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FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

OFFICERS 2012-2013

FPSA President Sean D. Foreman

Barry University

sforeman@mail.barry.edu

Kevin M. Wagner, 1st Vice-President
& Program Chair 2013 Conference
Florida Atlantic University
kwagne15@fau.edu



David Hill, Secretary
Stetson University
dhill@stetson.edu

Marco Rimanelli
Editor, *Florida Political Chronicle*
Saint Leo University
Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

Kathryn A. DePalo, 2nd Vice-President
Florida International University
depalok@fiu.edu

Aubrey Jewett, Treasurer
University of Central Florida-Orlando
aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu

Judithanne Scourfield McLaughlan
Editor Newsletter, *Political Scientist*
University South Florida-St. Petersburg
jsm2@stpt.usf.edu

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 2012-2013 (staggered 3-years terms)

Giselle Jamison (2011-13)*
St. Thomas University
GJamison@stu.edu

Vilma Fuentes (2010-13)
Santa Fe College
vilma.fuentes@sfcollge.edu

Stephen Baker (2012-14)**
Jacksonville University
sbaker@ju.edu

Mark Logas (2012-15)
Valencia College
mlogas@valenciacollege.edu

Joseph Uscinski (2012-15)
University of Miami
uscinski@miami.edu

Denis Rey (2010-13)
University of Tampa
denis.rey@ut.edu

Jocelyn Jones Evans (2011-14)
University of West Florida-Pensacola
jevans@uwf.edu

Mary Anderson (2012-14)**
University of Tampa
manderson@ut.edu

Richard Murgor (2012-15)
Tallahassee Community College
murgor@tcc.fl.edu

Ex-Officio Past-President
Houman Sadri
University of Central Florida-Orlando
Houman.sadri@ucf.edu

* Elected to fill remainder of Kevin Wagner's term.

** Elected to fill remainder of David Hill's term.

*** Elected to fill remainder of Kathryn DePalo's term.

**President's Introduction:
Debriefing the 2012 Election Results and Previewing FPSA's 2013 Conference**

FPSA President Sean D. Foreman, Ph.D., Barry University

Dear FPSA Members and All Interested Readers:

The 2012 Presidential election once again placed the spotlight on Florida and our electoral system. Fortunately for the country, if not Mitt Romney, the national election outcome did not depend exclusively on Florida's results as it happened in 2000: in 2012 it took four days after Election Day to finish counting and finally release Florida's results, but Obama had already secured the majority of the Electoral College and popular votes nation-wide! Florida's latest electoral fiasco was due to several factors, including a reduction in early-voting days from 14 to 8 days from prior elections, limited voting sites in some counties, and an extra-long ballot thanks to 11 State Constitutional Amendments placed on the ballot by the Florida Legislature (eight of those referenda questions were defeated).

It was not a "wave election", but nationally and in Florida it was a good year for Democrats: President Barack Obama won re-election and earned Florida's 29 electoral votes. Obama also became the first Democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win Florida two times. His superior ground game and campaign organization through social media, as well as traditional sources were credited for leading Obama to victory.

Democrats picked up eight seats in the U.S. House and two in the U.S. Senate. Incumbent Florida Senator Bill Nelson (D) defeated Connie Mack IV (R) to keep the seat once held by Mack's father. In Congress, Joe Garcia (D) defeated David Rivera (R) in District 26 to become the first Cuban-American Democrat in the House. Political newcomer Patrick Murphy (D) defeated Tea Party favorite Allen West (R) in District 16. And Alan Grayson in Central Florida and Lois Frankel in Southeast Florida won the two new seats added as a result of redistricting.

Democrats also won five seats in the Florida State House and two in the State Senate to break Republican super-majorities in each Legislative chamber. Already, Democrats are eyeing once again the Governor's mansion and gearing up to challenge Governor Rick Scott (R) in 2014. Not the least of contenders is former-Republican Governor-turned-Independent Senate candidate Charlie Crist, who officially became a Democrat in December 2012.

My essay "Top 10 Reasons Why Barack Obama Won the U.S. Presidency in 2008 and What it Means in the 2012 Election" in the previous edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle* (vol. 20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) looked at reasons why Obama won in 2008 and what it meant for 2012. The dynamics of a changing electorate and of a relatively successful first term, along with overall dissatisfaction by Republicans in their choices to take on the President, gave Obama an advantage heading into the November elections. This edge endured even as unemployment hovered around 8% and the killing of four Americans including the Ambassador to Libya did cast a cloud over the incumbent's quest for a second term in office. Using American University Professor Allan Lichtman's "Keys to the White House" as a template and giving the advantage on the economy to the Republicans, I still saw an overall lead for Obama heading into the 2012 Presidential Elections.

Concerning the Electoral College, my prediction was off by two states: Florida and Virginia. I, like many analysts and some Democrats, thought Romney had a better than even chance of winning Florida: the economy was still lagging, the Republican Party was strong State-wide, and popular surrogates like U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and former-Governor Jeb Bush seemed to rally the GOP troops. On Virginia, I took my cues from Professor and pundit Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, and counted on a close race going to the challenger. In the end, Obama won again every State he won in 2008, except Indiana and North Carolina, to earn a second term in the White House. He got less Electoral votes and popular votes, but a win is a win and scholars can debate whether this amounts to a mandate or not for the President.

Our next FPSA annual meeting will be on 16 March 2013 at Florida International University (FIU) in Miami. We hope that you can join us there to debrief about the 2012 elections and look at other new ideas in the field. Whether your area is national or local politics, or if it is comparative or international politics we have a place for you in our annual conference program. FIU's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) is a great place to be to discuss international issues, as well as review public policy and engage in serious political analysis. Be sure to put in a paper proposal and also consider submitting your work for review to the *Florida Political Chronicle*.

Best wishes for 2013!

Sean D. Foreman, Ph.D.

**President FPSA
Associate-Professor of Political Science
Barry University**

Editor's Introduction: A Banner Year with More "Old-New" Essays!

Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University

Dear FPSA Fellows and Political Readers:

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the annual regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association on politics and international affairs, and encourages scholarly submissions from all Politics disciplines: American Politics, Political Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, Public Administration, International Political Economy, International Law and Organizations (see submissions requirements for essays and book-reviews on p.63 of this issue).

This current *Florida Political Chronicle* December 2012 issue (vol.21, n.1-2, 2010-2012) welcomes readers to a new Introduction from President of the Florida Political Science Association Sean Foreman (Barry University) on his decoding of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections. Dr. Foreman had been among the few U.S. experts to predict since Summer in our Journal's previous "2012 Presidential Elections Issue" (vol. 20, n.1-2, 2009-2012) that just like in 2008, also in the 2012 elections President Barack Obama (D) would be reconfirmed for a second-term over his challenger Mitt Romney (R) based on 10 electoral factors. Please consider reviewing in-depth Dr. Foreman's earlier essay, "Top 10 Reasons Why Barack Obama Won the U.S. Presidency in 2008 and What it Means in the 2012 Election", in our previous vol. 20 issue.

Below are three key changes making more competitive our *Florida Political Chronicle* regional scholarly journal:

1. Starting with the previous "2012 Presidential Elections Issue" of August (vol. 20, n.1-2, 2009-2012), all new *Florida Political Chronicle* issues are now published in colour and only on-line, once or twice yearly, under the current format and art concept by returning Editor Marco Rimanelli (Saint Leo University). This on-line process also reduces printing costs, increases journal subscriptions and distribution in and outside Florida.
2. Both the "2012 Presidential Elections Issue" and all on-line Archived scanned past ones (1989-2009) are available *free to the public* in the Chronicle Tab of the Florida Political Science Association's Website at <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/>. Instead, starting with this current new issue of December 2012 (vol.21, n.1-2, 2010-2012) and future ones will be available only with *member password* and FPSA simple subscription of \$40 yearly (see p.64).
3. Like the previous vol. 20 issue, also this current vol. 21 and future vol. 22 (Spring 2013, n.1-2, 2011-2012) ones present a mix of both new essays and some as yet unpublished scholarly ones with most of the past Best FPSA Graduate Student Papers Awards (inconsistencies in published Graduate Awards years depend on some authors having already secured alternative publishing venues for their work).

The journal's first essay, "**Understanding the Divisions in Conservative Thought: Edmund Burke vs. Adam Smith**" by **Dr. Kevin Wagner (Florida International University)**, explores the development of the ideological roots of modern American Conservatism through the rival influence in 1780s Great Britain of Classical Conservatism by Edmund Burke vs. Economic Liberalism by Adam Smith, which contemporary theoretical assertions connect both ideologies as part of a natural developing philosophy of Conservative governance. Instead, Dr. Wagner's comparison of both theorists' works argues that traditional Conservative governance as championed by Burke (based on tradition, nature, history and the long-standing aristocratic structures) is profoundly at odds with Smith's principles of Liberal Economics and Free-Trade (based on reason and rationality). This belies the modern ideological assertions of a natural developing philosophy of Conservative governance based on the union of both Burke's aristocratic Conservative traditionalism and Smith's thoughts, with the latter's market-approach now dominating contemporary Conservative thought.

The journal's second essay, "**Raising Money, Attracting Outside Expenditures and Running for Congress: Impact of the 2010 National 'Wave' Election**" is the latest contribution of FPSA's long-serving former-Secretary/Treasurer **Professor J. Edwin Benton (University of South Florida-Tampa)**, which concludes our timely analysis of American elections issues. Professor Benton's essay seeks to determine if the 2010 U.S. Midterm election indeed was a "national wave" election with differential impacts (as predicted by many observers) on the ability of Congressional candidates to raise money for their campaigns and attract outside expenditures from various groups. The study suggests that unlike in the 2006 and 2008 U.S. elections, Republican candidates in 2010 for both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate enjoyed a distinct advantage on Democratic counterparts in general campaign funds and rising independent contributions by outside Conservative groups to support of their candidacy. Professor Benton supplements his study with a wealth of comparative graphs and tables.

The third essay, "**Europe at Stake: the First European Parliament Elections in a E.U. Enlarged to the East, 2004 & 2009**" is by **Dr. Magda Giurcanu (2012 Ph.D. Graduate of the University of Florida and Lecturer there at its Center for European Studies)** is the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award of 2011. Giurcanu's research (later expanded in her Dissertation) analyzes voters' decisions in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections after the European Union (E.U.) enlargements to the ex-Communist East. Dr. Giurcanu used recent research data on the last 2004 and 2009 "waves" of European Parliament elections in newly democratized ex-Communist member-states to challenge the "second order" election model in "old" E.U. member-states (that E.U. elections are 'not real' European contests, but mainly national contests). This study shows that instead in post-Communist Eastern new democracies the notion of "Europe" as "Europhile attitudes" towards E.U. institutions and political system, is matched by concepts of "egocentric Europeaness" (satisfaction with democracy in the E.U.) and "national Europeaness" (voters' perceptions with regard to country's benefits from E.U. membership). All three concepts strongly motivate voter participation at E.U. elections, at least in the initial transitional years. Important are also the author's detailed tables of data analysis of the 2004 and 2009 E.U. elections.

The **Book-Review** on Houman Sadri, *Global Security Watch—Caucasus States* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), ISBN 978-0-313-37980-2, unveils a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, geo-political survey of the troubled Southern Caucasus, with in-depth analysis of the politics, economics and security of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. By seeking to apply Samuel Huntington's famous "Clash of Civilization" Theory to the Caucasus, Dr. Sadri exposes both its relevance and limitations in regional inter-ethnic clashes vs. outside Powers' rivalries. This is the first scholarly book to fully analyze all aspects of the Caucasus States' security and geo-political role from the 1700s-1900s Anglo-Russia Great Game in Central Asia to the 1946-1990 U.S.-Soviet Cold War and current post-Cold War. The book also details the Caucasus' geo-strategic role as a transit-area for ex-Soviet energy flows to Russia and the West (oil and gas productions, plus key pipelines to Europe), as well as Georgia's, Armenia's and Azerbaijan's foreign-security policies towards Russia, U.S.A., NATO, European Union and sub-regional Powers (Islamic Iran, Turkey, India and China). Great additions in the Appendix are the biographies of Caucasus leaders, historical chronologies and key maps.

As "returning" Editor of this regional scholarly journal, I remain deeply thankful to the FPSA's President Sean Foreman and all my colleagues at FPSA and Saint Leo University for their support. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is a regional scholarly publication on politics and international affairs that embodies the U.S. Department of Education's new emphasis on public policy in universities. Together with all FPSA Officers we are committed to publishing a high-quality, modern, regional scholarly journal to keep enticing your intellectual fire as we have done since our first issues under our past Editors Dr. Bernie Schechterman (1989-1993), myself (1993-1999) and Dr. Houman Sadri (1999-2003).

Happy Holidays & New Year 2013!

Marco Rimanelli / Ph. D.

Editor *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA
Professor of Political Science & World Affairs
Saint Leo University

UNDERSTANDING THE DIVISIONS WITHIN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT: EDMUND BURKE vs. ADAM SMITH

Kevin M. Wagner, Ph.D., Florida Atlantic University

ABSTRACT: This historical analysis explores the development of the conflicted principles at the root of modern American Conservatism. The tenets of Classical Conservatism as expressed and developed by Edmund Burke are contrasted with the nature and concerns of Economic Liberalism based in the writings of Adam Smith. This study shows how the principles of Liberal Economics are inconsistent with, and ultimately destructive to, the very ideas and understanding of governance, which Edmund Burke championed. Ultimately, it is argued herein that the contemporary assertions connecting the two ideologies as part of a natural developing philosophy of governance is a theoretical fallacy. Notions of Economic Liberalism are based on reason and rationality, while Burke's Conservatism is an outgrowth of the belief in tradition, nature, history and the long-standing aristocratic structures they produced. This comparative study shows that many of the beliefs and concerns expressed by Edmund Burke not only cannot logically be joined with modern Conservatism, but are (in their application) contrary to the market-based approach that now dominates contemporary Conservative thought.



Hon. Edmund Burke, 1729-1797



Adam Smith, 1723-1790*

INTRODUCTION

Conservatism vs. Liberal Economics

Much of the study of the divisions in modern American politics is grounded in political behavior and institutional structure. In this area, scholars regularly study the causes of political polarization, the reasons for it or the magnitude of divisions themselves (Abromowitz, 2010). Yet, the ideas are not a constant nor are their arrangement on either side of the ideological division a preordained or even

logical placement. Ideologies are unions of ideas, though the linkage between them is often tenuous, even if regularly expressed in the most passionate of voices. This essay will explore the foundation of modern American Conservatism, by comparing the tenets of Classical Conservatism espoused by Edmund Burke to the nature and concerns of Economic Liberalism based on the tenets of Adam Smith as expressed in *The Wealth of Nations*.¹ This analysis is intended to expose the theoretical fallacy of the assumption in modern Conservatism that the two positions need be read and understood as being inherently consistent with one another or seen as part of a large continuity in the development of Conservatism through the last two-three centuries. The study will show that many of the beliefs and concerns expressed by Edmund Burke were not consistent and actually quite contrary to the market-based approach that now dominates Conservative thought.

The sources for this essay will consist of the writings and speeches of Edmund Burke, with a focus on his work related to his views on the role of state and community in the development of economy. More specifically, this study will focus on the philosophical underpinnings of Burke's belief in gradualism and the distrust he expressed for a reordering of the social order, especially by means of commerce and wealth unrelated to land holdings.

To contrast the philosophy of Burke, this comparative study uses the work of Adam Smith and rely also on some secondary sources that further develop the ideas and theoretical structure of Liberal Economics to illustrate how far this epistemology has moved from the foundational principles of Conservatism within the works of Burke. This study specifically asserts that Burke's famous attack on economists and calculators illustrates his underlying distrust for economic constructs that are based on reason and logic rather than social structure and culture as developed over time. This foundational cleavage between reason and history defines the division between Burke and Smith, as well as the separation between Economic Liberalism and Classical Conservatism. The linkage between the two concepts is ultimately a fiction created to suggest a natural evolution of Conservative ideas that is neither analytically sound nor historically accurate.

Understanding the Conflict: Free Markets and Feudalism

The XVIII Century was a time of great transition. Trade and commerce were altering the foundation of aristocratic power by shifting wealth away from large landed estates to a growing middle-class of entrepreneurs. The dominance of the aristocracy through a land-based agrarian economy was ending. The nature and implications of the growing impact of commerce was described in detail by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*. The impact of Smith's work was substantial, and it was not long before other thinkers drew on the work to suggest some revolutionary implications. Thomas Paine used Smith's writings to suggest that the power of commerce would ultimately render the contemporary modes of government obsolete (Foner ed., 1948, p.343).

In *The Rights of Men*, Paine describes the implications of Economic Liberalism quite plainly: "If commerce were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable of, it would extirpate the system of war, and produce a revolution in the uncivilized state of governments" (Foner, ed., p.400; emphasis added). By uncivilized, Paine is referencing the preexisting aristocratic system. Liberal Economic Theory would, and more normatively should, sweep away the vestiges of the old, more stratified class-based system. Paine's use of Smith as an intellectual justification for rejecting the social order put him at odds with Conservative thinkers at the time (Winch, 1992).

¹ References to *The Wealth of Nations* will be made by book, chapter (e.g. *Wealth*, II,p.4).

The ideological puzzle is how modern Conservatism has come to mean both support for Liberal Economics as set forth by Adam Smith and a defense of the existing social order (see, e.g. Nisbet, 1986). The easiest solution is to reference the works of noted Conservative Edmund Burke. Burke's impassioned defense of the aristocracy and even Feudalism in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* put him at the forefront of Conservative thought. But his support for Smith and Liberal Economics creates a plausible basis to claim that the two notions are part of the same intellectual tapestry. But the central argument of this paper is that the linkage of the two ideas is entirely superficial and lacks a true intellectual justification.

Placing Adam Smith and Edmund Burke in the same intellectual category is based not on logic, but circumstance. The two men were contemporaries in the XVIII Century and at least publicly, very respectful of each other's work. They traveled in the same social circles and both were members of an exclusive club in London (MacPherson, 1980: p.10). Yet the linkage between the men is largely idealized and consists largely of the exchange of compliments. Burke gave a very positive review of Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. According to Burke, Smith's book is one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory that has perhaps ever appeared (Winch, 1996: p.170). They even have some familiar consistency with their intellectual foes. Karl Marx, who markedly opposed the economic theories espoused by Smith, called Burke, "the celebrated sophist and sycophant" (MacPherson, 1980: p.3).

But understanding Burke requires more than noting that he authored writings that supported Smith and notions of Economic Liberalism. In reconciling the work of Burke, it becomes apparent that he had stark differences with Smith. As will be set forth below, the two men were intellectual rivals at the most fundamental level. Smith's theories were based on reason. Burke argued for historic societal institutions based not on reason, but divine will as revealed through history. While these different intellectual bases can lead to similar conclusions, they are at heart incompatible and not reconcilable. Burke and Smith had competing world-views, and the attempt to join the men at the base of modern Conservatism is an intellectual fallacy. As a result, modern Conservatives, especially within the context of American politics, have misinterpreted and misused the work of Edmund Burke to argue for a political consistency that does not exist, and never did.

Putting Burke in His Place: Understanding the Burke Problem

Edmund Burke was a prolific writer, and there is no easy way to reconcile Burke's work or the competing notions that he espouses. Burke has spoken and written in favor of Liberal Economics in terms that Smith would certainly approve. It is not overly difficult to pull different passages from Burke's work that facially seem quite supportive of the base principles of Liberal Economics. Burke repeatedly expressed opposition to governmental controls on the economy.

In a speech to the British Parliament, Burke asserted:

"To provide us with our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be vain and presumptuous in statesmen to think they can do it. The people maintain them, not they the people. It is the power of the government to prevent much evil, it can do little positive good in this, or perhaps in anything else."

*Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 1790*²

² References to Burke's work are made by the title of the work and are drawn from Internet reprints and from Isaac Kramnick's edited volume of Burke's writing.

Yet this understanding of Burke creates a tension with the larger focus of his writing. The superficial review of Burke's work on the economy is not a daunting task. The larger problem is understanding the underlying nature of Burke's beliefs as they apply to the nature of the economy is attempting to understand and reconcile the increasing inconsistencies in his writing that culminate in Burke's rejection of the French Revolution. In *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke's defense of the existing social hierarchy and custom are based on an undeniable hostility to the triumph of Liberal ideals that developed into the intellectual foundation for the French Revolution.

As becomes evident in *Reflections*, Burke was a defender of the existing social order, inherited rights and even prejudice. In what can only be viewed as a clear rejection of Liberalism and its reliance on reason, Burke suggests that prejudice should trump reason:

"[I]nstead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason."

Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790

Hence, the quandary is how Burke could write in defense of the principles of Liberal Economics since they seem to undercut his foundational belief in traditional Conservatism and governance through inheritance and prejudice. Liberal Economics draws its justification from reason, while Conservatism is based on tradition and custom. For Burke, custom, even prejudice, is a proven way to order society. Reason is of the moment and uncertain. Liberal Economics is drawn from reason, not custom. Hence Classical Conservatism and liberal economics are derived from a different foundation based on inherently inconsistent notions of society itself. Economic Liberalism is a theoretical undoing of the very concepts of society that Burke seeks to defend.

The implication of Smith's work on the existing social order is a stark contrast to Burke's beliefs about society and the 'Ancien Régime'. The distance is so large that Thomas Paine ultimately uses the writings of Smith to challenge Burke's observations and conclusions in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Foner, 1948: p.387). For Burke, the historical succession of the crown provides the stability for the society and divinely inspired cultural foundation for the rights within the Constitution (*Reflections*, 1790). Yet, as Paine argues, Liberal Economics is the method to sweep away the vestiges of the society that Burke vigorously defended (Foner, 1948: p.400). Reason will replace custom and prejudice.

This inconsistency is the heart of the Burke Problem. It is problematic to understand Burke as a steadfast defender of Liberal Economics in light of his clear and unequivocal support for the existing social order. Liberal Economics is corrosive to the foundation of the social structure that Burke is trying to defend, yet Burke has written in defense of both concepts. This problem has proved to be a difficult intellectual puzzle with some notable discussion (see Winch, 1996: p.128). Some have argued that there is no resolution, and that Burke was misled by theory, or that Burke simply based his political and social views on very different, even opposing, principles (Cobban, 1961: p.328 and Shklar, 1957: p.225 *respectively*). Others have simply asserted that both positions were supportable with little justification (Nisbet, 1986).

Though some authors have tried to explain away the tension in Burke's writing, it cannot be dismissed so easily. One resolution is proposed by C.B. MacPherson, who defines Burke's evocative language of Conservatism as simply a method to defend a Capitalistic system as if it were preordained and traditional in origin (MacPherson, 1980). According to MacPherson, Burke could maintain both positions because Capitalism had become incorporated into the social structure so that defending the 'status quo' was defending Economic Liberalism and the aristocracy (MacPherson 1980: p.71). Though

this surely is true to some extent, it suggests that there was no conflict between the two nor any shifting of the centers of power within the society.

Integrating the two positions is an oversimplification since it is ultimately clear that Economic Liberalism was not incorporated, but rather replaced the existing social order and changed the very nature of the distribution of power within the society itself. Burke rejected this change in *Reflections*. Burke's work is more than a prosaic, or religiously themed, language meant to bolster Smith's argument. Indeed, Burke was at the center of historic change attempting to intellectually justify a defense of the existing social order. To attribute to him an underhanded Capitalist motive is questionable in the light of his writings, especially those on the French Revolution.

Though admittedly, the "Burke Problem" is an analytical puzzle that has no clear solution, I propose this: The Burke Problem is based on the faulty premise of Burke being an unwavering defender of Economic Liberalism. There is no means to reconcile Burke's writings so that he can favor both Economic Liberalism and Classical Conservatism equally. The contention herein is that Burke was never a true proponent of Liberal Economics and its foundation in reason. There is a greater theoretical distinction between Smith and Burke than simply the method or prose selected by which to make an argument. The two men possess foundational different world-views.

It is clear that the essence of Burke's work is based on defending the existing social order. Economic liberalism, though espoused by Burke, was never the core of his philosophy nor the goal of his writings. It is only through the use of unconnected anecdotes that Economic Liberalism seems central. It is not. A more critical view of Burke's work suggests that he did not use the language Conservatism to defend Capitalism, but rather adopted Smith's notions as a means to defend the social order. This was a means and method I contend he largely discarded in seeing the results of the French Revolution.

It is hard to argue with the notion that Burke was opposed to government intervention, though this in and of itself is short of a real adoption of Liberal Economic values. Indeed, it really supports a more basic Conservative belief in maintaining the existing social structure. It is important to understand the context in which much of Burke's work on economics is derived. Unlike Smith, Burke's economic writings were not based on a carefully constructed multi-volume publication. They were largely based on speeches and letters where he is attempting to make or influence policy. While the justifications may shift, the result for which Burke is advocating is the maintenance of the existing social order, hierarchy and class system. In opposing proposals to adjust the agriculture prices to benefit the poor, Burke's rationale and allegiance become clear:

"The laboring people are only poor because they are numerous. Numbers in their nature imply poverty. In a fair distribution among a vast multitude none can have much... When the poor rise to destroy the rich, they act as wisely for their own purposes as when they burn mills and throw corn into the river to make bread cheaper."

Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 1795

What is observed here is not a philosophical attachment to the principles of Liberal Economics, but a clear concern for protecting the status and position of members in the top social structure. It is interesting to note that Burke's initial attack against the policy is made in the context of the class strife between the rich and poor. Further, Burke's major contention can be distilled down to a: "Don't kill the rich, it does not help the poor anyway".

The structure of this argument is particularly enlightening about Burke's own beliefs. A Liberal Economist might argue that the market may provide the means to escape poverty (*Wealth*, I, p.8). Indeed, Smith expressed a great deal more sympathy for the economic circumstances of the laborer

than does Burke. Burke simply is not concerned with improving economic circumstances. He is interested in defending them. Rather than argue about how best to approach economics for the best results for everyone, Burke is using the Liberal principles to justify poverty itself. He notes here that:

“Nothing can be so based and so wicked as the political canting language, at the laboring poor. Let compassion be shown in action- the more, the better, according to every man’s ability; but let there be no lamentation of their condition. It is no relief to their miserable circumstances, it is only an insult to their miserable understandings.”

Thought and Details on Scarcity, 1795

In short, Burke is using Liberal Economics to justify the existing social order. Politicians should not suggest government solutions since it does not relieve poverty. In Burke’s view, people are going to be poor—leave it be. Indeed, he goes as far as to contend that poverty need not necessarily be adverse of moral or philosophical happiness. People cannot change their economic circumstance, but they can achieve philosophical happiness (*Scarcity, 1795*). This is not an adoption of the Liberal Economic model. The above argument is borrowing elements of it to justify class divisions. Burke’s support for Liberal Economics was always a conditional support and not one that was fundamental to his own philosophy.

While some of the above can be read as consistent with MacPherson’s reading of Burke as a bourgeois Liberal, it is at this point where MacPherson’s interpretation is suspect. For while Burke did take sides in a class struggle, it was not on behalf of the growing merchant class. Burke’s advocacy was on behalf of the aristocracy and he is contemptuous of the rising merchant class of Acalculators who seek to replace the aristocracy. To Burke, it is the aristocracy that should wield the power, not some newly on-the-scene man who earned wealth and power through commerce. Wisdom to rule does not come from a quick rise to money and power. It comes not from financial or even mental acuity, but rather from one’s natural place in the social order. Burke rejects the ability of this individual to reason to solutions, “The individual is foolish. The multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it almost always acts right.” (*Reflections, 1790*).

According to Burke, the method designed to allow a species a sufficient period to deliberate is the aristocracy itself. The time given to the species is given to the aristocrats, who have the opportunity to take the long view. In a letter to the Duke of Richmond, Burke asserts:

“You people of great families and hereditary trusts and fortunes are not like such as I am, who whatever we may be by the Rapidity of our growth and of the fruit we bear, flatter ourselves that while we creep on the Ground . . . You, if you are what you ought to be, are the great Oaks that shade a country and perpetuate your benefits from Generation to Generation.”

Kramnick ed., 1999: p.3

While supporters of liberal economics such as Smith may well reach the same decision as Burke on the policies to address the poor, it is clearly for different reasons. No amount of fiscal justification in Smith’s work can explain Burke’s continued defense of the aristocratic institutions.

Ultimately, Burke uses Smith’s principles to support the wealth and power of the aristocracy, not to replace it with a Lockian notion of liberalism or democracy. To Burke, the power of economic liberalism is in its defense of property as an intellectual justification for the status quo. In this sense, there is not a Burke problem. The problem arises when Smithian notions go beyond social maintenance and generate the justification for systematic change. This is where Burke’s hostility to economic

liberalism becomes apparent. But this is later in his life, and most evident as he surveys the results of the Revolution in France in *Reflections*.

Revolutionary Liberalism and Adam Smith

The solution to the “Burke Problem” I suggest intimates that Burke failed to see the implications of Economic Liberalism on the social order until he reviewed the implications of the French Revolution. This seems unlikely for a man as learned and educated as Edmund Burke. Yet, this appearance of a significant oversight by Burke may be more a product of our own more contemporary educations than an actual lapse. From our own modern sensibilities, it seems clear that Economic Liberalism and the remnants of a more Feudal regime are incompatible. But in the XVIII Century, this was not so clear or easily predicted.

In a sense, I have polarized the contrast between Burke and Economic Liberalism a bit deceptively. It is noteworthy that in making Economic Liberalism revolutionary in scope, I have relied on the work of Thomas Paine, not Adam Smith. It is far from certain that Smith would have reached the same conclusions about the revolutionary tendency of Economic Liberalism as Paine. In addition, this would not be the first time that someone has accused Paine of “mutilating” the meaning of passages from *The Wealth of Nations* (Joerson, 1796). Though Smith did see Economic Liberalism as forcing change, it never appears in the immediate radical terms that Paine suggests. In the work of Smith, change is a gradual remaking of the system, not a rejection of it. “What all the violence of the Feudal institutions could never have affected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and manufacturers *gradually* brought about” (*Wealth*, p.418-419, emphasis added).

Smith was not a revolutionary. Even when speaking favorably about a possible separation between America and Great Britain, the language he used is far more pragmatic than visionary. What is curiously absent from Smith’s writings is any association with constitutionalism and the more Lockian motives for American Revolutionary ideals. Interestingly, and in a Burkean fashion, Smith repeatedly writes in support of the existing social structure as preferable to revolutionary change. In a critical comment on the American pretensions for constitutional government, Smith wrote:

“When [The Americans] compare the mildness of their old government with the violence of that they have established in its stead, [they] cannot fail both to remember the one with regret and view the other with detestation . . . It was not till some time after the conclusion of the civil war that the people of England began to regret the loss of that regal Government which they had rashly overturned.”

Glasgow, p.384 cited in Winch, 1996

The passage is so remarkably Conservative it almost could have been written by Burke and drawn from *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Despite the uses of *The Wealth of Nations* by writers like Paine to justify revolution, it is clear that Smith does not see the implications of his theory as foreclosing the traditional political structure.

Perhaps it is here that Burke can be forgiven for finding so much to admire in the work of Adam Smith. Smith writes as if the implication of his economic theories is not a reversal or rejection of the existing social order, but rather very much consistent with a Conservative desire to preserve the ‘status quo’. Though Burke is sometimes labeled an economist, his most notable works are not original economic theories. Perhaps he can be excused for failing to see the destructive effects of Economic Liberalism on the social order, especially in light of Smith’s own writings rejecting revolutionary change as one consisting of devastation. Further, Smith’s work, when viewed in this way, is a sophisticated

defense of the existing social order. It is an intellectual justification for declining to remove the surviving elements of the social order and preserving the aristocratic hold on wealth. It follows that if the benefits of commerce can exist within the 'status quo', then not only is there no justification for revolution, it is counter-productive and harmful.

This leads to a second inquiry that is beyond the scope of this essay but certainly worthy of some exploration. Did Smith really believe that his notions of Economic Liberalism were consistent with the existing social order, or was he simply deceptive in the implications of his work? Others have asserted that the way to reconcile Smith's own reluctance to reject the monarchy with his Economic Liberalism is in interpreting Smith as having separated the issues of government from economics (Winch, 1996: p.163). This is not to say that Smith should be read as having discarded government as unimportant, but rather having believed that the benefits of commerce were possible under a monarchy or other governments, as long as some basic tenets of law and liberty were enforced (Winch, 1996). The natural conclusion, then, is that Smith would prefer not to cause more problems by jettisoning the government for economic justifications since these benefits would be readily obtainable under the 'status quo' or some minor modification thereunder.

While this is certainly a plausible reading of Smith, it does suggest that Smith did not understand the power of his own theories, a concept that seems at minimum unlikely. There is no readily apparent means to reject the hypothesis, though it is difficult to believe that Thomas Paine and others could find such a natural use of Smith's work as a rejection of the social order without the idea having at least occurred to Smith. But as can be observed by Smith's comments on the American conflict, Smith was not a revolutionary. He sees Economic Liberalism as beneficial to the prevailing political system, not a rejection of it (Glasgow, p.384 as cited in Winch, 1996).

It is a question worthy of a more thorough treatment, but for the purposes of the argument herein, it is apparent that Burke, at least initially, failed to see the conflict. Indeed, in *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity*, Burke adopted notions of Economic Liberalism as justifications for maintaining the wealthy and rejecting distributions to the poor as if Smith's theories were another weapon available to defend the social order (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.194-198). Burke saw the justification for division of wealth based on property, but he did not in the same writing perceive that the economic model will justify a different manner of division. The Smithian model is not one that ultimately reinforces the aristocracy. Rather, it gives rise to a new power base in the growing commercial middle-class. These persons will become the class of people that Burke repeatedly vilifies in *Reflections*. "But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists and calculators has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever (*Reflections*, 1790: p.64).

Though there are plainly unanswered questions, it is clear that Burke's foremost concern was defending the existing social order. Initially, it was solely a traditional class issue between peasants and the aristocracy for which Smithian notions were very useful. As the French Revolution demonstrated profoundly, the nature of the conflict evolved along with the rise of the merchant class, which forced Burke to divert his attacks from the peasants to the increasingly powerful merchants and "calculators who arose as the most powerful force for change". In this battle of ideas, economic liberalism could not be the weapon of choice.

Two Ships Crashing in the Night: Economic Liberalism and the Social Order

This ultimately brings us to the heart of the theoretical struggle between the two men. Interestingly, this is a struggle between ideas that the two thinkers largely failed to emphasize and was mostly waged well after the death of Smith. The fundamental distinction between the two men is not

just circumstantial, but philosophical. It is a distinction that even is apparent when they agree on the outcome by simply asking what motivates the decision.

This historical comparative study has striven to illustrate that Smith was not a revolutionary, in the sense that Thomas Paine and others attempted to use his work. Smith does see commerce as a means of change, just a less stark one. To Smith, the feudal system was a great oppressor of people (*Wealth*, V, p.III). When discussing primogeniture, Smith notes, Nothing can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all of the rest of the children (*Wealth*, III, p.II). Smith was particularly hostile to nobles holding large estates that would only be partially cultivated with the remainder of the land to be left for nobody's use at all (Winch, 1996: p.181). In perhaps the starkest distinction from Burke, Smith condemns the system of landed nobility:

They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successful generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possess; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps five hundred years ago.

Wealth of Nations, III, p.III

As a result, Smith looked quite favorably on the American colonies since there were no remnants of the feudal system to restrict the economic growth there.

Interestingly, Burke took some effort in defending primogeniture against Paine's even more harsh assessment (Winch, 1996: p.180). Burke argues in a somewhat dubious fashion that it would not harm society to have a means of acquiring property other than through the accumulation of money and wealth (Langford, 1981: p.60). Indeed, Burke contends that it is the stability and consistency of the heredity right that provides the foundation for liberty. "The undisturbed succession of the crown to be a pledge of the stability and perpetuity of all the other members of our Constitution" (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.425). Ultimately, Burke's argument devolves to the paternalistic notion that the system provides a method to putting the land in the hands of the "wiser and more expert." This surely is a proposition that Smith would not have espoused or advocated.

The importance of this difference cannot be overstated, as it is fundamental. Burke is looking to the past not just for guidance, but as the unyielding bedrock of society itself. As is readily apparent from his work, Burke sees the past, including Feudalism, as the key to community and any notions of the future. It cannot be discarded or jettisoned, because some persons through the use of logical constructs or contracts view it as senseless or absurd. Society cannot be judged by individual notions of logic when it is the product of history and A profound reflection based on the laws of nature and God. In *Reflections*, one of Burke's most memorable statements is, "People will not look forward to posterity who never look backward to their ancestors" (*Reflections*, 1790). The past is a good that need not be justified based on economic viability. Indeed, it is exactly the reverse for Burke. It is the worthiness and proven value of the past as established by the laws of God and Nature that justify notions of liberal economics. For as long as the liberal economic notions are compatible with the concurrent social structure, they are consistent with Burke's interpretation of a viable society. When these notions can justify the society itself, they are more than just compatible. They both are the work of God and Nature.

This is most obvious in Burke's *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity*, where he incorporates liberal economics to justify maintaining class distinctions and rejecting reforms favoring the poor. "We, the people, ought to be made sensible, that it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of softening the Divine displeasure" (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.210). The laws of commerce then simply are part of the social fabric

that constrains change and keeps men and women in the place, which the Divine intended. Man or government cannot, supply to the poor what those necessities which it has been the Devine Providence for a while to withhold from them (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.210).

While Smith may see his theories as logical and the death of Feudalism as necessary, Burke joins Smith only to the extent that Smith's notions fit within his social construct of society and do not seek to destroy or replace that which history and God have produced. Burke relies on a way of knowing that simply is not based on reason or logic, but rather originates in tradition, experience and even prejudice (see e.g. Kramnick ed., 1999: p.194 et.al.). In the end, his comfort with Liberal notions and their supporters becomes more and more tenuous when these notions challenge the very social order to which he had thought they derived. Yet, this plainly was a difficult issue for Burke, who had come to see the economy as being derived from Divine and Natural powers working in concert with the existing social order. Burke's construct became more difficult to comprehend in practice.

Yet, Smith had no trouble challenging the social order, nor did he maintain a reverence for it. To Smith, the nature of economics was the primary law of nature, and ultimately, he uses religion to import a type of legitimacy on his economic notions (Reid, 1985: p.69). The "invisible hand" and the notions of individual gain providing social benefit is a broad allusion that is unlike much of the more practical and business-like examples in *The Wealth of Nations*. But it is in deference to this greater construct that Smith yields, not to the aristocracy and the pre-existing social structure. When acting to reform the political patronage, Burke spoke in reluctant and deferential terms. Smith shows no inclination to defend existing political institutions and procedures that he views as contrary to his economic model. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith is particularly unfriendly to aristocrats and even monarchs who pretend to guide the economy for the benefit of the private people and largely only act in their own self interest to maximize their own position. Smith is hostile to any type of government that restricts the freedom of the economy, including Feudalism, and when necessary, monarchs as well.

Both men reject Locke's notion of political revolution, but to Burke, it clearly is a stability issue and a rejection of change. For Smith, change is desired, but revolution is unnecessary and probably counterproductive to the evolution inspired by commerce. Smith was not for the rejection of the monarchy or revolution for the sake of change. He saw commerce as changing the social and economic structure without having to reject the entire system. It is not that Smith fails to see that the system may be oppressive at times, but rather he does not believe that revolution is necessary or desirable, and that where commerce is free, the system ultimately will balance. Hence, Smith condemns Locke's notions, while at the same time rejects Conservative arguments favoring primogenitor, entails and Feudalism. This is a balance that Smith perceives as proper, but it is not a belief that would fit with Burke's own notions of the natural order of things. In some sense, the two men look at the same thing, but see something entirely different.

Revolutions/Evolutions—Tradition and Economy

Perhaps the most fascinating facet of the relationship between Smith and Burke is how they can reach similar conclusions based on different understandings of the world. In part, this is why contrasting the men can be difficult. But it is clear that even if never openly hostile, they did differ on some important issues of the day.

Smith's work was greatly influenced by the economic implications of a separation from America and he even concluded that the structure of America for gathering wealth was a model for Europe (Winch, 1996: p.50 citing *Wealth*, I). Notably, Smith said little on the French Revolution, as it occurred in the final year of his life. But he was very much central and influential on the eventual conclusions and beliefs formulated by

Burke (Winch, 1996: p.3). It is problematic that the largest cleavage between the thinkers occurs where there is little writing to compare. But it is here that the two thinkers are far easier to contrast. The French Revolution, which was thoroughly criticized by Burke, was contemporarily seen by many as instead a realization of the goals set forth in the work of Smith (Winch, 1996: p.4).

Yet, the distance between the two thinkers is more than a creation of historical circumstance. Even in the areas where they tentatively agree, there is a strong theoretical difference. Though both scholars expressed sympathy for the Americans prior to the War for Independence, their solutions to the problem were quite different. In fact, Burke publicly dismissed, and at some points ridiculed, the solutions proposed by Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*. Burke argued that British policy to America should be one based not on taxes, but by the ties of trade (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.254 et. al.) These ties of trade were largely based on the mercantile system that Smith concluded results in nothing but a loss for Great Britain (*Wealth*, IV, p.VII).

Smith supported the taxation of America, though his ultimate conclusion was that separation was the preferred outcome since it would rid Great Britain of the expense associated with the colonies and allow for mutually beneficial free trade (*Wealth*, IV, p.VII). Interestingly, Smith also suggested a new form of union that may have ultimately moved the government across the ocean. This new government was based on economic power, not tradition. Burke's dismissal of the notion is easy to anticipate when it is understood that Burke is defending a social system, not a theory of economics. Smith is looking at the economic model first. It then becomes clear that the two men have different agendas based on different constructs of the world.

Smith's writings explain the economic inefficiency of the colonial arrangement in America. In *The Wealth of Nations*, he noted that separation would free Great Britain from "the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would eventually secure to her free trade" (*Wealth*, IV, p.VII). Smith also saw the colonial arrangement as harmful to the economy of the colonies and ultimately oppressive and insupportable, but only in the restriction of economic development. In a sense, Smith reached the conclusion that the economic circumstances did not justify the colonial arrangement. Notably, there is no evidence in Smith's writings to support independence based on some notion of the rights of Americans or the injustice of British rule.

Burke argues for reconciling with the American colonies based on a unity of spirit on a commonality. He argues that the colonists' love of freedom can be excused in part because it is derived from their bringing English customs and ideals of liberty with them (Kramnick ed., 1999: p.261). In Burke's writing, the issue of taxation is creating the difficulty. Resolving the issue allows the culture and history to mend, or at least allow for the reconciliation of the colonies with Britain. Burke does not reason to this conclusion in the manner of Smith. Rather, he emotes it in the language of history and tradition.

CONCLUSION

If Burke's work is viewed as based in culture and history, it is easier to reconcile his work and understand his clearly clever adoption of Liberal Economics as a sometimes useful method to articulate his more traditional positions. Much of the confusion about Burke's seeming inconsistencies can be derived in part from the timing of his work. *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity*, which can be read as his strongest endorsement of Liberal Economics, was published after his death. But it is not chronologically his last writing, as it was gathered from his documents to be published posthumously, nor can it be viewed as a summary of his economics.

Thoughts is really nothing more than a compilation of arguments on policy. As noted above, it is a policy that incorporates Liberal Economics as a Divine method of ordering the people. Ultimately,

Burke's views are most clear in *Reflections*, which was published late in his life when the most central themes of his writing become more pronounced and the clear defense of culture, history and even prejudice dominate any support of reason and Liberal Economic thought as a means for ordering society. It is particularly important to note that Burke regarded wealth and poverty as positions in a hierarchy that ultimately is divinely drawn. In Burke's view, people are meant to be where they are. If they are poor, then this is as it should be. Hence, the real justification for the working poor is one of divine intent. To Burke, the economic concerns simply were a means to reveal that the existing social order was indeed correct. The fact that economics cannot change the circumstances of the poor is simply consistent with the static notion of the hierarchical view of society. Economics is a tool, not an end. Burke is using this tool to justify poverty. Alternatively, Smith attempts to explain it.

It is not this study's intent to portray the positions of Burke as entirely static. He saw some of the excesses in the current system and was not unsupportive of some change. Possibly he may have been convinced to allow some change along commercial lines consistent with Economic Liberalism. But where the tone of Burke's work changes is after he views the impact of the French Revolution, and he is able to grasp the impact of the economic change as a revolutionary to the existing social order. Burke's support never was for a rejection of the social structure of the nation, and when the growth of Liberal Economic thought was seen as challenging the foundation of society itself, the tone of Burke's work became increasingly hostile to accountants and calculators.

When Burke viewed economic reform as part of the gradualism that could be incorporated into the state, it was acceptable. Indeed, when its reliance on the security of property sustains the social structure, Burke is a proponent. But when it was a reason for rejecting the state, it is clear that Burke's attachment to the principle was one of convenience, not ideology. The importance of this distinction is the presumption in modern Conservative thought of Burke's belief in Liberal Economics. It is not so much an issue of whether Burke did or did not support certain elements expressed by Adam Smith. He did. It simply is that this epistemology was never the key element of Burke's theoretical view of the world. He could, in a sense, work with or without it until the philosophy itself challenged the ideas that were most important to him: social stability. In understanding the nature of Burke's beliefs, it becomes clear that he cannot be used to justify an intellectual marriage of Liberal Economics to traditional Conservative thought. He never truly believed it himself.

Smith's own view is shrouded by his dearth of writing on the French Revolution and resultantly an understated implication of his Liberal Economic Theory in eroding social structure. Curiously, though Smith, as noted above, did not espouse revolution. He does appear at times sympathetic to those opposing the monarchy. In *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith disparages the accomplishments of the well-considered French King Louis XIV:

"These frivolous accomplishments, supported by his rank, and, no doubt too, by a degree of other talents and virtues, which seems, however, not to have been much above mediocrity, established this prince in the esteem of his own age, and have drawn, even from posterity, a good deal of respect for his memory."

This in itself is an entertaining contrast to the prosaic defense of the French throne offered by Burke in *Reflections* and based largely on the beauty of the French Queen:

"I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles, and surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in- glittering like the morning star, full of life and splendor and joy."

As is true for many of the implications and import of Economic Liberalism, it is plain that the two men, though looking at the same thing, really saw something entirely different. For Smith, monarchy was tolerated for stability as long as commerce was at work. For Burke, there was something inherent within the development of the system itself that justified it against all change. Whether it was God, Nature or some combination of the two, there was nothing to trump it, certainly not the efforts of calculators and their ilk.

NOTES

* Photo Credits:

Left Photo: Picture of Edmund Burke from: <http://www.themoralliberal.com/2011/03/10/our-presumption-and-pert-loquacity-edmund-burke/> (public domain).

Right Photo: Picture of Adam Smith from: <http://quotebunny.com/quotes/author/adam-smith> (public domain).

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AUTHOR

Kevin M. Wagner, Ph.D. received his Doctorate and a J.D. from the University of Florida, Gainesville. He is Associate-Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University, where he serves as Director of Graduate Studies and Chair of the Jack Miller Forum for Civics Education. He is also currently 1st Vice-President of the Florida Political Science Association. Dr. Wagner is co-author of the book, *Rebooting American Politics: the Internet Revolution* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

RAISING MONEY, ATTRACTING OUTSIDE EXPENDITURES AND RUNNING FOR CONGRESS: IMPACT OF THE 2010 NATIONAL “WAVE” ELECTION

J. Edwin Benton, Ph.D., University of South Florida-Tampa

ABSTRACT: In advance of the 2010 Midterm election, a number of political observers predicted that this election had all the makings of a “national wave” election and should produce a reversal of sorts for the electoral fortunes of Republican candidates running for Congress. Based on this projection, this paper set out to determine if such an election would have a differential impact on the ability of congressional candidates to raise money for their campaigns and attract outside expenditures from various groups. The results of the study suggest that Republican candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, unlike those in 2006 and 2008, clearly enjoyed a distinct advantage over their Democratic counterparts with respect to both receiving general campaign funds and convincing outside groups to make independent expenditures on their behalf in support of their candidacy.

INTRODUCTION

Even for the casual observer of American politics, money and politics are inseparable. Although there have been some instances where a candidate raises and spends very little or no money and is still able to win an election, this is not commonplace. For the most part, money is an indispensable “must” for political campaigns regardless whether a candidate is running for the presidency, a congressional or state legislative seat, a governorship, or some other state or local government office. Reiterating this point upon retiring from politics in the late 1970s, Jesse Unruh, a powerful former California state legislator, accurately but cynically remarked that “money is the mother’s milk of politics” (White & Shea 2000, p.95). In fact, many people are worried about candidates being overly preoccupied with the quest for money and think that our democracy is drowning in it. While raising more money than one’s opponent does not guarantee a candidate victory in an election, history however does suggest that the candidate who raises the most money is more likely to win. This could be because that more money buys name recognition or greater visibility for both challengers and incumbents, or greater funding may help incumbents scare off potential opponents. Regardless of the reasons for candidates seeming to be obsessed with fund raising, it takes money—and lots of it—for candidates to wage a viable campaign for elective public office.

As technology changed during the 20th Century, so did the cost of elections. By the late-1960s, money had become absolutely essential for political candidates for four primary reasons. First, the influence and importance of political parties had decreased, meaning that the critical role that party organizations played in connecting with voters also deteriorated significantly. Subsequently, candidates, needing new ways to reach out to voters, found that these new means were extremely costly. Second, there are more voters up for grabs today than was the case a century ago and reaching them requires an enormous amount of money. Third, the advent of mass media campaigns—but especially increasing utilization of television—has changed the way that candidates run for office, and buying precious advertising time requires huge sums of money. Lastly, the belief among a growing number of candidates

today that in order to stay competitive they must use the services of professional political consultants that have proven effective in campaigns (e.g. direct mail, survey research) came with hefty price tags.

Given these changing events and factors, it is not surprising that campaign expenditures have skyrocketed in recent years. As recent as 1952, a presidential election year, the cost of all campaigns for political office (that is, both national and state) added up to \$140 million (Reider 1987, p.171). By 2000, the equivalent figure had ballooned to \$3.1 billion, and in 2008, it was estimated to be \$5.3 billion¹. In the 1960s, it was not unusual for a successful House candidate to spend less than \$100,000, but by 2008, the average cost of winning a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives exceeded \$1.2 million (Shea, Green & Smith 2011, p.464). And, winning a U.S. Senate seat in the 1960s was still possible by spending less than a half million dollars; in 2008, however, the average Senate race cost nearly \$9 million (Shea, Green & Smith 2011, p.464). In fact, in advance of the 2010 Midterm, many predicted that campaign expenditure records would be shattered for off-year congressional elections, and reliable data support these projections as around \$4 billion was reportedly spent (Toner & Trainer 2011, p.131).

While it is useful practically and theoretically to examine campaign receipts and expenditures for presidential versus congressional races, it is equally instructive to compare campaign revenues and spending for congressional races held during Midterm versus those occurring during presidential election years. This would especially be the case when a Midterm election such as the one in 2010 took on the tone of a national “wave” election. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to ascertain whether the national “wave” election of 2010 differentially impacted the ability of congressional candidates to raise funds for their campaigns, as well as their ability to attract outside expenditures which were made on their behalf. To that end, this paper examines candidate receipts for Democrats and Republicans running for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate in 2010 with the amount of funds raised by candidates for the two major parties in the 2006 Midterm election and the 2008 presidential election. In addition, this paper analyzes outside expenditures made for Democratic and Republican congressional candidates in 2010 with comparable figures for 2006 and 2008.

Background for and Results of the 2010 Mid-term Election

As a result of the election of Barack Obama as president and more Democrats to both houses of Congress in 2008, along with a profoundly unpopular two-term incumbent in President George W. Bush, demoralizing defeats for Republicans in the Midterm elections of 2006, and serious citizenry concerns about problematic U.S. involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan and a poorly performing economy, many speculated about both the short- and long-term viability of the Republican Party. Added to this picture that portended an optimistic outlook for the future of the Democratic Party and might even herald a fourth political party realignment reminiscent of the second realignment that occurred in the 1890s was the fact that Obama entered office with remarkably high promise, expectations, and favorability rating. In fact, Obama’s job approval in the early months of 2009 typically exceeded 60% in nationwide surveys. Nevertheless, within one year the picture and potentially sanguine outlook for the Democratic Party had taken an abrupt and dramatic turn in the opposite direction, with polls indicating the American public was growing increasingly restless and disillusioned with the Obama administration and Democrats in Congress. While the president and his fellow Democrats in Congress could point to noteworthy legislative accomplishments, “Americans failed to detect wholesale ‘change’ in the way that politics was conducted in the nation’s capitol—the central tenet of Obama’s appeal for support during the 2008 campaign” (Panagopoulos 2010, p.1). Moreover, while many Americans were troubled by the policy maneuverings of the President and Congress principally with regard to health care reform but including other issues, they were also deeply concerned and growing impatient with efforts by the President and

Democrats in Congress to “jump start” the economy in spite of the Obama administration’s pro-growth policies that included congressional enactment along strict party lines of a \$787 billion economic stimulus package known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

Needless to say, the Republican Party swiftly seized the opportunity to take advantage of the President’s and Congress’s dwindling popularity and trust among the American public. As the election cycle for the congressional Midterm began to heat up in early 2010, Republicans aggressively opposed Democratic initiatives in Congress like regulatory and health care reform. Moreover, the GOP fielded strong candidates for both the House and Senate, energized the party base, and attracted support from disgruntled independents and Democrats who voted for Obama and Democratic congressional candidates in 2008. As the campaign got into full swing during the summer and fall of 2010, it became increasingly clear that the 2010 Midterm election had all the makings of a dramatic referendum on President Obama and Congressional Democrats. Simply stated, the 2010 Midterm election promised to produce more profound and far-reaching policy consequences than is typically the case for Midterm elections.

While Republican gains in the House where record-setting for a Midterm election, the Republican Party’s goal to reclaim control of the Senate came up a little short. When all of the dust had settled, Republicans had picked up 63 House seats, a number greater than even their most optimistic expectations. This number exceeded the previous record set by the Republican Party in the 1946 Midterm election when it gained 55 seats. The number of seats picked up by Republicans was also greater than the 52 seats gained in 1994 when a resurgent Republican Party and House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America movement challenged the policy orientations of President Clinton and Democrats in Congress. When viewed from a historical perspective, the outcome of the elections for the House in 2010 was amazing, but especially given the fact that since the end of World War II opposing political parties of first-term presidents have picked up, on average, only 25 seats.

A comparison of vote totals for Republican and Democratic candidates provide further perspective on the Republican gains in the House (see Table 1). Looking at all House races across the country, Republican candidates amassed 42.7 million votes in 2010, the most the party had ever won in a Midterm year (Wood 2011, p.87). For Democrats, it was a disappointing total of 36.6 million votes or nearly 6 million less than their record-setting 2006 tally (Wood 2011, p.87). Still according to Wood (2011, p.87), the election, as seen from a macro-level, “was something of a mirror image of 2006, when Democrats capitalized on voter disappointments with President George W. Bush and Congressional Republicans.” More specifically, Republicans running for the House in 2010 garnered slightly more votes nationwide than Democrats in 2006, whereas Democrats in 2010 barely outperformed the 2006 GOP slate.

**Table 1:
Total Votes for all U.S. House and Senate Candidates**

Year	House		Senate	
	Democratic Vote	Republican Votes	Democratic Votes	Republican Votes
2006	42,316,631	35,866,160	31,146,487	26,677,327
2008	64,888,090	51,952,982	32,297,785	28,862,985
2010	36,581,023	42,672,135	27,232,745	31,252,445

Source: House vote totals derived from Wood, 2011, while Senate vote totals calculated by author based on data derived from the *Washington Post* at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2010-race-maps/house.

The results of elections for the Senate, although encouraging for Republicans, were less than what they had hoped for. In spite of winning control of the House, a majority of the nation's governorships, and picking up a plethora of state legislative seats on the eve of the decennial round of congressional redistricting, this last major prize eluded the GOP. From the beginning, it was a long-shot for the Republicans to gain control of the Senate. They needed to pick up 10 seats to become the majority party—a feat that would require them to capture almost all of the Democratic seats that were deemed to be competitive and in play. In the end, while Republicans won only 6 of the 10 seats they needed to take control of the Senate, they nonetheless enhanced their bargaining power with the Democrat majority, as well as take away the Democrats 60-vote super-majority.

A glance back at the vote totals for Republican and Democratic candidates in Table 1 provides more insight into the Republican bid to gain control of the Senate. Counting across the entire country for the 33 Senate seats up for election, Republican candidates garnered 31.3 million votes in 2010. Democrats, on the other hand, collected 27.2 million votes in 2010, which represents a decline of 5.1 and 3.9 million votes, respectively, when compared to 2008 and 2006. Again, when viewed from a macro-level, the 2010 Midterm election was something of a mirror image of 2006. That is, Republicans running for a Senate seat in 2010 amassed slightly more votes nationwide than Democrats did in 2006, while Democrats in 2010 outperformed the 2006 GOP Senate contenders by about 650,000 votes.

How can we explain why the pendulum swung the way it did in favor of the Republican Party and its candidates for Congress in 2010? Two important factors seem to have been critical. First, while it may sound overly simplistic or a truism, every election—including the 2010 Midterm election—is determined by the people who show up. Turn-out in the 2010 Midterm election was quite similar to turn-out in every Midterm election since 1974 and virtually the same as it was in 2006 (40.3% vs. 40.4%).² Nevertheless, those who voted in the 2010 Midterm election were “dramatically more Republican, more conservative, and older than in 2008... as well as disproportionately White—a GOP-tilting demographic” (Sabato 2011, p.30). Simply put, while the 2010 electorate was split evenly between Democrats and Republicans (35% each), this profile is far less Democratic than in 2008 (which featured a 7% gap in favor of Democrats, 39% vs. 32%).³ Moreover, exit-poll data collected by CNN indicate that those independents who cast a ballot (29% in both 2010 and 2008) were more heavily drawn from the conservative end of the ideological spectrum in 2010 compared with 2008.⁴

Second, what happens to be on the mind of those who are voting is significant, and exit polls overwhelmingly suggest that the economy was weighing heavily on the minds of those who cast a ballot in 2010.⁵ With national unemployment at the highest level in a federal election year since 1982 (9%), voters were deeply concerned and growing impatient. Based on the fact that there was a Democratic president and a Democratic majority in Congress, voters did not have much difficulty in determining which party deserved most of the blame for the struggling economy. As exit-polling data of those who voted in 2010 suggest, the economy was the overriding issue of the election. Nearly two-thirds of voters (63%), identified the economy as the most important issue confronting the country, and nearly half of those surveyed (49%) said they were “very worried” about the economic conditions, with only 13% “not too worried” or “not worried at all.”

Furthermore, other issues (e.g., the expensive stimulus bill and cap-and-trade energy legislation) had their greatest impact when voters related them back to the economy. The same was true for the controversial health care reform bill that Democrats championed. That is, it was a concern of the public only when linked to the failing economy.

Given this setting and the impending policy significance of the 2010 Midterm election, this paper seeks to investigate the possibility that campaign finances—more specifically, candidate receipts—both

in the aggregate and for the two major political parties—Democratic and Republican—would be noticeably impacted. As a point of departure, we consider whether Republican candidates were able to take advantage of the political climate and raise larger sums of money than their Democratic opponents, and if so, would a Republican advantage also be reflected in campaign receipts derived from the following specific categories: contributions from individuals, political action committees (PACs), candidates themselves, as well as funds derived from candidate/other loans?

If this were the case, several other related questions come to mind and warrant further scrutiny:

1. Were Republican incumbents able to raise more money than Democratic incumbents?
2. Were Republican challengers to Democratic incumbents able to raise more money than was the case for Democrat challengers who tried to unseat Republican incumbents?
3. Were Republican candidates more likely to raise larger sums of money than Democrats in open House and Senate races?
4. Finally, would Republican candidates be advantaged by the political conditions in 2010 and thus be able to attract more outside expenditures on their behalf than their Democratic opponents?

Slicing and Dicing Candidate Campaign Receipts

To date, there is a sizable scholarly literature that has tracked and sought to explain significant patterns of how congressional candidates raise the money necessary to wage viable campaigns for the U.S. House and Senate. Some of the extant literature has found that changing campaign finance laws, type of office sought (House or Senate), status of the candidates (incumbent versus challenger), nature of the race (open versus one with an incumbent) and type of district or state (“safe” vs. “marginal”) have impacted the ability of candidates to attract campaign funds.⁶ Other research findings have pointed to the importance of the sharp cleavages among the American electorate with respect to controversial issues of the day, status of the economy, and the general mood of voters (e.g., levels of alienation, cynicism and political efficacy).⁷ The approach taken here is to examine as many of these factors as possible, while especially trying to gauge the overlaying influence of what some scholars, political pundits and the media have referred to as a “national wave”.

Total Receipts

Given Americans’ discontent and disillusionment with national politics and Democratic leadership in Washington, it was not surprising that campaign receipts for Republican House and Senate candidates in 2010 were up substantially from 2008 and were considerably larger than those for Democratic candidates (see Table 2).

Looking first at the House of Representatives, one is struck by the fact that overall receipts for all House candidates in 2010, including minor party candidates, continued to rise and surpassed the one billion dollar mark for the first time. Upon closer examination of these data, one sees that the amount of money raised by Republican House candidates rose dramatically from \$440.8 million in 2008 to \$588.2 million in 2010 with a 33% increase. This represented a reversal of what happened in 2008 when revenues of Republicans dropped by \$12 million when compared to 2006. House Democratic candidates, however, did not fare so well in 2010. They raised 5.4 % less revenue in 2010 compared to 2008 (\$510.2 million versus \$539.6 million), after Democratic revenues had increased significantly (over \$122 million) in 2008 compared to 2006. The bottom line is that Republicans in 2010 were much more successful than Democrats in raising money to fund their campaigns by a tune of \$588.2 million to \$510.2 million.

Table 2:
Campaign Receipts of U.S. House and Senate Candidates in 2006, 2008 & 2010 (in millions of Dollars)

Year	House			Senate		
	Total*	Democrats	Republicans	Total*	Democrats	Republicans
2006	874.3	417.3	452.8	564.0	291.7	245.3
2008	983.8	539.6	440.8	436.2	239.5	196.0
2010	1,101.8	510.2	588.2	757.6	318.4	424.2


* Includes minor party candidates' receipts, plus receipts of Democratic and Republican Party candidates.
 Source: Federal Election Commission data

The data in Table 2 also indicates that total receipts for all Senate candidates increased substantially from \$436.2 million to \$757.6 million from 2008 to 2010 after a \$128 million decline between 2006 and 2008. Once again, one notices a significant advantage for Republican candidates in 2010, as they outraised their Democratic rivals by collecting \$424.2 million compared to \$318.4 million. The amount of money that Republicans were able to raise in 2010 was more than twice as much as they collected in 2008. Democratic candidates, while they were also able to raise larger sums of money in 2010 than in 2008, ended up with about \$106 million less than their Republican opponents. The fund raising ability of Democrats in 2010 was a reversal of fortunes, as they had handily raised more money than did Republicans in 2006 and 2008.

Revenue Breakdowns

Since Republican House and Senate candidates were able to raise more money than their Democratic opponents in 2010, were there any differences in either Republican or Democratic sources of funding when compared to 2006 and 2008? According to the data contained in Figure 1, Republican House candidates in 2010 were relying more on contributions from individuals than in the past, while reliance on this source remained about the same for Democratic candidates in 2006, 2008 and 2010.

Figure 1:
Sources of Campaign Receipts of U.S. House Candidates as % of Total Receipts in 2006, 2008 and 2010




Source: Federal Election Commission data

Another noteworthy difference can be seen in the percentage of funds that candidates of both parties derived from PACs. Whereas Democratic candidates were depending more on PACs, Republican candidates were getting a smaller proportion of their money from these groups. These findings for

Republicans are consistent with their efforts to reach disenchanted and frustrated American citizens who were tired of “business as usual” in Washington, whereby powerful interest groups with lots of money were able to exert undue influence on members of Congress. It also probably was troubling for these same people that candidate Barack Obama had campaigned in 2008 on the promise that he would “change the way in which business was conducted in the national capital”, but had not delivered on this pledge. Moreover, it is interesting to note that a larger percentage of Republican candidates’ funds were coming from loans from either themselves or others in 2010. Lastly, candidates of both parties were still receiving only negligible proportions of their revenue from themselves and their political parties.

In contrast to the House, there were fewer changes in campaign finance patterns in 2010 Senate elections (see Figure 2). The most important change was that both Republican and Democratic candidates depended much more heavily on loans from themselves or others to finance their campaigns than in 2006 and 2008. For Republicans, nearly one-fourth of their money came from this source, while Democrats derived about one-sixth of their funds from loans of one sort or another. One other noteworthy change in 2010 was the lessened reliance of Republicans on money from PACs.

Figure 2:
Sources of Campaign Receipts of U.S. Senate Candidates as % of Total Receipts, 2006, 2008 and 2010




Source: Federal Election Commission data

Otherwise, Democrats and Republicans received fairly similar proportions of their funding from contributions from individuals, PACs, their political parties and themselves.

Campaign Receipts of Incumbents and Challengers

An examination of the total monetary receipts of House and Senate incumbents and challengers (see Figure 3) reveals the continuation of a trend that those who track campaign finance data have come to expect—incumbents raise substantially more money than challengers. Indeed, a comparison of total incumbent receipts (that is, Democratic and Republican) versus total challenger receipts reveals a clear advantage for incumbents in both houses of Congress, with the revenue gap being much greater in the House than in the Senate. For example, House challenges collected only 35%, 40%, and 53% as much money as did incumbents in that body in 2006, 2008 and 2010, respectively. The corresponding revenue-raising ratios in the Senate over the same three elections years were 72%, 58% and 73%.


Figure 3:
Total Campaign Receipts of U.S. House and Senate Challengers and Incumbents in 2006, 2008 and 2010 (in millions of Dollars)



Source: Federal Election Commission data

And now a closer look at the difference in the fund-raising abilities of incumbents and challengers by party, focusing first on House candidates (see Figure 4). Several interesting patterns stand out. First, Republican incumbents collected more revenue in 2006 than did their Democratic counterparts, although they would ultimately suffer the loss of a considerable number of seats in the lower chamber. Perhaps, this paradox of sorts can be explained in terms of Republican donors, buoyed by the re-election of George W. Bush and the gain of Republican seats in the House, were still willing to give to Republican incumbents. The results of this election, nonetheless, were consistent with the historical pattern and expectation that Midterm elections serve as referendums on the performance of Presidents.

Figure 4:
Campaign Receipts of U.S. House and Senate Incumbents and Challengers, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (in millions of Dollars)



Source: Federal Election Commission data

While those who traditionally donate money to Republican candidates were still willing to open up their wallets in 2006, this was still not enough to counteract the public's growing discontent with President Bush and policies coming out of a Republican-controlled Congress. Second, note that Democratic incumbents capitalized on the popularity of Barack Obama in 2008 and thus were able to raise more funds than Republican incumbents. At the same time, Republican donors were less willing to give as much as in the past years, given Republican House losses in 2006 and the anticipation of the Republican Party losing more seats in 2008. The 2010 Midterm election, however, seems to have been a repeat of what happened in 2006, except that Democrats would now be blessed with the good fortune of still being able to amass much larger sums of money in spite of facing the prospect of losing a considerable number of seats in the House. Once again, the explanation for this set of events appears to be that Democratic donors, still exuberant over the Party's electoral success in 2008, continued to be quite willing to fill the campaign war chests of Democratic incumbents. However, it is very important to note that fund raising abilities of Democrats in 2010 seem to be trumped by the national "wave" nature that characterized this election. Simply stated and as evidenced by the 2010 election outcome, it does not matter how much money that an incumbent can raise if national sentiments are against one's party. This same pattern was also apparent in 2010 gubernatorial elections (see Beyle 2011).

According to Figure 4, the campaign fund raising abilities of House challengers follow a different pattern. Observe that challengers of both parties seem to do better at fund raising under two kinds of scenarios. First, Democratic challengers in 2008, immediately after becoming the new majority party and trying to boost their numbers, collected somewhat more money than did their Republican counterparts. Second, challengers of the minority or "out" party (Democrats in 2006 and Republicans in 2010), sensing the prevailing opportunity to take advantage of the public's disenchantment with an unpopular incumbent president and a House controlled by the president's party, were able to amass a significantly larger amount of funding than their counterparts of the other party. The differences were astounding. In 2006, Democrat challengers raised almost three times more money as did Republicans, while Republicans in 2010 collected over four times more campaign funds than was the case for Democratic challengers. This second observation seems to suggest that challengers of both parties have the ability to attract donors who are willing to fund the candidacy of someone who is willing "go on the attack" against House incumbents affiliated with an increasingly unpopular and beleaguered majority party, but this was particularly evident in 2010.

Turning to the Senate, one sees some different patterns for incumbents running for re-election in this chamber than was the case for House incumbents. Data also located in Figure 4 indicate that Democratic Senate incumbents were still apprehensive about the big Republican victory in 2004 and perhaps felt the need to raise more money in 2006 than in previous years in an effort to ward off the prospect of losing their seat. Then, in 2008, Democratic incumbents raised considerably less money than Republican incumbents. This could be due to the fact that many of those who were up for re-election in 2010 held safe seats. In addition, they possibly sensed that their re-election bid would be aided by the Obama's coattails. On the other hand, Republicans, now the minority party, built up considerably larger war chests in an effort to prevent them from getting swept out of office as a result of Obama's coattails and mounting disaffection for Bush and his fellow Republicans in Congress. But, by 2010 the political fortunes had been reversed, with Democrats seeming to be "running for cover" and sensing the need to raise more money (like Republican incumbents in 2008) to help their chances of retaining their seat in the upper chamber. In short, Republican incumbents in 2008 and Democratic incumbents in 2010 appear to have been on the defensive and believed that they could "weather the storm" by raising larger sums of money than had usually been the case in other election years.

The pattern of fund-raising of Senate challengers of both parties appears to be similar to what was found for challengers in the House. Further inspection of the data in Figure 4 suggests that the ability of both Democratic and Republican challengers to collect campaign money is linked to two different scenarios. First, Democratic challengers, emboldened by the gains in 2008 and hoping to add to their party’s majority in the Senate, were able to collect more revenue than their Republican counterparts. Then, challengers of the minority or “out” party (that is, Republicans in 2010), feeling that the timing was right to capitalize on the sagging support for President Obama and Democrats in Congress, generally, and in the Senate, specifically, were able to raise substantially larger sums money than their respective counterparts. While the differing ability to raise money was quite noticeable in 2006, it very pronounced in 2010—a national “wave” election year. For instance, the amount of revenue raised by Democrats challengers in 2008 was more than six times greater than the amount raised by Republicans, and the campaign funds collected by Republicans challengers in 2010 were over three times greater than that for Democratic challengers. Under both scenarios, challengers of both parties seem to benefit from the declining fortunes of an incumbent president and his party in Congress.

Funding Breakdowns for Incumbents and Challengers

As the data in Table 3 show, the origin of campaign funds for House incumbents and challengers differ in several respects. Not surprisingly, incumbents of both parties depend more on contributions from PACs, while challengers of both parties rely more on donations from individuals. In addition, challengers of both parties obtain more money from loans, either from themselves or others, than is the case for incumbents. It is also important to note that, while there were no differences in funding patterns among Democratic and Republican incumbents, there were two distinct differences observed between Democratic and Republican House challengers. On the one hand, Democrats were more likely to secure a larger proportion of their funding from individual contributions; on the other hand, Republicans relied on a variety of loans to fund campaigns. Thus, it appears that Republican challengers, sensing a “national wave” effect favoring the Republican Party in 2010 and not being as adept historically as Democrat in raising large sums of money via contributions from individuals, were willing take the gamble of going into debt if necessary, to have enough money to wage a competitive campaign.

Table 3:

Sources of Campaign Receipts of House Incumbents and Challengers as % of Total Receipts

Year	Incumbents									
	Contributions from Individuals		Contributions from PACs		Candidate Contributions		Loans from Candidates/Others		Party Contributions	
	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps
2006	49.5	50.3	44.9	43.0	0.0	0.0	.6	1.4	.1	.2
2008	48.5	52.3	46.3	39.6	.1	.3	.8	1.0	.1	.2
2010	51.5	55.5	44.4	43.0	.2	0.0	.6	.7	.2	.1
Year	Challengers									
	Contributions from Individuals		Contributions from PACs		Candidate Contributions		Loans from Candidates/Others		Party Contributions	
	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps
2006	68.4	55.3	14.9	8.9	2.1	2.6	10.4	28.8	.3	.4
2008	64.9	61.4	12.8	7.7	2.9	8.6	15.8	17.9	.2	.5
2010	72.2	63.3	8.8	7.7	6.5	4.2	9.7	20.9	.5	.4

Source: Federal Election Commission data

Different patterns of funding sources are also detected when comparing incumbents and challengers in Senate races (see Table 4), as well as when comparisons are made between Republicans and Democratic within the challenger and incumbent categories. Again, one sees that incumbents enjoy a distinct advantage over challengers in their ability to attract campaign contributions from PACs. However, the proportion of campaign funds of Senate incumbents that are derived from PACs is only about half of the amount that House incumbents typically obtain from this source (21% vs. 44% for Democrats and 25% vs. 43% for Republicans). Moreover, in contrast to their House counterparts, Senate incumbents rely somewhat more on contributions from individuals. It is also true that Democratic incumbents in 2010 received a much larger proportion of their funds from individuals than Republican incumbents or even Democratic incumbents in 2008, while also depending less on contributions from PACs. This may indicate that Democratic incumbents were trying to ward off criticism or the perception that they were tied too closely to vested interests that are linked to or seem to promote a “business as usual” atmosphere in Washington. Earlier it was suggested that Republican incumbents and challengers in the House in 2010 were tapping into this concern among the public in an effort to get the vote of those frustrated by the “business as usual” perception.

Table 4:

Sources of Campaign Receipts of Senate Incumbents and Challengers as % of Total Receipts

Year	Incumbents									
	Contributions from Individuals		Contributions from PACs		Candidate Contributions		Loans from Candidates/Others		Party Contributions	
	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps
2006	76.9	67.4	13.4	24.2	0.0	1.0	4.5	3.4	.1	.2
2008	52.7	60.1	24.2	26.4	1.7	4.4	0.0	1.0	.1	.2
2010	73.7	60.5	20.6	24.8	0.0	0.0	.1	0.0	0.0	.2

Year	Challengers									
	Contributions from Individuals		Contributions from PACs		Candidate Contributions		Loans from Candidates/Others		Party Contributions	
	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps	Dems	Reps
2006	61.9	57.9	5.9	4.8	23.8	1.0	5.6	33.2	.4	.1
2008	66.3	56.1	6.6	4.8	2.6	1.2	16.5	33.9	.3	.2
2010	70.7	68.2	.9	4.8	1.0	.9	8.2	21.9	.5	.3


Source: Federal Election Commission data

Finally, the pattern of campaign receipts for challengers in Senate races is interesting, but especially for Republicans. While loans from candidates/others constituted a larger proportion of the campaign funds of Republicans in 2006, 2008, and 2010 than was the case for Democrats, there appears to be less of a tendency to rely on this source when Republican challengers are able to secure more funding from individual contributions. This was particularly noticeable during the national “wave” election of 2010.

Campaign Funding for Candidates for Open Seats

Perhaps, some of the most convincing evidence of the influence of the national “wave” nature of the 2010 election can be found in Figure 5. Here, it is quite clear that Republican candidates running for an open seat in both houses of Congress found it much easier to attract funding for their campaigns in 2010 than did Democratic candidates. For instance, Republican House candidates raised about 72% more money than their Democratic opponents (\$88 million compared to \$51 million), while Republican Senate candidates had about 37% more funds at their disposal than Democratic candidates (\$187 million vs. \$136 million). While Republican candidates for open seats in the House in 2006 and 2008 were a little more successful in attracting campaign funds than were Democrats, Republicans nonetheless held a substantial advantage in 2010. By comparison, Republicans running in open contests in the Senate in 2006 and 2008 were not always as success as their Democratic opponents—raising slightly more money than Democrats in the former year but less in the latter year—were able to amass a significantly larger amount of campaign funds in 2010.

Figure 5:
Campaign Receipts of U.S. House and Senate Candidates for Open Seats,
2006, 2008 and 2010 (in millions of Dollars)



Source: Federal Election Commission data

Comparing 2010 campaign revenues of Republicans and Democratic with 2008 figures is also quite striking. While GOP candidates seeking to win an open seat in the House in 2010 were able to collect slightly more money than their Republican counterparts in 2008, Democratic candidates were apparently hurt by the national “wave” against them, as they raised about \$34 million less in campaign funds than did Democratic candidates in 2008 who were also seeking election to an open seat. Democratic candidates hoping to win an open Senate in 2010 also seemed to be at a disadvantage, given the aura of a national “wave.” In spite of the fact that Democratic candidates in 2010 were able to collect over three times as much as their Democratic counterparts in 2008, their efforts were greatly overshadowed by Republican candidates who were able to amass about seven times as much money as their 2008 Republican counterparts. It should also be noted that Democratic candidates seeking to win an open seat in the Senate in 2008 raised almost \$11 million more in campaign funds than their


Republican opponents. Nevertheless, it seems that whatever greater attraction that Democratic candidates had in 2008 had been lost by 2010. Furthermore, one is also struck by the astounding increase in funds collected by both Democratic and Republican candidates in 2010, with the former's party trying to hang onto control of the Senate while the latter party was hoping to wrestle away the majority party status from the Democrats.

Campaign Receipt Break-downs for Candidates Vying for Open Seats

Data on the campaign receipt breakdowns for candidates running for open seats reveal some notable. With respect to House races (see Figure 6), the most noteworthy pattern was the greater reliance of candidates of both parties in 2010 on contributions from individuals when compared to 2006 and 2008, with Democrats obtaining somewhat more of their funds from this source than Republicans. As mentioned earlier, this may have been a conscious effort on the part of both Democratic and Republican candidates who were keenly aware that American voters were fed up with what they believed to be a "business as usual" atmosphere in Washington. As a result, candidates of both parties wanted to convey a message that they would be committed to listening to the average citizen and would not "be in the hip pocket" of vested interests.

The difference, however, was that Democrats were trying to distance themselves from Democratic incumbents in the House and the Obama administration who were perceived to be practicing, if not embracing, the "business as usual" approach to policy making and governing, while Republicans were attempting to capitalize on the public's contempt for the undue influence of vested interests. A glance back to Table 3 reveals that Democratic and Republican House challengers and those seeking an open seat in the lower chamber (see Figure 5) derived very similar proportions of their campaign funds from individual contributions. This is probably no coincidence as reasoned above.

**Figure 6:
Sources of Campaign Receipts of U.S. House Candidates for Open Seats as % of
Total Receipts, 2006, 2008 and 2010**




Source: Federal Election Commission data

Another striking pattern detected in Figure 6 is that Democratic candidates in open contests in the House obtained almost twice as much of their funds from loans from themselves and others as Republican candidates. Again, this pattern is similar to what we saw for Democratic challenges in House races (see Table 3).

When examining the data for open seat races in the Senate (see Figure 7), we find few discernible differences between Democratic and Republican candidates, except that Democrats seem to be better at raising funds from individuals. However, candidates of both parties in 2010 received a considerably smaller percentage of their funds from individual contributions and a much larger proportion from loans from one sort of another when compared to candidates vying for open seats in the House and challengers in Senate elections (see Table 4). For whatever reason, it appears that candidates from both parties seeking election to an open seat in the Senate in 2010 had to rely more on loans, given that they had a more difficult time attracting financial support from individuals.

Figure 7:
Sources of Campaign Receipts of U.S. Senate Candidates for Open Seats as % of Total Receipts, 2006, 2008 and 2010




Source: Federal Election Commission data

Wave Elections and Outside Expenditures

Over the last several decades candidates for public office, including those running for Congress, have been the beneficiaries of larger and larger sums of money being spent on their behalf by various outside groups—that is, both non-party organizations and political parties. According to the data in Figure 8, independent spending for congressional candidates increased dramatically from around \$279 million in 2006 to just over \$345 million in 2008 and to almost \$462 million in 2010. This means that outside spending rose by approximately 66% in the four years between the 2006 and 2010 Midterm elections. The end result is that considerably more money is actually spent on congressional campaigns than the amount of funds that candidates receive directly.

Moreover, it is significant to point out other patterns associated with outside spending for congressional campaigns. First, independent expenditures and electioneering communications by non-party groups grew to about \$280 million by the 2010 mid-term election, an increase of 130% from 2008 or by 420% since 2006. Second, independent spending by the national political parties fell 20% to around \$182 million between 2008 and 2010 elections, after changing very little between the 2006 and 2008 elections. Of course, 2010 was a national “wave” election, and while in other circumstances, such as may prevail in 2012, the importance of non-party money could change. Nevertheless, the much greater amount of money spent on behalf of congressional candidates by non-party groups in 2010 is what it is and may suggest that it has something to do with 2010 being a national “wave” election.


Figure 8:
Spending Totals by Non-Party and Party Groups in House and Senate Elections, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (in millions of Dollars)



Source: Federal Election Commission

Indeed, the data presented in Figures 9 and 10 indicates that the national “wave” nature of the 2010 election had a profound effect on the ability of candidates to induce various independent groups to make outside expenditures on behalf of their campaigns.

Figure 9:
Spending by Non-Party and Party Groups in House Elections by Party, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (in millions of Dollars)




Source: Federal Election Commission

Looking first at the data for House candidates (see Figure 9), two patterns appear. On the one hand, Republican candidates in 2010 had a distinct advantage over their Democratic opponents with respect to their ability to attract outside spending for their campaigns from non-party groups (that is, about 76% more money). In fact, the amount of non-party outside spending on behalf of Republican

candidates in 2010 was over four times as much as was the case in 2008, while the amount for Democratic candidates was about twice as much as what they were able to generate in 2008. In both 2006 and 2008, Democrats had been more successful than Republicans in persuading non-party outside groups to spend money to support their bid for election. On the other hand, Democratic candidates in 2010 were more likely to benefit from spending on their behalf by their party than were Republican candidates. Nevertheless, while Democratic Party committees gave their party's candidates an advantage over their Republican opponents in 2010, this advantage was narrower than in 2008.

Furthermore, the amount of money spent by the National Democratic Party for candidates seeking House seats in 2010 was 22% less than what they spent in 2008. Finally, it is important to note the obvious—the advantage that Democratic candidates had in outside expenditures made for them by their party was not nearly enough to offset the huge advantage that Republican candidates had in enticing outside expenditures from non-party groups.

The influence that the national “wave” of the 2010 election seems to have had on outside expenditures for Senate candidates was similar to what was seen for House candidates (see Figure 10).



Source: Federal Election Commission

First, GOP candidates had a whopping advantage over Democratic candidates with respect to attracting money from non-party groups. The amount spent on behalf of Republican candidates (\$98.5 million) was two and one-half times greater than was the case for Democratic candidates (\$38.1 million). Moreover, independent spending by these groups for Republicans more than doubled between 2008 and 2010, while independent expenditures made on behalf of Democrats increased by only 40% over this two-year period. It is also interesting to note that Republican Senate candidates were more successful in attracting outside spending in 2006 and 2008, as well as in 2010 compared to Democrats. Nevertheless, the differences were much more pronounced in 2010, a “national wave” election year.

Second, independent spending by political parties for Senate candidates also resembled the pattern that was seen for House candidates. That is, Democratic candidates benefited more from these types of expenditures than their Republican opponents. Yet, it is important to point out that Democratic Party spending on behalf of Senate candidates in 2010 was less than what it was in 2006—a “national wave” election of sorts for their party. Therefore, it appears that in 2010 the Democratic Party was less willing and/or able to assist their Senate candidates at a time when they needed the Party’s financial

support the most—a time when Democrats candidates were much less successful in raising campaign funds by their own personal efforts.

Third, the advantage Democrats candidates held in outside spending made by their party did not come close to offsetting the overall advantage that GOP candidates had in outside spending by non-party groups. In fact, total outside spending for Republican candidates (\$124.6 million) far surpassed the amount for Democrats (\$77.3 million).

These data in Figures 9 and 10 also reveal another significant finding. Simply put, congressional candidates have a greater tendency to rely on outside expenditures from their respective political parties when a “national wave” is going against them and their opponents are reaping the benefit of the “wave” in the form of attracting more outside spending from non-party groups. It is as though the party comes to the rescue of their candidates at this inopportune time, but this effort is not nearly enough to save their candidates and the party itself from losing an inordinate number of races.

Conclusion

While there are always commonalities among U.S. elections, no two are the same and the policy consequences of them will vary. Yet, there are some elections that take on more meaning and significance than others and retrospectively can be seen as signaling a rejection of a prevailing ideology or a particular political party and even a preference for a new ideology and/or party. These kinds of elections are typically referred to as critical realigning elections, and they are rare occurrence. Another kind of “out-of-the-ordinary” election that in some respects resembles a critical realigning election is a national “wave” election. These type elections occur more often and do not necessarily produce the same dramatic, long-lasting repercussions that are associated with realigning ones. However, a national “wave” election could be a harbinger of a political realignment period. But, at a minimum, these elections result from pent up frustration with the elected officials of the party in power and their persistence and insistence of practicing a brand of politics that has been repudiated by a significant proportion of the electorate.

As for the national “wave” election of 2010, a rapidly growing number of disaffected and alienated Americans were becoming increasingly disenchanted and impatient with a Democratic president and Congress and their unwillingness to change a political culture in Washington that can be best characterized as “business as usual” where big money interests held great sway. It was also the case that the 2010 national “wave” election was fueled by the perception that neither the President nor Democrats in Congress was “moving the country in the right direction” with regard to a host of crucial issues, but especially the economy.

Given this electrically-charged political environment and an aroused and angry public, this paper explored the possibility that Republican candidates for Congress in 2010 would be more successful than their Democratic opponents in raising campaign funds and convincing outside groups to make independent expenditures on behalf of their campaigns. The data presented above suggests that is exactly what happened. Simply stated, it would appear that when the public gets charged up enough about elections they are more likely to make a monetary donation by opening up their wallets and writing checks, while independent groups are more apt to raise and spend money on behalf of candidates’ campaigns. Nevertheless, it was equally clear that, while Republican candidates were advantaged by the national “wave” nature of the 2010 Midterm election, the pattern of campaign receipts differed in some respects for incumbents, challengers, and those seeking election to an open seat. In addition, the pattern of spending by non-party and political party groups also varied.

While the findings in this paper have improved our understanding of what factors seem to be responsible for fluctuations in campaign spending for congressional elections, there are still many questions that remain unanswered and warrant the attention of those who do research in this area. For instance, what effect does the partisanship, participation levels, or competitiveness of a congressional district or state have on the ability of candidates to raise campaign funds or induce outside groups to spend on behalf of candidates? Are there particular races (or by implication, districts or states) where outside groups spend more money for candidates' campaign than candidates are able to raise themselves, and if so, is it more likely for incumbents, challengers, or candidates in open races?

Moreover, what other factors (e.g., race/ethnicity, income, education, social class, or ideology of the electorate or degree of urbanization and conditions of the local economy) of the district or state may account for this variability? In addition, it should also be useful and enlightening to think about the kinds of people who tend to vote in Midterm elections versus presidential elections and whether this could result in a different perspective on donating to campaigns or being part of a group that spends on behalf of candidates.

Future studies could also build on the findings of the present article in other ways to expand our theoretical base in this area of research, for there is much more that we do not know about what influences congressional campaign giving. One area of fruitful inquiry would be to examine campaign funding patterns for different types of elections. For instance, theory building in this area could be advanced by comparing funding patterns of two different kinds of "wave" elections—one favoring Democrats (2006) and another favoring Republicans (2010). It would also be instructive to compare funding patterns in two other kinds of scenarios: three Presidential re-election years (1996, 2004 and 2012) and three "open" Presidential election years (1992, 2000 and 2008).

NOTES

¹ See: Center for Responsive Politics, "Big Picture: the Money behind the Elections" at <http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php>.

² These data were derived from United States Elections Project, Michael McDonald, George Mason University, VA at www.elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm.

³ Information derived from data collected by Edison Media Research for the Nation Election Pool (NEP) and found at www.edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/results/pools/#val=USH00p1. It is reasonable to speculate that turn-out among Democrats was depressed as a result of President Barack Obama being off the ballot. In the words of Wood (2011, p.85), "Obama's historic candidacy excited large numbers of African-Americans and young voters in particular, who went to the polls to enthusiastically pull the lever for Obama, and, while they were there, register their support for the local Democratic candidate, too. In all likelihood, these kinds of occasional voter did not vote in 2010.

⁴ See www.cnn.com/ELECTIONS/2010/results/polls.main/#.

⁵ See www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2020/results/pools/#val=USH00p.2.

⁶ For a sample of this literature see: Abramowitz (1991), Alexander (1992), Corrado, Mann, Ortiz & Potter (1995), Erikson & Palfrey (1998), Francia, Green, Herrnson & Wilcox (2003), Green & Krasno (1988), Herrnson (2006), Herrnson & Patterson (2002), Herrnson & Patterson (2002), Herrnson & Curtis (2011), Jacobson (2004, 1990, 1980, 1978), Magleby (1991, 1990), Malbin (2006), Samples (2006), Smith (2006), plus Toner & Trainer (2011).

⁷ For a sample of this literature see: Jacobson (2001, 2009), Panagopoulos (2010), Sabato (2001), and Wood (2011).

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AUTHOR

J. Edwin Benton, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Science and Public Administration in the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida-Tampa. Professor Benton's research has been published in academic journals such as *Public Administration Review*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Urban Affairs Review*, *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Public Budgeting & Finance*, *Journal of Public Administration Theory and Practice*, *State and Local Government Review*, and *American Review of Public Administration*, plus numerous edited volumes. He is currently working on the 4th edition of his *Government and Politics in Florida*, as well as a new manuscript, *Revenue Sources for Local Governments: Continuity and Change over Time*. A past recipient of the Manning J. Dauer Award by the Florida Political Science Association, Professor Benton is also Managing Editor of the *State and Local Government Review*.

EUROPE AT STAKE: THE FIRST EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN AN E.U. ENLARGED TO THE EAST, 2004 & 2009

Magda Giurcanu, Ph.D., University of Florida
FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award 2011

ABSTRACT: This study analyzes the potential dimensions of voters' decisions during the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections in a European Union (E.U.) enlarged to the ex-Communist East. Explanatory models on European Parliament electoral behavior in "old" E.U. member-states focus on the "second order" election model (S.O.E) whose major statement is that European Parliament elections are 'not real' European contests, but mainly national contests. However, with respect to the newly democratized ex-Communist member-states, the "S.O.E. model" does not yield accurate predictions. Moreover, recent research on the last two "waves" of European Parliament elections challenges the perspective that these elections are strictly national affairs, even from the "Old Europe" perspective. This study builds upon previous research on European Parliament elections and E.U. referendums to posit that there is more room for Europe to matter in the context of the post-Communist democracies of the East. In east European "new" member-states, the notion of "Europe" as "Europhile attitudes" towards E.U. institutions and political system, is matched by concepts of "egocentric Europeanness" (satisfaction with democracy in the E.U.) and "national Europeanness" (voters' perceptions with regard to country's benefits from E.U. membership). All three concepts reinforce each other in motivating voter participation to the European Parliament elections, than "second order" considerations.¹

Introduction

"Yes, I am a regular voter, I came to vote at European Parliament (European Parliament) elections because voting is my civic duty, but, at the same time, I believe in European institutions. I am positive that things will be better for us, now, that we are finally in Europe (...) and Romania will have a lot to gain from the European Union (E.U.) membership. Hence, I came today to make sure that the right people are going to Brussels to represent us."

The above quote represents a common answer received in 2009 in Romania, when the author administered exit-polls on Election Day to understand voters' political participation at the first Continent-wide European Parliament elections of 2004 and 2009, across all 27 E.U. member-states since the admission of 10 post-Communist East European democracies. In 2004 eight post-Communist states together with Malta and Cyprus had joined the E.U. and participated in the first 2004 European Parliament electoral "wave", followed in 2007 by Romania and Bulgaria in the next E.U. elections.²

Do these positive views on the E.U. and the utilitarian perspectives attached to the act of voting for the European Parliament have any effect on the decision to participate in the first place? Or is this Euro-optimism as dominant among the eligible electorate who decided to stay at home on Election Day as it is among active participants? And if positive European attitudes influenced the first European Parliament elections organized in newly democratized Eastern states (where voters, inexperienced with

E.U. policy-making processes, believe that E.U. membership will alleviate some of their domestic difficulties), does this Europhile effect change over time? In other words, do European Parliament elections transform, after five years of E.U. membership, from possible 'European affairs' into 'national affairs'? Moreover, are electorates' motivations in "new" member-states, such as Romania, *systematically different* than the electorates' motivations in "old" member-states? Or are the above perspectives on the E.U. simply reflecting the European electorate as a whole, rather than just perspectives from newly democratized, ex-Communist member-states?

The answers to these questions have important implications for understanding voter apathy and the dynamics of electoral behavior in E.U. states, but especially in those ones that only recently became member-states. If "Europe" matters for political and electoral participation in both "old" and "new" member-states, this implies that there is a stronger connection between citizens' attitudes towards Europe and E.U. governance, compared to earlier beliefs that overwhelmingly deny its existence, or only make a difference in affecting voting behavior in switching and defecting from governmental parties. Understanding these dynamics is also important because if European Parliament elections are mostly about "Europe" as symbols of reunification and short-term hopes of life improvements, then paradoxically any increasing the powers of the European Parliament might not increase the connection between voters and E.U. governance, at least not in "new" member-states. Thus, the arguments above that "European" attitudes might influence voting turn-out at European Parliament elections reveal interesting E.U.-wide dynamics between electorates already accustomed with European Parliament elections as 'lackluster affairs' vs. inexperienced ones.

To analyze the impact of pro-European attitudes on turn-out at the European Parliament elections, this study develops a comparative analysis on European Parliament electoral behavior in "old" vs. "new" member-states at their first E.U. election in 2004, followed up by an assessment of European attitudes of "old" vs. "new" member-states in the following 2009 "wave". In addition, a vital temporal 2004 vs. 2009 electoral comparison has been added to the study to observe whether the 2004 results were robust, or if only represented indeed just a symbolic reunification with Europe.

Explanatory models on European Parliament electoral behavior in Western Europe focus on the "second order" national election thesis, which holds that European Parliament elections are not real European contests but mainly second order national contests (Reif & Schmitt 1980). Thus, voters can behave differently than in national contents, with lower turn-out rates and systematically large losses for government parties, complemented by small, new, radical parties' winnings (Hix & Marsh 2007). Yet, electoral behavior in post-Communist states surprisingly differs from this nicely ordered model: European Parliament turn-outs are much lower in "new" member-states than in "older members", but large governmental parties' losses do not follow the cyclical argument and voters do not cast protest votes against their incumbent governments (Schmitt 2005, Koepke & Ringe 2006). The lack of party institutionalization and weak party attachments in the East in relation to Western Europe, combined with high volatility in post-Communist democracies, were the main culprits for the failure of the second order theory in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe (Schmitt 2005).

In addition, previous research on European attitudes and support for E.U. integration underscore particular dynamics in "new" member-states that only recently transitioned to democracy and market reforms (Cichowski 2000, Tucker et al. 2002). As such, post-Communist E.U. citizens see E.U. membership as the fulfillment of a long-term, historic goal of 'returning to Europe' since the early-1990s, and expectations for a better life under the E.U. as guarantor of market reforms and new supra-national forms of democratic accountabilities.

This study builds on the argument that the different party system in Eastern Europe matters and affects regional voting behavior at European Parliament elections. This research posits that because of the absence of long-term partisanship commitments or other strong membership ties that might substitute the need for party identification, there is more room for attitudes towards Europe to matter and affect behavior in the post-Communist context. Thus, the weakness of Eastern European structural party institutionalization, which is essential for high voter turn-outs (Franklin 2004), plus the high vote volatility and relevance of European attitudes for post-Communist citizens, mean that in this region European Parliament electoral participation depends more on European attitudes towards integration than on national issues. The study tests the argument that “Europe matters” by using two pooled cross-sectional data sets from 20 E.U. member-states in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections. The analyses, controlling for background variables and national, “second order” dimensions, support to a degree these hypotheses.

Theoretical Approach for Explaining E.U. Political Participation

“Second Order” Approaches and Alternatives

The “second order” literature has paid surprisingly little attention to the arguments of why people do not participate at European Parliament elections. For instance, country analyses that seek to disentangle interdependencies between national and European arenas affecting voting behavior have a minimal focus on low turn-out, mostly because it is an expected phenomenon. Such analyses mostly relate to campaigns, mainstream parties' positions on European issues, parties' aggregate winnings and losses, and voter switching at the individual level (see country chapters in Eijk & Franklin eds., 1996).

Cross-national studies on voting behavior at European Parliament elections, use either aggregate level data to explain decreasing overall trends in European Parliament turn-outs from the first European Parliament election of 1979 up to the last waves (Franklin 2007), or use individual level data to understand the “hidden messages” of abstentions (Schmitt & van der Eijk 1996). The major conclusion of such studies, however, is that “Europe hardly matters” (Schmitt & Mannheimer 1991, Franklin 2007). “European Community-related attitudes (...) play no significant role in the explanation of electoral participation in European elections” was the major finding of a comprehensive study that considered electoral participation data for all E.U. member-states in 1989 and 1994 European Parliament elections (Franklin, Van der Eijk & Openhuis 1996: p.322). In a more recent study on electoral participation at the 1999 European Parliament elections, covering all E.U. member-states of that time, the point that “Europe hardly matters” is reinforced: abstentions from European Parliament elections do not carry an anti-E.U. sentiment, but are allegedly based on “other grounds” than self-evaluations of the E.U. (Schmitt and Van der Eijk 2007). Moreover, also national evaluations seem to have no impact on turn-out since European Parliament electoral participation can be explained with only two aggregate level variables: compulsory voting and the position of the European Parliament election in the national electoral cycle (Franklin 2001, Wessels & Franklin 2010). As such, the major implication is that for both European politicians and citizens, European Parliament elections are “elections that serve no purpose” (Wessels & Franklin 2010), thus voting becomes, in a sense, superfluous.

Since it was established that “Europe does not matter” for political participation, the alternative that “Europe matters” was introduced to explain individual-level behavior and defection from government parties (Marsh 2008, Carrubba & Timpone 2005). At the aggregate level, Hix and Marsh (2007) use data from 6 elections to demonstrate that large parties lose votes regardless of their political position on either the Left-Right ideological divide or on European issues. “Europe matters” more

however, in the referendum literature, where “first order” European attitudes decisively trumped “second order” considerations (Glencross & Trechsel 2007). Still, much of the research on micro-level dynamics of European Parliament electoral behavior advances the argument that European attitudes and E.U.-based performance indicators affect European Parliament voting behavior (Hobolt et al. 2008, Clark & Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt & Witrock 2010, de Vries et al. 2010). Given the increased relevance of the European Parliament in the policy decision-making process and overall prominence of E.U. institutions, voters evaluate the E.U. on “its own terms” with respect to party choices at European Parliament elections (Clark & Rohrschneider 2009). Moreover, voters who supported government parties at previous national elections are more likely to turn out at European elections, the closer they are on European issues to the party they voted for (Hobolt et al. 2008).

And yet, in an experimental setting that develops a spatial model of vote choice in European elections, voters base their party choices primarily on domestic preferences, with the qualification that E.U.-related information makes E.U. preferences play a greater role in vote calculus (Hobolt & Wittrock 2010), for more sophisticated voters in particular (de Vries et al. 2010). Unfortunately, such analyses, only indirectly focused on European Parliament electoral turn-out. In addition, they are built upon the assumption that habitual voters' party preferences remain stable throughout several legislative elections, when instead in the post-Communist states this is more likely not to be the case, given the high volatility registered at both voters and party levels. Hence, considering preferences of more or less E.U. integration for both voters and parties, and calculating distances on the E.U. dimension between voters and preferred parties at European Parliament elections becomes very problematic since we cannot automatically assume that a preferred party at the legislative election remains the preferred party at the European Parliament election. Focusing on the post-Communist states in the E.U., then, permits the opportunity to build upon these previous studies.

Party Systems Characteristics

The environment of ex-Communist states that joined the E.U. in 2004 and 2007 is, however, characterized by highly unstable electoral markets from both parties' and voters' perspectives. At the party-level, they frequently split, dissolve, do not hold clear identifiable values or clear choices. As such, the mean party extinction in the E.U.'s East European region is 14.3 and ranges from 0 in a number of cases, to 58 for Poland in 2001 (Bernhard & Karakoc 2010).

In addition, about 5.6 new parties emerged on average in the region since regime-change at each legislative election, with an average vote share of 19% (Tavits 2007). In Estonia and Latvia, for instance, new parties have formed the government or participated in government coalitions shortly after their political emergence, while in Western Europe only one new party emerged on average for the period 1945-1991 and winning only 2% of the vote (Hug 2001). No study has yet considered the effect of new party entries during European Parliament elections, but one could assume that given the 'low stakes of elections' and probable low incentive for mainstream parties to invest resources in such “second order” contests, the costs of new party entry decreases compared to costs at national elections; this possibility might indicate that more new parties could use European Parliament elections as “window of opportunity” for testing the domestic electoral markets. Anecdotic evidence certainly points in this direction: at the 2009 European Parliament election in Estonia, Mr. Indrek Tarand, a high-ranking civil servant, managed to run a successful anti-party campaign, securing a European Parliament seat as an independent candidate (Ehin & Solvak 2010). Given the relative ease with which he succeeded, politicians seem to consider European Parliament elections as “testable electoral waters” for higher-level, national politics.

A high percentage of the electorate has not developed loyalty towards any existing party, such that high proportions of .40 or .70 constantly acknowledge in surveys that they have no party attachment whatsoever. During European Parliament elections, which take place within a national electoral cycle, only 10%-to-20% of the voters feel close to the governmental parties ruling at the time of European Parliament election. However, often coalitions formed after national elections already broke-up by the time European Parliament elections took place (Poland in 2004, Latvia and Czech Republic in 2009). Yet, despite the parties' adaptability to changing power relations without calling for new elections, the electorate's percentage identifying with coalition parties is rather minimal. In this context of high volatility, the highest among the democratizing regions if we exclude Russia and Ukraine (Bernhard & Karakoc 2010, Tavits 2005, Bielasiak 2002), it seems erroneous to assume stable voting preferences from one election to another: on the voters' side, preferences are far from settled; on the parties' side, the supply has varied significantly from one legislative election to another. Therefore, studies focused primarily on differences in party preferences from one type of election to another within the E.U.'s post-Communist Eastern Europe must consider weak party institutionalization and high vote volatility as potentially important variables affecting European Parliament voting behavior.

Essentially, the lack of strong linkages between voters and parties in post-Communist Europe has two distinct effects on overall participation and party choices in national and European elections. First, while in "older" European democracies parties play a distinct role in guiding their electorates on when and how to vote, instead in post-Communist Europe the lack of such incentives leaves room for other short-term incentives to affect electoral behavior. These short-term incentives in national elections can be charismatic politics (which dominate the Eastern region), policies and candidates' images, while in European elections one could add attitudes towards Europe. Second, given the post-Communist countries' short democratic experience with free and fair elections, their citizens have not yet developed habits of "entrenched voting" that may also explain European Parliament electoral participation in "older" democracies (Franklin 2004). From this perspective, one could expect European attitudes to play a larger part in determining turn-out and party choices at European Parliament elections in post-Communist countries than in other E.U. member-states. Or as Wessels and Franklin (2010) argue "the utility of voting should play a larger part in determining overall turnout in post-communist countries". However, more broadly than Wessels and Franklin, for me the "utility of voting" captures voters' European affective and evaluative assessments of the E.U., rather than strict linkages between votes and policy outputs of the European Union.

Finally, since previous research on electoral behavior underscores the role of information as essential for electoral participation and vote choices, this study focuses on the impact of European Parliament campaigns because they serve as major opportunities for informing and mobilizing citizens (Craig 2006). Information communicated via campaigns matter to non-committed non-voters, especially in the sense that campaigns trump the lack of partisan allegiances and mobilize electorates to cast their ballot (Hillygus 2005). To the extent that the E.U. political system, its institutions and governance are mentioned in any electoral campaign, the "idea of Europe" galvanizes voters into political participation (Hobolt 2008, Hobolt & Wittrock 2010, de Vries et al. 2010). This is especially true in post-Communist countries where voters are among the least partisan, least knowledgeable about Europe, and yet, probably the most optimistic about "returning to Europe". But do campaigns activate this optimism, and is that what is reflected in voters' decisions to participate in European Parliament elections in the "new" member-states?

Moreover, do European attitudes matter for political participation in "new members-states" that joined the E.U. since 2004? In contrast to other studies that focused on turn-out, this paper is neither

concerned with explaining decreasing turn-out trends in European Parliament elections, nor variations in turn-out across countries. Building on work which suggests that “Europe matters” for political participation mostly in a E.U. referendum context, the paper’s primary goal is to theorize and measure possible European dimensions impacting on voters’ decisions during the latest European Parliament elections of 2004 and 2009. This “European dimension” is considered against the “second order” characteristics of national/domestic influences voters’ participation.

Thus, the theoretical model incorporates E.U.-related dimensions of Europhile attitudes towards E.U. institutions and democracy, in addition to “national-based Europeanness” in regards to voters’ perceptions of national benefits accruing from their country’s E.U. membership. The “second order” model includes variables for four sub-dimensions: economic evaluations, attitudes towards the national democratic system, approval of government’s record, and attachment to government parties. To assess the stability of the European dimensions across “old” and “new” member-states, the analysis are replicated using data from both 2004 and 2009 electoral “waves”.

The hypotheses to be tested in this study are these:

- H1a. Attitudes towards Europe have a strong effect on turn-out.
- H1b. Positive attitudes toward Europe will increase political participation.
- H2. Attitudes towards Europe have a stronger effect on turnout in post-Communist states.
- H3. There are no differences between the elections of 2004 and 2009 in the effects of attitudes towards Europe on turnout.

Since this essay does not exclude the “second order” effects and only assume that they may be second in terms of relevance for political participation, the following hypothesis states that:

- H4. National evaluations of economy and politics will add to the explanation of political participation, but their overall effect is less important than attitudes towards the E.U.
- H5. At European Parliament elections, still lackluster affairs, campaigns have the strongest effect on turn-out.

Data and Methodological Approach

The data sets used for the analyses comes from the European Election Studies and PIREDE.U. surveys³ carried out in the aftermath of 2004 and 2009 elections for the European Parliament in 20 E.U. members: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia as “new” member-states vs. Austria, Britain, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain as “old” member-states.⁴ Since the surveys were administered by the same institution in 2004⁵ and 2009,⁶ I constructed two pooled data sets with the same questions applied in all countries with interviews limited only to respondents eligible for voting in European Parliament elections (see Appendix). The dependent variable for all analyses is a measure of voters’ participation at European Parliament elections, i.e. the binomial answers to the question: “did you cast your vote?” Voters who could not remember or did not answer were excluded from the analyses.

Operationalizing the “Second Order” Aspects in Electoral Turn-out

The “second order election” theory (S.O.E.) holds that voters base their voting behavior in “second order” elections on party preferences in the “first order” arena. In all countries concerned, the national arena is considered to be “first order”. Therefore, four sub-dimensions were created at the individual level, which capture the impact of national/domestic concerns on the decision to participate at European Parliament elections. These sub-dimensions refer to subjective political and economic evaluations of national democracies, governments, national economies and partisanship (see Appendix for survey questions):

- one sub-dimension related to the political system, which relates to the electorates' approval of democratic practices undergoing in the specific country: "how satisfied one is with how democracy works in [c]" (1=very satisfied, 4= not at all; 'don't know' was coded as missing);
- one decision-making sub-dimension which captures the support for government: "do you approve or disapprove the government's record to date"; coded as a dummy (approve=1, disprove =0). To avoid missing much data, 'don't know' (n= 928 for 2004) was recoded as 'no';
- one economic sub-dimension, which captures self retrospective evaluations of the economy: "on the whole, how satisfied are you with the economy" (1= a lot better, 4= a lot worse; 'don't know' was coded as missing);
- finally, a partisanship sub-dimension was created to capture attachment for government parties: "Do you consider yourself close to any particular party? If so, which one?" Coded as a dummy, '1'= for parties that are members in government coalitions during European Parliament elections; attachment to other parties or complete distance ('no party' answers) were coded as '0'.

The correlations among these four sub-dimensions do not exceed .34 for both the 2004 and 2009 pooled data sets. Among the individual E.U. countries, only Slovakia and Hungary have economic evaluations moderately correlated (coefficient .45 and .48) with approval of governments' record in 2004. Approval of the government's record and attachment to government parties are moderately correlated in Italy in 2004 with economic evaluations (coefficient .58 and .48 respectively). Approval of the government's record and attachment to government parties are moderately correlated in Poland in 2009 (coefficient .41). These low-to-moderate correlations provide confidence that the "second order" dimension is well captured from different angles—attitudes towards the political system, decision-making process, economic evaluations and partisanship.

Operationalizing the European Dimension

To measure the European attitudes four sub-dimensions were included in the analysis:

- "National Europeanness" sub-dimension, which represents a national, rationalized interest in the E.U., was captured in the question: "decisions made by the E.U. will be in the interest of my country". The answers have an ordinal scale, with lower values indicating more support and higher values indicating less support; "refused" or "don't know" answers were dropped from the analysis.
- "Europhile" attitudes towards the E.U. institutions is provided by the question: "trust the institutions of the European Union". For the 2004 data set this dimension was created as a sum of answers to 2 questions—"trust the European Parliament" and "trust the European Commission". However, the related question "trust the Council of Ministers" was not considered mainly because it was not asked in Italy. The scale for the answers ranges from '1'= no trust at all to '10'= complete trust. After adding the two answers, the new variable of trust in E.U. institutions ranges from 2 (no trust at all) to 20 (complete trust). The final scale ranged from 2 (no trust at all) to 20 (complete trust), with an alpha reliability coefficient of .91.
- "Egocentric Europeanness" is captured by the question: "One's country's membership to the E.U. is a good thing", coded as a dummy (1=yes, 0=bad, or neither). "Refuse" or "don't know" were dropped from the analysis.
- "Europhile" attitudes towards the political system is in the question: "How satisfied is one with the way E.U. democracy works"; 1= very satisfied, 4= not at all satisfied. "Refuse" or "don't know" are dropped from the analysis. However, this question in particular, proved to be very difficult for new members: out of 7000 participants almost one-third said "refuse" or "don't know" in 2004. These respondents were excluded from the analyses but the higher percentage

of people not answering this question especially in 2004 might actually indicate that the question of evaluating how E.U. democracy works should not be considered as part of E.U. attitudes, mostly because new members did not have the time, as “older” E.U. members, to form an opinion. Thus, in the future this sub-dimension for “first order” characteristics will be removed.

This time, however, the “first order” sub-dimensions are moderately correlated in the pooled 2004 data set, such that the “national Europeanness” is correlated both with “egocentric Europeanness” and with “Europhile” attitudes towards the political system. Coefficients in the pooled data set are .48 and .47, while for particular countries, Slovakia and Czech Republic they go up to .61. Despite the fact that high correlations impede discerning the independent effects of these particular sub-dimensions of European attitudes, it is best to measure 'Europe' from different angles rather than creating a single indicator. Establishing a strong significant impact, in the context of moderate to high correlations, testifies to the importance of European attitudes in impacting voting participation.

Operationalizing the European Campaign

Since campaigns matter, especially in the post-Communist context where the public is essentially uninformed on E.U.-related issues, I capture the campaign environment with measures correlated to the individual and country levels.

At the individual level I created a scale for European campaign exposure, using 5 survey questions related to television exposure, newspaper readings on the elections, friends and family discussions on European Parliament elections and campaign, public meeting attendance related to campaigns, and website searches for campaign information. The final scale ranges from 3 (more campaign) to 15 (not at all), with an alpha reliability coefficient of .64 and .74 indicating that the measure has internal consistency.

To the measures created at the individual level, I added 3 contextual variables, considered key in explaining electoral behavior at the European Parliament elections: two measure the campaigning context, as “Europeanness in the news” and E.U. tone, as well as timing within national electoral cycles.

Country Indicators

- “Europeanness in the news”—at the country level, the indicator of the European visibility in electoral campaigns was developed from the longitudinal cross-national media study released in 2010⁷, a data set built on 3 cross-national media studies carried out in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Such studies conducted a systematic coding of national television and newspapers in every E.U. member-state and included a measure of the E.U. visibility in the news. The measure of the E.U. visibility in the news ranges from 11% to 35% for the countries in question.
- E.U. tone—Campaign tone is also included in the analysis, mainly because it has been argued in the literature that E.U. negativity prompts anti-E.U. sentiments that affect electoral behavior (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley 2008). The percentage of negative evaluations of the E.U. in the Media ranges from 1% to 7%, with the clarifications that the differences up to 100% consist in general of neutral news rather than positive ones.
- Timing—in addition to campaigns, timing is probably the most important variable used in aggregate analyses when assessing second order dynamics at play. The theoretical expectation is that European Parliament elections that take place closer to national elections will reflect more the national dynamics in terms of participation (i.e., higher participation rates), while European Parliament elections at the midpoint of a national electoral cycle will have lower participation. Timing is measured as the distance in years elapsed from the previous national election.

Control Variables

A series of control variables were used to capture the regular voter. The socio-economic and demographic factors mostly used in political behavior analyses refer to:

- Gender: coded as a dummy, 1 (male) and 0 (female).
- Social class: coded as an ordinal measure, 1 (working class) and 5 (upper level class). Refusals of classifications, 'other', and 'don't know' were dropped from the analyses.
- Age: a continuous variable coding for the year of birth.
- Interest in politics in general: measured as an ordinal variable with smaller values indicating 'very interested' and larger values reflecting political apathy.
- Party attachment: 'do you feel yourself close, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer to the party'—given the high percentages of people that do not feel attached to any political party, for instance 64% in Czech Republic, 68% Latvia, 57% in Estonia, the author coded the answers as dummy, 1 is 'yes' and 0 as 'no attachment'.

Method

As the dependent variable is dichotomous (vote participation in the European Parliament elections) this study uses logistic regressions in all estimates. All analyses use four pooled data sets, one for each region of "old" and "new" E.U. member-states, and for each electoral "wave" in 2004 and 2009, rather than individual estimations for each country, so as to assess the overall regional effects of the two dimensions on individual behavior. Also, the overall variances of the pooled data sets are larger than the individual variances of each country set. Considering the nested structure of the data, individuals within countries and two levels indicators used in the analyses (individual and country levels), the work estimates a random intercept multi-level structural model with two distinct levels for covariates:

European Parliament Electoral Participation_{ij} =

$$\beta_{0j} + \beta_1 \text{Gender}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{Class}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{Age}_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{Political Interest}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{Party Attachment}_{ij} +$$

"Second order" considerations ($\beta_6 \text{Economic Evaluation}_{ij} + \beta_7 \text{National Democracy}_{ij} +$
 $\beta_8 \text{Close to Ruling Parties}_{ij} + \beta_9 \text{Governmental Approval}_{ij}$) +

European dimension ($\beta_{10} \text{National Rationalized E.U. interest}_{ij} + \beta_{11} \text{Europhile attitudes}$
for E.U. Democracy_{ij} + $\beta_{12} \text{Europhile Attitudes for E.U. Institutions}_{ij}$) +
 $\beta_{13} \text{(E.U. Campaign)}_{ij}$)

At the country level, this study models the individual-level constant β_{0j} as a function of European campaigns and timing:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{Timing} + \gamma_{02} \text{E.U. News} + \gamma_{03} \text{E.U. tone} + u_{0j}$$

By specifying a Level 2 random effect u_{0j} this work avoids imposing the assumption that the model accounts for all possible sources of contextual heterogeneity, mostly stemming from electoral rules and economic situations. Given the small number of groups in the analyses, the author opted not to include additional country variables found significant in other aggregate analyses.

Results

In this study 5 models are estimated for each region ("old" and "new" member-states) and each election wave (2004 and 2009), totaling 20 models. Table 1 shows the increase in explained variance (R squared) of European Parliament electoral behavior across all combinations of old/new member states in 2004 and 2009.⁸ However, this work does not present the coefficients of the explanatory variables for all 20 models, mostly because the question these estimations seek to answer is to what extent the

‘European dimension’ adds to the explanations of why people participate at European Parliament elections, an assessment performed across the two regions (“old” and “new member states”) and two waves. As mentioned earlier, the literature argues that European attitudes “hardly matter”. In this sense, once the European dimension is added into the models, the explained variance should either be the same or increase insignificantly. As such, this study starts the analyses with estimating simple logit models with control variables (M1), adding afterwards, in a step-wise regression fashion, “second order” (national) indicators (M2), ‘European attitudinal indicators’ (M3), European Parliament campaign exposure at the individual level (M4), and the final full model with all individual level and context indicators specified (M5).

As Table 1 indicates, adding the “second order” characteristics that refer to national politics and national incentives for voting in European Parliament elections, the explained variance of all 4 models increases only by .1 or at most .2 from what is already captured by models with control variables. However, when the European attitudinal variables are added into the estimations, we can easily notice an increase of .2 to .4, across all 4 models: “old” and “new” E.U. member-states in 2004 and 2009. Moreover, in both 2004 and 2009 European attitudes matter more in the “new” member-states, as opposed to the old member states (R squared difference is .4 and .3 respectively in “new” member-states, in contrast to .3 and .2 increase in “old” member-states). However, even though European attitudes matter more in the “new member states” at both 2004 and 2009, we notice an overall decrease from a .4 difference in 2004 to a .3 difference in 2009. Thus, Table 1 shows that European attitudes matter when explaining electoral behavior at European Parliament elections in both “old” and “new” member-states. There is however, a systematic difference between the two regions, in the sense that “Europe matters” more in Eastern than in Western Europe.

Finally, a possible decrease in European attitudinal impact on turn-out is seen in the decreasing trend of 2009. Also expected in the context of European Parliament campaigns that go relatively unnoticed by the electorate, campaign exposure is vital to push people to the voting booth. Once considered the individual exposure to European campaigns, the explained variance of these estimations increases with .3 to as much as .7 points in the 2009 European Parliament election (see Table 1).

Table 1

Variance (R Squared) of Participation at European Parliament Elections Multi-level Models

	2004		2009	
	OldMembers	NewMembers	OldMembers	NewMembers
<i>Individual level</i>				
M1: Socio-demographic	.15	.19	.11	.19
M2: Second order effects	.15	.21	.12	.20
M3: European Attitudes	.18	.25	.14	.23
M4: European Parliament Campaign	.21	.30	.21	.30
<i>Context level</i>				
Full Model: Timing & Campaign characteristics	.22	.30	.25	.33

Source: 2004 European Election Study (2009 PIREDE.U.)

A more nuanced perspective on the effects of national incentives and European attitudes on the probability of voting at European Parliament elections is in Table 2 and Table 2a. The full multi-level models are in Table 2, with the statistical significance of the coefficients, in addition to the directional impact of each predictor (Table 2a). As such, we notice that the control variables have the expected effects: older, wealthier female, educated, more interested in politics, attached to a party, is more likely to participate at European Parliament elections.⁹

What is interesting though is the alternation in which national factors matter at different points in time across the two regions (see especially Table 2a gray section, as the log odds coefficients are not directly interpretable). For instance, in 2004 we see that in Western Europe national economic or political evaluations hardly mattered, while in Eastern Europe, satisfaction with democracy had the most positive impact. However, in 2009 in the context of the international economic crisis that affected the E.U. as well, national governments, politicians and national parties are blamed, especially in “Old Europe”. In a sense, this finding confirms previous studies on European Parliament electoral behavior on “Old Europe”, where it has been argued, European Parliament elections function as mid-term congressional elections in the U.S.: people dissatisfied with national politics react at European elections. Interesting though, is the Eastern European region of “new” member-states, where political evaluations hardly matter.

The most incentive for not participating at European Parliament elections proves to be the economy—negative assessments of national economy keep people at home. In a sense, this significance of the economic voting, even at European Parliament elections, confirms previous research on electoral behavior in post-Communist states at national elections—the economy motivates electoral behavior for Eastern Europe, even at national elections as shown in Tables 2 and 2a (Tucker, Pacek & Berisnki 2002).

Attitudes towards the E.U.—are highly significant and have larger, significant impacts (see Tables 2, 2a & 3): the more convinced people are that their country will benefit from the E.U., trust E.U. institutions and think that E.U. membership is a good thing the more likely they are to vote. Interesting is the effect of “how E.U. democracy works”—the sub-dimension that captures “Europhile” attitudes towards the E.U. as a political system. Initially assumed that these four sub-dimensions capture different angles of E.U. support, the results here indicate that there is a clear distinction between what people think about the E.U. in normative terms and how they think E.U. democracy works. As such, normative assessments of good membership and trust in E.U. institutions have a positive impact on participation. Also positive economic E.U. benefits have, as expected, positive effects on participation.

However, dissatisfaction with how E.U. democracy works creates incentives for participation, probably as a protest vote. To disentangle more this particular dynamic, more analyses are necessary in which a clear distinction between types of voters is performed, i.e. regular voters (at both national and European Parliament elections and vote for the same parties in both cases) vs. voters that participate at both elections, but vote for different parties.

The expectation is that the effect of this particular E.U. sub-dimension would be different across the 2 categories of voters. In a sense, these European Parliament elections are beneficial for fringe Euro-skeptical parties that put forward a negative E.U. campaign; the negative effect of this sub-dimension confirms that some voters protest against the E.U. at European Parliament elections. The major point here is that, in contrast to second order national considerations, European attitudes matter a lot more for participation at European Parliament elections.

Table 2
A Multi-level Model of Participation at European Parliament Elections

	2004		2009	
	Old Members Participation log odds (s.e)	New Members Participation log odds (s.e)	Old Members Participation log odds (s.e)	New Members Participation log odds (s.e)
Individual level predictors				
Interest in politics	-.32 *** (.04)	-.34*** (.06)	-.31*** (.03)	-.38***(.05)
Gender	-.15 *** (.05)	-.20 *** (.08)	-.15*** (.05)	-.06(.07)
Social class	.04* (.02)	.09 ** (.04)	.12***(.02)	.05(.03)
Age	.02*** (.00)	.02*** (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-.00**(.00)
Rural-urban	-.08*** (.03)	-.01 (.05)	-.12*** (.03)	.16***(.04)
Education	.01 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.01***(.00)	-.01***(.00)
Party Attachment	-.27*** (.03)	-.36*** (.05)	-.22***(.03)	-.50***(.05)
“Second order” effects				
Economic evaluation	-.03 (.02)	-.04 (.04)	-.01 (.02)	.10**(.04)
Satisfaction with democracy	-.02 (.04)	-.32 *** (.06)	-.18***(.04)	.02 (.05)
Close to governmental parties	-.08 (.04)	-.08 (.12)	-.26***(.07)	-.10 (.10)
Government approval	-.01 (.06)	-.06 (.10)	.12**(.06)	.15 (.08)
European attitudes				
National Europeanness	-.03 (.04)	-.18 *** (.07)	-.09***(.04)	-.24***(.06)
Europhile E.U. institutions	.15*** (.02)	.18 *** (.04)	.12***(.02)	.18***(.04)
Egocentric Europeanness	.14*** (.06)	.51*** (.10)	.24***(.06)	.33***(.08)
Europhile E.U. political system	-.08 ** (.04)	.26 *** (.07)	.11***(.04)	.08(.06)
European Parliament campaign	-.27*** (.01)	-.28 *** (.02)	-.31***(.01)	-.33***(.02)
Country level predictors				
Timing	.00 (.01)	.00 (.04)	-.02***(.00)	-.02***(.00)
E.U. negative tone	.04 (.11)	.00 (.22)	-.13***(.03)	.00 (.05)
E.U. visibility	.01 (.02)	-.06 (.10)	-.00 (.00)	.07***(.02)
Intercept	.96*** (.19)	-.21 (.40)	1.21***(.09)	.47***(.09)
Random effects				
Variance component	0.57	0.3	.24	.16
R squared	.15***	.30***	1.18***	1.71***
No of groups	0.22	0.3	0.25	0.33
No of individuals	13	7	13	7
	8,847	3,162	10,389	4,449

Source: 2004 European Electoral Study. 2009 PIREDE.U. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

Table 2a

A Multi-level Model of Participation at European Parliament Elections
Directional Impact and Statistical Significance

	2004		2009	
	Old MS Participation log odds (s.e)	New MS Participation log odds (s.e)	Old MS Participation log odds (s.e)	New MS Participation log odds (s.e)
Individual level predictors				
Interest in politics	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Gender	- ***	- ***	- ***	-
Social class	+*	+ **	+ ***	+
Age	+ ***	+ ***	-	+ **
Rural-urban	- ***	-	- ***	+ ***
Education	+	-	- ***	- ***
Party Attachment	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
“Second order” effects				
Economic evaluation	+	+	+	- **
Satisfaction with democracy	+	+ ***	+ ***	-
Close to governmental parties	+	-	- ***	-
Government approval	-	-	+ **	+
European Attitudes				
National Europeanness	+	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Europhile E.U. institutions	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Egocentric Europeanness	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Europhile E.U. political system	+ **	- ***	- ***	-
European Parliament campaign	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***	+ ***
Country level predictors				
Timing	+	+	- ***	- ***
E.U. negative tone	+	+	- ***	+
E.U. visibility	+	-	-	+ ***
R squared	0.22	0.3	0.25	0.33
No of groups	13	7	13	7
No of individuals	8,847	3,162	10,389	4,449

Source: 2004 European Electoral Study. 2009 PIREDE.U.. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

To assess the magnitude of European attitudinal impact across “old” and “new” member-states in 2004 and 2009 in contrast to the national dimension, I calculated changes in predicted probabilities for each of 8 individual predictors corresponding to “second order” and European attitudinal measures. For continuous predictors I calculated changes in predicted probabilities as moving from 2 standard deviations below the mean to 2 standard deviations above the mean; for dummy variables I calculated changes in predicted probabilities at dummy = 0 and dummy =1 (see Table 3).

Table 3

Predicted Probabilities (%) at 2004 & 2009 European Parliament Elections for Old and New Members

	2004 Old Members		2004 New Members		2009 Old Members		2009 New Members	
	-/+2 std mean or Dummy=0 & Dummy=1	Absolute change	-/+2 std mean or Dummy=0 & Dummy=1	Absolute change	-/+2 std mean or Dummy=0 & Dummy=1	Absolute change	-/+2 std mean or Dummy=0 & Dummy=1	Absolute change
Economic evaluation	74 71	3	56 51	5	79 78	1	66 73	7**
Satisfaction with democracy	73 72	1	65 42	23 ***	83 73	10***	69 71	2
Close to governmental parties	74 73	1	56 53	3	83 79	4***	72 70	2
Government approval	73 73	0	55 53	2	76 79	3**	67 70	3
National Europeanness	74 72	2	60 46	14***	81 76	5***	77 61	15***
Europhile E.U. institutions	65 79	14 ***	42 64	22 ***	73 83	10***	61 77	16***
Egocentric Europeanness	73 70	3 ***	54 41	13 ***	79 74	5***	70 62	8***
Europhile E.U. political system	75 70	5 ***	44 63	19 ***	75 81	6***	67 72	5
European Parliament campaign at individual level	80 34	46***	76 29	47 ***	93 51	42***	89 38	51***

*** Indicates significant effects at .001 found in Model 5 analyses.

Table 3 presents the absolute change in the impact of each sub-dimension developed in the paper. We can easily see now, that E.U. matters more for participation than “second order” evaluations in both “Old” and “New Europe”, i.e. all absolute changes for the European dimensions are larger than the absolute changes for national “second order” considerations in all “old” and “new” member-states in 2004 and 2009. Moreover, we can note that European attitudinal impact on European Parliament participation is larger in “new” member-states than in “old” member-states, an assessment that is valid at both 2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections. However, we can also see that the European attitudinal differences in 2004: the “new” member-states are smaller than the European attitudinal differences in 2009 for the same “new” member-states. What this finding illustrates is that Europe mattered more in the very first European Parliament election for “new” member-states than at subsequent European elections in the same recent members just five years later. However, this finding is somewhat problematic as the data sets are not part of a panel structure. Hence, this particular statement should be complemented by analysis with data sets at both waves and same respondents.

A visual illustration of the absolute changes for each sub-dimension across old vs. new member states in 2004 and 2009 is provided with Figure 1 and Figure 2. In these plots, larger slopes indicate larger impacts. As already mentioned, we note that larger slopes are presented in the case of “first order” effects, which captures European attitudes for both “Old” and “New Europe” in 2004 and 2009.

Figure 1

2004 European Parliament Election







Figure 2
2009 European Parliament Election



Finally, E.U. campaign exposures at the individual have the expected, largest effects. E.U. campaigns seem to be the most important mechanisms for increasing turn-out in elections that are not about electing a government, and therefore are less important. The absolute changes presented in Table 3 are the largest in both “old” and “new” member-states.

Conclusion

In 2004, eight post-Communist countries participated at European Parliament elections for the first time. Yet, this 'return to Europe' translated into a low turn-out. This is understandable and explainable however, if one considers the lower stakes of European Parliament elections when compared to “first order” national elections. Attaching to European Parliament elections the label “second order”, however, should not necessarily imply 'national, domestic affairs'. In the E.U., Europe matters as an incentive for people to participate, and it even matters more than domestic concerns. Moreover, Europe matters more in “new” member-states than in “old” ones. Why? Firstly, because of the lack of strong party commitments in the E.U.'s new Eastern European region, and secondly because of different stakes that the E.U. represents in this post-Communist region. Given the high party and vote volatility in post-Communist E.U. member-states, “Europe” as an issue impacts electoral behavior in a region where the E.U. represents expectations of economic affluence and of democratic norm entrenchment.

In contrast to studies concerned with the relevance of the European arena for governmental parties' losses and different party choices, this work takes a step back and focuses on general European attitudes and turn-out to show that more positive evaluations of E.U. institutions can boost electoral turn-out and definitely trump national determinants. However, this finding is not entirely surprising. As mixed evidence from recent research on revising “second order” national election thesis points out, European attitudes matter in European Parliament electoral behavior (Hobolt et al. 2008, Clark & Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt & Witrock 2010, de Vries et al. 2010), and they matter differently in Eastern and Western European contexts (Garry & Tilley 2010, Tucker et al. 2002, Cichowski 2000).

In addition to the finding that Euro-optimists are the main voters in European Parliament elections, European Parliament voting is economically driven: voters have a rationalized approach of the inter-dynamics they envision between their respective countries and the E.U. with voters strongly believing that national economic benefits accrue from E.U. membership. Given the difficulties entailed by transitions to market economies in post-Communist Eastern Europe, the long enlargement process fueled at times with promises of material affluence via E.U. membership, and conditional on (mostly painful) socio-economic reforms, the importance of E.U. economic calculations should not be a surprise. Voters attach a distinct meaning to participating in elections that have been said to ‘have no purpose’ (Wessels & Franklin 2010) so that E.U. policy-making process is not evaluated in the strict sense of linkages between institutional attributes and policy outputs. The lack of these utilitarian approaches to the act of voting should not be viewed with suspicion, considering the relatively low levels of accurate understanding of how the E.U. operates. Voting has a utility associated with it: the E.U. is the symbol of material affluence and association with the ‘West’ for post-Communist states raises the hope that these poorer member-states will also become more affluent (Cichowski 2000, Romanian interviews in 2009). Such economic utilitarian predictors for European Parliament electoral participation corroborate previous studies on E.U. enlargements and political support for E.U. integration among less affluent countries with short democratic experiences and almost no open trade with Europe, like Greece, Spain, Portugal and Central-East European countries. In these states, public attitudes toward European

integration were mostly shaped by the prospects of higher living standards and of the E.U. as a mean of strengthening democracy and market related reforms (Cichowski 2000).

The analysis above shows that the European effect is robust across two European Parliament elections. But what will happen if these high expectations of the E.U. are not fulfilled? Will the E.U. matter less and negative assessments of the E.U. become more important in newer member-states, just as they are in "Old Europe"? This study looks at Eastern Europe or Western Europe as a whole, and more analyses are necessary to disentangle the impact of European attitudes in particular countries. Another possibility for future research would be to systematically compare national and European elections, since attitudes towards Europe play a role in national ("first order") elections, or also compare systematically Central-Eastern Europe with Western European countries.

Appendix

Survey questions used in the analysis:

Sources:

- Schmitt Hermann, Matthew Loveless, Sascha Adam & Daniela Braun, 2009. *European Election Study 2004. Design, Data Description and Documentation*, 2nd Ed. (European Election Study, 2004).
- Van Egmond, Marcel, Eliyahu V. Sapir, Wouter van der Brug, Sara B. Hobolt & Mark N. Franklin. 2010. *European Election Study 2009. Voter Study Advance Release Notes* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2010).

Socio-demographic controls

'To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very, somewhat, a little, or not at all?' (1 -very, 4 - not at all)
 'Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer?' (1-very close, 2-fairly close, 3-merely a sympathizer)
 'How old were you when you stopped full time education?' (xy in years, 97 for 'still studying')
 'Gender' (1-male; 2- female)
 'What year were you born?'
 'If you were to chose one of the five names for your social class, which would you say you belong to: the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class, or the upper level class (1-working class, 5- upper class)?'
 'Would you say you live in a rural area or village, in a small or middle size town, o in a large town? (1-rural area or village; 2-small or middle size town; 3-large town)'

"Second order" indicators

'What do you think of the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general economic situation is a lot better, a little better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse? (1-a lot better, 5- a lot worse)'
 'On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in[c]? 1- very satisfied, 2- fairly satisfied, 3-not very satisfied, 4-not at all satisfied, 5 - neither (only in Es)'
 'Do you approve or disapprove of the government's record to date? (1 approve, 2-disapprove, 3-neither (only in Es)'
 'Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which party do you feel close to?'

"First order" indicators

'Please tell me on a score of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 1 means that you do not trust at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Trust in European Parliament? Trust in European Commission?'

'Generally speaking, do you think that [country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? (1-good thing, 2- bad thing, 3- neither)'

'All in all again, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? (1-very satisfied, 2-fairly satisfied, 3- not very satisfied, 4- not at all satisfied)'

'How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the interest of [country]? (1-a great deal of confidence, 2-a fair amount, 3- not very much, 4- no confidence at all).'

European campaign exposure

'How often did you watch a program about the election on television?' (1-often, 3-never)

'How often did you read about the election in a newspaper?'

'How often did you talk to friends or family about the election?'

'How often did you attend a public meeting or rally about the election?'

'How often did you look into a website concerned with the election?'

European campaign at the country level

Source:

- Schuck Andreas, Xezonakis Georgios, Banducci Susan & de Vreese Claes H. (2010), *European Election Study 2009*. "Media Study Data Advance Release Documentation", 31/03/2010 (www.piredeu.eu)
- Banducci Susan, de Vreese Claes, Semetko Holli, Boomgarden Hajo & Luhiste Maarja (2010). *European Election Study 2010. Longitudinal Media Study Data Advance Release Documentation*, 15/10/2010 (www.piredeu.eu)

'Primary topic of the story'-- the % of E.U. related topics per country, which comprise story related to E.U. elections, E.U. politics/E.U. institutions/competences of the E.U. institutions and E.U. integration/E.U. enlargement were obtained by cross-tabulations.

'Story evaluating the E.U.: E.U. tone': 0-neutral, 1-positive, 2-rather positive, 3-ambivalent, 4-rather negative, 5-negative.

NOTES

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2. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia.

3. EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010 (www.piredeu.eu).

4. Excluded from the study are E.U. member-states that did not have all the survey questions relevant for this work, i.e. Lithuania, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Malta and Belgium. Moreover, Cyprus in this study is considered as part of the "old" member-states group, mainly because this country does not share the characteristics of a recently democratized state, with unstable electoral markets.

5. The data are available from the homepage of the European Election Study (www.europeanelectionstudies.net) and from the Archive Department of GESIS (ex-Central Archive for Empirical Social Research-ZA at the University of Cologne, Germany) at www.gesis.org.
6. EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010 (www.piredeu.eu).
7. Banducci, S., de Vreese, C., Semetko, H., Boomgarden, H. & Luhiste, M., 2010. *EES Longitudinal Media Study Data Advance Release Documentation*, 15/10/2010 (www.piredeu.eu).
8. The study computes R square as the square of the standard deviation of the fitted values divided by the standard deviation of the fitted values, plus the random estimate and plus 3.29. (Snijders and Boskers, *Multilevel Analysis*).
9. The surprise here is however the gender impact—the expectation is that females are less likely to participate in politics than males. Yet the analyses can also show a different, but highly significant relation, that the author included raw data that might indicate an over-representation of women that voted in these elections.

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AUTHOR

Magda Giurcanu, Ph.D. received her Doctorate in Political Science from the University of Florida, Gainesville (2012), and holds a B.A. and M.A. in History from the University of Bucharest, Romania. Originally from Romania, she is Adjunct-Lecturer at the Center for European Studies of the University of Florida. Magda is the winner of the 2011 Best Graduate Paper Award of the Florida Political Science Association. Her research interests include political behavior, political parties, public opinion on European Integration, on-line political communication in the U.S., and democratization.

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 Phone: 561-297-3218
kwagne15@fau.edu

Arrangements Chair: Kathryn DePalo
 Florida International University
 Miami, Florida
 Phone: 305-348- 2859
depalok@fiu.edu

The 2013 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at the **Florida International University** in **Miami, Florida**. Information on directions, parking and hotels will be sent by **February 2013**.

Pre-registration before the 2013 Conference day is \$75 for Faculty and \$35 for students until 9 March. All paper Presenters, Panel Chairs and Discussants are asked to pre-register. **Registration after 9 March and on-site at the conference is \$85 for Faculty and \$40 for students.** Registration includes lunch, refreshments and subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*. For pre-registration go on-line to www.fpsanet.org


Faculty, talented undergraduates and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. A \$250 award is given to the best Graduate Paper presented at the conference. **Please send paper proposals to the respective Section Chairs by 1 December 2012. Accepted papers will be notified after 15 December 2012.**

Section	Section Chair	Contact Information
American National Politics	Jocelyn Evans University of West Florida	jevans@uwf.edu 850-474-2337
Political Philosophy	David Ramsey University of West Florida	dramsey1@uwf.edu 850-857-6116
Public Policy/Public Admin.	Jonathan West University of Miami	jwest@miami.edu 305-284-2500
State & Local Government	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@mail.barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations/ Comparative Politics	Giselle Jamison St. Thomas University	Gjamison@stu.edu 305-628-6579
Roundtable on Teaching Political Science	Kathryn DePalo Florida International University	depalok@fiu.edu 305-348-2859

Call for Submissions to the FPSA's journal, *Florida Political Chronicle*. Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome, as well as other papers that have not been previously published. Please contact and submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the Peer-Review selection process.

Call for Submissions for *The Political Scientist* newsletter for announcements, book-reviews, short articles on teaching or research, job openings, etc. Please contact Editor Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan at jsm2@usfsp.edu

See FPSA web-site www.fpsanet.org for Conference information and Archives of *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist*.



BOOK-REVIEW

Houman A. Sadri's *Global Security Watch—Caucasus States* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), ISBN 978-0-313-37980-2, is a very accessible research work for Political Scientists and general public on the “mysterious” Caucasus region, with its hard to understand interplays of domestic multi-ethnic rivalries, corruption and international intrigue on oil and borders.

This book is a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, geo-political survey of the troubled Southern Caucasus region (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) with in-depth analysis of the politics, economics and security of each country, from their ancient past to their dual conquest by Czarist Russia (1820-1918) and the Soviet Union-USSR (1921-91), but especially detailing domestic and regional contemporary issues of the past 20 years since the 1991 collapse of the USSR to the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

The author, Dr. Houman A. Sadri is Associate-Professor in International Political Economy at the University of Central Florida-Orlando, past President of the Florida Political Science Association until 2012 and a Fulbright Fellow. In his research on this region and Asia in general, Dr. Sadri has sought to test the relevance of Professor Samuel Huntington's famous “Clash of Civilization” Theory to the Caucasus, exposing both its relevance and mostly limitations in domestic instabilities and regional inter-ethnic clashes vs. outside Powers' rivalries (especially when all three Caucasus states rely on the U.S., NATO and E.U. to contain Russia, while Christian Armenia also cultivates both Russian imperialism and Islamic Iran paranoia against pro-Turkish Azerbaijan, whose brethren of Southern Azerbaijan in Iran might be tempted to secede). This multi-disciplinary, geo-political, research survey is the first scholarly book to fully analyze all aspects of the Caucasus States' security and geo-political role in world politics, from the 1700s-1900s Anglo-Russia Great Game in Central Asia to the 1946-90 U.S.-Soviet Cold War and current post-Cold War.

First, this book focuses most of its research on detailing the current politico-economic status and security developments in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1991 USSR's collapse, which allowed them to emerge as post-Communist Newly-Independent States, beset by multiple sequential crises. Thus, an initial thorough survey of each country's domestic political instabilities since the end of Soviet Communist rule, with its first fragile post-Communist nationalist authoritarian régimes in the early-1990s (Georgia and Azerbaijan), transitioning to corrupt semi-democratic governments by the mid-1990s (Georgia and Azerbaijan), and current pro-Western democratic ones (Armenia and Georgia since its “Orange Revolution”).

Secondly, a great tableau is painted of each country's troubled ethno-religious minorities, described and weighted in terms of demographic size and domestic political autonomy compared to fragile State governments, while the powerful external protection of post-Communist Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeepers allowed Moscow to retain most ex-Soviet military bases within the Caucasus and secure the virtual re-annexation to Russia of Georgia's secessionist South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara, as well as blessing Armenia's re-annexation of Azerbaijan's secessionist Nagorno-Karabakh.

Thirdly, Dr. Sadri clearly explains the intricacies of the Southern Caucasus' ethno-religious civil wars.

- Georgia's repeated military defeats since its secession from the USSR in holding unto its own break-away pro-Russian autonomist ethnic minorities of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjara, until T'bilisi's final punishment in the brief 2008 Russo-Georgian War that consolidated the “separatists” merger with Russia.
- Christian Armenia's victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh War to re-annex that break-away Armenian province from Muslim Turkic Azerbaijan, where Baku's larger population size and oil wealth could not stop Armenia, able to cultivate its ties to most regional Powers (Russia, U.S.A. and Islamic Iran) against Azerbaijan (backed by Turkey).

- Lastly, a quick view also to cross-border impacts in the Northern Caucasus from Russia's counter-insurgency defeat of Islamic Fundamentalist Chechen secessionists, dashing their quest to become a "fourth" independent Caucasus state. Indeed, local politico-military opposition to Chechen Islamist guerrillans remains one of few cooperative areas among rival Southern Caucasus states (from democratic Christian Georgia and Armenia to semi-democratic, corrupt, Muslim Azerbaijan), despite each country's own ambivalence towards Russia.

Fourthly, the book details the Caucasus' geo-strategic role as an alternative key transit-area for ex-Soviet energy flows to Russia and the West (Azerbaijan and Caspian Sea oil and gas productions, reserves, plus key pipelines to Europe), as well as Georgia's, Armenia's and Azerbaijan's foreign-security policies towards Russia, U.S.A., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (E.U.) and sub-regional Powers (Islamic Iran, Turkey and India).

- On one hand, especially Azerbaijan and Georgia cooperate together with Western financial and technical support (U.S.A., E.U., NATO) to create since the 1990s their own oil-gas pipelines to the Black Sea (Georgia and Turkey), independent of Moscow's politico-taxing monopoly on old Soviet energy pipeline infrastructure from Central Asia to Russia in the north and east up to Europe.
- On the other, the U.S., NATO and Europe fully supported the emergence of a pro-Western independent and semi-stable Caucasus as a new geo-strategic energy pole and dual alternative route to the global oil monopoly exercised by the Middle-East/Gulf in the south and the old regional ex-Soviet energy monopoly still pursued by Russia in the north.

Equally important is Dr. Sadri's country-by-country analysis of the Caucasus States' parallel quest to leave the old suffocating Soviet and Russian regional control to join the West and (ultimately) Europe as its new independent members through: 1) national and regional security within NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the theoretical prospect of becoming future full Allies ("Open Door" policy); 2) economic partnership and future integration with the E.U.; 3) mediation-support through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and 4) mostly pro-Western voting also in the United Nations. In time, it is within the West that the three Caucasus States can solve most of their regional problems and rivalries as full members of NATO and Europe, and successfully balance Russia.

Great additions to this book's importance as an indispensable regional reference work are its Appendixes on Caucasus leaders biographies, each country's constitutions and historical chronologies, and key maps (energy resources and pipelines; ethno-linguistic and religious minorities with regional distribution; charts), although State Maps introducing each country chapters are very poor quality gray-scaled and others are too small for the complexity of their details. Overall a great informative read on the Caucasus.

Editor Marco



Rimanelli

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Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile



Barry University, Miami Shores, FL

Barry University is the second-largest private, Catholic university in the Southeast U.S.A. and was recognized as one of "America's Best Colleges" in 2012 by Forbes Magazine for the second consecutive year.

Barry offers a vibrant university community that empowers students to develop as professionals and well-rounded citizens.

History – Founded in 1940 as a small, women's college sponsored by the Dominican Sisters of Adrian, Michigan.

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11300 NE Second Avenue
Miami Shores, FL, 33161-6695
305-899-3100 • 800-695-2279

www.barry.edu