
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

*Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-94:
Appraising Steps in Democratization*

James A. Robison
(University of West Florida)

*Women in Elective Office:
Age, Abition and Perceptions of Generational Gaps in Policy Preference*

Susan MacManus
(University of South Florida)

*Local Government as Consumer:
A Constituent-Based Approach to Bureaucratic Training Needs*

Terri Susan Fine
(University of Central Florida)

*Neo-Liberal Renovations and Political Transformations:
The Spanish Socialists in Power*

Anthony Celso
(LaSalle University)

THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

Editorial Board

J. Edwin Benton
University of South Florida

John J. Bertalan
Hillsborough Community College

Joseph Cernik
Lindenwood College

Richard Chickerian
Florida State University

Alfred Cuzán
University of West Florida

Lance De Haven-Smith
Florida Atlantic University

Robert Huckshorn
Florida Atlantic University

Joan Johnson-Freese
University of Central Florida

Stuart Lillie
University of Central Florida

Gary L. Maris
Stetson University

Donald Menzel
University of South Florida

Michael Milakovich
University of Miami

George Serra
University of Miami

John Spanier
University of Florida

Jack Vincent
Florida Atlantic University

Mary L. Volcansek
Florida International University

Editors: Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo College and Michael Gibbons, University of South Florida. All contributing essays should be sent to Dr. Rimanelli, Saint Leo College, Division of Liberal Arts & Sciences, P.O. Box 2127, Saint Leo, Florida 33574

Managing Editor: Hudson Reynolds, Saint Leo College Institute for Policy Studies, Division of Liberal Arts & Sciences, P.O. Box 2127, Saint Leo, Florida 33574. **The Political Chronicle** is published twice yearly by Saint Leo College on behalf of the Florida Political Science Association. Information regarding subscriptions should be addressed to the Managing Editor. Annual subscription fee is \$15. Make checks payable to **The Political Chronicle**.

Manuscripts submitted for consideration can be returned only if accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. All manuscripts should be double-spaced with wide margins. The standard length for articles is 4,500-6,500 words. For style and footnoting, authors should refer to the **Chicago Manual of Style**. When a manuscript is accepted for publication, authors need to submit a copy on an IBM-readable floppy disk.

Interpretations, opinions, or conclusions in **The Political Chronicle** are to be understood as solely those of the authors and should not be attributed to Saint Leo College, its Board of Trustees, officers, or other staff members, or to organizations and individuals which support Saint Leo College. The same holds true for the Florida Political Science Association, its officers and staff members.

Introduction

This current issue of the *Political Chronicle* (Winter/Spring 1994-95), albeit late, presents four inquisitive essays from Florida-based academics who shed light on elections and governmental policies in both different comparative political systems (Taiwan and Spain) and local governments (Florida).

Dr. James Robinson of the University of West Florida examines in "Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-94: Appraising Steps in Democracy" the continuous process of democratization in Taiwan through local electoral campaigning (municipal and county seats), political change, inter-party competition, and monitoring of electoral fundings and corruption allegations.

Dr. Susan MacManus of the University of South Florida analyzes in her "Women in Elective Office: Age, Ambition and Perceptions of Generational Gaps in Policy Preferences" the impact of age, gender and social class in shaping the legislative policies of women seeking public office, who are no longer politically hampered by past socio-political "stigmas" (gender, age, divorce) or current inter-generational contrasts on policy choices (which are stronger among male rather than female legislators).

Dr. Terri Susan Fine of the University of Central Florida identifies in her "Local Government as Consumer: a Constituent-Based Approach to Bureaucratic Training Needs", the dynamics of university-government relations and university-based training institutions in incorporating academic analysis into local public administrations. This process is aimed at convincing public opinions and elected officers (with budgetary control) that local governments do adhere to criteria of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of service and resources allocation under fiscal restrictions.

Finally, Dr. Anthony Celso, formerly of the University of Central Florida and now at La Salle University in Pennsylvania, examines in "Neo-Liberal Renovations and Political Transformation: the Spanish Socialists in Power" the evolution of Spain's post-1975 democratization as a constitutional monarchy and multiparty system, where the political disarray of the Right brought the Socialists (PSOE) to power by adapting a moderate, pragmatic neo-liberal image. However, the PSOE's long tenure in government, the economic costs, and ideological weakening of the Left has fragmented the ruling party at a time when a resurgent and better organized Center-Right is vying for a return to office.

The Spring 1995 issue will be ready by next June.

Marco Rimanelli and
Michael Gibbons, *Editors*

Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-94: Appraising Steps in Democratization*

James A. Robinson

Abstract

This article places 1993 and 1994 elections of county magistrates and city mayors, and county and city councils and small town mayors and village chiefs, among trends towards greater democratization in Taiwan. It appraises electoral administration, voter participation, inter-party competition, and election campaigns according to criteria of normative theories of democracy. The appraisal identifies biased electronic media, high costs of campaigns, and allegations of corruption as problems for attention if Taiwan is to sustain democratic innovations that distinguish it from other former Leonist-like policies.

Standpoint of the Observer

This writer has observed elections in Taiwan regularly since 1986. These include campaigns and voting for Legislative Yuan, National Assembly, county and city councils, and county and city magistrates and mayors, and party primaries.¹ Often, Taiwanese ask, "What do you think of our election(s)? Others ask, "Are they actually democratic?"

Even a provisional appraisal cannot be simple, and a brief one must be incomplete. The author's "observational standpoint" (the perspectives with which one filters or screens the vast amount of sites, sounds, and other stimuli that come to one's attention during an intensive period of election watching), is that of a world democrat. This position favors the extension of democratic practices among people everywhere, not only in politics but in all value-institutions. For that reason, one admires Taiwan's progress toward democratization, begun during the presidency of the late Chiang Ching-kuo and continued through the tenure of his successor, President Lee Teng-hui. Not only does one admire the leadership from these two Kuomintang chairmen, but he applauds the initiatives and success of opposition leaders who also have worked

to make Taiwan a two-party or multi-party policy.

Not all people share this commitment to democratic values. There is, however, reason to think that such values correspond with rising demands and expectations throughout the globe. Democracy may not be the most widely applied form of government, but it probably is the one preferred in most places. And evidence accumulates that more and more people demand broad rather than narrow participation in shaping and sharing all values.²

As a democrat, one respects the choices of the people of Taiwan among candidates and political parties. Therefore, the student in the field makes a conscious effort not to side with any candidate or political party. As happens when one visits a country frequently, a scholar makes acquaintances of many different opinions. This writer knows people associated with Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and New Party. Some he counts as friends. Still, he strives to separate preferences for democratic processes from preferences for candidates.

In addition to valuing democratic choice, that is, free, fair, and periodic elections, this observer's standpoint attaches importance to practices that support such choices.³ That means one appraises a country's media, the content of campaigns as well as candidates, and the procedures of elections. In short, a democrat studies *effective or functional* choices, in addition to voting and vote-counting. In this respect, recent and current campaigns have several characteristics that are not consistent with deliberative, democratic decision-making. These include differences between print-media and electronic-media; relative inattention to issues in preference to other themes; and excessive cost of campaigning, including corruption.

Taiwan has long been known for its vigorous journalism, especially in its newspapers. People of Taiwan are said to be among the most avid readers of

newspapers of any people anywhere in the world. Yet studies report a decline in reading in favor of watching television and an increased reliance on television for news. Whereas newspapers are competitive, sometimes representing different political parties, the three major television channels are owned by and closely affiliated with agencies of government and/or ruling party.⁴ During recent election campaigns, local newspapers reported that several observers sought to document the bias alleged in the coverage of the election by CTV, CTS, and TTV. Television managers dispute the accuracy of these charges. Whatever the merits of the arguments, whatever the facts, as long as the virtual monopoly on the electronic media is maintained by the government and Kuomintang, television will lack credibility with many voters and most critics.

A democrat also notes the content or substance of the speeches and propaganda heard during campaigns. During elections in November 1993, little was said about important issues, such as Taiwan's economy, its government budget, its trade. Much time and effort instead were given to entertainment, vote-buying, and other evidence of a still incomplete, corrupt democracy. Likewise, when substantive issues arose, as with pensions for elderly, neither KMT nor DPP appeared to have thoroughly researched and developed realistic recommendations. Promises prevailed over policies.

It has been evident for several years that Taiwan's elections are inordinately expensive. Democrats in the United States and Japan, two countries respected in Taiwan, worry about the role of money in politics. Some candidates in Taiwan surely spend more money running for offices than in the United States or in Japan. Taiwan is an increasingly wealthy country, but not that rich!

It also is likely that money politics accounts for much of the violence and threats of violence that lurk near political campaigns in Taiwan. The Minister of

Interior regularly announces a redeployment of police to increase the presence of armed force at rallies and on election day, and even after elections on the day newly-chosen city and county councils pick their speakers and vice-speakers. Several candidates have asserted they withdrew from running because of threats from unnamed quarters. Bullet-proof vests have been common among candidates since at least 1989. An election can be neither free nor fair where voters, candidates, or families of either fear for safety.

On the eve of elections, many people predict the winners. This is fun but fruitless. In a few hours one knows the names and party affiliation or independent status of victors. More relevant to policy scientists, however, is the process by which winners win. Post mortems on campaigns present an opportune time to appraise the extent to which election processes meet normative criteria and might be made more democratic in practice as well as form.

County Magistrates and City Mayors

Criteria of Appraisal

On November 27, 1993, Taiwan voters would elect twenty-three chief executive officers for four-year terms. Sixteen executives were in counties (hsien), five in large cities (exclusive of Taipei and Kaohsiung), and two on the county-islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Lienchiang (Matsu). Kinmen and Lienchiang, the last regions of Taiwan governed according to martial law, elected their executives for the first time; they had elected legislators a year earlier. Voters for the other 21 offices would continue a 40-year tradition of electoral competition.

After 1950, once authoritarian Taiwan devolved into an increasingly, if still incomplete, democratic polity.⁵ For many years, competition for county magistrates and city mayors occurred only among Kuomintang candidates. Then an occasional independent filed nomination papers, later independent candidates became commonplace, and a few also won elections. After martial law expired and opposition parties formed, the Democratic Progressive Party scored unexpected victories in 1989 in the counties of Taipei, Ilan, Hsinchu, Changhua, Pingtung, and

Kaohsiung. In a subsequent by-election to fill a vacancy in Penghu County (the Pescadores Islands), DPP added a seventh local executive to its column. Six of these seven incumbents sought re-election in 1993. KMT, which had elected ten county magistrates in 1989, renominated six.

Despite losing almost half the county magistrates in 1989, KMT continued to dominate cities, winning all mayoralities except in Chiayi City, long a center of independence. There a candidate affiliated with neither party was elected. All city incumbents ran again in 1993.

Following DPP's unanticipated successes in 1989, its leaders set a goal to win a majority of local executive offices four years later. KMT's embarrassment at losing so many important grass-roots positions spurred a concentrated attempt to recover power. The Chairman of DPP, Hsu Hsin-liang, promised to resign if the party could not win 11 of 21 contests (excluding from this promise Quemoy and Matsu where DPP had no candidates). Similarly, KMT's Secretary-General promised to resign if his party could not maintain its level of control, 13 of 21 magistrates and mayors, or 15 of 23, counting the newly added county-islands.

The slightly different promises of the two party central leaders indicated different definitions of victory. Winning held one meaning for DPP (a majority of 21), another for KMT (a majority plus two of 21, or plus four of 23). The conditional promises of the two party leaders might have required both to resign, if, for example DPP had increased its number from seven to nine (two short of a majority) and KMT maintained a majority but suffered a net loss of two. Such confusion about what constitutes victory did not exhaust possibilities for complicated and conflicting interpretations of election outcomes. In addition to the two thresholds that party leaders set for themselves, other politicians as well as observers focussed on several alternative statistical criteria for answering, "Who won?"

Prominent among other criteria of victory was percent of total votes cast for candidates of each party (including the fledgling New Party) and for independents. In 40 years, KMT's share of total vote (so-called "popular vote") always had exceeded 50 percent; for magistrates and

mayors in 1989, it was 53 percent. DPP's share in 1989 reached 38percent.

If KMT fell below the 50 percent "floor," or if DPP broke the 40 percent "ceiling," DPP was sure to claim victory. Gallup Taiwan reported in October that interviews with a national sample of voters pointed to this prospect. In such an eventuality, statistics about vote-share would be used to explain indecisive or unwelcome outcomes concerning number of offices won by either party. Partisans of KMT were poised to account for a decline from 53 percent by noting that in previous years candidates affiliated with KMT but not nominated by KMT had their votes counted as KMT in national totals. That is no longer the way statistics are kept by election commissions, hence KMT's share might be expected to decline. Likewise, if DPP did not win as many votes as the pre-election polls indicated, its partisans could blame results on inflated "expectations."

In addition to number of offices won by each party and share of total popular vote, analysts focussed on details of individual elections, county by county, city by city. If, for example, KMT reclaimed Pingtung or Changhua counties, its campaign managers would be overjoyed. If it should deny Kaohsiung County to the Yu family candidate, KMT leaders would pride themselves on "replacing a dynasty with democracy" in the second most populous county. Similarly, DPP victory in Taichung City, the largest provincial city, would have overshadowed other indicators of victory or defeat.

Observers particularly anticipated success or failure of the large number of incumbents seeking re-election. Six DPP, eleven KMT, and one independent incumbent stood for re-election. If several DPP county incumbents had suffered defeat, they were prepared to blame the outcome on the strategy of the KMT-controlled central government to constrain DPP local executives more than KMT counterparts. If several KMT incumbents failed to be re-elected, interpretations would focus on case-by-case analysis of variations in local situations. Hsinchu City, for example, signalled the effectiveness of the New Party. There former KMT members, who in August 1993 defected to form a third party, nominated a candidate who conceivably could have split the customary KMT vote

and thus have opened the way to a DPP victory. New Party's candidate, for the same reason, might help re-elect DPP magistrate Yu Ching in Taipei County.

Still another criterion was available for application and interpretation. If voters denied re-election to several incumbents of both parties, analysts would infer nation-wide dissatisfaction with county and city administration, regardless of party.

An altogether new factor for interpretation appeared during the run-up to voting, that is, the influence of President Lee Teng-hui. Unprecedentedly, the President campaigned in every county and city for KMT nominees. In Taichung City, he humbled himself to persuade a prominent candidate, wife of a former mayor, to withdraw to improve chances for the party's incumbent. In Pingtung County, the President actively recruited a reluctant provincial administrator to accept his home-county's party nomination. In Taipei County, the most populous county, President Lee visited at least four times, exhorting voters in his home-county to restore KMT to an office won by DPP four years earlier.

While the President varied his time and themes to fit individual races, the net effect was to seek increased identification between himself and local KMT candidates. To what extent voters considered this election a referendum on Lee Teng-hui was not known, but a shift of a few votes in close races as a result of the President's intervention could have made a difference in the number of offices won by each party. His participation also might have stabilized KMT's share of popular votes, which, except for one election in 1991, has steadily declined since 1986.

If KMT maintained control of thirteen offices won in 1989, and certainly if it increased the number, much credit would go to President Lee, deservedly or not. Likewise a decline in KMT dominance of these important positions would indicate that the President's coattails are not necessarily long enough to help other KMT candidates. Either interpretation would enter into calculations and speculations about whether the President himself would seek another term. Candidates and their managers were reluctant to discuss this implication of their victories or defeats until after November 27, but one southern Taiwan

campaign director said, "This election will make or break President Lee Teng-hui's re-election."

In addition to voters, candidates, the President, and the parties as institutions, another set of claimants would win or lose in this election. These were friends of democracy, whether Taiwanese, Chinese, or foreign. Regardless of nationality, residency, or culture, these democrats hope for the maturing of democratic practices and institutions throughout the world. They, perhaps one should acknowledge we, watched the outcomes of the election to appraise whether Taiwan shows continuing progress toward democratization or whether it is encountering interruptions. The elected Hong Kong legislative councilors seen at a rally in Hsinchu City certainly were appraising the relevance of the Taiwan democratic experience to their aspirations.

Few dispute that Taiwan is democratic as measured by frequency of elections and by number of elective as distinguished from appointive offices. Likewise, Taiwan satisfies criteria such as competition between parties (at least nationally, although not locally) and acceptance of defeat by losers who promptly relinquish their offices to winners. There are, however, reservations among democrats in Taiwan and abroad about three prominent features of the island's polity, biased media, expensive elections, and excessive violence.

Electronic media, unlike print media, are government-controlled and government-owned or party-owned. The government and ruling party have been reluctant to privatize the three predominant television companies and slow to open new channels and to authorize cable-TV. Current media effectively advantage one party and disadvantage all others.

Candidates of both parties acknowledge that they exceed spending limits. NT \$100 million (US \$4 million) is not uncommon for a single candidate to spend for printing and distributing campaign materials, for buying newspaper ads, and for hiring campaign personnel. These are usually the largest expense categories, although vote-buying and gift-giving more effectively demean democratic electoral processes.

A third reservation about the current state of democratization of Taiwan is the apparent intrusion of gangs and thugs in

elections and campaigns. At least two county magistrate candidates reported threats that entered into their decisions to withdraw from the race. The presence of suspicious persons at several rallies, and the appearance of large numbers of policemen and private body guards, even for some incumbent mayors, evidenced undemocratic elements. "Free elections" mean elections without intimidation and threats of intimidation. "Fair elections," that is honest vote-counting, are meaningless if voters are not free of violence and intimidation. "Periodic elections," that is regularly scheduled voting for various offices, are symbolic, not substantive, if contending parties do not compete relatively equally.

Watching election returns on voting night and analyzing them afterward, observers could rely on several indicators of victory and defeat—number of offices won by each party, percentage of popular vote for each party, comparisons of actual voting with expectations, success of incumbents, and turnover of offices between parties. As they searched for national trends or examined details of local situations, citizens of Taiwan and friends abroad could be alert not only to "who won," but also to "how they won."

Outcomes

Taiwan voters in elections for county magistrates and city mayors meted out a mixture of indulgences and deprivations to candidates and political parties. If one appraised outcomes of the November 27 vote from a variety of vantage points, the ruling Kuomintang could declare victory, the opposition DPP could take satisfaction in winning a larger share of popular votes, and the four-month old New Party could claim a measure of responsibility for denying KMT a chance to recover populous Taipei County. And President Lee Teng-hui and his supporters could confidently assert that he remained the country's most popular political figure and one whose active participation in party politics could make a difference for the KMT in selected constituencies. These several factors may be analyzed from the standpoint of the criteria of victory presented above.

First, KMT maintained its control of 13 of the 21 magistrates and mayor's offices in Taiwan Province and won both offices in the two Fukien provincial counties (Quemoy and Matsu) that elected

magistrates for the first time. Thus, KMT now had 15 of the total of 23 regional executive offices. In winning it seemed to halt and partially reverse the challenge from DPP, which began in elections for the same offices four years earlier.

KMT not only stabilized its dominance, but its concentrated campaigns succeeded in regaining two counties that it had lost to DPP in 1989, Pingtung County and Changhua County. These contests indicated the capacity of the KMT to focus on key races, target its resources in behalf of able candidates, and effectively communicate its message to voters. Some voters also revealed their capacity to discriminate between candidates and not to cast "knee-jerk" votes for parties irrespective of the attractiveness of their nominees. While KMT recovered two counties, it also lost two, Tainan County to DPP and Miaoli County to an independent, rebel, former KMT candidate. DPP's ability to deprive KMT of only one office caused its net loss of one seat, a decline from seven to six.

If KMT took comfort from voter endorsement of a majority of its candidates, DPP drew succor from the larger share of popular votes it won in the total national count. Four years earlier, in 1989, DPP received 38 percent of the total vote; in 1993, it broke through the "ceiling" of 40 percent when it won 41 percent of the vote. Although this was less than hoped for, and also less than Gallup Taiwan polls expected, it constituted a respectable showing. It seemed to augur well for DPP in future regional and national elections, although it indicated little about potential strength of the opposition in the county and city council elections scheduled for January 29, 1994, barely two months later.

DPP's larger share of the popular vote was partially at the expense of KMT's share, which declined from 53 percent to 47 percent. KMT's smaller vote, a little more than polls expected, resulted from DPP's improved showing, the New Party's appearance in a handful of races, and from the fact that, as noted above, election commissions tabulated votes slightly differently from the method used in 1989.

KMT spokespersons, as expected, pointed out that 1993 totals excluded unofficial or rebel KMT candidates whereas in previous elections all KMT-affiliated candidates, official or unofficial,

had their votes counted in the same column.

Local analysts immediately paid more attention to number of seats won by each party than to share of popular vote. And so did political leaders of all parties. KMT Secretary-General Hsu Shih-te appeared at an early evening press conference to thank voters for their support. The next day, DPP Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang, as promised, resigned because his party had failed to capture a majority of magistrate and mayors, offices. So did Secretary-General David Chiang. Other members of the DPP Central Standing Committee, who were said to be poised to resign also to take responsibility for an unexpected defeat, remained to provide continuity. DPP turned out to be the victim of its own created but exaggerated expectations. Had its leaders not set such a high threshold for victory and melodramatically talked of resignation if short of an absolute majority, they might well have put a better face on the outcomes of the voting, especially when the results were taken as a whole.

The New Party's first entrance in elections did not evidence an overwhelming demand for its candidates and platforms. To be sure, it claimed credit for saving the DPP's control of Taipei County and preventing KMT's recovery of this symbolically rich office. Elsewhere, however, as in Hsinchu City, the New Party candidate could not dent KMT's control. And its voter share fell well below its prediction of 30 percent.

As noted earlier, the most novel feature of these elections was the role of President Lee Teng-hui. For the first time, the President actively participated in behalf of candidates. President Lee campaigned in every Taiwan provincial county and city race, although the extent and form of his participation varied from constituency to constituency. His success also varied. In Pingtung County, the President received much credit for KMT's recovery of this central constituency. Thanks to entreaties from the President himself, Wu Tser-yuan, a native of Pingtung, resigned from the Provincial government to return home and run for magistrate. Wu made an attractive candidate. With a successful record as administrator and previous election to the National Assembly, Wu offered a strong and ultimately successful challenge to the incumbent DPP magistrate. Wu is in the mold of Lee

Teng-hui himself, slender, erect in bearing, dignified, and with excellent technocratic credentials.

As a result of KMT's showing and the positive contribution of President Lee, mainstream enthusiasts seemed likely to renew their calls for direct election of the president, perhaps even for an early presidential election, and for President Lee to seek another term. The apparent increase in party unity, combined with a stronger electoral showing, was expected to embolden KMT leaders to push ahead with both party and government reform and to capitalize on the respect in which people of Taiwan hold the President. Such a strategy held out the prospect for KMT that it could stabilize its support throughout the country and improve itself for a long-term.

A strategy of further reform seemed likely to confront the three critical problems that observers consistently have identified in Taiwan's polity. One is the monopoly of control the ruling party has on electronic media. Analysts both sympathetic to and hostile to KMT contend that the three television companies do not present balanced coverage of candidates and parties. This chorus of criticism is likely to rise even higher. If KMT follows its typical pattern of respecting public opinion, it will accelerate reform of television management and ownership.

Another element of reform may consider steps to reduce the sheer cost of running for office. Estimates of campaign budgets are notoriously vague and inaccurate, but few doubt that they are expensive beyond reason. Candidates themselves worry about costs, including obligations they incur by large donations from a few wealthy contributors. Some form of public financing plus increased public accounting of the sources of funds and the objects of their expenditure may curb the runaway inflation of "money politics."

Vigilant enforcement of laws against corruption will not do the job alone, but are a necessary signal that the government and ruling party are serious about reforming prevailing practices as well as changing their own behavior. Similar vigilance in attacking gangs and organized crime in election campaigns seemed in order to deal with a third profound concern about the present state of Taiwan's democratization. Government

ministers declared that violence and threats of violence were fewer in this election than in previous years. If true, that was welcome news. But the announcement that 20,000 police were called to duty election day, however effective in dampening violence and other election law violations, had to be chilling. A political system that must show excessive force on election day, and weeks later at the election of council speakers, invites unfavorable appraisal of the voluntary behavior of its electorate and elected.

Applying criteria of appraisal to how the election was won as well as to who won indicates the advances that Taiwan has made toward a fuller democratic state. For nearly a decade, Taiwan justly has enjoyed a reputation of rapid democratization—frequent elections, regular elections, opposition parties, universal suffrage, usually honest vote-counting. Now that these basic features are taken for granted, observers focus on more sophisticated indices of democratic achievement. Hence, Taiwan is now held to a still higher standard of performance.

The end of one round of elections was only a pause before the next elections. On January 29, 1994, voters would go to the polls again to select more than 800 members of the county and city councils. These would be the regional legislators who would work with the magistrates and mayors just chosen to govern. Voters would also choose more than 300 executives or chiefs of smaller cities, townships, and villages. Historically, KMT had enjoyed a considerable advantage in these contests. Its larger membership has made it easier for it to field full slates of candidates than the smaller DPP can do. Its greater financial resources have enabled it to help candidates get out the vote more effectively than DPP.

Nevertheless, KMT's November victory assured no automatic success in January. Taiwan voters, some of them at least, seemed increasingly able to distinguish between parties and among candidates. As they grow more discriminating and choosy in the way they vote, all parties will understand the need to be increasingly sensitive to electoral demands. Experience in other countries that have progressed to Taiwan's current state of democratization indicates that voters are inclined continually to expect

more of politicians and political parties. These raised expectations seemed likely to impose greater demands for responsible conduct, conduct that brings voter preference more closely into line with rulers, performance, and vice versa.

County and City Councils and Small Town Mayors and Village Chiefs

Criteria of Appraisal

On January 29, 1994, Taiwan voters would go to the polls for the second time in two months. Except for Taipei and Kaohsiung cities, special metropolitan areas with more than a million population and whose mayors would remain appointed by the central government until late 1994, electorates would choose city and town mayors or village chiefs. (The councils with which the mayors and chiefs serve concurrently would be elected several months later.) At the same time, council members would be selected to work with 23 county and city magistrates whom voters approved in competitive elections in November, just two months earlier. All together, voters would choose 319 executives from 772 candidates and 883 council members from 1,876 nominees.

Such profusion of electioneering—voting in November, January, and again in July—indicates less than the full extent to which the Republic of China on Taiwan has imported and adapted institutions and practices of political democracy. This policy, known worldwide for a series of economic "miracles" that lifted it from Third World to developed status in a generation, also has undergone a series of remarkable but less familiar political marvels. By fall, appointed mayors in Taipei and Kaohsiung were expected to be replaced in elections that were likely to be keenly competitive and might be won by either the ruling Kuomintang or the major opposition party, Democratic Progressive Party or perhaps even by New Party in one city. Also by fall, if expectations prevailed, the governorship of Taiwan Province would be contested for the first time.

And in the same year also, the Taipei and Kaohsiung City councils and Taiwan Provincial Assembly would be re-elected. Some political elites champion constitutional revisions that would provide

for direct election of the president simultaneously with voting for metropolitan mayors and provincial governor. Whether the presidential election would be put on a fast-track or deferred for 1995 or, as scheduled, for 1996, Taiwan voters would enter polling stations frequently in 1994 and for several years to come. And should the Legislative Yuan adopt procedures for referenda or plebiscites or re-call elections, voters might confront still a wider array of choices.

Frequency of competitive elections and number of offices filled by election rather than by appointment mark the presence or absence of democracy. Democracy means different things in different cultures, but almost everyone who uses the term includes competitive elections as one of the minimal conditions for establishing and maintaining a democratic polity. Alexis de Tocqueville, in the early 19th century, remarked on the propensity of the then new American nation to elect many offices, especially local ones, for short terms of service at various times of the year. America still holds the record for frequency of reliance on popular voting, but Taiwan seems to emulate its North American ally in this respect more than any other polity.

Taiwan voters, however, differ from American voters in one important characteristic, consistency of high voter participation. In America, the more frequent the elections, the greater the number of non-voters. And when several offices are decided on the same day, significant numbers of voters tend to vote only for the top of the ticket (e.g., president) and to leave their ballots unmarked or uncast for offices of lesser visibility or status. By contrast, voters in Taiwan faithfully turn out to vote and to complete their ballots for all contested offices. Voting rates consistently hover around 70 percent of eligible electors, sometimes higher in local than national elections. Eligibility is defined broadly. The minimum age is 20 (19 if counting by western terms). No gender or property or educational qualifications are required. Registration is easy and is kept up-to-date. Government election commissions notify every enrolled voter of an impending election and publish and distribute a bulletin or gazette that pictures and describes all candidates for each office. Voting is scheduled for Saturdays, which

usually are made holidays of sorts in places where elections are held. Extra trains and buses sometime run to assist persons in big cities to return to homes elsewhere to cast ballots; there are no provisions for absentee ballots. A large retinue of workers, typically teachers and other devoted local persons, administer paper ballots at many convenient polling stations, count them reliably and quickly, and post and report results shortly after polls close.

So efficient is election administration and so routinized are democratic practices of voting that the government no longer sponsors foreign observers to appraise, authenticate, and advise about how to improve election procedures. If foreign observers come, the motivation is to learn different electoral methods that might be applied elsewhere. As Taiwan has provided instruction in economic development for other nations, it now also offers lessons in political sophistication.

The baseline for analyzing the outcomes of the January 1994, elections is the distribution of offices four years earlier. In January, 1990, Taiwan's electorate filled 842 city and county council seats and 309 city, village, and township executive offices. In 1990, voters witnessed a campaign that followed shortly after DPP had startled political elites by winning the highest percentage of opposition votes since elections began in 1950. Equally startling was DPP's success in winning almost one-third of the city and county magistrates offices, including the two largest counties of Taipei and Kaohsiung. DPP was, however, unable to nominate a large number of candidates either for councils or small town mayors. Accordingly, KMT swept the January 1990 voting, winning 77 percent of council seats and 91 percent of mayorships.

For the 1994 election, DPP nominated more candidates than four years earlier. The number of DPP nominees for executives increased from 44 to 84, for councils from 189 to 254. However, if all of them would win their seats, they would not constitute a majority of any city or county councils nor gain control of a majority of the small areas choosing mayors. Against this background, it was inconceivable that KMT would fail to win a majority of both offices. The litmus test of expectations about victory and defeat became the size of the KMT

majority, or more precisely how much smaller its margin of victory in 1994 than in 1990. Typical expectations were that KMT would win 65 to 70 percent of council seats (down from 72 percent in 1990) and 80 percent of mayoral contests (down from 91 percent). DPP members would regard such a showing as a considerable improvement and proclaim a moral victory.

In addition to watching shifts in ratios of KMT to DPP winners in both offices, observers kept an eye on the 30 candidates nominated by New Party, 29 for council seats, one for village chief. New Party leaders publicly talked about victory for 10 of these nominees; most observers expected they would be lucky to win half that number. Despite the drama of its breakaway from KMT in August, 1993, New Party had not had an auspicious start. Its failure to win a single magistrate's office in November detracted from its promise. Its assistance in indirectly re-electing a DPP magistrate in Taipei County preserved its image as a spoiler party, not a serious party. Current elections would sharpen or modify such a profile.

Given these considerations, how would democrats appraise the status and prospects of electoral democracy in Taiwan? To begin, elections are a cornerstone of democracy, or more especially, representative democracy. Voters usually do not decide questions of public policy directly, except in occasional referenda, not available to Taiwan citizens, at least not yet. Instead of direct democracy, practices of indirect democracy are common. Voters choose a few fellow citizens to deliberate and decide policy issues on their behalf, and then reserve the right to re-elect or reject their representatives at the next election.

Representative democracy is hardly a substitute for direct democracy unless voters have a genuine choice when they go to vote. Genuine choice means candidates who present alternative points of view on policies. When different candidates present different views, voters can decide not only who will represent them, but instruct representatives with broad policy guidelines.

In modern governments, political parties serve to fulfill functions of selecting candidates and organizing contending views. So, voters can appraise candidates as party nominees as well as

individuals. If they know little about candidates personally, as may be the case in a large constituency such as Panchiao in Taipei County, with more than 300,000 eligible voters, they can at least choose between or among parties. Yet representative government is not achieved in fact unless something more than candidates, policies, and parties are available to voters. An additional requirement of an effectively functioning democracy is competition between parties. Inter-party competition implies that sometimes one party wins, sometimes another. Who will win is uncertain, with victory or defeat for a party or a candidate being more or less equally probable.

Something resembling this ideal form of inter-party competition has occurred in a number of Legislative Yuan election districts in recent years. The same uncertainty of outcome appeared in the November 1993, vote for several city and county magistrates reported above. In such competitive elections, neither party defeats the other by large majorities, and the party that wins at one election may be defeated at subsequent elections.

If this is an ideal form of competition in a democracy, how closely did the forthcoming election contests approximate this ideal? The answer is not very closely. KMT's obvious overwhelming advantage allowed little doubt about the aggregate outcome of races for city and county councils and for small town mayors. That voters were expected to turn out in high percentages, around 70 percent, was remarkable. In many other countries, such uncompetitive elections would be greeted with indifference by disappointed voters.

Taiwan has had a two-party system for Legislative Yuan and for city and county magistrates. Whether it would have something akin to genuine competition for governor and president remained to be seen. It clearly lacked bi-partisan or multi-partisan status for the most local of offices.

In observing and analyzing these local contests, it would be worth considering whether and how Taiwan's promising democratic institutions could become in fact more competitive and hence more responsive to voters. Would that be Taiwan's next political "miracle"?

Outcomes

On the last Saturday of January 1994, nearly 74 percent of Taiwan's eligible

voters cast ballots for two local offices with results that all political parties regarded favorably. The ruling Kuomintang won an overwhelming majority of contests for county and city councils and for mayoral and chief executives of small towns, townships, and villages. In elections anywhere, majorities of 67 percent and 82 percent of offices and 59 percent and 72 percent of total vote for each kind of office are considered enviable landslides, even though less than in previous years. The Democratic Progressive Party, since 1986 the major opposition party, increased its share of seats for both councils and executives. From a minuscule 6 percent of council seats and 2 percent of mayors and chiefs in the 1990 elections, its 1994 showings rose to 11 percent and 7 percent. As expected, its spokespersons proclaimed a "breakthrough," the dawn of a new era of party competition. The still-new New Party, starved for success since being shutout in elections for county and city magistrates, enjoyed victories by 8 of 30 candidates for county councils. These winners numbered almost as many as New Party leaders had predicted publicly and more than some expected privately. Thus, they too rejoiced.

Voting ordinarily distinguishes winners from losers. Indeed, elections provide rules for a win-lose pair of outcomes. Notwithstanding party leaders' victory boasts, who, in fact, lost? The parties that aspire to govern Taiwan understandably take an optimistic, if short-run, view of their separate fortunes. In the long run, however, one set of losers may be those whose objective is to make Taiwan genuinely competitive in elections for all offices. As postulated, competitiveness means elections in which the difference between majority and minority is much smaller than in these elections. The outcome also is less predictable, that is, either party might win and no party would maintain a permanent majority.

Although Taiwan seems to be on the verge of such competition for Legislative Yuan and to approach that for county and city magistrates, and despite well-deserved congratulation about party politics and democratic elections, it remains one-party at local levels. In the argot of contemporary political science, it is a "dominant one-party system" of county and city councils and town mayors and village chiefs.

Notwithstanding a decade's effort by DPP, it cannot thwart KMT's winning majorities of two-thirds or more of all local offices and majorities of total votes. DPP's share of total vote for both councils and executives was 15 percent. This is the lowest proportion of total vote for DPP since the National Assembly sweep by KMT in 1991 and a dismal performance compared to more than 30 percent in Legislative Yuan voting in 1992 and more than 40 percent in elections of magistrates in 1993. Nor has DPP yet won a majority of seats in a single county council or city council. Even in four cities and counties where KMT lost nominal control for the first time (Chiayi City, Tainan City, Tainan County, and Kaohsiung County), independents form the apparent majority, not DPP.

But, one may ask, are not declines in KMT strength, gradual improvements in DPP's fortunes, and the appearance of New Party signs of impending inter-party competition? By 1998, when these same county and city councils and town mayors and village chiefs must be elected again, will not contests genuinely be competitive? The implication is that in due course DPP eventually will acquire nominal, then effective control of one or more levels of government. Such an expectation is widely shared throughout Taiwan, hoped for by DPP, and feared by some in KMT and New Party. Either from dint of hard work by DPP or default by KMT, conventional wisdom holds that DPP will emerge, at some unspecified date under unspecified conditions, as the opposition-turned-governing party.

Another possibility looms. One may also project a major realignment of parties. The catalyst could be the next presidential election, scheduled for 1996. KMT may divide then between its mainstream and non-mainstream wings, with each running a popular candidate for the nation's highest office. Non-mainstream elements could absorb New Party in fact if not in name. Two such strong camps descending from KMT would leave little space for DPP, which after a decade trying unavailingly to establish itself, might find it difficult to remain united. One wing of that party conceivably would feel comfortable in association with what is now thought of as the mainstream or predominantly "Taiwanese" wing of KMT. The other

could remain a minor or third party, continuing to carry the banner of independence and related issues. Clarifying these alternative possibilities, or identifying others, is beyond the scope of this article, as is predicting which alternative is more or less probable. But the slow and ineffectual pace of the opposition's electoral strategy, however crucial it has been in opening up competition with KMT, causes one to question the viability of the party for the long-term democratization of Taiwan.

Whatever the shape of party alignment or realignment, parties will continue to campaign in a culture of electoral corruption. Pious denials of vote-buying and solemn denunciations of violence do not obscure that two elections in two months shamed Taiwan's emerging democracy. The Minister of Interior once again augmented police protection of candidates during the campaign and of polling stations and ballot counting centers on election day. The Minister of Justice nearly doubled the number of agents pursuing allegations of vote-buying. More active law enforcement produces more alleged violations of existing standards of election conduct as well as proposed higher norms. Bullet-proof vests, bodyguards, investigating agents, and policemen, however, will not dissolve a long-standing, widely taken for granted patterns of corrupt practices. Vote-buying, and its source, graft from government contracts, exists in many political systems, not least in newly developing ones. Legislative assemblies and political parties, which everywhere are less professional than courts or civil services, are particularly vulnerable to graft, especially at grassroots levels less exposed to investigation and publicity.

The less professionalized agencies of politics are open to varying levels of education and class. It has been remarked that corruption is revenge of lower classes against middle and upper classes of scholars, journalists, bureaucrats, and lawyers. If there is any validity to this social psychology of corruption, Taiwan and other rapidly democratizing polities will have to cope with this problem, perhaps for a generation.⁶ That is no reason, however, for observers and participants in Taiwan's maturing polity to neglect the contingency that its admirable experience in democratization may be betrayed.

Appraising the Electoral Process

At the end of 1993, Freedom House published its annual appraisal of the status of democracy around the world. For the first time since the late 1980s, the number of territories adhering to more or less democratic ways of governing public affairs declined. Those who prepared the report attributed interruptions in democratic trends to difficulties in several formerly communist-Leninist regimes. These regimes had yielded power for a variety of reasons, including incompetence, domestic dissatisfaction, and loss of foreign support. Creating and sustaining democratic innovations did not follow surely, readily, or easily on the heels of communism's collapse.

While most communist-Leninist systems disappeared, the world's only non-communist Leninist regime—on Taiwan—began its transition from authoritarianism. In mid-1980s, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo had announced measures that effected gradual devolution of power from an elite of mostly mainland Chinese emigres to native Taiwanese. Taiwanese largely had been excluded from self-government since China ceded the island to Japan at the turn of the century and after its restoration to China at the end of World War II. The most significant initiative in Chiang's devolutionary strategy occurred in 1986 when an illegal opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, formed without its leaders being arrested or its campaign for elective offices terminated. President Chiang next announced abolition of martial law. The ruling party, the Kuomintang, eventually legalized opposition parties. Chiang's successor, President Lee Teng-hui, presided over constitutional revisions that included an assertive, newly-elected parliament.

That these reforms seem more durable than many in Eastern Europe is evident in elections for the thousands of local offices held in November 1993 and January 1994. Twice in two months, more than 70 percent of Taiwan's eligible voters went to the polls. In November 1993, they chose 23 county and city magistrates. In January 1994, they elected more than 800 county and city council members, including for the first time Quemoy and Matsu islands within sight of the mainland. They also filled more

than 300 smaller city, township, and village executives.

The routinization of democratic elections follows, not from holding a single "critical" election, but from a series of ballots over a period of years. Successive elections exhibit continuing, perhaps growing, opposition strength, gradual integration of dissidents with rulers, selective turnover of important offices from the old ruling party to new opposition party or parties. As oppositionists acquire their first positions of power, they also acquire legitimacy as well as opportunities to demonstrate their competence and then stand for re-election. During such periods, once powerful military officials and agencies lose their fear of opposition elements and are gradually limited in use of force in domestic affairs.

These processes have unfolded in Taiwan since emergence of DPP in 1986. Within three years, DPP openly competed in a wide variety of electoral contests, for National Assembly (a continuing constitutional assembly), Legislative Yuan (parliament), city and county councils, city and county mayors, and Taiwan Provincial Assembly. The opposition has been more successful in some contests than others, especially in 1992 races for Legislative Yuan when for the first time its share of total popular vote exceeded 30 percent. In 1993, it won more than 40 percent of votes for city and county magistrates, but actually lost one seat. It has done less well the more local the office, the smaller the electoral districts in population, and the more numerous the contests. The 1993-94 elections described here were such an arena in which the playing field is least level between ruling party and DPP, and also for the recently formed third party, the New Party.

DPP's membership, perhaps 70,000, is tiny compared with KMT's one to two million (data are uncertain). DPP has difficulty running full slates of candidates when many offices are filled simultaneously. Thus, KMT was sure to win an overwhelming majority of both council seats and local executives. DPP or New Party could regard slight gains as moral victories, but they hardly penetrate KMT's effective control at local levels.

DPP's reliance on contributions from mostly small businesses pales in comparison to KMT's vast wealth. Estimates of the ruling party's wealth are

unreliable, but even with massive pensions and a huge bureaucracy to support, it is one of the wealthiest political parties ever known.⁷ Whatever the differences in comparative wealth between and among parties, almost everyone deplores the expensiveness of political campaigns. Recent elections for districts, varying in size from Panchiao (more than 300,000 eligible voters) in Taipei County to a district in Quemoy (71 eligible) feature elaborate campaign headquarters, large retinues of workers and supporters, big printing bills for posters and brochures, entertainment at lavish dinners and receptions, ubiquitous sound trucks, frequent rallies, and undoubtedly vote buying.

Not only does KMT enjoy organizational and financial advantages, it also benefits from remnants of the Leninist-like connection between party and state. Television channels, as we have noted, are owned either by government agencies or KMT, and in the 1993 elections critics flailed the ruling party for the evident bias it received from news coverage. Pressures for privatization grow and alternative cable channels are now opening. Still this playing field remains uneven.

Taiwan's political maturity, even with room for further democratization, constitutes a political marvel. Its economic miracles are better recognized; but some observers undervalue the political achievements and often regard them as effects rather than equivalents of economic reforms. The hypothesis that democratic reforms follow economic ones, not the other way around or simultaneously, is popular. In fact, regularizing democratic procedures may be independent of wealth, or at least interdependent with, rather than solely dependent on economic factors, such as the rise of a middle class. Institutionalizing democratic practices is a continuing process of reinforcement and diffusion through implicit and/or explicit cooperation between ruling party elites, whose interests are to yield some power lest they lose all, and oppositionists, ambitious for power but willing to share rather than aim for total control.

That distinguishes Taiwan from less promising new democracies, but offers experience for others struggling to form.#

Notes

*A draft of this paper was discussed at the annual meeting of the Florida Political Science Association, New College of the University of South Florida, April 8-9, 1994. Comments for revision came from Linda and Alfred Cuzan, Richard Fenno, Marco Rimaneli, and Bert Swanson. This is part of a continuing study of "devolution" in Taiwan, that is, broadened participation in shaping and sharing of all values, partly initiated by elites and shared largely nonviolently with mid-elites and masses. Suggestions are welcome. Address: P.O. Box 32116, University of West Florida, Pensacola, FL, 32514-2116.

References

1. See my earlier "The KMT as a Leninist Regime," *Political Chronicle*, Vol. 3, No.1 (1991), pp.1-8, and with Julian Baum, "Party Primaries in Taiwan: Footnote or Text in Democratization?" *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 20, No.2 (1993), pp.88-89. One of the longest-serving watchers of Taiwan elections is John F. Copper, whose multiple works refer to many other election observers' reports. See especially his *Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise*. Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1990; and *Taiwan's 1991-92 Non-Supplemental Elections*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994. Also note Chong-pin Lin, "Democracy in Taiwan," *World Affairs*, Vol. 155, Nos. 2-3 (1992-93), pp. 51-138, esp. articles by June Teufel Dreyer on 1991 National Assembly elections and by Peter Kuo on news media.
 2. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, *Human Rights and World Public Order*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, Part III, concerning trends.
 3. Cf. Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
 4. On mass media, see Hung-mao Tien, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989, Ch.8.
 5. Tien, *ibid.* Also see Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics*, Vol. 41 (1988-89), pp.471-499, and Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy: Political Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No.3 (1994), pp.213-230. The essay by Chao and Myers summarizes their forthcoming book by the same title.
 6. For distinctive and unconventional views on corruption, see Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
 7. An excellent introduction to a vast, fascinating, and unexplored subject, KMT's wealth, is Sandra Burton, "Backlash Against Money," *Time* (Asia edition), August 23, 1993, pp.20-22. More detailed and extensive is Julian Baum, "KMT Inc.," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 11, 1994, pp. 62-67.
 8. Election data at such local levels as reported here are difficult to come upon except by in-country collection. Therefore, a note on sources is in order. Since local elections were introduced in 1950 in Taiwan, election officials have compiled and published comparable data for all offices. These include demographic data about the electorate as well as information about candidates, party affiliation, gender, education, occupation, and incumbency. The Central Election Commission in Taipei has published these data regularly for national offices, that is, National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, and for some regional-local positions, such as county magistrates and city mayors. These publications are in English as well as Chinese. As a rule of thumb, however, the more local the election, e.g., small town mayors and village chiefs, the less likely data are readily available in any form other than Chinese. In some cases, a visit to the Taiwan Provincial Election Commission in Nantou County may be necessary. For present purposes, the author depends heavily on statistics in *Introduction to Republic of China's Local Government Employee Election General Situation. 78th Year of ROC, 79th Year of ROC*. Taipei: Central Election Commission, October 31, 1990 (in Chinese).
- For tabular summaries of data from selected elections from Taiwan sources, see James A. Robinson, "The KMT As A Leninist Regime: Prolegomenon To Devolutionary Leadership Through Institutions," *Journal of Thought and Words*, Taipei, September 1990, pp. 165-213, at pp. 209-14; John F. Copper, *Taiwan's Recent Elections*, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58; Copper, *Taiwan's 1991-92 Non-Supplemental Elections*, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-98; Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan*. Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992, *passim*; and Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Political Change in Taiwan*. Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1992, *passim*.
- In addition to official sources, Chinese-language newspapers frequently are comprehensive, the two English-language papers, *China News and China Post*, somewhat less so, especially for local elections. Also to be consulted is the Government Information Office English-language weekly, *Free China Journal*. Official statistics appear there often in formats comparable from one election to the next. Although a government publication, *FCJ* has become increasingly professional in its coverage and analysis.
- Many data for this article derive from tabulations collected on election night or the day after in November 1993 and January 1994. The author summarized some of them in a series of columns in *FCJ*, *Asian Wall Street Journal*, and *United Daily News* (in Chinese) before and soon after the elections. This paper draws again on those sources.

Women in State Elective Office: Age, Ambition and Perceptions of Generational Gaps in Policy Preferences among Florida Legislators

Susan A. MacManus with the assistance of Patricia A. Turner

Abstract

Marked changes in the nation's age profile, sharp shifts in the family and marital status of many Americans, the entry of women of all ages into the work force, and changing attitudes about women's proper roles in society have challenged conventional wisdom about the fortunes of women seeking public office. The effects of age and gender on legislators' assessments of issue concerns of the young and old within their districts have also been questioned in light of new concerns about intergenerational conflicts. Based on a January-February 1994 survey of Florida's legislators, this research finds that the electoral chronologies of men and women are remarkably similar (especially for the younger generation), beginning with high school, and continuing through college and adulthood. Women are entering office at a younger age. A sizable proportion of all ages are bypassing local office to run for a state legislative seat which will undoubtedly increase the number of women in statewide and congressional offices over the long term. Being divorced is no longer a liability nor is it a stigma for women to run for office when children are still living at home. Neither age nor gender significantly affects a legislator's view of what are the primary issues of concern to young and old constituents. There is also a high level of consensus on which issues tend to evoke intergenerational conflicts, although women see no such conflicts over social services whereas men do and younger legislators are more likely to see intergenerational tensions over the economy/jobs. Those from rural districts see age group tensions over the economy as a bigger problem than those representing urban areas.

There's "a new breed of woman candidates [who are] secure enough to skip rudimentary, introductory politics and supported by their political machines to wage solid campaigns."

JoAnne Rajoppi in *Women in Office* (1993:10)

"This is the Year of the Woman." "Record Numbers of Women Win." "The Gals Beat the Guys." These are the headlines of the 1990s. They have replaced the "first" headlines of earlier decades—"State Elects First Female Governor," or "First Woman Elected to City Council." Early research on women in elective office focused on the personal attributes of these path-breakers—education, occupation, marital status, age, among others (cf. Kirkpatrick, 1974; Tolchin and Tolchin, 1976; Diamond, 1977; Johnson and Carroll, 1978; Carroll, 1985). More recent research has dissected the impacts of various electoral structures and rules on women's chances of winning office (cf. Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1987; Rule and Zimmerman, 1992; Pritchard, 1992; MacManus and Bullock, 1993) or examined whether women office seekers and holders behave differently than men (cf. Dodson, 1991; Dodson and Carroll, 1991; Kathlene, Clarke and Fox, 1991; Stanley and Blair, 1991; Welch and Thomas, 1991; Mandel and Dodson, 1992; Mezey, 1994). In the interim, the nation has undergone some major transformations in its socioeconomic structure, most notably its age profile (Dychtwald and Flower, 1990; Fosler, Alonso, Meyer, and Kern, 1990; Strauss and Howe, 1991; Torres-Gil, 1992; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992a,b; Siegel, 1993). As a nation, we are becoming grayer. And notions about where is "women's proper place"—in the home, the workforce, or public office—have changed considerably (Beckwith, 1986).

The Study

It's time to merge the old with the new. This article looks at the degree to which the age structure of women in office reflects the general aging of the population at-large. Are women still older than men when they first run for political office? Do younger women still follow the traditional path of seeking local office before running for state positions? Are younger women today more likely to have

held elective offices in high school, college, community associations, or political party organizations before first running for political office than their older counterparts? And are there still gender differences among the younger generation in who takes advantage of these leadership and organizational skill-building opportunities? If not, it would seem to indicate that sexual stereotypes which posit women as being less attracted to elective office from their youth to adulthood are outmoded. Finally, the paper looks at whether age and gender affects an elected official's assessment of the policy concerns of different age groups within his/her constituency and the extent to which legislators see generational schisms emerging on various public policy issues.

The source of our data is a mail survey of Florida's state legislators, conducted in January-February, 1994.¹ It tracked their electoral histories and queried them about the policy concerns of the young and the old in their districts, identifying issues closely watched by each age group and those evoking the greatest intergenerational tensions. Using state legislators as the unit of analysis permits researchers a better opportunity to conduct urban-rural contrasts and to look at the effects of different constituency bases on representatives' policy perceptions.

Florida: A Preview of the Nation's Age Profile

Florida, the nation's fourth largest state, has undergone a tremendous change in its composition over the past three decades, especially in its age profile. As of 1991, 18.3 percent of the state's population was 65 or older compared with just 12.6 percent for the nation as a whole. But equally important, and often unnoticed, is the fact that Florida's two age extremes (under 18; 65 and over) are converging. Between 1970 and 1990, the percent of those under 18 years of age shrunk from 31.2 percent to 23.3 percent.² During this same period, the proportion

of Florida's population aged 65 and over grew from 14.6 to 18.3 percent. By the year 2010, the two groups will be virtually equal in size (under 18, 20.6 percent; 65 and over, 19.9 percent).

Some predict that the chemistry between advocates for the young and the old could become quite volatile, as each "dependent" group competes for resources from a shrinking work force. In fact, many demographers and policy analysts across the U.S. view Florida as a leading indicator for what will happen in the nation at-large as it ages. Of great interest is the degree to which political changes will be driven by a radically and rapidly altered age structure.

No longer a one-party, predominantly rural southern state, populated by native southerners, Florida is now a highly competitive, two-party state.³ Nearly two-thirds of its current residents were born elsewhere, making it less of a Deep South state than its neighbors. For example, by early 1994, nearly one-fifth (18 percent) of Florida's legislators were women, just under the national total (20 percent),⁴ but above average for southern states. In summary, Florida is an ideal setting in which to look at the impact of a changing age profile on state politics—both in terms of who gets elected and what policy areas receive the most attention. Particularly fascinating is whether there's an age-gender interactive effect.

Are Women Older Than Men When They Seek Office?

Between 1980 and 1990, the median age of the U.S. population jumped from 30 to 32.8. For women the jump was from 31.2 to 34; for men, from 28.7 to 31.6. Projections are that the median age for the whole population will jump to 37.4 by 2010 and to 38.5 by 2025.⁵ Based on the upward slope of the life expectancy line alone, one might expect the median age of women seeking office to exceed that of their male counterparts. There are also other "conventional wisdoms" related to life style "expectations" that cause one to forecast that women enter politics later than men.

Waiting 'Til the Kids Are Grown

Past research has suggested rather strongly that women tend to enter politics

at a later age than men, waiting until their children are grown and out of the house (Rajoppi, 1993). By virtue of entering politics later, women do not go climb the political ladder nearly as fast or as high as men (Bledsoe and Herring, 1990). Because they enter politics later, a higher proportion of women office holders are content to capture local offices (city council, county commission, school board seats) rather than run for higher posts (cf. Johnson and Carroll, 1978; Carroll, 1985; MacManus, 1991; MacManus and Bullock, 1993).

Married or Widowed, Not Single or Divorced

Past research has also alleged that single and divorced women have a tougher time winning than male candidates in the same marital status (cf. Rajoppi, 1993; Witt, Paget, and Matthews, 1994; Boxer, 1994). Married or widowed—that's the optimal marital status for women seeking a political career—according to conventional wisdom (CW). "A single [or divorced] woman politician, without family to provide the paternalistic equivalent of coverture, will be gay-baited, or lusted after, or pestered with questions about why she can't get a man" (Witt, Paget, and Matthews, 1994:62). However, some analysts now believe that even married women candidates can have their marital status turned against them. As Witt, Paget, and Matthews (1994:61-62) have observed: "There is not even a best life-style option for the woman who would run for office. Whether she is Ms., Mrs., or Mommy it can be a role that has sexual connotations which trouble the voters...Just being strong, powerful, and female subjects a woman politician to speculation about her sexuality or 'true womanhood,' regardless of her marital or maternal status, or even her age."

Is the Literature Outmoded?

Many of the theories just cited are based on research completed before women began running for and winning "high viz." posts in record numbers and major changes in the living patterns of Americans took place. Today, record numbers of married couples are getting divorces and considerably higher percentages of younger persons of both

sexes are staying single longer. Consequently, one wonders if marital status still affects women candidates differently and more negatively than men candidates. Do women still "need" to be married or widowed to win? Do their kids need to be grown before they seek office? With sharp increases in the number of working women (of all ages) and the rise in the proportion of households using child care facilities, is the number of children living at home as big a deterrent to women seeking higher office as it used to be? These questions lead to even broader ones—are women older when they first capture elective posts (at any level)? when they first capture state legislative posts? And do their age profiles and electoral histories differ from men seeking the same posts?

Gender, Age, and The Plunge into Elective Office

The most extensive study of the age of entry of women into various elective positions was conducted quite some time ago (July 1977). In that study, researchers Johnson and Carroll (1978) identified the age at which women entered their current post but did not ask at what age they first ran for/won *any* elective post. They also failed to report the age differences between men and women when they first engaged in their electoral quest, noting only that there was no difference between men and women in the number of elective posts they had held before their current position. But if we are to make any conclusions about whether life cycle and sex role stereotypes are dissipating, it is necessary to determine whether there are significant differences between men and women in office today AND to look at whether the differences between men and women belonging to the younger cohorts are different than those of older generations.

The 1994 survey of Florida legislators asked these questions: "How old were you when you first *ran* for elective public office?" How old were you when you first *won* elective public office?" The results show that there is no statistically significant differences between the two genders on either count (see Table 1, Page 17). The average age each first ran was 38. The average age when each first won was slightly older: 39.3 (men), 38 (women). Even when focusing on the

age at which they first run for and got elected to their current state legislative post, there was little difference (40.3 for men; 41.5 for women). However, the average age at which women first won state legislative seats has *declined* in comparison with that observed by Johnson and Carroll in 1977 (47). This bodes well for increasing the numbers of women elected to statewide offices and to Congress as state legislative seats have been proven to be excellent "training grounds" for women seeking these posts.

Further evidence that age differences between the two genders may be disappearing appears when a close look is taken at state legislators who captured their first political office in 1992. A higher proportion of both male and female first termers holding their first elective post were 18-29 years of age (57.7 and 53.3 percent respectively). But there was no statistically significant difference between men and women 50 years of age or older who were first termers holding their first elective office (42.3 percent v. 46.7 percent). These data strongly suggest that one's age (young or old) is not a deterrent to capturing state legislative seats. In the case of older women, it shows that they are equally likely to men to start their political careers at a level above local politics—a real change from what the earlier literature had suggested (although rarely tested empirically).

Age, Gender, Family Status, and Decisions to Run for Office

At the time they first decided to run for public office, there was no statistically significant difference between men and women in the number of children they had living at home at the time (1.3 for men; 0.9 for women). The greater and more significant difference was in their marital status at the time they sought office—but not totally along the lines of conventional wisdom. While women were less likely to be single (5.9 percent compared to 14.8 percent of the men), they were also slightly *less* likely to be married (76.5 v. 82 percent) and *more* likely to be divorced (17.6 percent vs. 1.9 percent), but not widowed. The highest incidences of divorced women winning office occur among the youngest (under 30) and oldest (50 and over) cohorts. Again, these findings seem to toss conventional wisdom aside,

especially with regard to the alleged stigma of divorce. Could CW also be wrong in today's times with regard to the political career paths taken by men and women reaching the state legislature?

Elective Posts Held Prior to Winning Public Office: High School, College, Adulthood

Years ago, political scientists were quite interested in finding out which children were the most likely to be highly interested in politics by the time they reached adulthood (cf.: Greenstein, 1965; Hess and Torney, 1967; Jennings and Niemi, 1974). The political socialization literature, through panel studies, tracked kids from elementary school through their entry into the voting age population. It found that the most powerful political socialization agents were one's family and school experiences. After several decades of efforts to promote equal educational opportunities for girls and boys and to eliminate gender stereotyped textbooks and gender-specific student organizations, it is surprising that political scientists have not revisited the schools to discern whether girls have become more likely to seek leadership posts.

High School and College Elective Positions

The strong link between youth activism and adult political activism has long been established. The key question today is whether there are still gender differences in the high school and college experiences of those who ultimately seek political office. To get at this question, the state legislator survey asked: "In high school, did you serve on the Student Council?" If so, "were you President?" "In high school, were you an elective officer in any other student organization?" "If Yes, which one(s) and what offices?" For those attending college, it asked "In college, did you hold elective office in Student Government? If Yes, which post? student body president? senate? judiciary? other?" The results are quite interesting—and encouraging in some respects.

As shown in Table 1, there were no statistically significant differences in the proportions of men and women state legislators who had served on their high school's student council (53.3 and 47.1

percent respectively). More importantly, among those 18-29 years of age, there were no statistically significant differences. At the college level, the proportions of women and men who held an elective post in student government was also quite similar (33.3 percent v. 28.6 percent) and not statistically significantly different. The primary difference is that men more often captured *leadership* posts (student council/body/class presidents/service organization presidents) in broad-based campus organizations and judicial posts (in the case of college), even among the younger cohort (see Table 2, Page 16).

There's evidence that the educational and occupational levels of men and women candidates are converging. For years, the literature has concluded that one of the key reasons why women don't fare as well in running for office or become as effective once elected is that they are not as well-educated. Specifically, it has often been pointed out that males have an advantage in the legislative arena because higher proportions of them are lawyers. The Florida survey shows that these "truisms" are rapidly going by the wayside. Among the state's legislators, women are as well-educated as their male counterparts (see Table 1, Page 17). And while a higher proportion of women legislators have graduate or professional degrees rather than law degrees, that is not true of the youngest cohort of women legislators, no doubt reflecting the higher incidence of women going to law school (see Table 2, Page 17).

Adulthood: Nonpolitical and Political Organization Elective Positions

Past research has created the conventional wisdom that women's political bases are more "grassroots" and "nonpolitical" in nature than men's. Tracking back to traditional notions of sex roles, work, and family, women are assumed to be more active in community, church, service, and cultural organizations than men. After her children are old enough, the politically ambitious woman turns to the people in these organizations and her organizational skills acquired by belonging to these grassroots groups to launch a political career. In contrast, the literature suggests that men are more

likely than women to be active in local political party organizations, and to use those experiences and contacts as their primary political launch pad. In the past, party organizations have been viewed as exclusionary for women political "wannabes," restricting their involvement in party leadership positions and blocking their candidacies to high posts (cf. Kirkpatrick, 1974; Tolchin and Tolchin, 1976). But do these patterns still hold true in the 1990s?

The 1994 state legislator survey confirms what Burrell (1993) has recently argued — that, once again, conventional wisdom is not very accurate. The survey asked: "Before you first sought elective public office, had you held any elective posts in any non-political organization (civic, professional, cultural, church, business, service)?" "If yes, which organizations and what positions (President; Board member, etc.)?" It also asked: "Before you first sought elective public office, had you held any elective posts in a political party organization?" "If yes, which organization(s) and what position(s)?" As shown in Table 1, there were no statistically significant differences between men and women on any of these dimensions. The most surprising finding was in reference to experience in holding political party positions where the literature had strongly suggested that women had less experience than men. It is among the youngest cohort of women that this pattern is most observable. Younger women legislators are also more likely to have held elective posts in student government (high school and college) than those 50 or older but less so in nonpolitical organizations.⁶

The conclusion that one can draw from these data is that younger women are taking the same more "political organizational routes" to public office from their youth to adulthood that men have always taken. One could infer, although cautiously, that changes promoting gender equity that have been put in place in our schools, universities, and political parties have begun to have an impact, although the media's coverage of women's political victories has no doubt played a very important part as well. Witt, Paget, and Matthews (1994:101) have observed that changes over the past two decades "have allowed women to imagine themselves as politicians, to overcome the sense that

running for office was improper, and to pursue their own political goals. As more women have run, prospective candidates have had less trouble imagining what a female politician might look like." (We will return to the *downside* of media coverage later in the paper.)

Age, Gender and Perceptions of Constituent Issue Attentiveness

The tug-of-war between the old and the young has been the focus of the popular and academic press in recent years (cf. Dychtwald and Flower, 1990; Strauss and Howe, 1991; Torres-Gil, 1992). The major premise of much of this literature is that the aging of our population is creating a great generational divide as the old and young compete for increasingly scarce resources (Kotlikoff, 1992; Laslett and Fishkin, 1992). The underlying inference is that the old and the young *differ* considerably in their policy preferences. If this is true, does the age of a legislator affect his/her perceptions about what are the issue interests of the young and old within his/her constituency base (legislative district)?

Because there are gender differences in each age group's socioeconomic and political makeup, it is presumed by some that gender differences may be greater than age differences on many of issues.⁷ Past research has found that women legislators of all ages (and political parties) are prone to give higher priority than their male counterparts to "women's issues," which traditionally have been defined as "health care, education, the welfare of children and the family" (Dodson and Carroll, 1991:93). This leads to the question of whether women are more likely than men to identify the *same* issues as being of concern to both the young and the old within their districts.

To test whether a legislator's age or gender makes a difference in judging the issue interests of the young and old voting age constituents within their districts, Florida's legislators were asked a battery of questions: (1) "What issues do *younger* voters (under 24) in your district follow most closely. (Check all applicable);" (2) "What issues do *older* voters (65 or older) in your district follow most closely? (Check all applicable.);" and (3) "On what issues do the views of younger and older voters in your district seem to *differ* the most? (Check all

applicable.)" They were asked to assess age group attentiveness to: taxes, government spending, government growth, economy/jobs, health, crime/criminal justice, social services, public assistance, elementary/secondary education, higher education, environment, discrimination (race, gender, age, sexual preference), highways/roads, public transportation, parks and recreation, growth management, and moral issues (abortion, prayer in schools, gun control, pornography, privacy).

Age and Gender Make Little Difference

The results are quite surprising in some ways but not in others. There are no statistically significant differences between men and women legislators in their assessments of issues of concern to their young and old constituents, nor does a legislator's age make much difference in their judgments. The primary explanation for this is that there are no significant differences in the age profiles of districts represented by men and women legislators (*see Table 1, Page 17*). There are more district differences in family structure and urban-rural character. Women tend to represent more urban districts, with higher proportions of nonfamily households. On the whole, however, there are few statistically significant differences in the socioeconomic or political profiles of districts represented by men and women legislators.

Issues Followed Closely by Young Constituents. The issues of greatest interest to young constituents of both men and women legislators regardless of age are (in order): economy/jobs; crime/criminal justice; elementary/secondary education; higher education; taxes; moral issues; and the environment (*see Table 3, Page 18*). With regard to the moral issues, those followed most closely by the young are abortion and prayer in the schools.

Issues Followed Closely by Older Constituents. In general, there's a higher level of legislative consensus on issues of great concern to Florida's older population than on issues of concern to the young (*see Table 4, Page 18*). Issues following very closely by older constituents (65 and over), as

identified by both men and women legislators, are (in order): taxes, crime/criminal justice, health, government spending, moral issues, and social services. (Men rank moral issues—gun control and abortion—ahead of social services; for women, it's the reverse, although the differences are not statistically significant.)

Issues Evoking Generational Differences. It is when legislators are asked to identify issues on which the young and the old in their districts are most likely to *differ* that gender and age make some difference in legislators' assessments (see Table 5, Page 18). While men and women legislators alike identify moral, taxes, and health issues as among the most age conflict-generating, men see more generational schisms on social services than do women. This is not surprising in light of previous research showing women legislators of all ages are more consensual on this issue. The difference between men and women legislators on their assessment of this issue is statistically significant.

Much publicity has been given to public opinions surveys showing that today's young do not perceive they will be as well off as their parents and fear they will be burdened with supporting older generations, especially as the baby boomers reach retirement age and begin to draw Social Security. Some analyses of voting turnout patterns in the 1992 presidential election even attribute rising participation rates among the young as a sign of the pervasiveness of this attitude among the young (MacManus and Parker, 1995). Thus, it is not surprising that younger legislators (men and women) are more prone to view the economy/jobs issue as generating generational conflicts than their older counterparts (statistically significant at the .018 level).

The perceived generational schism on the economy/jobs issue is even stronger between legislators representing urban and rural districts. Legislators representing rural districts are much more likely to see generational conflicts arising over the economy/jobs than those representing urban areas. Again, it's a matter of the relative competition for scarce resources which is typically

more intense in rural areas.

Projected Generational Differences. Florida's changing age profile has gotten a lot of press attention recently both inside and outside the state. Statistics on the state's age profile (and projections) are generated annually and given a lot of publicity. Legislators are also constantly being bombarded with statistics generated by agencies and groups representing the young and the old, highlighting differences in need levels between the two.⁸ Of interest, then, is the extent to which state legislators see generational schisms intensifying over the next few years. To address this concern, the survey asked them: "Over the next five years, do you expect generational differences in public policy preferences in the State of Florida to become less noticeable, stay about the same, or become more noticeable?"

Overall, 45 percent of Florida's legislators project that the current level of differences will remain the same (see Table 6, Page 18). But an equal percentage see generational differences becoming more noticeable within the next five years—certainly more than think they will diminish (only 10 percent). Neither age nor gender affect these projections, again not surprising in light of their common exposure to facts and figures on issues and the similarities of their district profiles.

In general, these data highlight the issues over which generational differences are most likely to arise (health, jobs/economy, taxes, moral)—not just in Florida, but nationally. There is a certain amount of comfort in knowing neither gender nor age strongly affect a legislator's perceptions of age group issue attentiveness and disagreement. A more lasting concern is whether future generations will be as interested in entering public office as young persons are today.

The Desirability of a Political Career: Age and Gender Differences

In light of the tremendous negativism toward politicians prevalent in the press today (Sabato, 1991; Jamieson, 1992; Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993;

Patterson, 1993; West, 1993), one would expect that few Americans would choose politics as a career, either for themselves or their offspring. To get at this issue, a June 1992 public opinion survey by the Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press asked its respondents (a national representative random sample of 3,517 persons 18 and over): "Would you like your son or daughter or other member of your family to go into politics as a career?"

Only 27.1 percent of the survey respondents said they would like someone in their family to have a political career. The good news is that younger persons of both sexes are more positive toward a career in politics than the older cohorts. Over 31 percent of those 18-34 were enthusiastic about a political career for someone in their family compared to just 22 percent of those 50 years of age and older. The bad news is that fewer young women than men view politics as a desirable career for someone in their family (28 percent v. 34 percent). The dangerous news (for democracy's sake) is that so many Americans of all ages see elective office in such poor light.

Conclusion

This research, based on a 1994 survey of Florida's legislators, has challenged conventional wisdom in a number of areas related to age and gender. Florida offers an ideal setting in which to test many age and gender theories as its age, socioeconomic, and political profiles have changed drastically over the past few decades. It has the highest percentage of persons 65 of years or older of any state in the union. Women from both political parties have been successful at capturing local and state offices, reflective of its highly competitive two-party system.

The study has found that women do not enter elective office later in life than men. The average age of entry is virtually identical. Women also do not differ from men in the rates or age at which they first run for local office before taking a stab at state legislative seat. An equally high percentage of both men and women state legislators in Florida bypassed local elective offices, choosing instead to enter elective politics at the state legislative level. Of these, sizable percentages were 50 years of age or older, refuting the notion that older women more than older

men run for local, not state, positions.

Conventional wisdom also did not prove to be correct with regard to traditional notions of the "necessary" marital or family status for women candidates. Women legislators are slightly less likely to be married or single than their male counterparts but more likely to be divorced. These results suggest that women no longer have to be married or widowed to have a good shot at getting elected.

The fact that the average age at which women are running for office is *declining* reflects the fact that women no longer have to wait until the children are grown to run for office—no doubt an outgrowth of higher incidences of working women (of all ages) and greater reliance upon child care by all households with children of school age or younger. But the results also show that if an older woman wants to run for state level positions, age is no more of a liability for her than for older men.

Women and men legislators have remarkably similar histories of being elected to legislative bodies, beginning for many as far back as their high school student council days and continuing through college student government and adulthood. Their executive histories are somewhat different. Male legislators were more likely in their youth to have been student body or class presidents whereas women were more likely to be presidents of predominantly female-student organizations or honor societies.) Nearly equal proportions of men and women legislators held elective posts as adults in nonpolitical organizations (civic, business, professional, cultural, church, service) and political party organizations prior to running for office. The latter reflects a real reversal from the conclusions of earlier studies finding women to be excluded from political party organization leadership positions. And there were few differences in the political offices held by men and women representatives prior to their election to the state legislature.

A closer look at the youngest age cohort (legislators under 40) shows that gender differences in educational levels are disappearing. More women are entering state legislatures with a law degree, a pattern long associated with male legislators.

Conventional wisdom was also tossed aside for the most part with regard to the

common notion that one's age and gender "color" his/her perceptions of age-related issues. This research found that there is a high level of agreement among men and women legislators, regardless of their age, as to what issues are closely followed by the young (economy/jobs, crime, education, taxes, moral issues, the environment) and the old (taxes, crime, health, government spending, moral issues, social services) within their districts. Male and female legislators also agree that moral, tax, and health issues provoke the most intergenerational conflicts. However, men see significant age-group conflicts over social services whereas the women legislators don't. And younger legislators are more likely to see generational tensions over the economy/jobs than their older counterparts. This is consistent with newer research showing that economic issues are the most likely to stimulate higher political participation by both the young and the old. Generational schisms are seen as very likely to increase in Florida over the next five years by nearly half of the legislators, again regardless of gender or age.

In summary, by looking at different age cohorts of Florida's legislators, we have uncovered some very promising news. Contrasts of younger men and women legislators (with each other and with their older counterparts) show that few gender differences remain with respect to holding elective offices prior to running for political office (early signs of political ambition), or in their marital or family status, or educational levels. The challenge is to sustain the progress that has been made in making a political career gender-neutral in its attractiveness. In the population as a whole, women of all ages are still more negative toward political careers than men.

Notes

¹ A questionnaire was sent to each of Florida's 40 Senators and 120 House members, along with an addressed stamped envelope. A follow-up letter, including another copy of the questionnaire, along with an addressed stamped envelope was sent at the end of January, 1994. The overall response rate was 49 percent (43 percent for the Senators; 51 percent for the House members).

² Bureau of Economic and Business Research, *Population Projections by Age, Sex, and Race for Florida and Its Counties, 1991-2010* (Gainesville, FL: BEBR, University of Florida, Population Studies, vol. 25, May 1992, Bulletin No. 101-102).

³ By 1990, the affiliations of Florida's registered voters were: Democrat (52.2 percent); Republican (40.6 percent); and independents and third parties (7.2 percent).

⁴ National Conference of State Legislatures, "Women Legislators Following the November 1992 Election," January, 1993.

⁵ Kevin Kinsella and Cynthia M. Taeuber, *An Aging World War II*. Washington, DC: Bureau of the Census, February, 1993.

⁶ Over 85 percent of women legislators 50 and older but only 33 percent of those under 40 years of age held elective posts in non-political organizations prior to getting elected to public office. The difference is statistically significant at the .04 level.

⁷ Across all age groups, women are more likely than men to have less education, lower incomes, and primary child care responsibilities.

⁸ Advocates for youth stress prevention—pay now or pay later. Advocates for the elderly emphasize reaction—fighting wrongs.

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar (1993). *The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age*. New York: Macmillan.

Beckwith, Karen (1986). *American Women and Political Participation: The Impacts of Work, Generation, and Feminism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Bledsoe, Timothy (1993). *Careers in City Politics: The Case for Urban Democracy*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Bledsoe, Timothy and Mary Herring (1990). "Victims of Circumstances: Women in Pursuit of Local Office," *American Political Science Review* 84 (March 1990): 213-223.

Boxer, Barbara (1994). *Strangers in the Senate: Politics and the New Revolution of Women in America*. Bethesda, MD: National Press Books.

Burrell, Barbara (1993). "John Bailey's Legacy: Political Parties and Women's Candidacies for Public Office," in Lois Lovelace Duke, ed., *Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp. 123-134.

Carroll, Susan J. (1985). *Women as Candidates in American Politics*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Cook, Elizabeth, Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox (1994). *The Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Darcy, R., Susan Welch, and Janet Clark (1987). *Women, Elections, and Representation*. New York: Longman.

Diamond, Irene (1977). *Sex Roles in the State House*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dodson, Debra L. and Susan J. Carroll (1991). *Reshaping the Agenda: Women in State Legislatures*. Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey.

Dodson, Debra L., ed. (1991). *Gender and Policymaking: Studies of Women in Office*. Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey.

Duke, Lois Lovelace, ed. (1993). *Women in*

Politics: Outsiders or Insiders? A Collection of Readings. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Dychtwald, Ken and Joe Flower (1990). *Age Wave.* New York: Bantam Books.

Ehrenhalt, Alan (19). *The United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office.* New York: Times Books.

Fosler, R. Scott, William Alonso, Jack A. Meyer, and Rosemary Kern. (1990). *Demographic Change and the American Future.* Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Fowler, Linda L. and Robert D. McClure (1989). *Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Greenstein, Fred I. (1965). *Children and Politics.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hess, Robert and Judith Torney (1967). *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.* Chicago: Aldine.

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall (1992). *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Jennings, Kent and Richard G. Niemi (1974). *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kathlene, Lyn, Susan E. Clarke, and Barbara A. Fox (1991). "Ways Women Politicians are Making a Difference," in Debra L. Dodson, ed., *Gender and Policymaking.* New Brunswick, NJ: Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, pp. 31-38.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. (1974). *Political Woman.* New York: Basic Books.

Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1992). *Generational Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend.* New York: The Free Press.

Laslett, Peter and James S. Fishkin, eds. (1992). *Justice Between Age Groups and Generations.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

MacManus, Susan A. (1991). "It's Never Too Late to Run—And Win! The Graying of Women in Local Politics," *National Civic Review* 80 (Summer): 294-310.

MacManus, Susan A. (1992). "How To Get More Women in Office: The Perspectives of Local Elected Officials (Mayors and City Councilors)," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 28 (September): 159-170.

MacManus, Susan A. and Charles S. Bullock III (1993). "Women and Racial/Ethnic Minorities in Mayoral and Council Positions," in *The Municipal Year Book 1993.* Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association, 1993, pp. 70-84.

MacManus, Susan A. and Charles S. Bullock III (1994). "Electing Women to Local Office," in Judith A. Garber and Robyne Turner, eds., *Gender and Urban Research.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications (forthcoming).

MacManus, Susan A. and Suzanne L. Parker (1995). *Young v. Old: Generational Gaps in Participation and Policy Preferences.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press (forthcoming).

Mandel, Ruth and Debra Dodson (1992). "Do Women Officeholders Make a Difference?" in Sara E. Rix, ed., *The American Woman.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Mezey, Susan Gluck (1994). "Increasing the Number of Women in Office: Does It Matter?" in Elizabeth Cook, Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *The Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 255-270.

Patterson, Thomas E. (1993). *Out of Order.* New York: Knopf.

Pritchard, Anita (1992). "Changes in Electoral Structure and the Success of Women Candidates: The Case of Florida," *Social Science Quarterly* 73 (March): 62-70.

Rajoppi, Joanne (1993). *Women in Office: Getting There and Staying There.* Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.

Rule, Wilma (1993). "Why Are More Women State Legislators?" in Lois Lovelace Duke, ed., *Women in Politics: Outsiders or Insiders?* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993, pp. 152-163.

Rule, Wilma and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds., *United States Electoral Systems: Their Impact on Women and Minorities.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Sabato, Larry (1991). *Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics.* New York: The Free Press.

Schlesinger, Joseph (1966). *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Siegel, Jacob S. (1993). *A Generation of Change: A Profile of America's Older Population.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Snyder, Thomas D. and Carol Sue Fromboluti (1993). *Youth Indicators 1993.* Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Government Printing Office, October.

Stanley, Jeanie R. and Diane D. Blair, "Gender Differences in Legislative Effectiveness: The Impact of the Legislative Environment," in Debra L. Dodson, ed., *Gender and Policymaking.* New Brunswick, NJ: Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, pp. 115-130.

Strauss, William and Neil Howe (1991). *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069.* New York: Quill, William Morrow.

Thomas, Sue (1994). "Women in State Legislatures: One Step at a Time," in Elizabeth Cook, Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *The Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 141-160.

Tolchin, Susan and Martin Tolchin (1976). *Clout—Womanpower and Politics.* New York: Capricorn Books.

Torres-Gil, Fernando M. (1992). *The New Aging: Politics and Change in America.* New York: Auburn House.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992a). *Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1992 to 2050.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1092, November.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992b). *Sixty-Five Plus in America.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Current Population Report, Series P-23, No. 178, August.

Welch, Susan and Sue Thomas (1991). "Do

Women in Public Office Make A Difference?" in Debra L. Dodson, ed., *Gender and Policymaking.* New Brunswick, NJ: Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute, Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey, pp. 13-19.

Werner, Emmy (1968). "Women in State Legislatures," *Western Political Quarterly* 21 (March): 40-50.

West, Darrell M. (1993). *Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns, 1952-1992.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Witt, Linda, Karen M. Paget, and Glenna Matthews (1994). *Running As A Woman: Gender and Power in American Politics.* New York: The Free Press.

The authors would like to thank each of the Florida legislators who responded to the survey, along with Bill DeGrove, state demographic expert, and Lesa Chihak and Dolores Bryant of the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1994 Urban Affairs Association annual meeting.

Susan A. MacManus is an associate professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs at the University of South Florida.

TABLE 1
MEN AND WOMEN LEGISLATORS VERY SIMILAR:
ELECTORAL HISTORIES, PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES, DISTRICT PROFILES

Legislator Characteristic	Males %	Females %	Male-Female Diff. Statistical Significance Level
ELECTORAL CHRONOLOGY			
High School (n=60)		(n=17)	
Student council	53.3	47.1	NS
President*	40.7	0	.01
Other student organization	35.1	53.3	NS
College (n=60)		(n=14)	
Student Government	33.3	28.6	NS
Senate**	43.8	75.0	NS
Student body president**	18.8	0	NS
Judiciary**	37.5	0	NS
Other	3.1	3.4	NS
Adulthood before (n=61)		(n=17)	
Pub. Official			
Nonpolitical organization	73.8	70.6	NS
Political party organization	37.1	41.2	NS
First Public Office Sought (n=60)		(n=17)	
City council	11.7	29.4	
Mayor	3.3	0	
County commission	10.0	5.9	
School board	3.3	5.9	
Fla. House of Reps.	63.3	52.9	
Other	8.1	5.9	
Age at time	38.0	37.5	NS
No. of children at home	1.3	0.9	NS
Marital status (n=61)		(n=17)	
Single	14.8	5.9	
Married	82.0	76.5	
Divorced	1.6	17.6	
Widowed	1.6	0	
First Public Office Won (n=62)		(n=17)	
City council	16.1	29.4	
Mayor	3.2	0	
County commission	4.8	5.9	
School board	3.2	5.9	
Fla. House of Reps.	64.5	52.9	
Other	8.1	5.9	
Age at time	39.3	38.0	NS
No. of children at home	1.3	0.9	NS
Marital status (n=63)		(n=17)	
Single	12.7	5.9	.05
Married	85.7	76.5	
Divorced	1.6	17.6	
Widowed	0	0	
Current Position (N=131)		(N=29)	
Senate	26.0	20.7	
Age first elected to position	43.9	39.3	NS
No. of terms in position	1.9	1.0	NS
House of Representatives	74.0	79.3	NS
Age first elected to position	41.5	39.9	NS
No. of terms in position	3.0	2.1	NS
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES			
Education (n=131)		(n=29)	
High school or less	2.3	10.3	NS
Some college	16.0	17.2	
College degree	40.5	41.4	
Graduate/prof. degree	12.2	24.1	
Law degree (J.D.)	29.0	6.9	
Government Experience (n=131)		(n=29)	
Govt. board, task force, etc.	61.1	69.0	NS
Government employee	25.9	25.0	NS
Marital Status (n=125)		(n=25)	
Single	8.0	20.0	NS
Married	90.4	78.0	
Divorced	1.6	4.0	
Widowed	0	0	
Age in 1994	47.0	47.2	NS
No. of children	2.1	1.6	NS
Net worth 1992 (\$)	461,268	161,005	NS
Political party affiliation (n=131)		(n=29)	
Democrat	53.4	72.4	.056
Republican	46.6	27.6	
DISTRICT PROFILE (N=131)			
Area		(N=29)	
Rural	29.8	13.8	NS
Urban	70.2	86.2	
Constituent Income***			
% below \$15,000	17.4	17.6	NS
% above \$75,000	9.6	11.1	NS
% Female	51.6	51.9	NS
Constituent Family Status***			
% married w/o children	34.2	32.8	NS
% married with children	22.1	19.0	.009
% nonfamily households	29.9	33.5	.008
% single females	10.5	11.4	NS
% single males	3.1	3.3	NS
Constituent Age			
% below 18	22.3	21.6	NS
% 65 and over	18.1	19.3	NS

TABLE 1, Continued

Legislator Characteristic	Males %	Females %	Male-Female Diff. Statistical Significance Level
DISTRICT PROFILE, cont.			
Minority Constituents			
% black (voting age pop.)	10.7	16.1	NS
% of Hispanic origin (VAP)	12.9	7.4	NS
% noncitizens	8.4	7.4	NS
Constituent Party Affiliation (registered voters)			
% Democrats	51.4	52.2	NS
% Republicans	40.2	39.5	NS
% Independents/third parties	8.3	8.6	NS

Notes: Statistical tests utilized were: for interval level measures (F ratio difference of means); for nominal and ordinal measures (chi square maximum likelihood ratio).

* Percent of those elected to student council.

** Percent of those elected to student government.

***Households

NS-not significant at the .05 level.

Sources: Current profile information was abstracted from John D. McKinnon, *Guidebook to Florida Legislators 1993-94* (Baltimore, MD: Legislative Guidebooks, Inc., 1993) and from Tom Fiedler and Margaret Kempf, *Almanac of Florida Politics 1994* (Miami, FL: The Miami Herald, A Division of Knight Ridder, 1993). District constituent information on income, family status, and citizenship status are from McKinnon. They do not precisely match actuals; they are based on census tracts wholly contained within each district. District constituent information on age are from the 1990 Census of the Population (provided by the Florida House of Representatives). The district type classification (urban-rural) was made by Bill DeGrove, state demographic expert. The district voting age population racial/ethnic and partisan breakdowns are from files prepared by the Florida Senate Reapportionment Committee staff. Data on electoral histories are from a survey of Florida legislators conducted January-February, 1994, by the author.

TABLE 2
YOUNGEST GENERATION'S ELECTORAL/PERSONAL HISTORIES
PRIOR TO RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE VERY SIMILAR

ELECTORAL/PERSONAL HISTORY	18-39 Yr. Old Male Legislators %	18-39 Yr. Old Female Legislators %	Differ. Statistical Significant Level
High School (n=20)		(n=6)	
Student Council	60.0	50.0	NS
President*	60.0	0	.03
Other student organizations	29.4	66.7	NS
College (n=20)		(n=6)	
Student Government	50.0	33.3	NS
Senate**	50.0	100.0	NS
Student body president**	25.0	0	NS
Judiciary**	37.5	0	NS
Other	10.0	0	NS
Young Adulthood (n=19)		(n=6)	
Nonpolitical organization	57.9	33.3	NS
Political party organization	36.8	66.7	NS
PERSONAL BACKGROUND			
Education (n=30)		(n=6)	
High school or less	2.8	0	NS
Some college	12.8	12.5	
College degree	30.8	50.0	
Graduate/prof. degree	10.3	12.5	
Law degree (J.D.)	43.6	25.0	
Marital Status When First Ran For/Won Public Office (n=20)		(n=6)	
Single	40.0	16.7	NS
Married	60.0	66.7	
Divorced	0	16.7	

Notes: *Percent of those elected to student council.

**Percent of those elected to student government.

NS-not significant at the .05 level.

Source: Mail survey of Florida legislators, conducted January-February, 1994, by Susan A. MacManus.

TABLE 3
ISSUES FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY YOUNG CONSTITUENTS (UNDER 24):
LEGISLATOR'S GENDER AND AGE DON'T AFFECT ASSESSMENTS

Issue	Legislator Gender			Legislator Age (1994)			Diff. Statist. Sig. Level
	Male (n=60) (%)	Female (n=17) (%)	Diff. Statist. Sig. Level	18-39 (n=25) (%)	40-49 (n=20) (%)	50 & Over (n=32) (%)	
Taxes	46.7	47.1	NS	52.0	55.0	37.5	NS
Govt. spending	20.0	5.9	NS	16.0	16.0	18.8	NS
Govt. growth	11.7	0	NS	16.0	10.0	3.1	NS
Economy/jobs	71.7	88.2	NS	72.0	60.0	67.5	NS
Health	33.3	11.8	NS	32.0	40.0	18.8	NS
Crime	56.7	64.7	NS	60.0	70.0	50.0	NS
Soc. services	15.0	5.9	NS	12.0	20.0	9.4	NS
Pub. assist.	10.0	5.9	NS	8.0	15.0	6.3	NS
Ele/sec. educ.	50.0	64.7	NS	56.0	45.0	56.3	NS
Higher educa.	53.3	58.8	NS	44.0	45.0	68.8	NS
Environment	43.3	58.8	NS	40.0	50.0	50.0	NS
Discrimin.	21.7	29.4	NS	26.0	25.0	18.8	NS
Race	18.3	17.6	NS	24.0	20.0	12.5	NS
Gender	13.3	17.6	NS	24.0	10.0	9.4	NS
Age	5.0	5.9	NS	8.0	5.0	3.1	NS
Sex. pref.	11.7	23.5	NS	16.0	15.0	12.5	NS
High/roads	10.0	5.9	NS	8.0	5.0	12.5	NS
Pub. transport.	8.3	0	NS	4.0	15.0	3.1	NS
Parks & rec.	23.3	35.3	NS	12.0	35.0	31.3	NS
Growth man.	13.3	5.9	NS	16.0	10.0	9.4	NS
Moral issues	43.8	58.8	NS	40.0	65.0	43.8	NS
Abortion ¹	66.7	60.0	NS	66.7	66.7	60.0	NS
Sch.	60.0	0	.05	33.3	0	40.0	NS
Prayer ²							
Gun	40.0	60.0	NS	66.7	0	60.0	NS
Contr. ¹							
Pomo. ¹	20.0	0	NS	0	0	20.0	NS
Privacy ¹	0	0	NS	0	0	20.0	NS
Other	1.7	0	NS	4.0	0	0	NS

Notes: Respondents were asked: "What issues do younger (under 24) voters in your district follow most closely? (Check all applicable.)"

¹ Percent of those identifying moral issues as a closely followed category.

Bold-faced issues are the most closely watched.

NS=not significant at the .05 level.

Source: Mail survey of Florida legislators conducted January-February, 1994 by Susan A. MacManus.

TABLE 5
GENERATIONAL CONFLICT ISSUES:
LEGISLATOR'S GENDER AND AGE AFFECT ASSESSMENTS
ON FEW ISSUES

Issue	Legislator Gender			Legislator Age (1994)			Diff. Statist. Sig. Level
	Male (n=60) (%)	Female (n=17) (%)	Diff. Statist. Sig. Level	18-39 (n=20) (%)	40-49 (n=15) (%)	50 & Over (n=26) (%)	
Taxes	35.8	31.3	NS	35.0	46.7	26.9	NS
Govt. spending	8.7	12.5	NS	5.0	12.5	11.5	NS
Govt. growth	4.3	12.5	NS	5.0	0	11.5	NS
Economy/jobs	10.9	31.3	NS	30.0	0	15.4	.018
Health	28.3	31.3	NS	20.0	25.0	38.5	NS
Crime	6.5	12.5	NS	10.0	6.3	7.7	NS
Soc. services	41.3	12.5	.04	30.0	43.8	30.8	NS
Pub. assist.	10.9	12.5	NS	5.0	12.5	15.4	NS
Ele/sec. educ.	23.9	18.8	NS	15.0	12.5	34.8	NS
Higher educa.	19.6	6.3	NS	10.0	12.5	23.1	NS
Environment	15.2	25.0	NS	15.0	12.5	23.1	NS
Discrimin.	6.5	12.5	NS	10.0	6.3	7.7	NS
Race	4.3	6.3	NS	5.0	12.5	0	NS
Gender	2.2	12.5	NS	5.0	6.3	3.8	NS
Age	4.3	6.3	NS	5.0	6.3	3.8	NS
Sex. pref.	4.3	12.5	NS	5.0	6.3	7.7	NS
High/roads	6.5	0	NS	5.0	6.3	3.8	NS
Pub. transport.	2.2	0	NS	0	6.3	0	NS
Parks & rec.	8.7	0	NS	5.0	6.3	7.7	NS
Growth man.	10.9	0	NS	10.0	12.5	3.8	NS
Moral issues	43.5	31.3	NS	40.0	50.0	34.6	NS
Abortion ¹	100.0	0	NS	0	0	100.0	NS
Sch.	66.7	0	NS	0	0	66.7	NS
Prayer ²							
Gun	66.7	0	NS	0	0	66.7	NS
Contr. ¹							
Pomo. ¹	33.3	0	NS	0	0	33.3	NS
Privacy ¹	0	0	NS	0	0	0	NS
Other	0	6.3	NS	0	6.3	0	NS

Notes: Respondents were asked: "On what issues do the views of younger and older voters in your district seem to differ the most? (Check all applicable.)"

¹ Percent of those identifying moral issues as a closely followed category.

Bold-faced issues are those on which old and young are perceived as differing the most.

NS=not significant at the .05 level.

Source: Mail survey of Florida legislators conducted January-February, 1994 by Susan A. MacManus.

TABLE 4
ISSUES FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY OLDER CONSTITUENTS (65 & OVER):
LEGISLATOR'S GENDER AND AGE DON'T AFFECT ASSESSMENTS

Issue	Legislator Gender			Legislator Age (1994)			Diff. Statist. Sig. Level
	Male (n=60) (%)	Female (n=17) (%)	Diff. Statist. Sig. Level	18-39 (n=25) (%)	40-49 (n=20) (%)	50 & Over (n=32) (%)	
Taxes	83.3	94.1	NS	88.0	95.0	96.9	NS
Gov. spending	73.3	82.4	NS	68.0	85.0	75.0	NS
Govt. growth	28.3	31.3	NS	29.2	15.0	37.5	NS
Economy/jobs	15.0	6.4	NS	12.5	20.0	9.4	NS
Health	81.7	82.4	NS	88.0	70.0	84.4	NS
Crime	91.7	94.1	NS	84.0	95.0	96.9	NS
Soc. services	56.7	70.6	NS	52.0	60.0	53.1	NS
Pub. assist.	21.7	29.4	NS	24.0	25.0	21.9	NS
Ele/sec. educa.	18.3	5.9	NS	20.0	15.0	12.5	NS
Higher educa.	6.7	5.9	NS	8.0	5.0	6.3	NS
Environment	23.3	11.8	NS	12.0	25.0	25.0	NS
Discrimin.	18.3	11.8	NS	16.0	25.0	12.5	NS
Race	11.7	0	NS	16.0	5.0	6.3	NS
Gender	6.7	0	NS	12.0	5.0	0	NS
Age	13.3	5.9	NS	12.0	15.0	9.4	NS
Sex. pref.	3.3	0	NS	4.0	0	3.1	NS
High/roads	25.0	11.8	NS	20.0	25.0	21.9	NS
Pub. transport.	35.0	41.2	NS	28.0	45.0	37.5	NS
Parks & rec.	8.3	5.9	NS	8.0	10.0	6.3	NS
Growth man.	16.7	0	NS	12.0	15.0	12.5	NS
Moral issues	65.0	58.8	NS	62.0	75.0	65.6	NS
Abortion ¹	50.0	0	NS	0	100.0	25.0	.04
Sch.	25.0	0	NS	0	0	25.0	NS
Prayer ²							
Gun	75.0	0	NS	100.0	50.0	67.5	NS
Contr. ¹							
Pomo. ¹	12.5	0	NS	0	0	12.5	NS
Privacy ¹	0	0	NS	0	0	12.5	NS
Other	1.7	0	NS	0	5.0	0	NS

Notes: Respondents were asked: "What issues do older voters (65 or older) in your district follow most closely? (Check all applicable.)"

¹ Percent of those identifying moral issues as a closely followed category.

Bold-faced issues are the most closely watched.

NS=not significant at the .05 level.

Source: Mail survey of Florida legislators conducted January-February, 1994 by Susan A. MacManus.

TABLE 6
GENERATIONAL CONFLICT TRENDS IN FLORIDA: PAST AND FUTURE
LEGISLATOR'S GENDER AND AGE DON'T AFFECT FORECASTS

State Trends	Legislator Gender			Legislator Age (1994)			Diff. Statist. Sig. Level
	Male (n=58) (%)	Female (n=14) (%)	Diff. Statist. Sig. Level	18-39 (n=24) (%)	40-49 (n=19) (%)	50 & Over (n=29) (%)	
Generational Conflicts			NS				NS
Past 5 Years							
Become less noticeable	10.3	7.1	NS	6.3	10.5	10.3	NS
Stayed about the same	58.6	50.0	NS	70.8	36.8	58.6	NS
Become more noticeable	31.0	42.9	NS	20.8	52.6	31.0	NS
Next 5 Years			NS				NS
Will become less noticeable	10.5	7.1	NS	6.7	5.3	13.8	NS
Will stay about the same	47.4	35.7	NS	47.8	31.8	51.7	NS
Will become more noticeable	42.1	57.1	NS	43.5	63.2	34.5	NS

Notes: Respondents were asked: "Over the past five years, do you think generational differences in public policy preferences in the State of Florida have: become less noticeable? stayed about the same? or become more noticeable?" They were also asked: "Over the next five years, do you expect generational differences in public policy preferences in the State of Florida will: become less noticeable? stay about the same? or become more noticeable?"

NS=not statistically significant at the .05 level (chi square, maximum likelihood ratio).

Source: Mail survey of Florida legislators conducted January-February, 1994 by Susan A. MacManus.

Local Government as Consumer: A Constituent Based Approach to Identifying Bureaucratic Training Needs

Terri Susan Fine

Abstract

This paper identifies the symbiotic dynamics of university-government relations related to university-based training institutions and the incorporation of academic analysis into the practice of local public administrations. Especially at the local bureaucratic level, this symbiosis is essential to convince public opinions and elected officers with budgetary control that local governments adhere to criteria of efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery and resources allocation under fiscal restrictions.

Introduction

What do local governments want from university-based training institutes? Both rely on the same, dwindling tax base. State legislatures will continue supporting training institutes provided that local governments are accommodated. Local governments and university-based training institutes both benefit by open communication with each other in order to cultivate a symbiotic relationship that fosters positive public perceptions. The present study explores the dynamics of the university-government relationship giving special emphasis to the local government-university training institute alliance. The motivation behind and the manner in which a university-based training institute assesses local government training needs is examined.

American universities are modeled on three general obligations: teaching, research and public service. The latter has been widely implemented through ongoing relationships between governments and universities (Dunn, Gibson and Whorton 1985) allowing knowledge advanced by academicians to be incorporated into the practice of public administration.

One way that this relationship was formalized in Florida occurred when the Florida Institute of Government (FIOG) was created in 1981. Affiliate institutes

provide training and instruction to local government employees and officials around the state within a defined service area. Program topics range from two-hour seminars on dealing with constituents to week-long courses concerning the implications of state-mandated comprehensive planning.

The FIOG guides affiliates, which are housed at public universities and community colleges, and decides which institutes receive funding each year. Affiliate institutes are not necessarily guaranteed continued support due to current statewide budgetary constraints.

One primary evaluation criteria is the quality of an affiliate's service delivery. Failing to maintain high enrollments or having high cancellation rates due to under enrollment may place an affiliate Institute of Government (IOG) at risk of elimination.

Budgetary constraints are felt at the local and state levels. When local governments view training allocations as a budget cutting opportunity, their program participation may decline. As enrollment influences IOG evaluations, local governments decreasing their training budgets reduce the likelihood that the IOG serving them will be re-funded.

IOG directors must, then, understand constituent training needs because satisfactory programming benefits users and promotes continued funding for service providers. Local bureaucrats commonly face insufficient human and financial resources (Waugh and Hy 1988; Rutter 1980). Training gives administrators the opportunity to invest in human resources thereby making financial resources, the bulk of which provide direct public services, better utilized.

Recent studies focusing on the relationship between university-based training institutes and local governments suggest that users' opinions should play a more integral role in program planning by identifying the "type of assistance that state and local units need and ... the mode of delivery that public service units would

use in providing that aid (Whorton, Gibson and Dunn 1986:46)."

Local bureaucracies respond to two pressure sources: elected officials who hold budgetary authority over them and the public that they serve. The efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery has been affected by the interaction of these three actors because of the expectations and concerns held by each.

For instance, simplification efforts prompted by Reagan's "New Federalism" initiatives were meant to decentralize government administration, increase government accountability and cut administrative costs (Waugh and Streib 1990:27). Additional stressors resulted as governments already experiencing difficulties distributing those resources available to them in a manner consistent with public expectations increased. In short, local governments were forced to do more with less.

Local government is also most beholden to the public because of its proximity to it. And, public expectations of local government services are shifting in the 1990s as it keeps a more watchful eye on how well resources are allocated and utilized. Concerns about inefficiency and waste have led to declining public trust in government's ability to spend its diminishing resources wisely and appropriately (Ostrowski, White and Cole; Lorenz and Rogers 1987). Management improvements have followed such criticism (Ladd and Yinger 1989). Public services earn more intense scrutiny than would similar private sector offerings because government's monopoly means that the availability of services and the price of those services is not consumer based (Miller and Miller 1991, Ladd and Yinger 1989; See also Green 1991).

This diverse and growing literature suggests that local governments must heed fiscal pressure from their parent governments while fulfilling changing service delivery expectations. Local governments must possess the requisite implementation skills to be effective in their administration. By operating in a

restrictive financial environment under an ever watchful public eye, they must also be able to accomplish their mission efficiently (Downes 1987:185; See also Anton 1988:151).

Data and Methods

Whorton, Gibson and Dunn's conclusions were based on a national survey of state and local elected officials, directors of university programs and city managers in 1984. Because the study was based on a national sample, it does not gauge those views held by the users of, and providers from, the same institute. Following their advice requires that university service providers elicit user views so that practitioner preferences in an institute's service delivery area can be understood. Determining program offerings based on user needs benefits both users and providers. An additional advantage is that legislators may perceive these efforts as constructive steps toward improved efficiency and effectiveness which could lead to positive finding decisions.

The present endeavor analyzes the findings of one such undertaking by an affiliate FIOG, the University of Central Florida (UCF) IOG. A survey of local government public administrators holding decision making authority over employee training in the UCF IOG service delivery area was conducted during

Summer 1991.¹ This included approximately five hundred budget officers, personnel administrators, supervisors and city planners who received an anonymous self-administered questionnaire. The response rate was thirty-three percent (N=165).

The survey focused on opinion toward UCF IOG training services. Information indicating the kinds of seminars that would garner the greatest interest and the highest enrollment were elicited by asking respondents to rate twenty seminar topics based on their interest and likelihood of participation.

Program subjects focused on efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency is the ability to utilize appropriate resources when providing public services. Effective performance is found in external relationships such as with parent governments and the mass media. An agency in good public stead can better educate those determining its scope of

authority and resource levels.

Efficiency and effectiveness are not mutually exclusive. Local governments hope to earn positive regard from higher authorities when demonstrating that they are functioning at high efficiency levels. As a result, improved efficiency may be viewed as a precursor to greater effectiveness. Legislators may perceive training efforts as constructive steps toward efficiency that ultimately lead to positive funding decisions.

Respondents were queried about such efficiency-oriented seminars as communication skills, financial management, cultural diversity, meeting management, team building, supervisory skills, senior management skills, ethics, downsizing and strategic planning. Questions about seminars facilitating

improved

effectiveness

such as media

relations, labor

relations,

customer

service,

government in

the sunshine,

affordable

housing,

economic

diversity, water/

waste-water,

transportation,

alternative

revenue sources,

and growth

management

were also

included. The

response was a

five point scale ranging from very low to very high.¹

The State University System of Florida Board of Regents has determined that Brevard, Citrus, Flagler, Lake, Levy, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Sumter and Volusia counties comprise the UCF IOG service delivery area.

Preliminary findings indicate that, while both efficiency and effectiveness are important, the former is preferred to the latter. Local authorities may believe that resource allocation patterns will not likely change in the near or far distant future. Thus, they must continue serving the public despite constrained fiscal environments.

Interest in and willingness of

participation were elicited separately. Two concerns may be demonstrated should interest levels exceed participation expectations. An administrator may deem skill levels sufficient in that particular area. Or, despite high interest, the IOG may not be considered the appropriate training resource.

Improving internal efficiency was the first program area analyzed. The data summarized in Table 1 represent the combined percentage of those responding "Very High" or "High". Meaningful differences are found between interest levels and likelihood of participation.

Population considerations may have influenced reactions. As respondents hold supervisory and administrative position, the strong emphasis on upper level management training suggests the belief

Table 1.
Interest and Likelihood of Participation in Programs that Would Improve Efficiency

	Interest % Responding High or Very High	Likelihood of Participation % Responding High or Very High
Communication Skills	46	33
Cultural Diversity	15	13
Downsizing	31	26
Ethics	40	31
Financial Management	39	31
Meeting Management	25	18
Senior Management Skills	73	66
Strategic Planning	61	50
Supervisory Skills	58	47
Team Building	49	46
Mean=	44	36

that updating such skills is essential to efficient agency administration.

Likelihood of participation was consistently lower than interest levels for each program. Many lesser supported programs elicited similar interest and participation expectation levels such as cultural diversity and downsizing, a logical finding in light of the low interest levels. By contrast, the larger differences exhibited on the more popular seminars suggest that the funds may be perceived as unavailable.

Programs focusing on effectiveness received far lower overall interest and participation expectation scores than did those promoting efficiency (See Table 2, Page 21). Respondents may prefer

Table 2.
Interest and Likelihood of Participation in Programs that Would Improve Effectiveness

	Interest % Responding High or Very High	Likelihood of Participation % Responding High or Very High
Affordable Housing	23	13
Alternative Revenue Sources	60	49
Customer Service	50	35
Economic Diversity	25	21
Government in the Sunshine	36	28
Growth Management	52	39
Labor Relations	31	26
Media Relations	30	19
Transportation	30	28
Water/Waste Water Management	36	29
Mean=	37	29

improving internal operations to cultivating public image. The greatest interest expressed among the efficiency programs was 75% for senior management skills. By contrast, alternative revenue sources elicited less than two thirds response among the effectiveness programs. As respondents are charged with policy enforcement, exploring alternative revenue sources may not be deemed as worthy as improving service delivery.

Public administrators prefer learning about the substance of policy to public relations. Growth management, water/waste water management and affordable housing all ranked among the higher interest effectiveness-oriented programs. A broadened knowledge base regarding those policies bureaucrats are compelled to implement likely improves public service. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (1975) that seeks to offset the negative implications of unplanned growth (Juergensmeyer 1988) is one example.

Taken together, internal operations are favored over external perceptions. High priority effectiveness programs are those where training would ultimately benefit service delivery.

Improving present circumstances may be preferred to anticipating future conditions. Bureaucrats express lower participation expectations for those seminars where constrained budgetary circumstances render subject implementation difficult such as cultural diversity and affordable housing. Providing these services may depend on

that adherence to budgetary guidelines while the public being served is emphasized over effective relationships with outside organizations.

Summary

The needs assessment discussed herein builds on Whorton et al.'s encouragement that more symbiotic university-government relationships develop. The data presented here is unique because previous efforts did not survey the users and providers involved in the same relationship. The broader benefit is derived from applying a theoretically grounded approach to a better understanding of the role orientations of academicians and practitioners.

Swindling state resources affect both local governments and IOGs. Failure to maintain adequate and satisfactory service levels may lead to an IOG's demise. IOGs, must, then, understand their customer base. Local governments, by improving their performance, also benefit because positive public perceptions may foster improved resource decisions. Users opinions are, the, particularly important in constrained budgetary times.

Agencies must function effectively at high degrees of efficiency in order to earn positive regard from the public and its elected officials. Confounding the demand for efficient and effective service delivery is the view that decreasing training monies helps reduce operating budgets. As training may not be perceived as a tangible public service,

improved revenue conditions that will not likely occur in Florida's immediate future.

The findings concur with prior efforts demonstrating that administrators see themselves serving two interdependent constituencies. Efficient public service requires

these funds may be reallocated to direct public service leaving training allocations more vulnerable to cutbacks than other budgetary components.

Many of the political and economic conditions being experienced in Florida are also being felt in other municipalities. Budgetary constraints, environmental issues, changing financial structures and technological advances all affect a local government's ability to serve its constituency. These concerns directly affect university service providers as satisfactory programming benefits users and promotes continued funding for service providers.

The challenges facing local government public administrators are becoming ever more complex. Their self-defined training needs exhibit a high priority for efficient public service. A recognition that local bureaucracies must respond effectively to changing legislative and financial environments is also demonstrated.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Ms. Marilyn Crotty, director of the University of Central Florida Institute of Government who provided the idea for the study and the necessary clerical support and office space that allowed the study to be implemented.

References

- Anton, Thomas J. 1988. "The Political Economy of Local Government Reform in the United States." in Bruno Dente and Francesco Kjellberg (eds.) *The Dynamics of Institutional Change Local Government Reorganization in Western Democracies Sage Modern Politics Series Volume 19.* London: Sage publications.
- Gusson, Terry and Philip Coulter (eds.). 1987. *Policy Evaluation for Local Government Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.*
- Dente, Bruno and Francesco Kjellberg (eds.). 1988. *The Dynamics of Institutional Change Local Government Reorganization in Western Democracies Sage Modern Politics Series Volume 19.* London: Sage Publications.
- Downes, Brian T. 1987. "The Effects of Fiscal Stress and Cutback Management on Local Government Performance" in Terry Busson and Philip Coulter (eds.). *Policy Evaluation for Local Government Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.*
- Dunn, Delmer, Frank K. Gibson and Joseph W. Whorton. 1985. "University Commitment to Public Service for State and Local Government." *Public Administration Review* 45(4): 503-509.

Green, Donald Philip. 1992. "The Price Elasticity of Mass Preferences" *American Political Science Review* 86(1): 128-148.

Juergensmeyer, Julian Conrad. 1988. "The Development of Regulatory Impact Fees: The Legal Issues" in Arthur C. Nelson (ed.). *Development Impact Fees* Chicago: Planners Press.

Ladd, Helen F. and John Yinger. 1989. *America's Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and the Design of Urban Policy* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lorenz, Frederick O. and David L. Rogers. 1987. "Impact of Federal Government Grants on Local Government Capacity." in Terry Busson and Philip Coulter (eds.). *Policy Evaluation for Local Government* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Miller, Thomas I. and Michelle A. Miller. 1991. "Standards of Excellence: U.S. Resident's Evaluation of Local Government Services." *Public Administration Review* 51(6): 503-514/

Nelson, Arthur C. (ed.). 1988. *Development Impact Fees* Chicago: Planners Press.

Ostrowski, John W., Louise G. White and John R. Cole. 1984. "Local Government Capacity Building: A Structured Group Process Approach." *Administration and Society* 16(1): 3-26.

Rutter, Laurence, Committee on Future Horizons of the Profession 1978-1979. 1980. "The Essential Community: Local Government in the Year 2000." *Municipal Management Series* Washington, DC: International City Managers Association.

Waugh, Jr. William C. and Ronald John Hy. 1988. "The Administrative, Fiscal, and Policymaking Capacities of County Governments." *State and Local Government Review* 20(1):28-31.

Waugh, Jr. William C. and Gregory Streib. 1990. "County Officials Perception of Local Capacity and State Responsiveness After the First Reagan Term." *Southeastern Political Review* 18(1):27-50.

Whorton, Joseph W. Jr., Frank K. Gibson and Delmer D. Dunn. 1986. "The Culture of University Public Service: A National Survey of the Perspectives of Users and Providers" *Public Administration Review* 46(1): 38-47.

Susan B. Fine is an associate professor at the University of Central Florida.

*Neo-liberal Renovación and the Politics of Fragmentation : The Case of the Spanish Socialists**

Anthony N. Celso

Abstract

Following Franco's death in 1975 the Spanish political scene has rapidly moved towards constitutional monarchy and a multiparty democratic system. Even more important has been the impact of the political disarray and ideological extremism of the Right, which allowed the Spanish Socialists (PSOE) to come to power by adapting a moderate, pragmatic image and tight centralized discipline over its party cadres. This internal politico-philosophical renovation of the PSOE allowed it to rule uninterruptedly for the last twelve years as Spain's hegemonic party and as a promoter of neo-liberal domestic policies. However, the PSOE's long tenure in government, the economic costs and ideological weakening of the Left's traditional constituency following the PSOE's neo-liberal shift to the right has created dissention and fragmentation within the ruling party which threaten its survival, while new external challenges from a resurgent and better organized Center-Right.

"They are no longer in the same family as the left."¹

In the last decade and a half the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) has established its hegemonic position on the Spanish electoral landscape. The PSOE's stunning victory in the 1982 general election, and the Socialist's subsequent triumphs in the 1986, 1989 and 1993 elections coincided with the general weakness and disarray of its competitors. The Partido Comunista Español, once considered to be the dominant force on the Spanish left and a prime candidate to govern Spanish society in the post Franco era, disintegrated in the wake of severe ideological and organizational divisions, and its successor party Izquierda Unida (IU) has not been able to establish a sizeable electoral base. On the right, the Partido Popular has been notably unsuccessful in convincing the electorate

that it had decisively severed its Franquist legacy.

he political disarray and ideological extremism of the Socialist's main adversaries contrasted strikingly with the PSOE's moderate, pragmatic image and tight centralized direction. Under the leadership of Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, the PSOE embarked on a strategy of philosophical and organizational renovation that would broaden the Socialist's electoral appeal beyond its traditional working class base, isolate its left wing, and ensconce the PSOE firmly in the electoral center of the Spanish body politic.

The socialist's organization structure in the 1970's and 1980's also played a role in securing its dominant political position. The embryonic nature of the PSOE's organizational apparatus and its relatively low ratio of party members to voters, presented ample opportunities for upward mobility and central direction within the PSOE. The leadership's allocation of patronage during the PSOE's formative growth years of the late 1970's, and the subsequent creation of a dependent party cadre would set the stage for centrism within the PSOE during the González-Guerra period. Under the PSOE's organizational rules, which Paul Heywood has characterized as introducing a form of democratic centralism, member disobedience to leadership directives can be punished with expulsion.²

The PSOE's reputation for efficient management was enhanced by its policy behavior and the technocratic, neoliberal image of successive González governments throughout the 1980's. Several cabinet ministers (Narcís Serra, Miguel Boyer and above all Carlos Solchaga) gained a reputation as "modernizers" who were more concerned with growth than redistribution. The Socialist's courting of the international business community and their commitment to and enthusiasm for the European Community's open market arrangement, underscores the PSOE's ideological mutability and pragmatic

sense. Accordingly, the government's economic policy of monetarist austerity and neoliberal industrial adjustment, and its aggressive implementation of financial market deregulation would act to strengthen, not reverse, the economic power of the domestic and foreign capitalist class.

The central direction of the PSOE's organizational structure and its neoliberal programmatic direction have been hailed as key elements in the party's political success in the 1980's. Indeed, some observers have pointed to the PSOE's successful reign as a model to be emulated by the European left.³ The PSOE's organizational centrism and neoliberal ideology reflected an underlying strategic calculation made by the leadership in the late 1970's, that the general weakening of left ideology, the constellation of power in the Spanish party system, and the need to broaden the party's electoral base to include large segments of the salaried middle class, necessitated a broad "renovation" of party practice and philosophy.

Usually discussed in terms of the left's search for a new political-economic model, "renovation" implies that the old social democracy model is no longer viable in a globalized post industrial society.⁴ The renovation debate, in large measure, turns on the utility of Keynesian reflation of the economy and propriety of the classic party-working class mobilization model: the former is viewed as being undermined by global capital movements and as excessively inflationary, while the latter is mitigated by the decline of the industrial workforce and the rise of service sector.

Since its traditional constituency and policies are viewed as antiquated, the democratic left is searching for alternative operating principles and solutions. Within a general sense, renovation may describe a shift to the right: embracing the market, utilizing incentives for private sector growth, and reorienting party organization to include the salaried middle class, or it may portend a tilt to the left,

with a concomitant emphasis on ecological issues and community power and the incorporation of new social movements (feminists, pacifists and environmentalists) within the socialist fold.

The PSOE began its renovation debate long before most social democratic parties and its process of *renovación* has proceeded quite rapidly. During the late 1980's and early 1990's, however, the renovation process seems to have stalled and backfired for the PSOE. The halcyon days of robust economic growth, and foreign investment during the mid 1980's have given way to recession, massive unemployment and increased labor militancy. Consequently, signs of fragmentation have surfaced within the party's organizational structure over the social and equity consequences of the regime's neo-liberal agenda. Factions within the party are increasingly calling for more intraparty democracy and debate within the PSOE over the political trajectory of the government's neoliberal model.

The Socialists electoral fortunes and political standing have undergone a profound transformation. Even the PSOE's victory in the June 6, 1993 general elections (in which it failed to achieve a parliamentary majority), exhibited signs of the regime's erosion. The recent surge of support for the Partido Popular (PP) and its recent parliamentary pact with the PSOE may auger a reconstruction of power within Spain's party structure.⁵

This paper is concerned with the PSOE's *renovación* campaign and its impact on the allocation of power within the Spanish party system. In particular, the study is driven by several lines of inquiry . Firstly, what was the impetus and motivation for the renovation of the PSOE ? Secondly, why did party elites choose a renovation model based on the confluence of democratic centrism and neoliberal ideology? Thirdly, what were the political and economic costs associated with rightist renovation model for the PSOE and the González government? Fourthly, how sustainable is the PSOE's brand of renovation and does the recent fragmentation within the party auger a reinforcement of neoliberal values, or does it portend a new ideological model? And, finally, what lessons can social democrats and the left

learn from the PSOE's renovation campaign?

The study addresses these questions by examining the progression of central control within the PSOE and the concomitant development of neoliberal ideology within the González government. These factors contribute substantially to the PSOE's dominance during the 1980's and its subsequent internal crisis in the 1990's. We begin our inquiry by tracing the origin of the PSOE's renovation under González and Guerra, their construction of central control over the party's organizational structure, and their attack of the party's left wing. From this vantage point, we will then move to assess the regime's neoliberal policy trajectory and the political consequences of its increasingly adversarial relationship with labor. In the final section of the paper, we explore the intersection of these two forces and their impact on the unraveling of the PSOE's organizational integrity.

The Emergence of the Gonzalez-Guerra Party Machine and the Demarxianization of Spanish Socialism

"...the party has an obligation to be a source of tranquility for society."⁶

The death of Franco in 1975 and the subsequent rapidity of the rights' democratization efforts in Spain would effect the bargaining power and positions of the anti-Franquist forces. Donald Share, for example, has labeled the transfer of power in Spain as involving a process of "transactive democratization" where remnants of the Francoist regime determined the pace, scope and institutional character of Spain's democratic opening.⁷ Under this process, the left could refuse to negotiate with the right (i.e., seek a clean break with the old order) or it could work under the rules, processes and institutions specified by Franco's successors. The speed of the democratization process and the embryonic nature of leftist political organization (both the Communists and Socialists were outlawed during the Franco period) in Spain worked in favor of cooperation. The left, having been locked out of power for practically a generation, looked at the prospect of attaining political power, even under terms and conditions dictated by the right, as

too promising of an opportunity.

Prime Minister Suárez's dismemberment of the Franquist political infrastructure and his democratization initiatives in the mid 1970's would trigger a power struggle between three contending socialist factions. During the Franco years, the Socialists experienced severe fragmentation characterized by the simultaneous development of an exiled party of Popular Front veterans based in Paris, and the formation of two clandestine factions within Spain. In the 1960's and 1970's the historic PSOE, because of its remoteness and the geriatric leadership began to wither, while the indigenous and clandestine socialist movements grew in strength and membership.⁸

The most populous of these factions, anchored in the Sevillian student protest movement, represented important elements of the Spanish new left. The group's leadership, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra, were young, charismatic and were determined not to compromise their revolutionary zeal by accepting the right's electoral institutions. Their main rivals, a Madrid based group of Christian democratic lawyers and intellectuals, rejected the anti-clericism of the left, supported a mixed economy and were eager to accept the democratization initiatives offered by the Spanish monarchy. Tierno Galvan, their leader, hoped to push the PSOE in a centrist, social democratic path.⁹

The right's democratization proposals were apprehensively received by the Spanish left: the Communists and the Sevillian Socialists initially rejected a political dialogue with Franco's successors and demanded general elections and the restoration of democracy. Their refusal to cooperate, however, became impractical over time as the proliferation of new parties on the left, who eager to accept a power sharing arrangements, threatened the Communists and Socialists with political extinction.

González and Guerra responded to Prime Minister Suárez's democratization efforts with a two pronged strategy.¹⁰ On a internal level, ideological recruitment and mobilization of the party rank and file would be furthered by deepening the PSOE's commitment to Marxian ideology. The intensification of the PSOE's leftist identify would act as a locus of support for an recruitment of new

members. The embryonic nature of the PSOE's party organization, which promised rapid upward mobility and access to jobs for the party faithful, and a strict majority voting scheme within the party's federal and regional committees helped insure that the leadership would maintain tight control. Externally, González and Guerra reversed their initial position and in 1975 entered into a political dialogue with Suárez over the future course of democratization. Within the party, a functional division of leadership roles materialized with Secretary General González acting as the party's chief spokesperson and symbol of moderation, while Vice Secretary Alfonso Guerra governed organizational matters with the firm hand and enforced ideological norms on the rank and file. The González-Guerra strategy of internal radicalization and external moderation paid substantial political dividends: ideological intensification attracted a mass following and pragmatism enhanced the PSOE's leverage in constructing the electoral arrangements that would govern the country.

The pace of internal developments and the mobilization of party activists within the PSOE would accelerate the party's leftist ideological direction. During the mid 1970's the party's leadership openly avowed neo-Marxist themes, which would depart sharply from the social democratic ethos of previous PSOE leaders. The intensification of leftist orthodoxy was most visibly demonstrated in the PSOE's 1976 Conference in which they pledged a decisive break with the market economy by nationalizing 100 of Spain's leading companies and 50 of its largest banks.¹¹ In the area of foreign policy, the PSOE expressed solidarity with the third world, sharply criticized the injustice of multinational capital and sought Spain's removal from NATO. Finally, the PSOE sought numerous labor support measures including a commitment to full employment, the imposition of worker self-management and the expansion of the welfare state.

The General Election of 1977 established the dominance of both Suárez's Union of the Democratic Center and González's PSOE on the post-Franco political landscape. The PSOE's main leftist rivals fared badly: the Communists received only 9 percent of the popular vote, while Tierno Galvan's Socialist

Federation Party share of 4 percent of the vote confined his party to the political wilderness that would later be confirmed by his organizations incorporation within the PSOE.¹² The election's outcome intensified UCD-PSOE cooperation and allowed González to play a pivotal role in creating and shaping Spain's constitution. With its strong electoral performance (28 percent of the popular vote) and pioneering efforts in securing the democratization process, the PSOE had established its dominant status on the left. González hoped to position the PSOE as the governing party in the 1979 General Elections. Given the Socialists' high expectations, their performance in the March 1, 1979 election was a severe disappointment.

The election consolidated Suárez's hold on the electorate and resulted in only marginal improvements in the PSOE's electoral standing (1.2 percent increase in the popular vote and a three seat gain in the lower house).¹³ The PSOE's poor performance fostered a debate in the party over its future programmatic and ideological course. González and Guerra viewed the PSOE's lackluster showing as evidence that a more centrist image was needed.¹⁴ The contradictions between the PSOE's conciliatory gestures toward the center (i.e., its cooperation with Suárez) and its leftist ideological orientation was becoming quite clear to the electorate. During the 1979 campaign, Suárez had adroitly pointed out the inconsistencies in the Socialists moderate campaign image and the PSOE's programmatic radicalism.

The Socialist's maximalist ideological discourse, so successful in mobilizing the party rank and file, had become a serious campaign liability. Sensing the need for an abrupt u-turn, González recommended that all references to Marxism be deleted from the PSOE platform at the May, 1979 Twenty Eighth Congress. The leadership's position on Socialist ideological re-characterization encountered severe opposition from the party's left. González's leftist opponents (the so called *críticos*, or critics) insisted on a Marxian identity for the PSOE, pressed for proportional representation in the González dominated regional and national party organizations and demanded an electoral pact with the Communists.

The Congress gave González key victories on the alliance and intra party democracy issues, but strongly rebuked

his ideological agenda. Given the *críticos'* victory on the ideology issue, González resigned as the PSOE's General Secretary. González's sudden departure as party leader opened a political void that the leftist critics could not fill. The inability of the left to nominate and secure passage of an alternative party leadership resulted in a suspension of the Twenty Eighth Congress and a convocation of an Extraordinary Congress in September, 1979, which would be convened under a strict majority delegate selection scheme that insured a González-Guerra majority.

The political isolation of the *críticos* increased as the party's membership clamored for González's return as the PSOE leader. González dominated the Extraordinary Congress and used his influence under the delegate selection rules approved by the Twenty Eighth Party Congress to give his forces a majority in the PSOE's regional and federal executive committees. Within the PSOE's party apparatus, internal discipline was intensified with disloyal members facing the penalty of expulsion. The Extraordinary Congress was a personal triumph for the González-Guerra faction and a validation of their arguments for more ideological moderation and central control of the party.¹⁵ Accordingly, all references to class struggle, mass nationalization, worker self-management and the PSOE's Marxian roots were eliminated from the party's 1978 platform.

The extension of central controls over the party and the redirection of its ideological message encountered little opposition. Most party members, dependent on the leadership for resources and positions, found that their ascension through the party's ranks could be facilitated by complete fidelity.

James Petras, for example, has noted that a majority of party activists joined the PSOE for career advancement opportunities and as a consequence this disproportionately young, professional salaried class exhibited a high degree of ideological mutability.¹¹ Thus, access to money, prestige, positions, and above all electoral success became the operative principles and goals of many PSOE members.

Not all members, however, freely agreed to the de-ideologization of the PSOE. In 1981 the party's left wing formed the Izquierda Socialista (Left

Socialists) as a protest faction and study group to contest the abandonment of ideological norms and to protest the leadership's relentless pursuit of electoral success. Modeled along the lines of the CERES faction in the French Socialist Party, Izquierda Socialista has sought to push the PSOE back into a more socially conscious programmatic agenda.¹⁷

Despite this faction's energetic appeals, the PSOE's political trajectory of centrist politics and electoral opportunism would proceed unhampered for over a decade.

The de-Marxianization of the PSOE was used by the party's leadership to expand its potential electorate and to cultivate a pragmatic image. Indeed, the Extraordinary Congress set the stage for more moderation at subsequent party conferences. The Twenty Ninth Congress, convened in October 1981, ensconced the PSOE as a mildly social democratic party whose platform called for limited social investments, the creation of 800,000 jobs over four years, better provision of social services, and labor reform.¹⁸ Though light years from the party's earlier pledge of "*la ruptura*", rupturing Spain from its capitalist economic base, the Socialists decisively rejected austerity and sought some state intervention to ameliorate social ills.

The Socialists' centrist policy drift was furthered by the squabbling and eventual disintegration of Suarez's governing centrist coalition. The factionalism between the UCD's social democratic and christian democratic partners contrasted sharply with Socialist unity. The Socialists' capitalized on UCD discord by reassuring voters that a Socialist victory would not threaten the Church, the military or private enterprise and that the PSOE needed to carry out a bourgeois revolution, before enacting redistributive measures. Despite the PSOE's campaign message of "*El Cambio*" implying substantial change, Gonzalez minimalized socialist ideals, and growth and continuity would be the main party priorities.¹⁹ The political fragmentation of the center and the inability of the Communists to establish a solid electoral presence allowed the PSOE to move to the right and transcend the limitations of its traditional working class constituency. The precarious position of the Spanish economy, moreover, would rule out a major socialist reconstruction effort and

would lay the groundwork for the second phase of the PSOE's renovation (i.e., the movement to and the implementation of an aggressive neoliberal policy agenda).

Socialist Economic Policy Renovation: Neoliberal Industrial Reconstruction and the Great U-Turn

"...in order to form tortillas, you have to break a few eggs."²⁰

With 48 percent of the popular vote and a commanding legislative majority in the Cortes, the Socialists were well positioned to implement their program. The PSOE's 1981 party conference had pledged to use the public sector as a locomotive for growth and the Socialist's had promised the creation of 800,000 jobs in its first four years in power. In the 1982 campaign González had consistently rejected the austerity policies of the right and pledged to reflate the economy and produce more sustainable and equitable growth pattern in the Spanish economy. The constellation of political forces, it would seem, would force the socialists to act on their agenda.

The Socialist's pro-employment creation policy had been consistently supported by its sister organization in the labor movement, the General Workers Union (UGT).²¹ In the post Franco era the UGT and the PSOE had developed a symbiotic relationship; the trade union mobilized workers on behalf of the Socialists and the party articulated and represented labor's policy and political aspirations. The political alliance between the union and the party was furthered by a tight organizational connection in that members PSOE party hierarchy were required to join the union. With the Socialists 1982 electoral victory, the UGT sought to establish a party-union axis for corporatist mediation of economic policy that would trade wage moderation for state reflation of the economy.

Economic forces, however, would work against the implementation of the Socialists campaign promises. The policy freedom allowed by the PSOE's margin of victory and its close organizational ties to the trade union movement, would be constrained by the magnitude of Spain's economic problems. During the 1970's Spain experience numerous structural adjustment problems; its industry, long

protected by trade restrictions and state subsidies, performed badly on international markets. Upon taking office, the Socialists inherited a high unemployment rate and a huge trade deficit. The failure of Spanish industry to compete in the international market and the resulting expansion of production subsidies and unemployment assistance had a ruinous effect on the central government's finances. By 1982 Spain's public sector deficit and the magnitude of its debt limited the government's options in stimulating the economy.

The center right government's decision in 1979 to enter Spain into the European Community by 1986 added considerable pressure on the incoming Socialist administration to remove protectionist barriers and capital controls and expedite the influx of foreign investment. With greater international exposure, Spanish industry needed to be made more competitive. The severity of the economic challenges facing the new government, accordingly, required a strong response.

With the precedence of economic factors, power and prestige began to flow to the free market technocrats in González's cabinet. For some observers, the González period represents the flowering of technocratic government in Spain.²² Many of the top positions within the PSOE first government were filled by highly educated professionals that had ties to Spain's banking and business communities. This technocratic element viewed the redistributive and employment creation emphasis of the Socialists campaign promises as impairing the economic reform process.

Industry minister Carlos Solchaga, for example, took the lead in urging Gonzalez to abandon his 1981 pledge to create 800,000 jobs, while Economy Minister Miguel Boyer established the taming of inflation as the new government's number one priority, for these neoliberals, growth, marketization and technological rebirth should become standard terms in the PSOE's ideological lexicon.²³

Solchaga and Boyer defined Spain's economic problems from an explicitly free market, monetarist perspective. From this vantage point, excessive wage costs, "inflexible" labor markets, and antiquated, often state owned, companies stood in the way of the modernization of the Spanish economy. The neoliberals, having deemed social democratic ideology as

counterproductive, declared themselves in favor of new political-economic trajectory (variously called *renovación* and *refundación*) for the PSOE, that perhaps could set the stage for a consolidation of the Socialist's catch all electoral constituency.²⁴

The dominance of the neoliberal *renovadores* over economic policy formulation was exacerbated by the hierarchical nature of the leadership's control within the PSOE's national and regional party organs. In the formative years of the González administration, the cabinet was effectively shielded from party controls. Once the progression of neoliberal policy began, fidelity to the government's agenda (irrespective of ideological congruence) was expected. If opposition did erupt, the leadership could use its substantial patronage powers and, if necessary, threats of expulsion to induce support within the party parliamentary group and the national and regional organs. Thus, party centralism acted to support the Government's neoliberal emphasis.

The move away from Socialists 1981 electoral platform would be marked by the González administration's November 1983 White Paper on Reindustrialization.²⁵ Under the provisions of this policy, the government committed itself to a process of industrial regeneration that would involve substantial wage cuts and employment reductions in strategic industries. The workforce reductions and wage cuts planned for heavy industry by the governments neoliberal planners would be offset by the creation of reindustrialization zones (located in depressed areas) that would target tax incentives, loans and subsidies to attract both foreign and domestic investment. Both the "zones for urgent reindustrialization" and phased workforce reductions programs sought to shift firm resources away from wage costs to investments in research and technological development. The neoliberals envisioned such a shift as auguring the technological renewal of Spanish industry and maximizing its competitive potential in the European market.

The success of these policies, however, was dependent upon securing labor cooperation in the industrial reconversion effort.

Union refusal to hold the line on wages

or active resistance and strike activity against planned workforce reduction could have scuttled the new governments policy model. And given the close working relationship between the PSOE and the unions, social disruptions caused by worker militancy could have damaging electoral repercussions. Having taken the political risk of a policy u-turn, the Socialists sought to assuage labor's fears through active consultation and mediation of industrial policy.

The government's July 1984 Law on Industrial Reconversion established a consultive framework for negotiation over and implementation of plant closing and employment reductions. With remarkable condor, the 1984 law identifies eleven industrial sectors in which overmanning and excess capacity have limited productivity, and in many cases, have required the government to finance losses in public sector companies. The law originally envisioned the elimination of 63,000 jobs (about 25 percent of total employment in the affected firms) over a 3-8 year period that varies from sector to sector with 90 percent of adjustment layoffs coming from steel, shipbuilding, textiles and home appliance industries.²⁶ Under the policy, layoffs are negotiated between the state, the unions and management, and regional authorities (Commissions of Control) are established to monitor the sector by sector reconversion process.

With the comprehensive nature of the government's industrial reconversion policy and its disparate impact on labor, why would the unions cooperate with this policy? In large measure, unions had little choice. The severity of the economic crisis effecting Spain and the prospect of EC integration in 1986 would force eventual layoffs. From labor's perspective, the government's offer of consultative workforce reductions could better position the unions to manage the process of industrial change through negotiated early retirements.²⁷ Moreover, the government's policy of generous compensation for affected laborers (redundancy payments and retraining services), its promises of employment creation through its zones for urgent reindustrialization policy, and its offer of expanding workplace democracy in state firms were viewed credible enough by the major unions to coax participation.

The government's relationship with the

socialist General Workers Union (UGT) and the communist Workers Commissions (CC OO) would, however, experience severe strain as the process of industrial reconversion began to unfold. Within two years of the 1984 laws's implementation, the number of targeted job layoffs would rise to 83,000 jobs. The government's emphasis on fiscal-monetary austerity and inflation fighting, a direct bid to encourage foreign investment, pushed unemployment well past the twenty percent mark in the mid 1980's. The government's much heralded zones for reindustrialization program resulted in too few permanent jobs and accelerated the expansion of fixed contract, temporary work. Faced with mounting unemployment and the Government's rigid wage control policy, the unions began to balk.²⁸

Conflict between the unions and the government began to surface in a public feud between UGT leader Nicholas Rodondo (until 1986 a PSOE legislative deputy) and Economy Minister Carlos Solchaga. Rodondo, who began to question the government's strategy as early as 1985, sharply criticized Solchaga's dominance in González's cabinet. From Rodondo's perspective, Solchaga's defense of the monetarist orthodoxy and his frequent exhortations for labor to capitulate on wage and employment issues, personified the government's hostile attitude toward the unions. Despite threats of expulsion from the PSOE, Rodondo sought to rally support within the party to reign in the power of the neoliberal technocrats.

Rodondo's efforts to force a shift in government priorities floundered badly. The PSOE's left wing, badly marginalized by González and Guerra in the late 1970's, offered ineffective resistance and the mechanics of central control by party leadership proved an insurmountable obstacle. Frustrated by the level of opposition within the PSOE and the paucity of intraparty debate, Rodondo resigned his legislative seat.

Signs of erosion between the PSOE and the unions (particularly the socialist UGT) would increase after Rodondo's departure. The polarizing effects of the government's neoliberal policies (greater social inequality and mass unemployment), and a number of corruption scandals with the PSOE had weakened the position of González and

his team of pro market technocrats. By 1988 the government's failure to address key labor issues (better financing of pensions and more effective retraining programs) would create the absurdist spectacle of left unions engaged in a general strike against a Socialist government, who in a Fellinisque turn, would be supported by the employer's federation.²⁹

Though the strike failed to achieve its immediate policy objectives, it did succeed in stimulating intraparty debate.

The general strike's political consequences (it received massive support from the Spanish public) played a role in accelerating debate over the ideological and organizational trajectory of the PSOE's neoliberal model: for the right and the free market technocrats, the conflict underscored the need to move away from the party's union constituency and embrace more market reforms in order to attract the middle class; for the party's social democratic center, the strike symbolized the alienating effects of the government's regressive policies and, above all, the insular and imperial nature of the government's decision-making.

The factionalism stimulated by the government's conflict with the unions would widen appreciably throughout the end of the decade and into the 1990's. The political position of the neoliberals in the party, once thought preeminent, began to be contested. Richard Gillispie argues that the Socialist's efforts in 1990 to draft an ideological manifesto (Programa 2000) was inspired as a mechanism to challenge neoliberal hegemony.³⁰ The backers of this effort, most particularly Vice Secretary General Alfonso Guerra, sought to create a context that would bind future Socialist administrations to established party doctrine. Since Programa 2000 envisions that continued relevance of the working class within the PSOE and aspires to solve the labor crisis in a more humane and egalitarian fashion, Gillespie interprets this effort as an assault on the autonomy of the neoliberals to develop policy.

Fragmentation and the Guerrista Challenge: Whither Neoliberal Hegemony?

"I think he (Vice President Narcís Serra) has the habit of playing the piano, and does not understand what is occurring

in the streets."³¹

The role of Alfonso Guerra in fostering divisions within the PSOE would figure prominently in party politics in the 1990's.³² Though considered as the Socialist's second leading figure in the post Franco period, Guerra's position in the party has, in many ways, been more important than González's. Guerra's dual role as Vice Secretary General of the party and Vice President of the government gave him an important link between the two organizations, and allowed him the leverage to control the flow of patronage in the PSOE. Having built up sources of leverage and control within the Socialist ranks, he has many contacts and supporters within the party.

While Guerra was in the government, he sought to assuage party leaders on the federal and regional executive committees, who were angered by the abrasive tone of the government's neoliberal ministers. The 1988 conflict with labor and the social costs of the government's economic policy created great dissatisfaction within the PSOE's ranks. Many of the party's regional barons became critical about the social consequences of the government's neoliberal strategy, a concern that would be underscored by the PSOE's slim margin of victory in the 1989 election. Guerra's role as peacemaker during this period necessitated that he urge the government to take a softer line in its reconstruction of Spanish labor markets. With Guerra's advocacy of Programa 2000 and his brokering between the government and PSOE regional leaders, the government's neoliberal ministers viewed him as a disruptive presence.

Alfonso Guerra's fire fighting capabilities and standing within the government was weakened by his brother's (a local party official) involvement in a real estate scandal involving illegal use of party funds. Given the rash of corruption allegations being leveled against the PSOE, the government felt that Guerra could become an electoral liability. The neoliberals in González's cabinet, sensing an opportunity to isolate the PSOE's leading social democratic figure, urged that González force Guerra from his position. González's growing dependence upon the neoliberals and his unwillingness to support Guerra during

this period, forced Guerra's 1991 resignation from his government post.

With Guerra's departure, central control of the party's apparatus began to unravel, setting the stage for a series of battles between the neoliberal *renovadores* and the social democratic *guerristas* in the last three years.³³ The battleground between these contending forces has been fought throughout the regional and national organs of the PSOE's party structure. The *renovadores*, worried about Guerra's retention of the PSOE's Vice Secretary General post and his continued influence in the party, have sought to counter his forces in the PSOE's executive and federal committees.

González and his neoliberal supporters have used their leverage with these organs to insure support for the government's social and economic policies.³⁴ In his dealings with the federal executive committee González would seek its approval of numerous measures including labor market deregulation, European integration and unemployment insurance restrictions, by packaging even minimal opposition as auguring a major crisis. Despite their ties to Guerra, very few members on the national committee had enough will to oppose the leadership on key policy questions, for entrenched norms of party fidelity and discipline were difficult to break.

Loyalty to the central government, however, is weaker in the Socialist's regional organizations. Since the party's reorganization in the mid 1970's, the Socialist's local affiliates are organized around the provincial, with each regional unit having its own executive committee, and each playing a role in selecting delegates to the national party congresses. Sensing a high degree of vulnerability, Alfonso Guerra would move to weaken neoliberal control over local party organizations by securing alliances with the regional party barons.⁽³⁰⁾

The most famous of these alliances (the Las Navas group) involves a confederation of regional party barons that seeks to facilitate intraparty debate over the PSOE's centralist tendencies and the inequities of the government's policies. With the PSOE's Thirty Third Party Congress scheduled for Spring 1994, Guerra hopes to use his support in regional delegations to influence national party policy and doctrine.

The government's policy of

convergence with Europe has become the neoliberals standard justification for their every action. González, whose EC presidential aspirations are well known, used the integration issue as a key administration theme. Within this context, González and his coterie of free market advisors have interpreted criticism of government policy as insuring Spain's economic backwardness and isolation.

The tremors created within the PSOE by the 1988 general strike erupted into a political earthquake with the government's aggressive campaign against the workers in the 1990's. Guerra's posturing on behalf of labor and his network of alliances with regional party barons began to erode the once solid grip of the neoliberals over the party's apparatus. Despite their minority presence in the PSOE's federal committee structure, the guerristas became increasingly critical of the government's EC integrationist policies.

The PSOE's balkanization into competing camps and the quarreling between the renovadores and the guerristas was temporarily suspended by the need to close party ranks in the June 6, 1993 general election. The facade of unity presented by the PSOE's coalescence of forces succeeded in securing the Socialist's fourth straight electoral victory, yet the triumph failed to stem the party's steady electoral slide. The June election resulted in the government's worst electoral showing (it secured only 38 percent of the vote) and its failure to achieve a parliamentary majority in the Cortes.³⁶ The lack of a decisive showing in the election and the tenuous nature of the Socialists legislative coalition with the Catalan and Vascan nationalists prompted further divisions within the PSOE's ranks.

The *renovadores* have countered party centrifugalism by employing a two front offensive against the guerristas.³⁷ The first stage in the rightist attack involved González's securing of ex economy minister Carlos Solchaga as the Socialist's parliamentary leader. As a key figure within the renovador faction and virtual anti Christ for the PSOE left, Solchaga's new responsibilities underscores the government's commitment to preserve its neoliberal program and its resistance to any u-turn in policy.

The second, and more significant, sequence of neoliberal attack concerns the

process of delegate selection to the Party's March 18-20, 1994 Thirty Third Congress. According to party rules, delegates at the PSOE's party congresses are chosen at the regional congresses. The alignment of political forces at the regional meetings, thus, will play a decisive role in determining the composition. Guerra's efforts to secure regional alliances (i.e., his attack from below strategy) has been bitterly contested by the *renovadores* through their calls for party unity, González's frequent diatribes against "tribalism" and, above all, through the rightist's use of state patronage to bolster local supporters.

The PSOE's Thirty-Third Congress: Archimedean Point for a New Political-Economic Model or Pathway to Annihilation?

"The party has to break its tendency toward tribalism."³⁸

In January 1994 delegates to the Socialist's Thirty Third Congress were selected by the PSOE regional congresses. The delegate selection process revealed profound schisms in the party which is likely to produce a highly divided congress. The *renovadores* were able to muster around sixty percent of the delegates with the remainder controlled by the guerristas and the remnants of the *Izquierda Socialista* faction.³⁹ While the González loyalists are assured continued control of the party, they were not able to resolve the intraparty democracy and ideology issues that divide the Socialists without a damaging fight.

The Congress was viewed by major PSOE leaders as the most significant in the PSOE's post Franco history and a possible watershed in the Spanish Socialists ability to refound the party's ideology and organizational integrity. The intraparty democracy issues, including the *renovadores* suggestion of reconstituting the PSOE's federal committee structure to reduce the influence of regional party federations, that the Congress debated did not lend themselves to easy compromise.

The uncertain political status of Felipe González, who has equivocated on his willingness to serve as the PSOE's standard barrier, adds a further dramatic element to the Congress' deliberations. Many of the key figures in González's

government from Vice President Narcís Serra to PSOE parliamentary leader Carlos Solchaga have been positioning themselves to control the mantle of power in the postfilipista period. The neoliberals prominence in the PSOE's hierarchy and the often arrogant tone of their ideological discourse, is itself an incendiary issue that could force the bolting of the PSOE's *guerrista* and left factions.

Given the excitement surrounding the PSOE's Thirty Third Congress, the results of the meeting were somewhat anti-climatic. Most of the Congress would be dominated by organizational and procedural issues. The composition of the PSOE's federal executive committee, in particular, captured most of the delegates attention. In this regard, the guerristas were successful in retaining Alfonso Guerra as the party's Vice Secretary General and continuing Jose Maria Benegas as the PSOE's organizational secretary, though the representation of overall leftist elements within the executive committee would be reduced.

Gonzalez and the renovador section of the party were less accommodating on the electoral alliance and policy issues. Faced with the demands of leftist elements for the PSOE to renounce its informal parliamentary alliance with the Catalan nationalists and to construct an alliance with the ex-communist United Left (IU) party, the renovadores effectively resisted in any change in established government policy. The rightist forces, bolstered by a sixty percent majority delegation at the conference, upheld the administrations neo-liberal economic policy, making only minor concessions to pro-labor and leftist currents within the PSOE.

While augmenting their presence in the upper tier of the PSOE's party hierarchy, the guerristas failed to alter the government's neoliberal policy and political trajectory. Guerra and Benegas' placement in important party positions, moreover, is likely to aggravate conflict within the government. Should the neoliberals in the government fail to placate dissenting factions, it is likely that the PSOE will fail to maintain its organizational and political integrity. With the emergence of a broad informal political alliance between Anguita's IU party, the guerristas and the major trade unions, progressive forces within the PSOE have an alternative, and increasingly, attractive outlet. The IU's

possible incorporation of these factions could signal a substantial demise of the Socialist's electoral base and a possible rebirth of the Spanish left. Under these conditions, the Socialists of the 1990's could go the way of Suarez's 1980's UCD coalition.

The González administrations continued slide in public opinion polls and the poor showing in the June 1994 EC elections have caused the Catalans to reconsider their support for the regime. As of November 1994 the Prime Minister's standing with the Spanish public has reached an all time low. The Spanish socialists *refundación* campaign in the last two decades casts severe doubt on the ability of left parties to secure their political survival through the adoption of a neoliberal policy and ideological model. Even if one concedes that such policies are inevitable in an era of international constraints, the political trajectory of a neoliberal course for a left party is unsustainable. The social inequities created by such a strategy (close to a third of Spanish families live in poverty) and the turbulent nature of government-union relations under such a model create very damaging political repercussions.

The succession of general strikes waged by the unions against Gonzalez's regime have weakened the PSOE's legitimacy. The January 1994 labor protests against González's labor market deregulation policies comes amidst public opinion polls showing the Socialists eclipsed for the first time by the rightist Partido Popular.⁴⁰ Under circumstances of declining public support, rising social inequality, and economic crisis, the neoliberals calls for "entrepreneurial dynamism", "industrial modernization" and labor market "flexibility" have, at best, a hollow ring

The failure of the Socialists to rally public support for their European market initiatives and to quell dissident factions within the party has been exacerbated by the centralist tendencies and elite organization necessary to sustain a neoliberal programmatic course. Governments run by technocrats tend to be isolated and remote, and the economic "rationality" they propose frequently transgresses social and political norms. Thus, the concentration of elite wealth created by the Socialist's technocratic, market oriented policies has been accompanied by the squandering of public

wealth, social opportunism and corruption.

The violation of the public trust has been particularly acute in the Spanish socialists case. With its low number of organizational positions to rank and file members, many PSOE officials envisioned the party as a career ladder and as a catalyst for upward social mobility and personal enrichment. On this level, the yuppification of the PSOE ranks has been linked to personal use of party and state funds that have tainted its public image, and fostered a pervasive sense of cynicism about the "entrepreneurial" nature of Socialist party politics.⁴¹

The ideological and organizational dilemmas faced by the Spanish socialists at their Thirty Third Congress mirrors and echoes the quandaries faced by the democratic left elsewhere: frustrated by international market power when pursuing redistributive policies and constrained by political pressures when implementing neoliberal policies, social democratic parties and governments are entering an era where options are becoming increasingly more limited and precarious. How than will the PSOE resolve its organizational and ideological conundrums expressed at their Thirty Third Congress? The most likely response would be some continued compromise between the *renovadores* and the *guerristas* that allows for some alteration of policy (i.e., neoliberalism with a human face) and assures dissidents greater outlets and capabilities to influence policy.

Such a compromise, however, is likely to be transitory. In eleven years of PSOE rule the party has become battered and politically exhausted, and debilitatingly encased in an organizational forum of intense factional conflicts. The work of formulating a new ideological message and organizational model (a second phase in the *refundación* process) is likely to wait until the PSOE is an opposition party. Without the strain of governance, parties often find regenerative capabilities and, perhaps, the socialist's will find a reformation formula that does not have the centralist and inegalitarian tendencies of its neoliberal predecessor.

Notes

¹ Quote from Julio Anguita (Secretary General of United Left Party) reported by *El País* June 6, 1994. In his commentary on the PSOE, Anguita argues that they have eliminated most

traces of socialism in the policies and that they have become a party of the right.

² See Paul Heywood, "Mirror-images: The PCE and PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in Spain" *West European Politics* Volume 10, (April 1987). Number 2. p. 193-210.

³ See Donald Share's, *The Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The PSOE in the 1980's* (Greenwood Press, 1989)

⁴ See Richard Gillespie's " Programa 200: The Appearance and Reality of Socialist Renewal in Spain", *West European Politics*, Volume 16, (January 1993) Number 1, 78-96.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Felipe González quoted in an interview with Fernando Claudín *Zona Abierta* 20 (May-August 1979):8

⁷ See Donald Share's, " Dilemmas of Social Democracy in the 1980's: The PSOE in Comparative Perspective" in *Comparative Political Studies* Volume 21, Number 3 (October 1988) p. 408-435.

⁸ Felipe González quoted in an interview with Fernando Claudín *Zona Abierta* 20 (May-August 1979):8

⁹ See Donald Share's, "Dilemmas of Social Democracy in the 1980's: The PSOE in Comparative Perspective" in *Comparative Political Studies* Volume 21, Number 3 (October 1988) p. 408-435.

¹⁰ See Donald Share, *Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The PSOE in the 1980's* (Greenwood Press 1989)

¹¹ See Paul Heywoods, "Mirror Images: The PCE and the PSOE in the Transition to Democracy" *West European Politics* Volume 10, (April 1987). Number 2. P. 193-210.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ For coverage of the PSOE's dominance 1986 general election, see Robert Robinson's article "From Change to Continuity: The 1986 Spanish Election" in *Western European Politics* Volume 10 (January 1987) Number 1 p. 120-124.

¹⁴ See Donald Share, *Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The PSOE in the 1980's* (Greenwood Press, 1989)

¹⁵ See ABC, January 17, 1994.

¹⁶ The role of patronage and cronyism within the PSOE is given excellent treatment in James Petras' "Spanish Socialism: the Politics of Neoliberalism" in *Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe* edited by James Kurth and James Petras. (Berg Publishers 1993) p.95-127.

¹⁷ Richard Gillespie, *The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism* (Oxford Press, 1989)

¹⁸ Donald Share, *Dilemmas of Social Democracy* (Greenwood Press, 1989).

¹⁹ See Paul Heywood, "Mirror Images: The PCE and the PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in Spain" *West European Politics* Volume 10, (April 1987). Number 2, p. 193-210.

²⁰ Carlos Solchaga quoted in an interview with Juan Ibañez in *El País*, September 19, 1993. p. 16. In the interview Solchaga speaks of the necessary difficulties and hardships required as Spain goes through the process of industrial

reconstruction.


21. For a very good account of the conflict between the unions and the PSOE see Richard Gillespie's article "The Break-up of the Socialist Family: Party-Union Relations in Spain, 1982-1989" in *West European Politics* January 1990, p.48-62. The PSOE-UGT rift has been personalized in a series of heated and comic exchanges between Rodondo and Solchaga over a variety of economic issues.
22. See Anthony Ferner *Governments, Managers and Industrial Relations: Public Enterprises and their Environments* (Basil Blackwell, 1988).
23. See Richard Gillespie's "Programa 2000: The Appearance and Reality of Socialist Renewal in Spain", *West European Politics* Volume 16 (January 1993) Number 1, 78-96.
24. See PSOE parliamentary leader Carlos Solchaga's interview with *El País* September 19, 1993 in which he describes the *renovación* campaign.
25. OECD Economic Survey's: Spain, (May 1984) p. 32.
26. For a detailed breakdown of the 1984 Law's targeted employment reductions, see the OECD Economic Survey: Spain 1988.
27. See Anthony Ferner account of initial union cooperation in the industrial policy process in his book *Governments, Managers and Industrial Relations: Public Enterprises and their Political Environments* (Basil Blackwell, 1988)
28. Richard Gillespie, "The Break-Up of the Socialist Family: Party-Union Relations in Spain", *West European Politics* January 1990, p. 48-62.
29. See Miguel Martinez Lucio, "Employer Identity and the Politics of the Labor Market in Spain" in *West European Politics* Volume 14 January 1991, Number 1, p. 41-57. The Confederation of Spanish Business Organizations (CEOE) supported the governments stand against the unions in the 1988 general strike and it has pressed the government for more labor market deregulation.
30. Richard Gillespie, "Programa 2000: The Appearance and Reality of Socialist Renewal in Spain", *West European Politics* Volume 16 January 1993 Number 178-96.
31. UGT leader Nicolás Rodondo quoted in *El País* April 18, 1993. A long time critic of the neo-liberals in González's government Rodondo complained about Vice President Narcís Serra's indifference and ignorance of labor issues.
32. For a good account of the PSOE's divisions (La Fractura) see ABC August 8, 1993 and its breakdown of the position of the *renovadores*, the *guerristas* and the left groups within the party.
33. Ibid.
34. González has used his leverage within the PSOE executive committee to assure party support for the government's 1992 labor market deregulation initiatives and to its fiscal-monetary EC convergence policies. See *El País*' June 21, 1992 coverage of the PSOE's federal executive committee's deliberation of these issues.
35. Guerra's strategy of organizing regional support is covered in the August 8, 1993 edition of

ABC.

36. The 1993 general election confirmed the PSOE continued erosion in public support from 48 percent in the 1982 election to 38 percent in 1993. See *El País* June 6, 1993 report on the election.
37. See *El País* September 12, 1993 edition that outlines the *renovadores* strategy. p. 18.
38. Felipe González quoted in *El País* July 18, 1993. p. 1.
39. See ABC January 17, 1994 p. 12.
40. Ibid.
41. See James Petras " Spanish Socialism: The Politics of Neoliberalism" in *Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure in Southern Europe*" edited by James Kurth and James Petras (Berg Publishers 1993). P. 95-127.

*The author would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement his wife Alicia has given him in the final draft of this article.

Anthony N. Celso is assistant professor of international affairs at La Salle University.



Florida Political Science Association Annual Meeting

Winter Park, FL March 31-April 1, 1995

THEME: Surviving in the Global Village: Challenges and Opportunities

Technological advances have brought us into a new era--an era of interdependence, interconnections, and "internationalism." As members of this new global village, we are constantly faced with new challenges and fresh opportunities. Today, issues regarding to globalization and its consequences can be readily found on most public agendas. The conference theme this year focuses on globalization and its consequences; however, not all papers and panels need fit this theme.

Panel 1: Florida Politics and Migration

Effect of new migration trends on Florida's political and economic landscape; Migrant cultures in Florida and their impact.

Professor Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor School of Policy and Management Florida International University North Miami, FL 33181 (FAX: 305-940-5848)

Panel 2: Politics of Diversity

Will look at the issues of diversity from theoretical and work-oriented perspectives: changes and challenges for the Workforce of the 21st century, feminist political thoughts etc.

Professor Robyne Turner Department of Political Science Florida Atlantic University Boca Raton, FL 33431 (FAX:407-367-2744)

Panel 3: Analyzing the 1994 Election Results

Papers exploring the 1994 election issues, results, voting behavior, and the implications of the elections for domestic and foreign policy.

Professor Margaret Conway Department of Political Science P.O. Box 117325 University of Florida Gainesville, FL 32611-7325 (FAX: 904-392-8127)

Panel 4: Global Changes: Democratization, Privatization, Decentralization

A wide variety of issues (democratization, privatization, decentralization, administrative reforms, leadership changes) in developing and developed countries; how these changes/decisions may or may not be the results of global pressures; what they mean for national politics and economy.

Professor Marco Rimaneli Division of Social Science Saint Leo College P.O. Box 2127 Saint Leo, FL 33574 (FAX: 904-588-8300)

Panel 5: The New World Order

Papers examining the scope and definition of the new world order: is there a new world order? What are its premises. Also to explore are the issues of international political economy and its impact on local, state and national economy.

Professor Robert Barylski Department of Government & Intl Affairs University of South Florida 5700 N. Tamiami Trail Sarasota, FL 34243 (FAX: 813-359-4356)

Panel 6: Rountable Discussion on Clinton at Mid-Term

Assessment of the Clinton administration as issues apply to locally, nationally, and internationally.

Professor Alfred Cuzan Department of Government University of West Florida 11000 University Parkway Pensacola, FL 32514

Panel 7: Public Policy Making and the Politics of Gridlock

Examining policy issues (such as health, crime, environment, energy, technology, and others) and analyzing gridlock, if any, in the process of dealing with them.

Professor Susan MacManus Department of Government & Intl Affairs University of South Florida Tampa, FL 33620 (FAX: 813-974-0832)

Panel 8: Rountable on Huntington VS Rummel: Clashes of Civilization VS Promise of Global Democracy

Professor Edward W. Schwerin Florida Atlantic University Liberal Arts 2912 College Avenue Davie, FL 33314 (FAX: 305-236-1150)

Panel 9: Minorities and politics

Will examine the role of minorities in national, state, and national politics. Also will view the impact of politics on minorities in a variety of issue areas.

Professor James Ammons Office of the provost 301 Foote-Hilyer Florida A&M University Tallahassee, FL 32307 (FAX: 904-561-2551)

Panel 10: Issues in Public Administration

Will examine areas such as budget, ethics, practices, and organizational culture that might be impacted by the call to globalize; how agencies handle these challenges; what innovations have been made in this regard.

Professor Jonathan P. West Department of Political Science P.O. Box 248047 University of Miami-Coral Gables, FL 33124-6534

Panel 11: Graduate Student Panel on National, State and Local Issues

Graduate student papers that deal with topics in American government

Panel 12: Graduate Student Panel on International and Comparative Politics

Graduate student papers dealing with topics in international relations and comparative politics.

Panel 13: Graduate Student Panel on Public Administration Public Policy

Graduate student papers dealing with topics in public administration and public policy.



Institute for Political Studies
Division of Liberal Arts & Sciences
P. O. Box 2127
Saint Leo, Florida 33574