic leadership. Our system was not designed to achieve the acquiescence of the many in the rule of the favored few. It is sometimes said that people are ruled by their imaginations; yet it is perhaps more valid to suggest they are governed by the weaknesses of their imaginations.

Especially in the age of television, our presidents loom so large as to dominate much of the public discourse. It is difficult for political rivals or counter-leadership to get air time to present alternative interpretations of what might be desirable policy.

The dominant symbolic and priestly roles of presidents also make even the most constructive opposition seem as acts of disloyalty, disobedience or even sacrilege.

No one, certainly not the founding politicians, ever intended that presidents would be the sole interpreter of the meaning of America. Most assuredly we want a nation that is capable of rich dialogue about our purposes, vision and future aspirations. We also want a nation of leaders, not a nation dependent on a single leader and a single, centralized leadership institution. Our strength has always come from our diversity, our willingness and eagerness to debate, listen to alternative viewpoints and nurture dissent. A top-heavy leadership structure with undue reverence and deference to the presidency would undermine much that is precious to the American experiment.

If the profound symbolism of the presidency has costly implications for the quality of the relationship between citizens and the presidency, it affects fully as much the ways in which presidents and their associates conceive of themselves and their jobs. The reverence and loyalty rendered a new president are a rich resource, but an overindulgent citizenry can distort the president's psychological perspective

and sense of right and wrong. At the height of Watergate, critics suggested that what the country needed was some considered disrespect for the office of the president, "a refusal to give any more weight to a president's words than the intelligence of the utterance, if spoken by anyone else, would command; an understanding of a point made so aptly by Montaigne: "Sit he on never so high a throne, a man still sits on his bottom?"²

Fortunately, Americans have an excellent appreciation for humor — and our chief deflators of presidential pomposity or phony religiosity are sometimes our cartoonists, comedians and humorous columnists. A president who goes too far must beware Herblock, Gary Trudeau, Johnny Carson and Russell Baker — to name just a few potential adversaries. Thank God for our robust First Amendment!

On balance, we turn to presidents for more symbolic meaning and ritual leadership than was ever intended — and more than is probably desirable. Such dependency has consequences. Some of these have just been reviewed. Doubtless there are additional side effects and implications. We will strengthen the presidency and our polity if we have a greater appreciation of the unintended as well as those intended consequences of this profoundly important constitutional office.

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Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Soviet Union

Leon Gouré

In recent years, political developments in the Soviet Union have surprised and astonished the world and have been the subject of a great deal of speculation about their implications for the future of that country and the world. Few people, if any, in the Soviet Union and the West would have predicted the Gorbachev phenomenon. Least of all would anyone have anticipated the entrenched, long-standing Stalinist system in the Soviet Union could or would be subjected to extensive reforms and revisions carried out from the top in the name of its "democratization." After all, the few Soviet intellectuals who had earlier openly called for some sort of "democratization" had been either jailed or sent into exile. Now, however, new terms such as *glasnost* and *perestroika* have entered the Soviet and world political vocabulary. The western world has coined new words, such as "Gorbamania." It may, therefore, be permissible to also say that not only the free world but the Soviet system and people are suffering from "Gorbashock" due to a rapid succession of new Soviet policies and changes in declared aims which are profoundly altering perceptions of East-West relations as well as of the Soviet Union itself.

There is much talk about Gorbachev carrying out a political "revolution" in the Soviet Union. Measured against what the world has come to see as an unyielding stereotype of some 50 years of Soviet Communist leadership practices, the changes introduced by Gorbachev may indeed appear to be "revolutionary." There are those in the Soviet Union and abroad who question whether the term "revolution" can be properly applied to reforms which do not aim at a fundamental change in the Soviet political system but seek, rather, to revise it and build on existing institutions and power structure. Perhaps the term "revolution" or, at least, its poten-

tial applies less to the real substance of the changes introduced by Gorbachev than to their unanticipated consequences. After all, what is the reality of a "democratization" process which is controlled by an authoritarian leadership in power conditioned by the preservation in constitutional, legal, and political terms of a one-party rule, especially when it insists on being the sole source of policy decisions and demands that socialism be preserved as the only acceptable system for the Soviet Union.

No one has accused Gorbachev of altruism, political or other, even if his style differs dramatically from that of his predecessors. Indeed, one of his early supporters in the Politburo, Andrei Gromyko, said of him that for all of Gorbachev's apparent geniality, he has "iron teeth." Gromyko should know what he is talking about, being one of the victims of his purge in September 1988 after having earlier been removed as USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and "kicked upstairs" to assume the largely ceremonial chairmanship of the Presidium of the old, ineffectual Supreme Soviet, only to be "retired" when Gorbachev sought this post with far greater power for himself in the new Supreme Soviet.

It is also noteworthy that Gorbachev has been calling for an end to social dependence on a "benevolent tsar" and to the "strong-arm command-and-administer methods" of management from the center. Yet the process of foisting *perestroika* on a hostile bureaucracy and an apathetic population has been precisely in the "strong-arm command-and-administer" style, and Gorbachev has been and remains the one who is instilling order from above and organizing as well as leading the country's reconstruction. There is little question that he is the "tsar;" the only question concerns his degree of "benevolence."

The Beginning

It is very doubtful that when Gorbachev was elected to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and thus, chairman of the Politburo in 1985, he had a clear vision of and program for the reform of the Soviet system. The problem that faced him was the need to revitalize the Soviet economy which was in a state of stagnation and deterioration. What made Gorbachev's *perestroika* different from earlier attempts at reforming the system was the progressive recognition that this revitalization of the economy could not be successfully achieved without the revitalization of Soviet society, that is, without its active involvement in the *perestroika* process and its willingness to make the necessary efforts and sacrifices toward the attainment of its success. However, there was also another requirement which was the need to break the death grip of the governmental, party, and economic bureaucracy on the economic system and its management. To do this required, in turn, that extensive changes be made not only in the composition of the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee memberships, but also in the central and national party and government *apparatus*, thus giving Gorbachev greater power and control over the Party itself.

There are many indications and, indeed, many admissions that initially Gorbachev and his advisers had greatly underestimated the magnitude and complexities of the task confronting them in implementing *perestroika*. Apparently, it was somewhat simplistically expected that reforms in the management and fiscal system of the economy and pressure on the bureaucracy for more responsible behavior would yield significant results in two or three years. *Glasnost*, which was not and still should not be equated with

free speech — a Soviet political analyst recently characterized them as the difference between a light bulb and the light of day — was initially intended by Gorbachev as an instrument for pressuring the bureaucracy. It was thought that *glasnost* or "publishing how things really are" would encourage the lower and middle management and technical personnel, party workers, and the population to publicly point the finger at officials who misused their power, shirked their responsibilities, engaged in corrupt practices, and resisted the implementation of the reforms. In short, *glasnost* was aimed at breaking up the conspiracy of silence protecting the bureaucracy, which was also a major cause of public apathy.

Gorbachev and his advisers soon came to realize, however, that this limited approach would not work. Indeed, the further he pushed his economic reforms, the worse the economic situation became in the consumer sector. Meanwhile, except for some segments of the intelligentsia, the apathy of the population persisted, and the resistance of the *apparat* was greater than had been anticipated. It became increasingly evident that *perestroika* would not succeed unless and until the officials' and the population's attitude toward work and social responsibility changed, a process which required a great deal of time. To make matters worse, while initially the blame for the population's low living standards could be placed on the pre-Gorbachev "period of stagnation," their further deterioration became increasingly identified with Gorbachev's own hasty reforms and their destabilizing impact on the economy. In this situation, if Gorbachev was not to lose power, the only option he and his supporters in the Politburo had was, as one Soviet analyst put it, to "share political responsibility with other forces, — i.e., society — while keeping the key levers of power in their own hands."¹ This, in turn, required a broadening of *glasnost* and "democratization," and at least a partial reduction in power of the Party *apparat*, and for Gorbachev to find an additional power based in a new type of Supreme Soviet.

Gorbachev's "Democratization"

Gorbachev's approach to "democratization" has been necessitated partly by his struggle for power and partly by the unanticipated rapid spread of political discussion and activism among the population, including the flare-up of ethnic nationalism in the multi-national Soviet state, and the growing demands of power-sharing on the part of Soviet society. Of course, Gorbachev himself has had more limited ideas concerning the function of *glasnost*. Thus, addressing Soviet news editors and media representatives on September 2, 1988, he asserted that:

We are now embarking on the type of process, the kind of new ground and scale of work that demand immense efforts in theoretical and political activity, in the organization, the unification, the consolidation of society, and only the Party can be the vehicle for all this. Party organizations are changing; their activity is acquiring greater vitality, and this must be recognized and supported because if one weakens the Party rather than strengthen it, nothing will come of restructuring.²

In the same speech, Gorbachev made clear that "democratization" did not mean political pluralism. Thus, according to him:

We are not talking about any kind of limit on "glasnost" or "democracy. What limits? "Glasnost" in the interest of the people and socialism should be without limits. I repeat — in the interest of the people and socialism.

But if the objective of *glasnost* is to support Gorbachev's *perestroika* policies, what about *glasnost* within the Communist Party? The problem is that nearly all significant decision-making and management posts of the USSR Council of Ministers and some 90% of the elected Supreme Soviet are held by party members and therefore, are subject to Party discipline. On this question, the Resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference held in June 1988 states that:

Our primary task is to fully restore the Leninist vision of democratic centralism which implies free discussion at the stage when a particular question is being considered, and concentrated action when the

majority has adopted the decision.³

The 19th Conference also adopted to allow Party leaders at the *republic*, *oblast*, and *rayon* levels to be appointed chairmen of the elected local councils (*soviets*), thus giving them a great deal of influence over the legislative as well as executive bodies. In answer to critics who pointed out that this dual position was "undemocratic" and that the Party should not be directly involved in the day-to-day management of government affairs, Gorbachev replied that the Party leaders would also have to stand for election to the soviets. A year later, however, at the meeting of the Central Committee on July 18, 1989, Gorbachev suggested that the first Party secretaries may not have to subject themselves to this ordeal where there is a risk of their being rejected by the electorate. At the same time, Gorbachev reminded that Party members elected to the soviets are not free from party discipline or the duty of carrying out the Party's policy decisions. Thus, the Soviet historian, Roy Medvedev, observed in an interview that:

...if the Party Committee First Secretary is also chairman of the local soviet, there cannot be any separation of responsibilities. The danger is that the Party organization will still remain the strongest and most dominant body....(the) local party leaders' personal power is immensely increased by the reform. The CPSU first secretary was already, in all cases, the absolute master of his region, but at least, there was some debate with the chairman of the soviets who belonged to a difference organization to which he was, to some extent, answerable. Now the two roles will be assumed by a single person.⁴

The 19th Party Conference also won for Gorbachev, on his insistence, the creation of a new presidential system with far greater powers in the matter of domestic, foreign, and defense policies than those possessed by his predecessors in the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Thus, Gorbachev was going to hold the dual post of head of the Party and head of state, manipulating both to reinforce his power. The "democratic" forces in the Soviet Union perceived this as another threat to true "democratization" of the

Soviet system. Andrei Sakharov warned that in the absence of a multi-party system which Gorbachev made clear he rejected, this arrangement would give him or his successors "boundless power."

Having successfully engineered, at the 19th Party Conference, the election of three of his supporters to full membership in the Politburo, i.e., Aleksander Yakovlev, Nikolai Shurkov, and Viktor Nikonov, as well as made USSR Minister of Defense Dimitri Yazov a candidate member, Gorbachev moved swiftly and stealthily to restructure the Politburo and the Central Committee's secretariat. The axe fell on September 30, 1988. At a hastily called meeting of the Central Committee, Gorbachev unmistakably bared his "iron teeth." In a 45-minute session, invoking the 19th Party Conference Resolution, he won by unanimous vote, the retirement of Gromyko and M. Solomentsev as well as of two alternate members, P. Demichev and V. Dolgikh, from the Politburo and shifted Politburo member V. Vorotnikov to the ceremonial post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. At the same time, V. Medvedev, a secretary of the Central Committee and V. Chebrikov, the former head of the KGB, became full members of the Politburo, and three others, alternate members. Still more dramatic, Gorbachev abolished the long-standing organization of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, establishing instead six commissions, all but one headed by a full member of the Politburo. By so doing, Gorbachev transformed the Politburo into a collection of issues-oriented commissions, with each of their chairmen held accountable for the implementation of policies in a given area, the irony being that Chebrikov headed up the Commission on Legal Policy while Ye. Ligachev, former second-in-command in the Politburo, found himself unceremoniously demoted to the chairmanship of the Commission on Questions of Agrarian Policy.

Following the Central Committee meeting, a hastily convened Supreme Soviet promptly elected Gorbachev as its chairman. What was especially striking about the Central Committee meet-

ing of September 30 was that nearly 30 percent of the members had earlier been removed from their party or management position and had become, in the Soviet political vocabulary, "dead souls." Yet none dared oppose Gorbachev when he demanded their affirmative vote for the personnel and organizational changes he had decided to carry out.

Indeed, Gorbachev had carried out a ruthless purge of Party officials throughout the country on a scale not seen in the Soviet Union since the 1950s. In April 1989, at a meeting of a Central Committee Plenum called to ratify these personnel changes and to purge the "dead souls" from that body, Gorbachev revealed that since 1986, six of the fourteen leaders in the republics and 88 out of 150 *oblast* (regional) Party leaders had been replaced. In all, some two-thirds of leading Party and management leaders had been removed from office.⁵ In a sweeping purge, the April Central Committee meeting removed 74 of its full members out of a total membership of 301 as well as 24 alternate members. Gorbachev simply put the matter to an open show of hands and, not unexpectedly, none dared oppose him, even though a number of speakers had expressed disagreement with his policies.

The March 1989 Elections

Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy has been an undeniable success, although not necessarily in the sense for which it had been intended. It did generate broader public support for *perestroika*, but otherwise appears to have had little effect on motivating the Soviet people to work harder, given the worsening shortages of food and consumer goods. What it did do is to unleash increasingly bold criticism of Soviet policies and leaders since the revolution, of Party policies and management, and of *perestroika* itself. It also resulted in a proliferation of unsanctioned political and social organizations and clubs, representing a wide range of political views, in stimulating an overt upsurge of nationalism and anti-Soviet attitudes among the Soviet ethnic minorities, and has helped to further undermine the authority of the Communist Party.

Gorbachev complains that the Soviet Union has become a debating society unwilling to take action. His attempts to set limits to *glasnost* have had little effect so far. True, on April 11, 1989, Gorbachev signed a decree of the Supreme Soviet "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes," which contained the notorious Article 11 (1), stating that:

Public insult to or defamation of the USSR supreme organs of state power and government, other state organs constituted or elected by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet or officials appointed, elected, or approved in office by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet or public organizations...constituted according to law and acting in conformity with the USSR Constitution — are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years or a fine of up to 2,000 rubles.⁶

In the same decree, Article 7 threatened similar punishment for "public calls for the overthrow of the Soviet state and social systems," for "obstructing the execution of Soviet laws" in order to undermine the system and for "preparation for the purposes of dissemination or the actual dissemination of material containing such calls." The same acts committed by an organized group and the printing of large runs of subversive materials are punishable by up to seven years in prison and if carried out "upon instructions" from organizations abroad by up to ten years in prison. The anti-*glasnost* character of the law is self-evident and is not mitigated by the Soviet authorities' argument that the new law is less harsh in some penalties than its predecessor. The best one can say for it is that so far, it has not stifled *glasnost*, but it stands as a warning to the "radical," unofficial political organizations and their unsanctioned publications as well as to the ethnic dissidents calling for independence from the Soviet Union.

The first major public exercise in "democratization" other than *glasnost* has been the election of deputies to a new Congress of People's Deputies which, in turn, was to elect a new Supreme Soviet. The great novelty of elections was that, in principle, it offered the possibility for any qualified

citizen to stand for election with or without the Party's approval and also that the electorate was to have choices of candidates. In practice, however, the electoral process and apportionment were heavily rigged in favor of the power structure.

According to the newly adopted electoral law, 2250 deputies were to be elected to the Congress of People's Deputies for a four-year term. Of these, 750 were to be elected in electoral districts with equal numbers of voters, and another 750 were to be elected on the basis of the administrative-territorial structure of the USSR, with 32 deputies representing each *republic*, 11 each *autonomous republics*, 5 each *autonomous oblast*, and 1 each *autonomous okrug*. The remaining 750 were not to be elected directly by the population but instead, were to be elected by the CPSU, 100 by USSR trade unions, 100 by economic cooperative organizations such as collective farms and consumer societies, 75 by the Communist Youth League, 75 by the Soviet Women's Committee, 75 by the All-Union Councils of War and Labor Veterans, 75 by associations of scientific workers, 75 by unions of journalists, writers, artists, etc., and 75 by other legally constituted and officially recognized all-union social organizations. According to this arrangement, for example, the All-Union Society of Philatelists could nominate and elect deputies while such mass organizations as the Popular Front movement in the Baltic states could not.

The electoral system, therefore, ensured that the CPSU, the Communist Youth Organization and the USSR trade unions, which, for decades, had been obedient instruments of the Party, would have not less than 275 uncontested deputies shielded from popular vote. The electoral commissions and the complexities of the procedures for nomination were also structured to favor candidates approved by the Party and to discourage others from seeking nomination. Indeed, in 399 electoral districts, only one candidate—most often the local party leader—was nominated. For example, in 17 districts of the Kazakhstan Republic, the only candidates on the ballot were party first secretaries. In some cases, as for ex-

ample, the nomination of candidates from the USSR Academy of Sciences, the nomination process was rigged to exclude the "radicals," among them Andrei Sakharov. Only mass protest forced the Academy's leadership — whose candidacies were assured — to reopen the nomination list and include some of the "radicals." As a result, there was widespread public belief that "the election did not offer full freedom of choice. ...there were legal, semi-legal, and totally illegal amendments to electoral procedures favoring 'suitable' candidates and detrimental to 'unsuitable' ones."⁷

On the whole, the power structure did quite well in the March 1989 election. Among the elected were 14 Politburo and alternate members, 14 CPSU Central Committee officials, 237 Party secretaries, 14 leaders of USSR and republic Supreme Soviets, 56 republic ministers, 63 military leaders, and a total of 80 military deputies and 12 KGB staffers. Of those elected, 87 percent were Communist Party members and 133 were members of the Communist Youth League. The proletariat were represented by 532 workers, farmers and employees, but there were also 500 industrial and agricultural managers elected as deputies.

The large presence of the *apparatus* and its followers among the elected deputies was not surprising. It did, however, raise doubts about the extent of the "democratization" that Gorbachev was willing to carry out. The election apportionment suggested a certain cynicism on his part contradicting this proclaimed support for "democratization." But then, he had made clear all along that the Party had to remain in effective control. One sensational result of the elections was that a number of senior Party and government leaders failed to win a seat although they had run unopposed. This was particularly the case in Leningrad where not a single one of the top city and *Oblast* Party and government leaders obtained a majority. Among the losers was Yu. Solovyev, the first secretary of the Leningrad *Oblast* Party Committee and an alternate number of the Politburo, the only one with the latter rank to suffer this humiliation. A

number of the senior Party and government leaders in Moscow and in the provinces were also rejected by the voters, and Boris Yeltsin, the maverick former Party boss of Moscow won a landslide victory over a Party-backed opponent. This led to recrimination at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum at which Gorbachev glibly contended that this had not been votes against the Communist Party or his *perestroika* policy, but only against individual Party leaders who had lost the confidence of the population. In fact, the Party candidates had not run on a common Party platform but as individuals and, therefore, could be said to have been judged by the electorate on their records. In reality, however, much of the negative popular vote had been a protest aimed at the Party, its leadership, and its failed policies. For example, a public opinion poll conducted in Moscow on the eve of the opening of the Congress of People's Deputies in May indicated that while among non-Party members, 53 percent place their hope for improvements in the country on Gorbachev personally, only a small minority believed that the leading Party organization, including the Politburo and the Party as a whole would be effective in solving the country's problems.⁸

The Congress of People's Deputies

The Congress of People's Deputies opened on May 25 with 2,155 deputies out of a total of 2,249 who had been elected. It was the first Soviet experience with a parliamentary system and — not surprisingly — it bore little resemblance to a Western parliamentary session. In many respects it resembled a loosely run town hall meeting. The proceedings were televised. Gorbachev was promptly elected chairman of the Congress Presidium and president of the Supreme Soviet. He chaired the meeting which turned into a 13-day marathon of speeches, many deputies wishing either to complain about some conditions in their districts or to raise issues dear to them. Much time was also spent on procedural questions and on the election of the 542 members of the new Supreme Soviet.

The agenda for the Congress was drawn up by a group of 446 deputies said to be "representatives" of the delegations of deputies. According to Boris Yeltsin, however, it was "prepared by the (Party) apparatus." The agenda stipulated that the Congress would elect a mandate commission, the chairman, i.e., the president and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a USSR Committee for Supervision and Reform of the Constitution, approved the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the chairman of the USSR People's Control, the Supreme Court and the USSR Procurator General and the State Arbitrator. It was also charged with developing the main guidelines of the USSR domestic and foreign policies and to hear and debate on a report by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Sakharov objected to the Congress being largely reduced to the role of electors and demanded a discussion of basic principles of the rights and powers of the Congress and of the Supreme Soviet and key policy issues. His speech set the stage for what was to become an unequal debate between a majority which came to be characterized as "conservative" and largely obedient to the wishes of the *apparatus* and a fragmented "democratic" minority representing some 20-25 percent of the deputies. Given that only 36 percent of the Congress deputies could be elected to the Supreme Court on an annual basis, it became quickly evident that this group would also be dominated by the "conservative" majority.

Considering the large range of opinions and personal interests of the deputies, Gorbachev appears to have managed the proceedings fairly well, although by no means evenhandedly. When a deputy criticized Sakharov for his critical remarks about the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, Gorbachev openly joined in the applause and also cut off Sakharov's appeal for the condemnation of China's repression of the student democratic movement. Gorbachev's chairmanship has been characterized by some Soviet observers as "conducting," "maneuvering," and "manipulating" the Congress. Yet, he did give an opportunity to all factions to

speak. In many instances, however, proposals and calls by deputies for resolutions or discussion of specific issues or problems were simply ignored, with Gorbachev calling on another deputy to speak on a different subject. Members of the frustrated "democratic" minority accused the majority of having, in effect, set up a "voting machine" abetted by Gorbachev and of having elected a "Stalinist-Brezhnevian Supreme Soviet." As to the question of whether the voting should be by roll call so that the constituents would know how their deputies had voted on issues, the majority quickly rejected this proposal, choosing instead the anonymity of secret ballots.

One of the sensitive issues raised at the Congress was the question of whether the deputies should be required to give up their regular positions or jobs while serving in the Congress or in the Supreme Soviet. After all, there were many party and government officials among the deputies, and it was argued by some that this dual role on their part would bias their views and interfere with the development of "professional" legislators. It was clear, however, that the overwhelming majority had little desire to do so, even though the deputies to the Supreme Soviet were to spend a great deal of time away from their regular posts. One reason for this is that the Congress will hold new elections for the Supreme Soviet every year so that, in principle, all the deputies may have an opportunity to serve in the Supreme Soviet during its five-year term. Of course, this arrangement also precludes the emergence of truly "professional" legislators who, in any event, are not given the means to maintain their own staffs.

The Congress did pass a lengthy resolution "On the Basic Guidelines for the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR" for the benefit of the newly elected Supreme Soviet. The document offered along list of needed improvements and desirable objectives in the economic, social, inter-ethnic relations, legal and other problem areas. It suggested, however, few solutions to the problems it identified. As to the election of a Constitutional Commission with 107 members, its composition also

reflected the continuing grip of the "apparatus" in the management of key issues. Thus, the chairman of the Commission is Gorbachev; the deputy chairman is A. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and an alternate member of the Politburo, and the membership includes 11 other Politburo members, 14 senior party officials, and 10 senior government officials, including V. Kryuchkov, chief of the KGB, who is not a deputy, the editor of the main CPSU Central Committee journal **Kommunist**, and a number of other officials closely identified with Gorbachev.

As far as the general Soviet electorate was concerned, the Congress, while fascinating to watch, was a disappointment to many. The liberals were disappointed by the domination of the Congress and of the Supreme Soviet by a "conservative" majority and by Gorbachev's frequent display of authoritarian behavior. More widespread, however, was the disappointment over the failure of the Congress to come up with real solutions to critical problems, especially in the matter of the availability of food and consumer goods. The voters, having instructed their deputies concerning their wishes, had expected results and not lengthy debates about a vast variety of issues. These expectations had been fueled by the election campaign during which candidates had promised to promote various actions and policies.⁹

The population had watched the proceedings with hope but, as one Soviet analyst put it, "the magic has come to an abrupt end. Disappointment has set in. So many impassioned words have been uttered, but what about real deeds?" The public disappointment was probably most colorfully expressed by a Soviet satirist who wrote that instead of solutions, "we got something more impressive: the spectacle of a large, beautiful machine in high gear, producing nothing. The mountain brought forth a mouse, a cockroach, a bed bug."¹⁰

Indeed, the Congress with its exercise in *glasnost* had been another emotional catharsis for many watching Soviet citizens, just as the 19th Party Conference had been a year earlier.

The population could readily identify with the catalogue of shortages, failures, mismanagement, bureaucratic bungling, and so on, presented by the deputies. The difference between the 19th Party Conference and the Congress, however, was that while in the former case, the population had been excited, astonished, and delighted by the novel degree of *glasnost* in the speeches of the participants, in the latter case, having elected deputies and suffering from a further worsening of the economic situation, many elements of the population had expected far more from the Congress. To oversimplify it, one could say that Gorbachev's *glasnost* and political reforms have played the role of a safety valve or even of a circus distracting the public's attention from its deteriorating standard of living, but that by the time the Congress met, the *glasnost* circus was no longer sufficient to curb the population's impatience. Of course, it was more than a mere circus. Gorbachev has gained another powerful position by his election to the presidency and his base in the Supreme Soviet which provide him with a position in the state system mandated and guaranteed by the constitution. The Supreme Soviet has yet to legislate a procedure for impeaching the president. Furthermore, instead of bearing alone the main responsibility for the failures of *perestroika*, Gorbachev can now share it with the Supreme Soviet and its elected people's deputies even if all they do is rubber-stamp his policies.

"All Power to the Soviets?"

The Soviet constitution states that "all power belongs to the people" and that his power is exercised through the elected soviets. This makes the Supreme Soviet the organ of "supreme state authority." At the same time, however, the Constitution also guarantees that political monopoly of the CPSU and its leading role in the Soviet system and society, i.e., in effect, its right to leadership. Consequently, there is no clear demarcation line between the functions, role, and actual power of the Party and the Supreme Soviet. This problem has beset the Congress of People's Deputies and is still

besetting the Supreme Soviet. For the "radicals," the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" meant to transform them into true organs of the people and state power at the expense of the power of the Party. For the *apparatchniks*, in the Congress, it may have meant, as one Soviet analyst put it, "to cede to the newly elected Supreme Soviet as much responsibility and as little power as possible."¹¹

The deputies understand that control over the budgets represents real power and that the constitution gives the Supreme Soviet the authority to "ratify state plans for economic and social development and the USSR state budget." The formulation of the budget, however, rests with the USSR Council of Ministers and indirectly with the Politburo. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Soviet will exercise its control over the state budget and programs, especially given the limited experience of the deputies in dealing with such questions. It also remains to be seen how far the Supreme Soviet may go in challenging the power of the Party and especially its leadership. The Supreme Soviet's refusal to confirm some eight relatively lower ranked nominees to ministerial posts can hardly be viewed as a serious attempt to challenge the power of the *apparat*. When the confirmation of the USSR Minister of Defense and alternate Politburo member General D. I. Yazov seemed threatened, Gorbachev's personal intervention on his behalf insured his reappointment. Obviously the CPSU is not prepared to cede power to the soviets. Thus, according to Gorbachev's deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and vice-president Lukyanov:

The abandonment of the leading political role of the CPSU now in this very complex and ultra-difficult period of our society's development would be fatal....

Those who use the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" to mean power without party leadership are deliberately dragging us back seven decades (to the brief Russian experience with democracy.) Nothing will come of it.¹²

Certainly, neither the Supreme Soviet as a whole nor its "democratic" minority seriously seek or expect to curtail Gorbachev's power and influence. Indeed, the latter group still sees in him the only hope for peaceful reform. The situation in the Soviet Union, however is fraught with increasing uncertainties and growing social and political tensions. As the population loses patience, new elements of Soviet society become politically active. This is evident in the spreading unrest and violence among the ethnic minorities, the holding of unauthorized mass demonstrations, the growing labor strikes, and the appearance of extremist political associations. For example, on July 17, striking miners in the Kuznetsk coal region raised banners calling for "All Power to the People's Soviets." Gorbachev himself told the Congress about an incident on Moscow's buses when individuals displayed large pictures of Brezhnev bedecked in medals and of Gorbachev holding ration cards. At some public meeting in Moscow, calls are heard: "Down with Gorbachev," "Out with Gorbachev," "Out with the Party."¹³ Hence, the widespread rumors and fear not only among the "radicals," but even among some of Gorbachev's economic advisers and also the general population that the people's frustrations may cause a rapid and uncontrolled swing "to the left," which may, in turn, spark a coup by reactionary and militarist forces. Andrei Sakharov, among others, has repeatedly warned of this possible scenario.¹⁴ In many quarters in the Soviet Union the Congress of People's Deputies has given rise to pessimism rather than optimism about the future of the "democratization" of the system. And as one Soviet political historian has reminded, "there has been no example in history of a totalitarian political system peacefully developing into a democratic system."¹⁵ Communist China has recently confirmed this. Many fear that it may be the Soviet Union's turn next.

Notes

- 1 Igor Klyamkin, "What Lies Ahead?" *Moscow News*, No. 27, July 9-16, 1989, pp. 12-13.
- 2 M.S. Gorbachev, "At a New Stage of Restructuring. M.S. Gorbachev's speech at

- a Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee With Leaders of the Media, Ideological Institutions, and Creative Unions," *Pravda*, September 25, 1988.
3. "Resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System," *Pravda*, July 5, 1988.
 4. Roy Medvedev, interviewed by Ezio Mauro, *La Repubblica* (Rome), July 3-4, 1988.
 5. M.S. Gorbachev, speech at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, *Pravda*, April 17, 1989.
 6. *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1989.
 7. A. Nazimova, V. Sheynis, "A Choice has Been Made," *Izvestiya*, May 7, 1989.
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 9. L. Grafova, "For Now, Beginners, But....," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 28, 1989, p. 10.
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Democratization and Authoritarianism in China

June Teufel Dreyer

A decade of reform in the People's Republic of China appeared to come to an end in the spring of 1989. The declaration of martial law and brutal suppression of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square provided a dramatic counterpoint to what foreign observers had considered an impressive period of economic and political reforms. Within China, people were less surprised. Deng Xiaoping, speaking to a commendation meeting of the martial law troops, said that the crisis had been expected for some time. Borrowing from an old Chinese proverb, he noted that "one cold night will not make the river freeze three feet deep."¹

Ten years of rapid change had caused severe strains within Chinese society. Deng's reform program had brought unprecedented prosperity to some people, but at the same time, other groups had fallen far behind. The alarmingly rapid growth of inflation and corruption, both associated with the reforms, led to pressure on Party and government to take action. Proposed solutions may be grouped into two broad categories: those associated with the reformists, who believed that the problems accompanying the reforms could best be cured by more reforms, and those associated with the conservatives, who felt that decentralization had gone too far and favored the reassertion of certain state controls.

Though tensions had been visible between the two groups for many years, their public manifestations had been relatively muted. For example, Deng Xiaoping's September 1985 speech to a Party meeting praised the accomplishments of the reforms; it was immediately followed by a speech by another Politburo member, Chen Yun, pointing out the problems the reforms had caused. There was no public altercation between Deng and Chen, and the offi-

cial weekly news magazine **Beijing Review** printed both speeches, in the order in which they had been given, without commentary.² The **Government Work Report** issued in March 1989 represented a finely-crafted compromise, calling for "stability and invigoration." Plans were introduced to reign in some domestic practices that were considered inflationary; at the same time, increased foreign investment would be sought. Certain reforms, including the development of the stock market, were included, as well as certain conservative practices, such as the reinstatement of state controls in some areas of the economy.³

The composition of the five-member Standing Committee of the Politburo constituted another compromise, with Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and propaganda expert Hu Qili representing the reformers and Premier Li Peng, security chief Qiao Shi, and economist Yao Yilin representing the conservatives.

The student demonstrations that began in April 1989 destroyed this fragile compromise, and at least temporarily destabilized the leadership. At first, the demonstrations seemed little different from those of winter 1986-87. Indeed, their precipitating factor was the funeral of former Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, who had been removed from office in early 1987 for allegedly being too sympathetic to the students. Whether or not the allegations are true, the students came to regard him as a symbol of their hopes and aspirations.

Another symbolic occasion was important in the students' plans: the 70th anniversary of the *May 4 Movement of 1919*. It had originally begun as a protest by patriotic students against the Versailles Treaty's provisions with regard to China. Having fought on the winning side in World War I, China had

expected to have the treaty cancel territorial concessions it had made to Germany, one of the losers. Instead, the treaty awarded them to Japan, which had, like China, fought on the winning side. What began as a protest against the Versailles settlement escalated into a movement against the government of corrupt old men that had acquiesced in the treaty, and beyond that into an indictment of the Confucian family system and Chinese culture itself. The students were joined by members of their country's nascent middle class and also by factory workers. Eventually, the entire Chinese cabinet resigned.⁴ The demonstration did not solve China's problems, but is nonetheless regarded as beginning the process of popular participation in government, and hence as a great victory for democracy and freedom. The Chinese Communist government has commemorated it as such, arranging speeches, banquets, and parades each year. Indeed, many of the PRC's octogenarian leaders hold the *May 4th Movement* in living memory, and a few of them may actually have participated in it. These elderly leaders had sacrificed some of their loved ones and endured many years of hardship in order to create a system they believed would create a better China. Now, in what must surely be one of history's more bitter ironies, a new generation was accusing them of doing exactly what they had criticized their elders for.

The students' demands in 1989 did not, of course, relate to unjust international peace settlements. However, that aside, the complaints were remarkably similar to those of 70 years earlier, even including protests against their "warlord" government of corrupt old men. A number of banners denounced the "prince faction," meaning, in its modern version, the children of high Party leaders who receive

privileged treatment in advancing their own careers. Calls for freedom and democracy were displayed prominently. While there were no attacks on traditional Chinese culture or the Confucian system, a number of banners contained slogans denouncing their modern-day equivalents: the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and socialism. As if hinting that neither reform nor conservative factions had the solution, demonstrators' banners denounced both Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. The latter, as the adopted son of former premier Zhou Enlai, is also regarded as a leading member of the "prince faction."

Worse yet, from the leadership's point of view, was another parallel with the original *May 4th Movement*: other segments of society began to join the students. Peddlers donated soft drinks and food, factory workers began to carry slogans, and reporters from the official newspaper of the Party Central Committee marched under a banner imploring "allow us to print the truth." Also, as had happened in the *May 4th Movement*, the protests that began in Beijing were spreading to other cities.

With disruption threatening to turn into anarchy and world attention riveted on Beijing, there was intense debate within the leadership as to how to handle the situation. Reformers tended to see the choices as support of continued progress versus stagnation, and were sympathetic to at least some of the demonstrators' demands. Conservatives tended to see the alternatives as chaos versus stability, and were not sympathetic. Doubtless there was also fear that giving in to the students' demands — which were, initially, at least, quite reasonable — would open the floodgates to a deluge of other demands of unlimited scope. Although no one mentioned South Korea's student demonstrators publicly, that country's experience with escalating demands from student-led dissidents must have come to mind.

Possibly because the leadership was divided as to how to respond, it was slow to address the demonstrators' initial demands. This seemed to prove to the dissidents that the leadership was unresponsive, and their criticisms grew

in scope and stridency. Some of the cruelest criticism had been directed at Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, Deng did seem to have gradually moved away from championing increased political freedom. The man who in 1978 seemed to encourage politically liberal positions such as the Democracy Wall was by 1988 espousing the concept of "neo-authoritarianism." As defined by the official media, this meant "enlightened or elite autocracy to develop the economy and assure smooth progress in modernization." Enlightened was in turn defined as having good sense and being reasonable.⁵

Although he held no formal position other than Chair of the Central Military Commission, Deng is widely recognized as the *de facto* leader of China. Long regarded as a pragmatist, he had been denounced during the Cultural Revolution for having said "it doesn't matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat, as long as it catches mice," referring to the relative advantages of the socialist and capitalist economic systems in producing goods and services. Dissident sloganizers now carried banners proclaiming "it doesn't matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat if it is a bad cat."

This must have seemed to Deng gross ingratitude for his efforts, and may have been decisive in his opting to move from the reform faction, which favored negotiation with the students, to the conservatives, who favored repression. This meant abandoning his protege and heir-apparent, Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. Zhao had in fact been losing power steadily since his elevation to the Party's highest post two years before. He had been stripped of economic power due to problems the economy had suffered on his watch. And although Zhao held the post of First Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he did not in fact exercise control over the military. Since Deng, the Chair of the CMC, was preoccupied with the many other facets of administering China, responsibility for the administration of the military had fallen on the CMC's Permanent Vice Chair, Yang Shangkun. An elderly conservative who, unlike Zhao, had had substan-

tial military experience, Yang was simultaneously the President of China.

Zhao Ziyang's attempt to talk to the demonstrators may be seen as a desperate last attempt to save what was left of his position. While favorably impressing the demonstrators, his gesture had exactly the opposite effect on the conservative faction. Taking the offensive against the demonstrators, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun appeared on state television denouncing them. While Li's criticism was icy in tone, Yang, with an energy belying his 82 years, was vehement. The demonstrators had disrupted the Sino-Soviet summit, he raged, and made his negotiations with General Secretary Gorbachev much more difficult. The welcoming ceremony had to be held at the airport rather than at Tiananmen, and the official motorcade had to be diverted through Beijing's back streets instead of proceeding, in the dignity due it, along the impressive Changan Boulevard.

Whatever its backstage maneuverings and its denunciation of the demonstrators, the leadership took no action against them at this time. One *New York Times* reporter attributed this to the traditional Chinese respect for scholars, which must have amused the students who read it. In fact, one of the students' most persistent complaints involves the low prestige of intellectuals, and the concomitantly modest salaries they receive. More likely, the leadership was reluctant to move while Gorbachev was in Beijing, and was engaged in soliciting military support. The latter explanation is favored by student leader Wu'er Kaishi (Uerkesh Daolet),⁶ though he does not deal with why, after the leadership *did* formally call on the military, the army took so long to react.

On May 20, just after Gorbachev's departure, martial law was declared. As if anticipating that there would be difficulties in obtaining compliance, Deng reportedly left Beijing and convened an emergency meeting of the heads of the PRC's seven military regions in the central China city of Wuhan. The usually-reliable Japanese press agency *Kyodo* reported that the commanders of the Guangzhou and Lanzhou military regions had refused to comply. It added

that the two surviving members of the PRC's ten marshals — heroes of the War of Liberation whose reputations verge on the mythical — had telephoned to express their opposition.⁷ Dissension was immediately noticeable in more public ways as well. More than one hundred high-ranking members of the *People's Liberation Army (PLA*; term includes navy, air force, and marines as well as ground forces) signed a letter to the Martial Law Command, urging against the use of force:

The People's Army belongs to the people. It should not stand against the people or even kill ordinary people. It should under no circumstances fire at the people and create any bloody incidents. To prevent further deterioration of the situation, the army should not enter the city.⁸

Within a week, however, six of the seven military regions — i.e. all but the Beijing command — had telegraphed their support for the martial law decision.⁹ The case of Beijing is particularly interesting. For the decade ending in 1988, its commander had been Qin Jiwei. Last year, he had been elevated to the position of Minister of Defense. His long-term deputy succeeded to command of the Beijing Military Region. The rises and falls of Qin's career over the decades bore remarkable parallels to those of Deng Xiaoping, and the two men were reportedly quite close. Qin, however, was one of the leaders who publicly opposed martial law. Given the importance of loyalty networks in China, his decision to part company with Deng must have been wrenching.

Troops did move into the Beijing area. Not surprisingly, most of the initial arrivals were those of the Beijing Military Region, and in particular its 38th Army. They were soon joined by units from other areas, including the 27th Army. It was reputed to be commanded by a nephew of CMC Vice Chair and President of China Yang Shangkun. Armies were also brought in from outlying areas, some as far away as the southwestern province of Sichuan. Their numbers were variously estimated at between 150,000 and 200,000.

Beijing residents noted that the size of the troops was greatly dispropor-

tionate to what was needed to quell the demonstrations, and that their arms, including heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, were likewise inappropriate to deal with unarmed civilians. Speculation grew that the different units might actually have been called in to fight each other on behalf of a high-level power struggle in the leadership.¹⁰

Initially, troops did not move into the city center but remained on the outskirts. Indeed, it would have been very difficult to move much further forward without the massive use of force. Residents blockaded streets, let the air out of the tires of military vehicles, and surrounded the soldiers in overwhelming numbers. While most encounters were peaceful, tempers occasionally flared. The weather was hot, and the days long and boring. Later on, each side would use these incidents to bolster their own case for the brutality of the other side.

The stalemate that had been established before the troops arrived continued. However, as May ended, the demonstrators occupying Tiananmen Square seemed to be gradually losing resolve. The Railway Ministry offered free tickets home to students, and many accepted. The construction in Tiananmen Square of a Goddess of Democracy brought a number of additional people in, but they often seemed to have come as sightseers rather than out of ideological conviction. The demonstrators' numbers were dwindling.

Suddenly, early on the morning of June 4, with no warning, massive force was used. Tanks rolled down Changan Boulevard, smashing over barricades and bodies. Assuming that the demonstrators were the real targets, force was used precisely when it seemed least necessary. Even were the targets elsewhere, the actions were unnecessarily brutal. In the words of one correspondent.

It is difficult to imagine how the events of 4 June could possibly have been consciously intended in their full scale and barbarity by anyone still remotely rational. Such slaughter was not only unnecessary to a successful coup, but was likely to spell the eventual political doom of anyone who could be later considered responsible.¹¹

Fighting was reported among military units as well, with units of the 27th and 63rd armies, presumably loyal to the conservatives, battling those of the 38th, 15th, 16th, and 17th armies.¹² Speculation that a civil war was beginning ceased a few days later, as no more reports of fighting were received.

The victorious conservative faction set about repairing the damages, tangible and intangible, that the confrontation had caused. The demonstrators and their supporters in the leadership were denounced as counter-revolutionaries — which in the sense that many of them had called for the overthrow of the communist government, they had been. A "most wanted" list of these counterrevolutionaries was promulgated; about three thousand have been arrested so far. Some have been executed, and others given prison sentences.

The *PLA*, also being purged of its counterrevolutionary members, was ordered to do good deeds for the people, consonant with Party propaganda that "the army and the people are one." Within days after the massacre, soldiers were photographed cleaning garbage from urban areas, giving free haircuts to local people, and helping little old ladies to cross the street. Ceremonies were held to honor the memory of those soldiers who died in the course of putting down the rebellion, with eulogies depicting them as patriotic young people who were martyred in defense of their country.¹³

Official press releases stressed that there had been no one killed in Tiananmen Square, and that any reports to the contrary represented counterrevolutionary slander. It may in fact be true that most, or even all, of those killed were *not* despatched inside Tiananmen Square.¹⁴ The government, however, failed to mention that the massacre had taken place on Changan Boulevard, just outside the Square. Those who personally witnessed or saw television coverage of tanks rolling over bodies and soldiers firing into crowds are unlikely to perceive the distinction as meaningful.

Representatives of foreign media who filed stories contrary to the official line were often expelled. A particular

target of official ire was the Voice of America, which had indeed relayed the news of the Beijing demonstrations to other cities in China, thereby probably hastening the outbreak of sympathy demonstrations. The judgment of whether the VOA should be criticized for reporting these events or the Chinese press criticized for failing to report them will depend on the ideology of the beholder. The U.S. government was blamed for instigating the demonstrations, possibly because the VOA is funded by the United States Information Agency. Other, less clearly specified "foreign interference" was also alleged. Uerkesh Daolet has said that financial support from Hong Kong was most useful, but stressed that it was support rather than control.¹⁵

On June 24, the Party Politburo met and, as expected, dismissed Zhao Ziyang as Party General Secretary. Unexpectedly, he was replaced not with security chief Qiao Shi, as had been rumored, but with the former Party chief of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin. Jiang had been quite unpopular in Shanghai, and is widely regarded as a man who follows the political wind. However, from the point of view of reformers, Jiang has at least had considerable experience in the foreign trade field. And reformers will probably regard a "wind person" as preferable to a hard-line conservative like Qiao.

Zhao Ziyang was also dismissed from his position on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, as was its other reformer member, Hu Qili. The two were replaced by three new members: Jiang, Party Organization Department chief Song Ping, and former mayor of Tianjin Li Ruihuan. Like Jiang, neither Song nor Li can be identified as a conservative. Li Ruihuan was well thought of in Tianjin, and has had considerable experience in encouraging reforms there, and in dealing with foreign investors.

Since the government has made it clear that it wishes foreign investment to continue,¹⁶ it is possible that the appointment of former administrators of two of China's leading reformist cities is meant to encourage such investment. Jiang, Song, and Li Ruihuan join the remaining three members of the pre-

vious Standing Committee, conservatives Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin.

Just what it will take to reassure foreign investors that the climate is stable is a question that many Chinese leaders must be asking themselves now. At least publicly, the mood is optimistic. As one PRC chief of mission told the author this summer, "People always forgive China." Speaking in sorrow rather than arrogance, he noted that it had taken only a few brief years for the international community to effectively forget the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Each, he pointed out, had killed many more people than died in the current disturbances.

As to what exactly is at stake, the World Bank and Japan have frozen more than \$U.S. 10 billion in aid projects. Seven loans worth \$780.2 million which were due to go to the World Bank's board for approval before the end of its financial year on 30 June have also been postponed. The bulk of these loans were for power and transport projects, two areas which have been major bottlenecks in China's industrial development.¹⁷ Hence, it is important to the PRC to reinstitute them. Chances are good that they will, though valuable time has been lost and private investors may be more reluctant to take a chance on a country whose government is quite so repressive.

Whether the Chinese people will forgive their own government is perhaps a more important question. While the dissidents are not strong enough to overthrow the current leadership, the leadership is decidedly unpopular and cannot abolish the sentiments against it. Large-scale demonstrations against the leadership are highly unlikely in the next few years, but there are many other ways in which to express discontent. Sabotage, labor unrest, and passive resistance to government directives were already on the increase before the spring of 1989, and will probably continue on an accelerated upward path. The loser is apt to be the economic modernization program.

At least one Western journalist has argued that, since peasants form at least 75 percent of the population of the PRC and the peasantry supports the government, Party and government are basi-

cally stable. One doubts that the leadership is quite so complacent about the loyalties of the countryside. While demands for the rule of law and parliamentary democracy may have little resonance with the peasants, they are vitally concerned with the problems posed by inflation and corruption. In an effort to get the peasants to sell more to the state, the government last year raised procurement prices by a substantial amount. However, peasants pointed out, the prices of needed commodities such as seed and fertilizer, jumped sharply, wiping out most of their gains. These price increases were partly inflation-driven, and partly due to officials who held supplies off the market in an effort to drive up prices and encourage peasants to bribe them to supply the items. In 1988, due to currency shortages, they paid peasants with IOUs rather than cash in some cases, causing great dissatisfaction. In 1989, the PRC's financial situation is less than good, and the practice is spreading. In a carefully worded discussion of this potentially explosive issue, the official peasant newspaper concluded "The solution to the IOU question has a bearing on the overall economic situation."¹⁸ It has definite political ramifications as well.

It should not be forgotten that the demonstrations of 1989 grew out of dissatisfaction with what was essentially a compromise government, and that economic as well as political causes for dissatisfaction were present. One consequence of the demonstrations has been the increasing polarization of reformers and conservatives: they are now pitted more sharply against each other, in a situation where each side can make valid arguments, but neither can solve China's problems. Democratization would have the advantage of allowing people to feel more of a sense of personal responsibility, but at least in its early stages it has the disadvantage of being noisy and disruptive. Conservatives point out that, despite the credit given to Deng for his agricultural reforms, the country has never been able to equal the harvest of 1984, and the population has grown substantially in the interim. The land-to-people ratio is precarious, and China may not be

able to afford such a period of disruption. Moreover, many of the reformers demands are contradictory. Were Zhao Ziyang to be reinstated in triumph tomorrow, and promise the students the contested elections, free student unions, better dormitories and food, and the higher salaries they want, the PRC's problems would not be solved. Another of the protesters' demands was the end of inflation, which would certainly not improve while higher salaries were instituted and better food and lodging provided. Campaigns against corruption and nepotism have been carried out numerous times before; while some individuals are caught and dealt with, the phenomena themselves continue unabated. Meanwhile, the deserts continue to advance, more industrialization begets more pollution, and the population gets progressively larger. A citizenry increasingly skeptical of its government feels more and more inclined to ignore its directives, along the lines of the traditional Chinese maxim that "heaven is high and the emperor is far away." With the interests of the whole sacrificed to those of individuals and their families, there is a real danger that China will return to the state of decentralization that led Sun Yat-sen to describe it, almost a century ago, as "a sheet of loose sand."

Like the *May 4th Movement of 1919*, the demonstrations of 1989 have solved nothing. It remains to be seen whether, as happened with the *May 4th Movement*, something more positive will eventually develop.

Notes

1. Text of Deng's speech may be found in *Beijing Review* (Beijing) July 10-16, 1989, pp. 14-17.
2. "Deng Xiaoping's Speech," in *Beijing Review*, September 30, 1985, pp. 15-18; "Chen Yun's Speech," in *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.
3. Xinhua (Beijing) March 30, 1989, in United States Department of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: China* (FBIS-CHI) March 18, 1989, p. 17. See also *Renmin Ribao* March 18, 1989, pp. 4-5.
4. The definitive reference work on the May 4th Movement is Chou Ts'e-tung's *The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.
5. See, e.g., Gao Gao, "Improve the Social

- Control System Taking the Rule of Law as the Main Body," *Jingjixue Zhoubao* (Beijing) March 12, 1989, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI March 28, 1989, pp. 30-31.
6. As interviewed in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg) July 10, 1989, pp. 124-127. The student leader is an ethnic Uygur, and prefers to be known by his Uygur name, Uerkesh Daolet, rather than by its *sinified* version, Wu'er Kaishi.
 7. *Kyodo* (Tokyo) May 22, 1989, in FBIS-CHI May 22, 1989, p. 4.
 8. Quoted in *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong) May 22, 1989, in FBIS-CHI May 22, 1989, p. 4.
 9. *Hong Kong Standard*, May 25, 1989, in FBIS-CHI May 25, 1989, p. 17.
 10. *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong) May 27, 1989, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI May 30, 1989, pp. 52-53; *Sunday Standard* (Hong Kong) May 28, 1989, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI May 30, 1989, p. 83.
 11. Robert Delfs, "Tianamen Massacre," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong) June 15, 1989, p. 12.
 12. *Ming Pao*, June 6, 1989, p. 1; in FBIS-CHI June 6, 1989, p. 27.
 13. See, e.g. "Memorial Meeting Held for PLA Martyr," *Xinhua* (Beijing) June 29, 1989, in FBIS-CHI June 29, 1989, p. 32.
 14. Shi Wei, "What Has Happened in Beijing," *Beijing Review* June 26-July 2, 1989, pp. 11-15.
 15. *Spiegel*, p. 125.
 16. The cover story in the July 24-30 issue of *Beijing Review* is entitled "China's Foreign Trade Policy Remains Unchanged." In it, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade explains that after the counterrevolutionary rebellion is quelled, the PRC will open its door wider to the outside world, and will provide a more favorable environment for developing Sino-foreign economic relations and trade. See pp. 17-19.
 17. "Put on Hold," *Far Eastern Economic Review* July 6, 1989, pp. 69-70; Tai Ming Cheung, "Face Healing," in *Ibid.* July 27, 1989, p. 11.
 18. Commentator, "Upper and Lower Levels Must Make Concerted Efforts to Avoid Issuing IOUs," *Nongmin Ribao* (Beijing) June 29, 1989, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI July 13, 1989, pp. 44-45.

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Religion on Center Stage: Political Theatre in the 1990s

Charles W. Dunn

Will religion play on the center stage of political theatre in the 1990s? If the past is indeed prologue, it will.

Pro-abortion versus anti-abortion...pro-flag protection versus anti-flag protection...pro-school prayer versus anti-school prayer...pro-nativity displays versus anti-nativity displays...pro-Christian schools versus anti-Christian schools...pro-Christian homes schools versus anti-Christian home schools...pro-homosexuality... and the list goes on.

Despite court decisions on each of these and many other religiously-charged political issues, the curtain has not fallen on them.

Also likely to be on center stage is the major question: Will conservative Protestantism and conservative Catholicism continue to upstage their liberal counterparts?

Many new religious and political leaders and interest groups have come on the scene through conservative religious influence, forcing even President George Bush to change his position on pivotal issues like abortion. Numerical growth religiously, largely the domain of conservative church bodies during the past three decades, has not been without its political causes and consequences.

"The mainline is the sideline" has become an oft-repeated phrase about establishment Protestant churches. Their principal coordinating body on political issues, the National Council of Churches, fraught with internal warfare, membership decline and budgetary losses, faces extinction. The once dominant mainline Protestant churches, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Lutheran and Baptist, have lost millions of members while their conservative counterparts, independent Baptists, Pentecostals, Charismatics and lesser-known Presbyterian bodies, have gained ground rapidly.

Catholics, in disarray after Vatican II in the middle 1960s, now seem to have regained their stride through the increasingly more conservative leadership of the present Pope and his influence on the composition of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

The Democrat and Republican Parties — the former's role diminished, the latter's enhanced by religion's role at center stage — must await the long-term consequences of their short-term political lines in the 1980s. For example, as the stage-setting on abortion changes from the U.S. Supreme Court to state legislatures, will the Republican Party's anti-abortion platform lines of 1980, 1984, and 1988 continue to play well?

Republicans, benefitting from their anti-abortion stance in the legal arena, have not had to put their state legislators in the position of voting for and against various controversial and complex abortion issues. The 1990s should reveal whether Republicans accurately gauged public opinion on the issue. If they did, then the political payoff may be great: the redrawing of state legislative and congressional district lines. As a litmus-test issue among voters, abortion may determine the political control of legislative bodies.

Likewise, will conservatism still receive more applause lines than liberalism in the 1990s? Jimmy Carter in 1980, Walter Mondale in 1984 and Michael Dukakis in 1988 found themselves clothed in unpopular liberal clothing while Presidents Reagan and Bush cloaked themselves in more attractive conservative garb. The Republican Party's warm embrace of conservative ideology and the Democratic Party's estrangement from liberal ideology in the 1980s raises this oft-debated issue: will the law of cycles in American politics bring liberalism back to center stage?

Political playwrights enjoy engaging in their speculative craft about the 1990s, but the question remains about each of their plays: how will it play in Peoria?

What Playwrights Need To Know

First, few subjects arouse deep-seated emotions like religion and politics. The current debate about the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on abortion and desecration of the flag is like two armies encamped in battle array on either side of a mountain, lobbying volleys of cannon fire at one another. Reason and compromise do not appear on the horizon of battle, only charge and countercharge.

Second, the climax of this religiously-political drama, predicted to occur in the 1990s, may await the 21st century for the final scene and curtain calls. The themes in this drama possess a long history: they did not originate in the 1960s, 1970s or even 1980s; their genesis occurred during the formative periods of American government. If they were such a long time in the making, we should not be surprised if they last out the next decade.¹

Third, the length of their history and the anxiety of their emotions cause the respective sides to see the disputes even more differently and acutely than scholars might imagine. Certainly scholars, most especially political scientists, were not in the vanguard of leadership, analyzing and critiquing the development of contemporary religious forces. It has only been in the 1980s that serious and sober scholarly work has taken place on these matters. To the extent that scholarship is needed to help bring resolution of the issues, it has not been produced in a timely manner.²

Kaleidoscopic Lighting

Kaleidoscopic — an endless variety of symmetrical varicolored forms — reveals important truths about religion and politics. While American values increasingly appear kaleidoscopic, endless and certainly constantly changing, focusing on the product of kaleidoscope would be like piecing together a mosaic of fragments without benefit of the artist's vision of the mosaic. Since the endless variety is a result, not a cause, greater profit can be attained by examining what causes the kaleidoscopic nature of contemporary American values.

Sociologist Robert N. Bellah tells us that:

...any coherent and viable society rests on a common set of moral understandings about good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and social action. It is almost as widely held that these common moral understandings must also rest in turn upon a common set of religious understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of which the moral understandings make sense. Such moral and religious understandings produce both a basic cultural legitimation for a society which is viewed as at least approximately in accord with them, and a standard of judgment for the criticism of society that is seen as deviating too far from them.³

American values have become kaleidoscopic precisely because there is increasingly less agreement on the common set of religious and moral understandings or values. Indeed, there never was a time when total agreement existed, although earlier in our history, agreement was much more common. From uniformity to diversity, simplicity to complexity, these have been the directions of our values which now exist in wide variety and intense competition.

To illustrate:

The Harvard University Charter reads: "Everyone shall consider the main end of his life to know God and Jesus Christ which is eternal life: while the Yale University Charter reads: "to propagate...the blessed reformed Protestant religion, in the purity of its order and worship."⁴ Consider the

stark contrast and strident conflict between these Charters, no longer representative of the institutions they govern, and John Dunphy's 1983 polemic: "The (public school) classroom...will become an arena of conflict between the old and the new — the rotting corpse of Christianity...and the new faith of humanism."⁵

Or ponder the stark contrast and strident conflict between Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Harvard University commencement address appropriately entitled **A World Split Apart** and former Yale University President A. Bartlett Giamatti's polemic about religious conservatives.

Solzhenitsyn: "The humanistic way of thinking...started Western civilization on the dangerous trend of worshipping man and his material needs."⁶

Giamatti: "Angry at change, rigid in the application of chauvinistic slogans, absolutistic in morality, (religious conservatism) threatens through political pressure or public denunciation whoever dares to disagree with their authoritarian positions."⁷

Why has this stark contrast and strident conflict only recently become evident? To answer this question requires a brief examination of American history which reveals a fundamentally religious conflict from the beginning that has gradually escalated.

Setting the Stage of Conflict

The emergence of a conservative religious force in the 1980s to challenge the liberal religious force that was dominant in American politics from the 1930s through the 1960s, though it surprised the critics, should not have caught anyone off-guard. Roots of the conservative religious force were clearly latent in America's heritage.⁸

First, the early charters of government like the Mayflower Compact, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut and the Massachusetts Body of Liberties generally drew their ideas and sometimes even their precise wording, religiously conservative in nature, from the Bible.

Second, the charters of the early colleges and universities like Harvard and

Yale already cited usually had conservative religious origins.

Third, the theorists who influenced the formation of American government were themselves either of conservative religious persuasion or significantly influenced by it. For example, in 1695 John Locke wrote in **The Reasonableness of Christianity** that "As Christians we have Jesus the Messiah for our King, and are under the law revealed by Him in the Gospel." William Blackstone, largely responsible for the foundation of American constitutional law through his **Commentaries on the Laws of England** said: "As man depends absolutely upon his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should at all points conform to his Maker's will."

Fourth, authors of the **Federalist Papers** reflected a biblical view of the sinful nature of man. James Madison referred to the "degree of depravity in mankind," to "the caprice and wickedness of man" and to "the infirmities and depravities of the human character." Alexander Hamilton spoke of "the folly and wickedness of mankind" while John Jay said man is governed by "dictates of personal interest."

Fifth, principal writers on the founding era, such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Samuel Eliot Morison, acknowledged the pervasive conservative religious influence. Tocqueville said in *Democracy in America* (1839) that "Christianity directs the customs of the community, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state." Morison wrote in **The Oxford History of the American People** that "Puritanism was a cutting edge which hewed liberty, democracy, humanitarianism and universal education out of the black forest of feudal Europe."

Sixth, the early Thanksgiving Day proclamations, expressed a desire "to cause the knowledge of Christianity to spread over the earth" and that "the religion of our divine Redeemer may cover the earth as the waters cover the seas."

Seventh, even in pluralistically tolerant Pennsylvania in 1776, members of the legislature had to take this conservative religious oath: "I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the universe, the rewarder

of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration." Delaware in the same year required this oath: "I do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration.

Acknowledging the conflict between two religious points of view during the formative period of American government and society, Yale University President Timothy Dwight said in 1801:

Let me solemnly warn you, that you must take your side. There can be no halting between two opinions. Between them and you there is, there can be, no natural, real or lasting harmony. What communication hath light with darkness? What concord hath Christ with Beliel?⁹

Dwight saw conservative Protestantism's developing conflict with a variety of more liberal Protestant views: first, the moderate Unitarianism of the founding period and the deism of Jefferson and Franklin; second, the radical Unitarianism of the 1800s and the Transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau; third, the Social Gospel theology of Walter Rauchenbush and the Neo-Orthodox theology of the early 1900s; and fourth, the so-called "religious and secular humanism" of the later 1900s.

As American society became more pluralistic with the addition of large numbers of Jews and Roman Catholics, for example, even greater diversity has been added to the kaleidoscope of religious and moral values. Paul Goodman has pointed out, much to his surprise, that the political, social and economic turmoil from the 1960s to the present has religious roots:

I have imagined that the world-wide student protest had to do with changing political and moral institutions, to which I was sympathetic, but I now say that we had to do with a religious crisis of the magnitude of the Reformation in the fifteen hundreds, when not only all institutions but all learning had been corrupted.¹⁰

Conservatism: From the Wings to Center Stage

This question remains not fully answered: why did conservatism arise from its lethargy? Yes, conservatism had strong roots in American political history, but that does not explain why it came to center stage in the 1980s. The answer to this question has to do with both the style and substance of religious conservatism as well as its relationship with ideological conservatism.

First, as pointed out by de Tocqueville earlier, religious conservatism was hardly challenged during the formative period of American history, but gradually as the challenge arose, initially from liberal Protestantism and then from Judaism and Roman Catholicism, the conservative Protestant position lost ground, particularly from the late 1800s through the early 1960s. Interestingly in the late 1800s, the U.S. Supreme Court in a unanimous decision seemed to go out of its way to pronounce the United States of America a Christian nation as though there was a developing challenge to that proposition. In **Church of the Holy Trinity v. U.S.** (143 U.S. 471), the Court said that "we find everywhere a clear recognition of the same truth...that this is a Christian nation." It made this statement after a meticulous review of the background and language of the colonial charters, the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, the state constitutions and other sources.

Conservative Protestantism's first major battles were lost over control of historically conservative schools, such as Harvard, Yale and Princeton, and denominations, such as the Methodist, Presbyterian and Episcopalian. Orthodox Protestant doctrine gave way to neo-orthodoxy, the social gospel and other forms of liberal Protestant doctrines. These losses, however, were gradual and not abrupt: there was no frontal assault on established conservative Protestant positions. Gradual erosion requires time for detection and response.

Second, not until the mid-1960s to the 1980s did conservative Protestantism feel sufficiently threatened politically and socially to fight back. It was then that liberal social and economic

policies began to arouse opposition. In a sense, overextension of liberalism in public policy and society aroused latent conservatism.

Third, when historically-accepted community values and practices, such as school prayer and many others, began to be challenged, conservatism had an emotional cause for concern. Community, a cherished element of conservative thought, was directly challenged by individualism, a cherished element of liberal thought. Conservatives believe in the right of the community to establish and to pass along from generation-to-generation customs and traditions.

Fourth, until the 1970s, conservative Protestantism was inactive politically with rare exceptions for reasons cited, but also because conservative Protestants have been imbued with an indirect approach to influencing politics. With greater emphasis on the eternal and heavenly as distinguished from the temporal and earthly, conservative Protestantism has been less inclined to get involved in politics. Salvation of the soul more than reformation of society has been the motivating force of conservative Protestantism. Prior to the Civil War, an exchange between Oberlin College professor and president, Charles Finney, who was also the best-known evangelist of his day, and William Lloyd Garrison, an ardent abolitionist, reveals the difference between the indirect and direct approach to influencing politics. Ironically, Finney brought Garrison into the abolitionist movement only to see him part company on the following issue.

Finney: "If abolition can be made an appendage of general revival, all is well. I fear no other form of carrying this question will save our country or the liberty of the soul of the slave."¹¹

Garrison: "I shall strenuously contend for the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population...I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject, I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with moderation."¹²

The practical effect of this difference was creation much earlier of liberal religious interest groups, such as the National Council of Churches and those

of the various mainline Protestant bodies. Organization of the Moral Majority and many other groups awaited the 1970s and 1980s.

Fifth, conservative ideology, particularly beginning in the 1960s with U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater's presidential candidacy in 1964, began to develop a challenge to liberal ideology that was finally successful with President Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential candidacy. As conservative religious currents developed during the late 1960s and 1970s, Ronald Reagan in effect brought about a marriage between conservative ideology and conservative theology, bringing leaders from both into his campaign for the presidency and appointing leaders from both to high positions. The conservative religious impulse that began to sweep the nation enabled Republican presidential candidates in the 1980s to woo previously Democratic white southerners and also conservative Roman Catholics as well as some conservative Jews.

Sixth, votes of conservative southern Protestants and conservative Roman Catholics were absolutely crucial to Republican Party success. Thus, while doctrinal differences divide the two, political threats to each unite them. Interest groups like *Eagle Forum*, headed by a Roman Catholic, and *Concerned Women of America (CWA)*, headed by a conservative Baptist, have both Protestants and Catholics in their membership and share similar public policy goals. CWA, the largest women's interest group in America, is substantially larger than the *National Organization of Women (NOW)*.

Seventh, reaction within mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches to the growing dominance of liberal theology caused the organization of conservative theological interests in those churches. Liberal theology then became the reason used by conservatives to explain the substantial loss of church members and the diminution of interest by the young in religious vocations. For example, the historically dominant Jesuit Order in the Roman Catholic Church, has had to close many of its schools and has also been unable to replenish its numbers in the priest-

hood. Meanwhile, conservative orders like *Opus Dei* and *Legionnaires of Christ* have grown substantially. Ironically, as some liberal Roman Catholic religious orders were forced to close their schools, they sold them to schools in the burgeoning conservative Protestant movement, such as Maranatha Baptist Bible College in Watertown, Wisconsin, and Hyles-Anderson College in Hammond, Indiana.

Will Conservatism Remain On Center Stage?

Whether religious conservatism remains on center stage depends upon two motivational factors — (1) issues and (2) leadership. Where they will remain active depends upon accommodation with established political leaders and parties, rewards within the political system and maintenance of the coalition of religious conservatives.

First, the 1989 abortion decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, setting the stage for resolution of the issue in state legislatures and in future court decisions, is precisely the kind of issue conservative religious interests need for their continued political motivation. The Court's decision arouses conservative interests and shows them a well-defined battleground. Since it has been this type of issue that sparks political activity by conservative religious interests, we may assume that continued development of this type of issue is needed to spark their overt action.

Second, leadership dominated by such prominent individuals as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell in the 1970s and 1980s may change in the 1990s. These prominent persons have seen their religious work suffer on the altar of their political participation: they may not return to center stage. But they encouraged many people, especially the young, to get involved in politics. Thus, a shift in leadership is likely to occur, bringing in younger leaders and shifting from a pastoral-led leadership like that of Robertson and Falwell to lay leadership.

Third, the growing professional class in the conservative religious arena will likely be producing more of its political leaders, creating leaders who are better-trained and more seasoned politically.

A possible consequence of this would be a conservative religious movement that is better able to reach compromises and to achieve rewards within the political system.

Fourth, the religiously conservative coalition includes primarily Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Mormons, but with some Jews. Can such a diverse coalition theologically maintain itself politically? They are obviously not united on all issues, such as school prayer, and other issues may arise that would split their coalition. Within conservative Protestantism alone, there are serious divisions between those who would like to establish the kingdom of God on earth, and those who do not believe there will be a kingdom of God on earth until the return of Messiah. The former usually hold the view that the United States was established as a Christian nation and that its religious foundations should be restored.

Understanding Conservative Actors: Paradigm and Propositions

Religious conservatives, beginning with their view of the ultimate source of knowledge, have a fundamentally different worldview than liberals. It is this worldview, attempting to provide eternal certainty in the midst of temporal perplexity, that has made religious conservatism attractive in recent decades. Religious conservatives offer the precision of a moral compass on the seas of doubt in secular society. The paradigm in Figure 1 (page 30), developed after many years of studying conservative and liberal religious and political treatises, depicts summarily and graphically much of our discussion.

Understanding of conservative religious actors on the center stage could not be complete without attention to five propositions that reveal why conservatives have historically been less likely to seek solutions to life's problems in the political arena. These resolutions implicitly reveal that if religious conservatives do not have compelling catalytic issues to get involved politically, they are likely to return at least in part to the wings of center stage. Once again, these propositions provide a partial summary of our

Figure 1

Conservatism and Liberalism Compared: Religious Origins and Basic Beliefs

Topic	Direction/Tendency of Belief	
	Liberal	Conservative
Ultimate Source of Knowledge	Reason	Nature, Bible
Bible	Fallible	Infallible
Biblical Interpretation	More Symbolic	More Liberal
Moral Standards	Relative/Situational	Absolute/Orthodox
Relative Emphasis	Man	God
Conception of God	Remote/Impersonal	Sovereign/Personal
Creation of Man	Evolution	God's Direct Act
Human Nature	Good	Evil
Moral Emphasis	Social	Personal
Relative Importance of Man	Rights	Responsibilities
Origin of Evil	Unjust Social Systems	Satan and Fall of Man
Basis of Salvation	Good Works	Grace through Faith
Relative Focus	Earth	Heaven
Locus of Governmental Power	Man	God
Accountability of Government	To Man	To God
Role of Government	More Unlimited	More Limited
Relative Importance	Equality	Liberty
Primary Citizen Duty	Make Society Just	Salvation of Souls
Justice Achieved By	Governmental Reform	Spiritual Regeneration
Primary Focus	Individual	Community
Preferred Government	National	State and Local
Direction of Sentiment	Internationalistic	Nationalist
Method of Government Influence	Direct	Indirect
Economic Tendency	More Socialist	More Capitalist
Rate/Type of Change	Faster, Utopian	Slower, Prescriptive

Source: Developed from content analysis of over 20 major theological and political documents from the late 1700s to the early 1980s. Adapted from previous work by Charles W. Dunn, "Theology and American Public Policy," *Humanities in Society* 6 (Winter, 1983); 53-70; and *American Political Theology* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

discussion of religious conservatism. The propositions are:

- 1 that the biblical message is primarily personal and individual rather than social and national;
- 2 that the gospel message has personal application with national implication; that is, the effective alteration of the external circumstances of life depends ultimately upon change of the internal condition of the heart;
- 3 that meaningful social and governmental reform should be first of all a product of personal regeneration; that is, regeneration of the soul before reformation of society;
- 4 that indirect political action is in the long run more efficacious than direct political action; that is, moral suasion is more effective than legal sanction;
- 5 that regenerated man needs to

recognize his limitations in imposing his will on finite and fallen society.

Religion at Center Stage

Today, there is intense competition among our values and lifestyles. Religion, once a part of the glue holding American society together, now appears to be contributing substantially to society's breaking apart. American democracy now reveals religion as a divided and a divisive force in politics and government. Religious interests have come to compete on the same political terrain with nonreligious interests in trying to define American public policy, unlike what Alexis de Tocqueville found in the early 1800s when he said: "In the United States religion exercises little influence upon the laws and upon the details of public opinion, but it directs the customs of the com-

munity, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state."¹³

Politically at least, religion now occupies a role no more exalted than any other interest. The secularization of American politics and society has generally reduced religion to another competing political force within America's pluralistic democracy. Liberal religious interests have long been accustomed to this role while conservative religious interests have only recently begun to learn this role.

The issues are real. The emotions are intense. The solutions are problematic. In the courtroom and on the campaign trail, religious interests are playing for high stakes. They are influencing American politics, but in the process they are also being moved as pawns on the political chessboard. From any perspective, religion is not playing its intended role in American politics. Liberal religious interests would extend liberal theological and ideological ideas over a broader segment of American society while conservative religious interests would do the opposite. There appears to be little room for compromise between them as they vie for the starring role on center stage.

Notes

1. See generally: Charles W. Dunn *American Political Theology* (New York: Praeger, 1984).
2. See generally: Dunn, *American Political Theology*; Dunn, *Religion in American Politics* (Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989); Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); and Booth Fowler, *Unconventional Partners; Religion and Liberal Culture in the United States* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989).
3. Robert N. Bellah, *The Broken Covenant* (New York: Seabury press, 1975), p. ix.
4. Michael Novak, *Choosing Our King* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 114, 115.
5. John Dunphy, "A Religion for a New Age," *The Humanist* 43 (January/February 1983): 26.
6. Aleksander L. Solzhenitzyn, *A World Split Apart* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 1978.
7. *The New York Times*, September 1, 1981, p. 1.
8. See generally: Dunn, *American Political Theology*; and Dunn, *Religion in American Politics*.
9. Timothy Dwight, *A Discourse on Some Events of the Last Century*, January 7,

1801. Reprinted in Dunn, **American Political Theology**, pp. 25-27.
10. In William G. McLoughlin, **Revivals, Awakenings and Reform** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 207.
 11. In McLoughlin, p. 130.
 12. In Vernon L. Parrington, **Main Currents in American Thought: 1800-1860**, Vol. II (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930), p. 354.
 13. Alexis de Tocqueville, **Democracy in America** (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 311.

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Consistent, Concurrent, Compact: Florida's Search for a Rational Growth Management System

Dr. John M. DeGrove

Introduction

Over the 19-year period from 1970 to 1989, Florida has moved from an "also ran" to a national leader in efforts to manage growth. During that time "growth management" has emerged as an important sub-field in the area of public policy, and moved to or near the top of the issue agenda of hundreds of cities and counties and an increasing number of states. The term "growth management" was first given broad circulation in the 1970s when the Urban Land Institute published a three volume set of readings titled **Management and Control of Growth**.¹ Growth Management has been variously described as "no-growth" to "slow growth" to "controlled growth," but in recent years it has been widely accepted as involving a commitment to plan carefully to meet the impacts of growth, and to balance the need to protect the environment with an equally legitimate need to provide the infrastructure to support the impacts of growth.

Growth management grew out of the environmental movement of the 60s and 70s, but it is a broader concept concerned with all aspects of growth. In the last half of the 80s, the focus has been on providing the infrastructure needed to accommodate the impacts of growth in a timely way. Citizen frustration with crowded freeways and clogged local streets has brought transportation to the forefront of growth management efforts, with a widely held belief among citizens across the nation that their quality of life is being eroded in an important way by the failure to manage growth effectively.² The demand for avoiding or mitigating the negative impacts of growth has ranged from local "no growth" initiatives, especially in California³ to more comprehensive and integrated efforts to manage growth more effectively

through new partnerships between and among state, regional and local governments and the private sector.⁴ This paper will focus on Florida's efforts to plan effectively for its growth by enacting and attempting to implement two sets of legislative actions: one in the first half of the 1970s and the second in the first half of the 1980s. The weaknesses of the first set of laws and their inadequate implementation will be treated briefly, followed by a more intensive examination of Florida's second set of responses to its massive growth following World War II.

Florida's Post World War II Growth Explosion

The decades following World War II saw Florida realize its dream of attracting large numbers of people to the state far beyond anything that might have been imagined in the pre-World War II period. The explosive growth that occurred beginning in the decade of the 1950s and continuing to this day has a number of causes including technological advances in air conditioning, the much wider use of the automobile, and the rise of the airplane as an important way to bring large numbers of people to Florida, especially tourists. In 1950 there were fewer than 3 million permanent residents in the state. By 1960 this number had almost doubled to near 5 million; by 1970 this number reached 6.8 million; by 1980 it had reached almost 10 million; and the most recent estimates show that Florida has become the fourth most populous state in the nation with more than 12 million permanent residents and millions of tourists who visit the state each year. Florida is adding about 350,000 new permanent residents each year, which translates to about 3 million persons each decade. By the year 2000 Florida will have a population of between 15.5 and 16.5 million residents, which may

well place it in third place in population rank behind only California and New York. One census projection shows Florida topping the 22 million mark in the 2020-2030 period. Such figures are so far removed from the pessimism of Florida's early history that they would surely be almost impossible to comprehend were a citizen of the state in the mid-1800s return to visit us today.⁵

At first the large number of new citizens moving to Florida seemed an unmixed blessing. Economic prosperity, albeit with sharp boom and bust cycles in the real estate and development industry, seemed to come along with the growing population. Little concern was felt at first for any negative impacts of the unplanned and haphazard growth patterns that characterized the major growth surges as the state moved into the 1960s. To be sure concern had been expressed for the negative impacts of overdrainage in the lower east coast, and especially in the Everglades, as early as the 1930s. Florida's periodic wet dry cycles meant that flood followed drought and drought followed flood. Salt water intrusion from the ocean into the groundwater aquifer in southeast Florida began to be a serious problem as early as the 1930s. However, these problems received little serious attention except for a few "technocrats" in Federal and state agencies. However, as the population pressures continued, it became increasingly apparent that the extensive destruction of wetlands, beach and dune systems, the continued threat of salt water intrusion to the drinking water supplies (particularly in southeast Florida and in the Tampa Bay area), these and other negative impacts of unplanned growth began to end Florida's love affair with growth by the mid-1960s.⁶ At about this same time, forces were put in motion in the nation as well as Florida that set the stage for

the first efforts to craft a system to better manage the state's growth. The goal of these systems was to balance the legitimate needs of providing for the large numbers of people coming to the state and the equally legitimate demands for the protection of our natural systems, land, air and water.

Responding to the Growth Management Challenge:

The First Stage

The rise of the environmental movement nationally, which began in the 1950s, strengthened further in the 1960s, and reached a kind of peak in the early 1970s, coincided with the growing strength of the environmental movement in Florida. Small groups that had stood outside the centers of power and offered often strident, rigid and flexible solutions to environmental problems found themselves, in the 1960s, moving into a much stronger political position as they organized more efficiently and took on a number of environmental causes that both sharpened their political skills and broadened their base of support.⁷ A number of major environmental causes emerged to test the strength of the new environmental groups in Florida in the 1960s. These included the effort to protect an adequate water supply for Everglades National Park; the effort to block the building of a major regional jet port in the Everglades west of Miami; and the effort to stop the digging of a cross-state barge canal in the northern part of the Florida peninsula.⁸

A severe drought in southeast Florida and the Tampa Bay area in 1970-1971 coincided with the election of Reubin Askew as Governor of Florida. Some months after he took office in January 1971, with the drought reaching historic proportions and Lake Okeechobee dropping to an all time low, Governor Askew took action that became the focus for a major step forward in Florida's efforts to manage its growth more wisely. The Governor's Conference on Water Management in South Florida, meeting in August 1971, heard a keynote address by the Governor in which a statewide elected official for the first time in the history of the state chal-

lenged the necessary goodness of growth. Askew charged the Conference with examining the question of whether there was a finite limit to the number of people who could be accommodated in Florida in general and south Florida in particular without sacrificing environmental values that were both critical to the state in their own right and also necessary to the economic health of the state in the long run.⁹

A Task Force named by the Governor prepared and presented to the Governor and the 1972 session of the Legislature four major pieces of legislation that together comprised Florida's first major effort to address the issue of balancing the needs of the environment and the need to accommodate growth in a responsible way. The laws included the Environmental Land and Water Management Act (Chapter 380); The Water Resources Act (Chapter 373); the State Comprehensive Planning Act (Chapter 230); and the Land Conservation Act (Chapter 259). This set of laws, and a companion law mandating local governments to adopt plans approved by the 1975 legislature (Chapter 163) were for the time far reaching, progressive, even radical in what they proposed.¹⁰

The Environmental Land and Water Management Act was in some ways the sharpest break with the past in the approach to managing land and water resources so as to protect their integrity against heedless, unplanned, and ill-advised growth. The Land Management Act was based on the assumption that while most local government decisions should remain to be made at the local level, certain decisions made by local governments had a greater than local impact, either regional or even statewide, and that it was necessary to devise a system to factor in the regional or statewide impacts into those local decisions. The mechanism for achieving this purpose was embodied in two separate parts of Chapter 380: Area of Critical State Concern and Developments of Regional Impact. Critical Areas focused on environmental issues but included archaeologically important sites and certain other categories. Developments of Regional Impact were

defined in the law as developments such as housing projects, office parks, or industrial parks, that because of their size, character or location had an impact on the citizens of more than one county. Such projects were subject to certain regional and ultimately statewide review to assure that local government decisions accounted for the greater than local impacts of those decisions.¹¹

The Water Resources Act of 1972 was a bold and far-reaching effort to better manage Florida's water resources. The law established five Water Management Districts covering the entire state, and empowered these Districts with planning, management, and regulatory powers. The Districts were governed by nine-member governing boards named by the Governor, and their major powers included granting consumptive use and surface water management permits. A Constitutional Amendment adopted in 1976 gave each of these Districts the power to levy property taxes, and thus to raise a considerable part of their own funds to carry out their assigned responsibilities.¹²

The State Comprehensive Planning Act required that a State Comprehensive Plan be adopted that presumably would have framed the decisions regarding Critical Areas, Developments of Regional Impact, and other such growth management activities that were put in place in 1972.¹³ The Land Conservation Act of 1972 involved a Constitutional Amendment allowing the state to issue \$200 million in bonds to acquire environmentally sensitive lands.¹⁴ In 1975, the legislature completed the first set of growth management legislation by passing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act in 1975.¹⁵ This law, however flawed it ultimately turned out to be, did put in place an added piece of what ultimately became an integrated policy framework for managing Florida's growth.

A Decade of Implementing Efforts: 1972-1982

In assessing the record of Florida's efforts to manage growth so as to cope with the large influx of people that con-

tinued unabated during the decades of the 60s and 70s and into the 80s, one reaches the conclusion that while there were some important successes, on balance the system did not function so as to cope with the infrastructure and environmental impacts of new growth. It was a case of "too little, too late" and a failure to appreciate some central realities of the growth management process. First and foremost among these was the failure to recognize that substantial new funding would have to be provided to make the system work; funding both for planning and for supporting the costs of infrastructure. During much of the 1970s Florida still moved in a kind of fool's paradise in which it was believed that growth paid for itself, and that sooner or later the new growth itself would cause all the needed infrastructure to be put in place to support the impacts of that growth. It was in fact not until that notion was recognized as fundamentally false that Florida began to face fully in the 1980s its growth management problem.¹⁶

The weaknesses of Florida's first set of growth management laws should not obscure the fact that some good things were done. The record is clear that urban development patterns that took shape under the Development of Regional Impact (DRI) process tended to come closer to the ideal of good design and adequate infrastructure than projects that did not go through that process. Furthermore such projects were subjected to substantial exactions (impact fees) that contributed to the ability to provide needed infrastructure. However, the fact that more than 90 percent of Florida's development did not go through this process created a sense of inequity and unfairness on the part of those that did, and the DRI system failed to account for cumulative impacts that often were far more extensive and destructive than those that were subjected to the Development of Regional Impact process.¹⁷ The Water Resources Act was a progressive law that put Florida in the forefront nationally in managing its water resources. The Land Conservation Act set the stage for the development of the nation's most extensive public land acquisition program.¹⁸

In summing up the decade 1972-1982, we see that implementation weaknesses blocked attempts to solve complex and difficult problems. In the late 60s and early 70s environmental damage was so clear that a sense of crisis was obtained, and it was possible to pass extensive new laws aimed at addressing the perceived problems. However, after the laws were on the books, many people who had supported those laws forgot the critical lesson that only implementation, effective, well funded and timely, puts meaning into legislation aimed at solving important problems.

A special weakness as the decade wore on was revealed in the loopholes and incompleteness in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act. The law required each city and county in Florida to put a plan in place and that was accomplished by the late 1970s. However, the requirements of the state law were process and not substance oriented. The plans had to have a certain number of elements with certain names, but the elements had no qualitative criteria which they had to meet. Furthermore, "implementing mechanisms," even if they were adopted at all had to be consistent with the plans, did not have to be adopted, and many, many local governments simply went through the motions of adopting a plan, placing it on the shelf, and not referring to it again. Here the failure of the state to carry out its commitments to provide funding to local governments to help them prepare these plans undermined the state's credibility in mandating local planning. Furthermore, local plans were subject to review and comment, not review and approval, at the regional and state levels. By the end of the decade it was clear that the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act, even where plans and implementing regulations were in place, was not working effectively. Plans were changed willy-nilly virtually every time a city council or county commission met. The zoning continued in effect to drive the plan rather than the plan framing zoning, subdivision regulations, and other implementing mechanisms. The time was ripe, then, for a thoroughgoing reap-

praisal of the system as Florida entered the decade of the 80s. The reappraisal in fact began in 1978 and continued forward until the adoption of sweeping new growth management legislation in 1984 and 1985.¹⁹

Reassessing Florida's Growth Management System in the Early 1980s.

Newly elected Governor Bob Graham initiated a comprehensive reassessment of Florida's capacity to manage growth by appointing a Task Force on Resource Management that submitted its final report to the Governor and Legislature early in 1980. A **1979 Interim Report of the Task Force** had already resulted in a reinstatement and strengthening of Chapter 380.05, the Area of Critical State Concern process. The "new critical area law," featuring Resource Planning and Management Committees, became the state's most effective growth management tool prior to the adoption of the new system in 1985.²⁰ The 1980 report also called for changing the DRI program to include more comprehensive downtown DRIs, and this recommendation was accepted by the 1980 legislative session. More fundamentally, the **Final Report of the Task Force** clarified and restated the need for an integrated policy framework to shape the nature of Florida's growth management system. The **Report** called for a set of goals and policies at the state level approved by the legislature; strong comprehensive regional policy plans to further articulate state goals and policies at the regional level; and a much stronger local government comprehensive planning system with state and regional review and approval, not just review and comment, to assure quality programs sufficient to meet the needs of the state.²¹

In 1982, Governor Bob Graham, still frustrated and dissatisfied with the failure of the state to have crafted a system that could cope with the continued influx of large numbers of people into the state, worked with the legislature to establish the Environmental Land Management Study Committee II. ELMS II was constituted in much the same way as the Resource Management Task

Force: a cross section of interests concerned with growth, including all the principle adversaries, with the hope that there could be agreement on the problems, agreement on the solutions, and that a series of clear and strong recommendations could be taken to the legislature beginning in 1984 to completely revamp Florida's growth management system.

The **Final Report of ELMS II** to the Governor and the legislature in 1984 put in to one package in clear and strong language a recommendation for an integrated policy framework to shape and guide the future of Florida into the 21st century. Perhaps as important as any other one thing, the **Report** put strong and extensive emphasis on the need to fund whatever new systems and programs were called for in its recommendation. Funding was one of the most powerful recommendations provided, and indeed ELMS II stated flatly that if the state could not or would not fund the proposed system adequately, it ought not to adopt it at all. Finally, after years of equivocating with the issue, a flat statement that growth did not pay for itself, and that new funding would have to be provided if Florida was to grow responsibly, was put before the Governor, the Legislature and the people of the state. In this context, we turn now to examine the legislative actions over the 1984-1986 period that, remarkably, placed into law virtually every recommendation made by ELMS II.²²

A Comprehensive System for Managing Growth: The Politics, the Process, and the Substance

The **ELMS II Final Report** delivered to the Legislature and the Governor in the early spring of 1984 set the stage for Governor Bob Graham's leadership, complimented by equally strong support in each house of the legislature. It led to the first of the series of laws adopted over the 1984-1986 period which put in place the new growth management system for the state of Florida. The 1984 Legislature in the eyes of some labored mightily and did only a limited amount, but in fact the extensive and intense debate during that session of the legislature forged the

coalitions among the environmental groups, development groups, the local governments, and other support sources that made it possible to move forward in the 1985 session. In the meantime, the 1984 legislature did take the crucial action needed to get the integrated policy framework system underway.²³

The State and Regional Planning Act of 1984 (Chapter 186) required that the Office of the Governor prepare a State Plan and present it to the 1985 Legislative Session. It also reasserted the mandate for Regional Planning Councils to prepare Comprehensive Regional Policy Plans, with the crucial difference that for the first time funds (\$500,000) were appropriated by the legislature to support the preparation of the plans. The 1984 session also appropriated substantial additional funds to strengthen the State Land Planning Agency component of the Department of Community Affairs so that the number of positions and other kinds of fiscal capacities were strongly increased. During the interim between 1984 and 1985, the Governor's Office through the Office of Planning and Budgeting did in fact draft the proposed State Comprehensive Plan, and held hearings across the state in order to garner support for the document.²⁴

At the beginning of the 1985 legislative session, the stage was set for Florida to finally take the actions required for a comprehensive system capable of effectively managing growth in order to protect the quality of life of its citizens into the 21st century. During the session two key pieces of legislation were passed. First, surprising everyone by the speed of its action, the legislature held extensive hearings on the proposed Comprehensive State Plan and did in fact adopt that Plan into law fairly early in the session. It was more in the nature of a strategic plan with an emphasis on outcomes and ways of reaching goals than it was a traditional comprehensive plan that tried to cover everything. It was relatively short, and written for the most part in plain English. The goals and policies that formed the backbone of the Plan were reasonably concise and specific, and thus constituted a meaningful frame-

work within which the rest of the system could function. This law, Chapter 187, was followed by the passage of the Omnibus Growth Management Act including far-reaching changes to Chapter 163 (renamed the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act); Chapter 161 (The Coastal Setback Line Legislation); and other important changes in the statutes, all aimed at strengthening the growth management system. The heart of the Omnibus Growth Management Act was the provision that all local governments prepare new Comprehensive Plans that would be consistent with the goals and policies of the State Plan, as well as with the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan. This crucial provision provided the critical link between the state, regional and local levels, at last bringing Florida into a position of managing its growth comprehensively at all levels.²⁵

The integrated policy framework placed into the law by the 1985 session involved a vertical integration of goals, policies and implementation strategies, as well as a strong provision for horizontal compatibility within and among plans at the state, regional and local levels. Thus with the State Plan in place and approved by the Legislature, state agency functional plans were required to be prepared by July 1, 1986. Two fast track plans, the State Land Development Plan and the State Water Use Plan, had to be ready by January 1, 1986, to serve as somewhat of a framework to all other state agency functional plans. These plans were to be in the form of strategic documents that would be the source of state agency budget submissions so that at long last, in theory at least, a policy framework would drive the budget process instead of vice versa. The Comprehensive Regional Policy Plans, also required to be consistent with the goals and policies of the State Plan as determined by the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting, were to be prepared and adopted by rule by July 1, 1987. This goal was met. Finally, local plans were to be prepared and submitted to the State Land Planning Agency (the Department of Community

Affairs) according to a schedule which brought coastal counties and cities into the process first and then picked up the remaining counties and cities over a period of several years.²⁶

The adoption schedule, which is still in the process of implementation, called for the first local plans to be submitted to the Department of Community Affairs July 1, 1988. Brevard County and its cities submitted their plans first in April 1988. The process of state review of the plans is shaped by Rule 9-J-5, the minimum criteria rule, which is aimed at telling local governments what they must do in their plans and later verifying their implementing regulations to be consistent with the state's growth management process in general and in particular with the goals and policies of the State Plan and the substantive requirements of Chapter 163. This process will continue through 1990 with the provision that after a local plan is found consistent with the legislatively approved Rule 9-J-5, state and regional plan goals and policies, and other statute and rule provisions, local governments must put in place implementing regulations to carry out the plan within one year after a plan has been submitted to the state for consistency review. The process is complex, it is demanding, and it will require substantial resources in order to make it work. The funding issue will be discussed in more detail below.²⁷

Finally, the Omnibus Growth Management Act of 1985 opens up substantial new opportunities for citizen participation in the growth management process. The new roles for citizens can be thought of as a three level opportunity for citizen participation and possible challenge of state and local government activities. A citizen group or an individual has the right to challenge a consistency finding regarding a local plan by the Department of Community Affairs. This challenge goes to a Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) hearing officer, and can ultimately lead to a reversal by the Administration Commission of the consistency finding. In such a case, a number of sanctions are available that are put in place until the local plan is brought into consistency with the ap-

propriate criteria. The second level involves land development regulations, which must be consistent with an approved local plan. A citizen can challenge those regulations as failing the consistency test, and the process again goes through a hearing examiner for consideration. Finally, with regard to individual development orders, for instance the permitting of a project, citizens may challenge such an action in much the same way as existed before the legislation; that is standing is restricted and the burden of proof is on the citizen. In summary, the Growth Management Act substantially broadens opportunities for citizens to participate in the planning and regulatory process.²⁸

The substance of the new legislation can be summarized in three major parts. First, the Omnibus Act contained various provisions attempting to reverse the practice of careless and reckless development along Florida's coast in high hazard areas, barrier islands, and other areas susceptible to hurricanes and other storm-type conditions. These specific requirements took the form of a 30 erosion line which stipulated that intense urban development could not take place along a coast if the erosion rate showed that such land would be under water in 30 years; a strengthening of the coastal control line which regulates the way in which construction can take place in high hazard zones along the coast; and a very substantial strengthening of the coastal management element of local Government Comprehensive Plans which required far-reaching changes in the way local government would manage development along their coastal areas.²⁹

The second focus of the new growth management system was on incentives and disincentives to encourage compact urban development, discourage unplanned urban sprawl, and bring a better separation of rural and urban land uses. Little attention was given to compactness in the early stages of developing local plans for submission to the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) for state review. More recently, DCA Secretary Tom Pelham, with strong backing from the Governor, has

drawn on the goals and policies of the State Plan to place very strong emphasis on anti-urban sprawl measures in reviewing local plans. Plans are being rejected for failure to establish urban service boundaries so as to limit sprawl and assure more compact urban development patterns. The recent **Final Report** of the Governor's Task Force on Urban Growth Patterns calls for amendments to the growth management system to put in place much stronger policies for managing urban sprawl. The 1989 legislative session gave considerable support to such amendments, and they may come before a special session on transportation funding and growth management tentatively scheduled for fall or winter 1989. In the meantime, DCA Secretary Pelham is acting to discourage sprawl through local plan reviews. This development illustrates how the State Plan can be used by a determined and creative Secretary of DCA as a living document, with its goals and policies evolving over time to meet the needs of the state.³⁰

The third substantive thrust of the growth management system put in place in 1985 is also the most powerful. This component of the law asserts that Florida must abandon its traditional habit of growing without attention to putting the infrastructure in place to take care of the impacts brought about by that growth. For decades Florida has followed a practice of "selling Florida on the cheap," of failing to pay as we grow, of, in short, practicing the fine art of the deficit financing of growth. Such an approach makes a mockery of the constitutional provision that budgets must be balanced each year. The new law and its concurrency requirement says simply that after new local plans and land development regulations are in place and levels of service agreed on, it shall be unlawful for any local government to issue a building permit where it cannot be shown that the infrastructure will be in place to support the impact of that development at the time those impacts occur. The use of impact fees and other innovative funding mechanisms are encouraged, but the law is neutral as to who puts up the resources to provide that infrastructure.

It is absolutely clear on the fact that the funds to put the infrastructure in place must come from somewhere, with the final burden falling on the local government issuing the permit.³¹

The concurrency requirement is the product of a rising frustration in Florida, and in other parts of the nation, with the fact that citizens' quality of life is being degraded a little bit at a time by failing to put infrastructure in place concurrent with the impact of new development. While the focus is on transportation, the frustration of citizens with traffic jams and semi-gridlock on interstates leads to the same principle being applied to things like park and recreation facilities, schools, solid waste, storm water management systems, and other such components of the broad spectrum of infrastructure needs. The rationale for such a powerful requirement is simple. To continue to fail to "pay as we grow" dooms us inevitably in Florida to a long run decline in our general quality of life, in the character and quality of our environmental systems, and ultimately will undermine our economic health. Thus in Florida there is a powerful and broad based spectrum of support for finding the funding to make this strong component of the growth management system become a reality as new plans and new land development regulations and other implementing mechanisms are put into place.³²

The Implementation Challenge: A Test of Political Courage and Vision

Consistency, concurrency and compactness: these powerful policies, assuming that they are fully implemented, give Florida the strongest growth management system in the nation. So far, as of fall 1989, there is much to be encouraged about in the implementation record. Some 200 local plans have been submitted to DCA for consistency review. Of those that have received final review by DCA, about half have passed the consistency test. The Department of Community Affairs through its **Technical Memos** and direct work with local governments is striking a proper balance between strict adherence to the provisions of the law and appropriate flexibility to allow local

government plans to be found consistent. Special interest groups from all sectors of Florida's society reflect strong citizen support for managing growth effectively by continuing to give strong support to full implementation of the system. Funding remains the only major unsolved problem that threatens the success of the system over time. The Zwick Committee documented the need for more revenues at both the state and local levels to move from the deficit financing of growth to the full implementation of the concurrency requirement of the law.³³ Other analyses have shown the same results.³⁴ So far, only the funds for planning have remained reasonably on schedule, with about 30 million appropriated to help local and regional agencies prepare the plans mandated by the system. The annual shortfall for infrastructure alone is from 1.5 to 2 billion dollars. The Legislature and the Governor have struggled with the issue at each session of the legislature since 1987. It will be addressed again in a special session tentatively scheduled for November.

Florida is a national leader in growth management, but it cannot sustain that leadership role unless the state provides major new sources of revenue both for itself and for local governments. At a minimum, substantial increases in the gasoline tax, local ability to levy an optional sales tax without a referendum, new methods of charging automobile license fees, new ways of taxing revenues from tourists, and finally a reconsideration of the sales tax on services and ultimately a consideration and implementation of a personal income tax will be necessary if Florida is to be competitive in the 21st century as a high quality, high growth, healthy environment, healthy economy state. We have the growth management framework in place to be a leader. We cannot afford to forfeit that leadership position by failing to fund the system.

Notes

1. Scott, Brower, and Miner, **Management and control of growth (Volume I-II)**.
2. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, pp. 3-7; DeGrove and Stroud, "State land planning and regulation: innovative roles in the 1980s and beyond," p.3; DeGrove, "A battle over land use: a second wave emerges,"

- p.8.
3. Fulton, pp.1, 3-5.
4. DeGrove, "Growth management and its governance," in its entirety.
5. Bureau of Economic and Business Research, **1988 Florida statistical abstract**, p. 3; **Florida estimates of population**: April 1, 1988, p. 5.
6. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, pp. 102-103.
7. *Ibid*, pp. 395-396; Popper, **The politics of land use reform**, in its entirety.
8. De Grove, **Land growth and politics**, 103-109; Carter pp. 187-308; and Blake, **Land into water - water into land**, in its entirety.
9. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, pp. 107-108.
10. *Ibid*, pp. 109-110.
11. *Ibid*, pp. 117-121; provisions for Areas of Critical State Concern and Developments of Regional Impact are codified, respectively, at Florida Statutes s. 380.05 and s. 380.06 (1987).
12. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, p. 116; Carter, p. 133; the Water Resources Act of 1972 is currently codified at Chapter 373, Florida Statutes.
13. The Florida State Comprehensive Plan is currently codified at Chapter 187, Florida Statutes.
14. The Land Conservation Act of 1972 is currently codified at Chapter 259, Florida Statutes.
15. Current version at Florida Statutes ss. 163.3161-.3243 (1987).
16. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, pp. 166-174 deHaven-Smith, Westi Jo, p. 2; DeGrove, "The historical development of growth in Florida," pp. 1-2.
17. DeGrove, **Land growth and politics**, pp. 153-156.
18. *Ibid*, p. 116
19. DeGrove and Stroud, "New developments and future trends in local government comprehensive planning," p. 575; Corbett, pp. 16-17; O'Connell, pp. 2-3.
20. DeGrove, "Critical area programs in Florida," p. 60.
21. Florida, Governor's Task Force on Resource Management, in its entirety.
22. Florida, Environmental Land Management Committee, in its entirety.
23. As Secretary for the Florida Department of Community Affairs, 1983-1985, the author actively participated in the 1984 and 1985 legislative sessions.
24. Robertson, pp. 12-15.
25. Chapter 85-57, Laws of Florida (An Act relating to the State Comprehensive Plan); Chapter 85-55, Laws of Florida (Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act); DeGrove, "Historical development of growth management," p. 2.
26. DeGrove and Stroud, "New developments and future trends in local government comprehensive planning," pp. 575, 590; Robertson, p. 14.

27. For an in-depth description and analysis of the 1985 legislative action and subsequent implementing efforts, see DeGrove and Stroud, *ibid.*, pp. 584, 589-600.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 595-598; Stroud, (page numbers unknown).
29. Bernd-Cohen and Quinn, pp. 9-10.
30. Florida, Department of Community Affairs, **Technical memo** (Spring 1989), pp. 1, 6-7; Florida, Governor's Task Force on Urban Growth Patterns, **Final report**, in its entirety; 1000 Friends of Florida, pp. 1, 8.
31. The concurrency provision of the Growth Management Act is codified at Florida Statutes s. 163.3202(g) (1987).
32. For a full discussion of the evolution of the concurrency requirement, including the development of concurrency management systems and the ways in which local governments have succeeded or failed in meeting the requirement, see Florida, Department of Community Affairs, **Technical Memo**, Vol. 4, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (1989).
33. **Keys to Florida's Future: Winning in a Competitive World**, in its entirety.
34. Montanaro, pp. 20-23

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