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# THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

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*Ideological Pluralism and Economic Policy Innovation*

Anthony Celso

(University of Central Florida)

*The Role of Symbols, Myths, and Rituals in Governance:  
South African Examples*

Kim Lanegran

(University of Florida)

*The Emerging Iranian-Sudanese Relationship:  
Implications for the New Islamic Politics of North Africa*

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(Florida International University)

*Woodrow Wilson, Tariff Seeking, and Tariff Reform*

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The Political Chronicle is currently soliciting book reviews for the Spring 1993 issue. As the Chronicle is a publication of the Florida Political Science Association, preference will be given to reviews emanating from Florida scholars and to reviews of works pertaining to Florida politics. All reviews will be juried by members of the F.P.S.A. Please submit all articles in manuscript form and on an IBM-readable computer disk—in either WordStar or WordPerfect—to: Dr. Hudson Reynolds, Managing Editor, The Political Chronicle, Saint Leo College, P.O. Box 2127, Saint Leo, Florida 33574.

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	<i>PAGE</i>
<i>Ideological Pluralism and Economic Policy Innovation</i> .....	1
<i>Anthony Celso</i>	
<i>The Role of Symbols, Myths, and Rituals in Governance:</i>	
<i>South African Examples</i> .....	11
<i>Kim Lanegran</i>	
<i>The Emerging Iranian-Sudanese Relationship:</i>	
<i>Implications for the New Islamic Politics of North Africa</i> .....	21
<i>Bradford McGuinn</i>	
<i>Woodrow Wilson, Tariff Seeking, and Tariff Reform</i> .....	31
<i>Thomas L. Martin</i>	

## *Introduction*

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The Spring, 1992 issue, volume 4, no. 1, is again devoted to a combination of Florida academics and their presentations (and revisions) at our annual Florida Political Science Association meeting at the University of Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Florida as of April, 1991.

The lead essay by Anthony Celso examines the recent and current status of two major Socialist parties--that of France and Spain--in light of important political and economic forces at home and abroad. Heavily stressed points are the pressures of internal factionalism so prevalent on the Mediterranean Left and financial dictates influencing the varying paths chosen by the respective socialist movements. The remarkable shift to an analogous position with Neo-Liberalism is developed substantively proving the pragmatic over the ideological bent of the Socialist parties.

The Kim Lanegran essay confronts the broad issues of nation-building and governance by examining certain aspects of these processes--namely the use of symbols, myths and rituals as contributing factors. The ultimate paradox is of course the rigidification of these very beliefs working against needed change in her case study. Using South Africa as the case study provides the opportunity to study the emergent and heretofore dominant "white nation" as well as the Black African's need and desire to create nationhood as well. Today's urgent need is the transformation to a combined black and white nation.

The Brad McGuinn essay pinpoints both a current and upcoming explosive issue in a geographic sense (the Middle East/North Africa) and a behavioral sense (international terrorism). By focussing on the Sudan, nobody's priority until now, he tells why it is today's and especially tomorrow's great concern. The dynamic nature and breadth of Iranian foreign policies, formal and informal, is the fundamental cause celebre for this fast developing and threatening situation for regional and world distributions of power. In the process of exploring the subject, the author provides some interesting insights into the controversial aspects of "democratization" in these regions of the world.

The final essay by Thomas Martin places a vital Woodrow Wilson presidential policy into a perspective of greater sophistication and at odds with some of the more controversial interpretations available. On the issue of "protective tariffs and tariff reform" Wilson is viewed as favoring tariff protection when that was the truly competitive political and economic climate but opposed such protection in an imperfect competitive market. This would be viewed as consistent with his anti-concentration views. He apparently arrived at these positions by moralistic/theological thought patterns rather than as an economist. Of course this didn't mean Wilson was necessarily correct in his reasoning.

Bernard Schechterman  
*Editor*

# Ideological Pluralism and Economic Policy Innovation

Anthony Celso

## Introduction

During the 1980's the French and Spanish Socialists have profoundly altered their public policy agenda. Many of the ideals championed by the Mediterranean Left (worker self-management, nationalization and redistribution) have been discarded, and economic policy in France and Spain closely resembles the programmatic agenda of the neo-liberal Right. After a decade of Mitterand and Gozalez rule, Southwestern European Socialism seems ideologically exhausted.

The ideological reorientation of Mediterranean Socialist parties in the 1980's reflects a mosaic of political and socio-economic forces. This paper explains French and Spanish Socialist conversion to the free market within the context of Left ideological pluralism and integrated global financial markets. It is argued that both factors exerted effects on Socialist economic doctrine and facilitated the adoption of market oriented policies.

The paper traces the growth of neo-liberalism by examining Socialist factionalism and competitive political discourse that preceded the Francois Mitterand and Felipe Gonzalez election victories in the 1980's. The absence of an ideological consensus within the Mediterranean Left weakened the Socialists ability to resist the economic effects of business disinvestment and allowed Party conservatives to reorient economic policy in a pro-market direction.

## I. Ideological Pluralism and Economic Policy Innovation

The socialist left in France and Spain share a common and turbulent history of ideological factionalism and failed government (Griffith, 1979). Often dominated by larger, better organized Communist and Syndicalist movements, French and Spanish Socialists have been marginal players on the Mediterranean Left. When they have participated in leftist electoral arrangements, the Socialists have fallen victim to ideological eclecticism and indecision. The failures of the Popular Front governments in the 1930's were dramatic testimony to the ineffectiveness of the Spanish and French Left in governing their societies.

Until the Gonzalez and Mitterand election victories, the post-war Socialist experience was far from cohesive (McCarthy, 1987; Share, 1989). The progression of French and Spanish Socialist party development reflects the ebb and flow of different ideological traditions and the machinations of political elites jockeying for leadership positions. The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), long divided over the precise formula for socialist reconstruction, split into three camps in the 1960's: exiled party traditionalists, Madrid-based social democrats, and Sevillian new leftists. They competed vigorously for control over the party.

Their leaders (Rodolpho Llopi, Tierno Galvan, and Felipe Gonzalez) exacerbated these divisions by insisting that party unity and reconciliation be achieved under their own terms. The lack of compromise and persistence of factional splits within the PSOE shifted the Left's attention to the Spanish Communist party (PCE) whose leader (Santiago Carrillo) had gained a respected reputation as a fierce anti-Francoist and humanistic Marxist. Indeed, expectations on the Left were that the PCE would be in the vanguard of a leftist electoral victory at the end of the Franco period (Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986).

The French Socialist experience often mirrored and echoed the dilemmas of their Spanish brethren: a weak, divided grouping of intransigent elites marginalized by a cohesive Communist party. These dilemmas and ideological contortions persisted until the ascension of Mitterand and Gozalez as party leaders. Although they encountered the same problems, they, paradoxically, took dramatically different, but equally successful routes to electoral victory.

## The Common Program and Mitterand's March to the Left

Mitterand's defeat of the Rocardian Right and his ascension as leader of the Socialist Party (PS) in 1971 resulted in a electoral strategy that sharply deviated from past party practice. The Socialists' traditional determination to be the Left's standard bearer was replaced by an electoral coalition with the Communists. In large

measure, the PS-PCF alliance was a pragmatic response to the Fifth Republic's two tiered round of legislative and presidential voting in which parties of roughly comparable ideological persuasions were forced to unite to get a majority on the second round of voting (Bell and Criddle, 1987). Accordingly, Mitterand reckoned that the absence of a united Left front on the second ballot explained the Center-Right's dominance.

Although the PS-PCF alliance was born out of political expediency, it could not be consummated in an ideological vacuum (Antonian and Wall, 1985). From an electoral unity perspective, Mitterand's fundamental problem was how to traverse the ideological terrain of intraparty factionalism without alienating key constituencies. Mitterand consolidated party cohesion and legitimized his partnership with the Communists by uniting different philosophical currents on the French Left (Schmidt, 1987). Under Mitterand's articulation of French Socialism, the Rocardian center-right would be pacified by the PS's endorsement of autogestion and government decentralization, the Socialist research group CERES would be elated that nationalization would be the pillar of the party's economic policy and, Mauroy and the party traditionalists would be accommodated by the PS's advocacy of redistribution.

The PS-PCF partnership was firmly enconced in the signing of the Common Programs of 1972 and 1976 that committed the Left to nationalize major industries and banks once taking office. Mitterand's creation of leftist unity maximized the PS's electoral viability and facilitated his ability to create an encompassing coalition by bridging the traditional constituencies of the Left and the Center (McCarthy, 1987).

Although the PS economic program was defined and articulated to appeal to a diverse set of interests, it did represent a substantial change from past Party orthodoxy. Indeed, the Rocard and Delors factions were hostile to the extensive nationalization and expansionary fiscal monetary policies contained in the Common Program (Ross and Johnson,

1985; Kesselman, 1986). The Party centrists, particularly the Left Catholic's associated with these factions, argued for an alternative policy of industrial targeting and budgetary restraint. The radicalism of the PS economic platforms even contrasted sharply with Mitterand's pre-1971 policy positions, which were mildly interventionist and Keynesian.

The Common Program's statism oddly enough, coincided with an intensified critique of collectivism by French Left intellectuals in the 1970's (Ross, 1987; Berger, 1987). The de-collectivization of the French intelligentsia, strongly rotted in the PCF's harsh democratic centralism and the discrediting of the Soviet model, limited the enthusiasm intellectuals had for the interventionist aspects of Mitterand's PS Project. The French Left's new emphasis on individualism and self-autonomy, however, did play a role in the Socialists advocacy of autogestion and governmental decentralization (Kesselman, 1986).

The PS-PCF partnership attempted a reconciliation between the collectivist and individualistic impulses (Statist Jacobinism and Civil Republicanism) endemic to French political culture (Ross and Johnson, 1987). United in its hostility toward capitalism, the French Left could never arrive at a cohesive socialist vision. In the Common Program, it constructed an eclectic democratic collectivism that never really integrated its individualistic and statist orientations (Kesselman, 1986; Lauber, 1987). The French Left's reluctance to discuss the role of worker self-management in nationalized enterprises or to assess the impact of governmental decentralization on the planning process exacerbated the incohesiveness of the Common Program. Details in each policy area (nationalization, employment, taxation, municipal decentralization), therefore often were specified elaborately, but never blended into a coherent approach.

This pluralism contributed to the Socialists' 1981 electoral victory by allowing the Party to appeal to a diverse set of constituencies. The catch-all approach of the PS program, however, complicated its ability to deal with the global economic crisis and set the stage for the Party's eventual advocacy of the free market. The French Socialist electoral triumph encouraged and emboldened the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) to unseat the governing Union of the Democratic Center (UCD). For distinctive cultural and historical reasons, however, Spanish

socialism would travel down a completely different path toward electoral victory.

### **Gonzalez's U-Turn and the De-Marxianization of the PSOE**

Spanish Socialist party development in the post-Franco period parallels the problem or obstacle associated with the French case: a badly fragmented party ravaged by contending political elites. Although the French Socialists resolved their organizational and ideological dilemmas by forging an alliance with PCF and embracing a leftist identity, the Spanish Socialists resolved comparable difficulties by initiating an alliance with the Right and adopting a moderate image (Share, 1989).

The dismemberment of the Francoist political infrastructure and Adolfo Suarez's democratization initiatives in the mid 1970's triggered a power struggle among three contending factions within the Socialist movement. The PSOE had suffered a schizophrenic existence during the Franco years; the traditional Socialist elders, veterans of the Popular Front Government, languished in exile, while two contending factions in Spain claimed to be the legitimate heirs to a renewed and reinvigorated party (Share, 1989).

The most populous of these factions, anchored in the Sevillian student protest movement, represented important elements of the Spanish New Left. Their leader, Felipe Gonzalez, was young, charismatic and was determined not to compromise his revolutionary zeal by accepting the electoral institutions created by the Center-Right. The Felipistas main rivals, a Madrid-based group of Christian democratic lawyers and intellectuals, rejected the anticlericism of the Left, supported a mixed economy, and were eager to accept the democratization initiatives offered by the Spanish monarchy. Tierno Galvan, their leader, hoped to push the PSOE in a centrist path (Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986).

The initial stages of democratization were greeted warily by the Spanish Left. The Communists and the Felipista Socialists rejected a political dialogue with Franco's successors and demanded general elections and the restoration of democracy. The Left's recalcitrant posture became impractical over time (Share, 1989). The proliferation of new parties on the Left, eager to accept a power sharing arrangements with the Spanish monarchy, threatened the established Communists and Socialists with political extinction.

The Felipista Socialists' adapted to Prime Minister Suarez's democratization

overtures with a two-pronged strategy (Share, 1989). Internally, ideological purity, recruitment, and mobilization of the party rank and file would be furthered by deepening the PSOE commitment to Marxian political economy. The intensification of the PSOE's leftist identity would act as a locus of support for and recruitment of new members. Externally, the Felipistas reversed their initial position and in 1975 entered into a political dialogue with Suarez over the future course of democratization. Gonzalez's strategy of internal radicalization and external moderation paid substantial political dividends; ideological intensification attracted a mass following, and pragmatism enhanced the PSOE's leverage in constructing the electoral arrangements that would govern the country.

The General Election of 1977 established the dominance of Suarez's Union of the Democratic Center (34.3% of the popular vote and 46.8% of lower house seats) and the PSOE (28.5% of the popular vote and 33.7% of lower house seats) on the post-Franco political landscape and, most importantly, marginalized the Communists (9% of the popular vote and 6% of lower house seats) and Tierno Galvan's Socialist Federation Party (4% of the popular vote and 1.7% of lower house seats). The election's outcome intensified UCD-PSOE cooperation and allowed Gonzalez to play a pivotal role in creating Spain's constitution (Share, 1989). With its strong electoral performance and pioneering efforts in securing the democratization process, the PSOE had established its hegemonic status on the Left. Gonzalez hoped to position the PSOE as the governing party in the 1979 General Elections. Given the Socialists' expectations, their performance in the March 1, 1979 election was a disappointment (Share, 1989).

The election consolidated Suarez's hold on the electorate and resulted in only marginal improvements in the PSOE's electoral standing (1.2% increase in the popular vote and a 3 seat gain in the lower house).<sup>2</sup> The PSOE's poor performance fostered a debate in the party over its future programmatic and ideological course.

The Socialists' Sevillian leadership, most notably Gonzalez and Guerra, viewed the PSOE's lackluster showing as evidence that a more centrist image was needed. Accordingly, Gonzalez recommended that all references to Marxism be deleted from the PSOE platform at the May, 1979 Twenty-Eighth Congress. The leadership's

position on Socialist ideological re-characterization encountered severe opposition from the party's Left. Gonzalez's leftist opponents (the so called *critico's* or critics) insisted on a Marxian identity for the PSOE, pressed for proportional representation in the Gonzalez dominated provincial organizations, and demanded an electoral alliance with the Communists.

The Congress gave Gonzalez key victories on the alliance and intra-party democracy issues, but strongly rebuked his ideological agenda. Given the *critico's* victory on the ideology issue, Gonzalez resigned as the PSOE's general Secretary. Gonzalez's sudden departure as party leader opened a political void that the Left could not fill. The inability of the Socialist Left to nominate and secure passage of an alternative party leadership resulted in a suspension of the Twenty-Eighth Congress and a convocation of an Extraordinary Congress in September, 1979.

The political impotence of the *criticos* intensified as the party's rank and file clamored for a return by Gonzalez and Guerra as PSOE leaders. Gonzalez dominated the Extraordinary Congress and used his influence under the delegate selection rules approved by the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress to give his forces a majority at future conferences at the regional and national levels. The Extraordinary Congress was a personal triumph for Gonzalez-Guerra faction and a vindication of their argument for more social democratic ideological moderation (Gunther, Sani, Shabad, 1987). Accordingly, all references to class struggle, mass mobilization, and the PSOE's historic Marxian roots were eliminated from the Party's 1978 platform.

The de-Marxianization of the PSOE was used by the Party's leadership to expand its potential electorate and to cultivate a pragmatic image. Indeed, the Extraordinary Congress set the stage for more moderation at subsequent party conferences. The Twenty-Ninth Congress, convened in October 1981, and ensconced the PSOE as a social democratic party whose platform called for limited nationalization, the creation of 800,000 jobs, redistribution of income, and labor reform (Share, 1989).

The Socialists' centrist policy drift was furthered by the squabbling and eventual disintegration of Suarez's UCD governing coalition. The factionalism between the UCD's social democratic and Christian democratic partners contrasted sharply with

Socialist unity. The Socialists' capitalized on the UCD's internal discord by reassuring voters that a Socialist victory would not threaten the Church, the military, or private enterprise and that the PSOE needed to carry out a bourgeois revolution.

Under Gonzalez and Guerra, socialism was characterized from a utilitarian position that placed Spanish industrial modernization as its first priority (Share, 1989). The political fragmentation of the Center and the inability of the Communists to establish a solid presence on the Left allowed the PSOE to appeal to a broad spectrum and to transcend the limitations of its traditional working class constituency (Share, 1989; Gillespie, 1990).

### Mediterranean Socialism: Common Legacies, Different Paths

The ideological orientation of French and Spanish socialism in the early 1980's reflected unique political factors: the PS needed a distinct leftist identity to solicit PCF participation in an electorally viable coalition, while the disintegration of the UCD contributed to the PSOE centrist momentum. Despite their different paths, the two socialist parties never reached an internal consensus on economic policy (Share, 1989; Ross, 1987). The fragmentation was greatest among the PS factions with the Rocard, Delors, Mauroy and Chevenment groups divided over the role of state planning and nationalized enterprise in a market economy.

The Party's economic program thus reflected an array of competing intellectual currents held together out of political necessity.

The PSOE's transformation from neo-Marxism to social democracy was not so much effectuated by ideological conviction as it was by electoral necessity. Gonzalez's leadership of the Party has consistently demonstrated a capacity to discard ideological principle for political advantage with a resulting absence of programmatic content (Share, 1989; Almodia, 1990). Instead, the PSOE's justification for ruling would rest on vague claims of competence and pragmatism. Given Gonzalez's willingness to rise above principle, the PSOE's 1981 platform of public sector employment creation, social investments, and redistribution could be jettisoned if it became a political burden. Within the context of global deindustrialization and enhanced capital mobility, the French and Spanish Socialists found their freedom to

impose change, however ill defined, would be compromised by the need to maintain a hospitable investment climate.

## II Financial Markets, Capital Mobility and Socialist Economic Policy in the 1980's

In *Politics and Markets*, Charles Lindblom argues that capital exerts disproportionate influence over the conduct of public policy in democratic market societies (Lindblom, 1977). According to this perspective, the business class, through its control over investment, can frustrate the policy agenda of Left governments that are not accommodating to its interest. Corporations and individual investors therefore can refuse to invest or can relocate economic assets and wealth as a protest measure against recalcitrant social democratic governments.

The debilitating political and economic consequences of capital strikes (unemployment, low production, trade imbalances) often can jeopardize a government's ability to survive election challenges by conservative parties who are more amenable to the interests of domestic and international investors (Bowler, 1987; Shryock, 1991). The "privileged position of business" and its capacity to direct economic change in democratic market societies has particular relevance to Spain and France. In part, this is due to the existence of a competitive, pluralistic Left that had not made peace with the capitalist class (Ross, 1985; Kesselman, 1986). The enmity between the Mediterranean Left and the business sector contrasts sharply with the Northern European development of socialist-business relations. Unlike the Scandinavian case, French and Spanish Socialism could not be organized around an encompassing trade union structure committed to incremental reforms (welfare state, co-determination, income equity). The political convictions of French and Spanish unions covered an array of ideological perspectives; some were Communists (GCT, CCOO), some were apolitical (FO), and some were socialist (CFDT, UGT).

The organizational fragmentation and ideological diversity of Southwestern European unions contributed to a competitive pluralism in which Left parties sought to expand their ties to unions by taking contrasting policy positions (Ross and Jenson, 1985; Ross, 1987). The inability of the 1930's Popular Front governments to articulate a unified position vis-a-vis the business class fostered anxiety among the



domestic capitalists and resulted in disinvestment and economic destabilization (McCarthy, 1987; Shryock, 1991). The turmoil caused by capital flight forced the Popular Front governments out of office and, excluding the Liberation period in France, perpetuated a generation of rightist rule in both countries.

Andrew McCarthy's analysis of the French Left in power, has found that leftist governments often have been paralyzed by capital strikes and have altered wage and expenditure policies to suit business expectations (McCarthy, 1986). The policy direction of the Blum government in the 1930's is a good illustration of the capacity of domestic and international capital to influence and change the political agenda. Elected on a platform of increased wages, stronger trade union rights, and expanded welfare spending, Blum's Left Coalition sought to alter the balance of power to favor workers. The domestic and international business community responded by withdrawing economic assets and wealth from the French economy, which precipitated a speculative run on the French franc and a widening of the trade deficit (Shryock, 1991). After some considerable confusion and debate within the Popular Front coalition, the government reduced welfare expenditures, initiated investment incentives, and raised interest rates to stem the hemorrhage of private capital. The French capitalist class, however, never was convinced fully of the sincerity of Blum's transformation and its refusal to invest contributed to the unraveling of the Popular Front.

The political-economic context of Left rule in the 1930's, however, needs to be differentiated from the conditions that gave rise to the Mitterand and Gonzalez election victories; politically, the French and Spanish socialists in the 1980's were in a stronger position to initiate socio-economic change and resist business class opposition to their wage and industry policies. The 1981 Socialist-Communist coalition in France, united in the commitment to the 1976 Common Program, was given a five year mandate to govern, while the Spanish Socialist Workers Party in 1982 was elected with an impressive legislative majority. In neither case were the Socialists given an uncertain mandate and, for the most part, the Left had strong political support.

The fortunate political context that contributed to the Socialist electoral victories coincided with a less amenable domestic and international economic climate (Lauber, 1987; Petit, 1989). The

French and Spanish economies were ravaged by recession, deindustrialization, and inflation under Mitterand and Gonzalez's conservative predecessors. Although the Socialists were adept at exploiting these economic difficulties in the pre-election period, once in power, governing and directing complex economies proved especially difficult. The re-diversion of French and Spanish employment from heavy industry to light manufacturing and services presented the new Socialist governments with severe social and economic constraints. The most enduring problem was the emergence of structural unemployment. French long-term unemployment rates (as a percentage of total unemployment) rose from 21.6% in 1973 to 42.2% in 1983 and Spanish rates rose even faster from 21.6% in 1979 to 53.6% in 1983.<sup>3</sup>

Based on their election platforms, the policy directions of the Mitterand and Gonzalez governments clearly rejected austerity in favor of economic expansion, public sector industrial targeting, and employment generation (Lauber, 1987; Share, 1989). The French Socialist economic vision relied on a combination of Keynesian deficit spending, worker self-management, and nationalization to re-energize industrial employment, growth, and competitiveness. Though less precise, Spanish Socialist policy sought to create over 800,000 jobs through increased public sector investment in basic industries.

The reflation strategies of the French and Spanish Socialists were not without risks. Within an integrated economic framework, inflation rate imbalances between countries could stimulate capital outflow from high inflation countries and imperil future economic growth. The Socialists' policy of economic expansion contrasted sharply with the austerity pursued by the British, German, and American governments. The rekindling of French and Spanish inflation rates therefore posed particular capital flight problems.

Despite the frequent use of credit and exchange controls, the French and Spanish economies were not well insulated from global competition and capital flows (Loriaux, 1988). The internationalization of financial markets during the 1970's had increased the percentage of French banking assets held by foreigners to over 30% and had subjected the Spanish economy to numerous current account difficulties and currency devaluations (OECD, 1990).

The institutional infrastructure of European trade and capital markets,

moreover, militated against a single nation reflation strategy on several fronts. The European Monetary System's partially fixed exchange rates and temporary adjustment loans for indebted members sought to synchronize member state inflation rates. Within this monetary framework, the West German Bundesbank had become its anchor with the resulting implication that member state inflation rates would have to be lowered to German levels to avoid capital flight and currency devaluation (Cohen, 1990; Katseli, 1990; Goodman, 1990).

The capacity of capital to move across national boundaries, unhampered by government controls and foreign exchange restrictions, was a focal point of the European Commission efforts to liberalize investments in the 1980's (Goodman, 1990). Common Market members, in effect, were being encouraged to drop restrictions, reduce industrial subsidies, and adapt their economies to the competitive pressures of a unified European market. The French and Spanish Socialist electoral platforms, therefore were at considerable odds with the prevailing intellectual and institutional sentiment of European and global capital markets.

### **The French Socialist Experiment and Capital Flight**

The vulnerability of the French economy to international capital flows had enlivened considerable debate between contending socialist factions (McCarthy, 1987). The social democratic Rocardians advocated a continuation of Giscard's austerity policies with an emphasis on industrial retargeting and worker self-management. Any deviation from this path, the social democrats maintained, would compromise the position of the Franc in world currency markets and aggravate the French reindustrialization process.

Although acknowledging the inherent dangers of a reflation strategy, the Mitterandist Center and Chevenement Left hinged the success of a public sector led expansion on two vital conditions (Lauber, 1987; Petit, 1989). First, the credit and budgetary accounts of the previous Center-Right government allowed for some discretion in expanding state expenditures without substantially increasing debt obligations. Second, their forecast of a world economic recovery by late 1982 would allow France to engage in deficit spending and employment generation without too many adverse consequences.

The renewal of relations with the Communist party in 1979, the defeat of the Rocardian right at the Espinay and Metz party conferences, and CERES' dominance in economic policy had irrevocably altered the ideological orientation of the French Socialists. Mitterand's economic strategy would be in accordance with the PS election manifesto and be implemented in three phases (Lauber, 1987). During the first stage, increases in social benefits, reductions in hours worked per day, and public works programs would raise disposable income in the economy and reduce unemployment. The elevation of consumer purchasing power would raise demand for French industrial products and enhance domestic economic growth.

After consumer demand had been increased the public sector's presence in insurance, banking, basic metals, and technologically sensitive export industries would be expanded. The nationalized sector would use public capital, technology, and research to modernize the industrial core of the French economy and transform its competitive potential. In effect, public sector investments would be targeted to high growth areas to insure French dominance in aerospace, defense, electronics and nuclear energy in world markets.

The final phase (autogestion) would replace France's antiquated labor relations system with laws expanding worker participation in factory decisions. As contemplated by Socialist economists, workplace democratization would revolutionize employee-employer relations by increasing productivity through a more flexible, humane workplace (Antonian and Wall, 1985). Socialized enterprises and worker participation therefore would act in concert to transform the bureaucratic rigidity of state capitalism.

Mitterand's rupture with the French capitalist past was complicated by the adverse reaction of the international financial community. Within two years of the "Socialist experiment", the external position of the French economy declined precipitously (See Table 1). The progressive devaluation of the Franc, the persistence of high inflation, and private capital outflow exerted considerable pressure on the Mitterand government to reverse its expansionary budget and monetary policy.

With the third devaluation of the Franc in two years, the Socialists remained divided on what course to take to stem the hemorrhage of private capital. Prime Minister Mauroy's policy of rigor (wage-

**TABLE 1**  
**EXTERNAL POSITION<sup>(1)</sup>**  
**FF billion**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>LIABILITIES</b>					
<i>Cumulative annual flows of authorized borrowing</i>	95.7	113.7	147.3	225.4	314.5
<i>Impact of floating of currencies</i>	-1.9	+ 9.2	+40.4	+70.0	+136.5
<i>Foreign debt outstanding</i>	93.8	122.9	187.7	295.4	451.0
<b>ASSETS</b>					
<i>Commercial export credits</i>	104.7	119.7	139.7	168.7	196.2
<i>Public sector foreign lending</i>	19.1	24.3	32.7	42.5	55.9
<i>Claims on abroad</i>	123.8	144.0	172.4	211.2	252.1
<b>NET POSITION</b>	+30.0	+21.1	-15.3	-84.2	-198.9

(1) Residents' claims and debts of over one year vis-a-vis non-residents.

Source: *Ministere de l' economie et des finances et du budget, Direction du Tresor.*

price controls, high interest rates, and reduced public sector expenditures), pursued from April, 1982 to March, 1983, prompted considerable debate over the direction of French Socialism (Petit, 1989). The government's argument, spearheaded by Finance Minister Delors, was that an intensification of rigor was needed to lower inflation, increase exports and bolster France's external position. From this perspective, the restoration of international investor confidence required reducing public sector debt levels, freeing industry from state controls, and lowering inflation rates to world levels.

The PS Left viewed full fledged austerity with alarm, for it symbolized France's capitulation to the world market (Lauber, 1987). Jean Pierre Chevenement (Mitterand's Minister of Industry) and the CERES Left supported rigor as a temporary phase and resisted its incorporation as long-term policy. CERES, in particular, advocated exchange and capital controls that would set the stage for renewed public sector planning and higher state expenditures.

The huge PS-PCF losses in the March, 1983 municipal election effectively decided the policy direction of French socialism (Schmidt, 1987). Mitterand interpreted the Right's gains in the municipal elections as a repudiation of his 1981 leftward economic direction and as a vindication of Delors' argument that austerity was needed. Vivien Schmidt traces the Socialists' U-turn of March, 1983 to Mitterand's desire to retain the

broad-based coalition of salaried middle and upper middle classes that had become the political fulcrum of French electoral politics in the 1970's and 1980's (Schmidt, 1990). From this vantage point, the movement to austerity and the restoration of price stability would set the stage for maximizing PS competitiveness in the 1986 legislative elections.

Mitterand's conservatism was deepened by the departure of the Communists from his coalition and by his selection of Lurient Fabius as the government's new prime minister in 1984. Step by step the PS 1981 economic platform was dismantled: orthodox monetarism replaced Keynesian demand management; managerial autonomy in and profitability of the nationalized sector superseded the implementation of ministerial plans; and financial market liberalization resulted from the elimination of exchange and capital restrictions.

The shift in policy from rigor to modernization marked an effort by the PS to redefine and update its ideology on the role of the state in the international market economy (Ross and Jenson, 1985; Kesselman, 1986; Ross, 1987). The Socialists' new policy often invoked images of competitiveness and technological dynamism in which the state would foster a rebirth of French entrepreneurialism. Accordingly, PS industry policy would be associated with incubating and nurturing private investment through tax incentives, grants, loans, and subsidies.

Unencumbered by the need to maintain

the PCF in its coalition, the Socialists used the nationalized sector to rationalize industry by firing workers, closing unproductive plants, and phasing out state subsidies (Schmidt, 1988; Rand, 1990). The PS's new policy sought to restore an investment climate conducive to high profit rates and to reassure financial markets that France would move toward "sound non-inflationary economic management." Mitterand's capitulation to the realities of the international market punctuates what maybe the final chapter in the French Left's desire to break with capitalism and socialize production.

### **Capital Mobility, Economic Integration, and PSOE Neo-Liberalism**

Forces and developments similar to those in France affected the Spanish Socialists. The Gonzalez government inherited a considerably more difficult economic environment than their French counterparts. However, prior to the Socialist victory in 1982, the Spanish economy was beset by a vicious cycle of inflation, trade deficits, and capital flight. Within this economic context, a Mitterand-style reflation would be most impractical (Share, 1987).

The political pressures toward an abandonment of the PSOE's social democratic orientation, ensconced in the Party's 1981 platform, were fostered by three parallel developments. First, the Party's Left had been marginalized by Gonzalez after the Twenty-Eighth Congress, and power, prestige, and leadership positions within the PSOE were controlled by Felipista loyalists at the national, regional, and provincial levels. Second, the political terrain of Spanish politics had been altered profoundly by the disintegration of Suarez's Union of the Democratic Center. The political vacuum established the UCD collapse, and the ideological extremism of the Communists and the Popular Alliance had allowed the Socialists to create and consolidate a centrist position. Third, by 1982, the Mitterand economic program had become caught in an inflationary and trade distorted cycle that undermined the policy convictions of the PSOE left. The discrediting of the French Socialist experiment and the global movement toward austerity and free markets strengthened the position of PSOE centrists that a more cautious approach was needed. The Party's moderate to conservative wing

was able to capture the ideological highground and to use Spain's precarious economy to justify market enhancing industrial policies (Share, 1989; Gillispie, 1990; Martinez, 1990).

The conservative political climate co-existed with a harsh economic environment, and both contributed to the Socialists' abandonment of a public sector investment strategy to create 800,000 jobs in four years. Gonzalez's conversion to the neo-liberal Right was facilitated by the growing role of foreign capital in the Spanish economy and by Spain's entrance into the EC in 1986 (Share, 1989). Indeed, Spanish EC exports rose from 49% in 1984 to 63% in 1987's exports, and by the late 1980's foreign controlled companies were responsible for some 43% of employment in major Spanish industries (Buckley & Artisien, 1987).

The PSOE's embracement of disinflationary fiscal-monetary policies and its emphasis on market oriented industrial modernization has altered the nature of state, labor, and business relations in Spain. The Confederation of Spanish Business Organizations (CEOE) has often found itself supporting key provisions of the Gonzalez program (privatization, lower inflation, greater wage, and employment flexibility) and has been successful in articulating and promoting a free market consciousness in Spain (Martinez, 1990). Accordingly, the CEOE has used its influence in labor arbitration commissions and wage setting forums to support the PSOE's industry and employment policies.

The PSOE's ideological transformation during the 1980's has not been costless, and, on occasion, its Center-Right policies have been a liability. The rise in unemployment and the Government's desire to restrain wage demands have ruptured relations between the Socialists' and their historically, the General Workers Union (UGT) (Gillespie, 1990). Indeed, the UGT-initiated 1988 general strike demonstrated the ultimate spectacle of a socialist trade union protesting the wage and employment policies of a socialist government.

The PSOE-UGT split is significant, because it represents the Socialists' break from their traditional working class center (Share, 1987; Gillespie, 1990). Gonzalez's and Guerra's strategy of isolating and marginalizing the Left, so successful in PSOE party conferences, seems to have been extended to the larger environment. The ideological consequences of Gonzalez's move to the Center also has

affected the Spanish Right; for the conservatism of PSOE economic policy has prevented the Popular Alliance from mounting a credible political alternative (Share, 1989).

### **Mediterranean Socialism and Neo-liberalism's Ascendancy**

Under Mitterand and Gonzalez, the French and Spanish Socialists have adopted an ideology and set of policies that are incongruous with democratic socialist ideals. The ideological recharacterization of French and Spanish socialism is a multi-layered process that reflects the pluralism of the Mediterranean Left and the policy constraints imposed by global capital markets. Both help to explain the redirection of economic policy under Mitterand and Gonzalez. This philosophical transformation has been typically described as a shift toward neo-liberalism (Ross and Jenson, 1985; Kesselman, 1986; Ross, 1987; Shmidt, 1988). The problem with this characterization is that there is little discussion on what unique attraction neo-liberalism holds for Socialists. Additionally, there has been a systematic neglect over defining the boundaries of neo-liberal principles.

This inattention to ideological detail is a pity given a substantial amount of work, particularly by Anglo-American scholars, on the need for an industrial policy that supplements market forces (Thurow, 1985; Riech, 1990; Best, 1990), although these works differ in the scope and direction of policies advocated, they are concerned with state efforts to minimize the inequities and social disruption of the industrial adjustment process. Within this framework, the state cushions unemployment in basic industries through retraining and job placement efforts, and promotes employment opportunities in emerging sectors through tax incentives and grants.

Neo-liberals advocate an organic and cooperative relationship between business and the state. Reich, for example, urges a union of business and government cultures in the form of an industrial policy that makes public sector subsidy contingent upon private sector acceptance of plant modernization, labor retraining, and technological innovation (Riech, 1980). Under such an approach, business opposition to state policy could be transcended, markets could be used to modernize the economy, and a break with capitalism would not be necessary. Given the volatile relationship between the

Mediterranean Left and the corporate class, the reformulation of a progressive ideology that enlists and rewards cooperative business behavior could be the basis for avoiding capital flight and economic destabilization.

Neo-liberalism was also a natural extension of the intellectual currents popular in the PS and PSOE in the 1970's (Ross, 1985; Share, 1989). The Rocard and Delors factions within the PS and their advocacy of governmental decentralization, fiscal monetary restraint, and worker self-management sought to create a participatory, non-collectivized vision of French socialism. Since those sentiments always were represented in the PS, neo-liberalism's ascendancy during the 1983-85 economic crisis should not be surprising.

Neo-liberalism's allure, however, should not be overstated. The weakness and pluralism of PS ideology and the conscious nonideological development of the PSOE created an intellectual vacuum that facilitated the adoption of neo-liberal principles. In large part, the Socialists' conversion to the market was a pragmatic response to the constraints imposed by integrated European and global financial markets. These limits and the autonomy conceded to the market and private enterprise by neo-liberal ideology requires that the Socialists' metric of policy success be reconstituted away from full employment and social equity. In particular, conditions that enhance investment opportunities (wage flexibility, capital mobility and free markets) must be accorded priority and impediments (income support, exchange controls and state regulations) must be removed. Within this context, government is to adjust workers to the dislocating effects of deindustrialization through job retraining and regional development programs.

The Socialists' have justified their new thinking on economic matters by integrating elements of their old philosophy (Ross and Jenson, 1985; Kesselman, 1986). The Delors' stabilization plans (1982-84) incorporated taxation and compulsory loans on high income groups to complement efforts to restrain wages, cut social expenditures, and liberalize the French economy. "Social solidarity" and "equity in sacrifice" thus have become key phases in the PS economic lexicon. Similarly, the PSOE has undertaken youth employment and regional subsidy programs to offset the unemployment caused by industrial rationalization (Gillespie, 1989; Martinez, 1990).

Although the Socialists' have retained some aspects of their past philosophy, they have discarded a great deal of their egalitarian tradition. Gone from PS and PSOE intellectual discourse are notions of redistribution, nationalization, and worker self-management. Socialists, excluding CERES, no longer seek a radical break from capitalism and much of their rhetoric extols the virtues of the market, nation, and entrepreneurialism (Kesselman, 1987; Martinez, 1990). Under Mitterand and Gonzalez, the Socialists have diminished the importance of equity, labor solidarity, and full employment and have elevated price stability, high investment, and trade competitiveness to the forefront of their political agenda.

The new Socialist ideology rests less on philosophical ideals than it does on technocratic expertise and problem solving. Accordingly, great power and prestige have been associated with the operation of the finance ministries, whose leaders typically have been the most outspoken zealots of free markets and liberalization (Ross, 1987; Gillespie, 1990). Although a precise formulation of the new Socialist philosophy maybe elusive, the programmatic direction of the Mitterand and Gonzalez governments is clear.

State directed industrial modernization, labor re-training, and international market competitiveness are key priorities for Spanish and French Socialists. The French nationalized sector has been successful in modernizing basic industries and restoring profitability while shedding redundant labor (Schmidt, 1988; Smith, 1990). Accordingly, the autonomy of management in French public and private sector enterprises has been emphasized by the

Mitterand government, and ministerial direction of companies has been discarded.

Vivien Schmidt has described French industrial policy as a form of decentralized *derigisme* (Schmidt, 1988). Under Socialist economic management, nationalization and state capital have been effective in recapitalizing core industrial groups and enhancing competitiveness. The French planners, however, have accorded nationalized enterprise great discretion in investment, product design, and employment decisions and have encouraged private sector capitalization of and joint ventures with public sector companies.

Rationalization of Spanish industry and its adaptation to the integrated European market has been Gonzalez's major priority, and state restructuring programs have emphasized eliminating unproductive labor (Gillespie, 1990). The Spanish version of indicative planning involves work force reductions in key industrial groups, increased wage flexibility, and the utilization of foreign investment in the adjustment process. Within the context of the Government's 1984 Industrial Reform Act, 30 percent of the manufacturing workforce has been eliminated across eleven key sectors (OECD, 1988). Through restructuring of the INI state holding company, the Socialists have reduced labor costs, shed excess employment and recapitalized the industrial core of the Spanish economy. State industrial programs have altered employment in both French and Spanish industries (*See table 2*).

Macroeconomic policy has been aligned with the basic objectives of industrial restructuring. Within this context, public sector debt (as a percent of GDP) is to be curtailed to reduce price inflation and to

### INDUSTRIAL BRANCH EMPLOYMENT (1978-88)

	France	Spain
1. Food, tobacco and beverages	0.1	0.7
2. Textiles, wearing apparel, leather	-4.0	-2.6
3. Wood & wood products	-1.5	-2.6
4. Paper & Paper products	-0.7	-1.9
5. Chemical, chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastics	-1.2	-2.0
6. Non-metallic minerals except petroleum and coal products	-3.7	-2.8
7. Basic metal industries	-5.0	2.7
8. Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment	2.2	-2.1
9. Other manufacturing	-3.8	-3.6

Source: OECD, *Labor Force Statistics 1968-1988* France (p. 233)/Spain (p. 389) OECD Paris 1990

avoid crowding out private sector investment (Petit, 1989). The policy of rigor, pursued by Mitterand after the 1983 municipal elections, limited the public sector deficit to 3% of GDP, and tax increases were instituted to finance state expenditures. Similarly, the Spanish Socialists' have increased taxes, curtailed state expenditures, and used incomes policies to restrain price levels. In effect, both governments have based economic policy on the monetarist assumption that low inflation, irrespective of employment repercussions, is vital for a restoration of economic growth.

Industrial rationalization and strict fiscal monetary controls have contributed to increased unemployment rates of around 10% in France and 19% in Spain (OECD, 1990). The magnitude of the unemployment problem stands in stark contrast to the employment creation objectives in the Socialists original electoral platforms.

Finally, the French and Spanish Socialists have developed conciliatory policies toward the private sector; Mitterand's first Finance Minister, Jacques Delors, paved the way for less business taxation and the liberalization of financial markets, while his Spanish counterpart, Carlos Solchaga, openly sided with the employers' association in their wage negotiations with unions (Gillespie, 1990). Mediterranean Socialists have employed profitability, not greater equity, as a principal yardstick to measure public policy success.

### Conclusion

Within the last decade, Mediterranean socialism has been transformed. This paper has argued that two forces, ideological factionalism and financial market integration, explain the course of French and Spanish policy in directions that are incongruous with basic social democratic values. The Socialists' ideological formulation has been hailed as a triumph of pragmatism over philosophy and as evidence that the Mediterranean Left has erased the stigma of failed government and economic paralysis (Share, 1989). Vivien Schmidt speculates that the PS centrism has realigned the French electorate by preventing the Right's ability to unite against a distinctive leftist identity (Schmidt, 1990).

The French and Spanish Socialists' advocacy of neo-liberalism may not be permanent; the meager social content of their economic program already has produced negative political repercussions.

President Mitterand's selection of Edith Cresson as Prime Minister may soften the Party's neo-liberal emphasis and could signal a new orientation on employment and trade. The PSOE-UGT split and the 1988 General strike have damaged Gonzalez's reputation and have heightened public concern over rising inequality and structural unemployment. The departure of Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra, allegations of official corruption, and an intensifying debate within the PSOE over the governments industrial policy maybe the start of left wing revival within the Party.

Although their future ideological orientation is uncertain, the behavior of both parties during the 1980's epitomize the crisis of social democracy in an era of deindustrialization and heightened capital mobility. Many left parties, including the New Zealand and Australian Laborites, have reacted to international financial constraints by vigorously limiting wage increases, deregulating markets, raising interest rates, and curtailing public expenditure. With the general discrediting of the Keynesian model, the propensity of left governments to impose austerity may persist until the development of a coherent collectivist approach to deindustrialization and capital mobility.

### Notes

- 1 "Post-electoral elecciones generales 1977 automaticas Andulucia" conducted by the Centra de Svestigaciones Sociologicas (Madrid), study, 1245, June 1977.
- 2 "Post-electoral elecciones generales 1979 y Automaticas Andulucia" conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (Madrid), study 1262, April 1979.
- 3 OECD, *Labor Force Statistics 1968-1988* (OECD, Paris 1990). p. 280 (France), p. 378 (Spain).

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*Anthony Celso is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida.*

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# The Role of Symbols, Myths, and Rituals in Governance: South African Examples

Kimberly Lanegan

## Introduction

Approximately thirty years after Europe's African colonies began to transform themselves into sovereign states, political scientists continue to struggle to conceptualize accurate models of the political processes in African countries. A recent effort to capture the essence of African politics is seen in the emerging body of work which focuses on issues relating to governance in Africa. Goran Hyden, who is actively using the governance approach to shed new light on politics in Africa, has suggested that with this tool, political scientists can "discover things that years of neglect have made us forget."<sup>2</sup> The legitimating role of symbols, myths, and rituals in politics is just such an overlooked phenomenon which the governance approach leads scholars to rediscover. The three purposes of this essay are: 1) to present a tight definition of governance, 2) to remind scholars of the explicit and essential role political symbols, myths, and rituals have in establishing governance in a country, and 3) demonstrate, through examples from politics in the Republic of South Africa, the benefits and limitations of using political symbols and myths in building governance.

This essay contains two arguments. First, the presence and perpetuation of political symbols, myths, and rituals is a necessary yet insufficient dimension of governance in a polity. In making this argument, emphasis goes to 1) why governance depends on symbolic cues and relationships and 2) the characteristics of symbols, myths, and rituals. Specifically, the benefits include the following: the creation among a population of a sense of membership in a nation, the establishment of parameters of rule-making regarding public life, and the promotion of both hegemony and legitimacy. Furthermore, I postulate that myths are likely to become more important during times of crisis especially the formation of a polity. The limitations of myths include: their conservative nature, their inability to overturn deep-seated dissatisfaction among a population, and the fact that they can be misused as propaganda. Second, this essay argues that a rich web of political myths

has been an essential part of the governance-building process in South Africa.

I have selected South Africa as a case study not because it exemplifies common essential characteristics of all African countries but rather because its political myths and symbols are undergoing transformation. Currently, South Africans are in the process of reconceptualizing their sense of common national identity. At the individual and governmental level, South Africans are struggling to identify who the citizens of South Africa should be and determine their rights and responsibilities as citizens. South Africa's exclusionary political system in which only White, and as of 1983 also Coloured and Indian, residents of the country were granted citizenship status, is facing transformation by a more inclusive notion of citizenship in the Republic. This time of reevaluation is ideal for observing the roles of myths and symbols as the old myths which perpetuated the White dominated regime are being rejected and other symbols are being used to cultivate a new sense of national identity.

Before outlining a conceptualization of governance, it is important to explain the way in which the terms *citizen* and *nation* are used in this essay. When using the term citizen to describe an individual in a legal system, I am emphasizing the formal and potentially legal relationship that an individual has with his or her governing body. A citizen in a political system enjoys the full rights and responsibilities offered to any other person in that system. When speaking of an individual's membership in a nation, I am stressing the psychological identity held by that person as belonging to a community of like individuals. A nation is a cultural, not necessarily a legal or political, construct.

## Governance

One of the frustrating problems with the literature on governance is that scholars still use the term sloppily with vague and varied meanings. As an effort to pin down the meaning of governance, this section offers the following specific definition:

governance is the over-arching system of shared norms, rules, symbols and

myths which unite, guide, and legitimize the workings of a political entity. A political entity contains three parts: the state which is the legal structure and bodies which implement policies, the government comprised of the individual actors who formulate policies, and the citizens who give legitimacy to the state and government and whose public lives are structured by state policies. Governance shapes the relationship between citizens and the political structures established to order public life.

This definition is a synthesis of some of the more compelling discussions of governance in the literature combined with my thesis of the role of symbols and myths.

In the literature, there are three main points made concerning the workings of governance. First, the presence of governance unifies and thereby creates the polity. Second, governance operates at the most general over-arching level of human interaction setting the parameters for more specific decisions regarding behavior or political structure. Third, scholars recognize that the presence of governance promotes both hegemony for the government's ideology and legitimacy for the specific government.

### ● Governance as Unifier

The foundation for the consideration of governance as a phenomenon which unifies a polity comes from the writings of Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt.<sup>3</sup> They use as a starting point the premise that "governance is concerned with the relationships among the polity's several parts as well as with the relationship between the parts and the whole that is the polity."<sup>4</sup> More explicitly, governance, or in my words the presence of shared norms, rules, and symbols, is what brings the collectivity into existence. Furthermore, they continue, "No community exists without governance, for by definition a community is a set of persons bound to each other through joint efforts in conducting collective affairs. Even the most anarchic group one might imagine governs itself by common norms and understandings, implicit or explicit."<sup>5</sup> Clearly then, the presence of governance is a prerequisite for the emergence of a unified



community. Eulau and Prewitt use extremely general language and speak of "community," however, since our concern here is with the status of governance in countries, we can move to a larger scale and translate "community" into "nation". Based on this conceptualization of governance, the comprehensive definition offered here stresses that the presence of governance unites a polity.

Many of the examples offered here of political symbols and myths will demonstrate that ambitious political actors and would-be leaders understand the value of cultivating a sense of nationhood and/or citizenship among their potential followers. Political leaders strive to weaken any destabilizing factionalism within their body of supporters and, to that end, often use myths to build unity. In so doing, they are taking steps to establish governance. Of course, the key feature of governance is the acceptance by the followers of that proposed communal identity.

#### ● Governance at Constitution-Making Level

Elinor Ostrom and Larry Kiser's discussion of how individuals interact with their state and with each other assists in our conceptualization of governance.<sup>6</sup> Ostrom and Kiser suggest that human interaction exists at three levels: operational choice, collective choice, and constitutional choice. The most over-arching level, that of constitution-making, is where individuals agree to the types of rules which will regulate their decision-making. This is the realm of governance. The norms, rules, and myths which make up governance are at work at this constitution-making level determining the parameters in which choices at the two lower levels will be made.

The governance approach suggests that at the constitution-making level of interaction, individuals strive to establish a framework for political structures, or "regime." Then, once there is agreement on the norms determining the formation of structures and rules, citizens are willing to let structures determine their behavior at the operational and collective levels of interaction. It is cultural forces which play the crucial role in determining the norms which the population elevates to predominate at the constitutional level. However, at the lower level of interaction, structural forces play the greater role. With this model of different levels of political action, the governance approach delineates the separate arenas in which cultural and

structural factors shape public interaction.

#### ● Governance as Promoter of Legitimacy and Hegemony

The definition of governance offered here stresses that *the presence of governance establishes the legitimacy of a political structure.*

March and Olsen propose that "governance is an interpretation of life and an affirmation of legitimate values and institutions."<sup>7</sup> To the degree that the norms, rules, and symbols determining the constitution of the political structure are agreed upon and shared by the citizens, the structure is legitimate. Erik Eriksen points out that "according to the modern democratic constitution, this [legitimacy] is achieved by following legal and just procedure, but basically legitimacy depends upon public consent: It has to be openly and freely agreed that the decisions reached are reasonable and just."<sup>8</sup>

Also, the presence of shared norms and rules governing the regime enables the political system to obtain ideological hegemony. Hegemony is used here following Antonio Gramsci as "moral and philosophical leadership" which is attained through the active consent of major groups in society.<sup>9</sup> Since the parameters determining the constitution of the political system have received the active consent of the citizens, the system can achieve ideological leadership. Once the political system's dominant ideologies and rules are no longer questioned by citizens, i.e. have attained hegemony, the political system achieves legitimacy in the eyes of the body politic.

#### ● Locus of Governance

One of the features of the governance approach which makes it attractive to Africanists is that it does not necessarily equate the state with the locus of essential political activity. Recent scholarship suggests that African states, rather than dominating public life in Africa, by in large, fail to have major impact on Africans' lives<sup>10</sup> or even to formulate and implement policies successfully. Scholars provide evidence that other structures such as patronage ties,<sup>11</sup> ethnic groupings, and the "economy of affection"<sup>12</sup> play much greater roles in shaping public life in Africa. Thinking in terms of governance allows scholars to look beyond the conventional notion of the state in order to observe the most relevant dimensions of political life.

The most popular research agenda among Africanists concerned with

governance has been to look for signs of growing or established governance in extra-governmental organizations. Many are following Michael Bratton's suggestion to "devote more attention to the associational life that occurs in the political space beyond the state's purview."<sup>13</sup> Thus studies are being conducted on societal organizations such as mineworkers union in Zambia and South Africa (Bratton, 1989), the informal economy (MacGaffey, 1989), and the impact of world organizations such as the IMF and World Bank (Lofchie, 1989).

#### Political Symbols, Myths, and Rituals in Governance

This essay's contribution to the governance literature is the identification of the essential role political symbols, myths, and rituals play in the formation and maintenance of governance. Many sociologists, anthropologists, and some political thinkers such as Murray Edelman and David Kertzer have recognized that political leaders consciously use symbols and myths to strengthen their power. Yet, most scholars of politics do not consider the utilization of symbols and myths as true politics. As David Kertzer indicates, political observers have "noted ritual behavior associated with politics, [although] few have ever taken it seriously. They view ritual as mere embellishment for more important, "real" political activities."<sup>14</sup> This essay endeavors to strengthen the conceptualization of governance by showing how it can be linked to theories regarding the characteristics and uses of political symbols and myths.

#### ● Symbols

In most general terms, *symbols are visual icons which represent complex concepts.* Abner Cohen gives a broad definition of a visual icon and notes three of its characteristic properties. He writes, "Symbols are objects, acts, relationships or linguistic formations which stand **ambiguously** for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and impel men to action."<sup>15</sup> One can find many examples of symbols in political life in South Africa. It is helpful to think of political symbols in South Africa as falling into the following categories: 1) individuals, 2) linguistic devices i.e. slogans and language, 3) material icons such as monuments, flags and specific clothing, and 4) songs.

As one example, African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela, especially while he was incarcerated in



Robin Island, has been an extremely powerful human symbol of the battle black South Africans have been waging against apartheid. Because the white government believed Mandela's likeness was able to incite rebellion among blacks, they banned the printing or distributing of photographs or drawings of him. Regarding linguistic devices, some historians recognize that the Afrikaans language took on a symbolic character representing Afrikaner solidarity and uniqueness during the first quarter of this century.<sup>16</sup> The Xhosa exchange **Amandla!-Awethu** (translates as "Power!"-"It is ours") have become emotive slogans symbolizing the effort of the revolutionary anti-apartheid movement. Material icons in South Africa include the Voortrekker Monument outside Pretoria and the yellow, green, and black colors of the African National Congress (ANC). Finally, both the white regime and the ANC-led faction of the anti-apartheid movement have symbolic anthems. Supporters of the government sing **Die Stem van Suid Afrika** while ANC supporters sing **Nkosi Sikelel' i-Afrika**.

#### ● Myths

*A political myth is a specific interpretation, and often reorchestration, of events in the past expounded to establish or attack the credibility of a regime.*

A myth is often a weaving together of many symbols into a coherent belief about an event. Murray Edelman stresses that a myth is "a belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning; it is typically socially cued rather than empirically based."<sup>17</sup> The most essential feature of myths is the fact that they are promoted for the express purpose of assigning a specific interpretation to events, which may or may not have actually occurred, so as to justify a current political status quo. To the degree that promoting political myths creates beliefs about the past in order to use those beliefs in the present, this process is part of an interpretation of a society's history so as to derive a "usable" notion of its past.

South African politics has been rich with myths. One example is the body of myths promoted by the Afrikaners and their government surrounding the Day of the Covenant which will be discussed in a later section. These myths are reorchestrations and interpretations of the actual events surrounding a major battle in 1838 between the Afrikaans-speaking voortrekkers and the men of Zulu king

Dingaan at Blood River. Another example is the body of myths surrounding the powerful martial past of the Zulu people. In 1975, Gatsha Buthelezi, Prime Minister of Zululand, resurrected **Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe** (National Cultural Liberation Movement), which Zulu King Solomon Ka Dinuzulu had formed in 1928, and has been cultivating myths about Zulu martial prowess and cultural unity during the reign of King Shaka. Other black South Africans, including Nelson Mandela, have also been evoking myths about Shaka in order to cultivate among black South Africans pride in their past.

#### ● Rituals

*Political rituals are standardized and repeated symbolic actions intended to propagate political myths.*

David Kertzer has described rituals as "action wrapped in the web of symbolism."<sup>18</sup> Partaking in rituals is the most powerful way in which individuals interact with myths and symbols. By speaking the symbolic words of a pledge or attending a service at a symbolic place, a person's belief in the political symbols is strengthened. Through ritual, symbols become more firmly implanted in one's belief system.

There are many rituals in South African politics. For example, they include voting, for the whites, Coloureds, and Indians who choose to do so, attendance at political demonstrations or celebrations, and singing of anthems. As one specifically interesting example, I would argue that the **toitoi** marches<sup>19</sup> in which black South Africans have been partaking can be viewed as rituals. The **toitoi** contains each of the elements of a ritual. First, since people **toitoi** at political events such as funerals, strikes, and demonstrations, sponsored by the ANC and the now-disbanded United Democratic Front, the dance is associated with that faction of the anti-apartheid movement. Consequently, it is coming to symbolize their struggle. Furthermore, the words of the songs and slogans accompanying the dance are highly symbolic. More important still, since people actively participate, we can regard the marches as repeated *symbolic actions*.

### Beneficial Contributions of Symbols to Governance

In this section, I argue that the three essential dimensions of governance, its A) unifying, B) constitution-setting, and C) legitimacy and hegemony promoting abilities, depend fundamentally on political

symbols, myths, and rituals. Progress toward attaining these goals is the benefit which accrues to a political system which utilizes political symbols. In making this argument, I discuss how governance requires symbols in each of its dimensions, use the example of the myths of the Day of the Covenant to demonstrate how progress toward governance among the Afrikaners was enhanced through this myth.

#### ● The Role of Myths, Symbols, and Rituals in Uniting a Nation

The belief among a body of people that they are a community, or a nation, is the most crucial requisite for the emergence of governance. I would argue that the fact that most African countries lack a national identity, or more specifically a sense of citizenship in a nation, is a key cause of their inability to achieve governance at the country level. The politics of even those countries with nascent democracy such as Kenya and Uganda are still characterized by severe ethnic and regional animosity. The most valuable asset countries can achieve through the perpetuation of powerful political symbols and myths is a sense of nation. Furthermore, I propose that governance requires political symbols and myths because A) a nation can only be created with symbolic tools and B) humans need symbols in order to build a self and collective identity as citizens.

A nation must be fabricated since it exists not in the physical world but in the hearts and minds of a population. Benedict Anderson conceives of a nation as "an imagined political community... imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of the fellow-members... yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Walzer writes, "The state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived."<sup>21</sup> Symbols, myths, and rituals contribute to building the sense of national identity in part by being the media through which a nation can be seen. Flags, ceremonies, and even leaders embody the nation.

Not only does a nation need to be created via symbolic devices but so too, to a large degree, does an individual's self identity. Abner Cohen asserts that people engage in symbolic behavior because of "the continuous struggle of man to achieve personal identity, or selfhood."<sup>22</sup> A more complete discussion of this correctly lies in the literature of psychological, sociological, and anthropological research.

For the purposes here, let us accept Cohen's informed conclusion. His argument continues, "One of the most important of these [i.e. symbolic] functions is the objectification of relationships between individuals and groups. We can observe individuals objectively in concrete reality, but the relationships between them and abstractions, that can be observed only through symbols."<sup>23</sup> The nation is just such an abstraction whose relationship to individuals can only be seen through symbols.

A body of shared beliefs, practices, and perceptions guided by rituals, symbols, and myths builds two identities: that of a group and that of an individual. When individuals observe that a number of them speak the same language, recite the same pledge, sing the same song, and believe the same accounts of their past, they develop an affinity for each other and feel part of a group. The reasoning is along the lines of "we all speak Afrikaans, we all sing *Die Stem van Suid Afrika*, and we all believe that God protected the Afrikaner *voortrekkers* from the Zulu fighters, so we all are Afrikaners." At the same time, each individual reasons "I speak Afrikaans, I sing *Die Stem van Suid Afrika*, and I believe God protected the *voortrekkers* from the Zulu, therefore, I am an Afrikaner." Emile Durkheim observed the power of collective action in establishing social solidarity. "It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that [people] become to feel themselves to be in union."<sup>24</sup> Ritual, symbols, and myths have the power to shape a collective identity and thereby contribute the essential ingredient in governance.

#### ● Lack of Comprehensive Nation in South Africa

Painting with a broad brush, one can characterize the concept of nation in South Africa as having progressed through a series of phases. Prior to the advent of Europeans to the toe of Africa, various African ethnic units, some hunter-gatherers, others more stationary farmers, coexisted in the region. For example, as Richard Elphick emphasizes, the Khoikhoi and San people of the Western Cape had extremely fluid political structures which experienced a great deal of membership flow.<sup>25</sup> There was no effort made to achieve large scale political dominance and the notion of citizenship in the political unit was not relevant.

Permanent European involvement in the region began in 1652 when the Dutch East India Company established a refreshment post for its ships and later encouraged settlers to come farm at the Cape. As Dutch and later also British settlers increasingly put down roots in the Cape, competing concepts of nation and citizenship divided the people living south of the Limpopo River. During the almost 300 years from the time of Company rule, through British colonial rule of the Cape from 1806, the formation of the Afrikaner Republics in the mid-1800s, and the Anglo-Boer Wars to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, political change was marked by competition between British colonial, Afrikaner settler, and African interests.

One of the most significant political developments was the emergence of a sense of national identity among the white settler population in the region. From the original Dutch-speaking and Huguenot immigrants, emerged the Afrikaner nation. The political expression of the Afrikaner nation underwent various transformations. With a yet nascent group identity, the Boer farmers fled British imperial domination in the 1830s. They established a national self-concept and independent Republics by the 1850s. During the South African war of 1899-1902, the Afrikaners fought, unsuccessfully, to defend their political sovereignty from British domination. However, in 1910, the Boer Republics and some of the British holdings were unified. From Union through the two World Wars, Afrikaner nationalism was on the rise. In the 1948 election, the Afrikaner political interest, as represented by the Nationalist Party attained political dominance of South Africa. The majority of examples here of political myths contributing to governance will come from the process of the formation of the Afrikaner national identity.

Furthermore, during the apartheid era, 1948 to the present,<sup>26</sup> the concepts of White, Black, Coloured, and Indian nationality have been changing within the eyes of both the whites and the blacks themselves. In the earliest years of apartheid, the government's policy was to view non-whites as morally, intellectually, and politically subordinate to members of the white nation. Founded on this premise, Africans were separated from whites and forced to live in overcrowded conditions on the least fertile land in the country, work for the white economy, and possess no political rights. In 1959, however, Dr. Verwoerd introduced a bill to Parliament

which suggested that the government would encourage Africans to develop independent nation-states along ethnic lines. Thus began the policy of separate development in which territories occupied by blacks, the *bantustans*, were encouraged to become "independent" from the Republic of South Africa. Since the election of F.W. de Klerk to the Presidency in 1989, however, it is clear that the white government is moving away from viewing black South Africans as citizens in different nations and closer to a realization that blacks must be treated as citizens of South Africa.

Among black South Africans themselves one can observe different variations of the concept of nationhood. As one force, The African National Congress, which emerged out of the South African Native National Congress founded in 1912, has conceived of the citizenry of South Africa as being composed of all residents, black and white, living in the region. The Preamble to the Freedom Charter written in 1955 states, "We the people of South Africa declare for all our country and all the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority, unless it is based on the will of the people."<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which split from the ANC under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe in 1958, desires to transform South Africa into a nation of black people. The PAC rejects the multi-racial vision of the ANC.

Divided as it has been into various national identities, South Africa has never succeeded in achieving governance at the country-wide level. One can argue that during the earliest stages of apartheid, there was governance between the government and the white citizenry. The apartheid ideology appears to have held hegemony among the white constituents and serve as the foundation for the constitution-building norms, rules, and symbols that are governance. However, this governance has never extended to Africans in the country and has in fact been attacked by the anti-apartheid ideologies held by other groups of South Africans. The recent political changes in South Africa demonstrate that the apartheid ideology has been so weakened by ideological and economic attacks that it has lost hegemony even among the whites. The people of South Africa are currently embroiled in a struggle over whether or not to form a new ideology and achieve a country-wide sense of nationhood, citizenry, and governance.

### ● Day of the Covenant as Unifying Symbols of Afrikaner Nation

The myths surrounding the Day of the Covenant demonstrate the power of myths to foster national unity and that political leaders can be quite aware of the benefits of cultivating them. The Day of the Covenant (the celebration was renamed "Geloftedag" or "Day of the Vow" in the 1980s) has become a fiercely powerful symbol of the Afrikaner nation. Politicians have utilized the accounts of the 1838 **voortrekker** victory over the Zulu people at Blood River to propagate pride in the Afrikaner nation as a tool for legitimizing the Afrikaner monopoly of power. While its links to an actual event are tenuous, the Covenant remains "the prime symbol of Afrikaner Christian culture, the exemplary vindication of Afrikaner hegemony in South Africa."<sup>28</sup>

In November 1837, 478 Afrikaner **voortrekkers** led by Andries Pretorius and Piet Retief crossed the Drakensberg mountain range into the kingdom of the Zulu King Dingaan. Retief headed a delegation sent to seek Dingaan's permission to settle south of the Tugela River in his territory. Dingaan conceded with the stipulation that the Boers replace a number of his cattle which had been stolen by a rival chief. In February 1838, after Retief succeeded in tricking the guilty chief into returning the stolen cattle, the commando returned to Dingaan's headquarters to sign the treaty. However, by this time Dingaan had grown increasingly concerned about Retief's boasts of the Boer victories over Chief Mzilikazi's people in the Transvaal and decided that these settlers posed a threat to his kingdom. After putting his mark to the treaty, Dingaan's warriors murdered Retief's party and moved against settler encampments at that source of the Tugela River taking 281 lives.

Having eventually received reinforcements from the Cape Colony, the emigrants launched a commando in December 1838 headed by Pretorius in retaliation against Dingaan. The documents provided by Pretorius' secretary Jan Bantje written after the commando disbanded tell of Pretorius calling together the men who would lead their Sunday service on December 9. According to Bantje's records,

He wanted to make a vow to the Almighty, (if they were all willing), that "should the Lord give us the victory, we would raise a House to the memory of his Great Name" . . . and that we should note

the day of the victory in a book to make it known even to our latest posterity, so that it might be celebrated to the Honor of God.<sup>29</sup>

On Sunday, December 16, the Zulu army of perhaps 10,000 warriors carrying stabbing spears attacked the armed commando in their defensive laager. When the Zulu eventually retreated, they had lost approximately 3000 of their brothers while not a single Afrikaner died. The Boers interpreted this resounding victory as proof of God's blessing on their settlement. However, a recent biographer of Andries Pretorius, B.J. Liebenberg, concluded that the vow fell quickly into oblivion after the battle with only its first anniversary gaining much attention.<sup>30</sup>

Afrikaner historians and leaders such as J.B.M. Hertzog and D.F. Malan have interpreted this great victory as a divine sign that the Afrikaner nation is God's elect community chosen to occupy the region. It became a corner stone of the Afrikaner ideology. Malan presented the ideology thus: "The Afrikaner nation was entitled to survival because it was not the creation of man but of God, who had given it a unique language and philosophy as well as the vocation of fulfilling His design at the southern end of Africa."<sup>31</sup> This ideology not only compelled Afrikaners to feel affection for the Afrikaner nation by portraying it as God's blessed creation, but also justifies the current status quo which grants Afrikaners power, wealth, and domination.

For overtly political purposes Afrikaner historians began to resurrect the notion of the vow and politicians quickly built rituals around its anniversary. An early act of the Union Government, after achieving self-ruling status from Britain in 1910, was to make December 16 a national holiday in commemoration of the Battle of Blood River. Yet, the most dramatic and successful utilization of the symbol of the Covenant was the 1938 reenactment of the Great Trek and the ceremonies at Pretoria to lay the foundation for the Voortrekker Monument. Eight ox-pulled wagons named for heroes such as Andries Pretorius and Piet Retief took routes across South Africa to meet at Pretoria. More than 100,000 Afrikaners - perhaps one-tenth of their total population - gathered in Pretoria to partake in this highly symbolic celebration of the Afrikaner nation. In addition, tens of thousands more welcomed the symbolic wagons into their towns. The wave of Afrikaner nationalism was one of the key forces, in addition to concerns regarding

race relations and farmers' economic concerns, which propelled the Nationalist Party into power in 1948.

### ● The Role of Political Symbols at the Constitution-Building Level

It is impossible for a large body of people to join together to debate and reach a consensus regarding the parameters of a political structure which will form the "rules of the game" of public life. The constitution-setting level dimension of decision-making of which Ostrom and Kiser speak, is not accomplished during a planned series of meetings. Rather, I would argue, parameters evolve out of the social culture. Individuals are socialized into accepting these parameters while the parameters continue to be marginally altered to correspond to the priorities and needs of the society. I postulate that political symbols play a crucial role as the transmission belt between society and constitution parameters. The rules determining the rules of the game are conveyed to individuals through symbols, myths, and rituals.

### ● Day of the Covenant as Constitution Setting Symbol

The belief that race is a legitimate divider of human beings is one of the tenets in Afrikaner political ideology which shapes the constitution of South Africa's political system. This ideological position asserts that the rules of the game of South Africa's political system may and should recognize the different rights of the races. The tenet asserts "that races are the fundamental divisions of humanity and that different races possess inherently different cultural as well as physical qualities."<sup>32</sup> This gives rise to **volk** nationalism, an exclusive expression of self-determination which implies that a state should be based on a culturally homogenous people.<sup>33</sup> The adherence to a belief in the **volk** as the unit of a state has had two major impacts on politics in South Africa. First, it has supported the emergence of the Afrikaner nation and political control over The Republic of South Africa. Second, it also provided the ideological support behind the National Party's objective of establishing independent **bantustans** for the individual "African nations" currently in the republic.

A corollary of this tenet is that God has blessed the Afrikaner race. J.C. van Rooy, when chairman of the elite Afrikaner association the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1944, states this unequivocally.

God created the Afrikaner People with a unique language, a unique philosophy of life, and their own history and tradition in order that they might fulfill a particular calling a destiny here in the southern corner of Africa. We must stand guard on all that is peculiar to us and build upon it. We must believe that God has called us to be servants of his righteousness in this place.<sup>34</sup>

Widespread belief in the God-given destiny of the Afrikaners to rule in Southern Africa can and has granted a great deal of legitimacy in the eyes of the Afrikaner people to their political hegemony. The myths of the Day of the Covenant clearly supports this tenet as it reinforces the belief that God approves of racial separation and favors the Afrikaner race.

### ● The Role of Symbols in Obtaining Legitimacy and Hegemony

Through their emotive power, symbols and myths are powerful tools which leaders can and do use to establish legitimacy for their rule and hegemony for their ideology. Symbols assist a regime to reach political and ideological hegemony by 1) simplifying its ideology, and 2) creating emotional attachment to the ideology. By transmitting a complex ideology through simple yet emotionally compelling symbols, a regime can increase the likelihood that the population will accept the regime's ideological position.

The myths and rituals of the Day of the Covenant played a larger role in establishing the legitimacy and hegemony of the apartheid governments among white citizens. Admittedly not all white South Africans have accepted the legitimacy of the Pretoria regime, but for over forty years the Nationalist Party has retained supreme power in the country. Using the symbolic cues of the brave and noble *voortrekkers* in valiant combat against the brutal and untrustworthy Zulu king, and more important the interpretation that God chose to assist the *voortrekkers* built within many Afrikaners a conviction in the legitimacy of their government. They have a myth, the degree to which to accept each individual can choose, which gives a compelling reason for them to support their government.

### Limitations of Using Political Symbols

This section offers three propositions regarding the limitations of political symbols, myths, and rituals, and identifies examples from politics in South Africa

which demonstrate these limitations. First, political symbols and myths are very conservative forces; they justify and promote the status quo rather than encourage change. Therefore, the presence of myths can often hinder ideological or political change. Second, no matter how emotionally compelling, a system of myths and symbols can not build among a population a commitment to a government which fails to assist them meet their needs. Third, symbols and myths can be used as propaganda and so mislead the population and hinder the formation of governance.

### ● Problem with Conservative Nature of Symbols in South Africa

The progressive elements in the South African government are discovering that beliefs in the myths it had been propagating are now hindering its reform efforts. The radical right elements in South African politics, including the Conservative Party and the *Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaans Resistance Movement), still hold tenaciously to the old myths. To remove from the psyches of many South Africans the myths which have justified white rule and apartheid will be a very long and arduous process. It is likely that resistance to reform will grow increasingly violent and desperate as conservative Afrikaners begin to feel increasingly threatened by change.

One example will illustrate the lengths to which some factions have gone to protect the myths surrounding the Day of the Covenant. The right's most flamboyant, and perhaps equally dangerous leader, Eugene Terreblanche of the *Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging*, made explicitly clear his organization's opinion of liberal reassessment of Afrikaner history. In 1979, the University of South Africa invited Dr. Floris van Jaarsveld to its conference "Problems in the Interpretations of History such as the Battle of Blood River." Dr. van Jaarsveld was expected to take issue with some of the elements in the accepted myth. Terreblanche and a party of 40 men prevented the historian from speaking by bursting into the hall, covering van Jaarsveld with tar and plastering him with feathers. Terreblanche then stated: "We as young Afrikaners are tired of seeing spiritual traditions and everything that is sacred to the Afrikaner desecrated and degraded by liberal politicians, dissipated academics, and false prophets who hide under the mantle of learning and false faith."<sup>35</sup> The myth has worked too well.

### ● Symbols Cannot Override Basic Dissatisfaction

While it might be quite obvious, it is worth emphasizing that political symbols and myths are not so powerful that they can placate people whose needs are not being met by their governments. People can not eat symbols nor can they defend themselves from enemies with political myths. In order to achieve a system of governance, the government must be seen to be succeeding to some degree to protect and serve the people. Thus we find a serious limitation to the tactic of promoting governance through political symbolic cues. In the last analysis, while people may accept their national identity and share norms and rules which govern their social realm, governance will not develop to link an existing political structures to society until the political structure achieves an acceptable degree of efficacy. I suggest that in addition to the lack of national identity in African countries, the impotence of African governments is a second key variable hindering the emergence of governance on the continent.

We can find an example of a body of myths which has failed to capture the hearts of the populace in the nominally independent Ciskei. The former leader of the Ciskei, Lenox Sebe, perpetuated a multitude of political myths and symbols to justify the legitimacy of the Ciskeian nation when the South African government said it was independent. The central feature of Sebe's Ciskeian nationalist ideology, Ntaba kaNdoda (Mountain of Man), has emerged from a reorchestration of an older myth.<sup>36</sup> Sebe conceived of this national shrine during a visit to Mount Massada in Israel in 1977. Ntaba kaNdoda is a foothill of the Amatole range about 30 kilometers from King William's Town in the Ciskei. It is described as the site where the Xhosa High God Qamata historically has heard the pleas of his people. Sebe built an auditorium for conferences and party congresses and hosted national festivals in the shadow of a mountain which is most likely not the historic sight of Ntaba kaNdoda. However, it served the specific political purpose of linking his government with an ancient symbol of Xhosa ethnicity. He made this symbol a focal point for his government in the attempt to add legitimacy to his rule.

The lack of public acceptance of the Ciskei national identity was made explicitly clear after President de Klerk announced that the ANC was no longer an illegal organization in South Africa. A

coups were quickly enacted in the Ciskei and a new government put in place. This new government has announced that it intends to join the Ciskei once again with the Republic of South Africa. All of the myths Sebe propagated failed to override the harsh fact that his government could not provide services for its people. Therefore, the people living in the Ciskei have no affection for a Ciskeian national identity and most are eager to be legal citizens of a new and democratic South Africa.

### ● Symbols Turned to Propaganda

The final limitation of cultivating political symbols in the effort to promote governance is the problem that symbols can be misused as propaganda. Lasswell and Kaplan define propaganda as consisting of "political symbols manipulated for the control of public opinion."<sup>37</sup> Propaganda is characterized by a high degree of incongruity between 1) the intentions of the leaders, 2) the interpretations of the people, and 3) the words themselves. If the leaders creating the myth are doing so only to elevate their power and not to build consensus between members of society and the political elite, then the myth is not contributing to governance.

### Conclusion

This essay makes a case for enhancing the current theoretical discussion regarding the nature of governance with the conceptualization of the essential role political symbols, myths, and rituals play in building governance. Governance is defined here as the set of norms, rules, symbols and myths which govern and legitimize the parameters of public structures. It is concerned with the relationship between citizens and their political structures. The theoretical sections of this essay identify the following three essential dimensions of governance: 1) governance unites and creates a polity, 2) the norms, rules, and symbols that create the governance are the constitution-building parameters of public life, and 3) the presence of governance in a political system creates the legitimacy of the government and elevates its ideology to hegemonic dominance. Through their ability to arouse emotions and simplify complex reality, symbols and myths contribute to each of these features of governance.

This discussion also identified the ways in which symbols promote and limit progress toward governance. The benefits are many. Foremost, political symbols,

myths, and rituals build within the various members of a polity their self and collective identities; thereby building the sense of nation upon which governance depends. Second, they convey the constitution-building rules and norms to the citizens. Finally, they can promote emotional attachment to the leaders, thereby creating legitimacy and elevate an ideology to hegemonic status.

In South Africa, the problem still looms of establishing governance which would bond all of its inhabitants together with a common sense of unity and link them to a legitimate political structure. In the past, political symbols and myths which have been used to create competing national identities in South Africa. The review presented here of Afrikaner myths demonstrates two things. First, myths and symbols were successfully used to contribute to the creation of the Afrikaner political identity and the legitimizing (in the eyes of the white electorate) the political dominance of Afrikaners. Second, the process of creating a new political identity will be full of obstacles. We can expect to see continued resistance by conservatives to change since the process of altering the white national psyche will be very painful. Furthermore, the various African identities will have to merge into one sense of nation which incorporates both their factions and their white fellow citizens. Currently, South Africans are still in the stage where displaying an ANC t-shirt in a pro-Inkatha neighborhood can lead to bloodshed.

The advice a progressive South African political figure might take from this argument would be to embark on a concerted program of cultivating a new body of political myths, symbols, and rituals which would perpetuate the concept of a multiracial South Africa. There are steps being taken in this direction particularly by novelists and artists who are striving to capture the mental and physical image of the new South African polity. Political leaders must also recognize the useful power of political symbols cultivated in good faith. This essay asserts that more than legal changes, the national self-conceptions of people living in South Africa will have to be altered before that country will attain democratic governance.

Two suggestions for further research emerge from this examination. One research project could be the close examination of the role of political symbols and myths in other countries which are undergoing political reconstruction. The fragmented USSR and the reunited

Germany could prove to be fruitful ground for examination. Through a larger comparative study of how governments have used symbols and myths to try to attain governance, some of the propositions raised here could be tested. Specifically, a larger project could substantiate or cast doubt on my proposition that myths more crucial during the formation of a nation.

A second agenda is to more fully elaborate the South African case study. A great deal of research has been conducted on the political myths of the Afrikaner governments while much less is known about African myths in the country. Our understanding of African politics in South Africa would benefit from a close analysis of its myths. Furthermore, since I assert that a new set of myths and symbols will have to emerge in order to create a new sense of nation in the hearts and minds of all South Africans, it would be fruitful to search for evidence of that growing body of myths.

### Notes

- 1 I gratefully thank R. Hunt Davis, Goran Hyden, Rene Lemarchand and three anonymous reviewers for generously assisting me with helpful comments and advice.
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- 3 Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptation, Linkages, Representation and Policies of Urban Politics*, (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc.), 1973.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p.12.
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- 6 Elinor Ostrom and Larry Kiser, "The Three Worlds of Action: A Meta-theoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches," in Elinor Ostrom, ed., *Strategies of Political Inquiry*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), pp.179-222.
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- 8 Erik Eriksen, "Symbols, Strategems, and Legitimacy in Political Analysis," pp. 239-278, *Scandinavian Political Studies X* (1987), pp. 265.
- 9 Robert Boccock, *Hegemony*, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1986), p. 11.
- 10 See Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1988, Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), 1985 and Naomi Chazan and Donald Rothchild eds. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 1988.

- 11 See Rene Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," pp. 149-170 in Chazan and Rothchild, 1988.
- 12 See Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress*, (London: Heinemann), 1983.
- 13 Michael Bratton, "Beyond Autocracy: Civil Society in Africa," pp.28-33 in *Beyond Autocracy - working papers for the inaugural seminar of the governance in Africa program*, (Carter Center of Emory University, 1988), p. 28.
- 14 David Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics, and Power*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 3.
- 15 Abner Cohen, *Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), p. 23.
- 16 See Isabel Hofmeyer, "Building a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature, and Ethnic Identity, 1902-1924," pp.95-123 in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido eds. *The Politics of Race, Class, and Nation in Twentieth Century South Africa*, (London: Longman), 1987.
- 17 Murray Edelman, *Politics and Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence*, (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1971), p. 14.
- 18 Kertzer, p. 9.
- 19 "Toitoti" is the name of a specific dance step which looks like a slow jog. People marching in demonstrations often toitoti as they progress down a street while singing chant-like songs.
- 20 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983), p. 15.
- 21 Quoted in Kertzer, p. 6.
- 22 Cohen, p. 14.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- 24 Quoted in Kertzer, p. 62.
- 25 Richard Elphick, *Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa*, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press) 1985.
- 26 In 1991, as President F.W. de Klerk continues to dismantle the legal structure of apartheid and recognized the popular leaders of black South Africans such as Mandela and Buthelezi, it is likely that we are witnessing the closing of the apartheid era.
- 27 Reprinted in David Styles, *Understanding the Freedom Charter* (Cape Town, South Africa: NSF, 1989) page 89.
- 28 Leonard Thompson, *The Political Mythology of Apartheid*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 213.
- 29 Quoted in Thompson (1985), p. 152.
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- 32 Thompson (1985), p. 69.
- 33 James Leatt, Theo Kneifel, Klaus Nurnberger eds., *Contending Ideologies in South Africa*, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1986), p. 77.
- 34 Quoted in Thompson (1985), p. 29.
- 35 Quoted in Thompson (1985), pp. 213-214.
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*Kimberly Lanegran is a graduate instructor and doctoral student at the University of Florida.*

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# *The Emerging Iranian-Sudanese Relationship: Implications for the New Islamic Politics of North Africa*

Bradford R. McGuinn

## **Introduction**

According to the conventional interpretation the "New" Middle Eastern Order that has emerged from the end of the Cold War and the recent Gulf Crisis has several basic features.<sup>1</sup> First, it is one characterized by an American hegemony. Hence, secondly it is one in which regional actors scramble to take advantage of American primacy in the region. This means, thirdly, that the new order is distinguished by its dearth of meaningful regional challenges to the authority of the United States and its key allies. Fourthly, the new environment is one in which critical regional conflicts, notably the Arab-Israeli Conflict, are specifically targeted for intensive resolution efforts. And, finally, this and other "stabilizing" activities are now possible in the Middle East because its international relations has been "de-ideologized". That is to say, according to this optimistic assessment, the region has become disillusioned with the ideological politics which for so long characterized activities in the area and is now searching for "pragmatic" approaches to domestic politics and international affairs.

The one Middle Eastern power where this framework has been applied with increasing frequency is, ironically, the country which seemed to Western observers, to have been the most doctrinally driven regime in the region: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, it is one of the central assumptions of the "End of History" optimism which informs current thinking about the region that Iran's Islamic revolution has reached its "thermidor", or "cooling off" stage.<sup>2</sup> According to this view, Iran has been compelled by domestic, regional, and international forces to call off its global mission, abandon its call for "permanent revolution" and settle instead for "revolution in one country".

Six key developments are generally cited in support of this thesis: Iran's decision to end the war against Iraq in 1988; its relative neutrality in the recent Gulf War; its failure to tangibly support Iraq Shi'i rebels in their losing struggle against Saddam Hussein's forces at war's end; its agreement to use its influence in the release

of the western captives held in Lebanon; its removal of the Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon; and its general rapprochement with pro-Western Middle East regimes, notably Saudi Arabia. Taken together, these concrete acts present a compelling case for the thesis that Iran is currently engaged in a "moderating" and less ideologically-driven type of foreign relations.<sup>3</sup> Of course, underpinning this assessment is the impression that Iran's severe economic problems are forcing its leaders into a more "realistic" mode.

While it may be possible to argue that as a state-actor Iran has markedly altered its foreign policy it could equally be the case that it remains actively engaged in the promotion of Islamic politics throughout the region. Furthermore, it is argued in this essay that Iran's continuing activities in this direction may be seen in the light of its attempt to shape the new ideological and political contours of the post-Cold War Middle East. This contention is advanced in this paper with reference to Iran's recent undertakings in the Sudan and the implications of this involvement for the new politics and security of North Africa.

## **The Sudanese Connection: Preliminary Speculations**

Sudanese society is bifurcated between the Muslim Arab northern population and the Christian or animist Black African sector in the south. Stability and national "integration" thus hinge on the promotion of a type of rule that does not privilege the status of one group over the other. However, ever since Jafar al-Numeryi's attempt in 1985 to impose Sharia (Islamic) law as the legal basis of the Sudanese state a violent civil war has existed between Black and Arab-Islamic forces.<sup>4</sup> Of course, this is really a very old conflict, just as the legacy of fundamentalist Islam in the Sudan enjoys an old and distinguished pedigree. Since Numeryi was deposed in 1986 the governments of Sadiq al-Mahdi and General Umar al-Basir have been informed greatly by the fundamentalists for whom the advancement of Islamic law is of cardinal importance.<sup>5</sup>

The leading figure of Sudanese fundamentalism is Shaikh Hassan al-Tourabi, a Sunni Pan-Islamic leader. A supporter of Khomeyni, al-Tourabi has been considered a "leading Islamic fundamentalist theoretician and advocate of establishing Islamic regimes in all Arab countries".<sup>6</sup> Tourabi was also a critic of the American-led military effort against Iraq and was, presumably, a factor in Sudan's support for Saddam Hussein, a posture which, of course, put the country at odds with its much stronger neighbor to the north, Egypt.<sup>7</sup>

What motivation could be assigned to Iran for its cultivation of relations with Sudan? In a recent article in *The New York Times* Youssef Ibrahim speculated that it reflected a basic shift in Iran's focus from Lebanon to Sudan.<sup>8</sup> In his view, the shift was necessitated as Iran's room for manoeuvre in Lebanon decreased. Presumably, this shift was undertaken because Sudan seemed the most fertile ground for Iranian influence. Yet, it could also be argued that the Sudanese connection is vital if Iran seeks to have any influence over the new politics of Egypt and the North African region.

At present, little is precisely known about the depth of Iranian-Sudanese relations. To date, most of the information emphasizes the military and political nature of the ties. For example, a report in the *Saudi Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* on November 29, 1991, detailed a large-scale arms deal in which Iran was serving as the intermediary between the Sudanese government and China.<sup>9</sup> This report indicated that the deal involved some \$300 million in arms and fighter aircraft. It included as well the dispatch of a "team of Chinese Air Force experts". This deal was apparently signed during the rule of Sadiq al-Mahdi. Bashir, then, found it difficult to make the payments and requested Iranian financial assistance.<sup>10</sup>

In another report, Ibrahim suggests that Iran has sent between 1,000 and 2,000 Revolutionary Guards to the Sudan from Lebanon.<sup>11</sup> Citing "Western and Arab intelligence officials" Ibrahim claims that "at least a dozen training camps have been established". The purpose of these facilities, he asserts, is to train Islamic fundamentalist



activists from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf region to engage in "subversive activities". To this end, according to Ibrahim, Iran has furnished Sudan with "at least 17 million [dollars] worth of military equipment".<sup>12</sup>

In a more general sense, Sudan's relations with Iran stem logically from the revisionist posture it has assumed over the past several years. It will be recalled that Sudan was one of the countries which evinced support for Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. In fact, there has been some speculation that it was during the run-up to hostilities, in December of 1990, that the Iraqi regime sought to employ its Sudanese ally as a mediator with Iran, with whom Iraq sought a rapid rapprochement in the face of regional and international isolation.<sup>13</sup>

A good deal could be said regarding the Iraqi-Iranian competition for influence in the general North African area. It might be argued, for instance, that in its connection with Sudan Iran is energetically filling a vacuum created by Iraq's defeat in the Gulf Crisis. Iraq had, after all, developed strong relations with many regimes in the region. The *London Sunday Times* has recently reported, for example, that Iraq and Algeria had engaged in nuclear cooperation. The purpose of this cooperation was, according to this report, the creation of an "Islamic Bomb".<sup>14</sup> For its part, the Algerian government has recently issued strenuous denials regarding the existence of any such program or weapons capability.<sup>15</sup> No doubt, the prospect of a nuclearized Tehran-Khartoum-Algiers axis is a major source of concern for the United States and its regional allies.

### Rafsanjani of Khartoum

The emerging Iranian-Sudanese relationship was given tangible expression in the second week of December after the Islamic Conference Organization meeting in Dakar, Senegal. Returning from Dakar, Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani stopped for an official visit to Khartoum. He was accompanied by a host of Iranian officials including Foreign Minister Velayati, Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics Akbar Torkan as well as Ministers for Construction, Commerce, Information, and Budget.<sup>16</sup> It was reported also that Sudan's Army Chief of Staff held meetings with Major General Mohsen Reza'i, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.<sup>17</sup> The presence of these figures has prompted a great deal of speculation regarding the

Sudanese role in the "export" of Islamic revolution throughout North Africa. The visit was, incidentally, the first by an Iranian head of state to Sudan since 1956, the year of Sudan's independence.

During Rafsanjani's visit he met with key Sudanese officials as well as with religious leaders such as Hasan al-Turabi. Through these meetings and his public appearances Rafsanjani emphasized several major themes.<sup>18</sup> First, he stressed that Sudan merited the respect of Iran inasmuch as it has sought to faithfully apply an Islamic model. "What we have seen", Rafsanjani asserted, "shows that the Islamic revolution in the Sudan has reached all aspects of life in the country".<sup>19</sup> He praised the regime's efforts toward the "Islamization" of the Sudan. Second, Rafsanjani discussed the common threats faced by both countries. The main threat, he asserted, emanates from the nature of the post-Cold War international order which is viewed by Iran as one characterized by American hegemony.<sup>20</sup> In his view, the demise of the Soviet system and its motivational basis means that an ideological and power vacuum has been created. It is imperative, from his perspective, that this vacuum is not filled by American "arrogance" or by the designs of its regional allies, notably Israel. Indeed, a great deal of support was evinced for what might be termed the "rejectionist" position on the Arab-Israeli equation. In this sense, both Iran and Sudan advocate a "maximalist" and "Islamic" solution to the Palestine question.<sup>21</sup>

Iranian officials also noted that attempts by outside powers to assist Black rebels in the south constituted an attempt to thwart the spread of Islam. Indeed, there has been recent speculation that the forging of Iranian-Sudanese ties implies a new threshold of violence on the part of the al-Bashir regime against Black oppositionists in the south.<sup>22</sup> And, third, Rafsanjani advocated an increasingly activist approach by Islamic forces amidst the radical re-conjugation of international politics over the past several years. This may not be activism of the same sort as was identified with the "export of revolution" approach of the 1980s. Rather, it could represent an attempt to project Iran's influence through less violent means. In some remarks made in Sudan Rafsanjani noted that the Islamic *Umma* consisted of some 50 countries, one fourth of the world's population, over fifty percent of its natural resources, and enjoys control over key geo-strategic points.<sup>23</sup> Hence, Iran's relationship with Sudan

represents an attempt to join together Islamic forces and project Muslim power in the Arab world as a coherent balancing force to the power of the United States.

The London-based *Sawt al-Kuwait Al-Duwali* has disclosed what it claims to be the substance of a "security accord" between Iran and Sudan.<sup>24</sup> It cited four main provisions. First, Iran agreed to supply Sudan with about 2 million tons of oil annually at no charge "...to meet the Sudanese Army's needs until the problem of the South is over".<sup>25</sup> Second, "Iran will finance a 260 million Sudan-PRC arms deal under which Khartoum will receive 18 Shenyang F-7 and F-8 fighter planes, 140 T-54 and T-59 tanks and 20 T-70 tanks, 27 military trucks and armored vehicles, a number of multiple rocket launchers, and medium range guns".<sup>26</sup> Third, "Iran will send a group of military experts to help the Sudanese forces in the fields of scientific training and defence industries."<sup>27</sup> It agrees also to admit a number of Sudanese officers to Iranian academies, especially the Air Force Academy attached to the Revolutionary Guard where modern training takes place under the supervision of Chinese and North Korean advisors".<sup>28</sup> And, fourth, it seems that a joint security committee has been formed between the two countries whose primary function it is to "supervise all efforts to strengthen ties ...".<sup>29</sup> It is further indicated that many of the National Salvation Front Members have received training in Qom and other Iranian religious centers. It appears as well that Iranian military advisors have assisted the al-Bashir regime in the creation of a Sudanese Revolutionary Guards Corp, modelled after the Iranian units.<sup>30</sup> This action was taken, it is speculated, because Iran has come to fear for the stability of Sudan's Islamic government.

The *Sawt al-Kuwait al-Duwali* report provides some contextual information from the Iranian policy perspective. It mentions that this relationship had been in the works for some time. Yet, Iran had moved slowly because it was concerned about the level of internal opposition to the al-Bashir regime.<sup>31</sup> It was reluctant also because of the perception that his regime was becoming increasingly subject to international isolation. Indeed, it will be recalled that the Khartoum regime was severely criticized over the past year for its mishandling of relief efforts in the south. Furthermore, Iran was apparently concerned about deepening its relations with Sudan for fear of antagonizing Egypt and key Gulf states.<sup>32</sup>

Have these concerns been abandoned? This would seem doubtful. One of the salient trends in recent Iranian Middle East policy has been its rapprochement with two sets of actors. The first are the GCC states, notably Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it was at the Dakar Summit that Rafsanjani met with Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud Faysal and it was agreed that the two heads of state must soon meet.<sup>33</sup> This is a vast departure from the type of real animosity evinced between these states only several years ago. There have also been some signs of improvement in the relations between Iran and Egypt.<sup>34</sup> This has been expressed in the comparatively benign Iranian response to the activities of the "Damascus Declaration" group of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. And, atop all this, of course, is the noticeable lowering of tension between Iran and the United States.<sup>35</sup>

What then is the purpose behind Iran's exertions in Sudan? No doubt as a Middle Eastern actor Iran seeks to improve its state-to-state relations with other countries in the region. To this end, it has enhanced its formerly tense relations with a host of "moderate" regimes in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. Yet, the Sudanese connection suggests a somewhat different pattern. It indicates, one may speculate, a desire on the part of Iran to play a critical role in the new politics of North Africa. And, it may be argued, that from the Iranian perspective, North Africa now represents the most promising area for the advancement of Islamic fundamentalism.

### **Sudan and Islamic Terrorism**

There is now considerable evidence to suggest that the Sudanese regime is actively promoting Islamic as well as Palestinian terrorist activities. This process began, apparently in 1989, upon the accession of the al-Bashir regime.<sup>36</sup> At that time, contacts were made within the international Muslim Brotherhood movement, the purpose of which was to establish Sudan as a major base of Islamic activism.<sup>37</sup> Three such facilities were immediately created: on the Red Sea coast, in the town of Kaduqli, and in the suburbs of Khartoum.<sup>38</sup> At these and subsequently developed facilities, Islamic militants from a host of Middle Eastern and African countries are presently undergoing training.<sup>39</sup>

The recent Gulf War marked a critical juncture in this process. During the course of hostilities, meetings among fundamentalists were held in Khartoum, Amman, and Lahore.<sup>40</sup> A key issue for these activists

was the location of a suitable base for Islamic activist operations since movement in Lebanon has become increasingly restricted.<sup>41</sup> For his part, al-Tourabi apparently travelled to Afghanistan and Iraq, obtaining support from Afghan Islamic forces and Saddam Hussein.<sup>42</sup> According to one report, an agreement was reached whereby Sudan would "...receive weapons as well as members of the Arab religious groups that travelled before to fight in the Afghan war".<sup>43</sup>

In Sudan, the proliferation of terrorist training camps continued apace during 1990 and 1991. They were placed under the overall command of Colonel al-Hadi 'Abdallah, a high-ranking Sudanese military official with close ties to al-Tourabi.<sup>44</sup> These camps have provided assistance to such figures as the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rashid Ghannouchi, head of the Ennahda movement.<sup>45</sup> It has been claimed that these facilities host various Palestinian fundamentalist groups, notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad.<sup>46</sup> It has been asserted that al-Tourabi's organizations have "...recruited approximately 500 personnel from the extremist Palestinian groups to take part in assassinating leaders and security figures inside the Arab region".<sup>47</sup> To these Palestinian activists may be added Islamic militants from a variety of states including Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Uganda, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, Bahrain, Mauritania, and India.<sup>48</sup> Through its connection with Iran, Sudan has been also active in assistance for Shi'i groups now operating in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire.<sup>49</sup>

This "Shi'i connection" has also involved close relations between al-Tourabi's group and the Lebanese Hizballah.<sup>50</sup> From Hizballah's perspective, the Lebanese theater is no longer as attractive as it was during the 1980s. Israel and Syria, the two great powers of that area, share a mutual desire to reduce the influence of pro-Iranian Islamic forces such as Hizballah. This convergence was given tangible expression recently when the Israeli air attack which resulted in the death of 'Abbas al-Musawi failed to elicit any Syrian response. It is not unlikely, therefore, that given this new environment, Hizballah will seek to base more of its operations in the relative safety of Sudan.

### **North Africa: The Paradox Of Democratization**

The current pattern of North African politics throws into sharp relief the central

paradox that is at the heart of the "democratization" of the area. This is an irony with tremendous political consequences and ominous policy implications for the United States. The most articulate commentator on this "paradox" has been, appropriately enough, Iran's President Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In his Friday sermons he has railed against the American "New World Order" with its democratic pretensions.<sup>51</sup> He has ridiculed those Western observers who imagine that the "New Middle Eastern Order" will be dominated by pro-Western, secularists. Rather, he avers, the principle outcome of any democratization in the region will be the triumph of Islamic forces.<sup>52</sup> That is, the demise of the Arab authoritarian state will be replaced not by Western-style liberal secularists but, rather, by Islamic fundamentalists who will reject Western doctrines.

According to this view, the opening of "political space" in the Middle East, the emergence of "civil societies" will serve to mobilize Islamic movements.<sup>53</sup> Contrary to the desires of Western observers and Arab secularists the region will not find a "usable past" in the era which Albert Hourani called the "liberal age", between 1798 and 1939.<sup>54</sup> The liberal era, as with its post-1945 authoritarian sequel, had two things in common. First, they were both deeply influenced by Western normative and organizational paradigms.<sup>55</sup> And, secondly, both turned on the primacy of a narrow group of Arab elites.<sup>56</sup> According to the current Islamic critique neither condition will obtain in the new order which will be characterized by a movement toward more "authentic" paradigms and concomitantly a trend toward more participatory or grass-roots politics.<sup>57</sup> Of course, one may raise many objections regarding the likelihood of such a scenario. Yet, the Islamic critique of the "End of History" optimism so evident now in the West and among certain elites in the Arab world, has an unassailable cogency.

The Islamic critics are quite correct when they argue that to invite democratic, pluralistic politics into the region is to clear the way for Islamic movements to demonstrate their real strength. It has long been argued by Bernard Lewis and others that the closer one gets to the grass-roots in these societies the greater the salience of Islam.<sup>58</sup> It has also been argued that part of the inspiration for the resurgence of Islamic politics in the late 1970s was the result of the failure of specifically Western "radical" approaches such as Nasirism and

Ba'thism.<sup>59</sup> And, although Iran's revolution was clearly not emulated throughout the region there is no reason to assume that the force of the Islamic approach has been exhausted by the specific failures or successes of Khomeyni's project.

Consider, for example, the recent experiences in those societies which have permitted even a modest measure of "democratization." The big winners in Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria have been the fundamentalist groups.<sup>60</sup> In other countries, notably Egypt, Morocco, Libya, and even in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria Islamic forces constitute the cutting edge of oppositionist politics.<sup>61</sup>

Moreover, within the North African environment Islam represents not only a widely recognized normative framework, and an efficacious vehicle for anti-Western protest, but also serves as a tangible basis for societal relations.<sup>62</sup> In many of these post-colonial authoritarian regimes a wide gap has emerged between the state and the society.<sup>63</sup> Historically, Muslim brotherhood, or *tariqahs*, informed by a "popular" Islam, have served, along with tribal orders, as the real bases of society and politics in the area.<sup>64</sup> These "informal" structures have not disappeared despite the state-directed socialization and centralization efforts of North African "modernizing" regimes. Indeed, they serve today as the basis of "civil society", involving a range of cultural, societal, economic, and religious interactions. In this sense, then, the Islamic assertion in North Africa is energized by a viable and authentic political, social, and economic culture.

In general terms, then, despite tangible constraints Iran is not without ideological assets as it seeks to project its influence in the region. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that some type of "balancing" tendency will eventually emerge in the region in opposition to the influence of the United States and its regional allies. As it demonstrated during the recent Madrid talks, Iran is quite willing to assume the role of the leader of a new "rejectionist front", if only in ideological terms. It is, then, within this context of major political change in the area coupled with the continuing saliency of Islamic politics and Iran's desire to project its influence that some of the implications of the emerging Iranian-Sudanese relationship may be explored.

## The Iranian-Sudanese Nexus and North Africa

It is possible to point to serious Islamic challenges to all of the regimes of North Africa, including Egypt. In terms of the Iranian-Sudanese connection most of the available information centers on Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Yet, the implications of this Islamic challenge extend, of course, well beyond North Africa.

### Tunisia

From the time of its independence in 1956 until 1989 Tunisian politics was dominated by President Habib Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour Party. In theory, Bourguiba's rule was one of Arab nationalism and mild socialism, influenced largely by French political thought.<sup>65</sup> In practice, Tunisia was run as a single-party dictatorship, albeit a relatively benign one. By the late 1970s, however, an organized Islamic opposition emerged. Throughout the 1980s its main expression, the Islamic Tendency Movement, served as a critical source of potential instability for the secularist Bourguiba regime.<sup>66</sup> In an attempt to deny the Tunisian character of this Islamic challenge, the regime and its defenders depicted the Islamists as "Iranian-sponsored" extremists. While Iran did indeed provide the inspirational model for these forces and evidence exists to support the theses that a measure of tangible cooperation occurred, there can be no denying the authenticity of Tunisia's Islamic movement.<sup>67</sup> In fact, it was out of fear of the rising popularity of these forces coupled with the poor economic performance of the regime that precipitated the downfall of Bourguiba and the ascent of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. It has been his chief aim to engineer a successful Tunisian *Perestroika*. But his task is a difficult one. As Mr Gorbachev discovered to embark upon such a course is to solicit forces which once turned loose are impossible to control.

The recent tension in Tunisia's relations with Sudan are symbolic of Ben Ali's predicament and vulnerability. A recent report in the Tunisian *Al-Sharq* suggests that these relations may be near the breaking point. The cause celebre of this tension is, apparently, Sudan's support for the Tunisian Islamic group called "Ennahdha" or "Al-Nahda".<sup>68</sup> Specifically, it is claimed that Sudan providing false passports to Rachid Ghannouchi the leader of Al-Nahda so that he might travel to France and elsewhere.<sup>69</sup>

More ominously, it is asserted by this and other sources that Sudan (and presumably Iran) is provided training and logistical support for Tunisian Islamic forces seeking to overthrow the government.<sup>70</sup> According to an *Al-Sharq* report, Hasan al-Turabi as secretary-general of the Khartoum-based Arab-Islamic People's Conference serves as a focal point for the training of Islamic activists from Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and the Palestinian movement, Hamas.<sup>71</sup>

A report from the Egyptian *Al-Wafd* described, in detail, the workings of the Sudanese support for Tunisian fundamentalists. It asserted that a group of 16 Tunisians recently left Sudan for "Paris and Tunis".<sup>72</sup> The group was "one of several assassination squads entrusted to kill 14 Tunisian security men, described by the Ghannouchi group as "the Formidables".<sup>73</sup> According to this report, this group has trained "at the al-Ma'aqil camp, which is attached to the Sudanese Armed Forces northern command near Shandi, about 170km north of Khartoum".<sup>74</sup> These squads were, the paper continues, the outcome of an agreement between Turabi and Ghannouchi.<sup>75</sup> In addition to Ben Ali, the group's "hit list" includes a number of key Tunisian government officials.<sup>76</sup>

The *Al-Wafd* article describes an even more ambitious Sudanese strategy. It quoted, for example, a member of the Bulgarian parliament who stated that Sudan has "become a world center for the Islamic movement".<sup>77</sup> At a variety of training facilities, the Al-Kadru Camp, the al-Kamilin Camp, the Jabal al-Awiya Camp and the Sawba Camp, Sudanese officials train cadres from a number of "hardline world religions".<sup>78</sup>

The Tunisian regime is unequivocal in its assertion that Sudan is currently playing a de-stabilizing role in the region. This is expressed clearly and not without a note of panic in the Tunisian press. *La Presse*, for example, contends that Sudan presently maintains "more than 30 training camps for...terrorism".<sup>79</sup> It states further that "the aim of National Islamic Front leader Hasan al-Turabi...is to provide active assistance to various fundamentalist movements in other Arab and Islamic states".<sup>80</sup> The Tunisian press also gave wide circulation to stories of the involvement of Sudanese officials at the gathering of Palestinian rejectionist forces in Tehran.<sup>81</sup> No doubt much of this reflects a measure of desperation in Tunis. It may reflect as well a measure of "tactical" alarm. That is to say, by evoking images of Iranian-sponsored "terrorism" the Tunisian regime

automatically garners the support of various "moderate" actors who, in turn, are able to solicit the services of the United States in their efforts to promote "stability" both domestically and regionally.

### Algeria

Since 1962 Algeria has been ruled by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). For a generation of Third World politicians and their Western admirers the FLN symbolized the anti-Colonial struggle. Indeed, along with Cuba and Vietnam, Algeria has occupied a privileged place in the theory and praxis of Third World revolution. The works of Franz Fanon, for example, are known to have exercised a great influence over Iran's Islamic revolutionaries.<sup>82</sup> Over the past decade, however, the allure and moral legitimacy of the FLN has faded for many younger Algerian activists. Increasingly, their critique of the "old order" is framed in Islamic terms.<sup>83</sup> And, in the past two elections, in June 1990 and December 1991, the vast majority of the votes went to the Islamic parties, notably the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).<sup>84</sup> In fact, the victory of the FIS in the recent elections raises the real possibility that Algeria will join Sudan and Iran in imposing Islamic law on the state. Concomitantly, there is some evidence to suggest that Sudan and Iran are not assuming a passive position regarding developments in Algeria.

A report in *Al-Wafd* suggests that Sudan is currently sponsoring key fundamentalist groups from both Tunisia and Algeria.<sup>85</sup> According to the report, Algerian Islamic Salvation Front extremists who "carried out an armed attack against an Algerian post near the Tunisian border in late November were trained at a Sudanese camp used to train fundamentalist groups".<sup>86</sup> Members of this group "secretly arrived on the Algerian-Tunisian border via a European capital."<sup>87</sup> This apparently coincided with the arrival of the Tunisian terrorists previously mentioned. According to *Al-Wafd*, Tunisian authorities seized some of the *Al-Nahdah* militants and discovered papers linking them with Khartoum.<sup>88</sup> This account makes two additional key points. First, it is asserted that the figure in charge of the Sudanese effort is Hasan al-Turabi.<sup>89</sup> Apparently he is in charge of preparing fundamentalist in North Africa.<sup>90</sup> Second, this effort has been assisted by Afghan Islamic fundamentalists or North Africans who gained experience in the Afghan war.<sup>91</sup>

In the run-up to the December elections

there was an incident in Guemar, in north-east Algeria, in which Islamic fundamentalist groups reportedly attacked a border, army outpost. The Algerian government assigned culpability to the FIS, perhaps in an effort to discredit it before the elections, and engaged in a highly publicized effort to "wipe out" these "subversive forces".<sup>92</sup> A great deal of attention was given, in this connection, to the activities of the Tayeb el-Afhgani Group, an organization perhaps linked to the FIS and led by an individual who fought with the Afghan resistance.<sup>93</sup> For their part, the leadership of the FIS denied any involvement in the Guemar affair, but claimed that it simply reflected the "revolutionary situation" which now prevails in Algeria.<sup>94</sup> It could be noted as well that an important figure in the FIS participated in the recent Tehran conference. In his view, "Algeria has found a sibling in the Islamic Republic".<sup>95</sup>

For its part, Iran has responded favorably to the recent course of events in Algeria. It has been argued in the Iranian media that Algeria's Islamic victory was the natural result of the country's recent political evolution.<sup>96</sup> These sources are also critical of the "somber prediction" offered by Western observers regarding the outcome of the election.<sup>97</sup> They are, indeed, critical of the general perception in the West of Islam as a "threat" to the well-being and stability of the region. One commentary pointed to a contradiction in the American concept of positive political change. Whereas the dramatic shifts in Eastern Europe, the demise of totalitarian orders and the emergence of nascent democracies, has been viewed as positive by Western observers, a similar transition away from one-party authoritarian regimes is considered "dangerous" when applied to North Africa.<sup>98</sup> For Iran, then, the developments in Algeria as in the Muslim ex-Soviet Republics, represent a real political windfall. The Sudanese connection, therefore, represents an attempt to strengthen Iran's position in this area of Islamic ascendancy.

The resignation of President Chadli Benjedid and the creation of a "State Council" led by Mohammad Boudiafe and military elements signals a reaction to the democratization process in Algeria. In what must be seen as a panic induced move, this State Council has nullified the results of the recent elections and canceled the next round. This move came after several weeks of disarray following the victory of the FIS. The FIS and its leader Abdelqader

Hashani had, prior to the coup, declared that Algeria would now follow an Islamic path, a notion antithetical to the country's socialist parties and Western-oriented urban populations, including much of the military. After the coup FIS officials declared that the Islamic forces will resist this anti-democratic development. Parallels may, of course, be drawn here with the Soviet coup attempt in August 1991. In Algeria today, as was the case in the USSR, a dynamic exists in which organized elements within the new civil society are steadily gaining ground on state structures increasingly devoid of ideological legitimacy and the ability to instill fear in the populous.

The Algerian situation is, therefore, a very fluid one.<sup>99</sup> Should open resistance and armed conflict ensue the Islamic elements will presumably be able to receive assistance from Iran through Sudan. Of course, the Iranian leadership can make the effective case that the West has no right to be "alarmed" at such a prospect because if it really stood behind its democratic rhetoric the United States and its allies in the "New World Order" would demand the restoration of democracy in Algeria. The Iranian government has indicated that it will support Algeria's Islamic forces at the expense of its bilateral relations with the Algerian regime.<sup>100</sup> Sid Ahmed Ghazali, Algeria's Prime Minister, has gone so far as to accuse Iran of "providing direct financial and logistical support to the fundamentalists".<sup>101</sup> Other reports have, indeed, suggested that Iran is providing financial assistance to Algerian fundamentalists through its Revolutionary Guards stationed in Sudan.<sup>102</sup> Iran's position could, therefore, be critical as the Algerian's new rulers head toward conflict with their Islamic critics.

A consensus of sorts has emerged among moderate and secularist Arab regimes to condone the "anti-democratic" actions of the Algerian government. This alone must give pause to those who see signs of "democratization" in such countries as Egypt.<sup>103</sup> In fact, the Egyptian government seems eager to assist the Algerian regime in its efforts against the fundamentalists. There have been reports of Egyptian security specialists who are advising Algerian authorities as well as stories of possible coup attempts by the FIS. In this connection, the primary supporter of the FIS is said to be the Sudanese regime.<sup>104</sup>

### Libya

There have been indications that Libya's

Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi has recently voiced concern regarding the nascent Sudanese-Iranian connection. According to the London based *Al-Hayah*, Qadhafi has "ordered the transfer to remote military zones of a number of senior army officers accused of making contacts with Sudanese military elements".<sup>105</sup> It notes also that with Iranian funding Sudan has acquired Iranian and Chinese-made "silkworm missiles".<sup>106</sup> There are other indications that a "crisis" presently exists in Libyan-Sudanese relations over the Islamic activism of al-Turabi.<sup>107</sup> In this sense, it is suggested that Qadhafi has embraced the Egyptian position on the deleterious nature of the Sudanese-Iranian linkage.<sup>108</sup> There have, in fact, been indications that the Libyan-Egyptian relationship is growing more intimate, especially in the areas of military and security cooperation.<sup>109</sup> Qadhafi's domestic problems, coupled with the difficulties his regime faces with the United States in connection with the Pan Am 107 bombing, render him more vulnerable before the Iranian-Sudanese Islamic challenge and Egypt's desire to enlist Libya into its generally pro-American regional order. Of course, the notion of a Sudanese-based threat to the Libyan regime is quite ironic in light of Qadhafi's long history of subversive involvement in the politics of Sudan.

### The Egyptian Response

The fate of Sudan is, by virtue of its geography, of paramount concern to Egypt. Indeed, whether it was during the period of British control or the subsequent eras of independence Egypt has generally exercised a measure of hegemony over its Southern neighbor. Egypt's desire to dominate Sudan stems from Sudan's control of the Nile River, Egypt's lifeline. Anything that compromises Egypt's access to the Nile must, from Cairo's perspective, be viewed as a direct security threat.

It is, then, in this context that Egypt has reacted to the emergence of the Sudanese-Iranian relationship. Indeed, this apprehension has been energized still further by the fact that the nexus of this nascent relationship is Islamic fundamentalism, a force which represents, arguably, the chief internal challenge to the Mubarak regime.<sup>110</sup> It is, therefore, not difficult to fathom the sources of Egypt's opposition to any Iranian involvement in Sudan.

To these factors must be added a third. In the post-Gulf War regional environment Iran and Egypt have emerged as the two

key Arab or Islamic Middle Eastern powers. Indeed, they vie for ascendancy on several levels. Ideologically, Iran's fundamentalism challenges the essentially secular basis of the Mubarak regime. Politically, Egypt's close relations with the United States gives them an advantage over Iran amidst the new regional "Pax Americana". Moreover, the emergence of the "Damascus Declaration", an alliance between Egypt, Syria, and the GCC states, provides Egypt with a "legitimate role" in the security of the Persian Gulf, a role which Iran views as threatening to their primacy.<sup>111</sup> One reading of Iran's involvement in Sudan is, then, its attempt to gain some leverage over Egypt by projecting Iranian influence to Cairo's southern periphery.

It has been reported that Egypt has communicated its displeasure to Sudan regarding the Iranian connection. Apparently, "...information has already reached the Egyptian capital that an agreement signed by Sudan and Iran during ...Rafsanjini's visit to Khartoum stipulates that about 5000 Iranian fighters would be stationed in Sudan".<sup>112</sup> The report indicates as well that the Egyptian government "...has formed a special team..." to monitor the situation.<sup>113</sup> Mubarak has apparently instructed al-Turabi, that insofar as the Sudanese fundamentalists were giving assistance to their Egyptian partisans he was "playing with fire".<sup>114</sup> There have, in fact, been recent reports of tension on the Egyptian-Sudanese border.<sup>115</sup> In one instance the Egyptian Air Force launched a mock air raid in northern Sudan which forced the evacuation of several hundred foreign oil workers and the dispatch of Sudanese air defense personnel.<sup>116</sup>

The nature and implications of this relationships were explored in further detail by Ibrahim Nafi, the Editor-in-Chief of *Al-Ahram*. In his view, Sudan's decision to invite an Iranian presence reflects the isolation which the al-Bashir regime presently faces.<sup>117</sup> This stems from the repressive nature of the regime which has earned the scorn of the international community during the time of Sudanese drought conditions and its pro-Iraqi stand during Gulf hostilities. According to the *Al-Ahram* piece, the al-Bashir regime is in desperate shape, destined to go the way of Mengistu's in Ethiopia.<sup>118</sup> The recent success of the SPLA and the oppositionists in Darfur are suggestive of the government's vulnerability. For Nafi then, Sudan's involvement with Iran is tied primarily to Iran's ability to furnish arms to be used

against the regime's opponents.<sup>119</sup> The Chinese deal was also cited in this connection.<sup>120</sup>

Yet, in Nafi's view the "more dangerous aspect" of this relationship is the training role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. "It is known", Nafi asserts, "that the Revolutionary Guards were directly or indirectly responsible, together with the Lebanese Hizballah party, for the hostage crisis in Lebanon".<sup>121</sup> "It is", he continues, "the political-military establishment that reflects the most hard-line aspect of the Iranian regime and is used to export the revolution".<sup>122</sup> Here again it should be noted that this "alarmism" and demonologizing is not devoid of tactical utility. To conjure up the "Islamic threat" is, of course, to legitimize efforts taken against it by the Mubarak regime and its allies.

Mr. Nafi then proceeds to offer an analysis of Iranian intentions in Sudan and the region. He makes six general points. First, Iran is, in his view, seeking to become the dominant power in the Gulf area.<sup>123</sup> Second, it is seeking closer ties with Pakistan and Afghan resistance groups in an effort to "...strengthen its links with the Asian Islamic republics in the Soviet Union to cordon off the Gulf Region".<sup>124</sup> It is moreover "...attempting to build a network of extensive relations with western Asia as part of a new Middle Eastern order and as a substitute for the Arab order".<sup>125</sup> According to this view, then Iran is seeking to "breakoff" the Gulf from the "Arab" Middle East.<sup>126</sup> In this sense, Iran emerges as the "Super Power" of a new Southwest Asian order, of which the Gulf represents the strategic prize.

Third, much of this is motivated, Mr Nafi asserts, by Iran's concern over the rising influence of Egypt and Turkey as dominant forces in the area.<sup>127</sup> Hence, a link with Sudan serves to challenge Egypt in its own "back yard". It acts also to challenge Saudi Arabia within its critical Red Sea sub-region. This challenge has recently taken the form of joint Iranian-Sudanese-Eritrean military exercises in the Red Sea.<sup>128</sup> The participation of Yemen as an "observer" in this alliance must add to the Saudi unease.<sup>129</sup> Fourth, support for Turabi and Sudanese fundamentalists furnishes a base for radical Islamic activities throughout North Africa. Fifth, Iran's efforts in this connection stem as well from its desire to offer a "balancing" force to what it sees as an American hegemony.<sup>130</sup> That is, Iran's Islamic approach challenges the basically moderate and pro-American Egyptian and Saudi approach. And, having



lost its position in Lebanon, activism in Sudan represents a way of exercising some leverage over the Americans and their allies. Sixth, in the bigger picture, Iran's activity in Sudan may be seen as part of a larger Middle Eastern strategy. According to this view, Iran seeks to fashion a coalition comprised of Sudan, Afghan resistance movements, "...and Islamic movements in numerous Arab countries such as Sudan, Algeria, and Yemen".<sup>131</sup> There are also indications that Egypt is concerned about Iran's exploitation of the Ethiopian situation. With increased autonomy upon the downfall of the Mengistu regime Eritrean and Tigrean forces are, apparently, providing support to the Iranian-sponsored Sudanese army in its fight with the SPLA.<sup>132</sup> In this connection, it has been reported by Sudanese oppositionists that 18,000 Iranian troops have been sent to southern Sudan and that Iranian naval vessels have been based at Eritrean ports.<sup>133</sup> For its part the Egyptian government cannot but look with unease at the formation of a pro-Iranian coalition comprised of Sudan and the independence-minded Muslim provinces of the old Ethiopian state.<sup>134</sup>

On a number of levels, then, Iran's Islamic assertion represents a direct challenge to Egypt in the new Middle Eastern balance of power. Domestically, as the death of Anwar Sadat revealed, the most potent source of instability is to be found in the numerous Islamic radical groups. The growth of the Islamic movement among the intelligentsia, students, professional classes, and newly urbanized elements must be viewed with alarm by a regime unable to come to terms with Egypt's massive social and economic problems. Within the North African and Red Sea sub-regions the spread of "militant" Islam and the enhanced Iranian role challenges Egypt's traditional hegemony. Iran's long-standing Islamic activism in Sub-Saharan Africa also threatens Cairo's historical centrality in African Islam. Further afield, in the Middle East as a whole, Iran's way challenges Egypt on a range of questions from the Arab-Israeli equation to the security of the Persian Gulf to the legitimate role of the United States in the region.

### **Implications and Conclusions**

Based on what has been cited, it is possible to offer several observations:

\* The lasting primacy of pro-Western, secular, rulers in the region is by no means a foregone conclusion. One

should be wary about attempts to invest into one's analysis "End of History" optimism. The basis of politics in these societies remains deeply tied to Islamic values and themes.<sup>135</sup> At present, in the wake of the Cold War and the recent Gulf Crisis, the region is again in the midst of a struggle between essentially Western liberal paradigms and Islamic ones. Events in the Sudan and North Africa generally suggest that the Islamic approach, while retaining its historical legitimacy, enjoys wide subscription among those in search for a viable "post-modern" ideology.

\* In those states where a measure of "democratization" has been sanctioned it has been the Islamic forces that have demonstrated the most "grass-roots" support. Hence, if Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and others move toward more pluralism they may witness a significant growth of Islamic movements. This pattern has once again been confirmed in the results of the December 26 Algerian elections where the FIS scored an impressive electoral victory. This, in turn, triggered a coup of sorts in which the results of the election were nullified. One must assume, however, that the Algerian situation cannot be frozen indefinitely. The Islamic forces are, in other words, bound to reassert themselves.

\* The Sudanese regime is, indeed, a weak reed on which Iran seeks to erect a major regional initiative.<sup>136</sup> And, it must be assumed that much of Sudan's motivational basis for its Iranian connection is informed by its desire to prosecute its war against the Blacks in the South. While Sudan has, along with Iraq and Yemen, been identified as part of a counter-axis to the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian coalition, it has few real assets to offer.

It does, however, provide Iran with a lever to use against the Damascus Declaration bloc. Beyond the balance of power logic of the relationship, Sudan offers Iran an Islamic ally in an area of the Middle East where the Islamic tendency is on the ascent.

\* While in many ways Iran's revolutionary project has been stalled by serious objective factors it remains the most articulate spokesman against the hegemony of the United States and its allies in the region. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that Iran is increasingly involved with Sudan and that this involvement centers on the

promotion of Islamic forces throughout the region, particularly in North Africa. There is an unresolved contradiction in Iran's foreign policy between the "moderating" and "activist" tendencies. It may well be that within its foreign policy establishment no resolution to the contradiction exists. The dispatch of Revolutionary Guards to Sudan may, in other words, have as much to do with internal Iranian disputes as it does with any coherent strategy to export the revolution to North Africa. The debate and confusion in Tehran regarding the Sudanese connection and the Islamic factor in North Africa may parallel the disorientation so observable among American analysts and officials. Conversely, the case could be made that Iran's approach reflects a coherent strategy. Seen this way the Iranian regime seeks to promote its revolutionary Islamic agenda in the region while maintaining generally positive relations with the areas pro-Western powers. In so doing Iran succeeds in advancing its interests without incurring opposition from the United States and its Middle Eastern allies.

\* Judging by the sharp anti-Sudan rhetoric emanating from Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt it may be assumed that these regimes take seriously the de-stabilizing potential of Sudan's Islamic challenge. Moreover, recent statements by American officials suggest that the Bush Administration also takes seriously the prospect of a major Islamic upheaval in key North African countries.<sup>137</sup>

\* Finally, the intensity of the "Islamic factor" in the new politics of North Africa and the potential roles of Sudan and Iran should give pause to Western observers and policy-makers who believe that "stability" may be realized through either American hegemonic management of the region, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, reliance on pro-Western authoritarian rulers, or even the promotion of democratization. As was demonstrated so ostentatiously in the Soviet case, American attempts to "manage" or "control", political change are often of little efficacy. The regional forces and tensions described in this essay are of a sort that will frustrate any American attempt to unilaterally "manage" the region. They also underscore the difficulty inherent in the more traditional American "devolutionary" type of policy of reliance on key allies. But, these

potential sources of upheaval must warn also against any American retreat from the area, an eventuality consistent with the isolationist temper now prevalent at both ends of the American political continuum.<sup>138</sup> The trends discussed in this paper suggest a strengthened pattern of "regionalization" in international relations, in which local dynamics are increasingly liberated from the framework of the bi-polar Cold War. This promises to be a very fluid era, pregnant with all the dangers of ethnic fragmentation, religious activism, and nuclear proliferation. The full implications of the Iranian-Sudanese connection and the Islamic trend in North African politics are dim and uncertain. Much of this ambiguity is the result of unfinished debates within the region itself regarding the relationship between Islamic approaches to politics and society and those offered by the West. This debate is, of course, an old one. While the United States has little control over its outcome, it will nonetheless be greatly effected by its painful continuation.

## Notes

- 1 Much of this reasoning emanates from what might be termed the "End of History" optimism which was based on the demise of the Soviet system. See, in this connection, Fukayama, F. "The End of History?" *National Interest*. (Summer 1989). For regional applications of this line of thought see Synder, J. "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe." *International Security*. (Spring 1990). Also see Fuller, G. "The Middle East in US-Soviet Relations." *The Middle East Journal*. (Summer 1990).
- 2 This view is presented in Ajami, F. "Iran: The Impossible Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*. (Fall 1989).
- 3 Numerous media accounts speak to these developments. See, for example, Judith Millar's report in *The New York Times*. (April 5, 1991).
- 4 For an account of Sudan's civil war see Lesch, A.M. "The Republic of Sudan" in Ismael, T. and J. Ismael. *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa*. (Miami: FIU Press, 1991). Also see Holt, P.M. and M. Daly. *The History of Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
- 5 See Voll, J. "Political Crisis in Sudan". *Current History*. (Volume 89, 1990).
- 6 See Ibrahim, Y. "Iran Shifting Its Attention From Lebanon to Sudan." *The New York Times*. (December 13, 1991).
- 7 Sudan was generally supportive of Iraq during the recent Gulf Crisis.
- 8 Ibrahim, Y. op. cit.
- 9 See the translation in *Foreign Broadcast and Information Service-Near East and South Asia*. [hereafter FBIS-NEA] (December 3, 1991) pp. 11-12.
- 10 See FBIS-NEA. (December 13, 1991) p. 31.
- 11 See Ibrahim, Y. op. cit.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 See FBIS-NEA. (December 30, 1991) p. 16. Also see al-Bashir's comments in FBIS-NEA. (January 9, 1991) pp. 9-11.
- 14 See FBIS-NEA. (January 7, 1992) p. 6.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 For details of Rafsanjani's visit see FBIS-NEA. (December 16, 1991) pp. 24-29.
- 17 This was reported by Ibrahim, Y. op. cit.
- 18 These were taken from his remarks as translated in FBIS-NEA. (December 16, 1991) pp. 24-29.
- 19 Ibid. p. 29.
- 20 This theme has been articulated forcefully by Rafsanjani and other Iranian leaders since the demise of the bi-polar international order.
- 21 A comprehensive critique of the "peace process" and the Madrid Talks was presented at a series of meetings in Iran attended by a variety of regional rejectionist forces.
- 22 See, for example, the analysis presented by Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants Concern to World" in *The New York Times*. (January 1, 1992) p. 3.
- 23 See FBIS-NEA. (December 16, 1991) p. 26.
- 24 See the translation in FBIS-NEA. (December 19, 1991) p. 39.
- 25 Ibid. p. 39.
- 26 Ibid. p. 39.
- 27 Ibid. p. 39.
- 28 Ibid. p. 39.
- 29 Ibid. p. 39.
- 30 See FBIS-NEA. (February 10, 1992) p. 23.
- 31 Ibid. p. 39.
- 32 Ibid. p. 39.
- 33 See the news accounts in FBIS-NEA. (December 9, 1991) p. 21.
- 34 See the statements by Egypt's Foreign Minister Amr Musa in FBIS-NEA. (February 6, 1992) p. 11.
- 35 Of course, movement on the hostage issue and the return of frozen Iranian assets represent areas of improvement in the relationship.
- 36 See FBIS-NEA. (February 14, 1992) pp. 16-18.
- 37 Ibid. p. 17.
- 38 Ibid. p. 17.
- 39 Ibid. p. 17.
- 40 Ibid. p. 17.
- 41 Ibid. p. 17.
- 42 Ibid. p. 17.
- 43 Ibid. p. 17.
- 44 Ibid. p. 17.
- 45 Ibid. p. 17.
- 46 Ibid. p. 17.
- 47 Ibid. p. 18.
- 48 Ibid. p. 18.
- 49 Ibid. p. 18.
- 50 Ibid. p. 18.
- 51 See FBIS-NEA. (November 22, 1991) p. 55.
- 52 Ibid. p. 55.
- 53 On the relationship between democratization and Islam see Esposito, J. and J. Piscatori. "Democratization and Islam." *The Middle East Journal*. (Summer 1991).
- 54 See Hourani, A. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- 55 This theme is discussed in Kedourie, E. *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies*. (New England: University Press of New England, 1984).
- 56 These elites were primarily Sunni Arab nationalists and Arab Christians. Both groups were secularist in orientation.
- 57 This is very much part of Iran's critique of the American "New World Order."
- 58 This point was made by Lewis, B. in "The Return of Islam." *Commentary*. (January 1976).
- 59 This is discussed in Ajami, F. *The Arab Predicament*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- 60 On the electoral success of Islamist forces see Esposito, J. and J. Piscatori. op. cit. For an analysis of the Algerian situation see Mortimer, J. "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria." *The Middle East Journal*. (Autumn 1991).
- 61 For a report on the fundamentalist issue in Saudi Arabia see Ibrahim, Y. "The Saudis are Fearful, Too, As Islam's Militant Tide Rises." *The New York Times*. (December 31, 1991)
- 62 On state-society relations in North Africa see, for example, Gellner, E. and C. Micaud. eds. *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*. (London: Duckworth, 1972).
- 63 It is striking, for example, that regimes whose ideological legitimacy was once unquestioned such as the FLN in Algeria are now subject to intense criticism from organized elements within Algerian civil society. See Mortimer, J. op. cit.
- 64 On the political significance of *tarjums* see Jansen G. H. *Militant Islam*. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1979).
- 65 See, for example, Moore, C. ed. *Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of a One-Party Government*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
- 66 On the Islamic Tendency Movement see Wright, R. *Sacred Rage*. (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985). For a discussion of the fundamentalist issue in contemporary Tunisia see Boulares, H. *Islam: The Fear and the Hope*. (London: Zed Books, 1990).
- 67 Some of the linkages between Iran and Tunisian Islamists are explored in Schechterman, B. and B. McGuinn. *Linkages Between Sunni and Shi'i Radical Fundamentalist Organizations: A New Variable in Recent Middle Eastern Politics?* in Schechterman, B. and Slann, M. eds. *Violence and Terrorism 90/91*. (Conn: The Dushkin Publishing Group, 1990).
- 68 On "al-Nahda" see FBIS-NEA. (November 21, 1991) pp. 20-21.
- 69 See FBIS-NEA. (December 9, 1991) p. 33.
- 70 See FBIS-NEA. (November 21, 1991) pp. 20-21.
- 71 See Ibid. pp. 20-21.


- 72 See FBIS-NEA. (December 19, 1991) p. 15.
- 73 Ibid. p. 15.
- 74 Ibid. p. 15.
- 75 Ibid. p. 15.
- 76 Ibid. p. 15.
- 77 See FBIS-NEA. (December 9, 1991) pp. 41-42.
- 78 Ibid. pp. 41-42.
- 79 See FBIS-NEA. (December 29, 1991) p. 14.
- 80 Ibid. p. 14.
- 81 Ibid. p. 14.
- 82 See, for example, Shari'ati, A. *What Is To Be Done?* (Houston: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986).
- 83 See Mortimer, J. op. cit.
- 84 For recent reaction to the Algerian election see FBIS-NEA. (December 30, 1991) pp. 6-10).
- 85 See FBIS-NEA. (December 19, 1991) p. 15.
- 86 Ibid. p. 15.
- 87 Ibid. p. 15.
- 88 Ibid. p. 15.
- 89 Ibid. p. 15.
- 90 Ibid. p. 15.
- 91 For more on this "Afghan connection" see FBIS-NEA. (December 2, 1991) p. 11.
- 92 See FBIS-NEA. (December 9, 1991) p. 30.
- 93 See FBIS-NEA. (December 2, 1991) p. 11.
- 94 See FBIS-NEA. (December 9, 1991) p. 31.
- 95 Ibid. p. 31.
- 96 See FBIS-NEA. (December 30, 1991) p. 42.
- 97 Ibid. p. 42.
- 98 Ibid. p. 42.
- 99 By late January 1992 the new Algerian regime had arrested Hachani and had moved to ban all Islamic political activity. See Ibrahim, Y. "Algeria Arrests a Senior Islamic Leader." *The New York Times*. (January 23, 1992).
- 100 See Ibrahim, Y. "Iran Ussets Algeria by Backing Muslims." *The New York Times*. (January 19, 1992).
- 101 See Ibrahim, Y. "Algeria Arrests a Senior Islamic Leader." *The New York Times*. (January 23, 1992).
- 102 See FBIS-NEA. (February 19, 1992). p. 59.
- 103 See, in this connection, Al-Sayyid, M. "Slow thaw in the Arab World." *World Policy Journal*. (Fall 1991).
- 104 See FBIS-NEA. (February 4, 1992) p. 14.
- 105 See FBIS-NEA. (December 12, 1991) p. 16.
- 106 Ibid. p. 16.
- 107 See FBIS-NEA. (November 18, 1991) pp. 12-13.
- 108 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
- 109 See FBIS-NEA. (February 24, 1992) p. 21.
- 110 The depth of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt is discussed in Dekmejian, R. H. *Islam in Revolution*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985). There are indications that recent events in Algeria have triggered demonstrations among Egyptian fundamentalists in such areas as Asyut. See FBIS-NEA. (February 11, 1992) p. 23.
- 111 This concern stems from Egypt's involvement in the Damascus Declaration bloc and its involvement in Gulf security.
- 112 See FBIS-NEA. (December 23, 1991) p. 11.
- 113 See FBIS-NEA. (December 24, 1991) pp. 15-18.
- 114 See FBIS-NEA. (February 4, 1992) p. 2.
- 115 See FBIS-NEA. (February 19, 1992) p. 18.
- 116 Ibid. p. 18.
- 117 See FBIS-NEA. (December 24, 1991) pp. 15-18.
- 118 Ibid. p. 15.
- 119 Ibid. p. 15.
- 120 Ibid. p. 16.
- 121 Ibid. p. 16.
- 122 Ibid. p. 17.
- 123 Ibid. p. 17.
- 124 Ibid. p. 17.
- 125 Ibid. p. 17.
- 126 Ibid. p. 17.
- 127 Ibid. p. 17.
- 128 See FBIS-NEA. (February 6, 1992) p. 16.
- 129 Ibid. p. 16.
- 130 See FBIS-NEA. (December 24, 1991) p. 17.
- 131 Ibid. p. 17.
- 132 See FBIS-NEA. (February 24, 1992) p. 27-28.
- 133 Ibid. pp. 27-28.
- 134 See FBIS-NEA. (February 27, 1992) pp. 22-23.
- 135 See Vatikiotis, P.J. *Islam and the State*. (London: Routledge, 1987).
- 136 The instability of the Sudanese regime is discussed in FBIS-NEA. (February 10, 1992) p. 23.
- 137 See, for example, Ignatius, D. "Sudan Seen as New Base for Iranian Forward Policy." *Guardian Weekly*. (February 9, 1992). Ignatius described the sense of alarm that has developed within the Administration over this issue. According to a counter-terrorism expert, Sudan is "absolutely the place to watch." "The Iranians," the official continues, "have a dangerous program in Sudan. Its vast. The target is not just the north-Egypt and North Africa-but also the south, into (sub-saharan) Africa, with the creation of Islamic states being the goal." There is also, Ignatius suggests, a linkage between Sudanese fundamentalist and "radical" Palestinian factions.
- 138 See Weigel, G. "On the Road to Isolationism?" *Commentary*. (January, 1992).

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*Bradford R. McGuinn, is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Florida International University in Miami, Florida.*

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# Woodrow Wilson, Tariff Seeking, and Tariff Reform

Thomas L. Martin

## Introduction

Thanks to Professors John M. Gunn and Mary Ann Dimand for helpful comments on a previous draft. The author remains responsible for any errors which remain.

## Woodrow Wilson, Tariff Seeking, and Tariff Reform

At the heart of the paper is the idea that Woodrow Wilson favored competition, even if that competition were for the rights to tariff protection. His approval of the protectionist tariff disappeared once tariff reform became revenue seeking among a few powerful members of Congress and a few powerful "trusts." This is an alternative explanation of Wilson's thought and action than is presented by the important works of Diamond (1943) and Link (1953).

Much has been written about the economic thought and policy choices of Woodrow Wilson, the professor of political economy and jurisprudence who would become the 28th President of the United States. Wilson's writings on economic and political issues have generated many commentaries attempting to explain Wilson's presidential actions on the basis of his economic thought. One of the major areas of inquiry in these works is Wilson's thought on the protective tariff and tariff reform. Important works on the topic include Diamond (1943) and Link (1953) in which various explanations are presented for Wilson's thought and action on the tariff.<sup>1</sup>

As Link and Diamond stress, Wilson clearly opposed the monopolization of output markets, and believed that the trusts were strengthened by higher tariffs.<sup>2</sup> He also recognized the adverse regional income distribution effects of the protective system. Redistribution through "heavy tariffs" promoted the growth of wealth and population in the East and North, but "left the South to stand still and gain nothing."<sup>3</sup> Rising tariffs also led to an increasing cost of living, and genuine tariff reform would promote the general welfare by slowing the increases in the cost of living. Clearly, Wilson used more than one argument concerning the disadvantages of the protective system. This paper presents an

additional argument used by Wilson to justify his partial dismantling of the protective system.

Wilson's underlying economic philosophy remained anchored in a tempered laissez faire with acceptance of selected protectionist arguments from Smith and Hamilton. What had changed in the free trade versus protection debate for Wilson were the institutions governing tariff reform and the key players in them. The conduct of both the private enterprises and the governing bodies operating in the market had undergone crucial changes between the time of Hamilton's protective system and that which existed in Wilson's time. Once competitive, tariff seeking had become imperfectly competitive tariff seeking. On the demand side of the market for tariff protection, only large enterprises could effectively bid for and secure the artificial scarcity rights. On the supply side of the market for tariff protection, dominate individuals now controlled critical committee decisions in the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, creating monopoly power in the granting of tariff favors. Wilson perceived that these political changes affected the net welfare to society from the protective tariff, and consequently he sought tariff reform as President in 1913.

Wilson wanted two types of reform. He wanted reduced protective rates to reduce the expected benefits and hence reduce the demand for protection. He also desired a change in the method by which tariff rates were negotiated in order to offset the imperfect competition and high costs in the market for the protection rights. Thus, Wilson attempted to address both the supply and demand sides of the market for tariff protection. His desired goal was to recreate a system in which protection protected the true public interest rather than powerful private interests, and to end the system in which government officials were able to sell their services to interested applicants. The remainder of this paper provides evidence to support these claims. Wilson's model of tariff seeking is examined by extracting a tariff history of the United States from his writing, relying mainly on **History of the American**

**People** (1901-02) and "The Tariff Make-Believe" (1909).<sup>4</sup>

## Wilson's Thought on the Antebellum Tariff

Wilson had read **The Wealth of Nations** by the year 1885, and like many others writers before and since, he used Smith's arguments both for and against the tariff throughout his life.<sup>5</sup> He accepted a limited number of protectionist arguments including Smith's national defense argument and Hamilton's infant industry argument.<sup>6</sup> Wilson's approval is found in his **History of the American People**, in which he praises the original protection, calling the principle "intelligible and statesmenlike, particularly for a new country, without capital and unprepared for competing in a trading world.... Hamilton's position... is defensible enough."<sup>7</sup>

Clearly Wilson was no free trade ideologue, but was a modified free trader. Nobody "now doubts that the policy of Hamilton put the nation under a great stimulation...." <sup>8</sup> According to Wilson the historian, for a "new nation" like the U.S. it was "idle" to put its faith in "the natural laws of trade and production...."<sup>9</sup> Intervention was desirable since "it has not at the outset capital enough to find either its resources or its capacities. There must be a waiting and a spending time at the first before it finds out what its resources are and what it can do with them."<sup>10</sup>

Infant industries must be protected because "in their very nature" they are "not natural to America, but forced and artificial."<sup>11</sup> The existence of "hidden stuffs" and "unschooled people" make this protection necessary.<sup>12</sup> More than good politics, such policy was the "genuine enterprise of statesmanship...."<sup>13</sup> To Wilson, the effectiveness of the "American System" of tariff protection was not in doubt. In the early days of the "American System" Wilson believed that all businesses had equal chances to obtain protection from government because there was competition of the demand side appealing to the many members of Congress involved in tariff revision. Comparing antebellum

tariffs with the tariff system of the late nineteenth century, Wilson observed that the system had worked "no radical harm" on the country for a generation or two since it involved private enterprises dependent on "individual initiative..."<sup>14</sup> The participation of simple partnerships and small companies meant that the tariff-making procedures were competitive among those businesses. The benefits of the tariff system were "widely distributed" and enriched no single lobby. /15 Tariff reform was "at least a game into which almost any one could get."<sup>16</sup> Modest fortunes were made, but even then the relatively few rich men had only local influence.<sup>17</sup> Wilson admits that there was favoritism, but it "did not wear the ugly face of monopoly or special privilege."<sup>18</sup> The market for government favors was competitive, which in Wilson's mind, made the system and the resulting income distribution effects of the system socially just.

### Wilson's Thought on Post-War Tariff Reform

After the Civil War, tariff reform and the behavior of interested parties changed fundamentally. What most concerned Wilson about the tariff-making process was not the existence of protection, but lack of equal opportunity to obtain protection. According to Wilson, the manner in which tariff reform was conducted had changed over the years.

In Wilson's model, tariff reform would attract tariff seekers, as it had done throughout United States history during the major tariff debates on the 1820s-30s and the 1880s.<sup>19</sup> Under President Arthur, the Tariff Commission was created in 1882 with the responsibility of recommending a program of tariff reform to reduce the federal budget surplus.<sup>20</sup> Following the recovery from the recession of the late 1870s, imports and tariff revenue increased, generating the federal budget surplus as well as an active opposition to more liberal trade from import competing businesses. Wilson observed that every manufacturer, "no matter how small, wanted the protective tariff to guard his privilege; the public was unrepresented."<sup>21</sup> It was not the smaller producers which would receive the favors, according to Wilson. In fact, the trusts did not even testify, but were the beneficiaries of tariff making. Wilson suggested that it was the big firms which would seek and receive protection in "the lap of government."<sup>22</sup>

By the 1880s, the Senate was full of powerful individuals representing the

special interests of their states. The "particular undertakings" that "got rich" were "only those who had the capital to take advantage of those favors...."<sup>23</sup> The rich would receive the benefits since they could afford to pay the high costs of tariff seeking. On the supply side, according to Wilson, Mr. Samuel J. Randall (D: PA) "still, it turned out, held the balance of power and controlled the action" in the matter of the tariff reform in the U.S. House of Representatives.<sup>24</sup> The source of the monopoly power in the sale of artificial scarcity rights was Mr. Randall supported by about forty Democrats who sat for constituencies in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, California, and New Jersey. They voted against every reasonable argument against the tariff, for the rest of the party could carry nothing against them, though they numbered one hundred fifty strong.<sup>25</sup>

With the election of Cleveland in 1884, the Democrats had majorities in both houses of Congress as well as the White House. The subsequent House tariff bill placed many raw materials on the duty free list, with internal taxes to make up for the reduction in revenue. This bill was labeled by Wilson as a "genuine measure of reform."<sup>26</sup> Genuine reform, to Wilson, meant reform of the method of taxation with the addition of ad valorem to specific excise duties, making the burden on the consumer "clearly calculable"<sup>27</sup> The difficulty, according to Wilson, was in the Senate where "Senators allowed themselves to be attached to particular interests..." which meant the monopolists of the trusts.<sup>28</sup> They "acted like men who had forgot the compulsions of political principle and played each for his own benefit."<sup>29</sup> They raised the sugar tax, changed the ad valorem rates to specific rates, and removed coal and iron ore from the duty-free list. As Wilson described the market he observed operating, each senator exerted "himself, as it seemed, to secure advantage for the industries of his own State...." or "some private interest...."<sup>30</sup> They were "heeding, not their party leaders, but the representatives of a particular industry who had obtained a hold upon them which could not be shaken."<sup>31</sup> The result, according to Wilson, was that "the rest of the country was obliged to pay the costs in high prices and restricted competition."<sup>32</sup> Competitive markets for artificial scarcity rights had become imperfectly competitive. On the supply side, a handful of powerful Senators controlled tariff legislation. On the demand side, the "trusts" now controlled the bidding

for the artificial scarcity rights. The result was higher cost tariff negotiations, higher lobbying expenses, and more concentrated benefits than even before. It was this undesirable end that Wilson opposed, not the chosen means of "protectionism."

The next great tariff struggle would occur surrounding the 1909 Payne-Aldrich tariff. Wilson, as governor of New Jersey, argued that the bill was "radically wrong in principle" and he attacked as "all too familiar" the "way these gentlemen have attempted to settle it...."<sup>33</sup>

Wilson observed that all legislation designed "to give particular classes of citizens a special economic assistance or advantage" had trouble justifying those advantages "without creating inconvenient comment and startling questions that cut very deep...."<sup>34</sup> The "insincerity, the uncandid, designing, unpatriotic character of the whole process" was not intended for the public good, only the private good.<sup>35</sup>

On the supply side of the market for tariff protection, the Senate Finance Committee Chairman had a great and "sinister" hold upon the "legislative machinery."<sup>36</sup> Republicans are the tariff party of old and have "established a business constituency."<sup>37</sup> Those who conduct the tariff business "extend their clientage from generation to generation, to make sure that they have clients enough."<sup>38</sup> Those who make the tariffs are "the patrons of the industries favored: they dispense the largess of the Government, and those who receive the favors will be their partisans and followers so long as the favors continue."<sup>39</sup>

The "essential wrong" of the system is that it has become a means of granting favors obtained in one of two ways: either by "influence" and by "supplication of a kind for which there is no classical or strictly parliamentary designation."<sup>40</sup> To ask humbly and earnestly for protection meant, among other things, promises of political support and campaign contributions, "although not direct bribes."<sup>41</sup> By the time the 1909 tariff debates were engaged, Wilson recognized that it was the monopolists in the output markets who were seeking favorable tariff reform. They are "relatively few in number" but their kind is as old as economic history itself.<sup>42</sup> What was new was that "their scale was new and ominous."<sup>43</sup>

The key observation by Wilson was that competitive tariff seeking had changed fundamentally. The tariff seekers "had cornered" the opportunity which the Government's favoring legislation had been intended to create.<sup>44</sup> Those who

benefit are few in number and their names are known. Their influence is "direct, personal, pervasive."<sup>45</sup> Wilson preferred tariff legislation to put on a "safe, reasonable, and permanent footing."<sup>46</sup> Protection had become patronage, with highly liquid lobbies and potentially profitable private sessions between business and government.<sup>47</sup>

Wilson wanted a new "principle of reform" that was based on the "old principle of Hamilton, in a new form and application."<sup>48</sup>

The question that should be considered "a great question of fact" was the distinction between private versus public benefits.<sup>49</sup> What protection "still benefits the country" asked Wilson, and "what part is unnecessary; what part is pure favoritism and the basis of dangerous and demoralizing special privilege? ... "No other questions are pertinent or admissible."<sup>50</sup>

Protection should remain for activities "which are manifestly suited to the country and as yet undeveloped or only imperfectly developed."<sup>51</sup> Thus Wilson continued to accept the protectionist argument if applied properly with the right method. As Wilson states in *The New Freedom*, there has come over the land that un-American set of conditions which enables a small number of men who control the government to get favors from the government; by those favors to exclude their fellows from an equal business opportunity....<sup>52</sup>

Wilson, like Smith, believed the system needed to be fixed, rather than attempt to change human nature. We "are not attacking men... we are attacking a system. The men are, most of them, honest."<sup>53</sup> He asked for gradual tariff reduction and pledged to destroy the alliance between business and government. Wilson was not opposed to big business, just opposed to monopoly and the trusts.<sup>54</sup> Such trusts were "rank growths" in the garden, "killing off all the other growths" since some men can discover "artificial methods of cultivation... with great ease in particular schedules of the tariff."<sup>55</sup>

Wilson's victory over Taft and Roosevelt in the elections of 1912 was accompanied by a Democrat majority in the Senate.<sup>56</sup> The unfamiliar rising cost of living during Taft's administration pushed popular pressure for downward tariff revision. As of his First Inaugural Address, Wilson stated it was time for a change.

"Some old things with which we have grown familiar... have altered their aspect as we have lately looked critically upon them, with fresh awakened eyes; they have

dropped their disguises and shown themselves alien and sinister."/57

The "things that ought to be altered" include the tariff which "makes Government a facile instrument in the hands of private interests...."<sup>58</sup> In addition, there should be a "fundamental safeguarding of property and of individual right," with tariff reform mentioned first on the list.<sup>59</sup> Wilson would also pursue an investigation of the role of the tariff lobbies while Congress was instructed to examine itself.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, on October 3, 1913, came the tariff reform under Wilson with the Underwood Tariff. The act lowered the average tariff rate to 29% from the level of 40% under the 1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff. The free list was also expanded, although the overall package did maintain significant protection. The act worked for only months before the war in Europe provided a natural protective umbrella. After 1916 Wilson would approve the Tariff Commission and many other government commissions designed to prepare the nation for entry into the European War. On his last day in office, Wilson vetoed a tariff bill aimed at aiding farmers, arguing that it was no time for the erection here of high trade barriers. Wilson would, of course, have his influence reversed with the passage of the tariffs of 1921, 1922, and the 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff.

### Conclusion

The primary theme of this paper is that Wilson favored tariff protection when such protection could be obtained in a competitive tariff -seeking environment, but opposed such protection when obtained in an imperfectly competitive market for tariff protection. It would seem that Wilson found tariff seeking rewards acceptable as long as many individuals enjoyed the opportunity to seek them, while on the other hand, these rewards became evil when the beneficiaries became highly concentrated. There is no analytical proof for such a position, and Wilson presumably justified his normative judgment with moralizing rather than analysis. As Keynes has observed, Wilson's thought and temperament were "essentially theological, not intellectual, with all the strength and the weakness of that manner of thought, feeling and expression."<sup>61</sup>

It could even be argued that Wilson was incorrect in his judgment on post-war tariff seeking. As Bhagwati points out, tariff seeking can increase welfare in a situation in which there are distortions already in

place prior to the tariff seeking.<sup>62</sup> Such was indeed the case in the tariff revisions examined by Wilson. Viewed in retrospect, Wilson's bias against tariff seeking when imperfectly competitive must rest on non-analytical grounds if it is to remain acceptable. His instinct as a Democrat was to favor benefits to the many smaller interests as opposed to the few larger interests. When tariff seeking shifted to favor the few rather than the many, Wilson's value judgment concerning the protective system shifted as well.

Wilson wanted not just another revision of the tariff, but a change in method. In the year 1910, the world was changing and changing more dramatically than most people could have predicted., ending The World War would change the map, centuries old dynasties; Einstein would change the notions of space and time; and the Russian revolution would herald the rise of modern totalitarian states. Wilson achieved the short run victory with the Underwood Tariff, but the opposition would overtake his legacy with the tariffs of 1921, 1922, and 1930 in much the same way in which Cleveland's efforts during his administrations would be offset by the tariffs of 1897 and 1909.

### Notes

1. Diamond, William., *The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson* (Johns Hopkins, 1943); Link, Arthur. *The New Freedom* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956). See also, Baker, Ray Stannard., *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1927).
2. See, for example, Diamond, pp. 87-130, especially p. 108.
3. Wilson, *History of the American People*, Vol IV, p. 23.
4. Wilson, *History of the American People*, 1902. "The Tariff Make-Believe," *North American Review*, 1909, pp. 535-556.
5. Wilson, *History of the American People*, Vol. IV, p. 176.
6. Wilson, "The Tariff Make-Believe," p. 544.
7. Wilson, *Ibid.*, p. 544.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 545.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 544.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 544.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 545.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 544.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 545.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 549.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 547.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*

19. Most of the literature on Wilson's economic thought appeared before the emergence of the theory of rent seeking and the economic theory of regulation, including especially the work of Tullock (1967), Stigler (1971), Krueger (1974) and Peltzman (1976). As Bhagwati (1980) points out, rent seeking originally referred to the pursuit of the benefits derived from quantitative limits to imports or import licensing. The phrase tariff seeking is used throughout this paper because Wilson's concern centered on the reform of tariff rates rather than the level of quotas.
20. The commission traveled the country seeking testimony concerning tariff reform, taking bids, as it were, for their services of supplying artificial scarcity rights. Taussig and others label the commission as protectionist from the start, agreeing with Wilson's assessment that "the majority of the commission had been made up of stout protectionists...." History of the American People, Vol. V., p. 164.
21. Cited in Baker, Papers, VI, p. 147.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
23. Wilson, History of the American People, I Vol. V., p. 189.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 228-16
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 230.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
33. Wilson, "The Tariff Make-Believe," North American Review, 1909., pp. 535-36.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 536.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 539-40.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 540.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 541.
38. *Ibid.* The use of the word "clients" obviously anticipates the fundamental ideas of the economic theory of regulation.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, p. 542.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 543.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 547.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 548.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 549.
45. *Ibid.* Wilson believed that the tariffs aided the trusts, although they would probably have formed anyway, but in a different fashion. He argued that the system should not be destroyed all at once. Rather the system should be altered "in some conservative way" until we have tax legislation on a "safe, reasonable, and permanent footing" (p. 552).
46. *Ibid.*, p. 552.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 546.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 553.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 555.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. Wilson, The New Freedom. :1913. p. 18.
53. Quoted in Baker, Papers, Vol. III., p. 391.
54. Quoted in Diamond, p. 108.
55. Quoted in Torodash, p. 148.
56. In the House: Democrats, 291; Republicans, 127. In the Senate: Democrats, 51; Republicans, 41.
57. Wilson, Messages and Papers, Vol. I, p. 1.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
60. The Senate, under a Democratic majority, created a special committee to investigate the nature of tariff lobbying. The House would also investigate claims made in the press and repeated during the Senate proceedings in the first special investigation into the Washington lobbyists. The investigations forced members to testify what financial interests they had at stake in the tariff debates, and to what extent they were financed by lobbyists.
61. Keynes, p. 21.
62. Bhagwati, pp. 992, 999.

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
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*Thomas L. Martin is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Central Florida in Orlando, Florida*

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# Saint Leo College



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Saint Leo College is a member of the Sunshine State Conference of NCAA Division II, and offers basketball, volleyball, soccer, tennis, cross country, softball and baseball on intercollegiate level. The College also has intramural athletic programs in basketball, volleyball, softball, tennis, racquetball, swimming, touch football, golf, soccer, archery, billiards, and street hockey.

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*Saint Leo College is committed to policies and practices that assure that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race, color, creed, religion, national origin, or handicap.*

## Directions to Campus

Take Exit 59 off Interstate 75. Go four miles east on Highway 52 and Saint Leo College will be on your left. Call (904)588-8432 for general information.

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A Catholic, co-educational, liberal arts college, Saint Leo College was founded by the Benedictine Order and chartered by the State of Florida in 1889. In January 1969, the Order of Saint Benedict transferred title and control to an independent board of trustees.

## The Campus

The main campus consists of 170 rolling acres in East Pasco County, 5 miles west of Dade City and 30 miles north of Tampa.

## The Students

Approximately 1,000 students are enrolled on the main campus of Saint Leo. Fifty percent of the students are from Florida. The rest come from 34 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and 27 foreign countries.

## The Faculty

The student/teacher ratio is 17/1.

## Accreditation

Saint Leo College is accredited by the Commission on College of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, the Council on Social Work Education and the State of Florida Department of Education.

## Degrees Awarded

Saint Leo awards Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, and Bachelor of Social Work degrees. Also, the Center for Continuing Education program offers weekend and evening college, directed study classes and a Pastoral Institute. A well-received extension degree program extends from Key West to Virginia with courses offered at 15 military bases.

## Academic Divisions

- ◆ Business Administration
- ◆ Education
- ◆ Humanities
- ◆ Natural Science & Mathematics
- ◆ Physical Education
- ◆ Social Science



Mr. J. Edwon Benton  
University of South Florida  
4202 Fowler Avenue  
Tampa, FL 33620

*Saint Leo College Press*  
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