
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

*American Eagle in the Sand:
the Story of the United States Central Command*
Jay E. Hines
(U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB)

*The Monarchical Roots of Republican Government:
John Locke's Evolving Commonwealth*
Hudson Reynolds
(Saint Leo College)

*Democratization and Stability in
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic*
Beat Kernen
(Southwest Missouri State University)

*Provincial, Metropolitan and Recall Elections in Taiwan, 1994:
Appraising Steps in Democratization*
James A. Robinson
(University of West Florida)

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Introduction

This issue of the *Political Chronicle* (vol.8, n.1, Spring 1996) contains three essays from Florida scholars and one from Missouri, spanning all the major areas of Political Science (Comparative Politics; Political Theory; International Security; Democratization and Elections).

The first paper is a novelty: a survey of the history and operations of the U.S. Central Command, based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. "American Eagle in the Sand: the Story of the United States Central Command" is written by Jay E. Hines, Command Historian of the U.S. Central Command. The U.S. Central Command provides the planning and muscle for America's military presence and intervention in the volatile Middle-East and Persian Gulf region. Born originally as President Carter's Rapid Deployment Force (RDJTF) to offset any Soviet and regional threat to local security and the free international flow of oil, the Central Command later shifted exclusively to inter-regional threats following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the 1990s the U.S. Central Command has been successful under General Schwartzkopf in the War against Iraq. Then it was a key element in humanitarian intervention in Somalia and other operations, while recent developments in its strategic plan have validated its mission and vision into the Twenty-First Century.

The next essay is from Dr. Hudson Reynolds, Associate Professor at Saint Leo College near Tampa: "The Monarchical Roots of Republican Government: John Locke's Evolving Commonwealth." This paper refutes the common concept that John Locke is an inveterate opponent of monarchy: an analysis the *Second Treatise on Government* discloses how kingship is the best form of government for barbarians. Secondly, by focusing on the historical transition from monarchy to republican government, Dr. Reynolds underscores Locke's deliberate rejection of the classical polis; the underlying dispute with Hobbes over the framework of the modern nation-state; and his insistence on the preservation of executive prerogative in a commonwealth dedicated to the rule of law and not of men. Although these points have been well covered recently, they have not been reviewed in conjunction with Locke's view on the evolution of political regimes.

Dr. Beat Kernen, Assistant Professor at Southwest Missouri State University in Springfield, has already collaborated with the *Political Chronicle*. In this essay, "Democratization and Stability in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic," Dr. Kernen analyzes the current process of political democratization in these former-Soviet satellites after the 1989 Revolutions. Although recently both Poland and Hungary have witnessed a return to power of reformist former-communists, this does not imply any abrupt return to the undemocratic ideological policies of the past. Only the Czech Republic avoided this by implementing gradual social-democratic reforms, and in this way shall likely continue to provide a model to others Eastern European countries. However, the most important issue is that despite institutional shortcomings, all three countries appear to benefit from continuing internal stability and socio-political reforms, which will help their transition into the broader Western community of democratic nations and in the European Union.

Also the last paper, "Provincial, Metropolitan and Recall Elections in Taiwan, 1994: Appraising Steps in Democratization," is from an old collaborator to our journal, Dr. James A. Robinson, Professor of Political Science at the University of West Florida in Pensacola. This article analyzes the 1994 elections in Taiwan as another solid step towards greater democratization in that country. By applying normative theories of democracy, Dr. Robinson's field observations of the elections, voter participation and inter-party competition, helped identify both the negative side (biased electronic media, high costs of campaigns, allegations of corruption) and the positive trends (regular, frequent elections at all levels, healthy political debate between different opinions, lack of threats from the military on the electoral process) in Taiwan's sustained democratization process. This essay is part of a broader year-by-year scholarly analysis of Taiwanese politics and electioneering by Dr. Robinson, who was pleased to observe in person this year how Taiwan's latest elections confirmed the country's maturity and democratization, by denying any political influence and distortions to the open campaign of threats and intimidation mounted by Communist China to affect the outcome.

Marco Rimanelli, and
Michael Gibbons, *Editors*

American Eagle in the Sand: the Story of the United States Central Command

Jay E. Hines

Abstract

The U.S. Central Command is responsible for planning and conducting United States military activity in a region consisting of 20 countries in Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia. The command evolved as a practical solution to the problems of projecting American power to the Middle East. It has become known in recent years for its success in the War against Iraq, for the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and other operations. Recent developments in the command's strategic plan have validated its mission and vision as a flexible, versatile command into the Twenty-First Century.

One of five geographically defined unified commands, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is responsible for planning and conducting United States military activity in a region consisting of 20 countries in Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia. The command has become known in recent years for its success in the war against Iraq and for humanitarian intervention in Somalia.¹

Although USCENTCOM was officially activated on 1 January 1983, it grew out of an earlier unit known as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). The RDJTF was established on 1 March 1980 and was originally subordinate to the much larger United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), which had been at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, since 1972. USREDCOM was the successor to United States Strike Command, which had been activated at MacDill AFB during the Kennedy administration in January 1962, with responsibility for joint planning of operations in the Middle East, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Since the name "Commander in Chief, Strike Command" (CINCSTRIKE) may have sounded too aggressive to nations in this area of the world, CINCSTRIKE was also given the title of Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (CINCMEAFSA).²

There were difficulties caused by CINCMEAFSA's area of responsibility being halfway around the world. Although MEAFSA's boundaries included the Red Sea and Arabian (or Persian) Gulf, the western Indian Ocean was assigned to the Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and the eastern portion was responsibility of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), with headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii. Command lines were consolidated in 1966 with the assignment of CINCLANT as CINCMEAFSA's sole naval component.³

Another problem was that CINCMEAFSA's forces were too far from his area of responsibility. Whenever actual military operations were required in MEAFSA'S area, United States European Command (USEUCOM) and its components usually had to provide the operational forces and necessary support since they could arrive more quickly than more distant U.S.-based forces assigned to CINCMEAFSA. This was the case during the Congo rescue mission of 1964, evacuation of American citizens during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, and US participation in exercises sponsored by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).⁴

When USREDCOM replaced Strike Command in 1972, it gave up the MEAFSA mission, partly in consonance with the Nixon doctrine of gradual U.S. disengagement from Third-World conflicts, such as Vietnam. The MEAFSA area of responsibility was divided between the European and Pacific Commands, while Atlantic Command retained responsibility for portions of the Indian Ocean bordering on Africa. USEUCOM, which had previously been responsible for North Africa, now had an area which extended through Southwest Asia as far as Iran. The Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility then extended to Pakistan and included the northern Indian Ocean, but not the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf.

In 1976, PACOM's area of was expanded to encompass the entire Indian Ocean.⁵

As a result of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the formation of a new mobile joint task force to deal with distant crises, but the idea was slow to catch on. Following its initial review of national defense policy, the Carter Administration issued Presidential Directive 18 in August 1977, advocating establishment of a new quick reaction force. No funding for such an organization was contained in the Administration's military budgets, however.⁶

Two events occurred in 1979 which fundamentally changed American feelings about the emerging "crescent of crisis" extending from Somalia to Pakistan. In Iran, the Shah was replaced by the fanatical theocrat Ayatollah Khomeini, and Afghanistan was invaded and conquered by Soviet forces. These events deeply affected the thinking of President Jimmy Carter, and the RDJTF was established on 1 March 1980. The hostage crisis in Tehran led to the United States' severing diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April and the aborted covert mission to rescue the American hostages on 24 April 1980. Although it took place in the RDJTF's Area of responsibility, the failed hostage rescue mission was not conducted by the new command.⁷

The first Commander of the RDJTF was Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, United States Marine Corps (USMC), who later became Commandant of the USMC. Under General Kelley's direction, the RDJTF stepped out smartly, conducting its first command post exercise, POSITIVE LEAP, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 10 to 15 April 1980. This was followed by BRAVE SHIELD, a rapid deployment readiness exercise conducted at Fort Bragg and Fort Polk, Louisiana, from 13 to 21 August 1980. Another command post exercise, GALLANT KNIGHT 81, was held at Fort Bragg from 23 to 30 October 1980. The RDJTF conducted its

first exercise outside of the United States when it held BRIGHT STAR 81 in Egypt from 7 to 27 November 1980. Another first was ACCURATE TEST 81-2: conducted in Oman from 13 to 23 February 1981, this was the first RDJTF deployment to Southwest Asia. BRIGHT STAR and GALLANT KNIGHT both became regularly occurring exercises, joined by the GALLANT EAGLE series of field training exercises held at various locations in California and Nevada.⁸

The second commander of the RDJTF was Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, United States Army, who assumed command of the RDJTF on 17 July 1981. Under General Kingston, the RDJTF evolved from a potentially worldwide deployable troubleshooter into a unified command representing American interests in the Middle East and Northeast Africa. As the first step in this evolution, on 1 October 1981 the RDJTF became a separate joint task force and ceased to be subordinate to USREDCOM. Its area of responsibility was expanded to include Egypt and Sudan in Northeast Africa, in addition to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The area also included Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, People's Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen Arab Republic.⁹

Despite the evolutionary nature of the development from the RDJTF to USCENTCOM, the two commands were fundamentally different units. By definition, a joint task force is a temporary organization created by the Secretary of Defense for a specific purpose. When the RDJTF was created during the Carter Administration in 1980, it was meant to be only a temporary solution to the problem of projecting American power in the Middle East and East Africa. By the time the Reagan Administration decided in 1981 to establish a new unified command for this region, it was envisioned to take several years to complete the transition.¹⁰

The RDJTF was inactivated on 31 December 1982 and replaced by the USCENTCOM (1 January 1983). Added to the command's area of responsibility was Jordan, the Red Sea, and the Arabian

Gulf. Internal political realignments within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility have occurred since its activation. The two Yemens merged in May 1990, and Eritrea unilaterally declared its independence from Ethiopia in May 1991. Most recently, the Seychelles and some of the Indian Ocean were added to USCENTCOM's territory on 7 February 1996.¹¹ Despite changes in political boundaries, USCENTCOM's central geographical area of responsibility on the mainland of Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia has remained unchanged since its activation.¹²

General Kingston's task as the first Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), was to establish the command's *bona fides* as a unified command and as a credible force. He insisted on being assigned actual component forces from the military services, not the "notional" forces which had characterized the RDJTF. Overcoming the initial skepticism of USEUCOM, which had a headquarters and available forces located much closer to its area of responsibility, General Kingston championed the idea that USCENTCOM was a full-fledged unified command in exactly the same sense as others, notwithstanding that the headquarters was geographically displaced from its area of responsibility. USCENTCOM's assumption of security assistance operations, its most important financial tool for influencing international economic relations within its area of responsibility, had to be delayed at USEUCOM's insistence until 1 October 1983, when the new fiscal year began. Similar difficulties delayed USCENTCOM's Air Force component's takeover of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in its area of responsibility from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE, the Air Force component of the United States European Command).¹³

The new command did not have to wait long to face its first test. On 13 and 14 February 1983, four E-3A AWACS deployed non-stop from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, to Cairo West Air Base, Egypt. Their deployment was part of the United States response to a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt against Sudan.

As a result of U.S. support during Operation EARLY CALL, Egyptian aircraft were able to forestall a Libyan attack against the government of President Nimeiri of Sudan. According to President Reagan's Secretary of State George Schulz, Libya's Qaddafi had been put "back in his box, where he belongs."¹⁴

Another significant early USCENTCOM operation was ARID FARMER, conducted from 2 to 23 August 1983. This action involved the deployment of an RC-135 reconnaissance platform, two KC-10 aerial refuelers, two E-3A AWACS aircraft, and seven F-15 fighters to Sudan in support of the government of Chad against Libyan-supported insurgents. Libya and Sudan were also involved in Operation EAGLE LOOK, which provided surveillance of Eastern Libya after an apparent Libyan bombing attack on Omdurman, Sudan. This involved the first deployment of USCENTCOM's EC-135Y aircraft, which carried the operations commander and his battle staff. EAGLE LOOK was conducted from 15 March until 15 April 1984.¹⁵

General Kingston was promoted to full (four-star) general on 6 November 1984, finally establishing parity with other unified commanders. He served as USCINCCENT until his retirement on 27 November 1985. He often said that when he took over the RDJTF, no one could tell him where his forces would come from, what they would consist of, how long it would take them to arrive, and who would be in command. After several years of detailed deliberate planning during his tenure (as the only person to command both the RDJTF and USCENTCOM), he finally could answer all these questions.¹⁶

The second USCINCCENT was General George B. Crist, USMC. When he assumed command on 27 November 1985, General Crist observed that USCENTCOM was a unified command in name only. In most quarters, he felt, it was still perceived as "an RDJTF whose sole purpose was to go to Iran and wage World War III against the Russians in a conflict restricted solely to our theater of operations." General Crist believed that this mode of thinking permeated official perceptions at all levels

but failed to take into account the necessity for bilateral consultation with individual states in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Moreover, USCENTCOM was perceived by many countries in its area as "little more than a major intervention force designed to operate solely for U.S. purposes without their consultation or participation." Worse, General Crist believed his command was seen as a pariah by most U.S. government agencies with a vested interest in the region, including the State Department and the Defense Department's International Security Affairs Directorate.¹⁷

To counter the belief on the part of many countries in its area that USCENTCOM's mission was inimical to their own interests, General Crist set out to impress their leaders that the purpose of his command was to support key nations in the region without "gangpressing them into actions contrary to their perceived self-interest." Harkening back to the Nixon Doctrine, he made them aware that USCENTCOM would "provide them with capabilities that would allow them to stand on their own two feet and, if necessary, to defend their territorial integrity against local or regional threats to their security." He also assured them "of our ability to deal with threats beyond their ability to respond."¹⁸

General Crist's concern for diplomacy extended to USCENTCOM's exercise program. Previously, the command's planners would arrive in a country and dictate to its military leaders, "Here's the exercise, here's the way we want to do it, and this is the way you will do it." To General Crist, "we were acting too much like the proverbial ugly American, twisting our friends into submission without properly consulting them." His planners began consulting host nations and other foreign participants at least a year in advance of an exercise, ensuring that U.S. interests were in harmony with their goals and aspirations. Consequently, USCENTCOM became far more successful in planning and conducting exercises overseas.¹⁹

General Crist then familiarized himself with State Department's operations to work more harmoniously with it. The same approach worked with the

Directorate for International Security of the Defense Department and with the various agencies of the intelligence community. He also began working individually with each of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), encouraging each to work together collectively on defense issues. The members of the GCC--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates--eventually began to talk with each other. General Crist was very encouraged, and felt that he "could detect the emergence of a collective defense strategy," similar in spirit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In view of the twin threats presented to the region by Iran and Iraq, which were largely kept busy fighting each other from 1980 to 1988, collective defense was in the interest of both the GCC and the United States.²⁰

The Iran-Iraq War came home violently to USCENTCOM on 17 May 1987, when the *USS Stark* (FFG-31) was struck by Iraqi missiles, resulting in the deaths of 37 sailors. Shortly thereafter, in response to a request from the government of Kuwait, the United States reflagged and renamed 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers. Beginning on 22 July, USCENTCOM's Middle East Force escorted these reflagged tankers through the Arabian Gulf to Kuwait and back out through the Strait of Hormuz. Operation EARNEST WILL continued through 16 August 1990, by which time it had conducted 480 missions escorting a total of 649 merchant ships.²¹

Several incidents occurred during these escort operations. The reflagged supertanker *Bridgeton* struck a mine off Farsi Island on 24 July 1987, and had to be repaired in Dubai, before returning into service on 15 October. Meanwhile, on 21 September 1987, the Iranian ship *Iran Ajr* was caught red-handed laying mines in the Arabian Gulf. USCENTCOM forces, including U.S. Army OH-6A Cayuse helicopters launched from the *USS Jarret* (FFG-33), attacked and seized the *Iran Ajr*, killing five Iranian sailors and capturing 26 others.²²

Apparently undeterred by this retaliation, Iran continued to lay mines

in the Gulf. On 14 April 1988, the *USS Samuel B. Roberts* (FFG-58) detected three Iranian mines lying approximately 55 miles off the Qatar peninsula, reversed engines to back away, and struck a fourth mine. The 253-pound mine blew a 21-foot hole in the ship, injuring ten sailors. Despite extensive fire and flooding, the crew was able to control the damage and keep the ship afloat. The *USS Roberts* was towed to Dubai and later taken to Bath, Maine, for repairs. Within the next ten days, U.S. and allied forces discovered eight more Iranian mines.²³

Directed by the National Command Authority to plan and execute a measured retaliatory response, General Crist and Rear Admiral Anthony Less, Commander of the Joint Task Force Middle East, carried out Operation PRAYING MANTIS. On 18 April 1988, three U.S. surface action groups destroyed two Iranian oil platforms and severely damaged two Iranian frigates and a missile patrol-boat. Two A-6 aircraft from the *USS Enterprise* (CVN-65) sank a Swedish-built Boghammer speedboat and neutralized four more Iranian crafts in the Mubarak oil field. American losses consisted of one AH-1T Sea Cobra from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167. As the "Tanker War" continued, on 3 July 1988 the *USS Vincennes* (CG-49) mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner, killing all 290 people aboard. Finally, under intense international political and economic pressure, Iran and Iraq agreed to a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire on 20 August 1988.²⁴

On 23 November 1988, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, assumed command from General Crist. Returning to the Middle East for the first time since 1947 (when as a teenager he accompanied his father, Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Senior, on his mission to Iran), General Schwarzkopf was able to exploit that earlier connection to expand General Crist's diplomatic and military relations with his Arab counterparts.²⁵

When he was interviewed for the position of USCINCENT by President Reagan's last Secretary of Defense, Mr. Frank Carlucci, both were concerned about Iraq's military might at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. In his travels around

the Arabian Gulf during his first year as USCINCENT, however, General Schwarzkopf found that most of the friendly countries in his area of responsibility remained more concerned with Iran than with Iraq. King Hussein of Jordan, for example, told General Schwarzkopf in January 1989, "Don't worry about the Iraqis. They are war-weary and have no aggressive intentions toward their Arab brothers."²⁶

Spurred by the rapid diminution of Soviet aggressiveness under Gorbachëv, General Schwarzkopf worked to supplant USCENTCOM's primary war plan, which involved a war against the Soviets in Iran, with a more realistic scenario. The original strategic plan (which General Crist had characterized as "bankrupt" as early as 1986), called for five and two-thirds U.S. divisions to march from the Arabian Gulf to Iran's Zagros Mountains and prevent the Red Army from seizing the oil fields of Iran. Instead, General Schwarzkopf decided to plan for what he thought was a much more likely scenario: Iraq, emerging from eight years of war against Iran with the world's fourth-largest and most battle-tested army, moving south to capture the rich oil fields of the Gulf whose output was essential to the industrialized world.²⁷

This new strategy was first tested in INTERNAL LOOK, a command post exercise conducted from 9 July through 4 August 1990 at Fort Bragg and at Hurlburt and Duke Fields in Florida. As the exercise developed, General Schwarzkopf noticed that the real-world movements of Iraq's air and ground forces eerily paralleled the scripted scenario of the war-game. So closely did actual message traffic resemble fictional reports, the latter had to be prominently stamped "Exercise Only." During the last few days of INTERNAL LOOK, Saddam Hussein's forces actually invaded and captured Kuwait. Now in possession of Kuwait's oil fields, Iraq was poised to acquire the even more valuable prize of the Arabian peninsula.²⁸

Four days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, General Schwarzkopf and Secretary Cheney traveled to Saudi Arabia to confer with King Fahd regarding the threat of an

Iraqi attack on his kingdom. After USCINCENT outlined his plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia, Secretary Cheney conveyed a message from President Bush that the United States was prepared to deploy the forces outlined in General Schwarzkopf's plan but sought no permanent bases in his country. Based on his experience in the Middle East, General Schwarzkopf had expected a dilatory and non-committal response, but, to his open-mouthed surprise, King Fahd accepted Cheney's offer almost immediately, after a minimum of consultation with his royal advisors.²⁹

Thus, operation DESERT SHIELD began the next day, on 7 August 1990. Within two days of the invasion, the first U.S. naval combatants began deployments toward the waters of the Arabian Gulf, while on 8 August 1980 the first Military Airlift Command aircraft arrived in Saudi Arabia together with the first combat aircrafts and ground forces. On 10 August, the ships of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force were ordered to sail, 17 ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet were activated, commercial U.S. ships were now chartered, and more than a hundred additional aircraft were deployed to the theater. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force began deploying by air on 12 August. Concurrently, the President ordered economic sanctions against Iraq and the deployment of additional naval vessels to enforce them. The first squadron of C-130 transport planes arrived in Saudi Arabia on 17 August 1990.³⁰

When the first prepositioned ships arrived in the Gulf on 16 August 1990, they were quickly linked with Marine Corps units, forming a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. With its 30 days of supplies, this task force provided USCENTCOM with a mechanized force and supporting air power within two weeks of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. To increase the deployment pace, on 17 August 1990 the Civil Reserve Air Fleet was activated for the first time in its history. During the next seven months, the U.S. Transportation Command moved nearly 504,000 passengers, 3.7 million tons of dry cargo, and 6.1 million

tons of petroleum products to USCENTCOM's Area of responsibility. On 26 August 1990, General Schwarzkopf officially established a forward headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (in addition to his USCINCENT, he was now also called Supreme Allied Commander, Kuwaiti Theater of Operations), while President Bush worked through the United Nations to put together a coalition that ultimately numbered 29 countries fielding a total force of nearly 700,000 men and women.³¹

As forces continued to arrive in the theater, a significant milestone was reached on 2 October 1990, when the aircraft carrier *USS Independence* (CV-62) moved into the Arabian Gulf: this was the first time since 1974 that an American carrier had sailed into the relatively confined waters of the Gulf. By November 1990, General Schwarzkopf was able to shift his focus from defense to offense. Having successfully deterred Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia, USCENTCOM now began to plan for the liberation of Kuwait. President Bush authorized the deployment of follow-on forces, including a heavy division from the United States and the VII Corps from Europe, their associated combat and support elements, three additional carrier battle groups, one battleship, Amphibious Group 3 with the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, the II Marine Expeditionary Force, and 410 additional Air Force aircraft.³²

Backed by the U.N. Security Council, which had passed Resolution 678 on 29 November 1990 authorizing the Coalition to use all means necessary to enforce its previous resolutions calling for Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait, USCENTCOM continued to develop a force adequate to the task. The U.N. resolution had given Iraq until 15 January 1991 to remove its forces from Kuwait or face military action from USCENTCOM and its Coalition partners. Shortly before that deadline, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution on 12 January 1991 authorizing President Bush to use U.S. armed forces pursuant to the U.N. resolution.³³

As the U.N. deadline approached, General Schwarzkopf set out the objectives of the offensive campaign.

USCENTCOM and the Coalition were to attack the Iraqi military and political leadership and their command and control systems. They would gain and maintain air superiority, sever Iraqi supply lines, and destroy Iraq's production, storage, and delivery capabilities for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. They would also destroy Saddam Hussein's vaunted Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Finally, they would liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.³⁴

To accomplish these objectives, the original Operation DESERT STORM theater campaign plan was to be carried out in four phases. Phase I was to be a strategic air campaign. Phase II would be a short, but intense effort to establish air superiority in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Phase III would consist of air attacks on the Republican Guard and other Iraqi army forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Finally, Phase IV would be a ground offensive supported by air and naval forces.³⁵ By January 1991, there were enough air forces available that the Coalition decided to conduct the first three phases comprising the air operation simultaneously, applying the greatest amount of pressure from the opening minutes of the war. On 17 January at 3:00 a.m. Riyadh time, Operation DESERT STORM began with a massive air interdiction strike. Within seven hours, more than 750 sorties had been flown by aircraft from the United States, France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Italy. Targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait included military emplacements, air defense assets, and command and control targets. The air campaign deprived Saddam Hussein of the initiative and prepared the theater for a Coalition ground assault, which could complete the destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait with minimal losses.³⁶

Following more than five weeks of air strikes, ground operations began on 24 February 1991 at 4:00 a.m. Riyadh time. Aided by a USMC amphibious feint along the coast of Kuwait (which focused on Iraqi forces to the east and south), assisted by secondary attacks along the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the main Coalition attacked on a sweep

from the west northward deep into Iraqi territory. It then approached Kuwait eastward from an unexpected direction--from inside Iraq. Attacking from the west cut off the enemy's supply lines and avenues of retreat. This became known as the "left hook" or, as General Schwarzkopf called it, the "Hail Mary" play. The main attack force consisted of U.S., French, and British forces, while secondary operations were conducted primarily by Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Bahraini, Qatari, Omani, Syrian, and United Arab Emirates forces, as well as the U.S. Marines.³⁷ Kuwait was liberated on 27 February 1991. With all the Coalition's objectives met, a cease-fire was declared for 28 February 1991 at 8:00 a.m., exactly one hundred hours after commencement of ground hostilities. On 3 March 1991, a cease-fire conference was held at Safwan: all Allied demands were agreed to, allowing Iraqi forces to disengage near Basra. By the time General Schwarzkopf returned to his Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in April 1991, he had completed his mission and become an international figure. As one indication of General Schwarzkopf's standing in the world community, Queen Elizabeth II sailed her royal yacht *HMS Britannia* to Tampa and on 20 May 1991, made him an Honorary Knight Commander in the Military Division of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath. General Schwarzkopf continued to serve as USCINCENT until his retirement on 9 August 1991.³⁸

The fourth USCINCENT was General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC. Taking over from General Schwarzkopf he inherited a command that no longer had to justify its existence. Moreover, having been USCENTCOM Chief of Staff from the fall of 1988 through June 1990, he was intimately familiar with its activities. Many of USCENTCOM's operations in the years after the Gulf War involved issues left over from it. Maritime interception operations, begun in the early phases of DESERT SHIELD, continued throughout General Hoar's tenure. These operations enforced U.N. sanctions against Iraq and were performed by multinational naval forces patrolling assigned areas and performing vessel boardings and inspections. When

the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr opened in July 1993, maritime interception operations were reinstated in the northern Arabian Gulf. By that time, more than 19,150 ships had been challenged and over 8,250 merchant ships boarded and inspected by warships from Australia, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom.³⁹

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, which began in August 1992, was part of the international response to continued Iraqi non-compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 688. This resolution condemned Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi civilian population, including air and ground attacks against insurgents in south-eastern Iraq. USCENTCOM established a no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 and established Joint Task Force Southwest Asia to command and control the entire operation. This approach had already been successfully used in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq to protect the local Kurdish population from Iraqi reprisals.⁴⁰

Iraq complied with the no-fly zone for several months, but began to challenge it late in 1992 and early in 1993. In one incident, a U.S. F-16 shot down an Iraqi MiG-23 after it violated the no-fly zone. When Iraq persisted in flying in the zone and threatened coalition aircraft with anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles, USCENTCOM forces took decisive action. On 13 and 18 January 1993, SOUTHERN WATCH aircraft conducted strikes against selected Iraqi air defense targets threatening Coalition forces. Meanwhile, on 17 January 1993, the U.S. Navy conducted a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strike against the Zaafaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility because of Iraq's refusal to comply with nuclear inspection requirements. Four surface vessels fired a total of 44 TLAM cruise missiles against the facility, rendering it unusable. Another TLAM strike was launched by the U.S. Navy against the Baghdad headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service in response to the Iraqi-sponsored planned assassination of former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

prevented Iraqi aircraft from participating in large-scale offensive actions against the people in south-western Iraq, although Iraqi ground operations continued at a reduced level.⁴¹

A more defensive deployment following the aftermath of the Gulf War was the movement of Patriot air defense batteries to the region. In response to requests from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, USCENTCOM rapidly deployed Patriot missile systems to those countries in 1992 within a few days of alert notification. This strategic deployment underscored the American commitment to the region and U.S. willingness to ensure the security of its friends. The batteries in Kuwait and Bahrain were withdrawn in December 1992 only to be redeployed in January 1993 as a result of Iraqi non-compliance with the no-fly zone restrictions. The Patriot batteries remained in Saudi Arabia to provide continuous aircraft and missile defense coverage to key ports and population centers. Continued deployment of the Patriot air defense system to the Arabian Gulf provided inter-operability training and initiatives in collective air defense among USCENTCOM's partners in regional security.⁴²

The most significant challenge facing USCENTCOM after expelling Iraq from Kuwait concerned the east African nation of Somalia. No national government had actually existed in Somalia since the departure of former dictator Mohamed Siad Barre on 26 January 1991, and the country was riven by competing clans fighting what amounted to a multi-sided civil war. To relieve the widespread starvation caused by food shortages and an inadequate food distribution system, USCENTCOM began Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in August 1992 to supply aid to Somalia and northeastern Kenya. On 17 August 1992, USCENTCOM deployed a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team consisting of 35 people to Mombasa, Kenya. Within three days, USCENTCOM established Joint Task Force PROVIDE RELIEF to conduct airfield and security surveys, establish communications, provide flight clearances and coordinate assistance with relief agencies. On 21 August 1992, the first food delivery mission was flown to

Kenya, beginning a massive effort that continued through the end of the year. American forces involved in Operation PROVIDE RELIEF peaked at 858 personnel and 14 C-130 aircraft. By the end of 1992, they had flown 1,699 missions, delivering nearly 20,000 metric tons of food and supplies.⁴³ In support of the United Nations Organization in Somalia (UNOSOM), USCENTCOM helped also move a 500-man Pakistani contingent of U.N. security forces to Mogadishu, Somalia, from 12 September through 3 October 1992. The *USS Tarawa* (LHA-1) Amphibious Ready Group provided tactical command and control of U.S. air operations in that effort and then turned these duties over to the *USS Tripoli* (LPH-10) Amphibious Ready Group.⁴⁴

By late November 1992, it was clear that airlift alone would not be sufficient to get relief supplies to those who desperately needed them, thus President Bush offered to send U.S. troops to Somalia to provide the security needed to insure the food supplies actually reached starving Somalis, who by then were dying at the rate of a thousand per day. Operation RESTORE HOPE began on 9 December 1992 in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. USCENTCOM led a multinational coalition known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Its mission during RESTORE HOPE was to provide security for key transportation and distribution centers, ensure security of relief convoys and assist relief organization operations. UNITAF quickly accomplished this mission and transferred operational control of operations in Somalia to the United Nations.⁴⁵ UNITAF continued to provide security for relief operations from January through May 1993 while the U.N. undertook the difficult task of creating UNOSOM II. Its task was to meet the unprecedented challenge of performing peace-making operations under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Meanwhile, humanitarian airlift of food and other supplies under Operation PROVIDE RELIEF continued through 28 February 1993, totaling nearly 2,500 missions flown and 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies delivered.⁴⁶

March 1993, UNITAF had established

nine humanitarian relief sectors in southern Somalia. Centered around major towns and feeding centers, these sectors were key to the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II as they were gradually turned over from USCENTCOM forces to those of other nations in the coalition. Under UNOSOM II, France assumed responsibility for Oddur, Canada for Belet Uen, Italy for Gialalassi, Morocco for Baledogle, Australia for Baidoa, Belgium for Kismayo, and Botswana for Bardera. During the transition, UNITAF strength peaked at 38,300 personnel, of whom 25,800 were U.S. forces.⁴⁷ In addition to conducting weapons sweeps, security patrols, and convoy escorts, UNITAF forces carried out civic action projects in all of the humanitarian relief sectors. U.S. Army engineers and Navy Seabees drilled dozens of wells and built or repaired hospitals, orphanages, schools, and over 1,200 miles of roads, while medical personnel from the coalition and relief agencies treated thousands of Somalis for a wide range of problems.⁴⁸

On 26 March 1993, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 814 creating UNOSOM II, and in a truly seamless transition, on 4 May 1993 the UNITAF commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC, turned over all operations to the new UNOSOM II commander, Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir. By then, most U.S. forces had redeployed from Somalia, but a residual presence remained to support the U.N. command: some members of the UNOSOM II staff, a logistics support command of about 2,800 personnel, and a Quick Reaction Force of about 1,200 U.S. troops.

Shortly after the U.N. had taken over the relief operations in Somalia, security in the Somali capital of Mogadishu began to deteriorate, although UNOSOM II operations in the countryside continued to be somewhat successful. Forces led by Somali General Mohamed Farah Aideed were largely responsible for the unrest and increased hostility toward UNOSOM II forces. UNOSOM II was given an expanded mission which outstripped its available resources, the kind of "mission creep" that UNITAF had avoided by virtue of its clear and unambiguous

mission statement. On 5 June 1993, Pakistani forces engaged in confiscating weapons in accordance with their expanded mission were ambushed by Somali militiamen loyal to General Aideed and 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The Quick Reaction Force responded to UNOSOM's request for assistance and rescued the beleaguered Pakistani unit.⁵⁰

As a result of this attack, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 837 authorizing UNOSOM II to "take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks of 5 June 1993." Some of these measures included Quick Reaction Force and AC-130 operations against weapons storage facilities and command and control facilities, as well as efforts to capture General Aideed and other leaders of his Somali National Alliance. During the UNOSOM II operations, remaining U.S. forces suffered several casualties, including four military police killed by a command-detonated mine on 8 August. By late August 1993, U.S. Special Operations forces under Task Force Ranger had deployed to Mogadishu to enforce the U.N. resolution.⁵¹

Violence erupted again on 5 September 1993, when Somali militia attacked Nigerian forces. Task Force Ranger conducted several operations against the militia in September 1993 and succeeded in capturing several key leaders. On 25 September 1993, however, three U.S. crew members were killed when their helicopter was shot down by Aideed's Somali militia, and additional casualties were suffered during the ensuing rescue. The most significant combat action took place on 3 October 1993, when Task Force Ranger captured six of Aideed's lieutenants and several militiamen in a daylight raid. During withdrawal operations, two UH-60 helicopters were shot down by the Somalis and US forces remaining on the ground came under heavy fire as they attempted to carry out rescue operations and consolidate their positions. During the intense firefight that followed, approximately 300 Somalis were killed and hundreds more were wounded. American losses totalled 18 killed and 81 wounded before a relief column of Quick Reaction Force soldiers,

Pakistanis and Malaysians was able to withdraw the forces to safety early on 4 October.⁵²

As a result of the incident on 3 October 1993, President Clinton announced that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Additional U.S. personnel and heavy equipment were deployed to Somalia to provide increased military capability to protect existing forces and to support UNOSOM II. Joint Task Force Somalia was activated on 20 October 1993 to provide force protection, support U.N. operations, secure lines of communication, and redeploy U.S. forces by the 31 March 1994 deadline. Approximately 3,000 troops were deployed ashore in Somalia, along with tanks and other armored vehicles. The aircraft carrier *USS Abraham Lincoln* (CVN-72) and an escort had arrived on station near Mogadishu. Additional forces included the *USS New Orleans* (LPH-11) and *USS Guadalcanal* (LPH-7) Amphibious Ready Groups with their associated Marine Expeditionary Units.⁵³ One of the amphibious ready groups was ready to withdraw from Somalia by November, and all carriers were withdrawn by December 1993. American presence on the ground fell from 8,107 in early-December to 5,582 at year's end, and full withdrawal was completed on 25 March 1994.⁵⁴

Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the United States' ability to respond to distant humanitarian crises as part of an international coalition. USCENTCOM orchestrated the strategic deployment of both U.S. and foreign forces and coordinated logistics to sustain the force once deployed. RESTORE HOPE also demonstrated the use of the JTF concept for effectively deploying forces to create the secure environment needed to conduct humanitarian relief operations. It underscored the commitment and capability of the men and women of the armed forces to accomplish demanding missions in remote and hostile environments.⁵⁵ Held in abeyance during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, USCENTCOM's exercise program was revitalized following the successful conclusion of the Gulf War. Because of the participants'

flexibility and aggressive pursuit of exercise opportunities, the program dramatically increased over pre-war levels. In fiscal year 1993, USCENTCOM scheduled a total of 97 combined exercises in ten of the 19 countries in its area of responsibility. An increased naval presence drove up the number of exercises, accounting for 77 of them. There were also six Army, six Air Force, and eight special operations exercises conducted during this time. In addition, six exercise-related construction projects were completed.⁵⁶

The vast distances from the United States to USCENTCOM's Area of responsibility make it necessary for the command to exercise its deployment and redeployment capabilities on a frequent basis. The ULTIMATE RESOLVE command post exercise was held in Kuwait late in 1993, bringing back nearly all of the Coalition members together for the first time since the Gulf War. Mindful of the need to have forces available on short notice, the INTRINSIC ACTION ground exercise rotations in Kuwait demonstrate the quick response ability of USCENTCOM ground forces to utilize prepositioned equipment in its area of responsibility. The Gulf War proved the importance of coalition warfare to the accomplishment of USCENTCOM's mission. Given the downsizing of U.S. Armed Forces, such combined operations are increasingly important.⁵⁷

On 5 August 1994, General J.H. Binford Peay III, United States Army, became the fifth USCINCCENT. As commander of the 101st Airborne Air Division (Air Assault) during the Gulf War, he was well acquainted with USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, doctrine, and tactics. He continued USCENTCOM's peacetime strategy designed to deter aggression and protect U.S. national security interests: the uninterrupted flow of Arabian Gulf oil, freedom of navigation, access to commercial markets, security of coalition partners and other allies, and regional peace and security.⁵⁸ Shortly after taking over, General Peay developed a new, expanded strategy for his area of responsibility: maintaining essential regional access through the three traditional pillars of forward presence,

combined exercises, and security assistance programs, augmented by the two additional pillars of power projection and readiness to fight. By emphasizing deterrence through coalition building and military-to-military access, this strategy promotes stability and protects U.S. interests within USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.⁵⁹

It was not long before this new strategy encountered its first test, again in the form of a challenge from Saddam Hussein. In response to the threat of renewed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait by troop concentrations in Southern Iraq, early in October 1994 General Peay deployed forces to his area of responsibility in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. By the end of October, USCENTCOM had deployed more than 28,000 U.S. troops and over 200 additional aircraft to the region. Augmented by French and British aircraft, these forces were based in the GCC states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. As many as 300 Coalition aircraft and 20 Coalition naval combatants took part in the operation. VIGILANT WARRIOR marked the first time that USCINCENT, a USCENTCOM headquarters element, and component commanders and staffs deployed to the area of responsibility since Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM four years earlier.⁶⁰ On 15 October 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 949, which condemned Iraqi aggression and demanded that Iraq withdraw its forces to their earlier positions. Five days later, the United States backed the U.N. resolution with a demarche of its own concerning its enforcement. In the face of this determined response, the Iraqi régime backed away from the crisis and pulled its forces north of the 32nd parallel, as required. By early November, the Secretary of Defense authorized redeployment of those U.S. forces considered excess to the new combination of an emerging mission and a reduced threat.⁶¹

Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR reaffirmed the value of prepositioning matériel in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. U.S. Army forces were

able to fall in on prepositioned stocks already in place in Kuwait City and to deploy to defensive positions in Kuwait in time to bolster that nation's defenses. Patriot air defense personnel deployed from Fort Polk, Louisiana, to place off-line missile batteries at Riyadh and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, into full operation. General Peay also ordered the relocation of another Patriot battery from Dhahran to Kuwait City to provide air defense coverage of key facilities in Kuwait. Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR also provided an excellent opportunity for Army and Marine forces to exercise their land-based and afloat prepositioned stocks. Use of this equipment allowed the United States to maximize its strategic lift assets and to limit deployment response time.

Shortly after the conclusion of VIGILANT WARRIOR, USCENTCOM found itself involved once again in Somalia, this time to cover the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in accordance with a United Nations decision to pull its forces out of that troubled country. After the withdrawal of U.S. forces on 25 March 1994, the United States maintained a liaison office in Mogadishu in an attempt to further the process of political reconciliation in Somalia. Security for this office was provided by a Fleet Anti-terrorist Support Team (FAST) platoon from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion. As conditions in Mogadishu deteriorated, the liaison office relocated to Nairobi and the FAST platoon redeployed to the United States by 15 September 1994. Then President Clinton announced in late 1994 that U.S. forces would help withdraw UNOSOM forces from Somalia.⁶²

Following planning at United Nations Headquarters in New York, operation UNITED SHIELD began on 1 January 1995: USCENTCOM orchestrated the withdrawal of the multinational force of Egyptians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Americans from Somalia with minimum risk. The command formed a combined task force to conduct a five-phased military operation to bring out UNOSOM personnel and U.S. equipment from Somalia. By the time UNITED SHIELD began, Indian, Zimbabwean, and Malaysian UNOSOM units had already

redeployed in December 1994 and early January 1995, leaving 6,200 of the approximately 13,000 UNOSOM personnel to be withdrawn, at Mogadishu, mostly at the international airport and the new seaport.⁶³ Safe withdrawal from this dangerous urban environment required phased redeployment of units, with the remaining forces conducting rear-guard operations. Military operations consisted of naval deployments, airlift, passage of lines, and an amphibious landing. This daunting task relied on Coalition control of Mogadishu's beaches and littoral. General Peay deployed more than 4,000 personnel supported by over 40 combat and combat support aircraft, five naval combatants, and support vessels. Off-shore patrolled a Coalition task force of U.S., Italian, Pakistani, French, British, and Malaysian naval vessels.⁶⁴

On 8 February 1995, the combined task force deployed an aerial quick reaction force to cover the redeployment of a Pakistani brigade and a Bangladeshi battalion from Mogadishu airport. This was followed on 22 February by the withdrawal of an Egyptian brigade from Mogadishu by air and sea. The final withdrawal phase began on 28 February with an amphibious assault by 1,800 U.S. and 350 Italian Marines at the eastern portion of the Mogadishu seaport to secure a lodgement area. These forces provided a rear guard for the departure of the Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and all U.S. equipment, then completed their own withdrawal on 3 March. As a result of careful planning and international teamwork, Operation UNITED SHIELD resulted in the safe withdrawal of 6,200 UNOSOM personnel and 100 combat vehicles without a single casualty or significant damage to any equipment. This remarkable success set a high standard for future coalition operations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.⁶⁵

Later in 1995, tensions peaked anew in Iraq when several high-level Iraqi officers defected with their families to Jordan. These defectors brought revelations of growing frustration among members of Saddam Hussein's régime and validation of pending military action against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Drawing on the lessons from Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR a year earlier, Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL involved increasing alert for designated units in the United States, accelerating scheduled military exercises with Jordan, and moving prepositioned equipment from Diego Garcia to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL deterred Iraqi adventurism through its combination of prompt detection, GCC unity, and rapid movement of forces to the region. The ironic result of the operation was that each time Iraq rattles its saber, the coalition becomes better prepared to counter future aggressions.⁶⁶ As the United States Central Command looks forward to future challenges to carrying out its mission in the world, it does so with a clear vision:

United States Central Command: A flexible and versatile command into the Twenty-First Century . . . trained, positioned and ready to defend the nation's vital interests, promote peace and stability, deter conflict in the central region; and, if necessary, be prepared to wage unrelenting, simultaneous joint and combined operations to achieve victory in war.

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The Monarchical Roots of Republican Government: John Locke's Evolving Commonwealth

Hudson Reynolds

Abstract

*John Locke is widely regarded as an inveterate opponent of monarchy. Yet a careful reading of the *Second Treatise on Government* discloses an equivocal attitude towards monarchical government, closer in orientation to John Stuart Mill's acknowledgment that kingship is the best form of government for barbarians.¹ Moreover, Locke has been repeatedly criticized for his lack of historical awareness. In this regard, then, not enough attention has been paid to his treatment of the evolution of political institutions from their origin in primitive monarchy to constitutional representative democracy. By focusing on the historical transition from monarchy to republican government, a much clearer understanding of several key strands of Locke's argument can be attained, namely: a) the deliberate rejection of the classical polis; b) the underlying dispute with Hobbes over the framework of the modern nation-state; and c) the troubling insistence on the preservation of executive prerogative in a commonwealth ostensibly dedicated to the rule of law and not of men. It is true that these particular points have been well covered by recent Lockean scholarship, but they have not been reviewed in conjunction with Locke's presentation of the evolution of political regimes.*

John Locke's Evolving Commonwealth

In Chapter VII of the *Second Treatise*, "Of the Beginning of Political Societies," Locke speculates that in all probability the first political societies were governed monarchically.² He emphasizes the hypothetical nature of the observation, as written records do not antedate the foundation of civil society, nor were ancient histories compiled until long after the establishment of political institutions.³ The actual transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society is therefore undocumented, but can be inferred.⁴ Even so, Locke cites both classical sources (histories of Rome,

Venice, and Sparta) and contemporary accounts (reports from America) as supporting the consensual origins of government against those who would use historical sources to plead otherwise.⁵

As families arise independently within the state of nature, the actual foundation of a political order must have occurred as either a single family grew by degrees into a commonwealth or several families united for their general protection.⁶ Once formed into a political society, the members appointed one man general "whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war."⁷ By Locke's account, the earliest forms of government were elective monarchies. This rather closely parallels Machiavelli's treatment of the same topic in the *Discourses*:

Chance has given birth to the different kinds of governments among men; for at the beginning of the world the inhabitants were few in number, and lived for a time dispersed, like beasts. As the human race increased, the necessity for uniting themselves for defence made itself felt; the better to attain this object, they chose the strongest and most courageous from among themselves and placed him at their head, promising to obey him.⁸

The earliest forms of government were patriarchal in arrangement. This is not surprising insofar as the communal experience of those who created and lived in these societies had been formed within patriarchal families. To the extent that our ideas of government are the products of our experience, the experience of early society taught that paternal rule was salutary and beneficial. As rulers of their households, fathers are apt to be benevolent and merciful; they manifestly love their dependents and labor to provide for their interests. If called upon by necessity, they will commonly sacrifice their lives for the sake of their families.⁹

Nor were those who founded the earliest civil societies familiar with the existence of other forms of government.

Complex constitutional devices like representation or separation of powers were simply unknown. There was no necessity to develop elaborate governmental safeguards to prevent abuse of power, because monarchs were well fitted to the tasks of ruling. "The first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand, without any other express limitations or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required."¹⁰

Under the earliest conditions of civil society, the act of governing was itself uncomplicated. Society was just emerging from a state of absolute scarcity, and nearly everybody was poor. A general social and economic equality among the members of society prevailed. Consequently, avarice and ambition as political passions were as yet undeveloped. With few uncontrollable passions to inflame them, the earliest members of political society led simple and virtuous existences, though they enjoyed little in the way of commodious living.¹¹

The very smallness of the earliest political societies virtually guaranteed that the citizens would be well acquainted with one another's characters. The closeness of the citizenry, their moral innocence, and lack of artificial social distinctions, encouraged the development of genuine friendships.¹² Indeed, friendship may have prevented many disputes from initially arising. It certainly made possible the settlement of such disputes as did arise by calling upon the good offices of a mutual friend. Under such circumstances, it would be reasonable to appeal controversial decisions to a single ruler who could lay claim to the support of the community. The judgment of a Solomon would be sought and respected.

Such a simple and impoverished condition of society did not require a multiplicity of laws. In such a state, property relations are not very sophisticated. The accumulated wealth of the society is not great, nor are economic

interests much diversified. Landed interests, rather than manufacturing or commercial interests, are likely to predominate. For this reason few laws are needed, and they would not be of the sort necessitating regular revision. It might well lie within the capacity of a clever individual to devise a complete and yet simple code of laws that would satisfy the entire community by adjusting the property relations which over time had become inequitable. Even so, the services of a Solon would neither be frequently required nor requested.

For the reasons just cited: namely, that civil societies in the beginning were poor and small, and that the regulation of communal life required little attention, monarchs by and large refrained from interfering with domestic affairs. Instead, they preoccupied themselves with attending to foreign relations.

The "petty commonwealths" of antiquity were vulnerable to foreign invasion. What little property they managed to accumulate attracted the attention and envy of their larger neighbors. From time to time, it was necessary for the entire society to assemble for war. To secure unity and energy in collective action, a general would be needed to direct an army in the field. Such an army would be composed of citizen soldiers. Having recently emerged from the state of nature, where the enforcement of the laws of nature are left to each and every individual, these primitive societies would be conveniently populated with warriors. It stands to reason that such a society would entrust leadership only to someone with a military outlook and a warlike spirit.

For their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against foreign force. 'Twas natural for them to put themselves under a Frame of Government, which might best serve to that end; and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies.¹³

Consequently, the monarchical form of government proved to be well adapted to the defense of society against external invasions and injuries.

Perhaps some restraints upon the monarch's exercise of the war power were present even at the beginning. During wartime, the monarch commanded absolutely in the field. Yet at home and in time of peace, the same general exercised a very moderate sovereignty.¹⁴ Declarations of war and the making of treaties were left to a council or shared with the people as a whole. Such a safeguard may have developed early in response to monarchs who attempted to keep the society on a constant war time footing.

Locke's description of the earliest political communities bears a remarkable resemblance to the ideal polis, or city-state, of the classical political philosophers. Consider the number of shared features, including a small population, limited wealth and commerce, friendship among the citizenry, the absence of faction, and the paucity of laws.

Plato and Aristotle, for instance, maintain that increase of population threaten the existence of a good regime. Plato, in the *Laws*, provides an optimal number of 5,040 citizens.¹⁵ Aristotle insists that the basis of any political community is friendship, and friendship cannot exist where the population is so extensive that citizens are strangers to each other.¹⁶ Likewise, both maintain that the existence of factions within the citizen body disrupts the goodness of the political order. Plato, in the *Republic*, proposes absolute communism among the guardian class specifically in order to annihilate faction; litigiousness is also deprecated.¹⁷ In the *Laws*, he condemns the spirit and influence of commerce.¹⁸ There he endeavors to equalize ownership of property by placing limits on the acquisition and expansion of estates.¹⁹ Aristotle designates inequality of property as the primary source of faction and a general cause of revolution.²⁰

Along the same lines, certain passages in the works of Plato and Aristotle could be interpreted to support kingship as a desirable form of government. Plato's *Republic* is famous for its advocacy of the absolute rule of philosopher kings.²¹ As for Aristotle's *Politics*, the question is raised whether it is better to be governed by law or by the best man, but

this is ultimately left unresolved.²² Robert Filmer, Locke's chosen antagonist, notes this very ambiguity in Aristotle's *Politics* and turns instead to an obscure passage in the *Ethics* praising monarchy and condemning popular government in order to appropriate the authority of Aristotle.²³

It is characteristic of Locke not to cite the classical political philosophers as authorities to support his arguments. Unlike Thomas Hobbes, Locke exercises caution in confronting the classical tradition. In fact, his description of the eventual inadequacy of primitive monarchy may constitute the only intelligible critique of classical political philosophy that his work provides.

What happened then to render the classical solution to the problem of good government, namely, the polis, no longer viable? Locke compresses his answer into a single sentence:

When ambition and luxury, in future ages would retain and increase the power, without doing the business, for which it was given, and aided by flattery, taught Princes to have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and to prevent the abuses of that power.²⁴

We must exercise some care in unpacking this sentence.

Once civil society begins to provide greater security for property, men become more industrious. As a result, property rapidly accumulates. Greater wealth brings forth increases of population. States become larger, more prosperous, and more powerful. In these more populous societies, the intimate bonds of friendship begin to dissolve among the citizenry. Citizens increasingly become strangers to one another. At the same time, protection for property leads to specialization of labor according to the diversity of faculties among human beings for acquiring property. Great inequalities in the distribution of property emerge within civil society.

Those who managed to obtain much wealth change their manner of living and make lives of luxury the fashion of the age. Monarchs are compelled to compete

with the richest and most influential members of the society in order to retain their prestige and position within society. When everyone was poor and lived in comparative poverty, monarchs were content to live frugally. As Locke says: in America "a King of a large fruitful territory feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day laborer in England."²⁵ But once an aristocracy arises, the monarch has no choice but to outstrip everyone in luxurious living, even if that means appropriating the property of his subjects through oppressive schemes of taxation.

It does not take much to demonstrate Locke's point concerning monarchical ambition. More powerful states and professional armies tempt monarchs to conduct aggressive wars of foreign conquest instead of defensive wars. Foreign adventures cost huge sums of money, and where is that kind money to be obtained? Only by burdening the citizenry at large.

Finally, flattery fits into the equation. Modern monarchs have been taught by flatterers to have distinct and separate interests from their people. Can we identify these flatterers? It would appear as though they fall into two distinct groups. In the first, we may place all those who have lectured kings on their divine right to absolute rule. This doctrine was wholly unknown at the beginning of civil society. Those who favored the early monarchies "never dreamed of monarchy being *jure divino*, which was never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age."²⁶ Locke here is alluding to Robert Filmer, the second rate political thinker whose work he refuted in the *First Treatise*.

In the second group we may place those who have instructed monarchs in the social contract philosophy, namely, the justly decried Thomas Hobbes and his disciples. Hobbes teaches that absolute monarchy is the best form of government. In particular, he advocates hereditary monarchy because a fixed succession of rulers has the best chance of preventing the outbreak of civil war when the reigning monarch dies.²⁷ Locke detests hereditary monarchs, although he is sly enough not to emphasize his complaint. He speaks of "the

inconveniencies of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon mankind."²⁸ Elective monarchy tends to be self-restrained and limited in power, when the conditions of society are rudimentary. Hereditary monarchy inclines towards absolutism. Once again we ought to compare Locke's treatment with that of Machiavelli.

*When they began to make sovereignty hereditary and non-elective, the children quickly degenerated from their fathers; and, so far from trying to equal their virtues, they considered that a prince had nothing else to do than to excel all the rest in luxury, indulgence, and every other variety of pleasure. The prince consequently soon drew upon himself the general hatred. And object of hatred, he naturally felt fear; fear in turn dictated to him precautions and wrongs, and thus tyranny quickly developed itself.*²⁹

It may be possible to describe the defect in Hobbes' teaching as Locke understood that defect. Hobbes concentrated exclusively on the foundation of civil society, on the conditions of emergence of civil society from the state of nature. Locke would agree that some kind of monarchical government is indeed necessary at the beginning of political society in order to secure the emerging state against the depredations and predatory practices of its neighbors. However, Hobbes did not think through his insistence on the superiority of monarchies once the state of nature had been left behind. This is because he did not take sufficiently into account the changing social and economic conditions that occur within civil society over time.

What holds true from the earliest stages of civil society, that monarchies are well adapted to the preservation of lives and property, does not hold true as civil society advances, as property becomes more extensive and property relations grow more complex. New forms of government incorporating various safeguards against absolute power become necessary. Monarchical government may well be the best form of government for a primitive society,

but some kind of republican government or mixed regime is best adapted for modern civilization. Hobbes simply did not realize that the most important task facing modern government would not be self-defense but adjusting the commercial code.

While it is easy to see the impact of changing social and economic conditions on the Locke's commonwealth in its transition from monarchy to constitutional republican government, the effect of changing historical conditions is less visible in its impact upon the laws.

Locke is rightly regarded as strong advocate for rule of law. Indeed, the very purpose of civil society, according to Locke, is to substitute the rule of positive law for control by the arbitrary will of powerful individuals which is the unfortunate but unavoidable outcome of living in the state of nature. "Whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to be governed by declared and received laws, and not be extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions."³⁰ The rational society is thus characterized by being governed by promulgated, standing laws that are fashioned in a truly representative assembly. To be valid, however, the laws must be universal in their application, prohibiting the creation of separate class interests within the society.

Despite his insistence on rule of law, Locke investigates some of the defects of government by law and argues that there are situations where rulers ought to be allowed to suspend the positive laws by appealing directly to natural law, or to the security and preservation of the nation. His advocacy of executive prerogative in Chapter XIV of the *Second Treatise* is the most outstanding example. In the case of a national emergency, where positive law provides no immediate direction and the legislature cannot be readily convened, it is the duty of the executive to take vigorous action in order to preserve the society.³¹ Abraham Lincoln used this line of argument in defending the actions that he took unilaterally following the Southern attack upon Fort Sumter.³² Locke also justifies executive intervention in the case where a strict and rigid enforcement of the laws may do more

harm than good. It is possible, for example, for the judiciary to act in an overbearing and tyrannical manner. Here it is given to the executive to suspend the normal execution of the laws through the exercise of the pardoning power. Similarly, in the case of rebellion, the executive may offer clemency or amnesty to some for the sake of suppressing armed resistance to the government, which might otherwise continue for fear of punishment.

But by far, the greatest scope for the exercise of executive prerogative lies in the field of foreign relations. The tempestuous vacillations in the conditions and the severity of the threats to civil society stemming from the near anarchical state of international affairs render foreign relations the special preserve of the executive. Locke speaks most clearly on this point:

*And though this federative Power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than the Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good.*³³

On its face, this argument implies that the executive ought to be left virtually free from legislative interference in the field of foreign affairs. In the exercise of his powers, the executive should never come into conflict with the legislature, for the legislature will have wisely refrained from hobbling him. But this interpretation demands that we ignore Locke's treatment of the historical evolution of the commonwealth.

In the earliest civil societies, there were few laws. The monarchs that ruled those societies exercised near absolute powers in wartime, far less during intermittent periods of peace. As civilization advanced, the range and influence of laws increased. The control of domestic affairs fell more and more into the hands of aristocratic councils and popular assemblies. With the dawning of the commercial age, legislative bodies proved their superiority in regulating an increasingly complex and expanding

commercial code. As peace and prosperity become characteristic of advanced societies and war anathema, it is to be expected that the character of international relations would undergo a profound change. Orderly trade and peaceful economic cooperation between civilized republics replaces the turbulent and haphazard military joustings among absolute monarchies.³⁴ At some point, executive prerogative in the field of foreign relations must diminish in extent and importance: the wise legislature expands its influence over the executive concurrent with the progress of civilization.

A more obvious line of argument supports the eventual ascendancy of the legislature over the executive. Locke notes that executive prerogative is typically expanded during the terms of good monarchs and limited during the terms of bad ones. Good rulers establish precedents in the use of executive power which are subsequently employed by bad rulers to assault the rights of the people. "Upon this is founded the saying that the reign of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of the people."³⁵ There is an inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this reasoning: legislative assemblies ought to provide for every occasion of the use of executive power that can be circumscribed by law and ought carefully to fence good rulers within the narrow circumference of the laws as well as bad ones.

Contrary to the interpretations of Locke provided by the supporters of broad executive prerogative, an interpretation that takes into account the historical evolution of Locke's commonwealth suggests that such Presidentially restrictive legislation as the 1973 War Powers Act and the 1974 Impoundment Act is fully compatible with Locke's understanding of the evolving character of the relationship between legislative and executive powers in an advanced commercial republic.

Notes

1. Mill. Representative Government, "Criterion of a Good Society."
2. Second Treatise, VIII, 105. "I will not deny,

that if we look back as far as History will direct us, towards the *Original of Commonwealths*, we shall generally find them under the Government and Administration of one Man." Also, Second Treatise, VIII, 106. "Thus, through looking back as far as Records give us any account of Peopling the World, and the History of Nations, we commonly find the *Government* to be in one hand..."

3. Second Treatise, VIII, 101. "Government is every where antecedent to Records, and Letters seldom come in amongst a People, till a long continuation of Civil Society has, by other more necessary Arts provided for their Safety, Ease and Plenty. And then they begin to look after the History of their *Founders*, and search into their *original*, when they have outlived the memory of it."
4. Second Treatise, VIII, 101. "That is not at all to be wonder'd, that *History* gives us but a very little account of Men, that lived together in the *State of Nature*."
5. The Biblical account of the origin of Israel may appear to be an exception to the rule that governments in the beginning were freely chosen and rulers elected, rather than divinely imposed. Nevertheless, the *First Treatise* sufficiently disposes of the argument that the Biblical account supports divinely ordained paternally inherited rule.
6. Second Treatise, VIII, 105. "And I am also apt to believe, that where a Family was numerous enough to subsist by it self, and continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much Land and few People, the Government commonly began in the Father." And, "where several Families met, and consented to continue together: There, 'tis not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest and most likely, to Rule well over them."
7. Second Treatise, VIII, 110.
8. Machiavelli, Discourses, Book I, Chapter II.
9. Second Treatise, VIII, 105. "Paternal affection secured their Property, and Interest under his Care, and the Custom of obeying him, in their Childhood, made it easier to submit to him, rather than to any other." Also, Second Treatise, VIII, 107. "It was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that Form of Government, which from their Infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience they had found both easie and safe."
10. Second Treatise, VIII, 110.
11. Second Treatise, VIII, 107. "The equality of a simple poor way of living confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each mans small propertie made few controversies and so no need of many laws to decide them."
12. Second Treatise, VIII, 107. "Since then those, who liked one another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have som Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another."
13. Second Treatise, VIII, 107.
14. Second Treatise, VIII, 108. "and though they command absolutely in War, yet at home and in time of Peace they exercise very little Dominion, and have but a very moderate Sovereignty, the Resolutions of Peace and War, being ordinarily either in the People, or in a Council."

15. Plato, *Laws*, Book V, 738a.
16. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Chapter 9.
17. Plato, *Republic*, Book III, 415e.
18. Plato, *Laws*, Book IV, 205a-205b.
19. Plato, *Laws*, Book V, 741b-745b.
20. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book V.
21. Plato, *Republic*, Book V, 473d.
22. Aristotle, *Politics*, Book III, Chapters 15 & 16.
23. Filmer, *Patriarchia*, Chapter II. "Yet in his *Ethics*, he hath so much good manners as to confess in right down words that "monarchy is the best form of government, and a popular estate the worst." And though he be not so free in his politics, yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy; he confesseth it to be, first, the natural and the divinest form of government; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy. What can a heathen say more?"
24. *Second Treatise*, VIII, 111. Locke begins this important passage by speaking of a "Golden Age" which "had more Virtue, and consequently better Governours, as well as less vicious Subjects." Cf. Plato's *Laws*. This may betaken as a allusive reference to the purposeful abandonment of classical philosophy and its search for the best regime, similar to Machiavelli's complaint against "those who have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist." Cf. *Prince*, XI.
25. *Second Treatise*, V, 41.
26. *Second Treatise*, VIII, 112, 10. "Though they never dream'd of Monarchy being *Jure Divino*, which we never heard of among Mankind, till it was revealed to us by the Divinity of this last Age;..." For an allusion to Hobbes, compare *Second Treatise* VII, 93. "As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made licentious by Impunity." This is here identified as the "talk" of "Flatterers" directed "to amuze Peoples Understandings."
27. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Part II, Chapt XIX. "There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Sovereign."
28. *Second Treatise*, VIII, 107, 11. "To which, if we add, that Monarchy being simple, and most obvious to Men, whom neither experience had instructed in Forms of Government, nor the Ambition or Insolence of Empire had taught to beware of the Encroachments of Prerogative, or the Inconveniences of Absolute Power, which Monarchy, in Succession, was apt to lay claim to..."
29. Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Book I, Chapter II.
30. *Second Treatise*, XI, 137. "And therefore whatever Form the Commonwealth is under, the Ruling Power outh to govern by *declared* and *received Laws*, and not by extemporary Dictates and undetermined Resolutions."
31. *Second Treatise*, XIV, 160. "This Power to act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called *Prerogative*. For since in some Governments the Law-making Power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern the publick; or to makes such Laws, as will do no harm, if they are Executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all Persons, that may come their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice, which the Laws do not prescribe."
32. Lincoln, "Message to Congress in Special Session," July 4, 1861.
33. *Second Treatise*, XII, 147. "And though this *federative Power* in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet is is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than the *Executive*; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good."
34. Kant, *Perpetual Peace*. "The spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with war."
35. *Second Treatise*, XIV, 166. "Upon this is founded that saying, That the Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of their People."

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Democratization and Stability in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic

Beat Kernen

Abstract

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all embarked on a process of political democratization. They have largely been successful in pursuing this goal by retaining a high degree of systemic and socio-economic stability. Poland and Hungary, on the other hand, have witnessed a return to power of former communists, whereas the Czech Republic, by implementing moderate and gradual social-democratic reforms, has averted such a development. The latter may serve as a model to others in Eastern Europe, regardless of whether reform-communists or "anti-communists" are at the helm of government. In sum, despite some institutional shortcomings and certain questionable democratic credentials, all three countries appear to have promising prospects for continuing internal stability and socio-political reforms, and for the fulfillment of their foreign policy aspirations such as membership in the European Union.

The process of democratization is, at best, a very long one and, at worst, one for which no recipe or commonly accepted theory exists. It includes, therefore, a great deal of caveats and a high degree of unpredictability for any political system that finds itself in the transition from a non-democratic past to some form of democratic future. This is especially true of the former "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe which for several decades were within the Soviet "camp" and thus tainted by the experience of "totalitarianism," an experience that earned them the label of "ideocracies" that was attached to them in order to distinguish these systems from the older and more pervasive Soviet type of totalitarianism as described by Friedrich and Brzezinski.¹ On the other hand, the common denominator of East European ideocracies was that their political system emulated that of the Soviet Union in at least two principal ways: The government derived its legitimacy from Marxist-Leninist

doctrine and the ruling communist party and its affiliates (allied "opposition" parties, trade unions, youth organizations, etc.) were the only organizations officially admitted into the political process. Furthermore, from a Western perspective and as a result of these "ideocratic" and "monolithic" characteristics, political (mass) participation was encouraged and controlled from above, elections were rigged in favor of the official institutions and candidates, and no guarantees existed for civil liberties and rights.

In theory, therefore, democratization in Eastern Europe involves changing the political system from one based upon a single ideology, a dominant institution, a ruling elite which co-opted its members according to normative criteria, and an enforced consensus derived from the official ideology, to one which tolerates competing ideas on the organization of society, accepts and encourages institutional and group pluralism, and allows for upward mobility governed by meritorious criteria. In practice and in a comprehensive fashion, such a move towards democratic pluralism "entails the satisfaction of five situational preconditions and five institutional preconditions," namely:

- (1) a modicum of economic prosperity;
- (2) general system stability and ethnic harmony;
- (3) agreement on the rules of the game;
- (4) the presence of valued and effective institutions;
- (5) general popular contentment;
- (6) free elections for a popular mandate;
- (7) the existence of an effective, independent judiciary;
- (8) a depoliticized bureaucracy functioning according to written rules;
- (9) legal guarantees of basic rights; and
- (10) a free press.²

For convenience, and in order to provide a degree of comparability with

other East European countries,³ this paper will directly address the issues of system stability and ethnic harmony or tolerance (#2), the extent of citizen satisfaction with governmental policies (#5), and the degree of pluralism in and resulting from elections (#6). Indirectly, it will touch upon progress towards economic prosperity (#1) (since popular contentment with government may be largely a function of perceived economic well-being or improvement), rule acceptance (#3) (especially by political groups), and the degree of representation and institutionalization (#4).

In order to achieve these purposes, the paper will evaluate the level of socio-economic unrest and manifestations of discrimination against minorities, the functioning of elected bodies, and the degree of political pluralism in popular elections and representative institutions in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic since the fall of communist regimes in 1989. The selection of these countries is justified by the underlying assertion that the three systems similar features and experiences: They were at the forefront of the revolutionary upheaval in the late 1980s; their citizens enjoy a high standard of living relative to the rest of Eastern Europe; and they continue to be the region's leaders in implementing democratic, pluralistic, and market-oriented principles. From this perspective, Slovakia lags politically and economically behind the Czech Republic (as well as Poland and Hungary), and could better be categorized among Balkan states (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and the states created from the former Yugoslavia).

The paper does not pretend to provide any new theoretical insights into the democratization process. Rather, it relies on existing analytical frameworks as a guideline to describe trends and events in these three East European countries during the last four or five years. The basic goal of this endeavor is to show that Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have emerged from the

turbulent and potentially disruptive post-"Soviet" years with a remarkable degree of political and socio-economic stability. Problems and pitfalls that they face are not insurmountable and exist in other stable systems as well. The major assertion of this article is, therefore, that the characteristics of the transition period in these three countries bode well for their future domestic situation and the fulfillment of external aspirations such as membership in the European Union.

Hungary

Even under the regime of Janos Kadar, Hungary occupied a leading role not only in forging ahead with economic reforms (epitomized by "goulash communism"), but also in the, albeit underground, function played by the opposition in leading the country towards democracy. Crushed in 1956, intellectuals, students, and artists, united in opposition to the Kadar regime and relying on the *Samizdat* press, succeeded in putting pressure on the authorities and keeping alive the discussion of the future of reforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By 1985, seats to the National Assembly were allocated on the basis of competitive, multi-candidate elections, moving the legislature towards a more formidable competitor to the government. By the late 1980s, the Communist Party (the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) tolerated independent political organizations which were to form the backbone of an emerging multi-party system. Prominent among these groupings were the *Hungarian Democratic Forum* (founded in September 1987), the *Federation of Young Democrats* (created in March 1988 as an alternative to the Communist Youth League), and the *Network of Free Initiatives* (established in March 1988) which renamed itself the *Alliance of Free Democrats* by the end of the year.

The Communist Party itself climbed onto the bandwagon of political reform when, in May 1988, Janos Kadar was forced to resign as General Secretary and replaced by Karoly Grosz, together with other reformers newly elected into the Politburo. In February 1989, the Party proposed talks with the opposition on a new constitution and parliamentary

multi-party elections. These talks culminated in an agreement on competitive elections to the National Assembly in 1990 and a referendum, held in November 1989, supporting a parliamentary system in electing a president. The parliamentary elections of spring 1990 sealed (at least temporarily) the fate of the Communist Party. A two-round election brought the Hungarian Democratic Forum, together with two small coalition partners--the *Independent Smallholders Party* and the *Christian Democratic People's Party*, into power. The Democratic Forum's leader, Jozsef Antall, assumed the position of Prime Minister, and the new parliament elected Arpad Goncz (leader of the *Alliance of Free Democrats*), as President of Hungary.

System Stability, Regime Support and Ethnic Tolerance

The peaceful transfer of power resulting from the March 1990 elections to the National Assembly seemed to bode well for political stability in Hungary. Hungary adopted a European-style parliamentary system of government in which both the President as head of state and the Prime Minister leading the government are elected by the legislature. In addition to these appointment powers, the legislature also approves governmental policies proposed by the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet. The separation-of-power principle is guaranteed by the Constitutional Court whose members cannot belong to any political party or be actively involved in politics; the Court has judicial review power over any act passed by the legislature. The President is limited in his or her powers, but may demand from the Constitutional Court a review of a bill's constitutionality. On the other hand, the 1990 elections, based upon a complicated electoral law passed in the fall of 1989, also contained the seeds for political instability. The winning Hungarian Democratic Forum did not gain an absolute majority, and the ruling coalition did not enjoy the two-thirds majority necessary to pass laws or amend the constitution.⁴ As a result, the government of Jozsef Antall failed to address important political and economic

issues, resulting in a growing social and economic crisis within a year of the election.⁵ By 1992, public dissatisfaction with both the political and economic situation had assumed more threatening proportions, although evidence suggests that popular discontent had not grown remarkably from previous years. Nonetheless, 1992 surveys indicated that almost two-thirds of Hungarians were dissatisfied with the general political situation, blaming primarily the government of Jozsef Antall.⁶ An even greater proportion (over four-fifths) of Hungarians expressed negative attitudes towards the economic situation, with over half expecting a further decline in living standards. Again, most blamed the government itself, although a greater percentage (but still less than a fifth) than in the case of political dissatisfaction thought the former communist system was responsible for the current economic shortcomings. Most ominously from a democratic perspective may have been the fact that a bare majority indicated a strong determination to vote in future parliamentary elections, with half of those who would definitely abstain from the polls giving disappointments with politics and the multi-party system as the principal reason.⁷ (Voter turnout rates were, however, also relatively low in the first Hungarian post-communist elections, a phenomenon that one observer explained as the consequence of a lack of mass mobilization in Hungary during the transition phase).⁸

These discouraging political and economic trends, however, did not produce any large-scale social unrest which could threaten the stability of the system. The reason for this lethargic or at least complacent behavior may be sought in the fact that "economic issues were outside party rivalry and trade unions [which might mobilize working class citizens in a Western democracy] had a legitimacy deficit." In other words, Hungary (and other East European post-communist societies) was, at that time, still distinguished by the lack of a traditional or Western-type social-democratic left whose absence explained the "weakness of class-based politics."⁹

Furthermore, compared to other East European countries, Hungarian society is

relatively homogeneous in its ethnic composition which largely explains the lack of destabilizing conflicts that could undermine the political system itself. The country is home, however, to some one million people (about ten per cent of the population) of non-Hungarian ethnicity, of whom the Roma or Gypsies constitute by far the largest group with several hundred thousand members. In the summer of 1993, the National Assembly passed a law on national and ethnic minorities which guaranteed these groups the right of self-government and other collective rights. It seems clear that the Assembly's motivation for the new law partially derived from Hungary's desire to induce other countries in the region, where Hungarian minorities reside, to emulate Hungary's example, an endeavor that appears to have failed so far.¹⁰ Despite these legal guarantees, however, reports have surfaced indicating that Roma, especially, are victims of both official and private (skinhead) attacks.¹¹ Hungary also contains one of Europe's largest Jewish communities whose members have come under attack from nationalist forces. Most ominously and controversially, Istvan Csurka, vice president of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum, publicly promoted a nationalistic, anti-Semitic policy. Although he was subsequently expelled from the party, the democratic credentials of Antall's government were questioned by a number of political opponents and Western human rights organizations.¹² Whereas these disturbing incidences are not unique to Hungary, evidence suggesting that official circles are involved in, or at least tolerate, ill treatment of Roma, Jews, foreigners, and other "non-Hungarians," casts a shadow of a doubt on Hungary's full commitment to democratic principles.

Representative Institutions, Political Parties and Elections

Hungary's politics has been described as "politics by tribe," emphasizing the notion that personalities, trustworthiness, and other personal attributes of political candidates in post-1989 Hungary were at least as important as positions taken by political parties and their representatives.¹³ One might, therefore,

expect a highly fragmented and "hyperpluralistic" landscape characterizing both representative institutions and the political party system in Hungary. The degree of institutional and organizational fragmentation in Hungarian politics, however, has been moderate. As a result of the 1990 elections, six parties shared more than 97% of the seats in the new parliament, three of which (the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders Party, and the Christian Democratic People's Party) formed the coalition government, and the remaining three (the *Alliance of Free Democrats*, the *Hungarian Socialist Party*, and the *Federation of Young Democrats*) formed the opposition.¹⁴ Furthermore, notwithstanding a subsequent split within the Smallholders Party's parliamentary faction, the parliament remained stable after 1990 in terms of both its political composition and party discipline.¹⁵

The stability in the parliament's composition and representatives' voting behavior has also translated into a stable Hungarian party system, although arguments emphasizing fragility have been advanced as well. On the one hand, actual or potential instability may result from three features of Hungarian politics: First, Hungary's political conflicts are seen to be ideological in nature and, therefore, less "bargainable" than divergent views on economic issues where compromise is easier to reach.¹⁶ Secondly, it has been alleged that political parties in Hungary do not represent societal forces but instead reflect interests of elitist, personalized groups that are highly fragile. Most conspicuously, according to this notion, there is no party which represents the working class and its social-democratic interests (supporting social and welfare policies and "authoritarian-conservative" values). Because of the lack of representation, the working class is seen to be susceptible to nationalistic and populist demagoguery.¹⁷ Thirdly, political instability may result from intense competition for the largely unattached electorate, especially in times of unfulfilled rising expectations of economic rewards.¹⁸ In contrast to these arguments in favor of potential political

instability, one expert developed a rather convincing stability hypothesis. His counter-arguments is summarized below:

1) As an ideology, ethnic nationalism, the most destabilizing factor, is absent in largely homogeneous Hungary;

2) ideological conflicts have occurred mostly at the elite level, not within society at large;

3) divergent economic interests may be more bargainable only during periods of economic growth, not in times of recession which Hungary experienced from 1989 until 1992, when they may have been as non-bargainable as ideological conflicts;

4) the recession did not produce socio-political unrest because economic issues were not the cause of inter-party competition and labor unions lacked the legitimacy to bring them to the public's attention;

5) ideological conflicts are not bargainable in a highly fragmented society, but are bargainable in a homogeneous society such as Hungary;

6) other factors besides class determinants explain voting behavior in Hungary, including religion and church attendance; and

7) centrifugal party competition and adversarial elite behavior may be destabilizing factors, but they are mitigated by moderate (normal) political preferences and the absence of political extremism within the Hungarian electorate.⁹

The electorate's desire for and behavior supporting political stability has also expressed itself in the acceptance of existing parties to provide a sufficient choice to voters, despite a significant degree of apathy among the latter. A survey conducted in late 1992 revealed that a majority of Hungarians perceived no need for new parties, even though a quarter of the respondents welcomed the three most recently formed ones (the *Party of the Republic*, the *National Democratic People's Party*, and the *Social Democratic People's Party*).²⁰

Thus, from 1990 until 1994, Hungary enjoyed the reputation of "an island of stability in Eastern Europe" and the coalition government led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum had become the region's longest lasting

government.²¹ The government's stability began to unravel in 1994, however. Facing growing unpopularity, largely due to the fact that over 80% of Hungarians felt that they were worse off than before,²² the Hungarian Democratic Forum had to face a humiliating defeat, not only during the first round of elections in early May, but especially in the second round at the end of the month. The Hungarian Socialist Party (the former reform-oriented communists) garnered a third of the vote during the first round, but increased its share to well over 50% in the final tally. Reasons for the Forum's defeat and the Socialists' victory are generally seen in voters' disillusionment with economic reforms, their longing for security and certainty that the Kadar regime provided (during the period of "goulash communism"), the division within and between the political forces elected in 1990, and the Socialists' effective campaign strategy and convincing promise to voters to focus on their economic well-being without turning back the clock or abandoning democracy and market reforms.²³

The election outcome, however, does not seem to have endangered prospects for continued stability and democratization. First of all, the new parliament contains the same six parties whose representatives were elected in 1990. They occupied over 97% of the seats in the 1990-1994 National Assembly, and control virtually 100% in the recently elected legislature. These results do suggest, therefore, that the Hungarian party system remains stable and the electorate is unwilling to experiment with radical parties on either the far left or the far right of the political spectrum. In addition, voters seem to have regained some of their interest in politics, as indicated by the higher voting turnout rates in 1994 compared to 1990 (almost 70% during the first round and over 55% in the second round). Secondly, the winning Hungarian Socialist Party entered into a coalition with the second largest parliamentary group—the Alliance of Free Democrats—through which the governing parties together enjoy the two-thirds majority necessary to advance their program. Unfortunately, the overwhelming parliamentary presence

has not translated into the government successfully adopting legislative programs or filling top-level positions required for forging ahead with the economic reform program.²⁴

The return of the former communists may be disconcerting to some and signal a growing danger to democratic gains made in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.²⁵ A greater risk, however, seems to stem from potential instability within the government and growing social tensions because of the worsening economic situation. The two possibilities are, of course, intricately linked with one another: In Hungary, the failure of the government to improve the lives of average Hungarians may lead to socio-economic conflicts which in turn could divide the governing coalition and the Socialist Party itself. The resulting governmental instability could threaten both the economic reform program and the democratization process.

Poland

In contrast to Hungary, prior to the mid-1980s Poland did not benefit from a regime willing to experiment with some economic reforms in order to increase the standard of living of its citizens. It did, on the other hand, also not suffer from the legacy of a traumatic event such as the Hungarians experienced in 1956 (or the Czechoslovakians in 1968). Moreover, Poland's communist government gradually dismantled the repressive measures of the Martial Law period and began to implement provisions for the protection of human rights and the granting of civil liberties, including freedom of the press. This, in turn, fostered the gradual, although not always peaceful, growth of a rival power center in the form of an organization that represented the working class. After an initial attempt to crush the rebellious force (by declaring martial law in the early 1980s), the Jaruzelski government felt compelled to negotiate with the competing movement (resulting in the famous Gdansk Agreement) and eventually recognized Solidarity as a result of the "round-table" talks held in 1989. More importantly, these talks led to the creation of a second legislative chamber (the Senate which was to coexist

with the unicameral Sejm) and the position of President to be elected by the legislature. Competitive elections to all Senate seats and to 35% of the seats in the Sejm were held in the summer of 1989. The ensuing victory of Solidarity representatives and the defeat of communist candidates are well known: Solidarity won 99 out of 100 Senate seats, and the Communist Party even lost seats that were uncontested because voters crossed out the names of official (communist) candidates.

System Stability, Regime Support and Ethnic Tolerance

The political system created as a result of the "round-table" talks remained fragile, largely because of the dichotomy between officials from the communist hierarchy who continued to occupy executive positions, and Solidarity members who had won legislative seats and enjoyed widespread popular support. Following the June 1989 legislative elections, the parliament elected General Jaruzelski as President and General Kiszczak as Prime Minister. Growing disillusionment with the Communists' sincerity in pursuing political reforms led to the resignation of Kiszczak less than three weeks after his election, and his replacement by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual. Moreover, in September 1990, Jaruzelski himself resigned, paving the way for competitive presidential elections in the fall of that year. The surprising showing of Tyminski (a millionaire and former Polish exile) and a meagre 40% support for Walesa, forced a runoff election between the two at the end of the year which Walesa easily won.

Subsequent parliamentary elections (see below) witnessed a highly fragmented political landscape; and, as a consequence, Poles were confronted with weak, volatile, and short-lived governments. Nonetheless, the post-1989 political system has remained relatively stable which may be due to two factors: First, despite numerous governments and Prime Ministers, all leaders were supportive of remained dedicated to economic reforms.²⁶ Second, Lech Walesa, while less popular as President than as Solidarity leader in the 1980s,

remained in office almost since the beginning of Poland's post-communist experience until his recent electoral defeat. He was thus able to render stability to the system, especially in the face of economic hardships. In addition, although unable to adopt a new and comprehensive legal framework, the Polish parliament did accept a "Little Constitution" in October 1992, which, apart from other provisions, helped to regulate the separation of power between the three branches of government.²⁷

Also contributing to stability is the fact that public dissatisfaction with governmental policies and the economic situation has not translated into widespread popular unrest. Instead, protests against the government and its course of action have been expressed at the ballot box and, perhaps reflecting Poland's recent labor history, by a series of strikes. In addition, low voting turnout rates may be considered a form of non-destabilizing protest against the government as well. Thus, Polish citizens generally have not resorted to the streets as they did during the communist period, and those who did have largely engaged in peaceful behavior. Finally, it is equally revealing that the most conspicuous expression of anti-government public opinion was not provoked by some economic issue, but the threat from the legislature and the Catholic Church to undo or restrict the right to abortion. Symptomatically, Poles' dissatisfaction with the government's position on this issue translated into support for "pro-choice" parties and candidates, not into protest marches.²⁸

Even more than Hungary, Poland enjoys an ethnically highly homogeneous population with non-Poles constituting a mere 4%. Ethnic conflict is, therefore, unlikely to destabilize the system or discredit the democratic credentials of the government. There have nonetheless been incidences of violence against Romas and reports of insufficient governmental response to them.²⁹ As part of the democratic process, the post-communist governments felt compelled to accept that Poland was ethnically not as homogeneous as some had traditionally proclaimed and, therefore, to undertake steps to protect and promote the cultural

identity of ethnic minorities.³⁰ In general, we may argue, however, that the highly homogeneous nature of Polish society (enhanced by historical trends such as the reduction of the Jewish population because of Nazi Germany's occupation before and during World War II, and the forced or voluntary emigration of Germans after the war), and relatively liberal policies by post-1989 governments towards ethnic minorities, have greatly reduced the ethnic tensions in Poland. On the other hand, recent socio-political developments have created new minorities that are not ethnically defined and may be subject to official or unofficial reprisals. Examples would be non-believers or members of non-Catholic nominations,³¹ and former Communist Party members who may be accused of having committed human rights violations under the communist regime. The question of "lustration" (how to treat such alleged perpetrators), however, is not unique to Poland and may be less pronounced here than in other East European countries where repression was more severe and, as a result, the desire for revenge is more pronounced.³²

Representative Institutions, Political Parties and Elections

Following local elections (the first free ones in Eastern Europe since the end of World War II) in May 1990, and presidential elections in December 1990, free and extremely competitive parliamentary elections took place in the fall of 1991 and 1993. If Hungary's politics can be described as "politics by tribe," those of Poland emerging after the 1991 elections may be labelled "politics of hyperpluralism." During the 1991 campaign, an astounding 69 parties participated, including such frivolous but symptomatic groups as the "Polish Beer Lovers Party." Twenty-nine of these parties gained seats in the new parliament, but none collected more than 14% of the popular vote.³³ Consequently, the coalition government forged from this fragmented legislature was a "hotchpotch" of groups whose members were unified only in being "rabid anti-Communists [or] Roman Catholic nationalists."³⁴ Not surprisingly, the newly elected parliament may have been

highly representative of Polish society (except for the former Communists), but it proved to be extremely fragile. It gave rise to five Prime Ministers and four different coalition governments between 1991 and 1993. Most importantly, these governments were too weak to tackle the most pressing economic problems such as the question of privatization. The privatization issue was not solved in Poland until 1994, despite the fact that Poland had developed a plan (adopted in various East European countries as well as Russia) as early as 1988.³⁵

By 1993, the political situation had become untenable and combined with the economic hardships many Poles experienced as a result of the continued "shock therapy," triggered a rude awakening for both other East Europeans and especially Western observers. In September of that year, Polish voters returned to power the very parties that had been associated with the communist regime and were virtually ousted by the 1991 elections: The *Democratic Left Alliance* (the former Communist Party) gained the largest share of votes with 20.4%, followed by the *Polish Peasant Party* with 15.4%.³⁶

Before looking at the reasons for this "bolt out of the blue for the outside world,"³⁷ an examination of the evolving Polish party system is in order. In contrast to 1991, party "hyperpluralism" had moved towards "pluralism" by 1993 in that "only" 35 parties participated in the elections and a mere five individual parties and one coalition of parties reached the 5% and 8% threshold, respectively, necessary to gain seats in the new parliament. Thus, the fear expressed in 1991 about excessive fragmentation that could potentially lead to anarchy or the undoing of the democratization process was unwarranted. Whereas the 1993 elections witnessed a transfer of power to the "moderate opposition," most voters did not support extremist or "outsider" parties--"radical populists, extremists, cranks, and even beer lovers"--which received less than 6% of the total support, and included *Party X* (2.74%) of Stanislaw Tyminski who had created an uproar in the 1990 presidential elections.³⁸ Thus, we may safely argue

that Poland's party system had consolidated and "normalized" itself by 1993, with most voters backing reform-minded but moderate parties.

This assertion is also borne out by reasons given for the return of former communists in 1993. Whereas the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant party benefitted from the protest vote against economic hardships and the ensuing "angst" of uncertainty, other factors must be taken into account as well. First, the Catholic Church and its hardline stance on abortion and other religious issues (religious education, for example), turned away voters from the governing parties that were perceived to be too closely beholden to official Church dogma. Second, women, apart from the abortion issue, felt particularly hurt by the economic "shock therapy" pursued by the government, since they had often been the first to join the unemployment line or to suffer the consequences of inadequate fixed pensions and losses in social security benefits. Third, rural voters supported the Polish Peasant Party because of its promise to increase governmental farm subsidies and to introduce protectionist measures against agricultural imports from Western Europe. Fourth, pledges by incumbent members of parliament to "settle" with former communists proved to be less appealing than proposals dealing with the economy and other everyday concerns of voters. Finally, both the Democratic Left Alliance and the Peasant Party ran well organized and unified campaigns and offered a program that addressed issues of direct relevance to Polish citizens. By contrast, the losing side was fragmented, too ideological and mired in personal rather than substantive differences.³⁹

The hold onto power by the winning parties, and benefitting thereby the stability of the political system, was further enhanced by the fact that one-third of the votes cast failed to gain any seats for those parties which did not reach the required voting percentage threshold and were allocated to the victorious parties. The end result, therefore, was a parliament in which the Democratic Left Alliance (171 seats) and the Peasant Party (132 seats) enjoy a two-thirds

majority, and four parties constitute the big power blocs: The Democratic Left Alliance, the Polish Peasant Party, the *Democratic Union*, and the *Union of Labor*, the latter two forming the principal opposition to the governing coalition of the former two parties. The inevitable regrouping predicted by one observer in early 1994 has not (yet) materialized, although there have been signs of tension between members of the Peasant Party and their coalition partners from the Left Alliance.⁴⁰

Overall, therefore, Polish political stability does not seem to be threatened by forces within the parliament or the Polish party system. Presidential elections held in December 1995 also did not motivate voters since Lech Walesa and his fierce anti-communist rhetoric have lost much of their earlier appeal to Poles.⁴¹ Walesa's electoral defeat is even more surprising in view of the notion that these elections may have constituted the second political variable (apart from the 1993 victory of the former communists) to determine the future of Poland's transition to a market economy.⁴² Although it was widely expected that the presidential elections would go into a second round between the incumbent president Walesa and the ex-communist Kwasniewski, most experts estimated that Walesa, personifying the struggle against the Polish communist regime, would emerge on top. The reason for this assessment lay mostly in the argument that "a large majority" of Polish voters "simply [did] not want an ex-communist in the presidency," especially since Kwasniewski's DLA was already leading the governmental coalition.⁴³

When Polish voters proved these predictions incorrect and elected Kwasniewski over Walesa by a margin of 51.7% to 48.3%, they solidified a shift towards former communists begun in Poland in 1993, emulated similar developments in Hungary, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, and foreshadowed events in Russia's 1995 parliamentary and perhaps the 1996 presidential elections. In general, however, the electoral victory of ex-communists does not signal a return to the old days, but more the demystification of the free market and

(Western-style) democracy as panacea.⁴⁴ The new president of Poland in particular is generally regarded as a pragmatic and Western-oriented politician who will likely continue much of Walesa's agenda, apart from his strong insistence on the separation of church and state.⁴⁵ He and his government under Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (who replaced Josef Oleksy because of his involvement in a spy scandal) are, therefore, unlikely to threaten socio-political stability in Poland. Instead, instability may be triggered by one of several forces or a combination thereof: First, the third of "unrepresented" voters, i.e., those who voted for parties in the parliamentary elections that did not reach the necessary threshold;⁴⁶ second, the large and growing segment of disillusioned, depoliticized, and pessimistic Poles; and third, somewhat paradoxically, Walesa and members of Solidarity who may seek "revenge" against the ex-communists or be unable to accept electoral defeat.⁴⁷ So far, however, alienation from the central government and frustration with socio-economic circumstances have not meant inactivities by individual Poles within their immediate surroundings, but a situation whereby "social activists are depoliticized and the politicians are desocialized." The remedy for potential political instability thus is to "politicize those people who are taking social initiatives".⁴⁸

The Czech Republic

In 1989, Czechoslovakia and the rest of the world witnessed one of the most remarkable events in post-World War II history: The "Velvet Revolution," a peaceful and very short yet dramatic transfer of power from the Communist Party to intellectuals and former dissidents who were riding a wave of non-violent popular demonstrations. After two decades of harsh, neo-Stalinist rule under the post-1968 leadership, the Czech and Slovak populations got rid of their former rulers and embarked on a surprisingly smooth journey of reforming the political, economic, and social features of the country. These reforms led Czechoslovakia, then Czechoslovakia, and finally the Czech Republic towards one of the most stable and slowly

prospering nation-states in Central Europe.

Once the most inspiring and hopeful communist country during the Prague Spring of 1968, Czechoslovakia turned into one of the most repressive, albeit economically relatively well-off, societies before the revolutions of 1989 swept over Eastern Europe. The legacy of 1968, however, had been kept alive by small groups of dissidents through such informal organizations as *Charter 77* and the *Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted*. That legacy did not necessarily translate into a desire to return to "socialism with a human face" as promulgated by the reformist Communist Party leadership under Alexander Dubcek, but into the longing for political freedoms and a state of law. Furthermore, unlike in 1968, the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989 was not a revolution from above, but an intellectual movement that rapidly spread to, and was in turn fed by, the population at large. Other stimuli came from the "withering away" of 1968 memories among a more assertive younger generation of Czechoslovakians, unfulfilled rising expectations in a stagnating economy, unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and encouraging signals from Gorbachëv's perestroika and glasnost. The Soviet leaders reforms were explicitly designed to induce East European leaders (unheeded in Czechoslovakia) to pursue their own reforms, and implicitly spurned the opposition to continue pressuring the intransigent regime.

Regime intransigence, i.e., the lack of response to social and political pressures for reform, distinguished Czechoslovakia in 1989 also from Poland and Hungary. The government in Poland in particular attempted to move ahead of, and thereby to control, the popular uprising. Although not successful immediately after 1989, the reformist wing of the former Communist Party in both Hungary and Poland was able to play a role in the political arena and eventually even to reassume power. By contrast, in Czechoslovakia the communists were simply swept from power and have, in today's Czech Republic, not been able to exert any significant political influence. Czechoslovakia also differed from

Hungary and Poland in that the country had experienced both a degree of democratization and rapid industrialization before World War II, facts that may partially account for the successes achieved after 1989. Finally, from a negative perspective, Czechoslovakia was the only former communist country in Eastern Europe that ceased to exist in its pre-1989 form (excepting, of course, East Germany which was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia which fell into the abyss of a civil war). Initially, both the Czech and Slovak parts of the federation seemed destined to remain united: The 1990 elections in Slovakia brought the pro-union coalition of the *Public Against Violence* and the *Christian Democrats* to power, and the *Civic Forum* led a pro-federation government in the Czech part. Furthermore, unity seemed strengthened after the elections of the popular and world-wide respected Vaclav Havel as President of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989. By the 1992 elections, however, the *Movement for a Democratic Slovakia* under Vladimir Meciar and Vaclav Klaus' *Civic Democratic Party* in Prague made separation seemingly inevitable, and they implemented it as of January 1, 1993.⁴⁹ Ever since then, the Czech Republic has economically and politically surpassed Slovakia and today constitutes, along with Poland and Hungary, the core and vanguard of the East European transition movement.

System Stability, Regime Support and Ethnic Tolerance

The Czech Republic deservedly enjoys the reputation as the most stable country in Eastern Europe. Both its "Velvet Revolution" of 1989 and the "Velvet Divorce" of 1992-93 were conspicuously peaceful and consensual.

Shortly before the breakup of Czechoslovakia into its two constituent parts, the Czech legislature adopted a new constitution that went into effect on January 1, 1993, and consolidated (albeit not without controversy as will be illustrated below) the political and legal framework of the country. In addition, the Constitutional Court ascertains the balance of power between the branches

of government and the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature.⁵⁰ System stability is further enhanced by the office of the Czech (formerly the Czechoslovak) Presidency with the election of Vaclav Havel at the end of 1989. Although he was limited in his political and constitutional powers, and unable to prevent the breakup of the federation, Havel brought to the office the power of moral persuasion as an "apolitical" intellectual and writer and because of his worldwide prestige as a former political prisoner under the communist regime. In addition, his longevity as the president of both Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic has provided a sense of continuity and purpose to the citizens of the country.

Political stability in the Czech Republic cannot be understood, however, without reference to the economic policies implemented by the Klaus government. Vaclav Klaus, publicly known as a self-professed economist and politician of Thatcherite persuasion, formed his own Civic Democratic Party in 1991 which he subsequently led successfully through the 1992 elections and into the position of senior partner in the four-party coalition government of the Czech republic after January 1, 1993. Contrary to rhetoric and popular opinion both within and outside the Czech lands, he and his cabinet members are "far more paternalistic and interventionist than they would have the world believe," in order, in Klaus' own words, to "maintain the social peace and basic political consensus in this country."⁵¹ Whereas the post-1989 Czech governments were aided by Czechoslovakia's history of democratization and industrialization, and by the policies pursued by the former Communist government (which, to its credit, bestowed neither huge debts nor macroeconomic imbalances to its successor), Klaus, first as finance then as prime minister, pursued a three-tier reform program designed to stabilize the system during the transition phase: First, in early 1991, price liberalization, cuts in subsidies, currency convertibility (for trade), and exchange stability were introduced. In addition, the government reduced its spending during consecutive years which allowed for a tight monetary

policy and low inflation rates. Second, in 1993-94, the government launched a huge privatization program through the selling of vouchers to individual Czech citizens, through which 80% of the citizens acquired personal assets in the private sector and a stake in the well-being of the economic system. Thirdly, a social contract of sorts was established between the government and the working population. The contract provides for low wages for the workers (thereby making Czech exports cheaper and luring foreign investments because of cheap labor costs) who, in turn, benefit from high employment (with the government keeping afloat inefficient industrial enterprises) and low costs of living (through rent and utility price controls).⁵²

At the same time, some of these economic policies contain the seed of potential instability in the immediate future. Particularly, the small number of bankruptcies may indicate that the Czech economy has not been restructured as radically as the government proclaims. Its continued support for large-scale and inefficient enterprises may have kept the unemployment rate artificially low, and some expected it to increase to as high as 8% in 1995.⁵³ Were such an economic downturn to occur, the Czech government might come under similar pressures as its Polish and Hungarian counterparts from those suffering under the reform program which, in turn, would have weakened its political position. Even unemployment rates of 8%, however, are not dramatic compared to those found elsewhere in Eastern or even Western Europe, and as long as Klaus succeeds in keeping the social contract working and the coalition government more or less intact, chances of growing instability are slim.

The political forces at work within the government may indeed seem more threatening than the economic situation. Klaus' Civic Democratic Party has been at odds with its coalition partners, particularly over the issues of the relationship between central and regional authorities and the formation of a second parliamentary chamber. In the debate over the degree of centralization, Klaus preferred a strong central government facing 81 small (and weak) local

authorities, whereas the coalition partners supported the creation of 13 or fewer (and, therefore, stronger) regional governments. In a thinly veiled criticism of President Havel, Klaus objected to the "cantonization" of the Czech Republic and to "dreamers [dreaming] about a new collectivistic world called civic society."⁵⁴ The second point of contention derived from the 1992 constitution itself which provides for the creation of an upper legislative chamber, the Senate. According to Klaus, the members of the Senate should have been elected according to a first-past-the-post system, whereas his coalition partners preferred proportional representation. In addition, differing viewpoints existed on how seats were to be allocated to the constitutionally envisaged 81 single-member electoral districts. Each Senator would serve a six-year term, but with a third of the seats rotated every two years. The Civic Democratic Party left the decision on who should initially serve a two-year, four-year, or six-year term, respectively, to the Minister of Internal Affairs (a member of Klaus' party), a move that created fear among the rest of the coalition that the Civic Democratic Party could control a huge majority of seats in the Senate. Their counter-proposal was to hold elections in one third of the districts, allocating three seats to each, followed by elections held in two-year intervals in the other districts with one seat each. In the summer of 1994, the three junior coalition partners joined the opposition and defeated the Civic Democratic Party's proposal submitted to parliament, thereby postponing Senate elections until after the fall of 1994 when they had been officially scheduled. Finally, Klaus personally has been assailed by opponents as well as members of his own party for espousing authoritarian and "centralistic tendencies."⁵⁵

Notwithstanding these intra-coalition and inter-party quarrels, the Civic Democratic Party has remained the strongest and most popular party in the Czech Republic. Polls in 1994 indicated that Klaus and his party were supported by more than 60% of Czech citizens and over 30% of voters would have cast their votes for the party.⁵⁶ Moreover, a recent

controversy between the Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance, involving spying allegations by the Alliance against the Klaus government, has increased popular support for the Civic Democratic Party again to over 30% (after it dropped early in 1995), whereas the Alliance's rating fell from 12.2% to 8.2%. In addition, in 1995 two opposition parties moved into second and third place, respectively: The *Social Democrats* would have garnered 20.8%, and the *Communist Party* 10% of the popular vote.⁵⁷ Thus, had elections been held recently, we might at worst have witnessed the collapse of the present coalition government, but Klaus and his party would likely have re-emerged as the new governing party.

Ethnic intolerance will also hardly undermine the socio-political system of the Czech Republic, although it is the least homogeneous country in comparison to Poland and Hungary. Eighty percent of the Czech population today is ethnically Czech, but the "populism factor," which could translate into support for extremist or hate groups, has little appeal among them.⁵⁸ There are, on the other hand, at least two ethnic minority groups which have raised concerns about their treatment in the Czech Republic: Roma (Gypsies) and former Sudeten Germans. Comparable to Hungary and other East European countries, the Czech Republic has also had its share of hate crimes against and official neglect of the Roma living on Czech territory. Whereas the government has undertaken some steps to address wrongs committed against the Roma in the past (for example, by supporting the Lety Archives and protecting the Lety camp—a site from where thousands of Roma were deported to Auschwitz during World War II), official policies have not gone far enough to prevent discrimination and violence against this ethnic minority. Indeed, Vaclav Havel has called the "Gypsy problem" the litmus test for a civil society like the Czech Republic.⁵⁹ By contrast to the Roma, the Sudeten Germans are not threatened in their personal safety, but have raised claims because of their treatment after World War II. Following the war, most Germans were expelled

from Czechoslovakia, and their property was confiscated. Today, many ex-Sudeten Germans demand restoration of citizenship and property, or restitution for lost property, from the Czech government. These claims have resulted in some diplomatic conflicts between the Czech Republic and both Germany and Austria, but no solutions are in sight.⁶⁰

Most disturbing has been a law on Czech citizenship which went into effect on January 1, 1993, and is based, ironically, on a citizenship law adopted by the communist authorities in 1969, following the violent suppression of the 1968 reform movement. Devoid of any meaning during the communist period, the 1969 law provided for either Czech or Slovak citizenship in addition to citizenship of Socialist Czechoslovakia. In 1993, Slovakia expanded eligibility to Slovak citizenship to include all citizens of the former Czechoslovakia, whereas the Czech Republic restricted citizenship to those who were officially designated as "Czech" citizens under the 1969 law. The official justification for the restricted interpretation of Czech citizenship rights was the prevention of economic immigrants into the Czech Republic from poorer neighbors, namely Slovakia.⁶¹ Two provisions of the new law—"permanent" residency in the Czech Republic for a minimum of two years, and no criminal record for at least five years—had the specific effects, however, of ex-patriating those citizens who had lived in the country as "non-Czechs" or who were undesirable citizens, i.e., Roma. The organization Human Rights Watch estimated that the law affected about 100,000 "non-Czechs" or "Slovaks," most of whom were Roma.⁶² None of these trends or policies threaten to undermine the Czech social or political system. They are disturbing signs, however, that the democratic credentials of that young nation-state are not as untainted as is commonly believed.

Representative Institutions, Political Parties and Elections

The political institutions in the Czech Republic since January 1, 1993, were largely transferred from the former post-1989 Czechoslovakia. A presidency whose occupant is popularly elected and

enjoys the constitutional prerogative to dissolve the lower chamber of parliament; and a legislature which follows standard procedures of parliamentary systems and elects the government and controls its policies. The one institutional and disquieting aspect which distinguishes the Czech Republic from other East European systems is the ongoing conflict over the Senate as the upper chamber within the Czech legislature. The Senate would not only possess legislative oversight function over the lower chamber but replace it in the case of the government's collapse and the subsequent dissolution of parliament. One observer has argued that two reasons explain inaction or procrastination on this issue: Lower chamber deputies' fear of losing prestige and influence to better known members of the Senate who might be recruited from the former Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia which was dissolved in early 1993. Second, parliamentarians' recognition that their seats in the lower chamber are safe as long as no upper chamber exists which could assume parliamentary functions in case of the former's dissolution. The risk inherent in such a delay tactic is, however, that the Czech Republic, by having failed to implement constitutionally mandated provisions, may provoke a constitutional crisis: The government could fall and the parliament might be unable to agree on a new government, in which case the President could not dissolve the parliament and call for new elections since the non-existent Senate could not assume its constitutional functions.⁶³

Apart from this controversy, the relative institutional continuity stands in sharp contrast to the political party landscape in the Czech Republic which has undergone dramatic changes since the days of the "Velvet Revolution." During the upheavals of 1989, two ill-defined and loosely organized movements—the *Civic Forum*, mostly active in the Czech part, and the *Public Against Violence* in Slovakia—were at the forefront of the struggle against the communist regime. When the need for more formally organized and ideologically more coherent groups became apparent, generally dictated by

the emergence of differing views on the economic and political reform programs proposed by the government, the two movements collapsed and split. By February 1991, the Civic Forum ceased to exist and gave birth to the *Civic Democratic Party* (right-centrist) led by Vaclav Klaus, the *Civic Movement* (left-centrist) headed by foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier, the *Civic Democratic Alliance* (conservative), and the *Social Democratic Party*.⁶⁴ Similarly, other movements that had emerged during the heyday of the "Velvet Revolution" also splintered: the *Association for Moravia and Silesia* (promoting regional autonomy) split into a radical and moderate wing, and the *Christian and Democratic Union* had disintegrated into several Christian-Democratic parties by 1991. Finally, the Czechoslovak Communist Party itself broke into a predominantly Czech and a largely Slovak faction even before the dissolution of the federal system.⁶⁵ The consolidation, division, and renaming of political parties continued in 1992, but their proliferation never reached the proportions of post-1989 Poland. The number of major political parties in the Czech Republic remained relatively constant with about half a dozen being represented in both the 1990 and 1992 federal parliaments. Since no elections have yet taken place in the Czech republic since its separation from Slovakia, the 1992 Czechoslovak elections continue to serve as the basis for representation in the Czech parliament. With the splitting of the Civic Forum in 1991, Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party had become the largest political faction in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly as early as the second half of 1991, controlling 43 out of 300 total seats.⁶⁶ By the June 1992 elections, the composition of the Czech National Council (the future Czech parliament) consisted of the following groups and their respective seat distribution: the Civic Democratic Party (38%; allied with it was the small *Christian Democratic Party*), the *Left Bloc* (17.5%; consisting of the *Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia* and the *Democratic Left*), the (Czechoslovak) *Social Democracy* (8%; now the *Czech Social Democratic Party*),

the *Liberal Social Union* (8%; combining the *Agricultural Party*, the *Czech Socialist Party*, and the *Party of the Greens*), the *Christian Democratic Union* (7.5%; a mostly Catholic-oriented group without religion, however, being its primary concerns), the *Association for the Republic* (7%; considered an extreme right-wing party which, however, often joins forces with leftist parties against the government), the *Civic Democratic Alliance* (7%), and the *Association for Moravia and Silesia* (7%; renamed the *Movement for the Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia* after the 1992 elections).⁶⁷

Most significantly, the Czech citizens have swum against the current emerging in other parts of Eastern Europe: They have refused so far to bring back to power the former communists. Although the Left Bloc is today the second-largest faction in the Czech parliament, it has not been able to increase its voter support to more than 10%, whereas the more moderate Social Democrats have succeeded to reach the 20% threshold.⁶⁸ The latter may, therefore, pose a more immediate threat to the ruling coalition, especially in view of the coalition's internal tensions. Two reasons may explain why the Czechs have not followed the Hungarians and Poles: First, the government of Vaclav Klaus has designed a unique program which combines economic market reforms and governmental support for industry designed to prevent large-scale unemployment. The social contract may in turn provide a partial answer for the government's and labor's shared commitment to market reforms and their mutual dislike of communists. Second, unlike the Polish and Hungarian Communist Parties, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia never shed its image of a hardline, neo-Stalinist party between 1969 (with the beginning of the "normalization" process) and 1989. In addition, the "Velvet Revolution" was too short to give the communists sufficient time to regroup and emerge as an alternative to the reformers before other parties had established themselves.⁶⁹

Conclusion

The process of democratization is well

under way in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. All three political systems (with the partial exception of the Czech Republic) have well established and functioning institutions. In the absence of any unforeseeable internal or external crises, the social, political, and economic foundations of these post-1989 systems are likely to remain stable, allowing the respective governments to pursue their reform programs and foreign policy aspirations.

For the sake of socio-economic stability, however, we may witness a slowdown in the implementation process of market reforms, especially in Hungary and Poland. The Czech Republic under the Klaus government may, in this regard, serve as a model which Hungary and Poland could emulate, but the return to power of Polish and Hungarian "communists" may guarantee such an outcome in any case. Furthermore, the "communist"-led governments of these two countries have proven to be committed to reforms which allays fears of a return to an authoritarian and possibly destabilizing type of government. Perhaps the most convincing argument against such misgivings may be the notion that the former communists, as educated, experienced and nowadays apparently pragmatic politicians, have benefitted themselves directly and profoundly from the liberalization of economic and political activities. In addition, even if they were inclined to authoritarian tendencies, it seems highly unlikely that the respective population (as well as the outside world) would permit a "turning back of the clock." Whereas this does not guarantee against the re-establishment of patronage and clientele networks, it will ascertain stability which, in the long run, may be more beneficial than "lustration" campaigns that could erupt into witch-hunts.

Other factors that could possibly undermine stability are the provisional nature of the constitutional system in Poland (the "Little Constitution") and the ongoing debate in the Czech Republic on institutional reforms (the Senate). In addition, in both Hungary and Poland the growing gap between government and citizenry, expressed in voter apathy and

disillusionment, must be addressed. The treatment of ethnic minorities in all three countries gives some reason for concern as well, especially of the Roma living in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The latter has furthermore acquired the dubious reputation of having adopted one of the most restrictive citizenship laws. In sum however, all three countries appear highly stable and prospects for both continued stability and further democratization are promising. On the other hand, each of these societies and respective governments must retain its vigil for potentially destabilizing trends that could undermine the democratic gains. In that sense, they are still transitional systems.

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Provincial, Metropolitan and Recall Elections in Taiwan, 1994: Appraising Steps in Democratization

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Abstract

This article places 1994 elections for provincial governor, provincial assembly, Taipei City and Kaohsiung City mayors and councils, and legislative recall among trends toward greater democratization in Taiwan. It appraises electoral administration, voter participation, inter-party competition, and election campaigns according to criteria of normative theories of democracy. The appraisal identifies biased electronic media, high costs of campaigns, and allegations of corruption as problems for attention if Taiwan is to sustain democratic institutions that distinguish it from its former Leninist-like policies and practices.

Standpoint of the Observer¹

As a "world democrat," I follow Taiwan as an example of a polity in gradual pursuit of a policy of power sharing. This is the political equivalent of the so-called "economic miracle," the root of the much acclaimed "Taiwan experience."² In 1994, Taiwan voters took further steps toward democratization. One significant step was the election of Taipei's mayor from the elite of the main opposition. Chen Shui-bian's plurality victory over both the ruling party's incumbent, Huang Tachou, and the New Party's champion campaigner, Jaw Shau-kong, made him the opposition's most successful candidate to date in competition for high political offices throughout Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) previously had established itself as a formidable and promising opposition, but until 1994, its highest office was that of county magistrate, including the larger county, Taipei, which surrounds Taipei City but is a sub-provincial jurisdiction. With success in Taipei City, DPP wrested an office of status and power from control by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT). This surrender of office from one party to another, voluntarily and at the hands of votes not of violence, marked an advanced state of democratization. It is one thing to have frequent elections, as

Taiwan does, but another when those elections become competitive. Until 1994, Taiwan resembled Japan so far as concerns inter-party competition; it was a predominant one-party state, in the jargon of political scientists.³ Taipei mayoral results showed that the major opposition party actually can win one of the major elective offices.

A second significant effect of the voting was the apparent diminution of ethnic or national origin issues. Despite the efforts of the New Party to make a controversy of independence versus reunification, voters elected two-island born candidates and one mainland-born candidate. President Lee Teng-hui was said to have insisted on naming James Soong, a mainlander, to the governorship of Taiwan Province in 1993 and thus to break the practice of reserving that post for a Taiwanese. Soong's success in being elected in his own right seemed to vindicate the President's efforts to reduce a divisiveness that some elites have promoted. While the DPP and the KMT leaders differ over policies domestically, they have been closer to one another about cross-Strait relations, as well as democratization, than either has been to the New Party strategists' usual positions. Thus, a national consensus appeared in the making and the risks of polarization of the electorate reduced.

A third effect, likely to flow from the second, was the way in which the election was expected to be interpreted by elites in Taiwan's greatest source of worry, the People's Republic of China. While it is difficult for foreigners to divine the thought processes of political figures in the PRC, one of the latter's chief interests is assumed to be "stability." Electoral results in Taiwan rather closely followed results that had been expected for months. Thus, they could be read as stabilizing on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Stability not only promotes peace across this 100 mile passageway, but it helps to secure the processes of democratization within Taiwan. For several years, the greatest threat to

continuing democratic progress had not been internal but external. External dangers remained, but the election helped to calm rather than excite such threats.

With this added security, Taiwan resumed its pursuit of a democratic agenda. Much remained to be done, as the 1994 campaign revealed, but Taiwan, for the time being, could continue its own course. That democratic course need not imitate any other democracy in particular, but blend American, European, and Asian experiences.

Provincial Governor and Assembly, Metropolitan Mayors and Councils Criteria of Appraisal

On December 3, 1994, Taiwan held its fourth round of elections in one year and a week. At stake were the governorship of Taiwan Province and the mayoralties of the two largest metropolitan areas, Taipei and Kaohsiung. During the previous year, voters in local elections chose 23 county-level and large city executives, their county or city councils, and the chiefs and councils of the smallest units of local government. Voting in late 1993 and twice in early 1994 followed annual trips to polling stations every year since 1989. Taken together, the frequency of elections and the number of offices filled by popular vote give Taiwan the distinction of relying more heavily on ballot boxes than any other polity, perhaps with the exceptions of the United States and Switzerland.

Local elections are not new to Taiwan.⁴ They have occurred regularly in most areas since 1950. What gave special significance to the late 1994 voting was that this was the first time ever for voters in Taiwan Province to elect their governor. Heretofore, the official had been appointed by the Central Government. Similarly, Taipei voters would elect their mayor for the first time in 30 years. The last elected mayor was an independent, Kao Yu-shu, in 1964.

Since Taipei became a special municipality in 1967, the Central Government had appointed the city's chief executive, once including Kao himself, until the 1994 occupant, Huang Ta-chou. Kaohsiung also had lost an elected mayor when its population size qualified it as a special municipality in 1979. The last elected mayor was also the first appointed incumbent. Wang Yu-yun of the prominent Wang family of southern Taiwan was retained as mayor and had been succeeded by four incumbents, including the 1994 mayor, Wu Den-yih.

Taiwan Province, Taipei City, and Kaohsiung City are separate administrative jurisdictions and therefore separate constituencies for electoral purposes. No one votes in more than one of these elections, as determined by place of residence. Every voter, however, is also eligible to cast a ballot for the legislative body that corresponds with the provincial or city executive. The Taiwan Provincial Assembly had been increased in size from 77 to 79, and all seats were up for election. In the Taipei City Council, 52 seats would be filled, and in Kaohsiung City Council, 44.

The Assembly and Council elections are notable for their use of "Multi-Member, Single Vote" constituencies. As is also the practice in electing members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, each voter casts one vote among a number of candidates of all parties running for several seats from the same geographic sub-area. This method, dubbed MM-SV, is used now almost exclusively by Taiwan voters. In 1995, Japan changed to a combination of single-member districts and proportional representation for elections to the lower house of the Diet. Only a few multi-member districts survive in some local elections in the United States, in Thailand's lower house of parliament, and this method is virtually untried elsewhere. This procedure is widely thought to favor large, well-established parties and to disadvantage small parties. At the same time, it sometimes seems to encourage splinter parties, which by selectively nominating only one candidate in a few districts and concentrating their scarce votes can successfully elect a

handful of members.⁵

Electoral processes and procedures for these offices may be appraised according to standard criteria applicable almost everywhere. These criteria apply both to the administration of the election and to the outcomes (who wins) and effects (what wins, or what parties and policies win). A common basis of comparison is percentage of eligible voters who actually cast ballots, or "turnout." Voter turn-out in Taiwan has been consistently high. In elections for thousands of offices filled since 1950, 70% of voters typically have visited their polling station on election day. A number of factors account for high voter participation. One is that election commissions in Taiwan rely on up-to-date household registration lists to notify voters of time and place of voting and to inform them, through an election bulletin mailed to every residence, of the candidates for each office being filled. Elections have been scheduled on Saturdays, treated as work-holidays, and extra trains and busses run to carry urban workers to their provincial places of registration. Another element encouraging high voter participation is competition between parties. As Taiwan has become a more competitive party system, that is as the ruling party, the Kuomintang, faced increasing electoral opposition from first the Democratic Progressive Party and later the New Party, interest and motivation among voters was expected to rise and apparently did.

This election, or rather these elections, had something special to attract voters. They were, as noted earlier, the first time in a generation that Taipei and Kaohsiung voters had the opportunity to vote for mayor and the first time in history that voters in the Province had chosen their own governor. This alone was expected to maintain the 70% level of turnout, perhaps even increase it. Moreover, mayoral and gubernatorial campaigns featured several novelties that also may have stimulated voter attention. Debates and joint appearances among candidates in Taipei and Kaohsiung attracted much media notice. Other new techniques for promoting candidates among voters included endorsements from prominent actors and entertainers.

And not to be overlooked were contentious controversies that divided candidates, particularly debate of the status and defense of Quemoy and Matsu, Taiwan-controlled islands within sight of mainland China.

Hence, observers expected a relatively high rate of voting participation. Anything under 70% would have been cause for comment; anything above, no surprise.

How shall we know who won? By who got the most votes in each contest, of course. Analyzing elections, however, is more complicated than that. Whenever a polity matures, as Taiwan's democratic processes have been becoming more routine, *expectations* of victory are almost as important as actual victories. The ruling party, the KMT, had held office for so long that any defeats for its candidates defied expectations of its inevitable governing. In fact, a sign of Taiwan's political maturation is success among opposition candidates. Power sharing through elections testifies to the KMT's success in devolving power and promoting democratization.

So, any success among the DPP and the New Party candidates became special evidences of victory. Likewise, unanticipated outcomes drew notice. For example, at the time candidates for the three main offices were nominated in August, it was widely expected that the KMT would win the governorship and the Kaohsiung mayoralty, while DPP would win the race for Taipei mayor. Any divergence from this expectation would surprise many observers, although one could find election-watchers with counter-predictions.

Still another effect of the voting was its likely impact on future competition between and among political parties. If the KMT should win all three executive offices, an unlikely prospect, opposition parties would be handicapped severely. If the KMT should win two of the three, and the DPP one, the existing balance of power would be maintained. On the other hand, if the KMT should lose all three or even two major elections, either to the DPP or a combination of the DPP and the New Party winners, one would identify the 1994 elections with increasing competition between parties.

Taiwan would be less a one-party and more a competitive or multi-party system.

Not to be overlooked in defining "winners" were the post-election distributions of seats in the provincial assembly and metropolitan councils. Historically, each of them had been dominated by the KMT. Indeed, in previous elections in the Province and in Taipei and Kaohsiung, opposition parties had fielded few candidates with the effect that the KMT had enjoyed large working majorities in legislatures (the same had been true in county councils and city councils throughout the island). This time, however, the DPP had nominated enough candidates that if they all won, the party could have a small majority in the assembly and in the Taipei council. This was not considered likely, but a possibility was that a high DPP success rate combined with selective victories by the New Party candidates, could threaten KMT's working majorities in one or more legislative bodies.

Such an effect would be important in its own right, but like all other consequences of these interrelated elections set the stage for the *next round* of elections. If any Taiwanese voter felt fatigued from going to the polls so frequently, he could look at the calendar. Within another year, the campaign to elect the President for the first time would be underway, and the terms of members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly would have expired leaving those bodies open for re-election.

So, the results of voting on December 3 promised much—to voters, of course; to winning candidates, to be sure; to the fortunes of parties, also; and to prospects for candidates and parties in the next year's elections. Most of all they would mean much to the stability and continuity of democratic reform, long devolving, now rapidly accelerating, in Taiwan. And beyond Taiwan, the example would be of interest to much of the rest of the world for which democratization remains a goal, not a reality.

Outcomes

More than ten and a half million Taiwanese voters, in elections for provincial governor and assembly and metropolitan mayors and councils,

delivered significant rewards and punishments to candidates, political parties, and proponents of major issues on December 3, 1994. With a near record 76.19% of eligible voters casting ballots for the three highest offices, Taiwan's citizens once again affirmed their attachment to electoral democracy and to continuing, gradual devolution of power.

If one considers the vote from several points of view, each of the political parties had a new balance sheet of assets and liabilities. The ruling Kuomintang won two of the highest level offices ever elected in Taiwan. In Kaohsiung, it re-elected Wu Den-yih, who had served as appointed mayor since 1989, with 55% of the votes among more than 80% of the eligible electorate who went to the polling stations. As the newly elected mayor of Taiwan's second city, Wu continued the KMT's electoral dominance from the days before 1979 when the city's population surpassed one million and qualified it for status as a special municipality.

The KMT leaders enjoyed even greater satisfaction from the election of James Soong as governor of Taiwan Province with 56% of total vote. This was the first time in the four-hundred history of the province that its governor derived office from the suffrage of constituents rather than from the sufferance of a superior central government. As a mainland-born citizen of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Soong won office among a population 85% of whom were born in Taiwan from families that date their island ancestry as far back as 300 years (see chart on Page 34).

The Democratic Progressive Party, the largest opposition party, staked a claim for further power sharing by its victory for Chen Shui-bian as mayor of Taipei. As noted earlier, this was the first time for this office to be elected popularly since 1964, when after losing it to independent Kao, the KMT altered rules for urban elections and made cities larger than one million special municipalities with appointive rather than elective executives. In the wake of consensus formulated at the 1990 National Affairs Conference, called by President Lee Teng-hui to promote continuing

democratization, local governmental autonomy from central government was enlarged and election of Taipei and Kaohsiung mayors devolved to voters.⁶

DPP Taipei candidate Chen, widely respected as an effective opposition leader in the Legislative Yuan, won nomination in a close primary election over fellow-legislator Hsieh Chang-ting. With a united party supporting him against adversaries divided between the KMT and former KMT members in the year-old New Party, Chen became an early favorite among election observers. In the week before voting, *Time* included him among 100 promising leaders in all fields throughout the world.⁷

Despite the mid-campaign suggestion by DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh that the future of Quemoy and Matsu be negotiated with mainland China, Chen held onto his apparent early advantages. He hastened to Quemoy to explain his own position, somewhat different from Shih's, and returned to Taipei to refocus his campaign on the capital city's special problems, among them transportation, pollution, alleged corruption, and more amenable conditions for living. In winning a 43.6% plurality of votes, Chen overcame efforts of the New Party's legendary election campaigner, Jaw Shau-kong, to divide voters between mainlanders and islanders. Taipei's population consists of just more than one-third of people with mainland origins, the largest such concentration on Taiwan.

Jaw, who never had lost an election in Taipei and held records for most votes ever won in a city council or a Legislative Yuan election, could not repeat his campaign magic. He was left to be content with having denied the KMT-appointed incumbent Huang Ta-chou re-election with 20% of total vote. Thus, the New Party, despite Jaw's 30% showing, reconfirmed its role as a spoiler party, which it had established in county magistrate elections just a year beforehand. Moreover, the poor showing of the New Party candidates for races outside Taipei—for Kaohsiung mayor and council and for provincial governor and assembly—revealed the limited constituency available to it, as well as the shortness of its list of articulate and attractive candidates for high offices.

That the New Party performed successfully in contests for Taipei City Council, winning eleven of 54 seats, further testified to its limited geographic appeal, however enthusiastic. Taiwan's unusual "Multi-Members-Single Vote" legislative constituencies worked to the New Party's advantage, which strategists exploited effectively.

Also in the Taipei City Council, the DPP improved its representation, from fourteen to eighteen members. The biggest change in power distribution, however, was the KMT's decline from 37 seats to fewer than a majority, 20. Both the DPP and the New Party apparently targeted their resources on fewer candidates more successfully than did the KMT, which heretofore had enjoyed a reputation for effective mobilization of voters behind selected candidates. The peculiar electoral system and party strategies for implementing it probably did not account for all of the KMT's declining fortunes in the Council. Council members were subject to criticisms over policies and issues similar to those lodged against Mayor Huang, especially by the New Party.

City Council politics now likely would be coalition politics. Recent experience among the three parties in the Legislative Yuan only partially guided expectations of things to come in Taipei's council. In the legislature, the DPP alternately had coalesced with the KMT and the New Party. In the City Council, however, which must work with the new DPP mayor, a more stable coalition was expected to be required than in the Legislative Yuan whose executive counterpart, the premier, is a leader from the KMT. This suggested a possible alliance between the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, with the effect of freezing out the New Party, at least in selecting the Speaker and organizing the Council.

Beyond Taipei, the New Party made negligible progress. Gubernatorial candidate Ju Gau-jeng won only 4.3%, not enough to have his pre-election deposit refunded by the Election Commission. In the Provincial Assembly, the New Party won only two seats of 79, in Kaohsiung City Council three of 44. In both bodies, the New

Party's showing was less successful than that of independents who claimed eight seats each in the Assembly and the Kaohsiung Council. These results also deserved interpretation that left the New Party largely a Taipei regional or sub-regional phenomenon, yet an element in position to broker and bargain between the two major parties. The New Party's fortunes did not appear promising enough to lure away remaining dissidents within the KMT, as might have been the case had Jaw been a victorious candidate. On the other hand, loyalty and cohesion among the New Party adherents permitted its leaders to occupy a position on one side of the KMT with the DPP on the other.

If this was the shape of things to come, at least in Taipei City, the KMT was a reluctant beneficiary of its defeats in that city's mayoral and council races. Certainly KMT national leaders campaigned with a view to getting along with and accepting gracefully the consequences of an opposition victory. This seemed evident in the different role President Lee Teng-hui played in this campaign. In the previous year, he participated unprecedentedly and visibly in county magistrate and city mayor elections. In 1994, he appeared to give more attention to selecting nominees for the three high elective offices than to campaigning for them after nomination. The President spoke for and endorsed Governor Soong and Mayors Huang and Wu, but not with the frequency or intensity of a year ago. This different strategy may have stemmed from either or both of two factors. One was an early anticipation that Mayor Huang could not win, hence the President should invest little in a losing cause. The other was to signal that any fair outcome was acceptable to the leadership of Taiwan's democratization movement. Premier Lien Chan and most members of the Executive Cabinet also were reticent about participating in campaign activities.

Effects

These elections augured for a period of inter-party cooperation, especially in the assembly and councils, as well as Cabinet in which the mayor of Taipei (now an opposition figure) like the mayor

of Kaohsiung takes a seat. Such cooperation would promote the oft-acclaimed goal of "stability," which business as well as political leaders and perhaps a considerable proportion of the citizenry demand and expect. Stability in internal political affairs also provides for continuity in the conduct of cross-Strait relations. Mainland China, a hundred or so nautical or air miles away, remained a primary source of latent, often manifest, concern. Whatever intentions officials in Beijing owned about Taiwan, they too, as we have said, were presumed to favor stability over instability. That these elections adhered to and extended a devolutionary trend begun nearly a decade earlier on Taiwan may not have pleased those in the PRC who regard Taiwan as a "renegade province." Yet the orderliness and predictability of the trend also may have served mainland interests as they appeared to serve Taiwan's.

The sharing of victory between the major parties (the governorship and one mayoralty to the KMT and the other mayoralty to the DPP) induced stability in the gradual devolution of power. A devolutionary equilibrium also drew support from the "anti-provincial" outcomes of the provincial governorship and Taipei mayor contests. DPP legislator and former city councillor Chen Shui-bian would be Taipei's mayor and his election achieved another first. His would be the highest office yet yielded by the ruling KMT to the opposition as a result of an election. Taiwan, thus, had crossed another threshold in its long march of democratization. To well-established traditions of regular elections of many offices by high voter turnout efficiently administered, Taiwan voters now added the ultimate in democratic practice: voting out one party and voting in another.

Taipei City was especially symbolic for the opposition. It is the capital city. It also is the residence of the largest concentration of mainland-born citizens in Taiwan. Its last election of mayor dated to 1964, as indicated above, when the ruling party altered the rules and made mayors appointive in cities of one million population and larger. And Taipei's incumbent mayor was Huang

Ta-chou, considered a protégé of President Lee Teng-hui.

To competition between the DPP and the KMT was added challenge from the energetic and enthusiastic New Party. The New Party had been founded only 15 months earlier by dissidents within the KMT. Led by legislators and former cabinet ministers, Jaw Shau-kong and Wang Chien-shien, the New Party had won few votes and fewer offices in late 1993 and early 1994 regional and local elections. This time with the dynamic and experienced Jaw as its candidate in Taipei, the New Party threatened to win a vital contest in its own right.

Jaw's rallies were something never seen before in Taiwan. Friendly, happy, chanting crowds responded interactively with speakers and singers. Enormous gatherings and congregations of cheering supporters were preceded by miles with caravans of taxis, private cars, trucks, and buses bearing New Party flags and RCC emblems that filled streets leading to rally sites. Were winning platforms and victorious candidates decided according to crowd size and collective noise, the New Party principles and Jaw Shau-kong would have been installed in Taipei's cavernous new City Hall. According to procedures associated with modern democracy, voices of the people ordinarily are counted neither by decibel levels or stomping feet but by a show of hands or secret ballots. When ballots not boots were counted, results gave the DPP control of the Taipei executive branch.

DPP rejoicing in Taipei was matched by KMT gratitude in Taichung and Kaohsiung. At campaign headquarters near Chung Hsing Village, Nantou County, site of the provincial government, James Soong greeted cheers from faithful supporters. His landslide victory was distinctive for several reasons. Although a lifetime member of KMT and a party functionary all his adult career, Soong had never run for public office. He climbed to prominence on rungs of party and bureaucratic ladders. He had been secretary and translator for President Chiang Ching-kuo; director of party propaganda and government information; deputy secretary-general of the KMT; and then its Secretary-General after Lee Teng-hui succeeded the late

President Chiang Ching-kuo as Party Chairman.

Soong's period as party leader and confidant of the new president coincided with numerous reforms in the KMT's and the ROC's democratization. When DPP scored impressive gains in the 1992 Legislative Yuan vote, Soong offered his resignation to take responsibility. Worn by years of party controversy, his future was unclear to observers. President Lee and Premier Lien Chan appointed him governor of Taiwan Province, making him the first mainland-born governor in a generation. This office had been reserved for a Taiwanese as part of KMT's "Taiwanization program" initiated in the 1960s by Chiang Ching-kuo. President Lee had served in this post before becoming vice-president.

Soong used the appointment as a stepping stone to election, against odds set by many observers who did not imagine that a mainland-born KMT candidate would win the allegiance of the island's largest electoral unit made up of 85% provincial-born. In a year and a half, Soong reportedly visited every one of 309 towns and townships. His became a household name through cultivation of mass media, especially by vigorous and thorough exposure of his ceremonial visits by local newspapers, including provincial-owned papers, weekly paid advertisements in Taipei papers, and island-wide reception of provincial-owned Taiwan Tele-Vision. He soon reversed the odds and became the hands-down favorite to be the KMT's candidate. He elbowed aside the popular and ambitious Wu Poh-hsiung, then Minister of Interior and a Hakka (Hakkas are a Chinese ethnic minority among the Fukienese majority of Taiwanese).⁸ Minister Wu withdrew rather than contest Soong, who then was nominated easily by KMT leaders and cadres.

Soong campaigned from August to December intensively. Despite concern in his entourage about DPP opponent Chen Ding-nan, Soong left no stone unturned in relentless pursuit of victory. Chen, former independent magistrate of Ilan County, member of the Legislative Yuan, and recent convert to the DPP narrowly had won nomination in July. Soong ran as if Chen might be catching

up at his heels and in the end left more than a million votes between them. With ineffective support and reportedly sometimes inactive participation from DPP county magistrates and city mayors, Chen won only Ilan County among the 21 cities and counties of the Province.

Soong's victory opened re-interpretations of "provincialism." Though the population of the province is overwhelmingly Taiwanese, a mainland-born KMT stalwart was accepted readily. Some attribute this to the KMT's experience and advantaged organizational resources. These cannot explain all Soong's success because they were available also to the KMT's candidate in Taipei City who suffered a humiliating defeat. Nor can the outcome be put down to vote-buying, which by now universally acknowledged, at last, was also more vigorously prosecuted and better understood. Soong's enormous outlay of NT dollars must have gone to more substantial purchases than traditional vote-bribery--travel, advertisement, staff, printing, communications. In the end, it was clear that many Taiwanese did not take easily to the DPP's slogan, "Taiwanese vote only for Taiwanese."

Recall Election

In the midst of the provincial and metropolitan elections, more than two million eligible voters in the largest county constituency on Taiwan had an opportunity on Sunday, November 27, 1994, to add another chapter to the book on democratization (Taipei County's mayor, You Ching, was a member of the DPP, and as chair of the County Election Commission he managed to schedule this vote on Sunday, in hopes of increasing turnout; the DPP has held its party primaries on Sunday for the same purpose). Only 21.36%, the smallest percentage ever to vote in an important Taiwan election, cast ballots for or against retaining four Kuomintang legislators in an unprecedented "recall election." The four defied an unofficial referendum in May by voters in Kungliao Township, Taipei County, who overwhelmingly opposed the construction of a nuclear power plant. As members of the Legislative Yuan, they were forced

to choose between demands of constituents in part of the whole county that elected them and the policies of the KMT leaders, including President Lee Teng-hui, a native of Sanchih in the county.

Although more than 80% voted to terminate terms of offices of the four legislators, the 21% participation rate fell below that required in the Public Officials Election and Recall Law. The Legislative Yuan only recently had raised this requirement from one-third to one-half of eligible voters, at the behest of the KMT leadership to increase the probability that recalls would be defeated. Some supporters of the controversial legislators urged voters to boycott the recall balloting. For whatever reason, an insufficient number of participants doomed the outcome, whether the voting rate requirement was thirty-three percent or fifty percent. The legislators, accordingly, retained their offices for the balance of terms to expire in January 1996.

On the same day, at sites adjacent to the 883 polling stations in Taipei County, residents could express their approval or disapproval of the proposed nuclear facility, the fourth such in Taiwan. In all 29 county administrative districts, results ranged from 79.7% to 96% against construction. This vote, organized by the county government rather than the county election commission, was unofficial because Taiwan as yet has no provision for referenda. If recall voting settled the fate of four legislators, the unofficial referendum left unsettled whether and where nuclear power was to be expanded.

Recall elections, in which voters decide whether to continue or terminate terms of officials previously elected, are rare except in the United States. The American Constitution provides no opportunity to recall a president or a member of Congress. Among fifty separate states that comprise the U.S., some of the newer states, especially in the south and west, allow recall elections. They are not nearly so popular as other methods associated with "progressive" or "direct" democracy, including initiative and referenda (sometimes called plebiscites).

In Dr. Sun Yat-sen's philosophy of democracy, borrowed partly from practices in America and western Europe, four methods of popular representation held prominence, elections, recall elections, initiative, and referenda. For forty years, Taiwan has held regular, periodic elections of local officials and in the last decade of reform, similar voting opportunities have devolved to the electorate for mayors in the two largest metropolitan areas, for provincial governor, and in 1996 for President of the Republic.

Although the Public Officials' Election and Recall Law historically has included a section on recall voting, this event in Taipei County was its first serious test. Recall elections in actuality are a form of initiative, that is, they result from citizen petitions to call an election on retaining (recalling) an incumbent official or adopting (initiating) a law or policy. Referenda differ from initiatives in that they are devolved (referred) to voters by the government, usually a legislative body.

The history of these forms of direct democracy is recent, roughly the last 100 years in America, Switzerland, and some Scandinavian countries. Taken together they represent a series of checks and balances between elected or appointed representatives and the people they are chosen to represent. Recalls, initiatives, and referenda came late in the development of representative government, after direct election of legislatures. When elected legislators behaved in ways some thought contrary to popular will, they could be countered with a variety of means. One method was to organize political parties that would mediate between voters and representatives. Another was to defeat offending politicians when they stood for re-election at the end of short and fixed terms (two to four years, typically). Still another was to limit the number of terms or years that a person could hold any particular office without a period of inactivity between terms. Recall elections are a kind of last resort of voters when other checks and balances seem ineffective. One reason for the absence of such elections in Taiwan is the relatively short experience there with

democratic practices and institutions. Voters first experience representative government, then perfect it with more direct forms of popular government, as Dr. Sun observed in the growth of democratic institutions in the west.

Thus, one would expect the recent recall election eventually to be emulated by other occasional but not frequent attempts to terminate legislative service between regular elections. This vote in Taipei County was as much about the merits of nuclear power as about the merits of recall elections. Likewise, future introduction of official initiatives or referenda would depend on demands over controversial matters as well as on expectations about the effectiveness of one or another democratic procedure.⁹

Appraising the Electoral Process

In a culture in which public opinion polls apparently are not trusted by respondents, it is difficult to infer voters' motivations. It is less difficult to draw implications of their votes. Post-election interpretations often confuse motives with effects. Whatever the intentions of provincial voters, the consequences of their 1994 electoral choices promoted the status quo and preserved stability in the democratic transformation of Taiwan and the mid-course of pragmatic diplomacy between independence and reunification. If this was the mandate of voters, it coincided with the major trend lines of Taiwan politics, since before Chiang Ching-kuo formally launched what became known as the Democratization Period.¹⁰ Taiwan now enjoyed standing, for however long, as the most democratic polity in Asia. It is not a perfect democracy. It never will be. No democracy is complete. None ever has been or will be.¹¹ But Taiwan's record of frequent, free, and fair elections entitled it to some kind of comparative prize for establishing electoral democracy.

The next agenda of democratic reform emerged rather clearly. Major challenges included perfecting electronic media coverage of parties and candidates to increase the flow of objective reporting and analysis and to decrease the streams of bias, propaganda, and selective attention. Another challenge flowed from continually rising and ever more

exorbitant expense of election campaigns. Taiwan has earned world respect for its growing wealth, yet Japan and the United States have per capita incomes two and a half times greater. Taiwan elections, however, are more expensive than Japan's or America's. And campaign costs would be expected to escalate even further when parties and candidates would be allowed to buy time on television.¹²

With all its residual imperfection, Taiwan democratization earned distinction for having been realized with minimum violence and threats of violence. Sun Yat-sen was an apostle of Asian or more exactly Chinese democracy. He was also an advocate of gradualism, and his heirs have made a metaphor of his idea of tutelage. Political elites gradually have devolved political power from a narrow band of participants to virtually all adult citizens who desire to participate (three-fourths of whom do). Gradual non-violent transformation has been the ruling party's objective. More rapid, but also non-violent, transition has been the opposition's goal. In tandem they have cooperated to make the "Taiwan Experience" more than an example of economic growth. They have given the world, still mostly undemocratic, an unusual lesson in devolution rather than revolution.

For these reasons, the significance of the 1994 elections was larger than which candidates from which parties won which offices on a small island of 21 million people. It testified to the fact that within a generation-and-a-half, leaders and followers could relate together to transform a non-democratic polity into an ever increasingly democratic one. Moreover, this was done in a region of the world said to be inhospitable to an idea thought to be exclusively relevant to another region of the world.

The suggestion that Taiwan imported an ill-fitted suit of electoral clothes is a variant of assertions that Asian values and institutions conflict with western values and institutions. So far as the appropriateness of democracy to Taiwan is concerned, it is worth remembering that Dr. Sun infused Chinese nationalism with some western ideas but that he also modified them to fit the contexts

established by Chinese history and culture. Moreover, particular electoral procedures have been borrowed not exclusively from American or European practice but from elsewhere in Asia. For example, Taiwan's unusual "multi-member, single vote" legislative constituencies apparently derived from Japan, which introduced this method in 1925 and retained it until 1994.

Taiwan, thus, may be said not only to be an instance of gradual non-violent democratic devolution, but of a blend of practices and institutions that is at once universal and provincial. Taken together these offered one formula for continuing peace and well-being of the people of Taiwan.

Postscript

The relatively optimistic projection of the penultimate paragraph more or less coincided with subsequent developments in Taiwan politics and in cross-Strait relations. It did not anticipate, however, the belligerent response of the People's Republic of China to President Lee's June 1995 visit to Cornell University. Following that event, officials of the PRC initiated both propaganda campaigns and campaigns of military threats prior to the December 1995 Legislative Yuan elections and the March 1996 National Assembly and Presidential elections. Notwithstanding these interventions in Taiwan's elections, voters, candidates, and parties successfully conducted and concluded their still more competitive contests. Thus, did participants reconfirm that democratic electoral practices and institutions offer "one formula for continuing peace and well-being of the people of Taiwan."¹³

Notes

This is one of a series of articles identifying trends in increased power sharing in Taiwan, since 1986. See my "Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-1994: Appraising Steps in Democratization", in Political Chronicle, Vol.6, No.2 (1994): p.1-9 and its citations. Simultaneously with this paper, there will appear "Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan, 1995: Appraising Steps in Democratization", in American Asian Review (forthcoming), and "National Assembly and Presidential Elec-

tions in Taiwan, 1996: Appraising Steps in Democratization", in American Asian Review (forthcoming). All papers derive from field work concurrent with the elections.

1. See "Local Elections in Taiwan, 1993-94." loc. cit.
2. Jason C. Hu, ed., *Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Republic of China* (Taipei: Kwang Hwa, 1994); Peter Ferdinand, ed., *Taiwan Takeoff* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
3. Hung-chao Tai, "The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 406-36.
4. John F. Copper with George P. Chen, *Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China* (Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1984), pp. 40-58, and Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 67-70.
5. Andrew J. Nathan, "The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (April 1993), pp. 424-38.
6. James A. Robinson, "The ROC's 1990 National Affairs Conference," *Issues and Studies*, 26 (1990), No. 12, pp. 23-35.
7. *Time*, December 5, 1994, Vol. 144, No. 23, p. 30.
8. Clyde Kiang, *The Hakka Search for a Homeland and The Hakka Odyssey & Their Taiwan Homeland*, both (Eglin, Pa: Allegheny Press, 1991 & 1992).
9. John T. Rourke, Richard P. Hiskes, and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadieh, *Direct Democracy and International Politics: Deciding International Issues Through Referendums* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums Around the World* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1994).
10. References are innumerable. A comprehensive review is Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Political Change in Taiwan* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
11. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven CN: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 8.
12. James A. Robinson, "Shuan-chu ping fan zhen-ma fu tan teh chi," *Chung-kuo shih-pao*, November 29, 1993, p. 8; "Te hsing hou huan jen hui hi mei jih hua chien to," *Lien-he pao*, January 29, 1994, p. 11.
13. This paper, like others in the series, derives from observations made in the field during the election campaigns described and published contemporaneously in *Asian Wall Street Journal*, *Chung-kuo shih-pao*, *Lien-he pao*, *Free China Review*, and especially *Free China Journal*, August 19, p. 7, November 25, p. 7, December 2, p. 6, December 9, p. 7, all 1994, and used with permission. Many observations are retained, others corrected in light of

subsequently obtained information. In general, however, the observational standpoint remains that of the on-site field worker. For accounts and appraisals of subsequent elections, see the forthcoming publications referred to in the note symbolized by an asterisk. Also see my "Myth and Taiwan Politics," *American Asian Review* (forthcoming).

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Gubernatorial and Mayoral Election Outcomes			
Candidate	Party	Vote	Percent
Taiwan Governor			
James Soong	KMT	4,726,012	56
Chen Ding-nan	DPP	3,254,887	39
Ju Gau-jeng	NP	362,377	4
Tsai Cheng-chih	Ind.	37,256	—
Wu Tzu	Ind.	25,398	—
Taipei Mayor			
Chen Shui-bian	DPP	615,090	44
Jaw Shau-kong	NP	424,905	30
Huang Ta-chou	KMT	364,618	26
Jih Rong-ze	Ind.	3,941	—
Kaohsiung Mayor			
Wu Den-yih	KMT	400,766	54
Chang Chun-hsiung	DPP	289,110	39
Tang A-ken	NP	25,113	3
Shih Chung-hsiang	Ind.	13,084	2
Cheng Te-yiao	Ind.	7,513	1

Source: Chung-yang hsüan-chu wei-yuan-hui, Sheng shih i hui i yuan chi sheng shih hsuang chu (Hsuan-chu kai-kuang, 3 December 1994).

Saint Leo College

The College

A Catholic, co-educational, liberal arts college, Saint Leo College was founded by the Benedictine Order and chartered by the State of Florida in 1889. In January 1969, the Order of Saint Benedict transferred title and control to an independent board of trustees.

The Campus

The main campus consists of 170 rolling acres in East Pasco County, 40 miles north of downtown Tampa.

The Students

Approximately 1,000 students are enrolled on the main campus of Saint Leo College. Sixty percent of these students are from Florida. The rest come from 34 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and 27 foreign countries.

The Faculty

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
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