
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

Implementing High-Tech Economic Development Policies in Florida

Dianne Rahm

(University of South Florida)

*Ambition and Retirement from the
United States House of Representatives, 1957-1984*

Daniel J. Reagan and Donald L. Davison

(Ball State University and Rollins College)

*The Efficacy of the Superpower Foreign Policy Instruments:
the Case of Soviet-Third World Consensus Building*

Kunihiko Imai

(University of Wisconsin-Parkside)

*Post-Soviet (Russian) Military Thought,
Russian Foreign Policy, and the Future*

Roger Hamburg

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Introduction

With this edition, late as it is, we close off the 1993 year for *The Political Chronicle*. In this issue are four essays, two in the area of domestic politics (one specifically on Florida) and two in the international relations/foreign policy realm.

In Dianne Rahm's essay "Implementing High-Tech Economic Development Policies in Florida" the reader is exposed to the literature of Florida's state-wide economic development. The obvious focus is on "indigenous technology-based economic development" in the State versus the "industrial-based" strategies elsewhere. Other sector ramifications for such success are also brought in.

Co-authors Dan Reagan and Don Davison in "Ambition and Retirement from the United States House of Representatives, 1957-1984" add to the current literature on congressional committees and organizational incentives. Using categories such as "institutional vs. constituency-oriented committees," the authors examine the variable rates of retirement based on goals and/or ambitions plus institutional reforms. The subtlety of the issue is reflected in this provocative study.

The third essay "The Efficacy of the Superpower Foreign Policy Instruments: The Case of Soviet-Third World Consensus-Building" by Kunihiro Imai examines this activity through 1984. The primary device for operationalizing the calculations of influence are UN-country voting patterns. The conclusion as to "efficacy" (over ideological agreement) of Soviet behavior is clearly demarcated as are the instruments of military/arms over economic aid-giving. Some serious implications about Third World nations' behavior also flow from this study.

In the fourth and final essay, Roger Hamburg's "Post-Soviet (Russian) Military Thought, Russian Foreign Policy, and the Future," we are treated to a major insight on Soviet military doctrinal debate in recent years. Even with important political and economic changes in the past year, including a newer public statement on Russian military doctrine, the analysis lends important insight into continuities in military thinking and analysis stemming from that region of world politics. Despite fast-changing events in the CIS and adjacent new states, an appreciation by the author of the immediate antecedents is critical to current understanding of the military developments.

Postscript

After five years, as co-founder of *The Political Chronicle* (with Joe Cernik), and with the endorsement and support of the Florida Political Science Association, I exit voluntarily with the knowledge that the publication is on a firm foundation as to academic credibility and circulation nationally (actually internationally in several instances). I leave the journal in the capable hands of a solid team of Marco Rimanelli (of Saint Leo College) and Mike Gibson (of the University of South Florida) as Co-Editors and Hud Reynolds (of Saint Leo College) as Managing Editor. I am confident of our continued success, fully aware that the Spring 1994 issue is already under way as part of a smooth transition.

As a parting comment, I want to express my heartiest thanks to the untold number of reviewers, friends and colleagues in Florida and around the United States, who have faithfully given of valuable time to make a success of the journal. You are too numerous to list, but know that not only am I appreciative, but so are your many colleagues in the profession that have counted on you when submitting their essays for review. Above all I am pleased with how well the integrity and objectivity of the process has operated.

Thank you for having allowed me to serve all of you.

Bernard Schechterman
Editor

Implementing High-Tech Economic Development Policies in Florida

Dianne Rahm

Introduction

During the last fifteen years, Florida and many other American states have attempted to implement high-technology economic development strategies. The American states have moved in the direction of nurturing high-tech firms due in large part to the impact of global economic competition on state economies. Since the late 1970s, many state governments have found traditional job creation increasingly difficult. Competition from abroad has reduced the demand for both low-wage service sector jobs as well as highly paid manufacturing positions. Some states, therefore, have shifted their economic development strategies and have tried to create jobs in areas where the U.S. may have an international competitive advantage -- in science and technology (S&T) intense industries.

Global competition was not the only factor pushing state governments. For the last 50 years, the federal government has dedicated funds to Research and Development (R&D) with the goal of increasing national economic prosperity. As the federal government, under the Reagan Administration, reduced or eliminated many activities performed at the national level, most states established some type of technology development programs. By the late-1980s, most state governments recognized the technology-base as a powerful force in state and regional economics¹. Spending in these state programs totaled \$550 million² by the late-1980s. Certain states were clear leaders in the effort. New York, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and North Carolina had large programs. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Texas, and Minnesota each spent more than \$30 million annually in efforts to promote their state's technology-base.

While not an innovator among the states, Florida, has felt both international and national inducements to formulate and implement a high-tech economic development policy. Long-held state strategy, concentrating on maintaining

low wages, rapid population growth, tourism, incoming federal defense and space funds, and on luring businesses from other states and regions, began to be revised in the 1980s. Prominent state officials and private sector advocates concur that Florida needs an economic development policy promoting high-value-added³ high-wage employment and which relies extensively on a skilled labor force able to use the fruits of science and technology (S&T) for global economic competitiveness. The central problem for politicians, policy analysts, and economists is how best to formulate policies and implement programs to achieve that goal.

Florida has made two attempts at implementing a high-tech economic development strategy. Initial program formulation and implementation began in the 1980s but problems arose. Budget cuts and program fragmentation destroyed most of the initial efforts. Enterprise Florida, the name given to a second attempt at implementing this strategy is currently underway. Under this initiative, Enterprise Florida, Inc., a non-profit, public-private corporation, has been created to replace all economic development activities of the Department of Commerce. The mission of Enterprise Florida is to promote high-tech economic development by focusing on "attracting, retaining and growing high-value-added economic clusters based on strong economic foundations of skilled human resources, capital availability, accessible technology and a competitive tax and regulatory climate"⁴.

What are the factors which impede or aid the implementation of successful S&T-based economic development policies in Florida? The experience of other states suggests certain determinants of success or failure: state political capacity, state infrastructure capacity, and state fiscal capacity⁵. This paper first defines what is meant by political, infrastructure, and fiscal capacity in the context of leading high-tech economic development policy states. Next,

political, infrastructure, and fiscal capacity are explored in detail in the Florida context. Finally, conclusions are drawn concerning what areas of Florida's state capacity need attention before a high-tech economic development policy can be successfully implemented.

Political, Infrastructure, and Fiscal Capacity Features of the Bellwether States

Implementation of a high-tech economic development policy is first and foremost a political process. The policy steps that must be followed are the same as those for any other policy effort: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legitimation, budgeting, and program implementation. The limits of making high-tech policy include the standard political restraints of getting on the agenda, coalition-building, and compromise. While some interests within a state may want to shift traditional economic policy toward a high-tech strategy, they may not have the coalition support to press through the change. The first step to the implementation of a high-tech economic development policy within a state is the creation of state political capacity.

State political capacity is the ability of advocates within the state to formulate policy and pass laws likely to achieve policy goals. State political capacity, however, also involves an assessment of the quality of policy efforts—not just the ability to pass random legislation. Decision-making and leadership come into play. A poorly designed policy reflects negatively on a state's political capacity.

What comprises good high-tech economic development policy? While the answer may not be straight forward, one can look to the bellwether states as models. While specific policies differ from state to state, some general comments can be made regarding the common features of policies across the states.

States with considerable experience in high-tech economic development concentrate their efforts in specific areas of infrastructure capacity-building. State infrastructure capacity includes factors directly associated with the implementation of high-tech economic development policy. Some of these factors include: the state's S&T-intense industrial base, the quality of the state's research universities, and ability of the state's K-12 school efforts to create a skilled work force for high-tech industry to hire, and the ability to wed the higher education system to the production of skilled workers and researchers for high-tech economic development efforts.

States with well-established and seemingly successful high-tech economic development programs try to create jobs by building indigenous S&T-intensive firm capacity rather than trying to attract firms and jobs from other states. Smokestack-chasing and chip-chasing are seen as risky strategies for job-creation because of the negative side-effects associated with offering tax incentives or subsidies to encourage firm relocation. It usually takes a substantial economic commitment to attract firms and there is no guarantee a plant will not close or the firm move again out of the state at a later date, especially if a competing state or country offers better recompense⁶.

The emergence of a global economy and geographically vast free trade zones, such as the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), underscores the importance of this lesson. States with traditional attractions based primarily in low land prices, low wages, low taxes, and few regulations will be at a distinct disadvantage competing with Mexico (and other nations) for relocating industries. Moreover, states with firm-entice strategies will have to compete not only with other states but with other countries not subject to U.S. environment and wage laws.

During the 1980s most states promoting technology-oriented economic development programs did not seek to lure firms to their states. Neither did they spend tax dollars to aid declining state-based industries⁷. Instead they mustered the political capacity to enact policies that emphasized job growth through high-tech spin-offs from existing firms and university research, they

nurtured entrepreneurial activity by providing venture capital and start-up support, and they sought to increase the competitiveness of existing firms by linking them to new productivity-enhancing technologies (many of which were developed through university researcher collaboration) and a highly educated and skilled work force.

The bellwether states have placed heavy emphasis on state infrastructure capacity when developing high-tech economic development policies. Knowledge of the level and areas of advanced research under study at the universities, the distribution of advanced technology firms within the state, the skill-level of the current work force, the preparation of the future work force (K-12 and college youth) in skills of importance to the state's high-technology enterprise are all important areas of concern for S&T-based economic development policy efforts. The leading states have strongly promoted cooperation between colleges, universities, and the business community. To accomplish this cooperation, government offices and agencies are given the task of fostering liaisons. Accordingly, programs are often decentralized in "centers" which are geographically distributed but linked both to government offices and to state higher education systems.

Building on strengths and expanding the existing S&T infrastructure is often the policy focus. Many states do this by targeting specific technologies for development. In 1988, twenty-five states explicitly picked particular technologies to nurture, clearly identifying them in a program mission statement⁸. Policy analysts and economists favoring this approach argue that costly job generation activities should be focused on technologies that appear the most promising. Picking winning technologies involves matching institutional capacity (including university researcher knowledge) with state strengths in S&T-intense industries.

Many of the leading states have also carefully considered the needs of nurturing small or new firms⁹. In 1988, thirty-six states funded technology-based economic development program components specifically aimed at small and new firms. Eighteen states funded

incubator programs, twelve other states financed seed or venture capital programs, and six states ran programs in both categories¹⁰.

Political and infrastructure capacity tell much but not all of the high-tech state economic development story. The last crucial factor is state fiscal capacity -- the ability to adequately and consistently fund programs established and related infrastructure needs. The leading states had high levels of fiscal capacity in the 1980s. They shared a dedication to fostering excellence in their state university systems, as well as in state K-12 and junior college programs. State economic development efforts were supported despite general state fiscal distress. Texas is a good example of this commitment. Texas maintained support for high-tech economic development even at the extreme lows of the oil bust economy.

There is, however, a less sanguine lesson to be learned from the states in regard to fiscal capacity. The experience of the states in the 1990s also shows that high-tech economic development programs are fragile. The unrelenting budget crises and economic downturn of the 1990s ended with the cutback or termination of many state programs¹¹. The importance of political and infrastructure capacity for successful efforts cannot be dismissed, but without adequate fiscal capacity high-tech economic development policies rapidly fail.

Florida's Political Capacity

How does Florida measure up on the political capacity dimension? First, Florida's political leadership has shown the ability to formulate policy and pass legislation that creates programs. Florida has, in fact, passed two separate waves of high-tech economic development policies. Second, many of the features of Florida's legislation match the characteristics of policies passed in the bellwether states. The quality of the policy formulation can be seen in attention to details such as availability of venture capital, the role of the universities, the importance of a skilled work force, and the value of targeting technologies.

In the 1980s Florida set up the first wave of high-tech economic development

programs. These programs were established primarily to assist technology-based firms and industries. The aid was to be offered in several ways, including: direct monetary grants, indirect tax incentives, and by creating linkages to universities and colleges for research-support and training.

The central agency for these first wave programs was the Florida High Technology and Industry Council, located originally in the Department of Commerce but moved to the Governor's Office in July of 1992¹². The High Technology and Industry Council, directed by Ray Iannucci, was established in 1984 as an umbrella organization to coordinate S&T development efforts in the state. One of the largest programs under the High Technology and Industry Council was the Applied Research Grant Program. The goal of this program was to strengthen research efforts in 7 basic technologies and to foster closer relationships between firms and university researchers. The 7 targeted technologies were: biomedical devices, biotechnology, light wave and electro-optics, microelectronics, computer software, computer-integrated engineering and manufacturing, simulation and training¹³. Grants were provided to university faculty members for applied research on innovations with commercialization potential¹⁴.

One of the identified needs within the state was for venture capital to support new high-tech start-up companies. The High Technology Innovation Research Fund was an attempt to create such venture capital. This program was started in 1985 under the High Technology and Industry Council then later moved independently to the Department of Commerce.

Training efforts were particularly highlighted by the programs developed in the 1980s. Started under the High Technology and Industry Council, the Bureau of Business Assistance (under the Division of Economic Development of the Florida Department of Commerce) sponsored the High Technology Vocational Education program. This program was implemented to improve Florida's training programs in electronics. The Legislature initially established 10 Centers of Electronic Emphasis in 1985, added 5 more in Spring of 1988, and in

the Fall of 1988, 22 more centers were established. Thirty seven Centers of Electronic Emphasis were created in total. Additionally, in 1988, 11 Centers of Electronic Specialization were established. These centers are public/private partnerships totally responsive to firm needs for skilled technicians¹⁵ and distributed throughout the state primarily located at junior and community colleges¹⁶.

There was duplication of effort and lack of coordination built into these first wave programs because the training needs of industry were also addressed by different programs. For instance, the Industrial Services Training Program, located within the Division of Vocational Education in the Department of Education, provided customized training of employees for new, expanding, and diversifying firms in the state. From 1983 to 1985 about 88 customized training courses were developed and taught¹⁷. Closely associated to the Industrial Services Training Program was the Sunshine State Skills Program which was established in 1985. The goal of this program was to link community colleges with employers who have specific training needs related to new, expanding, or diversifying businesses. The state gave community colleges training grants, which needed to be matched by participating businesses. The community colleges then prepared and conducted specific classes for the firms¹⁸.

While the policy goals of the programs developed during the 1980s were clear, the implementation was portioned between agencies and departments. Little harmony could occur, even if it was desired, between the government and the private sector. Moreover, the emphasis on training was narrowly tailored to specific firm needs. The overall level of work force skills vis-a-vis an assessment of K-12 teaching effectiveness was not adequately addressed. Budgetary problems (to be discussed more fully later) were paramount.

To remedy these problems and to reinvigorate the high-technology economic development efforts within the state, Enterprise Florida was formulated. The legislation creating the Enterprise Florida Corporation was passed on March 26, 1992. This legislation was strongly supported and largely fashioned by

business community leaders operating through the Florida Chamber of Commerce¹⁹ which commissioned a state-wide study on high-tech economic development (completed in 1989). The Cornerstone report was a state-wide policy analysis which examined the condition of Florida's economy and suggested strategies for improvement. The report divided the changes in Florida's economy into three eras and pointed to deficiencies given global competitive pressures.

The first era depicted was that before 1970. During this time the main change factors effecting the state's economy were migration and retirement. The economic structure was dominated by agriculture, construction, and tourism. Positive economic development factors were primarily the warm climate and low costs. The economic policy followed was to try to attract new residents. In the second era, that from 1970-1980, increasing domestic competition and the energy crisis had an impact on the state's economy. The economic structure of the state included some diversified manufacturing, services, tourism, and agriculture. The positive economic development factors were low land costs, low wages, as well as low taxes and few regulations. The primary economic policy strategy of the 1970s and early 1980s was to attract industry to the state, very often by luring it from other states, and to try to diversify the economy. But as the report points out, by the mid to late 1980s those strategies were no longer effective.

The report argues the key change factors currently effecting Florida are increasing international competition and decreases in defense spending. The economic structure of the state, the researchers suggest, should be built upon clusters of high-value-added industries. The authors of the report discuss three types of high-value-added clusters: emerging, expanding, and transforming. The emerging clusters are identified as information industries (office and computing equipment, communication equipment, electronic components, and information services), biomedical industries (drugs and pharmaceuticals, x-ray and electro-medical apparatus, surgical and medical instruments, surgical appliances and supplies, and optical

instruments), space and defense industries (missiles and space vehicles, aircraft and parts, ordinances and accessories, and engineering and scientific instruments). The expanding clusters are tourism (amusement and recreation, hotels and lodging, motion pictures, radio and TV broadcasting), business and financial services (business services, financial services, legal services, engineering and architecture, and accounting and auditing) and printing and publishing (commercial printing, newspapers and periodicals). The transforming clusters—those in need of transformation if they are to survive—are apparel and textiles (apparel and other textile products, and textile mills), lumber, wood and paper products (lumber and wood products, furniture and fixtures), and agriculture and food processing (agricultural production, agricultural services, and food processing).

The report argues that these clusters—whether emerging, expanding, or transforming—require certain conditions if they are to be competitive in the global economy. Among the factors identified as critical are: improvement in the quality of the work force, increased access to technology, increased availability of venture capital, maintenance of a competitive tax and regulatory environment, and increased investment in the physical infrastructure. The economic policies recommended to equip Florida for economic competitiveness in the 1990s are to “attract, retain, and grow value-added industry” and “promote new enterprise”²⁰. The Enterprise Florida legislation is the economic policy formulation stemming from the report’s recommendations.

A key component of Enterprise Florida is integration and leadership. The legislation establishes a nonprofit corporation called the Enterprise Board of Directors to be co-chaired by the Governor and a senior business leader. The private sector appointees to the board were named by Governor Lawton Chiles in July of 1992²¹. Only 9 of the board’s 21 members are drawn from the public sector and three of them include the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Secretary of Commerce. The function of the Enterprise Board is to oversee economic development in the state. The oversight function consists of

three components: strategic planning of economic development efforts, policy formulation, and performance assessment of economic development programs.

Several affiliate organizations will be established as nonprofit corporations with public-private boards linked to Enterprise Florida, Inc. to provide direct support to businesses. These affiliate organizations will concentrate on assistance to the high-value-added industrial clusters and include: the Florida Technology Partnership Corporation (to develop a strategic plan for technology development statewide), the New Enterprise Development Corporation (to provide technical assistance to entrepreneurs), the Private Sector Risk Capital Partnership (to provide venture capital for new start-ups), the Florida Development Finance Corporation (to provide government bond financing for critical infrastructure needs), and the Florida Training Partnership Corporation (to provide a strategic plan linking vocational education in community colleges with industry needs)²².

Enterprise Florida will be phased in over the next three years. In year one, a strategic plan will be developed. In year two, the strategic plan will be used for detailed targeting of key clusters of high-value-added industries for attraction, retention and growth. In year three, the fully developed Enterprise Florida, Inc. will emerge with all affiliated organizations and the economic development functions of the Department of Commerce will be assumed. Enterprise Florida, housed in the Sunbank Center building in Orlando, began operating July 1, 1993 with an initial staff of eight²³.

Based upon the two waves of legislation creating a series of economic development programs, it would seem that Florida has adequate political capacity to legislate seemingly intelligent policies. The first wave legislation attempted to initiate the main features of other successful states’ programs: linkages to universities, training programs for improvement in the work force, venture capital funds, entrepreneurial seed money, and targeted technologies. Nevertheless, the first wave programs suffered from fragmentation and lack of budgetary support. The second wave policy formulation was an attempt to overcome

some of the weaknesses in the first wave legislation. Enterprise Florida concentrates all command in one central umbrella organization and attempts to secure more stable funding by drawing from multiple sources (public and private). Another important indicator of political capacity can be seen in the ability of the state to integrate the economic development effort with other state initiatives. The ability of the state’s comprehensive plan to integrate the goal of local and state economic development is significant²⁴. Political capacity does not seem to be a barrier to the implementation of high-tech economic development policies in Florida.

Florida’s Infrastructure Capacity

How does Florida rank on the dimension of infrastructure capacity? The state’s S&T infrastructure includes a heavy emphasis on federal defense installations and programs, NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, a national laboratory, and a variety of private sector technology-intense firms. Any discussion of infrastructure must also include an assessment of the state’s education system and efforts to tie the mission of educational institutions to high-tech economic development within the state.

Florida, though one of the largest states in the nation, has a poorly ranked K-12 public school system. Drop out rates are high, but staying in school does not guarantee a successful transition to either a well-paying job or higher education. Academic preparation of K-12 students is paltry -- even among those students completing high school and entering college. Less than half (45.6%) of those students entering Florida’s community colleges in 1991-92 were prepared for college level math, reading, or writing. Florida’s community college system spends about \$10 million a year for remedial courses for students not yet ready for college²⁵.

For students with the appropriate high school prerequisites to qualify them to apply directly to one of the state’s 9 universities, high school academic preparation is better than for high school students as a whole. For those students entering directly into the universities, 92.3% were ready to begin college level math, reading, and writing²⁶.

Nevertheless, a relatively small percent of graduating high school seniors enter directly into the university system. For those students fortunate enough to enter the university system, other infrastructure problems abound. In the last several years in particular, the universities have suffered from chronic inadequate funding which has seriously weakened educational efforts. The increasing existence of 5th and 6th year college seniors testified to the shortage of class offerings and the associated inability of the system to educate the next generation of skilled workers.

Despite the difficulties of the teaching mission of the state's universities, Florida's research effort is reasonably well ranked nationally. Three of the 9 public and one private university fall within the top 100 research universities in the United States. According to National Science Foundation 1991 R&D expenditure rankings²⁷, the University of Florida ranked 33rd, the University of Miami was 55th, the University of South Florida was positioned 80th, and Florida State University stood 87th. It might be argued, however, that for a state of its size, more than 4 institutions should rank in the nation's top 100. For instance, both California and New York have 9 in the elite class and Texas has 5 universities with such ranking.

The universities link with other organizations to create important infrastructure contributions related to, but distinct from the universities. For instance, an important federally supported S&T feature of the state is the National High Magnetic Field Laboratory which is a joint project of Florida State University, University of Florida, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The lab, backed by millions of federal dollars, brings an important element of prestige to the state. Both Florida State University and the University of Florida have a research park located adjacent to their campuses. The University of Florida's Progress Center and Florida State's Innovation Park each house many private science and technology corporations, as well as university affiliated research centers. The University of South Florida and the University of Central Florida boast important research centers (discussed in more detail below) as well.

Florida's S&T infrastructure also

consists of a disproportionately large share of military stations and providers of military-related equipment or services, many of which are high-tech firms. While the large number of these may have been an economic benefit in the past, the presence of these Pentagon-dependent establishments will be felt negatively as defense spending continues to spiral down.

The federal dependency is seen again in the state's reliance on space R&D. NASA's Kennedy Space Center on the "Space Coast" is the hub of a host of space-related firms ringing the Center²⁸. General Dynamics, Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, and AstroTech lead in the commercial space business and contribute to more than 1000 high-wage high-value-added jobs in the region. This industry is intensely dependent on the continued development of NASA's space station which, if it manages not to run into debilitating budget difficulties in Congress, will be launched in March of 1995. The Space Station, however, has experienced continuing federal budget cutbacks and several unsuccessful threats of termination.

Like the Space Coast, other regions of the state have come to be identified with particular technologies. Laser and electro-optics (LEO) technology centers are concentrated near Orlando, which ranks nationally just behind Massachusetts' Route 128 and California's Silicon Valley as a center for laser activity in the country²⁹. Support for laser research comes from the University of Central Florida's Center for Research in Electro-optics and Lasers (CREOL), which not only functions to transfer technology to the private sector for commercialization, but also provides a trained work force. The Central Florida Research Park is located on 1260 acres adjacent to the University of Central Florida. It houses many centers for simulations and training, as well as lasers and optics. Unfortunately for Florida, laser technology research is heavily financed by the Defense Department and may be effected by the downturn in military spending.

Florida has a large medical and life sciences sector. Sales of medical-equipment alone are more than \$1 billion annually. Additionally, the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research

Institute is located on the University of South Florida campus and draws upon researchers from the Colleges of Medicine and Arts & Sciences. Biotechnology may play a leading role in the future. Currently, Florida's biotech industry employs about 10,000. Research in biotech is distributed across the state with R&D groups such as Miami's Coulter Electronics (with a biotech branch), University of Miami's Medical School, the Showa University Research Institute in St. Petersburg, and the University of Florida's Interdisciplinary Center for Biotech Research in Gainesville³⁰.

Florida has several regional areas that have, or are attempting to develop based upon microelectronics. Under the name "Silicon Beach" an attempt was made in Broward and Palm Beach Counties. Firms such as IBM, Unisys, Gould, Harris, Motorola, Computer Products, Modular Computer Systems and Racal-Milgo set up manufacturing in the region. Jobs grew between 1981 and 1985 to 30,000, but then they began to decline. IBM and others have closed their plants over the past five years and what was to become Silicon Beach seems to be a casualty of the changing global economy and increasingly competitive foreign factories³¹. The lack of venture capital for new start-up firms has been blamed for some of the problem, while the downturn in defense spending has also hurt microelectronics companies. Besides the Silicon Beach area, the Panhandle region also sees microelectronics as the technology of choice.

A plan called Technopolis Network/Silicon Coast Corridor has been recently funded by the Florida legislature in the amount of \$200,000. The money went to Okaloosa-Walton Community College and the Okaloosa County Economic Development Council to help military personnel and defense contractors adapt to cuts at nearby bases. The plan focuses on stimulating cooperation between local high-tech firms to guarantee their survival. The Technopolis Network plans to specialize in two fields: microelectronics and rebuilding aging jetliners.

Microelectronics has also been targeted by the Tampa Bay region as one high technology of interest. In the late 1980s the region reached national

prominence when it made the short-list for likely locations for Sematech, the multi-billion dollar chip manufacturing consortium (which eventually went to Austin, Texas). Through the combined efforts of the University of South Florida, the Florida Legislature, and the local business community, however, the region received a Pentagon "consolation" prize of \$7.2 million for the university³². Moreover, the region houses several firms of importance including E-Systems' ECI and CMD divisions (St. Petersburg), Tech Data Corp. (Clearwater), Reflectone, GTE Data Services, and Clabir General Defense³³. The Tampa Bay Region's Committee of 100 (the economic development arm for the Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce) commissioned a report from SRI International which suggested a development strategy to focus on high technology, agriculture and aquaculture, biomedical and health services³⁴. Researchers at the University of South Florida in Tampa Bay are also being praised for world-class discoveries in solar energy technologies and for unraveling genetic clues to diseases of aging.

As the above discussion suggests, Florida's infrastructure capacity is a mixed bag. The strengths are a great variety of high-tech firms and centers staffed with able workers and researchers. The weaknesses rest with federal dependency and an ailing educational system. Many of the problems can be traced to inadequate fiscal capacity.

Florida's Fiscal Capacity

Understanding the fiscal capacity dimension of Florida's high-tech economic development policy efforts is key. To do so, two questions need to be answered: First, what does the funding history of Florida's two waves of high-tech economic development policies and programs suggest about current and future efforts? Second, how does the state's fiscal capacity impact crucial S&T infrastructure institutions -- particularly the education system?

The first wave high-tech economic development programs were centered in the Florida High Technology and Industry Council which had an initial operating budget of \$75,000. That operating budget remained fairly

consistent (even grew slightly) until financial problems began to surface in the state in the late 1980s. As budget reductions took hold, the High Technology and Industry Council began to cut back on programs it oversaw. One such program, the Applied Research Grant Program, was awarded \$4.6 million for FY 1988-89, \$7.1 million for FY 1989-90, \$4.8 million for FY 1990-91, and \$1.8 million for FY 1991-92³⁵. The program for FY 1992-93 is funded at the same level as for FY 1991-92. Since many of the funded projects are multi-year, this level of funding essentially means no new dollars for additional grants³⁶. The High Technology Innovation Research Fund, which also operated under the High-Tech Council, received an initial appropriation of \$1.5 million but was never funded again. The program limped through 1991³⁷ and then died³⁸. That is a real problem, since one of the major needs for new start-ups is venture capital.

The same budget problems are clear in first wave training programs. Some programs have fared well like the High Technology Vocational Education program. It received \$1.3 million in 1985, another \$650,000 in 1988, and \$1.62 million in the fall of 1988. Additionally, in 1988, 11 Centers of Electronic Specialization were established with a one-time funding allotment of \$1.2 million. But not all training efforts received continuing support. For instance, in FY 1990-91 the Industrial Services Training Program was funded for \$600,000 but as of 1992's budget cuts, the program was without funding³⁹. The staff was eliminated in October of 1992 to meet budget cuts. The program was supported by the Governor for funding in FY 1992-93, however, the Legislature did not fund it⁴⁰. The Sunshine State Skills Program has seen mixed funding support. In FY 1985-86 the program received \$700,000, in FY 1986-87 \$2.7 million, in FY 87-88 funds increased to \$4 million, then decreased to \$3.5 million the following year, and decreased again to \$1.5 million in FY 1990-91. By FY 1991-92 the funding level had dropped to \$550,000, and currently no funds are available⁴¹. These widely fluctuating budgets spotlight Florida's low fiscal capacity and highlight the need for coordination and stability.

While it is very early to determine the likely fate of Enterprise Florida's funding, certain preliminary signs do not look promising. In March of 1993 the Florida Chamber of Commerce was sufficiently concerned about adequate funding that it sent an alert notice to all people in its contact network. The alert urged recipients to call their representatives because the Governor's initial \$10 million request was lowered to \$1.5 million in the Senate appropriations bill and the House bill included no appropriation at all. The legislature eventually agreed to \$9.8 million⁴² but having to fight for budget appropriations this early in the program's life does not bode well for the future.

Deficiencies in Florida's fiscal capacity are also revealed when trying to answer the second question: How does the state's fiscal capacity impact crucial S&T infrastructure institutions, such as the state's education system? While political capacity to improve the state's school system may exist, fiscal follow-through is not assured. A technology-based economy requires an educated work force. The poor condition of Florida's lower level schools and the inadequate support to higher education in the state suggest serious flaws in the policy plan.

The state's public university system has experienced several continuous years of steady budget reductions. Vacant faculty lines have been sacrificed resulting in permanent downsizing of the research and teaching community, faculty salaries have been stagnant, class offerings have decreased, and pressure has been brought to increase class sizes. Some efforts are afoot to change the dismal situation of Florida's K-12 schools, however, the reforms seem more rhetorical than real. The Florida Commission on Education Reform and Accountability pushed forward a legislative proposal under the name Blueprint 2000, approved October 6, 1992, with the goal of improving schooling in the state⁴³. According to the writers of the report itself, many of the improvement efforts will be dependent upon increases to the budget in three specific areas: retraining of school teachers and staff, assessment of student progress as they move through the reformed school system, and

provision of technology for student use. With a K-12 system fighting year after year of threatened or real teacher layoffs, the likelihood of widespread acquisition of computers and other educational technology accompanied by teacher proficiency training seems low. Again, the problem is poor fiscal capacity.

Conclusion

As the bellwether states show, the implementation of high-tech economic development policies can best be understood through the separate dimensions of political capacity, infrastructure capacity and fiscal capacity. When examined in this manner, Florida's attempts at high-tech economic development policy unveil some important state characteristics.

Florida has demonstrated the political capacity to formulate and enact policies which seem reasonable and informed. Emphasis has been placed on providing for direct monetary grants, indirect tax incentives, linkages to universities and colleges for research support and training, high-tech spin-offs from existing firms and university research, venture capital, and firm start-up support. All these categories are those highlighted as important by the leading states.

An analysis of Florida's infrastructure capacity yields commingled results. The strengths consist of a substantial base in a variety of sciences and technologies such as life and space sciences, electro-optics, lasers, microelectronics, biotech, medical devices, and energy technologies. The major infrastructure weakness are the lack of a skilled work force and the failure of the educational system to produce such a work force. Without skilled workers, implementation of a high-tech economic development strategy is doomed to failure.

The difficulties rest primarily with poor state fiscal capacity. This is demonstrated in the inability of the government to adequately maintain the first wave of economic development programs passed in the early 1980s, the hints of budget battles yet to be fought by Enterprise Florida, and the inadequate support for the public school system including both higher and lower education institutions. Until Florida summons the resolve to consistently and adequately fund institutions and programs

intimately linked to high-value-added high-wage S&T-based employment, the probability of high-tech economic development policies succeeding is nil.

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Ambition and Retirement from the United States House of Representatives, 1957-1984

Daniel J. Reagan & Donald L. Davison

Careers, Retirement, and Institutional Change

Congressional careers continue to interest and to confound political commentators. Most recently, the high reelection rates of contemporary House members led many to conclude that the only way to generate meaningful turnover was to amend the constitution and impose term limits. Yet just as these concerns were peaking, 71 representatives voluntarily left office. This most recent increase in retirement recalls a similarly unexpected rise in retirement levels in the 1970s. Twenty years ago the retirement rate of House members jumped suddenly, soaring to levels that had not been seen since the early years of this century. Voluntary departures became so common during the 1970s that retirement replaced electoral defeat as the single, highest source of turnover in the House.¹

Scholars continue to disagree about the causes and significance of these increases in retirement levels.² Cooper and West suggest that the increase in retirement in the 1970s was caused by members who were "disaffected" by a series of institutional reforms, and so conclude that certain types of members were driven from the House (Cooper and West, 1981a, 1981b). Hibbing, however, finds that if we assume all House members are motivated by the desire for power and money, that variables associated with those goals can explain fluctuations in retirement rates. By treating all legislators as seekers of power and money, he discounts variations in member types as an important part of the retirement decision (Hibbing, 1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1982d). We want to resolve this dispute, and to broaden its understanding of the role of retirement in congressional politics.

While both sets of studies illuminate House retirement, they each are partial investigations. The evidence presented by Cooper and West tying retirement patterns to member ambitions is unnecessarily indirect, and leaves them unable to provide any substance to their use of the term "disaffection." While they make an interesting connection between retirement patterns and broader institutional reforms, Hibbing is right to observe that saying that retirees are leaving because they do not like the House is not saying a great deal. Yet while Hibbing offers more empirical depth, his interpretation of his evidence is somewhat narrow. He treats all representatives as seekers of money and, most especially, power. He then reports that changes in seniority (which he interprets to represent power) is the single best predictor of retirement levels. But the development of the seniority norm has always been understood by scholars to be part of an interrelated set of variables—one factor in a web of factors which were all tied together. The advent of seniority in this century has been linked with the lengthening of careers, low rates of retirement, norms of reciprocity, specialization, apprenticeship, institutional loyalty, expansion of professional perquisites, and the increase in prestige associated with House service. Seniority has been understood to be an important part of this web of characteristics, but it is the web that has been at the forefront of analysis. Much of the power and coherence of the "institutionalization" and "professionalization" studies is rooted in the inter-connectedness of these variables³ and they lead us to suspect that the changes in seniority noted by Hibbing influenced more than the power goal, narrowly understood. Since seniority is bound up with the whole tenor and flavor of congressional politics, its alteration in the 1970s may have influenced the whole range of benefits and satisfactions involved in House service.

This paper thus seeks to do more than resolve the dispute about 1970 retirement patterns. It also aims to change the level of that discourse by contributing a more substantive account of the disaffection that drove certain members to retire and offering a more subtle appreciation of the link between organizational arrangements, member ambition, and the nature of congressional representation.

Reforms, Organizational Incentives, and a New Kind of Retiree

Until the 1970s, retirement from the "modern" House was attributed primarily to advanced age, electoral insecurity, or ambition for higher office (Frantzich, 1978). Yet we will show that while these traditional causes of retirement were surely still at work in the 1970s, they cannot explain that decade's increase in retirement levels. We believe the institutional reforms adopted in the 1970s contributed to that increase by differentially frustrating certain types of majority party members. Since organizational features work to reward and encourage certain activities and to punish and discourage other activities, they help to structure organizational incentives. Given that the 1970-era reforms significantly altered institutional structures and procedures, they also changed the range of satisfactions and costs associated with House service. Representatives whose ambitions were frustrated by the new institutional arrangements retire in proportionally greater numbers than their colleagues whose goals were more satisfied by those arrangements.

In contrast, we do not expect similarly dramatic consequences among Republicans in the House. Republicans, quite logically, will be more-or-less uniformly frustrated by their minority status. Consequently, reforms which change incentives should not profoundly increase their frustration beyond levels it is already at. In fact, democratizing

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the chamber may offer some new opportunities to Republican members.

One overall aim of the reforms was to democratize the House in the hopes of increasing its responsiveness and accountability. Power was taken away both from particular committees and from all committee chairs, and spread throughout the general membership. The committees that experienced the largest reduction in power were Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules. These prestigious panels lost much of their control over institutional activity, and in particular Ways and Means was stripped of its ability to determine committee assignments.

The power of committee chairs was also diluted. Chairs lost much of their control over committee resources, the scheduling of meetings and hearings, and in determining the number and jurisdictions of subcommittees. These powers were shifted down to the committee membership, and so they were given the resources to resist the lead of chairs. As the number of institutional positions of power were thus increased⁴, informal norms which had reinforced the old system, such as apprenticeship and institutional loyalty, began to lose their grip over new and younger members. These changes reinforced one another, and led to other reforms which opened up the legislative process to more public scrutiny, which in turn permitted greater interest group penetration of the congressional process. The success of the reform movement was perhaps most dramatically signalled by the removal of three committee chairs in 1975.⁵

We believe that the democratized, individualized, reformed House presented its members with new organizational incentives, and that members moved by different ambitions responded differently to these new incentives. We expect to find that those who enjoyed a more privileged position in the pre-reformed House — Democrats, more senior members, and members of the most powerful institutional committees — would be most frustrated by the reforms, and so most likely to end their careers there voluntarily. Accordingly, we compare the behavior of all House retirees from 1957-70 to the behavior of all retirees from 1971-84, across activities that reflect member goal orientation.

	PERCENTAGE OF PURE-TYPE RETIREES WHOSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP WAS EXCLUSIVELY:			
	INST'L ORIENTED	POLICY ORIENTED	CONST ORIENTED	TOTAL
85th-91st Congresses	25.3% (42)	36.7% (61)	38.0% (63)	100% (1957-1970)
92nd-98th Congresses	36.2% (72)	30.2% (60)	33.7% (67)	100% (1971-1984)
(n)				

Gauging Ambition: Committee Membership

Most representatives hold an array of ambitions, and the predominant member goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Furthermore, these basic goals are not so sharply differentiated from each other that it is always easy to distinguish among them.

There is, however, a literature which has linked particular sets of ambitions to particular congressional activities. Some activities that are understood to reflect legislators' goals are committee membership, staff allocation, and trips back to the district. We employ committee membership as an indicator of ambition, which permits us to rely on a measure that has passed scholarly scrutiny and that has been replicated over time by different investigators.

Fenno argues that of all the goals espoused by congressmen, three are basic — reelection, the creation of good public policy, and influence within the chamber. He notes that most members probably hold all three goals, but suggests that each has their own personal mix of priorities, and so every member is not equally moved by all three. The opportunity to realize these three goals varies widely among committees, and members “match their individual patterns of aspiration to the diverse patterns of opportunity presented by House

committees” (Fenno, 1973, p.1). He thus links committee membership to member goal orientation, and concludes that since member ambition is a key variable influencing committee activity, committees can be classified as being primarily reelection-oriented, policy-oriented, or influence-oriented.⁶

Smith and Deering observe that although there has been debate about which of the three basic goals drives members most of the time, “some mix of the three goals motivates most committee activity”. They agree with Fenno that we can link member ambition to committee service. “Multiple motives ... are infrequently expressed for the same committee. Usually only one goal is emphasized for each committee of interest [and members] generally are forced to pick among their goals when choosing committees” (Smith & Deering, 1984, p.84, 85 & 88).

Unekis and Rieselbach also find a patterned relationship between member goals and committee assignments. They “accept as beyond argument Fenno’s assertion that committees differ from one another ... and [that] they differ systematically”. They conclude that these systematic differences reflect the various “intentions, motivations and goals of those who serve on the panel[s]” (Unekis & Rieselbach, 1984, p.3).⁷

TABLE 2
 PERCENTAGE OF ALL PURE-TYPE RETIREES DERIVED FROM
 COMMITTEE TYPES, BY PARTY, 1957-1984

	INST'L DEMS	INST'L GOPS	POLICY DEMS	POLICY GOPS	CONST DEMS	CONST GOPS	TOTAL
1957-70	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	23.5%	15.1%	22.9%	99.3%
	(21)	(21)	(21)	(39)	(25)	(38)	(165)
GAP	0			10.9		7.8	
1971-84	22.6%	13.6%	12.6%	17.6%	16.6%	17.1%	100%
	(45)	(27)	(25)	(35)	(33)	(34)	(224)
GAP	9			5		0.5	
% CHANGE	+10%	+1%	--	-5.9%	+1.5%	-5.8%	

(n)

Two methodological points bear emphasizing. First, the committee typology generated by these scholars ties specific groups of legislators to one of the three goals that are understood to predominate among House members. Second, when confronted with the need to choose a committee assignment, members must decide which of the goals competing for their attention they will emphasize. The decision to join one or another committee forces members to prioritize their various ambitions, and so that decision reduces the problems posed by members who harbor an array of goals.⁸

Furthermore, we report findings for only those retirees whose committee service was composed exclusively of committees that fell into one of the three committee categories --- constituency, policy, or institutionally-oriented. These "pure-type" retirees evinced the clearest goal orientation, and can most confidently be identified as having displayed particular ambitions.⁹

Ambition and Retirement

Most retirees from 1957 - 1984 belonged exclusively to one committee type. 87.4% of all pre-1970 (n=190) retirees were "pure-types" of this sort. Predictably, as it became common for members to hold multiple committee assignments, it became less likely that they would serve only on one type of committee. Nevertheless, an impressive 73.4% of the later retirees (n=271) served

exclusively on committees that satisfy one of these three goals. Overall, 79.2% of the retirees from the entire 1957-1984 period can be classified as a "pure-type".¹⁰

Table 1 reports the committee membership of pure-type retirees. Before 1970, these retirees were mainly from constituency and policy-oriented committees accounting for 74.7% of all pure-type retirement in the pre-reform period. Falling considerably off that rate were retirees from institutionally-oriented committees, who made up just about one-quarter of all pre-1970, pure-type retirees.

After 1970, the relationship between committee goal orientation and retirement changed considerably. The percentage of retirees serving exclusively on constituency committees made up just 33.7% of all pure-type retirees, while those from policy committees barely accounted for 30% of such retirements. Together, these two categories combined for a 10.8% reduction in their contribution to House retirement in the post-reform period.

The contribution of those from institutional committees, though, moved in the opposite direction, and climbed to 36.2% of all such retirements. This amounts to a proportional increase of almost 11%, far and away the largest change in either direction in any of the categories. Moreover, while institutionally-oriented committees produced the single, smallest proportion of all earlier pure-type retirees, they

contributed the single, largest proportion in later years. After the reforms, retirees were dominated by institutionally-oriented members in a way that was not true in the pre-reform era.

While this general pattern continues when we break the retirees down by party affiliation, there are intriguing party-based differences in goal orientation and retirement. Table 2 divides the pure-type retirees by party membership and committee type. It also reports the partisan gap in retirement rates for members from the same type of committees.

As before, after 1970 retirees were more likely to come from institutionally-oriented committees than they had been previously. And among Republicans, retirements from policy and constituency-oriented committees decreased, as they had in Table 1. Yet the increase in institutionally-oriented retirees is much stronger among Democrats than it is for Republicans. Democrats from institutionally-oriented panels contributed the single, largest proportion of retirees in the post-reform era, and they also experienced the largest increase in retirement from the pre-reform era. After the post-1970 10% climb among Democratic, institutionally-oriented types, the second largest increase is a 1.5% rise. Retirements among Democrats from these key committees far outpaced the changing retirement rates in the other categories. Members of the majority party serving on the most powerful committees would seem to be best situated to reap the full range of benefits associated with congressional service. The advantages stemming from their institutionally advantaged positions should bind them most tightly to the House and make them least likely to end their careers there voluntarily. Yet this pattern makes sense if organizational incentive structures were changed by the 1970's reforms. Dispersing power throughout the chamber and reducing the power of influence-oriented committee seats decreased the rewards of House service for those Democrats sitting on institutionally powerful panels. Members positioned on other types of committees, pursuing other kinds of goals, may have been either unaffected by the changed incentive structure, or even been positively influenced by such changes. Notice, for example, that the gap in

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF RETIREE AGE, ELECTORAL VULNERABILITY,
PURSUIT OF HIGHER OFFICE, AND SENIORITY, 1957-1984

	Age ^(a)	Election ^(b)	Office ^(c)	Seniority ^(d)
(1957-1970)				
INST'L ORIENTED	58.4 yrs (42)	65.8% (42)	45.2% (19/42)	28.5 (43)
POLICY ORIENTED	56.1 (60)	66.6 (59)	48.3 (29/60)	32.6 (73)
CONST ORIENTED	55.7 62	64.2 (61)	52.4 (33/63)	37.9 (66)
(1971-1984)				
INST'L ORIENTED	57.5 yrs (72)	69.8% (72)	37.5% (27/72)	24.1 (78)
POLICY ORIENTED	54.0 (60)	66.8 (60)	41.0 (25/61)	29.2 (94)
CONST ORIENTED	57.0 (66)	70.3 (66)	26.9 (18/67)	25.9 (79)

(a) mean age of retirees

(b) mean victory margins in election preceding retirement

(c) percentage of retiree-type seeking other political office after leaving the House.

(d) average seniority position number

retirement rates between Democrats and Republicans decreases for policy and constituency-oriented types after 1970, suggesting that the "democratized" House of the reform years enabled them to pursue their goals more successfully than they had previously. In an organizational environment that eroded power centers and increased the power of individual members, the minority status of Republicans may have been less of an obstacle to satisfying their goals than it had been before the reforms.

Age, Electoral Security, Seniority, and Pursuit of Other Office

In order to see whether variables unrelated to ambition can explain the changed retirement trends of members serving on different types of committees, we explore the age, electoral margins, seniority, and desire for other office of retirees. Table 3 indicates that these factors are unable to explain the retirement patterns discussed thus far.

If advanced age, and not the range of goals associated with their committee

assignment could explain the post-reform increase in retirement among Democratic, institutionally-oriented members, we should expect to find three things: These retirees ought to have been at or near usual retirement age levels, they should have been older than retirees from policy or constituency-oriented panels, and they should have been older than their counterparts in the pre-reform years.

Table 3 presents little evidence to suggest that age can explain these retirement patterns. The average age of institutionally-oriented retirees was 6.6 years younger than the typical retirement age of 65 before 1970, and this grew to 7.5 years after 1970. Moreover, the difference in the average ages of institutionally and constituency-oriented types declined after 1970. Therefore, when institutional retirees were more likely to depart, the age gap between them and constituency retirees was narrowing. Perhaps most importantly, institutional-type retirees were younger in the post-1970 period than they had been previously. If the increase in the proportion of institutionally-oriented retirees resulted from the fact that as a

group they were older than they had been in previous decades, then certainly we would expect their post-1970 retirees to be as old or older than their pre-1970 counterparts. Since they were younger than they had been in the 1950s and 1960s, the post-1970 increase in the proportion of institutionally-oriented retirees cannot be attributed to their age.

This cannot be attributed to electoral insecurity. Notice that none of the election margins can be considered competitive; as a group, these retirees were safe incumbents. And institutionally-oriented retirees in both periods were not especially unsafe compared to those in the other categories. Indeed, institutionally-oriented retirees were as a group safer after 1970 than they had been before it. At precisely that time when their contribution to the overall level of House retirement was on the rise, so too were their victory margins. These results leave no ground to suppose that the increase in their retirements was caused by electoral vulnerability.

Nor can the post-reform increase in institutionally-oriented retirees be explained by their desire for another political position. The likelihood of any pure-type retiree seeking other office upon leaving the House decreased in the later period. Before 1970, such retirees were as likely to pursue other office as they were to depart political life altogether: 49% (81) of pre-1970 pure-type retirees sought another political station, while 51% (84) left the political arena. The pattern of their post-House career choice was quite different after 1970. Only 35% (70) of pure-type retirees sought other office after 1970, while 65% (130) returned to private life. Moreover, this pattern was not affected by partisanship. Republicans were just about as likely as Democrats to seek another public office before and after 1970.¹¹ Similarly, in the later period, Republicans were less likely to seek a political position at about the same rate as Democratic retirees (36% versus 33%, respectively). As a group, pure-type retirees were less likely to pursue a political career after 1970, as a larger proportion of them simply departed politics altogether.

This same pattern holds when we examine the pure-type retirees by their particular goal orientation. Compared to

TABLE 4
RATE OF RETIREMENT OF PURE-TYPE REPRESENTATIVES
BY COMMITTEE TYPE AND BY PARTY, 1957-1984

	PERCENTAGE OF PURE-TYPES THAT RETIRED					
	INST'L DEMS	INST'L GOPS	POLICY DEMS	POLICY GOPS	CONST DEMS	CONST GOPS
<u>1957-70</u>	5.4%* 21/387	9.2% 21/229	3.6% 21/579	10.4% 39/375	3.8% 25/657	8.4% 38/453
<u>1971-84</u>	10.0% 45/450	11.1% 27/244	6.2% 25/404	11.2% 35/311	6.7% 33/491	9.8% 34/348

*: Indicates the percent of this type that retired.
(n)

other pure-type retirees, institutionally-oriented ones were never the most likely to pursue other office after leaving the House. More importantly, they were less likely to seek another office after 1970 than before it. If aspiration for other political positions lay behind the increased retirement rate of institutionally-oriented members from the reformed House, then there should be a larger proportion of them pursuing office in the later period. Instead, we find that a smaller percentage of them aspired to another political position, which suggests that other forces are responsible for their changed retirement rates.

Finally, the reforms do appear to be frustrating to the comparatively more senior members of the House. Retirees after 1970 are slightly more senior on the institutional and policy committees and substantially more senior on the constituency committees. We would expect senior members to have been more frustrated by the reformed organizational environment than their junior colleagues, since the reforms diminished the institutional advantages that had been associated with seniority, and increased the power available to the membership at large.

Comparison of the Distribution of Ambition in the House and Among Retirees

The evidence shows that post-1970 retirees were dominated by members displaying institutionally-oriented ambitions in a way that was not true before that time. The reforms passed by the House in the early 1970s may have so changed the chamber's incentive structure that institutionally-oriented types found congressional politics more frustrating than they had previously, and more distasteful than their colleagues pursuing other kinds of goals. However, it is also true that the number of seats on institutional committees increased after 1970. Perhaps the larger presence of institutionally-oriented retirees simply reflects this committee expansion, and has nothing to do with the reforms.

Accordingly, we calculate the percent of representatives in each pure-type category who decided to retire among all members who can be classified as a pure-type. Members displaying institutional, policy, and constituency-oriented ambitions all retired in higher proportions after 1970. The most pronounced change occurred among institutional-types. They experienced the largest increase in the proportion of retirees in the post-reform period, and a larger proportion of institutional-types retired after 1970 (10.4%) than before it (6.8%). The increased presence of institutionally-oriented members among retirees cannot simply be attributed to

the expansion of seats on institutional committees.

Partisanship accounts for most of that increase in the rate of retirement. Table 4 reports the number of pure-type retirees as a percentage of all pure-type members on those committees, by partisanship. The proportional increase in retirement occurred among Democratic, institutional-types. This group of members experienced the sharpest rise in retirement levels, as the proportion of them that retired almost doubled after 1970. Democratic members displaying institutionally-oriented ambitions were more likely to retire in the post-1970 period than they had been previously, and more likely to retire than their colleagues displaying other ambitions. And since their increased retirement rates cannot be explained by variables unrelated to ambition, it seems they were especially frustrated by the incentives provided by the reforms.

Conclusion

(1) REFORM AND INSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED RETIREES

It would be interesting to track these retirees across other behavioral indicators of ambition, to see if they reveal similar changes. We have found a discernable relationship between member goal orientation and retirement. Before 1970, members displaying an interest in policy and constituency goals were more likely to leave the House voluntarily than members displaying an interest in institutional concerns. After 1970, this pattern was reversed, as institutionally-oriented legislators were more likely to retire than their colleagues evincing other concerns. This pattern was particularly pronounced among Democrats. This raises the question what it is about House service that induced particular kinds of members to retire, and conversely, to consider what it is about that service that encouraged other kinds of members to stay.

The change in the ambition of retirees indicates that there was something more to the post-1970 retirement pattern than an increase in volume. This change in goal orientation indicates that the rewards of House service were not what they had been in the pre-reformed House, and that after 1970 the incentive structure provided by the chamber began to change

in an identifiable direction. Thus the changes related to post-1970 retirement patterns are both more profound and more lasting than a simple look at the numbers would suggest.

The 1970 reforms diffused power throughout the membership and stripped prestige committees of many of their institutional advantages. Before the reforms, representatives interested in fashioning legislative responses to an array of complex policy problems naturally gravitated to these committees, in part because these committees had the clout to commit the House to a course of action. After the reforms, those committees lost their power to compel House action, and so those kinds of representatives had no organizational place to turn to in order to satisfy their ambitions. As those places of institutional leverage disappeared, members who had been drawn to them reasonably become more frustrated. Thus, while professional dissatisfaction may not explain the entire increase in retirement,¹² it does seem to account for the retirement of institutionally-oriented Democrats in the immediate post-reform era.

2. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Given this change in the kind of turnover generated by voluntary departures, the post-1970 retirement pattern increased the amount of constituency-oriented activity in the House. Especially among Democrats, members displaying an interest in electoral goals seem to find the post-reform House more congenial than do their colleagues exhibiting an interest in institutional ends. Post-reform retirement patterns increased the House's orientation to the electoral arena, since members attracted to institutional concerns were the ones most likely to leave of their own volition. The reforms thus seem to have exacerbated the congressional inclination to play to narrower, individual, electoral interests at the expense of larger, public, common concerns.

Finally, these results suggest that future recruitment patterns will be driven in part by the post-1970 incentive structure. If certain members of the House disproportionately retired because of their frustration with organizational arrangements, then certain types of new members may be attracted to House

service. The stabilization of retirement in the 1980's may indicate that a new type of representative finds the contemporary House appealing, or at least that members have accommodated themselves to its demands and incentives.

The post-reform incentive structure, along with a membership which increasingly reflects the ambitions encouraged by the new organizational arrangements, may affect the operation of the whole House. For instance, prestige committees may be transformed into panels which are more consistent with members' ambitions. Ways and Means, or Appropriations, while still influential, may manifest some constituency-oriented characteristics which is reflective of its "changed" membership. And the difficulty the Democratic party leadership experiences when trying to persuade its members to follow their initiatives may be as much a reflection of a disharmony in member-leader perspectives and ambitions, as it is the post-1970 dispersion of power throughout the chamber. The post-reform career pattern of House members elicits a variety of behavioral consequences for contemporary congressional politics.

APPENDIX 1 Committees Included in the Various Pure-Type Committee Categories¹³

Institutionally-Oriented Committees

- Appropriations
- Budget
- Rules
- Ways and Means

Policy-Oriented Committees

- Banking
- Commerce
- Education and Labor
- Foreign Affairs
- Government Operations
- Judiciary

Constituency-Oriented Committees

- Agriculture
- Armed Services
- Interior and Insular Affairs
- Merchant Marine
- Public Works
- Science and Technology
- Small Business
- Veterans' Affairs

Notes

¹ Our data shows that an average of 43.8 House members retired from each of the five Congresses elected in the 1970s.

Different research goals lead investigators to define "retirees" in different ways. We include as a retiree any member who voluntarily left the House to return to private life, to pursue other elective office, or to accept appointment to other government positions. We do not count as a retiree any of the following: those who filled the term of their deceased or disabled spouse and then left at the close of that term; those who retired due to scandal; those who retired, switched seats, and ran again under a new party banner; those directed to retire by their religious order.

² While some attribute contemporary retirement levels to a more demanding and disagreeable congressional environment, others do not. See, Michael K. Moore & John R. Hibbing, "Is Serving In The Congress Fun Again?", *American Journal of Political Science*, August 1992. As will become evident, our focus in this paper is the retirement pattern in the 1970s.

³ See, among others, Bogue, et. al., 1976; Bullock, 1972; Cover, 1977; Fiorina, 1975, 1977; Mayhew, 1974a; Polsby, 1968; Price, 1975.

⁴ For example, while only 27.2% of House majority members chaired a committee or subcommittee in the 80th Congress (1955-57), that percentage increased to 49.1% in the 94th Congress (1975-77), and to 52.2% by the 96th Congress (1979-81). See Deering & Smith, 1984, p.51.

⁵ W. R. Poage (TX; Agriculture), F. Edward Hebert (LA; Armed Services), and Wright Patman (TX; Banking, Currency, and Housing) were all stripped of their chairmanships by the Democratic Caucus.

⁶ David Mayhew, in *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974), developed a committee typology that parallels Fenno's typology, and that supports Fenno's linking particular motives to particular committees. See Mayhew's discussion of re-election committees, policy committees and prestige committees.

⁷ Evans also cites with approval Fenno's linking of goals and committee membership. See C. Lawrence Evans: "Participation and Policy Making In Senate Committees", *Political Science Quarterly*, v.106, no.3, Fall 1991, pp.479-498.

⁸ Note that with the exception of Evans, the research cited in this section covers the historical period we are investigating. Whether this committee typology holds true for the contemporary House is another question, one that we address in our conclusion.

⁹ For a list of which committees are in which of the categories, see Appendix 1.

¹⁰ The percentage of pure-type retirees closely matches the percentage of pure-types found in the body at large during these years. The percentage of the entire membership that was a pure-type for the pre-1970 period, the post-1970 period, and for the whole 1957-1984 period are, respectively, 89.1%, 74.8%, and 81.9%.

¹¹ Prior to 1970, 48% of Republicans sought another public office compared to 49% of Democratic retirees; after 1970 it is 36% compared to 33% respectively.

¹² See "Is Serving in Congress Fun Again? Voluntary Retirements from the House since 1970," Michael K. Moore & John R. Hibbing, *American Journal of Political Science*, August 1992, where they conclude that "job dissatisfaction...has been greatly overrated as a cause of retirement" (p. 828).

¹³ Source: Smith & Deering, 1984, p.90.

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The Efficacy of the Superpower Foreign Policy Instruments: the Case of Soviet-Third World Consensus Building

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Abstract

This article tries to answer the question how effective Soviet foreign policy instruments—Trade and Arms Transfers—had been in making Third World countries' political attitude correspond more closely with that of the Kremlin. Contrary to the negative view held by many scholars about the efficacy of Soviet foreign policy instruments, this article reveals evidence of a strong impact of Arms Transfers, in general, on Third World regimes. The findings also suggest the necessity to examine the synergistic effect of the quantity and quality of the instruments upon the consensus between the USSR and developing countries. Furthermore, the empirical results lead us to conclude that the argument about the postwar transformation of the global system—from a political-military to a trading world—is somewhat premature for many Third World countries.

Introduction

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which became official in the fall of 1991, the structure of the global system has experienced a major transformation. The clear bipolarity of the postwar decades is a thing of the past and the dynamics of international relations, which used to be governed by superpower rivalry, are now influenced by many variables other than the polarity within the system. However, the interactions between Third World countries and the superpowers during the bipolar period—which started with Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Third World countries at the expense of the United States around 1955 and ended with its shift in attitude toward the U.S., facilitated by the leadership change in the Kremlin in 1984—provide us with excellent material to study the behavior of weaker states placed between major powers. Thus, the findings of this study are focused on these interactions.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of the USSR's use of instruments—trade and arms transfers—for creating a "consensus"¹ which would help make Third World countries' political attitude correspond more closely with that of Moscow. The efficacy of Soviet tools of influence² has not been sufficiently thoroughly tested and we do not know the extent of the success, or failure, of Soviet foreign policy initiatives. In order to advance our theoretical understandings of the dynamics of international relations, however, it is imperative that we obtain a clear answer to the question through a rigorous empirical analysis. That is what this study tries to achieve.

Influence does not necessarily mean compliance (or ideological agreement). As Bruce E. Moon (1985) emphasized, the idea of Third World 'compliance,' which connotes almost blind obedience by LDCs to the wishes of the dominant powers, is misleading as well as inaccurate. This study assumes that dominant powers try to make Third World countries' political attitude correspond with that of themselves by creating a "consensus." The "consensus"—the dependent variable—is measured by using the rate of voting agreement between the Soviet Union and Third World states in the General Assembly of the United Nations.³ The Soviet foreign policy instruments—the independent variables—include trade and arms transfers.

Virtually every study on this subject examines economic aid, trade, and/or arms transfers.⁴ However, more than ninety-five percent of Soviet economic aid was in long-term credits bearing various amounts of interest. Economic aid was thus strictly tied to Soviet goods and Soviet aid had been closely linked with Soviet trade. Therefore, this study does not include Soviet economic aid as an independent variable.⁵

Whether the economic and/or political dependence of subordinate states breeds political compliance in their foreign policies toward dominant states is clearly an important issue, and it has received considerable attention in the international relations literature. However, some important conceptual ambiguities and measurement barriers remain unresolved. While Bruce E. Moon's (1985) recent challenge to the traditional assumption of the dependence-compliance correlation for example, added a new dimension to the study, Menkhous and Kegley (1988: 319) argued that "[Moon's model] risks oversimplifying the complexities of transnational relations, and offers a static picture of a dynamic pattern of interaction among states." Instead, they emphasized, and thus tried to examine, the changing alignment among the elites governing dominant and weaker states.

Menkhous and Kegley's method of testing the hypotheses, which relied on eyeballing the correlation figures, however lacks scientific rigor and a more scientific test of the hypotheses is called for. Furthermore, as they have recommended, there is a need to "distinguish dimensions of dependence by type and account separately for the variation within each type." (1988: 342)

The dimensions of dependence in this case are twofold—economic and politico-military. Most studies focus on either one of the two dimensions and examine the effectiveness of economic aid, trade or arms transfers individually. However, in order to evaluate their efficacy more accurately, it is necessary to include all of them in a model and find out the relative strength of their impacts. Therefore, to resolve the dilemma this study incorporates both economic and military factors as independent variables. While looking at their separate effects, it also examines the variations within each dimension by grouping Third World countries according to their economic and politico-military situations.

Successes or Failures?: Soviet Involvement in the Third World

For over three decades the Kremlin had been actively involved in the Third World. Based on Marxism-Leninism, which posited the 'world revolution' as its ultimate goal, the Soviet Union had formulated its foreign policy to promote international communism. To that end it had provided support for national liberation movements throughout the world and the Third World became the logical target of Soviet attention.

The primary Soviet objective in building relations with Third World countries was to make them politically more amenable to Moscow than to Washington or other capitalist countries, so that eventually the Soviet Union could form a united front with Third World countries to defeat capitalism. In truth however, Moscow did not have to make Third World countries pro-Soviet. What the Soviet Union wanted was to create, what Moon (1985) called, a "consensus" between itself and Third World states. To that end Moscow relied heavily on bilateral trade and arms transfers.

Trade and arms transfers—from Khrushchev to Gorbachev—had been the leading instruments of Soviet Third-World policy. The question is whether or not the Kremlin succeeded in achieving its objective of influencing foreign policy of Third World countries. The general conclusion one could draw from the literature on this issue is predominantly negative. Most literature pointed to the limited potential of Soviet influence in the Third World and stressed the vulnerable nature of whatever gains the Soviets managed to achieve. However, despite the negative picture of Soviet success among Third World countries, various scholars continued to express concern over the 'expansion' of Soviet influence in the Third World and this inconsistency left the issue unresolved.

Roger E. Kanet (1987:17) argued that, despite the significant expansion of Soviet capabilities and the new role as a major actor in international affairs, Soviet power and influence were still limited. Kanet argued that it was the coincidence of interests of developing states with those of the Soviet Union that enabled Moscow to expand its role in Third World countries.

Of course, there is no denying that after they embarked on dramatic Third World initiatives in the mid-1950s, the Soviets established a clear and visible presence in LDCs. Indeed, the record of Soviet entry into, and expansion within, the Third World during the 1970s was impressive. (Rubinstein, 1988a) Military assistance for example, became a major manifestation of Moscow's continuing commitment to its involvement in the Third World and, beginning in the mid-1970s, the USSR emerged as the "world's leading [arms] exporter to the Third World."⁶ Further, the vulnerability felt by most Third World elites resulted in a desirable environment for the Kremlin to advance its interests in the Third World.

The extended 'presence,' however, may not necessarily mean that Soviet Third-World policies had generated their intended influence over the policies of the target nations. When it comes to the question of effectiveness of Soviet tools of influence, there is no uniform opinion.⁷

Although there may be a general understanding among scholars that the Soviets had not exercised great control over Third World countries' policies, opinions vary about whether Soviet tools of influence had achieved their intended objective of creating the *consensus* between Moscow and developing countries.

The message we get from the literature is mixed and confusing. On the one hand, we find many scholarly works explaining the limits and constraints of Soviet foreign policies toward the Third World. (i.e.: Kanet, 1987; Laqueur, 1983; Machowski & Schultz, 1987; Rubinstein, 1981, 1988a, 1988b) On the other hand, we find some works reporting the increasingly extensive record of Soviet involvement in the Third World and the success of the Kremlin in obtaining cooperation of the Third World in the U.N. General Assembly. (Alker, 1964; Alker and Russet, 1965; Armstrong, 1981; Kay, 1969; Rai, 1972) While we get the general impression that the possibility of the Kremlin attaining major 'control' over policies of Third World countries was slim, we are left with an unanswered question as to how successful—or unsuccessful—the USSR had been in influencing developing countries through foreign policy instruments. For

this purpose, more systematic, empirical tests of Soviet Third-World policies are clearly needed.

Instrument of Foreign Policy

Trade and Arms Transfers are the premium foreign policy instruments used by major powers. All of the major powers use both the "lure of foreign economic and/or military" ties and the "threat of canceling that assistance, to achieve their international political goals," (Singer, 1972: 319) and most literature suggests a positive effect of these instruments on less developed countries' (LDCs') foreign policy orientations toward dominant states.

If a Third World country becomes dependent on trade with a major power, the decision-making elite of the LDC would become increasingly more careful not to make any decisions that might adversely affect the economic relationship. The more a country becomes economically dependent on another, the more the decision-making elite will also become dependent on the trade for maintenance of its own interest, and if a large share of the economy becomes dependent on "trade with a particular country, there is very strong likelihood that the decision-making elite in the dependent country will in some way be bound to that foreign country." (Singer, 1972:226)

Becoming dependent, of course, does not mean a Third World country would become obedient to the political wishes of a dominant country. It is quite conceivable that, as economic and/or military relations develop between a major power and a weaker state, both of them would become dependent—i.e., interdependent—upon each other. Thus, the idea of a dominant country unilaterally dictating the terms of relationship would be inaccurate.

However, considering the huge difference in the economic and military capabilities between the major powers and Third World countries, and considering the desperate economic and/or military conditions most LDCs are in, it makes most sense that a same degree of interdependence would carry different weights in the minds of political elites in weaker states than in the minds of those in dominant states. This differing significance of the ties would work

World state's voting agreement with the Soviet Union in the U.N. General Assembly.

H₆: The heightened desire of Third World states to achieve the New International Economic Order weakened the voting agreements between LDCs and the Soviet Union in the U.N. General Assembly.

The overall model of factors affecting the consensus between Third World countries and the USSR is shown in Figure 1.

The hypotheses 1 through 6 are tested by using pooled time-series, multiple regression analyses based on the equation below.¹⁴

To study the efficacy of the Superpower foreign policy instruments during the bipolar period, this study uses thirty observations--between 1955 and 1984--for each of the thirty-nine non-communist, developing countries¹⁵ (with a total of 1,107 observations for the entire pooled time-series regression).¹⁶ The data are explained in the Appendix.

Statistical Controls

Pooled time-series models require special statistical considerations. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is not automatically applicable for pooled time-series analyses because it ignores the pooled structure of the data. It treats each case as independent of all others, not as part of a set of related observations. When the cases are systematically related to each other however, the OLS is not an appropriate technique to use; and some necessary adjustments would have to be made.

Two particular violations are likely to accompany pooled data. First, the cases may not be independent along the time dimension within units, in which case auto-correlation would bias the statistical findings. Second, a form of heteroscedasticity (which means the variance of the error terms is not constant and, thus, violates one of the basic assumptions of the OLS) is likely to be present in pooled data. For a variety of reasons, some units may consistently vary more than others (e.g., all years for one geographical region) and thus may bias the results.

In this study, all the independent variables are controlled for the 'total' amount of either *Trade* or *Arms*

Transfers. In addition, to reduce possible bias from auto-correlation, a variable, *Year*--representing the time period under analysis, 1955 through 1984--is included so that any variation in an independent variable would be independent of time-series effects. An appropriate test of auto correlation is also carried out by using the Durbin-Watson Statistics.

Some 'unit-specific' effects, however, may be present and appropriate statistical controls are required.¹⁷ Soviet arms transfers in the late 1960s through the early 1970s were heavily concentrated to the Middle East region and this regional concentration may have systematic, 'unit-specific,' effects on the regression results. Thus, dummy variables-- D_{R1} , for Middle Eastern countries, and D_{R2} , for non-Middle Eastern countries--are included in the regression to control for the heteroscedastic regional effects.

This regional concentration may also have synergistic effects on foreign policy instruments in general and on arms

transfers in particular--because of the especially higher volatility in the Middle East. So, the dummy variables are also used together with other independent variables--the *Soviet Arms Transfers* and the *US Arms Transfers*--as interactive variables. (See the equation below.)

Besides the regional concentration, the differences in the size of the LDC economies may influence the effectiveness of the Soviet foreign policy instruments. In fact, this may be a second potential 'unit-specific' effect of this pooled data set. Therefore, the independent variables, the *Soviet Trade* and the *US Trade*, are also controlled for the size of the economy measured by the GNP of the developing countries.¹⁸ Again, dummy variables-- D_{E1} , D_{E2} , and D_{E3} for economically larger, medium, and smaller Third World countries, respectively--will be used both in isolation and in conjunction with the two independent variables--the *Soviet Trade* and the *US Trade*--as interactive variables.

Equation

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Consensus} = & a + a * D_{E2} + a * D_{E3} + a * D_{R2} + a * NIEO * D_{E1} + a * NIEO * D_{E2} + a * NIEO * D_{E3} \\ & + b * \frac{STrade}{Total} * D_{E1} + b * \frac{STrade}{Total} * D_{E2} + b * \frac{STrade}{Total} * D_{E3} + b * \frac{SAT}{Total} * D_{R1} + b * \frac{SAT}{Total} * D_{R2} \\ & + b * \frac{USTrade}{Total} * D_{E1} + b * \frac{USTrade}{Total} * D_{E2} + b * \frac{USTrade}{Total} * D_{E3} + b * \frac{USAT}{Total} * D_{R1} \\ & + b * \frac{USAT}{Total} * D_{R2} + b * \frac{USAid}{Total} * D_{E1} + b * \frac{USAid}{Total} * D_{E2} + b * \frac{USAid}{Total} * D_{E3} + b * YEAR + e \end{aligned}$$

NIEO refers to the declaration of a New International Economic Order by the G-77 at the UN in 1974.

STrade refers to the amount of trade a Third World country had with the Soviet Union per year.

SAT refers to the amount of arms transfers from the Kremlin to each Third World country per year.

USTrade refers to the amount of trade a Third World country had with the United States per year.

USAT refers to the amount of arms transfers from the United States to each Third World state per year.

USAid refers to the amount of the U.S. economic aid to each Third World state per year.

YEAR represents the period under analysis--1955 through 1984.

e refers to the error term.

D_{E1} , D_{E2} , and D_{E3} represent dummy variables for economically larger, medium, and smaller Third World states, respectively.

D_{R1} and D_{R2} are dummy variables for geographical locations. Middle Eastern countries are represented by D_{R1} and other Third World countries are represented by D_{R2} .

These two sets of dummy variables also serve to distinguish the aforementioned economic and politico-military dimensions and, at the same time, account separately for the variation within each of them. Thus, they contribute to the rigor of the testing of this study.

Empirical Findings

The results of the controlled, pooled time-series multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 1 below.¹⁹

Contrary to the initial expectation, *Soviet Trade* proved to have no effect on the *consensus*. Regardless of the size of their economy, Third World countries did not respond to *Soviet Trade* in any appreciable manner. None of the

interactive variable—*Soviet Trade* x D_{E1} , D_{E2} , or D_{E3} , with the regression coefficients of .0232, -.2699 and .1172 respectively—were statistically significant. In other words other things being equal, the increase in the amount of bilateral trade did not lead to any congenial relationship between developing countries and Moscow. The first hypothesis (H_1) turned out to be false.

Soviet Arms Transfers however, proved to be a very effective instrument for the Soviets to foster favorable relationships with Third World countries. The regression coefficients for both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern Third World countries—.1653 and .1546—were significant. As stated in the second hypothesis (H_2),—regardless of

the geographical location—a greater amount of arms transfers from the Kremlin to a Third World state strengthened the state's agreement with the Soviet Union in the General Assembly votings.

The results of *U.S. Trade* were rather mixed. As expected, *U.S. Trade* did have a negative impact on the *consensus* between Third World states (with either larger or mid-size economies) and the Kremlin (H_3). In fact, among the LDCs with mid-size economies, *U.S. Trade*—with the regression coefficient of -1.1346—demonstrated the stronger impact on the *consensus* than any other instrument of foreign policy. However, it did not have any impact on the *consensus* between Moscow and developing countries with smaller economies. Although the negative notation supports the hypothesized direction of the impact, the coefficient -.0228 was statistically insignificant. This leads us to believe that the size of the national economy does affect a developing country's foreign policy vis-à-vis major countries. The implications of these mixed findings are discussed below.

U.S. Arms Transfers also had a strong, negative impact on the *consensus*. The regression coefficients for both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern developing countries -.2721 and -.1864 respectively, were statistically significant. The greater the amount of arms transfers a Third World country received from the United States, the weaker the LDC's agreement with the Soviet Union in the U.N. votings became (H_4). The slope coefficient for Middle Eastern developing countries was the largest among all the arms transfers variables. Further, the non-Middle Eastern developing countries also responded more strongly to *U.S. Arms Transfers* than to *Soviet Arms Transfers*. The absolute value of the coefficient -.1864, was larger than that of either one of the coefficients for *Soviet Arms Transfers* (.1653 or .1546). These results negate our assumption that *U.S. Arms Transfers* would not have been as effective as *Soviet Arms Transfers* in influencing Third World states' relationship with Moscow.

U.S. Aid turned out to have no effect on the recipients' relationship with the USSR. None of the slope coefficients of (USAID)* D_{E1} , D_{E2} , or D_{E3} —-.0005, .0421

Table 1:
Regression Results of the Pooled Time-Series Data
(Controlled for the Size of Economy and Geographical Location of Third World Countries)

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Auxilliary R ²
Intercept	.4263***	.0754	
D_{E2}	.0185	.0845	.9309
D_{E3}	-.0420	.0649	.9086
D_{R2}	-.0693	.0488	.7577
(NIEO)* D_{E1}	.0867	.0499	.6028
(NIEO)* D_{E2}	-.0097	.0520	.6620
(NIEO)* D_{E3}	-.0602	.0425	.6712
(STrade)* D_{E1}	.0232	.4933	.3341
(STrade)* D_{E2}	-.2699	.4541	.5351
(STrade)* D_{E3}	.1172	.1731	.4384
(SA.T.)* D_{R1}	.1653*	.0681	.7797
(SA.T.)* D_{R2}	.1546***	.0356	.2569
(USTRade)* D_{E1}	-.6244*	.2650	.8180
(USTRade)* D_{E2}	-1.1346**	.4098	.8026
(USTRade)* D_{E3}	-.0228	.1697	.4559
(USA.T.)* D_{R1}	-.2721**	.1032	.4771
(USA.T.)* D_{R2}	-.1864***	.0316	.3147
(USAid)* D_{E1}	.0005	.0008	.0756
(USAid)* D_{E2}	.0421	.0781	.3408
(USAid)* D_{E3}	.0094	.0300	.1867
(YEAR)	-.0080**	.0026	.7153

* Probability < .05

** Probability < .01

*** Probability < .001

R² ---- .335

Adjusted R² ---- .311

Pooled Durbin-Watson d=1.902

F-Ratio ---- 13.81
(Probability < .000)

or .0094 respectively—was significant at even .05 level. Considering the small size, as well as the statistical insignificance of all of the coefficients, the fifth hypothesis (H_5) should be rejected.

It turned out that the heightened awareness among Third World countries toward establishing a New International Economic Order (NIEO) had no effect on the *consensus* between the Kremlin and the LDCs. The coefficients for each of the three groups of Third World countries—.0867, -.0097 and -.0602—were all statistically insignificant, and their small size would be a proof enough to reject the sixth hypothesis (H_6).

Neither the difference in the size of their economy nor geographical locations of Third World states influenced developing countries' relations with the Soviet Union. None of the dummy variables— D_{E2} , D_{E3} , or D_{R2} —turned out statistically significant. Another controlling variable, *Year*—with a coefficient of -.0080—however, proved statistically significant. That is, during this thirty-year period there had been a gradual, albeit slight, decline of political relationships between Moscow and Third World states in general. Although the magnitude of the decline was almost negligible, this suggests that the variable successfully relieved the possible auto correlation problem. That is, a possible bias in the estimators was relieved by controlling them for time-serial noises.

Discussion

The purpose of this study has been to analyze the effectiveness of the Kremlin's use of trade and arms transfers for creating a political *consensus* between the USSR and Third World countries. As shown above, arms transfers did bring about desirable results for the Soviets, while trade did not help them at all in improving their relationships with developing countries. These empirical findings provide an answer to the question about the extent of the success, as well as failure of Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The implications of the findings, however, go beyond the case of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the mixed findings obtained in this study about the variables give us valuable information on the efficacy of foreign policy instruments used by major countries to influence weaker countries.

Arms Transfers proved to be a very effective means of influence-building by the Superpowers. The results were consistent for both Superpowers regardless of the geographical locations of Third World countries. The interesting thing is that, contrary to the initial expectation, arms transfers from the United States had a stronger, albeit negative, impact on the relationship between the Kremlin and developing countries than those from the Soviet Union. The assumption that the dependability of Soviet arms delivery would have been favored by Third World recipients over the superior quality of American weapons—which were also more expensive than their Soviet counterparts—seems to have been in error. Then is it the quality and not the quantity of goods that determines the effectiveness of foreign policy instruments?

In comparing the impact of various foreign policy instruments, their quantity and quality would be the two most obvious focuses of attention. The results shown in Table 1 however, suggest the necessity to look beyond these two factors. The fact that *Soviet Trade* did not influence the *consensus* between Moscow and Third World countries, while *U.S. Trade* strongly affected the *consensus* between Moscow and Third World countries with either larger or mid-size economies may seem to suggest that the *quality* is more important than the *quantity*. However, this assumption does not explain the fact that *U.S. Trade* failed to affect the *consensus* between the Kremlin and LDC's with a smaller economies. Had quality been the most important factor, economically smaller developing countries would have responded to *U.S. Trade*. But they did not. If you compare the performance of *Arms Transfers* between the Soviet Union and the United States, quality does seem to have made a difference; but the case of *U.S. Trade* with economically smaller LDCs raises a question about the singular importance of the *quality* of foreign policy instruments. Therefore, neither quality nor quantity alone seems to determine the effectiveness of the instruments. Instead of examining the individual impact of the *quality* or *quantity* we would need to look at their synergistic effect upon the *consensus*.

We should also take into consideration the impact of the changing degrees of, what this author calls, Superpower competition. The impact of the bipolar structure on the political attitude of developing countries has been examined in this study. As hypothesized, the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States did affect the *consensus*. In addition to *Arms Transfers* and *Trade*, however, we may need to pay attention to some other indices of the rivalry—such as geographical contiguity of a Third World country with the Superpowers as well as their respective allies—to more fully evaluate the impact of the relative degree of interest/stake between the Superpowers. In fact, the above-mentioned oddity of economically smaller LDC's might be explained by the fact that Washington had less interest/stake in them than Moscow did. Had the United States had greater interest/stake and, thus, had stepped up its overall involvement in them, its foreign policy instrument—namely, *U.S. Trade*—might have had greater impact on those developing countries.

Since the overall degree of interest/stake a Superpower had in another state could hardly be measured by the volume of arms transfers and trade alone, we would need to use an index which would indicate how much the Superpower was involved with a developing country in each year. Such an index would allow us to measure the degree of interest/stake the United States or the Soviet Union had in a developing country. By comparing the degrees of involvement between the two Superpowers, we may be able to figure out how important the bilateral relationships with the Superpowers, and thus how important their foreign policy instruments, would have been for the LDCs. In other words, the effectiveness of foreign policy instruments would be better evaluated by including in the equation a variable that would measure the overall relationships between the superpowers and developing countries instead of looking at the quantity or quality of the instruments alone. The measurement, however, is beyond the scope of this paper and has to be reserved for future research.

The findings of this study raise yet another important issue. Among the political scientists there seems to be a

general understanding that after World War II, economic issues have become increasingly more important in international relations. Many, if not most scholars would agree in general terms that, especially in recent decades, economic issues are becoming more important than security concerns—even for Third World countries. Further, some scholars argue that ‘power’ in international relations has come to be defined increasingly more in economic rather than in military terms. In his book *The Rise of the Trading State*, Richard Rosecrance (1986), for example, concluded that the world is turning from a traditional, “military-political world” into a “trading world.” In a military-political world, military capability, or the attainment of one, is the most important factor determining the fate of a state. In a trading world, however, military capability increasingly loses its relative importance to economic capability, and states play the games of international relations by using economic leverages, rather than relying on forces. Naturally in such a world, economic instruments of foreign policy—such as trade and/or economic aid—would become very important in influencing relationships with other states.

If Rosecrance’s argument were correct, the economic variables examined in this study—the *Soviet Trade*, the *U.S. Trade*, and the *U.S. Economic Aid*—should all have proven to be effective foreign policy instruments. The empirical results, however, do not support this argument. Among Third World leaders the above-mentioned shift in the paradigm—from a military-political to a trading world view—does not seem to have quite taken place. For many of them, economic factors have not taken priority over other immediate concerns, such as territorial integrity or survival of the regimes.

For any state, the preservation of territorial integrity from external invasion or internal fragmentation and the maintenance of domestic regime stability take precedence over economic development, and this is particularly so among developing countries who are still in the process of nation-building and for whom national security is a precarious issue. Most developing countries rely heavily on military establishments in order to maintain national security and domestic

order. For those Third World states, arms transfers become vital necessities without which they could not survive. As Marshall Singer (1972: 275) argued, “none of the weak countries . . . are capable of producing the equipment themselves; therefore, they have to procure it from one or another of the major powers.” Thus, as long as these conditions persist, *Arms Transfers* will remain an effective foreign policy instrument for major powers to facilitate the *consensus* with Third World countries.

The world system is evolving—from a clear bipolar into a less clear, pseudo-multipolar world. The end of the Cold War has made the labels of the First, Second and Third Worlds virtually irrelevant. Ideological differences between countries now seem almost insignificant in international relations. Instead of ideological or economic issues, international actors now fight over cultural or religious differences. Furthermore, toward the future, yet other issues may turn out to be the determining factors governing international relations.

In this changing world, however, one thing seems constant: there will always be conflicts of interest between countries. Depending on the nature of the dispute, arms transfers may remain an important factor in influencing the relationship between LDCs and major powers. By the same token, if the above-mentioned shift from a ‘military-political’ to a ‘trading’ world becomes the reality for every nation, economic factors may become more important than arms. Through all these changes, however, the important issues concerning the question of efficacy of foreign policy instruments will always be dependent on their *quality* and *quantity* and the impact of the *degrees of competition* between/among rival powers on Third World countries.

Appendix: Data

Third World Countries By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with over one hundred Third World countries. However, because of lack of data, this study is confined to thirty-nine developing countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chad, Chile, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, North Yemen, Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay.

Consensus (Dependent Variable) The consensus of Third World countries with the Soviet Union is measured by using the roll-call votes in the General Assembly of the most prominent international forum for dealing with global issues—the United Nations. Considering the nature of the subject, only the votes on which the Superpowers disagreed with each other are included to test the effects of the rivalry between the two. The data were taken from the “United Nations Roll-Call Data, 1946-1984” obtained through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The responses of the member states are recorded as: a) Yes, b) No, c) Abstain, or d) No-response for each roll-call, which give us ordinal data. In order to measure the rate of agreement in the U.N. roll-call votes, which is a measure of association in symmetric ordinal data between the USSR and each developing country, Kendall’s tau-b is utilized.

Trade Soviet (and U.S.) trade with the Third World is operationalized as the annual volume of Soviet (and U.S.) non-military trade with each developing country divided by the country’s total volume of trade, thus controlled for the unit-(country)-specific bias. The data were obtained from the ‘U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.’ (Annual editions between 1957 and 1987.)

Arms Transfers The data on annual arms transfers between countries were available from “The Arms Trade with the Third World” (between 1956 and 1970) and “Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85,” both published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). However, since the data were available only in five-year durations, some calculations were necessary to obtain annual statistics for individual Third World countries.

As A-1 (previous page) illustrates, we can automatically assign 100 (%) as the Soviet share of arms transfers to Afghanistan for each year between 1956 and 1975, and also zero to India for each year between 1951 and 1960. Between 1961 and 1975, however, we do not know the annual ratio of Soviet arms transfers in India’s total arms imports. Therefore, we need further information.

The books mentioned by SIPRI also contain information on the “register of the trade in major conventional weapons with Third World countries.” (See A-2 and A-3 on previous page). It gives us the suppliers and the recipient countries of weapons-systems, the year of delivery, and the kinds and the number of weapons delivered. By using these pieces of information, as well as using the weighted scales for every weapons-system—specifically devised by the author¹—each A-1: Share (%) of Major Suppliers in Third World Imports of Major Conventional Weapons; by country (sample) country’s annual value of arms imports as well as the Soviet and American shares within the country’s total arms imports were calculated.²

In order to figure out a country’s annual value of arms received, we would have to know the prices of the weapons-systems. We find prices for American weapons-systems in Tom Gervasi’s *Arsenal of Democracy; American Weapons Available for Export* (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1978). Thus, assuming that the values of Soviet weapons would be similar

to those of American weapons, we can figure out the relative prices for Soviet weapon systems.

For example, if the price of a rifle around 1960 is between \$300 and \$500, we take the mean value of \$400 for a rifle. Using ten times of that value, \$4,000, as the base—giving a scale of one—we can put relative weights to all the weapons listed in the aforementioned SIPRI books. If the price of a medium tank around 1960 was between \$100,000 and \$300,000, we take the mean \$200,000 and give a scale of fifty for medium tanks (\$200,000 divided by \$4,000). In order to control for the effect of inflation, the weapons-systems are grouped into two time periods and the scales are weighted separately.

A country's annual value of arms received is calculated by multiplying the number of each of the weapons-systems by the above mentioned scales and aggregating the scores for each year. After the total value of arms imports is determined, the ratio of Soviet arms transfers in individual countries is calculated by figuring out the value of Soviet arms sent to each Third World state, divided by that of the state's total arms received.

U.S. Economic Aid The degree of each Third World state's dependence on the United States' economic aid is measured by the amount of aid it received from the United States and dividing it by the state's total net receipts of economic aid to control for the unit-specific bias. The data were obtained through various issues—between 1960 and 1985—of **Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries**, published by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.) A dummy variable, *NIEO*,—representing the renewed resolve among Third World countries to achieve a New International Economic Order—is included in this study. A value of '1' is assigned for the years after 1975 and a '0' for the years 1974 and before.

¹ Kunihiko Imai, "Strategic Tools of Influencing Third World Attitude: The Case of Soviet-U.S. Rivalry," **Comparative Strategy: An International Journal**, Volume 11, Number 4 (Winter 1992).

² The detailed information on the weighted scales is available upon request.

Data Sources

CIA (1985) **Handbook of Economic Statistics**.
Gervasi, Tom (1978) **Arsenal of Democracy: American Weapons Available for Export**. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1960-1967) **Geographical Distribution of Financial flows to Less Developed Countries**. Paris: O.E.C.D.

(1969-1984) **Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries**. Paris, O.E.C.D.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1971) **The Arms Trade with the Third World**. New York: Humanities Press.

A-1: Share (%) of Major Suppliers in Third World Imports of Major Conventional Weapons; by country (sample)

Recipient Country	Period	Supplier			
		USSR	USA	.	etc
Afghanistan	1956-60	100	-	-	-
	1961-65	100	-	-	-
	1966-70	100	-	-	-
	1971-75	100	-	-	-
India	1951-55	-	9	-	-
	1956-60	-	-	19	-
	1961-65	41	9	7	-
	1966-70	68	-	6	-
	1971-75	73	-	2	-

Source: **Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85**, by Michael Brozoska and Thomas Ohlson, SIPRI, 1987, pp.338-351.

A-2: Country Registers (1954-70) (Sample)

Recipient	Date	Number	Item	Supplier
Afghanistan	aircrafts			
	1955	2	Il-14	USSR
	1955	10	Auster AOP.9	UK
	1956	30	NA T-6G	USA
	naval vessels (etc)			

Source: **The Arms Trade with the Third World**, SIPRI, New York, 1971, pp.338-351.

A-3: Register of Trade in Major Conventional Weapons with Third World Countries, 1971-85. (Sample)

Recipient	Supplier	No.	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Delivery
India	Australia	5	N-24A Nomad	Transport	1977
	Czechosl.	300	OT-62	APC	1967
	France	27	AS-365N	Hel	1986
	USSR	75	MIG 21FL	Fighter	1971

Source: **Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85**, by Michael Brozoska and Thomas Ohlson, SIPRI, 1987, pp.138-280.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1987) **Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985**. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Notes

- ¹ Bruce E. Moon (1985) first publicized this term to describe a politically congenial relationship between states.
- ² By 'influence' I mean "getting one's way by having others behave in the way you want them to behave." See Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr (1981: 127-130).
- ³ Although a recent study (Tolmin, 1985) called into question the validity of using U.N. General Assembly votes to define political

attitudes of countries, the main problem identified by this study rested in the use of **Events Data**. As Holloway concluded (1990: 283), however, "if event day and voting data do not agree, analysis suggest that it is the former which is at fault," and the appropriateness of the use of U.N. votes to measure countries' political attitude is currently broadly accepted in this discipline. See Charles D. McClelland (1983: 169-178) for an extended critique of **Events Data**.

In fact, the use of the U.N. roll-call votes as a good index of informal political ties (political compliance) between countries is well established. Singer (1972) argued that, by analyzing the voting behavior between countries over long periods of time on a large number of issues, "it appears possible to make inferences about informal political ties that may exist...between states." Richardson and Kegley (1980) and Armstrong (1981), among others, justified the use of U.N. General Assembly voting behavior as an indicator of

foreign policy compliance on several grounds: the votes are uniquely regular and public statements of the governments through their delegates, the U.N. has an almost universal membership, and the U.N. roll-call votes by now constitute a long and easily accessible time series. Roeder (1985) even concluded that the use of General Assembly voting records has become something of a convention in empirical studies on the link between dependence and political compliance.

Indeed, the list of empirical works using the U.N. roll-call votes to measure the political compliance of dependent states with the political interest of dominant states is long: Armstrong (1981), Alker (1964), Alker and Russett (1965), Betts (1980), Ellis and Salzberg (1965), Holloway (1990), Hovet (1963), Kay (1969), Kegley and Hook (1991), Menkhaus and Kegley (1988), Moon (1985), Rai (1972 and 1980), Richardson and Kegley (1980), Roeder (1985), Rummel (1969), Singer and Sensenig (1960), Vayrynen (1980), Vincent (1971)—to name just a few.

⁴ The list of relevant works is long—which would include: Cassen (1985), Hoffman (1987), Kanet (1982 and 1987), Kanet and Menon (1980), Kolodziej and Kanet (1989), Noguee and Donaldson (1988), Rubinstein (1981, 1988a, and 1988b), Rubinstein and Smith (1984), Saivetz and Woodby (1985), Starr (1987), and Whelan and Dixon (1986)—to name just a few.

⁵ Friendship and Cooperation treaties were also used by Moscow to formalize and promote long-term close relations between the USSR and Third-World states. However, it would be more appropriate to consider the treaties as a manifestation of improved—and often already stable—relationship between the parties rather than a cause of improving the relationship. Thus the treaties are not included either.

⁶ From the mid-1970s through most of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest supplier to the Third World of "combat aircraft, tanks, self-propelled guns, air defense weapons, and armored personnel carriers." See Rubinstein (1988b: 55).

⁷ Pajak (1981), for example, claimed that Soviet arms transfers had "served as the primary Soviet vehicle for acquiring influence" and that they had often provided the "open wedge" for a variety of diplomatic, trade, cultural and other contacts. Betts (1989) and Sylvan (1978), on the other hand, concluded that from the standpoint of Soviet, as well as U.S. foreign policy, the use of arms transfers had been "singularly unsuccessful" in terms of increasing the suppliers' influence on the recipient's foreign affairs.

⁸ For the United States and the Soviet Union, economic benefits of arms transfers are probably of secondary importance. See Catrina (1988: 70-71).

⁹ The annual growth rate of Soviet-Third World trade, for example, had soon declined from 23.8 percent in 1974 to 3.8 percent in 1977. See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier (1983: 22).

¹⁰ Clark, O'Leary, and Wittkopf (1971), for example, found positive correlations between foreign aid received from the West and LDC's support for the donors in the "system-conforming" and "economic" dimensions in

the U.N. votings. Rai (1980) also identified a correlation (for the period between 1967 and 1976) between economic aid and U.N. General Assembly voting.

¹¹ See Steven Holloway (1990) "Forty Years of United Nations General Assembly voting." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 18: 279-296.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ A small group of LCDs—such as Cuba—argued that the USSR was a "natural ally." However, those countries are not included in this study, and thus, the expected effect of NIEO on the *consensus* stays negative.

¹⁴ In the equation, time-lags between the variables are not introduced because of the difference in time periods the data were aggregated for on the dependent and the independent variables. Since the *Consensus* is measured by using the roll-call votes in the U.N. General Assembly, which takes place between September of each year and May of the following year, the consensus score for 1980, for example, is determined after May of 1981. On the other hand, the statistics for *trade*, *arms transfers*, and *U.S. economic aid* are aggregated for each calendar year covering the period ending in December 1980. Therefore, considering this time-lag and also considering the fact that changes in the volume of the independent variables could be felt within a shorter period of time than a year—usually, within a quarter of a year—no time lag is introduced in this study.

¹⁵ The Warsaw Pact countries are not included in this study for an obvious reason: they had *always* voted with the USSR in the U.N. regardless of the variations in the volume of trade or arms transfers from the Kremlin, and their inclusion would have seriously biased the statistical findings. Furthermore, the number of the Third World countries included in this work was determined by the availability of data on all the independent variables.

¹⁶ James A. Stimson (1985) compared four statistical techniques—the ordinary least squares (OLS), least squares with dummy variables (LSDV), general least square estimate (GLSE), and general least square-auto-regressive moving average (GGLS-ARMA)—and concluded that all of the above are applicable to pooled time-series analyses depending on the design and situational contexts. The technique most suitable for this study is the LSDV because of the expected, fixed between-unit effects in a data set in which the number of cross-national units (thirty-nine) is slightly larger than that of time-series units (thirty).

¹⁷ The Third World countries are divided into three groups based on the size of their economy; the first group included the top ten countries, which had at least nine LDCs, which had an average annual GNP of between \$5,000 million and \$14,000 million; and the last group encompasses the rest of the developing countries with a maximum annual GNP of less than \$5,000 million before 1984. The grouping of the countries is to detect some potential effect of differences in the size of the economy in general on their policies, the approximate grouping into three groups—large, medium, and smaller economies—would suffice. More

rigorous examinations on this point have to be left for future studies.

¹⁸ The residual plots showed no discernible pattern of heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation. Furthermore, the Durbin-Watson *d* statistic of 1.902 suggests the very low probability of the existence of autocorrelational bias in the analysis.

Multi-collinearity becomes a problem when a regression coefficient turns out to be statistically insignificant because of the collinearity problem with other independent variable(s)—when, in fact, the variable *does* have a significant impact on the dependent variable. In other words, we have to pay attention to variables that turned out to be statistically insignificant and have high auxiliary R^2 , which shows the high collinearity with other independent variable(s). Although there is no set standard for auxiliary R^2 to check for (multi)collinearity, .75 would be a reasonable borderline.

As Table 1 shows, except for the dummy variable, (multi)collinearity was not a problem. Among the insignificant variables, the highest R^2 was .6712 for $(NIEO) \cdot D_{E3}$, which is well below .75. Although the dummy variables, D_{E2} , D_{E3} , and D_{R2} , might be affected by (multi)collinearity—judging from the very small magnitude of their regression coefficients, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that neither the size of the economy nor the geographical location of developing countries made a difference in the *consensus*.

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Post-Soviet (Russian) Military Thought, Russian Foreign Policy, and the Future

Roger Hamburg

Former-CIA Director Robert Gates testified in January, 1992, that "The threat to the United States of deliberate attack (from the former-Soviet Union) has all but disappeared in the foreseeable future...The capabilities of the strategic forces are being significantly reduced. Modernization programs are likely to be delayed or abandoned and training will be cut back. The readiness of conventional forces is at the lowest level in many years. Naval deployments continue to decline from already reduced levels and inadequate training is degrading the combat capability of the general purpose forces."

A dissolved conventional military and military alliance eliminates the need for forward-deployed European-based U.S. forces while the virtual disappearance of significant Soviet activity from Asia to Africa to Latin America means entering different assumptions about the American military role in these areas.¹

However, the disintegration of Soviet and now Russian military power, as the successor of the old USSR's military traditions is fraught with serious problems since the military factor cuts across all three of the formidable problems that the Russian political leadership faces; transition from communism to capitalism, from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, and perhaps most significant, from a military point of view, from a heterogeneous superpower to a potentially fractious nation state.²

The former-Soviet military and its Russian successors have lost their traditional *Raison d'Être* as part of a united force, the foreign threat. What kind of war, nuclear or conventional, long or short, regional or global, should it be prepared to fight? Who are its likely foreign adversaries? Only the nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth still pose a threat and only the Strategic Forces could mount a major military operation.³

The former-Soviet Union has peacefully relinquished its position as a super power, even its separate statehood, an

"abrupt but amiable collapse," in John Lewis Gaddis' apt phrase.⁴ "Is there the danger..." of a frustrated, directionless, demoralized and politically disenfranchised former-Soviet army aligning itself with conservative political forces to reestablish some kind of authoritarian state (or disintegration of Russia into competing "war lords" with possible seizure of nuclear weapons) another possibility? Will a Russian government out of a sense of anger and frustration in the face of multiple political and economic deterioration, amid a feeling of lost greatness, feel compelled or have the support at home to reestablish Russian military power, on something approximating its former terms?⁵

Global instability in Central Europe and elsewhere since the end of the Cold War, coupled with the disintegration of the communist order and the end of the Soviet Union has, in the words of the leader of the Russian conservative National Salvation Front, "caused only suffering from our people...and has not made anyone happy." In the old days, there was a "confrontation of two worlds, but we had a guarantee of a balance of power and a guarantee of peace. Now this balance is destroyed. Now someone may be tempted to solve the problem by force, such as in Iraq and now Serbia. This might push mankind into World War III."⁶

The Place of Armed Forces in Society: The Russian Example

Military forces can be used to encapsulate the pattern of society, as well as affect its pattern. Military forces help set the tone for the general life of society. A society's view of the world, coupled with its armed forces perception, is crucial. These perceptions and the military means and doctrines chosen to deal with that world, are critical in determining the shadow that a government throws as it deals with the world. Each society that deems itself a "nation" and is organized into a state,

has a social code that contributes to its identity. Foreign policy, the larger component of which military policy is a part, is "ultimately determined by the set of social values controlling the society at large."⁷

General Vladtmik Lobov, a Russian military reformer, put the relationships between the military, domestic politics, and foreign policy in this way. Military doctrine "does not exist by itself. It exists, in any society, only as part of the state doctrine. Each component in that doctrine has a military aspect, domestic and foreign policy, economy and science, social, political, and other spheres."

A military doctrine discussed in isolation ends up "at odds" with other aspects of government. If military doctrine is "divorced from the entire range of national problems, its provisions remain only on paper, but there is a danger if military doctrines gain pre-eminence, something that has happened in this country more than once." The military should not run ahead of policies or lag behind the economy. If the former, it will dictate policy while if the latter, "any problem will fail to be addressed creating new contradictions in society."⁸

Lobov's reference to military pre-eminence "that has happened in this country more than once" was a part of an ideology of political control at home that exaggerated internal and external threats while super-centralization in internal policy led to hegemonic and Great Power ways in foreign policy. Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, noted this internal and external nexus since there can be no trust in "dictatorial, anti-popular regimes which are all but inevitably spreading methods of violence beyond their national borders as well...And why were our partners frightened by Stalinism? There are many reasons, but one is perfectly clear, i.e., it is difficult to have confidence in a society which is mirrored in all-out suspicion; it is hard to build a regime that has no faith in its own people."⁹

But foreign policy and the

international environment to which it responds have an independent logic of their own; it is not a mere reflection of a state's internal order, though it is affected by it. The geographic environment of a state inevitably conditions—if it doesn't determine a state's response to it. In the Russian case, for example, the issue of the return of the southernmost Kurili Islands to Japan (seized in 1945) led even democratic deputies in the Supreme Soviet to espouse a "Great Power" foreign policy orientation that emphasized preservation of Russia's Great Power status (particularly as the economy deteriorated) and rejected following a Western lead in international relations. The islands issue operated independently, even in the centralized USSR, and became an issue of Russian predominance almost irrespective of political coloration. In the changed conditions in Russia today, such issues are filtered through a post-Soviet political spectrum in which powerful ministries, presidential advisory teams, the Supreme Soviet, regional political groupings, the mass media, and political opinion all influence foreign policy over the islands issue. There is no simple liberal-conservative split on such questions.

Basic geopolitical realities affect this complex internal assessment. With the formal dissolution of the USSR, 15 new states arose from the old "secure wrappings." While the external borders of the USSR were protected, the internal ones were "nothing but lines on an obsolete map." There were open borders with Ukraine, the three Baltic states, Kazakhstan, and war-torn Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia's external borders with Mongolia, Norway, North Korea, Finland and China, on the other hand, were fortified in depth. Former-Prime Minister Gaidar observed that Russia entered 1992 with a "purely formal, theoretical statehood." Security arrangements have deteriorated on old internal borders during 1992.¹⁰

While the geopolitical space remains, its meaning has changed when filtered through the prism of Russian thinking. It is easy to attack those responsible for a tragedy and a tendency to romanticize a past relationship, as will be seen below, with those who attack Yeltsin and idealize the past in a climate of political and economic uncertainty. As former State Department official Harold

Saunders observed, "how each partner defines its own identity and how each feels about itself will affect how each perceives the other—as a source of threat or support." "How a party perceives itself provides the lens through which it sees external changes." The emerging new Russian identity is a subject of serious debate and it is, of course, reflected in discussions of Russian military doctrine. "Misunderstanding of that identity will cause a misperception of the security policy of the Russian federation. Russia's identity is different than that of the Soviet Union, and it is hard for outsiders to understand this. While the Soviet Union was a continuation of the Russian Empire, Russia is not a continuation of the Soviet Union" (although some would like to resurrect the latter). There was never a Russia "with these boundaries or within the political and economic system we are trying to build today. We only now understand that Russia today is just Russia, and we are not sure yet what that means."¹¹

A Russian commentator stated that any absolute reliance on a distinctive national experience may result in the country's self-isolation and the emergence of a society infected with chauvinism and xenophobia—a return to the Cold War. Yet, the opposite danger is also fraught with peril. If a country loses its national supports, universal human values also disappear, for only a state that knows its own values and way of thinking can respect them in other nationalities and enjoy their respect. But military honor is part of national honor, and statements like that of Vice President Alexander Rutskoi that, while restoring the Russian Army, we are restoring Great Russia, gave pause to former-Soviet republics like Ukraine because it can be read as something more than a mere assertion of honor and national pride.¹²

In a wide-ranging survey of Russian interests in the past Soviet period, Matsenov notes that Russia is realizing itself in "more than a state"—it is a unique spiritual community of the numerous ethnic groups that populate its geopolitical space. The former-Soviet Russian Federation "like it or not" is the sole equivalent of Russia today. Russia must have enough defense potential to guarantee security in the event of a crisis close to the border and in collective action to deter aggression against other

states. An adequate defense capability will in turn guarantee Russia's international status and its relation with the other former-Soviet republics and the leading states of the world. Failure to secure the rights of the Russian speaking population in other republics, Russia's main ethnographic interest, will bring a collapse of the Russian Federation, worsen existing disputes with other republics, and foster a great influx of Russian-speaking refugees from them, this at a time of the emergence of several new nuclear powers along Russia's borders. The author notes that the new international space in former-Soviet territory can be divided into a European Northern Region (the Baltics), a Central Region (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), and a Southern Region (the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia).

He pays particular attention to the Southern Region, the Islamic factor and Western unwillingness to raise its international status to a Western level, as well as prejudice against Libya. But the West must encourage Russia to remain a primarily European power and not "slip" too much into Asia (as some who have supported a more "balanced" Russian policy have urged). Otherwise, the West will have to deal with new disturbances of the power balance in Central Asia and the Middle East, with several regional groupings aspiring to regional geopolitical influence, like Azerbaijan, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and a confederation of Turkistan (or Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran). Russia, even in the weakened and altered form, still remains an important player in world politics and the global power balance.¹³ It seems to suggest that a strong Russia is preferable to a pre-Soviet pattern of the Western power playing the balance of power, as Great Britain did in Central Asia and trying to hold sway in Iran and Afghanistan.

Another Russian academician Konstantin E. Sorokin warns that whatever the nature of centralized control of nuclear weapons in the CIS, it cannot live without them at a time "when the old world order is ending and the contours of a new world order are just beginning to emerge." Dangers proliferate in such an uncertain climate of growing political and military danger from the south, internal and regional instability, unpredictable behavior, with growing

arsenals of weapons of man's destructiveness and long-range delivery systems. there are dangers. The Southern Region of the CIS is within targeting missile range today and the area of vulnerability will widen in the future.

Nor is there any guarantee of "trouble-free relations" between CIS members and the West. Any return to confrontational thinking in Russia would result in the West's return to a power-based ideology even though "practically thinking" such a possibility is "not very great." Any internal development in Russia that led to an attempt to launch a semi-fascist and/or imperial revenge following disintegration would bring external and internal catastrophe. "The West has not lost its ability quickly to resurrect its containment system in a variant which would be even harsher and qualitatively less advantageous to Russia." This would result in greater opportunities for foreign/Western involvement in Russian territory, with Russia in an extremely weak military position, unable to recover from its military and technological lagging. Even the nuclear front "sooner or later" will become depreciated.¹⁴

In an early 1993 assessment, three specialists including Alexander Bessmertnykh, President of the Russian Foreign Policy Association; Andranik Migranyan, political scientist; and Andrei Kortunov, President of the Russian Research Foundation, gave a mixed review of Russian foreign policy. The one common feature they highlighted was that it must be oriented to its own interests, not "oriented toward anyone, from blindly following the West to defining the parameters and limits of constructive cooperation and competition." Russia should seek Western recognition of its "special rights" in the "near foreign countries" (the ex-Soviet republics) in connection with the issue of respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population, (but this is not the "re-creation of an empire"), as well as seeking political solutions in Moldova (the tran-Dniester region) and the Caucasus. It must also sell arms because of its need for hard currency and the "too paltry" level of Western aid. (This is a frequent comment from Russian officials of different political coloration who often question U.S. and Western motives who object to arms trade competition from their Russian/CIS

recipients of Western aid).

The "soothing adagio" of Kozyrev's vibrato was challenged by the "robust allegro scherzando" of Lukin's drums (Russian ambassador to Washington) and Ruskoi's (former-Russian Vice President who often expressed strong nationalist views) "timpani". But there will be "no radical changes with foreign policy for politics is the art of the possible." The policy course in 1993 is likely to be rather "pragmatic, cautious, and at times opportunistic and expedient." It is doubtful that any new foreign minister could develop a long-range strategic concept for Russian policy. Too many variables must be taken into consideration.¹⁵

Whatever the pragmatic calculation of foreign policy, professionals like Bessmertnykh and others (and even they favor the idea that Russian foreign policy should become more independent away from its recent pro-Western orientation), the political winds blow increasingly to the right, away from Kozyrev's call for Russia to "form itself into a state and enter the family of civilized people," as well as his obligatory defense of the rights of Russian people in the former republics. Instead, some Russian military planners still see the West as an external threat, despite having security cooperation with NATO, the CSCE and others. Others see NATO's military power in Europe and the American military presence in the Far East, especially its rapid deployment forces near Russia's border, as a source of danger. There is also growing concern with regional powers, especially Germany, Japan, Iran, and Turkey, and anxiety with the potential danger that the political leverage of Western aid may create, forcing the Russian government into concessions detrimental to national interests. And finally, the U.S.' ability and propensity to project military power beyond its borders to further foreign policy objectives is viewed apprehensively. The conservative vision of Russian security coming from the General Staff is sometimes at odds with assessments coming from civilian analysts. The former increasingly approach CIS partners in the same "heavy-handed manner" as it approached the Old Warsaw Pact. There is also increasing concern that Yeltsin is coming under military influence—a military that

wants to reconstruct as much of the former Soviet Union as it can. The West may have to be prepared to deal in the future with a "less accommodating negotiating partner," which, as in the former-Yugoslavia, presents its interests more assertively, however those interests may be defined.¹⁶

It is extremely difficult to assess the impact of the increasingly rightward turn of Russian domestic rhetoric on its actual foreign policy behavior. The Clinton administration in Washington seems openly determined to attend to neglected domestic priorities, is also the first non-Cold War administration since Franklin Roosevelt making a prediction unusually problematic. Independent of such changes in Russia's external environment, however Yeltsin shifted more responsibility to the Security Council (which includes military and security officials in addition to the Foreign Ministry). These maneuvers reflected the increasingly bitter internal struggle over Russia's place in the post-communist world and were not totally a turn against Washington. Russia has huge internal priorities of its own, especially in dealing with its former-Soviet space and this caution will be accentuated as Russia continuously redefines itself, whether in cooperation with the United States or Europe, or as a balance between East and West. Inevitably, of course, the statements and attitudes of the new Clinton administration will affect this debate. Objectively, however:

"It is quite clear that financial limitations, economic interests, lack of possibility for any serious export of capital, and high internal resource availability determine the needs for the revival of a continental strategy which is traditional to Russia and a total rejection of the global involvement of the USSR in the affairs of the entire world, imposed by communist messianism and historical accident. This involves the need for further reduction, at least for the foreseeable future, of geostrategic ambition and overseas commitments and the forces and funds needed for their support (an ocean-going fleet above all)."¹⁸

There will be a reduced resource, power, and geopolitical base in defense and foreign policy and less of a possibility of defending government interests abroad "for at least the next few

years," indicating "sensible compromises" and a "certain limit of what is admissible," as Russian professional foreign policy analysts like Kortunov noted.¹⁷

The Russian Military: New Doctrine

To recapitulate, the study of a state in military forces can be used to encapsulate the pattern of the larger society. Military forces must be sensitive to the availability of economic resources, the nature, and character of authority structures and the factors determining a state's influence in the international arena. Military forces affect these elements and help set the tone for the general life of society. A society's view of the world, coupled with the armed services view are crucial. Therefore, it is a portent for the future that when a radio correspondent interviewed Vladimir Sergeyevich Smirnov, chairman of the Military Men for Democracy, and enquired on what Russia's new military policy would be, was answered that "the choice has been made in favor of militarization, in favor of changing nothing." Why is this so, the reporter asked? Smirnov responded that the main reason is the retention of old forces, Russian political leaders lack of understanding of the situation, and lack of political will. The leaders sought to "discuss" the problem in the United Forces and the army, and to solve them later after the economic reform has taken hold. This, he contended, was a "profound delusion."²⁰

This stubborn preservation of the old structure is exemplified in William E. Odom's comment on the command economy. As long as parts of it exist, "we shall be dealing with vestiges of totalitarian institutions." The great value of the old model totalitarianism is not its description of the successor system, but "in understanding what they are overcoming, what they carry as legacies. The legacies of Stalin's rule will not disappear at once."²¹

Whatever the residues of the military portion of the old command system, the Russian military has views of Russia's new international situation and appropriate adaptations to it. There is civil-military "consensus" for the most part on Russian "mobile," rapid reaction forces to protect Russian minorities in

other areas, new technology, research and development to fight the new "technological war," and a great emphasis on military power (especially nuclear weapons) to establish Russia's place in the international system.²² Yet such comments are guarded and cautious, particularly any pronounced anti-Western tone and reflects the objective circumstance or Russia's weakness.

Military men tend to see international relations as a world of zero-sum conflict and the ubiquity of war in military history. They see little room for compromise with the enemy and do not trust compromise itself. Military organizational ideology is driven by a combination of rational calculation, national bias, and a need to simplify. Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, especially, the former military leaders were suspicious of U.S. motives, for Washington was the assumed enemy and they were reluctant to give up hard-won capabilities to arms control treaties with the West. Brezhnev sought political means to avoid war and was less concerned with fighting one unlike his military leaders. Gorbachev could not bring the political (supposedly the dominant views of the political leadership) and technical sides of military doctrine (the military arena of responsibility) into total alignment, even as the technical sphere was theoretically subordinate to the goals and priorities established by the political leadership.

Military organizations resisted and resist attempts to alter their force posture because they wish to retain their autonomy. Under Gorbachev, the "log rolling" Brezhnev policy that didn't attack major military interests broke down because of fear of economic and national stagnation; the deteriorating economy meant that there had to be a redistribution of power and resources away from the military, and they reluctantly acquiesced. Even under the relatively compliant Brezhnev regime, there was military resistance to the political leadership and serious questions remained on how effective Politburo oversight was in ensuring that its leaders' policies were implemented. In fact, there were civil-military splits on key issues such as whether an East-West conflict would remain non-nuclear. On political goals, the military often followed its own assumptions, not those of the communist political leadership. Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, the

military sought repeatedly to expand the area of their influence and autonomy and waged a successful delaying action against the political leadership interest in arms control cooperation with the West. For example, the military did not so much support the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty as it acquiesced to it. Even now there is evidence of continuing influence by military conservatives on the new Russian military doctrine postulating that offensive military action and even surprise attack (especially given current Russian conventional weaknesses), might be part of a "defensive" military doctrine.²³

Arms control measures and conciliatory statements by the political leadership help keep the other side's military in check and limit demand for resources from one's own armed forces. In the Brezhnev era there was a split between those implementing Soviet strategy, who took a dim view of arms control because it weakened their case for additional resources, and those who looked at American capabilities and technology. The latter argued against a Soviet ABM system because it wouldn't work, would spur the arms race, might cause a disproportionate strain on Soviet resources, and a technologically-superior American ABM system might be strategically destabilizing.²⁴

A current example of these splits between some military and civilian leaders complicated by a Russian desire to maintain ties with two opposed states is seen by the visit of two retired Russian admirals to Taiwan in June 1992. Admiral Sidirov (former-commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet), insisting that their visit had been approved by the Russian Defense Ministry, said that Russia was not a potential enemy of Taiwan's and was "willing to develop friendly ties with all peace-loving countries around the world." Sidirov declared that the communist system of the former-Soviet Union had "also driven their country into a suffering hell and this was why the CIS republics had abandoned communism. Russia is no longer a communist state, and it needs help to stand on its own feet on the side of democratic countries despite a long-time split."²⁵

These statements, of course, go further than any conciliatory remarks of the previous Brezhnev and Gorbachev

periods, but their immediate result was a denial by the Russian Foreign Ministry that the admirals in their week-long visit were authorized to negotiate Russian arm sales to Taiwan: those reports were "speculative and not corresponding to reality." Russia has no official relations with Taiwan and did not intend to offend the mainland Chinese government. It is also highly likely that such extreme (to some) statements in support of an American ally were not acceptable to conservatives in the Defense Ministry and elsewhere.²⁶

At the same time, some Russian analysts of Desert Storm seek to deal with a defeated client and former ally, while disentangling from bad alliances, and realizing that it is better to work with the West than against it. Although unevenly, the Russian military is adjusting from a "threat specific" to a more "mission specific" planning environment, like the post-Cold War American military, and is developing the technology that made the American operation in the Persian Gulf such a success, a smaller, more mobile, more technologically adept force.

And yet, as will be seen below, a word of caution is mandatory. Russia is not a defeated country as Nazi Germany and Japan were in 1945. And as I have repeatedly emphasized it, Russia is a proud country in great domestic turmoil over which the United States has little control.²⁷

The new Russian armed forces will be much smaller than the old Soviet army, gradually moving away from a conscription-based force to a smaller organization with contracts to officers and non-commissioned officers. Thus, on April 1, 1992, the president of the Supreme Soviet stated that [the military policy of the Russian Federation will be used for territorial integrity and fulfilling Russia's international duties. Officially, the threat of war had eased, with less need for personnel and lower defense potential. But there are potential dangers and threats—large states maintain large forces with mobilization potential, and potentially the United States too. Territorial disputes can become local conflicts, especially in the former territory of the USSR, and there is the previously noted concern for states acquiring regional hegemony and changes in national

leadership that could bring major policy changes. This is not unlike the views of civilian analysts, but the new Russian doctrine shows signs of conflict—with conservative spokesmen taking a far more qualified view of a "defensive" strategy and a less benign view of states like the U.S. For the foreseeable future, with a planned force of 1.3 to 1.5 million men in the year 2000. Russia could hardly mount military operations against Ukraine, much less China. But Russia will still be able to exert influence on its peripheral border states, and by the year 2000, also regional influence beyond its borders, especially with adroit diplomacy.

The former-USSR Ministry of Defense has now become a Russian government agency. It is headed by Pavel Sergevich Grachev, appointed on May 18, 1992, at the time that the Russian armed forces were created. The old Soviet ground force mission against NATO, aimed at reaching the English channel, has been abolished. At a meeting attended by NATO officials, Grachev said that the sphere of interest at the Russian Federation included all former Soviet republics on its old borders, where Moscow could intervene if the northwest Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus to the West, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the south, and Kazakhstan to the southeast, were threatened. Any reduction in military spending does not signify any cut in research and development. In fact, the new military doctrine, discussed below, mentions that the perceived technological lag behind the West requires an increase in Research and Development, and this has been going up recently.²⁸

The May and June 1992 special editions of *Voennaia Mysl'* (*Military Thought*) on military doctrine, contains elements of radical, traditional, and even American thinking on security issues. The ensuing debate resulted in a compromise doctrine but revealed sharp disagreements, especially from conservatives. In the background were statements like that of Colonel General Victor Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS. In the new geopolitical situation, "We don't see the West as our enemy anymore. That's why there is no need to restore the first strategic echelon (against NATO) as it existed before with the same

tasks." The Russian far right, on the other hand, warned that the threat to Russia was growing. Pressure must be resisted from a position of strength, "which allows us to paralyze the policeman's desires of the United States, and the threat of a nuclear Holocaust, and to defend and support all who are victimized by American imperialism." Nuclear parity (or at least strong reliance on nuclear deterrence, stressed by even civilian moderates) "is the last anchor of salvation that we depend upon. It is necessary, by relying on the factor of nuclear deterrence, to demonstrate to the whole world that any efforts to interfere in our internal affairs will be frustrated by all available means. In time, the global balance of forces and nations will consider a reorientation and become our potential and real allies." In a view that may have a wide resonance in the political instability in Russia today it is argued that the "army is the only force which is capable of maintaining the integrity of the Russian state and (protecting) its national revival" and of "restoring the historical boundaries of the Russian state."²⁹

An Overview of the Special Issues of "Military Thought"

The May 1992 issue of *Military Thought* states the doctrine itself. Aside from what has been mentioned earlier, "Russia's military goal is averting war" and its doctrine will be defensive. Reliable defense means that Russia "will not utilize surprise attack and large scale offensive operations to be conducted without additional augmentation (a possible reference to the old "operational maneuver groups" that could move westward without additional mobilization). "Russia does not consider a single state or coalition of states as its enemy." But Russia's security is inseparable from that of other Commonwealth states and all states in the Commonwealth must agree to joint military action. And therefore Russia's strategic and conventional forces must be "sufficient". The new military doctrine also highlights a major argument of the democratic reformists:

"The cooperation of Russia with other states in avoiding war, upholding International Law, as well as safe-

guarding defense against aggression jointly with other states is built in conjunction with the provisions of the U.N. Charter."³⁰

But it is the June 1992, issue of the *Journal* that contains the most interesting spectrum of views, especially those of General Rodionov and others who make grudging concessions to economic and political realities not unlike those made in recent years in the face of unavoidable financial stringency. However, General E. I. Shaposhnikov, for example, commander-in-chief of the United Commonwealth Forces, makes it clear that whatever the document states on Russian coordination with the other Commonwealth states before ordering military action, only Russia is able to produce key arms and technology components (although this may change in time with the presence in other republics of components of the old USSR military industrial complex). Ninety percent of aircraft came from Russian plants. Twelve of the fourteen tank factories are in Russia. The control leadership for control of nuclear weapons is really Russian.³¹

General Rodionov discussed the new Russian military doctrine by stressing that Russia will not seek to attack anyone or deploy its forces first, but will defend its national interests, territorial integrity, and the independence of states resisting aggression. But Russia has global and regional interests. Any attempt to isolate Russia in political, economic, scientific, and cultural development whether in Europe, Asia, or other parts of the globe, and the erection of military blocs directed against her will be considered an action, infringing on Russia's national interests. Geographically, Russia straddles both Europe and Asia from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In Europe its interests cover states formerly belonging to the Warsaw Pact. "Entry of these states into military-political groupings, directed directly or indirectly against Russia, will significantly influence its security and worsen the strategic situation." Eastern European states must remain neutral, and perhaps this is a warning about how closely such states should associate with NATO. But recently Yeltsin gave Russia's consent to Poland's future entry into NATO. Although they have been increasingly reserved on this issue, it remains unresolved in NATO-Russian

discussions.

The Baltic states must exclude from their ports the military forces of "third countries," not enter into military blocs directed against the Russian federation, and must unconditionally guarantee the civil and political rights of the Russian population in those states. Any attempt of any state of Europe, America, or Asia to take advantage of the contradictions existing within CIS members to strengthen their influence there "will have a negative influence on their own situation," a vague but veiled threat. Also, the attempts of any state or coalition to dominate a particular region of the world as a whole, to dictate their will, interfering in their internal affairs, facilitating the igniting of internal contradictions cannot but call forth concern in Russia." There are also territorial, economic, and regional contradictions and the instability of a rapidly changing world that will affect Russian national (state) interests. Some of this is precautionary--a warning, but the defensive tone also has a clearly offensive edge because its terms are left vague: when does mere dealing with non-Russian Commonwealth states become a threat, for instance, especially the vague "interference in their internal affairs"?

General Rodionov also mentions repetitively NATO's air forces "huge offensive might," holding on to supremacy in space and on the sea as part of U.S. "strategic principles". It is not excluded that states can use military forces to "resolve contradictions globally." "Such was the origin of many conflicts after World War II, including the war in the Persian Gulf." The United States was dictating its will and by no means is it the case that Russia should ally with it. S. Rodionov argues that "it is impossible to agree with the opinion that at present no one thinks Russia faces military dangers, that differences in ideology with foreign countries which previously were sources of military danger have been exhausted." "This is completely untrue." Russian collective security with the other states of the Commonwealth should utilize the full elements of the defense system of the former-USSR. "Russian armed forces must be capable of conducting military operations of any character and on any scale."³²

A senior captain, V.M. Golitsyn,

examines U.S. military doctrine, especially its stress on rapid and effective response in crisis situations, which would threaten the vital interests of the United States and its allies. He also notes U.S. mobilization potential. Beyond the containment of war and crises, the U.S. preserves the possibility of augmenting its armed forces in the event that a regional war grows into a global one with U.S. participation. The U.S. in peacetime must be able to exert influence on those areas where its forces are permanently stationed and in wartime able to increase its forward based forces.

"Therefore, it can be noted that changes in U.S. strategy have a dual character. Initiating corrections in conjunction with the situation operating in the 1980's can be considered as positive. But U.S. military strategy, as formulated in the 1990's, presents only a reduced version of the concepts and plans at the time of the Cold War."

There are quite significant changes in the military doctrine and postures of the main foreign states. But after assessing them, one cannot conclude that at the end of the 1980's "we live in a more secure world." The doctrinal changes from preparation for a general (global) war to regional war mean only that armed conflict as a means of guaranteeing the interests of state is a "permanent possibility." Western military forces have been stabilized in numbers and composition, but their constant equipping with the most modern kinds of weapons and military technology raises their military capability, which must be taken into account in building the Russian armed forces.³³

The author is not quite as strident as Rodionov but does argue for the possibility of a larger, more capable force than the reformers, and takes Western, i.e. military capability and the willingness to use it quite seriously. Russia, even given its limitations, must follow suit. Others in the *Military Thought* symposium warn that in modern conditions any conflict is capable of rapidly growing into a large scale war, which makes the situation in particular parts of the world "explosively dangerous" and peace "fragile." Another concedes that the building of Russian armed forces must take the economic capabilities of the state into account but it is "inadmissible" to lag behind the most

developed countries and a general scientific-technological parity must be preserved in the areas of modern, highly effective capabilities. Nuclear missile deterrence preserves its priority in spite of the significant reduction of strategic offensive weapons. This emphasis on nuclear deterrence and qualitative parity irrespective of budgetary stringency is in line with American thinking, and the "mission-oriented" reference to sudden threats is only prudent and in line with military insurance against unforeseen contingencies. It does not single out the U.S. as a special threat, except in the general sense that the latter is the global "pacesetter." Nor is it totally incompatible with civilian thinking. *All* recognize the continuing significance of military power, especially at a time when other means of state influence are at a low ebb.³⁴

General Makhmud A. Gareev, a major military thinker in the Soviet era, makes a stridently Russian nationalist appeal, reflecting domestic strains and an emotional rallying point to some in Russia. "Russia can and must be reborn as a great power because of historical tradition, the geopolitical situation which it occupies in the world, and its economic, political, and spiritual rank." "Any attempt to denigrate the role of Russia will be met by opposition and the people will not stand for it." "What is Russia defending itself against? The fact is that no one is threatening and no one intends to attack." But the same discussion took place on the eve of war in 1941 and it is "known what that led to." "It is necessary to be prepared for larger scale conflict." The so called mobile force (which, as noted, many say is appropriate in a less threatening environment and which makes sense in budgetarily restricted times) is not adequate for long, intense military operations.

Gareev seems to say that nothing really has changed domestically and abroad and his nationalist appeal may have much resonance, especially with older Russians when he refers to June 1941.

Alexander Rutskoï, the then-Russian Vice-President who used nationalist appeals noted the sober realities of defence economics. Forty percent of surface ships and submarines need capital repairs although it is not the fault of naval

personnel. Naval expenditures were reduced to half of what they were (described as "catastrophic" by one admiral at the symposium) without a single ship being built in a year for the first time in 60 years, while aircrafts are not capable of coordinating operations under modern conditions. He, too, stresses the new mission, small, rapid response forces, especially capable of defending Russians in the former Soviet states. Others report that the sharp reduction of military expenditures is down two and one-half times since 1990 and the production of arms and technology is only 19 percent of the 1990 figure. This is dangerous because the U.S. Pentagon, in one assessment, still considered Russia as a possible enemy. Therefore, "I should hope that such a situation (low expenditures) could be corrected."³⁵

Major General A.L. Vitkovski makes an interesting concession to current reality, but only tactically and provisionally. The classic formulation that, "the enemy is imperialism, the political goals of the war are decisive without restriction, up to the complete destruction (of the enemy)" is no longer the case. Now the situation "has sharply changed." The threat of world war has not been excluded, but postponed; but Russian armed forces will participate in local and regional wars. Russian goals, it is all the more probable, will be "more proportional and restricted." But Russia must be ready to inflict a blow "at any moment" with unacceptable damage to any opponent. "This can be guaranteed by the threat of using nuclear weapons at any stage of war." This implies a first strike, offensive capability, although couched in defensive terms, and a possibility probably not intended against a nuclear armed state. He also stresses surprise. Not seeking surprise at the most propitious moment of war (at the beginning, even as it unfolds), "dooms combat-ready troops to possibly waiting for the enemy's blow (where, when, with what strength and means will he inflict them)." Surprise is necessary considering events in any part of the world, even though the growing capabilities of strategic and tactical intelligence makes the achievement of surprise as war unfolds "problematical." But the military conflict in the Persian Gulf showed that the arsenal of political, diplomatic,

technical, tactical and strategic means of achieving this purpose has "significantly grown." So headquarters must study the principle of surprise. Russia must strive to become a Great Power and must have such armed forces and possess such weapons so that no state would dare (to commit) aggression against it. It is very important that all the people of Russia and the people of other states know this."³⁶

Vitkovsky's comments are most disturbing, especially his offensive thrust borne out of a sense of current weakness. He seems to be biding his time for a change for the better in Russian military fortunes and his emphasis on what appears to be a nuclear threat and first strike (an exaggeration of those who stress nuclear deterrence at a time of unprecedented conventional weakness), as well as his emphasis on and warning of surprise give cause for concern. Like other conservatives, he draws very different lessons from the American Desert Storm experience than the more moderate reformist thinkers.

Army General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defense Minister, closed the symposium whose goal was to bring about a reorganized and reduced Russian military force in a short time. "No one will deny," he said, "that the degree of military danger has been reduced, and the visible prospect of a world or other large-scale war is "hardly possible." But of course, the danger of so called small, local, and even regional conflicts has grown. Russia is not looking for enemies and must stress political means in dealing with other states. Russia will not use nuclear weapons first (contrary to what the conservatives imply), or military force for resolving international disputes, and adheres to disarmament. But Russia's adherence to defense can be misinterpreted. "Objective principles" cannot be ignored. If an enemy begins an aggression, Russia will choose these types, forms, and methods of struggle that are the most effective.

Russian armed forces must be constantly ready to operate in local conflicts, capable of being transported in the shortest time to any region of the world (the American concept) while strategic nuclear forces remain the chief deterrent to foreign threats of unleashing nuclear and conventional war against Russia and the Commonwealth.³⁷

Grachev is a Defense Minister with major responsibilities and is close to Yeltsin, unlike military theoreticians and other conservative general staff researchers quoted earlier. But the latter draw disturbing conclusions from Russia's present weaknesses. It is not wise to rely on the permanent good will of states like the U.S.; Russia must watch U.S. capabilities and intentions based on the Persian Gulf experience and periodic American policy statements.

But Russian comments, while occasionally anti-American or stridently nationalist and populist, like those of Gareev, reveal an anxiety about a world not dominated by the old super powers. Danger can suddenly arise or grow worse, either in the old Soviet land mass or in areas of the world close to Russia, like the Persian Gulf. And in the words of a letter to the author from a Russian scholar at the U.S. Institute in Moscow, there is always the possibility of "sliding toward authoritarian rule." The unfolding domestic situation and tense political struggle within Russia and the states of the Commonwealth will have an impact on the results of the military debate above and beyond international events which are problematical and indeterminate enough.

Postscript

This earlier analysis was written in the spring of 1993 and reflected developments at that time and that summer when it was delivered as a paper in Moscow in July. But it is herein briefly updated to take account of later developments whose full meaning remains unclear, especially the second "October revolution."

It the tumultuous events of Sunday, October 3rd to Tuesday, October 5th 1993, Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, who had been considered a "centrist" by some, situated between the democratic reformers and communists and nationalists as the leader of the Peoples' Party Free Russia. He issued a virtual call for armed insurrection in the wake of Yeltsin's dissolution of the Russian parliament and the blockade by the military and security forces that followed. This incipient revolt was suppressed by military units loyal to Yeltsin, and Rutskoi was captured and arrested on October 4th. But there were mounting indications that key military

leaders like Pavel Grachev were *at best* reluctant supporters of Yeltsin's actions perhaps fearing a split within army ranks.³⁸

A new military doctrine has been under discussion and parts of it were published in the November 18, 1993 *Izvestiia*. Discussions before that indicated that some members of the Russian General Staff were stressing limited nuclear war and the possibility of launching preemptive "limited and strategic nuclear strikes" against possible new members of the "nuclear club" (Iran comes to mind). But Grachev argued in November 1993 that Russia would use nuclear weapons only in self-defense and not against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He continued to stress improved "conventional forces" in a background of severe budgetary limitations that would make a greater role for nuclear weapons more likely. There would be an emphasis on more joint service commands and combined arms mobile forces probably for use in the Russian Federation and other parts of the former-U.S.S.R., especially to counter new threats and instability along its southern borders as well as the "traditional Western threat."³⁹

There is also some speculation that while vowing to protect the constitutional system, the Russian military would like to avoid taking sides politically in the increasingly volatile and unpredictable domestic situation and focus on external threats,⁴⁰ the nature and magnitude of which are not as yet clearly defined. This is true of many states in the amorphous post-Cold War world, as reflected in the political-military hesitation on such issues in the vastly different geopolitical situation confronting the United States.

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7. **Comparative Politics** - The agony of democratic change in post cold world. How have the reputation of Soviet authoritarian socialism and the end of cold war effected the theory and practice of democratic development? Have you as a political scientist modified your understanding approach? Invite papers on second and third worlds - Chair Robert Barylski, University of South Florida (813) 359-4341
8. **Comparative Politics** - Elite - Masses Linkages and Peaceful Political Change. The analysis of long term political monopoly by "single-party" regimes, trends towards widespread domestic corruption and chances of effective radical but peaceful political change to offset corruption and political monopoly - Chair Marco Rimaneli, Saint Leo College (904) 588-8277
9. **Political Theory** - Democratic Politics and Political Theory - This panel welcomes a wide variety of theoretical perspectives on the nature and practice of democratic politics. Proposals for papers on the history of political thought and normative political theory will be considered seriously, as well, for example, feminist analyses and discourse theories. Topics for papers might include (but will not be limited to) democracy and community democratic citizenship, unity and diversity, political legitimacy, power and political change - Chair Laura Greyson, Department of Politics, Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida 32789 (407)646-2158
10. **The West Against the Rest?** Round-Table Discussion of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." This panel invites the participation of faculty not just in international relations or comparative politics, but in all subfields of political science. We hope to have a broad discussion about the relationship between "western" civilization and other civilizations of the world, about the degree to which the fall of the Soviet Union has altered the relationships between those civilizations and the nation-states that govern them, and about the relative importance of culture, ideology, economics and statecraft in determining the nature and direction of political change. We invite as well the participation of scholars from fields outside of political science who might be interested in this topic. Chair Professor Joan Davison, Department of Politics, Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida (407) 646-2158
11. **Graduate Student Panels** - The Florida Political Science Association encourages graduate students to participate in its annual meeting, and will sponsor a number of panels for papers presented by graduate students. Proposals for papers from all fields within political science (including American Politics, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Public Administration) are welcome. Any graduate students who would like to present a paper should send a short proposal (dds. January 14) to Chair Professor Michael D. Martinez, Department of Political Science, P. O. Box 117325, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325.
(e-mail: MDM! @ NERV.M.NERDC.UFL.EDU)
12. **Best Undergraduate Paper** - Michael Hoover, Seminole Community College (407) 323-1450
13. **Best Graduate Student Paper** - Joyce Lilie, University of Central Florida (407) 275-2608



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