
THE POLITICAL CHRONICLE

The Journal of the Florida Political Science Association

*Popular Participation in Municipal Brazil's Workers' Party:
Democratizing Democracy in Municipal Politics*

William R. Nylan
(Stetson University)

Branch Battles: Nixon, Congress and the Veto Power

Samuel B. Hoff
(Delaware State University)

Diplomacy as an Academic Discipline

Ufot B. Inamete
(Florida's A&M University)

Taiwan's International Participation: Problems, Solutions and Impacts

Dajin Peng
(University of South Florida)

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Editor: Marco Rimanelli, Saint Leo College, University of South Florida. All contributing essays should be sent to Dr. Rimanelli, Saint Leo College, Division of Liberal Arts & Sciences, P.O. Box 2127, Saint Leo, Florida 33574

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Introduction

This issue of the *Political Chronicle* (vol.8, n.2, Fall 1996) contains three scholarly essays from Florida scholars and one from Delaware on both international and domestic issues.

The first essay by Assistant Professor William R. Nysten of Stetson University in DeLand, Florida, is an intriguing case-study of socialist ideals and practices in Post-Cold War Brazil: "Popular Participation in Brazil's Workers' Party: 'Democratizing Democracy' in Municipal Politics". Originally presented at the Florida Political Science Association's 1996 Conference in Sarasota, this essay shows how Brazil's Left survived the collapse of traditional Marxism-Leninism while continuing its traditional popular social struggle against bureaucratic authoritarianism from the military dictatorship of the 1960s-1970s to the current Post-Cold War Brazilian democratic experience. Socialist ideals and practices have now coalesced around a commitment to making capitalist democracy more participatory, egalitarian and socially just, while opposing re-emerging practices of paternalist clientelism. The Left's main strategy has been to focus on citizens' empowerment (ie. using human and civil rights to influence decisions concerning individual lives and the society as a whole) through active popular participation in democratic political processes beyond just electoral mobilization. Thus, this case-study analyzes how the Left's municipal and state governance in Betim, State of Minas Gerais, is based on popular involvement in crafting the annual *Orçamento Participativo* (Participatory Budget), including the local difficulties faced by the Left in achieving such goals.

The next essay is from Professor Samuel B. Hoff, ROTC Director at Delaware State University-Dover: "Branch Battles: Nixon, Congress and the Veto Power". Dr. Hoff analyzes here the veto record of President Nixon, who being elected with a minuscule majority was the first U.S. leader in 120 years to confront a Democratic-dominated hostile Congress, thus forcing him to resort to many Executive powers (executive privilege, war powers and especially vetoes) to pursue his policies. Few case-studies exist on Nixon's use of vetoes (both regular and pocket vetoes) and this one relies on primary documents from Nixon administration files, quantitative methods, federal court cases, Nixon's personality and the inter-branch conflict during divided party government to analyze the Republican veto strategy, congressional and judicial responses, as well as public and scholarly perceptions of Nixon's Presidency.

The third essay is from Associate Professor Ufot B. Inamete of Florida's A&M University in Jacksonville: "Diplomacy as an Academic Discipline". Dr. Inamete evaluates "Diplomatic Studies" as a distinct, albeit small academic discipline (the processes and structures involved in the implementation of foreign policy), compared to larger related academic disciplines like "Diplomacy and International Relations" (foreign policy-making and area-studies), or political science, psychology, anthropology, sociology, management, communications, history, philosophy, linguistics, languages and law. This study also discusses the different university programs for undergraduate or graduate degrees in diplomatic studies both in America and abroad, as well as in-house training programs for career foreign service officers and other experts.

The last paper is by Assistant Professor Dajin Peng of the University of South Florida-Tampa: "Taiwan's International Participation: Problems, Solutions and Impact". Dr. Peng analyzes the recent crisis between Taiwan, Mainland China and the United States, as at least partly triggered by Taiwan's efforts as a newly democratized and economically rich independent country to shed political isolation, join International Organizations and establish global diplomatic relations. Yet this is routinely opposed by Mainland China's veto and threats against normalizing diplomatic relations between foreign countries and what she considers as her "rebel province", while the end of the Cold War and American resentment towards Mainland China's records on human rights, trade and security changed U.S. attitudes toward China and Taiwan in the difficult quest for future stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Marco Rimanelli, *Editor*

Popular Participation in Brazil's Workers' Party: "Democratizing Democracy" in Municipal Politics

William R. Nylen

Abstract

*The Workers' Party in Brazil provides a case study of socialist ideals and practices in the Post-Cold War era. Rooted first in the international lessons of the collapse of the Cold War Left (and, with it, the collapse of traditional Marxism-Leninism) and, second, in the regional and domestic experiences of the Left and popular social movements struggling against bureaucratic authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s, Post-Cold War socialist ideals and practices are seen as having coalesced around a commitment to making capitalist democracy more participatory, egalitarian and socially just. In the Brazilian context, this has meant waging war on re-emerging traditions and practices of paternalism (clientelism and personalism). The main weapon in this war has been citizens' empowerment (ie. consciousness of human and civil rights, and a sense of power to influence decisions concerning one's individual life and that of society as a whole) achieved through active participation in formal democratic political processes above and beyond the minimal act of voting. The main instrument of citizens' empowerment, visible in the party's experiences of municipal and state governance, has come to be the *Orçamento Participativo*, or Participatory Budget (illustrated here by the case of Betim, Minas Gerais). Practical difficulties in implementing this party project, and in realizing its desired results, are discussed and evaluated.*

Contrary to claims that Socialism died along with the Soviet Union, it is very much alive in contemporary Latin America. Brazil's *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT, or Workers' Party), for example, openly espouses Socialism and is that country's largest opposition party.¹ Elsewhere in the region, Socialist forces have made striking advances in the last ten years: *MAS* and *Causa R* in Venezuela, the *PRD* and even the *Zapatista* rebels in Mexico, and the *Frente Amplio* in Uruguay, to name but the most obvious.² But what exactly does Socialism mean in a post-Cold War world? Specifically, what does it mean in a region where democratization and market-oriented economic reforms are as widespread today as were military-dominated bureaucratic-

authoritarian regimes and Statist economies just a decade and a half ago?

Brazil's PT offers a perfect case study both of the development of the ideas of the Post-Cold War Left in Latin America, and of efforts to actually put those ideas into practice. The party's fifteen-year history of implementing its program at municipal and state levels of governance, and of making concerted efforts to learn from and build upon its mistakes and successes, make it a particularly rewarding case study. Like many of its Post-Cold War Left counterparts in Latin America, the PT has committed itself to a "reformist, social-democratic" agenda: "democratizing democracy" by promoting "popular participation" in government planning and operations.³ Indeed, the PT's transformation of the meaning of Socialism, from anti-Capitalism and anti-democratic Marxism-Leninism to a new emphasis on participatory democracy, seems to be a worldwide phenomenon.⁴ As one author put it, "'democracy' has replaced 'revolution' as the central concept in the political vocabulary of the Left."⁵

This article begins with a brief historical sketch of contemporary political and economic developments in Brazil, focusing on the re-emergence of a tradition of paternalistic politics that strongly colors Brazil's ongoing process of democratic consolidation. This is contrasted to the PT's commitment to "democratizing democracy" in action: the *Orçamento Participativo* (Participatory Budget) in the PT-administered city of Betim, Minas Gerais. After explaining the party's commitment to popular participation and describing the evolution of its efforts to put that commitment into practice at the municipal level, the article concludes by highlighting several challenges to its capacity to democratize democracy in Brazil.

Historical Background

Brazil is a country of 160 million people spread over a land-mass larger than the 48 contiguous U.S. states. Following upon half a century of State-led capitalist "developmentalist" policies (ranging in political content from civilian-led populism to military-led bureaucratic authoritarianism), Brazil evolved from an almost monocrap

economy (coffee) to become, by 1990, the eleventh largest economy in the world, with 39% of its economic output devoted to industrial production.⁶ Meanwhile, Brazil developed one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world.

In the 1980s, Brazil became mired in a region-wide recession dubbed "the lost decade", marked by low rates of growth, high inflation, rising unemployment and poverty, growing public sector deficits and fiscal constraints, and crushing external and internal debt burdens on both the private and public sectors. While the rest of the continent adopted free-market and State-dismantling "Neoliberal" responses to these economic ills with varying degrees of enthusiasm, Brazil moved hesitantly in this direction.⁷ From the loud public debate and the plethora of half-implemented government reforms emerged devastating rates of inflation (an average of 284.4% in the 1980s, but reaching levels above 10,000% by the end of the decade) and spiraling public sector debts.⁸ In this context of extreme economic instability, those who had money could keep it safe in inflation-indexed government bonds, in black market dollars, or simply by sending it out of the country. Those with little money suffered the worst of all.

Somewhat paradoxically, given this troubling economic picture, Brazil underwent a successful political transition during the same period. After more than two decades of military-dominated politics (1964-1985) and a relatively tightly 'controlled liberalization' process, Brazil held two free and fair presidential elections in 1988 and 1994, both of which were highly competitive and resulted in the passing of power to a candidate from a party different than that of the incumbent. Even with the resignation under threat of impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992, Vice President Itamar Franco served out the rest of Collor's term with no institutional crisis threatening the legitimacy and continuity of the democratic regime.⁹ Since 1982, municipal, congressional and gubernatorial elections have been regularly held, all without serious incident. Most important of all, perhaps, the Brazilian military has made it clear that

it has no intention of entering politics again, at least not in the foreseeable future.

One could say, therefore, that Brazil's democratic transition was complete as of the mid-1990s. But what can we say about its process of democratic consolidation?¹⁰ For it is in the debate over the ideal vs. the actual practice of Brazil's formal democracy that the PT's post-Cold War Socialist project of "democratizing democracy" has taken shape.

Brazil's Democratic Consolidation, the Re-emergence of Paternalism & the PT's Response

Many have suggested that Brazil is experiencing the re-emergence of a paternalistic, or patrimonial, style of civilian politics that was well-established prior to the 1964 military coup.¹¹ That style is, first and foremost, clientelistic: centered around politicians' distribution of patronage and 'favors' (eg. legislative votes, public funds, public sector jobs, etc.), and candidates promises of such, in exchange for political/financial support and votes.¹² Second the re-emerging style is personalistic: political parties serve primarily as local-based electoral machines for elite political 'personalities' who literally own and control them; nationally, they exist in the sense of loosely organizing and uniting a number of these local-level machines and their leaders into a type of mutual-aid society. These parties are neither ideologically-coherent or issue-oriented, nor are they bureaucratically-coherent "catch-all" parties pursuing goals of interest articulation and intermediation. In fact, representation is not really on the agenda of such parties at all.

Instead, there is the rule of those individuals who, by virtue of their traditionally dominant position, in exchange for "favors" expect continued loyalty from their subordinates. [...] To the extent that this type of relationship prevails, both a requisite and a result of it is the fragmentation of the popular sector, as well as a fierce resistance to any effort on the part of the subordinated classes to organize as collective subjects and to be represented as such.¹³

Since "the popular sector" and "subordinated classes" in Brazil have suffered from both the ups and the downs

of the economy over the last several decades, one is forced to conclude that democracy, in the form just described, has been of little use to this large and growing sector of the population.

This was certainly the conclusion reached by a large number of the PT's leaders and militants as the party grew to become Brazil's largest opposition party in the late-1980s and early-1990s. By then however, the PT was an integral part of that 'defective' democratic system. While the choice to continue to take part in that system was accompanied by a great deal of acrimonious debate within the party over *how* to do so, few questioned the fundamental commitment to legal and non-violent political action.¹⁴ Indeed, facing the reemergence of paternalist politics, on the one hand, and the PT's demonstrated capacity to win municipal elections, on the other, a growing number of voices within the party called for the construction of a new "Democratic Socialist" (or "heterodox Socialist") party project.¹⁵

The principal target of this party project was Brazil's traditional political culture. It was anti-personalist in its construction of internal "mechanisms of rank-and-file participation" in leadership and decision-making and in its dedication to maintaining the autonomy of constituent social movements by not simply subsuming their leaders within the party's leadership ranks; and it was anti-clientelist in its insistence on programmatic unity (once collectively-determined decisions had been reached) and ethically exemplary behavior on the part of its cadres and office holders.¹⁶ More to the point, this was a call for the (re)construction of the party around the central proposition that economic and political exclusion were rooted fundamentally in Brazil's political culture and centuries-old traditions of patron-clientelism (or, simply, patronage politics) and "social authoritarianism."¹⁷ Thus, rather than calling for the revolutionary destruction of private property in favor of the construction of socialist relations of production (ie. Marxism-Leninism's project), the PT's founders targeted the political culture of patron-clientelism, offering in its stead a vision of an "empowered" democratic citizenry (ie. the Brazilian masses, fully conscious of their economic and cultural subordination, and aware that their new-found democratic political rights give them the means and, therefore, the responsibility to participate

in ending that domination).

Given the long association of socialism with Marxist theory's implication of the deep structures of capitalism as **the root cause** of economic and political exclusion, this 'revisionist' focus on political culture needs to be further clarified. To this end, Brazilian political scientist, Evelina Dagnino, has constructed a useful description of the PT's "idea of citizenship as a *political strategy*" by boiling it down to five basic points (in the process, distinguishing it from the more familiar but 'culture-bound' Eighteenth Century Liberal version).¹⁸ Dagnino's first point focuses on the question of individual rights, particularly the right to define new rights as they emerge from the specific and unique conflicts of contemporary Brazilian socio-political reality (seen as inevitably different from the reality of Eighteenth Century Western Europe and the United States which spawned classical Liberalism). "The right to autonomy over one's own body, the right to environmental protection and the right to decent housing are examples ...".¹⁹ Her second point contrasts the concept of "empowerment" to Liberalism's "inclusion", seeing in the latter a top-down strategy of cooptation and social control and, in the former, "the construction of active social subjects, defining for themselves what they consider to be their rights and fighting for recognition of those rights."²⁰ The third point of this "new citizenship" addresses its scope or reach, entailing a vision of its enlargement beyond formal laws and political institutions into all aspects of social life. Thus, the Liberalism's principle of political equality (ie. 'one person, one vote' at the ballot box) could be extended to include 'one person, one vote' in defining the content of the government's budget priorities, or its cultural policy, or even setting up new rules for what constitutes "public order" or "public morality". Dagnino's fourth point constitutes a further criticism of the narrowness of the Liberal paradigm in that "the new citizenship must transcend the privileged focus of the relationship with the State, or between the State and the individual, to strongly include the relationship with civil society."²¹ Citizenship, in other words, should not be just freedom from State intervention in the private realm of civil society, but freedom from elite civil society's interventions in the private and social lives of non-élite

individuals (eg. the afore-mentioned "social authoritarianism"). Finally "the new citizenship transcends a central reference of the Liberal concept, which is the demand for access, inclusion, membership, belonging to the political system, when what is really in play is *the right to participate effectively in the actual definition of that system*, the right to define what it is we want to be included in ...".²²

This concern with "new citizenship," while representing a clear break with traditional Left thinking about the nature of politics and political strategy, represents at the same time a continuation of the Left's traditional moral crusade to 'save' the downtrodden from the ravages of capitalism;²³ and to do so *in spite of the masses themselves*—that is, in spite of the poor majority's "false consciousness" (or, in Gramscian terms, their repression by way of internalizing the values, culture and ideology of the dominant bourgeois class as if they were their own), and/or their conservative fear of the unknown.²⁴ For Marx of course, this crusade was far from being a "moral" one, as it could be both explained and justified in terms of Marxist "scientific laws" of history. For Leftist activists often struggling against the fear and culture-based rejection of the very people whom they wish to enlighten and emancipate, however, the moral component has always been of utmost importance in keeping them committed to the cause. How might this vision of reforming democracy by fostering greater popular participation translate into actual practice? The following case study provides a good illustration.

Betim's Orçamento Participativo

*Those who pay taxes have the right to an opinion on how those taxes are spent in their own city.*²⁵

On 22 July 1995, 129 residents of the working class neighborhood of *Bairro Betim Industrial* in the city of Betim, Minas Gerais met together to discuss what their PT-administered city government could and should do for them.²⁶ They had been called to the meeting by the city government for the purpose of coming up with a list of demands for spending in their neighborhood, in the region of the city in which their neighborhood is a part, and in the city as a whole. In each case, they were asked to vote by a show of hands for their collective sense of the government's top

three spending priorities. Their final task would be to elect from among themselves neighborhood representatives to attend the next month's Regional Budgetary Assembly where regional spending priorities would be discussed and voted upon. These representatives would then elect 500 delegates from among themselves to form a Municipal Budgetary Congress for discussion and a final vote on city-wide priorities.

Opening the neighborhood meeting, Airton Augusto, head of one of Betim's eight Regional Secretariats created by the administration to decentralize day-to-day municipal operations and organize these annual meetings throughout his region, explained to those present the concept behind the city's *Orçamento Participativo* (OP, or Participatory Budget). Since Maria do Carmo Lara Perpétuo was elected mayor as a candidate of the Workers' Party (PT) in 1992, the OP had emerged as a centerpiece of her administration: an "ethical proposal" rooted in the PT's ideology and "mode of governance", which explicitly elevated "popular participation" to a guiding principle.²⁷ This was, in fact, the third year in which the citizens of Betim were meeting in neighborhoods throughout the city to vote for the upcoming year's spending priorities. The previous year in *Bairro Betim Industrial*, only 30 people had shown up. As a result, the neighborhood sent only three delegates to the Regional Budgetary Assembly (one delegate per ten neighborhood meeting participants).²⁸ In 1995 the neighborhood sent 13 delegates to the Assembly. Airton then gave a run-down of past OP results and the extent to which "popular demands" had been met by the administration since coming to power: a municipal hospital, three emergency health care centers, eight elementary schools, 14 daycare centers, eight public dental care centers, and a center of popular culture.

Following Airton's introduction, Gilberto Lisboa, president and founding member of the neighborhood's association of residents, described the history of the neighborhood's struggle to acquire such basic public services as bus service and pavement for principal roadways. He praised the OP for making that struggle so much easier. Gilberto, also a member of the PT, finished by stressing the power of neighborhood unity, and the need for continued solidarity (the responsibility on the part of "those who

have" to understand that others "who don't have" deserve help in order to catch up).

During the two-hour meeting, all who wanted to speak and offer suggestions were allowed to do so. Nevertheless, this was clearly a case of 'guided' popular participation, as Gilberto essentially ran the show. Votes were taken, but not without Gilberto's frequent interjections of, "I think _____ is most important for us", or "That concern is best taken up in a different manner". While this sort of intervention has formed grounds for criticizing the process as window-dressing for PT manipulation, confusion on the part of a great many participants was a constant throughout this meeting and elsewhere. This confusion often took the form of individuals stubbornly pushing personal interests and demands, or repeatedly returning to a point from which the discussion had already moved on until other participants would get disgusted, tune out, or actually leave the meeting. Confronted with this, Gilberto's 'guiding' of the process is understandable albeit, perhaps, lamentable in terms of the didactic purpose of such meetings. At the end of the day, the voting results were as follows:

Neighborhood Priorities: 1) paved streets, 2) neighborhood health post, 3) sewer system;

Regional Priorities: 1) sewer system, 2) cultural center, 3) paved streets;

City-wide Priorities: 1) outfitting the hospital, 2) bus terminal, 3) finish construction of a major traffic artery.

Throughout June and July of 1995, 99 such meetings were held to include all of Betim's 128 neighborhoods.²⁹ As part of a training course focusing on instruction in the basics of accounting and public administration, elected representatives to each of the eight Regional Assemblies were taken in city buses to visit all the neighborhoods of their region in order to see and compare, first hand, the needs of all their communities.

Prior to the Regional Assembly meetings, administration offices used a somewhat complicated formula to determine the amount of budgetary resources each region would receive. From the 1995 estimated municipal revenues for 1996 of R\$130,000,000 (roughly US\$ 144 million), they deducted such fixed costs as public servants' wages, interest payments, and ongoing operations. Then the administration determined that the remaining R\$21,000,000 available for new

investments (16.15% of total revenues) was the effective budget of the *Orçamento Participativo* of 1996.³⁰ Based on regional population figures (higher population meant more 'points') and an assessment of infrastructure needs (current lack of public services meant more 'points'), the administration assigned a percentage of this total "new investments" budget to each region and a percentage to the city as a whole.

The actual budgetary priorities decided upon in the Regional Budgetary Assemblies and the Municipal Budgetary Congress were then presented as an integral part of the Administration's total 1996 budget to Betim's City Council for debate and a final vote. With only three of the Council's 19 members, the PT had struggled bitterly with the chamber from day one of its administration.³¹ Most of Betim's Council Members had shown themselves to represent precisely the sort of paternalistic practices that the PT wished to eradicate: extravagant salaries (eg. the salary of the Council president was almost twice that of the mayor), nepotism, vote buying and clientelistic distribution of public goods and services to supporters, rather than to all eligible citizens.³² Each year, the Administration foresaw the Council's likely opposition to the OP, or the tacking on of self-serving amendments.

With this in mind, on presentation to the Council of the first OP (1994), Mayor Maria do Carmo brought with her some 200 citizens who had participated in the OP process. Throughout the Council's subsequent deliberations, which included debate on 345 amendments proposed by Council Members, delegates from the Municipal Budgetary Congress and Administration officials lobbied to keep the OP exactly as it had been presented. They repeatedly reminded the Council that the OP expressed the direct wishes of the population; to act against those wishes was to risk public condemnation and difficulties in re-election. In the end, only 31 amendments were sustained, and the OP for 1994, thus amended, received unanimous approval from the Council. Each year thereafter, the Administration made sure that citizen representatives from the OP process were present during Council deliberations to support OP results and to remind Council Members that the people were watching. Nowhere in Brazil, except in other PT-administered cities, have

'average citizens' been so directly involved in such important "affairs of State".³³

Explaining the PT's Commitment to Popular Participation

Betim is but one example of a PT-run municipal government committed to *participação popular*. Such a commitment has become one of the defining characteristics of the party's governing platform. But how, exactly, did this commitment come about? Part of the answer refers to the history of the contemporary Left worldwide and ongoing debates over the meaning of Socialism in the Post-Cold War era. Suffice it to say that with the collapse and delegitimation of so-called 'Real Socialism' in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late-1980s and early-1990s, participatory democracy became the new banner of a more democratic, reformist Post-Cold War Left throughout the world. PT intellectuals and activists were perfectly aware of this, and participated actively in the contemporary debates, both at home and abroad.³⁴

But the PT's interest in popular participation must also be attributed to more localized factors: the growth of vocal and activist popular movements emerging in the 1970s and 1980s in the face of the erosion of political authoritarianism and subsequent democratization and the devastating social consequences of Neo-Liberal economic restructuring. Margaret Keck's definitive work on the PT describes how the struggles against the military dictatorship on the part of "new unions" and social movements in São Paulo's urban and industrial heartland (ie. the PT's core constituents) during the late-1970s and early-to-mid-1980s created a strong "ethos" of popular participation "stressing autonomy and self-organization".³⁵ These political struggles broadened in the 1980s to include unions' efforts to keep wages in line with galloping inflation, and more general opposition to recessionary adjustment policies and Neoliberal 'solutions' to Brazil's stagnant and debt-ridden import-substitution based economy.³⁶ Keck argues that the ethos of popular participation in these struggles "was echoed in PT organizers' insistence that workers and the poor could not rely on elite actors to defend their interests and needed to project their own voices into politics."³⁷

It is precisely those PT activists with a past in social movement activism who tend

to promote citizens' empowerment most.³⁸ An integral part of such activists' identities, in terms of ideals and defining experiences, have been forged by mass mobilization (strikes, demonstrations, rallies, etc.) and the consequent transformation of individual consciousness that such direct confrontational politics often entails. They see mobilization, or popular participation, not only as a collective action strategy necessary for the political emancipation of repressed classes or groups; but as the vehicle for an individual's psychological emancipation from the idea of natural socio-political hierarchies and/or the sense of personal impotence in breaking out of such hierarchies. They see empowerment-through-participation as a profoundly life-altering experience, akin in many respects to a religious conversion.³⁹ As such, they often urgently desire to share this experience with others.

While social movements have been clearly instrumental in providing PT activists with a strong ethos of popular participation and a commitment to developing this ethos among the rest of the Brazilian population, the PT's numerous experiences with municipal governance have also influenced and reinforced these tendencies. Unfortunately, this is an area in which the literature to date has been largely silent.⁴⁰ My own field research suggests a significant degree of "institutional learning" taking place as many national party leaders, having experienced first-hand the difficulties, for example, of confronting anti-PT smear and disinformation campaigns on the part of powerful local-level opposition forces (eg. hostile mass media, conservative political groups and business associations, clientelistically dominated neighborhood associations, and even disgruntled organized labor groups) have determined that popular participation programs are an effective means of fighting back by mobilizing support behind 'popularly defined' administration policies, while also demonstrating to participants just who their 'true' friends and enemies really are.⁴¹ With each generation of PT victories (and losses) at the municipal and State levels, a growing cohort of activists-turned-administrators have come to see popular participation programs in this 'practical' light.

From 1982 to 1992, most PT administrations attempted to govern by setting up issue-specific or neighborhood-

specific participatory organs called *Conselhos Municipais* and *Conselhos Populares* -- Municipal Councils and Popular Councils. These Councils were intended to serve as intimate and non-intimidating spaces for public debate, to provide opportunities for citizens to meet together in familiar settings and express opinions on issues that they themselves deemed important, then to channel those opinions directly into the formal decision-making processes of the Administration and the City Council. Ultimately, the Councils were meant to empower the unorganized poor through organized, institutionalized participation. The experience of Diadema, São Paulo, however, was illustrative of one of the practical problems with this idea: participation 'from below' rarely, if ever, emerges fully functional from well-intentioned initiatives 'from above'. Thus, according to Keck:

... it was soon clear that lack of prior popular organization made the council concept unviable. Too easily manipulated by local political leaders, the councils could not count on a legitimacy derived from real representation of the local population.⁴²

Efforts to create, and then shore up, popular participation confronted a serious practical problem: popular participation seemed to be unpopular and unrewarding in terms of electoral politics. The Brazilian public demanded "results", which they generally associated with, on the one hand, highly visible public works projects and, on the other, the all-too-familiar invisible or hidden 'favors' and benefits clientelistically distributed on a personal basis. These, of course, were precisely those aspects of the Brazilian political culture and practice that the PT wished to eliminate with its focus on empowerment via organized popular participation. Electoral logic, however, appeared to dictate the abandonment of this central tenet of the party—a party, it must be remembered, that defined itself and distinguished itself from all others by its commitment to such fundamental principles. The dilemma between ideals and getting elected seemed insurmountable, and it contributed to intense intra-party disputes that threatened to pull the party apart.⁴³

Nonetheless, experimentation in PT-run municipalities produced many variations of the Municipal and Popular Council theme.

Some of these variations moved in the direction of "benevolent vanguardism" (an abandonment of popular participation programs in favor of 'top-down' formulation and implementation of electorally popular 'good works').⁴⁴ Others moved in the opposite direction of throwing more and more decision making into public meetings and Popular Councils. This essay does not analyze all these experiments, but indicates that out of this caldron of practical experimentation and theoretical debate emerged a particular strategy of popular participation that captured growing attention and a growing number of adherents both within and outside the party. This strategy was the *Orçamento Participativo* (OP, or Participatory Budget), illustrated above by the case of Betim.

The OP had its origins in the capital of Brazil's Southernmost state (Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul) when in 1989, the newly elected PT mayor Olfvio Dutra, began to construct Popular Councils that were, by then, a trademark of PT administrations throughout Brazil. Dutra however, added his own touch: he envisioned a Popular Council of the Participatory Budget with the idea that citizens should participate in the processes of deciding where their money should be spent. Brazilian Political Scientist, Ricardo Taveres, summed up the way the Council worked as follows:

Popular assemblies in 16 city zones bring together 10,000 people and 600 grassroots organizations to debate and vote on municipal expenditure priorities. From a general budget of approximately \$465 million, about 31% is divided up in an open, public process involving large numbers of people and interests. As a result of this process, the city's residents decided the city should concentrate its resources on legalizing land titles, providing water and sewage to poor communities (almost 100% of households now have clean drinking water), transportation, and environmental clean-up.⁴⁵

The success of Porto Alegre's OP in terms of growing levels of citizen participation and a clearly popular redistributive outcome of the entire process, capped by the PT's re-election in that city in 1992, generated great interest within the party in studying and hopefully duplicating the strategy.⁴⁶ Thus, in Betim and virtually everywhere where the party governed in the

mid-1990s, the OP had emerged as the cornerstone of the "PT's mode of governance".

Assessing the *Orçamento Participativo* as a Model for "Democratizing Democracy"

Dutra and the Porto Alegre PT seemed to have discovered in the OP a means of balancing the party's ideological demands of promoting citizens' empowerment via popular participation, with the pragmatic demands of electoral politics that incumbent policies or challengers' policy proposals be in the voters' own self-perceived immediate interests. Other experiences where PT-run administrations invested heavily in the OP process, however, have not fared so well. The region surrounding Betim offers several exemplary lessons of the challenges that the PT faces in pursuing popular participation as a party project. The town of Timóteo, Minas Gerais, for example, administered by the PT in 1989-1992, found its OP process torn by dissent between rival factions of the party (one led by the Mayor, the other by the party leadership). As the faction that opposed the Mayor gained control over the OP Municipal Council, the ensuing internecine warfare rendered the whole OP process useless as a tool of popular participation and citizen empowerment.⁴⁷

Strong evidence suggests that such factional in-fighting between 'moderates' in the administration and 'radicals' in the party leadership and organized non-élite civil society has been more the norm than the exception.⁴⁸ These and similar struggles among the national party leadership have provided a perfect target for critics and opponents of the PT to attack its organizational integrity and, even worse, its capacity to govern.

The nearby town of João Monlevade, Minas Gerais, also administered by the PT from 1989 to 1992, offers an example of a different sort of challenge. As in Betim, João Monlevade's OP process proceeded relatively smoothly with increasing numbers of participants each year, and resulted in a significant distribution of attention and resources to the town's poorest and most neglected neighborhoods. Yet it was precisely in those neighborhoods where the party lost by the biggest margins in its bid for re-election. In the outlying shantytown neighborhood of Novo Cruzeiro, for example, OP-directed resources constructed

an elementary school, a fully-staffed and supplied local health post, paved roads, street lighting, water and sewer systems and municipal bus service. Several hundred local residents participated in annual OP meetings with administration officials, oftentimes including the Mayor. Yet when the 1992 elections arrived, only 31.6% of the neighborhood's voters voted for the PT, while 68.4% voted for the conservative opposition candidate, an old-time politician who had twice been mayor with the pro-military party during the dictatorship.⁴⁹ One Novo Cruzeiro resident and former OP neighborhood representative explained the PT's loss in the following terms:

[Administration officials] should not have said that the OP priorities would be done by 'time X'. The people wait, 'time X' passes, and they start to get demoralized: 'They said they would do this, but the money's not there.' In fact, eventually, the money came and they did get things done. But people had to wait. They felt that the government should have attended them personally and much sooner. This was the case even for PT supporters. This is what made Laércio [the PT's candidate] lose.

Bio [the victorious candidate] always attends people individually. He'll also give stuff to people in his party and avoid known PT supporters. The PT attended people generally, without discrimination. It didn't matter if you were not a PT member or supporter. Bio, no. Things only go to his supporters. Also there was the campaign of Dona Zarifa [Bio's wife] distributing baskets of food, powdered milk (and our water's not even fit for drinking!), old cooking oil. She has 1,500 godchildren all over the city. She distributes soup every Thursday, but PT supporters don't get any.⁵⁰

Experience shows, therefore, that popular participation programs, including the OP, have a hard time avoiding a contradiction between the long-term transformative goal of citizens' empowerment via popular participation, and the short-term instrumental goals of authoritative administration and getting re-elected. This contradiction has been targeted by the PT's opposition in a number of ways. Programs like the OP are incredibly time-consuming and, as such, relatively costly when compared to the 'normal' process of a

handful of officials governing behind closed doors. They lend themselves to criticism that the PT is wasting time, money and administrative expertise when it could simply be 'giving the people what they need'. Similarly, confusion and lack of decorum at OP meetings—combined, as in the case of Timoteo, with intra-party factional infighting—is easily criticized as wasteful anarchy ("*bagunça*"). The "guided participation" and the alleged overrepresentation of PT activists at such meetings is also easily criticized as "political theater", or indoctrination. Such criticisms can contribute to tarnishing the image of the party and, ultimately, to losing elections. The point is that the PT's flagship party platform—empowering citizens through popular participation in governance and, in the long run, changing Brazil's paternalistic political culture -- is not necessarily "popular" in terms of attracting votes. "Electoral logic" of having to please average voters inexorably pushes one along the path of least resistance; and that means not only accepting, but actively taking advantage of existing political culture as 'the way of the world'.

While refusing to surrender completely to such "electoral logic", the PT's internal divisions have been exacerbated by the efforts of its elected officials to compromise on its ideological commitments for the sake of playing the democratic game. Such infighting contributes to an image, consistently played up by opposition politicians and a generally hostile media, of a party so fragmented that it is incapable of governing, and/or incapable of reining in its radical anti-democratic and pro-communist elements. It also no doubt contributes in some degree to Brazil's growing public disinterest in party politics in general, as more and more Brazilians apparently come to identify partisan and ideological debates with politicians' self-centered and corrupt game-playing.⁵¹ Such a loss of public interest in democratic politics can only play into the hands of the PT's less civic-minded opponents.

In the end, it may be that widespread "empowerment" of non-élite citizens, in practice, is rooted primarily in the initial "heroic" phase of the breakdown of authoritarian régimes (the period of "the resurrection of civil society" in social movements and 'popular' parties), when there is a clear repressive enemy and a bright, idealizable future.⁵² If that turns out

to be true, the PT can only look forward to a limited number of newly-empowered "new citizens" filling society and swelling the ranks of the party. Party leaders may have to settle for working within the dirty game of paternalist democracy, trying to sell its image as an ethical party with a moralizing project of democratic transparency and moderate redistribution to a potentially interested but easily 'swayable' electorate. If, however, the leadership opts for an exclusive hard sell of its transformative agenda of empowerment via popular participation, it may find itself relegated to an historical footnote by the very political cultural dynamics it desires to change.

On the other hand, should ideals be criticized for being overly idealistic? Is it not the nature of ideologies to be somewhat Utopian? Pure pragmatism makes for boring politics and disinterested citizens. Pure self-interestedness destroys politics and creates alienated and cynical non-citizens. Democratic politics, then, needs such ideals in order to foster opinions and stimulate debates, to call attention to political processes, to mobilize and organize collective action, and either to keep political outcomes from being skewed too close to a generally overly-conservative and oftentimes short-sighted 'pragmatism', or to keep it from degenerating into a game of pure interest-driven power politics. As long as 'idealistic' ideals contain a commitment to uphold the basic rules of the game of democratic politics -- as the PT's Post Cold War democratic Socialism clearly does -- then it could be argued that they should be included in that game with a bare minimum of programmatic compromise.

Ultimately, of course, the answer lies within the PT itself. As it confronts the practical contradiction between "ideological logic" and "electoral logic" (and the still-present voices of those who would take the party backwards to a Leninist logic), the outcome will emerge not only from the struggle between factions that represent each of these positions, but perhaps even more from the ability of the PT's municipal and state-level administrations to implement programs like the *Orçamento Participativo* with a maximum of efficiency and positive publicity, and a minimum of internal bickering.

In the midst of its internal divisions, the party has staked its reputation on its "new style of governance". That being so, the future of the PT could very likely be

determined by the success of popular participation programs in helping win elections and fill the party with new activists and members. If unsuccessful for whatever reason, Brazil would lose the only significant nationally-organized political force willing and capable of pushing "paternalist democracy" in a more egalitarian direction.

Conclusion

The PT in Brazil represents a new Post-Cold War generation of Socialist ideals and activists. Rooted in the international lessons of the collapse of the Cold War Left and in the regional experience of the Left and popular social movements struggling against bureaucratic authoritarianism, this generation defines the transformative agenda of Post-Cold War Socialism in terms of making capitalist democracy more participatory, egalitarian and socially just. In the Brazilian political and cultural context, this means waging war on re-emerging traditions and practices of paternalism (clientelism and personalism) that have permeated Brazil's process of democratization. The main weapon in this war is citizens' empowerment (ie. consciousness of human and civil rights, and a sense of power to influence decisions concerning one's individual life and that of society as a whole) achieved through active participation in formal democratic political processes above and beyond the minimal act of voting; for without active empowered citizens, formal democracy is meaningless in that it is incapable (short of highly unlikely elite benevolence) of addressing the severe inequalities and injustices that pervade the lives of most Brazilians.

In the PT's experiences of municipal governance, one can see the progression of efforts to put these ideals into practice. The culmination of those efforts is the *Orçamento Participativo*, or Participatory Budget. As illustrated by the case of Betim, Minas Gerais, over 10,000 citizens of Betim had participated in the OP process in its second year (1994). Out of these 10,000, the party hopes to foster its ideal "new citizens", and to fill the party itself with new activists to help further the cause.

As such efforts come to characterize the PT as a political actor, their success or failure carry enormous weight when discussing the future of the party. Prospects are not encouraging, although neither is pessimism entirely called for. Opposition

from powerful sources is everywhere (most of the political class, the media and economic elites), while factional infighting within the PT and among its support coalition eat away at the party's image. And strongly-inculcated and widely-practiced paternalist practices thwart election, or re-election of party candidates.

Nevertheless, the commitment of the PT's leadership and local activists to improving the lives of Brazil's poor and excluded majority pushes the party forward in spite of such obstacles. So far, it has been successful in treading the fine line between electoral logic and ideological logic. It has, after all, grown to become the largest party of the Left in Latin America. But its future depends on its capacity to continue to walk that line: to win elections, to 'deliver the goods' (ie. implement popular and beneficial public policies) and at the same time, to pursue citizens' empowerment and popular participation.

The future course of Brazil's democratic consolidation could very well hinge on the success or failure of the PT's efforts. Even those who are predisposed to dislike the Left need to recognize that, throughout the 1990s, the PT was the only substantial political force committed to making Brazil's highly unequal "paternalist democracy" more truly democratic. And if it is true that the PT is representative of the Post-Cold War democratic Left throughout Latin America, then perhaps a reassessment of old attitudes about this new Left is appropriate, because only the PT in Brazil and the Left generally in Latin America, are truly concerned with "democratizing Democracy".

Notes

1 As of October 1996 there existed twenty-five legally registered political parties in Brazil. As evidence of the PT's relative prominence within that field, its presidential candidate in 1988, Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, came extremely close to winning the election (46.9% against Fernando Collor de Mello's 53.03%) and placed second place again in 1994 (27% against Fernando Henrique Cardoso's 54.5%). See Frank Mazella, "Democratization in Argentina and Brazil: New Political Paradigms", in *The Political Chronicle*, Vol.7, No.2 (1995), p.15.

As of June of 1996, the PT had fifty federal deputies serving in Brasília (out of 485 total in the Chamber of Deputies), and five Senators (out of 81). In 1990, only thirteen Deputies and one Senator served under the banner of the PT. In 1994, the PT elected its first governors in the states of Espírito Santo and the Federal District of Brasília. There are 27 states in Brazil's federation. In the first municipal elections allowed by the outgoing military government in 1982, the PT elected mayors in two cities: Diadema, São Paulo and Santa Quitéria, Maranhão. In 1985's elections in the state

capitals, the PT won in Fortaleza, Ceará. In 1988, the PT elected 32 mayors. By 1992, that number jumped to 56. All told, by mid-1996, the party had governed or was governing in some 72 cities ranging in size from 2,320 to nine and a half million inhabitants (as of 1994, there were 4,974 municipalities in Brazil). Additionally, in 1988, the PT elected 35 vice mayors and 1,015 city council members throughout the country. In 1992, the corresponding numbers were 70 vice mayors and 1,148 council members.

Other dimensions of the magnitude and diversity of experience in local governance were equally impressive. Following 1992, the PT administered municipal governments in 18 states, as opposed to only ten during 1988-1992. And while 16 (or 62%) of its 1988-1992 administrations were located outside of São Paulo (Brazil's most industrialized and richest state), the corresponding figure for 1992-1996 was 45 (or 80%). In addition, while only ten (or 42%) of the cities administered by the PT from 1988-1992 had a primarily non-industrial economic base, 33 (or 59%) of those picked up in 1992 were non-industrial. Information is from: Keck *ibid.*, p.157 & 277; also Bittar *ibid.*, p.301-24; also "Prefeituras Petistas, 1993" (PT, Secretaria Nacional de Assuntos Institucionais, mimeo: 27 April 1993); also "Curiosidades eleitorais" *Boletim Nacional* (mimeo: no date, but late October or November, 1992). According to the party leadership, as of April 1996 the party had 750,000 registered members throughout the country.

2 See *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. XXIX, No.1 (July/August 1995). This edition of the journal is entitled, "Introduction to Hope: The Left in Local Politics".

3 "Every now and then, the Brazilian Workers' Party claims that it does not wish to become a reformist, social-democratic organization.", argues Carlos Castañeda in *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p.153; "But if one looks at what it does and not so much at what it says, it is in fact becoming just that."

4 For Latin America see S. Jonas & E.J. McCaughan eds., *Latin America Faces the Twenty-First Century: Reconstructing a Social Justice Agenda* (Boulder: Westview, 1994). See also: Castañeda, *ibid.*; Barry Carr & Steve Ellner eds., *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika* (Boulder: Westview/Latin American Perspectives Series, No.11, 1993); Richard L. Harris, *Marxism, Socialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview/Latin American Perspectives Series, No.8, 1992). For analyses of post-Cold War Left thinking and practice outside Latin America see: Robin Blackburn ed., *After the Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism* (London: Verso, 1991); Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Revisited* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993).

5 Harris, *ibid.*, p.195.

6 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report, 1993* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.186, 188 & 212. In rank order measured by total Gross National Product the countries were: USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, Canada, Russian Federation, Spain, China and Brazil. "Developmentalism" is well-defined by Jeff Frieden as a State-directed and foreign capital-fueled "multiclass alliance aimed at protecting the domestic economy from a hostile external environment, encouraging the growth of national industry, and redistributing income away from traditional sectors toward the modern urban economy." Quote from J.A.

- Frieden, Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.47.
- 7 What might have looked like caution on the part of Brazilian policy makers in implementing neoliberal reforms turned out, in actual fact, to be a form of gridlock resulting from fierce intra-élite political struggles as specific sectors of the economy, organized in corporatist-style trade associations and allied with portions of the State bureaucracy, sought to protect their sector-specific 'turf' and privileges (eg. subsidies, tariffs, etc.) from budget cuts and privatizations while, at the same time, attempting to pass the costs of adjustment onto others. This is a process dubbed "defensive scapegoating", in William R. Nylen, "Liberalismo Para Todo Mundo Menos Eu: Brazil and the Neoliberal Solution", in Douglas A. Chalmers et alia eds., *The Right and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1992), p.259-276.
 - 8 UNDP, *Ibid.*, p.188.
 - 9 See Mazella, *Ibid.*, p.11-18.
 - 10 For definitions and examples of the distinction between democratic "transition" and "consolidation" see Scott Mainwaring et. alia eds., *Issues In Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
 - 11 For excellent examples of this argument see Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities and Paradoxes" and Frances Hagopian, "The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition", both in Mainwaring et alia, *Ibid.*, p.17-56 & 243-293.
 - 12 Describing patronage as one of the "guiding principles of Brazilian social organization" in the 19th Century (and beyond), Richard Graham defines it as an "exchange of protection for loyalty, benefits for obedience" with obvious implications for social domination: "... failure to obey or be loyal subjected one to punishment by the patron and left one openly vulnerable to exploitation by others. No dichotomy existed between force and benevolence: each drew its meaning from the other.... In a culture of genuine paternalism, the recipient [of a "favor": a job, a contract, a public service, etc.] must see himself as a child, with cloying gratitude for a father's benevolence that cloaks enormous relief at escaping punishment." Quote from Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p.23-24 & 244.
 - 13 O'Donnell, *Ibid.*, p.44.
 - 14 For this debate see Clovis Bueno de Azevedo, *A Estrela Partida ao Melo: Ambigüidades do Pensamento Petista* (São Paulo: Entrelinhas, 1995); also William R. Nylen, "Reconstructing the Workers' Party (PT): Lessons from Northeastern Brazil", in Douglas A. Chalmers et alia eds., *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
 - 15 For one elaboration of that project see Jorge Bittar [org.], *O Modo Petista de Governar* (São Paulo: Teoria & Debate, 1992).
 - 16 Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Something Old, Something New: Brazil's Partido dos Trabalhadores", in Carr & Ellner eds., *Ibid.*, p.230-237. In the words of Lúcio Kowarick & André Singer, "The Workers' Party in Sao Paulo", in Kowarick ed., *Social Struggles and the City: the case of São Paulo* (New York: Monthly Review, 1994), p.227-228: "We are dealing with a party with a large number of militants that during the 1980s simultaneously assisted in the construction of union and grass-roots movements while being forged by these movements."
 - 17 Defining "social authoritarianism" as a political culture rooted in an historical tradition of social and political-institutional organization, Evelina Dagnino describes Brazilian society as one: "... in which economic inequality, misery, and hunger are the most visible aspect of a social order presided over by the hierarchical and unequal organization of all social relations: what we could call social authoritarianism. Profoundly rooted in Brazilian culture and based predominantly in criteria of class, race and gender, social authoritarianism reveals itself as a system of classifications that establish different categories of persons, laid out in their respective places in society.... This social authoritarianism engenders forms of sociability and an authoritarian culture of exclusion that infuse the whole of social practices and reproduce the inequality of social relations at all levels." Quote from Evelina Dagnino, "Os movimentos sociais e a emergência de uma nova noção de cidadania", in E. Dagnino, *Os Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1994), p.104-105 [her emphases].
 - 18 Evelina Dagnino, *Ibid.*, p.107-109 [her emphasis].
 - 19 E. Dagnino, *Ibid.*, p.108.
 - 20 E. Dagnino, loc. cit. "Empowerment" refers to the transformation from an individual's prior mentality of fatalism and dependency to a new sense of personal responsibility to struggle against systemic domination, and a belief in one's efficacy to be successful in doing so. For a good analytical discussion of the concept, see John Friedmann, *Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991).
 - 21 E. Dagnino, *Ibid.*, p.109.
 - 22 E. Dagnino, loc. cit. [her emphasis].
 - 23 Socialism is the name that has been given, since the 19th century, to popular aspirations for a life of dignity, justice, and liberty. These aspirations have not disappeared with the Berlin Wall or the statues of Lenin. Carlos M. Vilas, "Latin America: Socialist Perspectives in Times of Cholera (Preliminary Notes for a Necessary Debate)", in Jonas & McCaughan, *Ibid.*, p.102.
 - 24 See Carl Boggs Gramsel's *Marxism* (London: Pluto, 1976), especially chapters 1 & 2.
 - 25 Maria Helena Ribeiro, Betim's Secretary of Planning, quoted in "Betim persegue a gestão participativa", *Diário do Comércio* (Belo Horizonte) (3-5 July 1993).
 - 26 "Betim is a municipality situated in the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte. It is marked by strong contrasts. One the one hand, it collects the second highest amount of tax revenue in the state of Minas Gerais, it has a modern and consolidated industrial park, and has strong potential for growth and adaptation to new economic and technological conditions. On the other hand, it is the municipality with the highest statewide indexes of favelização [shantytown living conditions] it has a high rate of unemployment, and the greater portion of its 200,000 inhabitants lack the training to occupy the jobs created within the city. The current administration entered office finding only 30% of households with access to sewers, only 40% of the roads were paved, there was not a single hospital bed in the public sector, and seven entire neighborhoods had neither running water nor electricity. In other words, Betim is a municipality rich in revenues, but with a population that is poor and totally lacking in public services." Quote from, Otília Macedo Pinheiro, Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação "Orçamento Participativo: A Experiência de Betim", paper presented at the II Encontro das ABOPS Regionais (mimeo, no date). See also James Brooke, "Inland Region of Brazil Grows Like Few Others", *New York Times* (11 August 1994); also "Betim tem o maior índice de favelas", *Estado de Minas* (24 March 1993), p.1 & 21.
 - 27 Other dimensions of Betim's popular participation strategy included election of municipal-run public school officials by school employees, students and parents; also election rather than executive appointment of councilors in the Municipal Health Council, and the expansion of the number of MHC councilors from 18 to 24. See "Betim: Eleição na rede escolar municipal", *Diário Da Tarde* (19 November 1993); also "Conselho Municipal de Saúde é ampliado", *Frente A Frente* (16-30 June 1993).
 - 28 In 1993 more than 6,000 people participated in Betim's first OP process. In 1994, that number rose to 10,000. See "Betim promove outra reunião do Orçamento Participativo", *Diário Da Tarde* (23 June 1995), and "Betim discute prioridades administrativas para 95", *Diário Do Comércio* (30 August 1994).
 - 29 Some meetings included two or three smaller neighborhoods together.
 - 30 This represented a significant increase over 1995's R\$7,040,000 (or 11% of total revenues of R\$64,000,000). See "Betim terá problemas no orçamento do próximo ano" *Diário Do Comércio* (27 July 1994). For a journalistic account of 1995's OP process, see "Orçamento Participativo de Betim já teve nada menos de 128 reuniões", *Diário Da Tarde* (30 August 1994).
 - 31 The key issue at the outset of the PT administration was the percentage of the budget allocated to the Council in salaries, expenses and 'extras'. See "Manifestação acaba em pancadaria na Câmara de Betim", *Hoje em Dia* (5 July 1994); also "Vereadores de Betim fazem greve contra a prefeitura", *Estado de Minas* (4 August 1994). No single party controlled the City Council. Its 16 non-PT members came from a variety of the type of parties described in Section III: the PDT, PFL, PMDB and PSDB.
 - 32 See, for example, "Betim: continua impasse sobre os salários dos vereadores", *Estado De Minas* (22 January 1994); also "Câmara mantém vantagens dos 'privilegiados'", *Diário Da Tarde* (28 May 1994); also "Vereadores de Betim contratam até 50 parentes", *Hoje em Dia* (3 March 1995).
 - 33 This is discussed in terms of "democratizing democracy" in Castañeda, *Ibid.*, p.358-90.; similarly, it is spoken of in terms of a "reevaluation of the individual [as] expressed in the importance of the citizen in political processes" in Jaime Osorio "Liberalism, Democracy, and Socialism" in Jonas & McCaughan [eds.], *Ibid.*, p.31.
 - 34 These debates were amply covered, for example, in the PT's trimesterly academic-style journal, *Teoria e Debate*, and the monthly party newspaper, *Boletim Nacional*, mailed out to local party leaders and dues-paying party members.
 - 35 Margaret E. Keck *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale, 1992), p.79.
 - 36 For the debate neoliberalism during Brazil's economic crisis of the 1980s, see Nylen, (1992) *Ibid.* For the PT's response to the crisis, see Emir Sader "Brazil: Against the Winds of Change" in Jonas & McCaughan [eds.] *Ibid.*, p.104-115.
 - 37 Keck, loc. cit.
 - 38 For this argument, see Nylen (1997) *Ibid.*
 - 39 For gripping portrayals of this, see Warren E. Hewitt "Maria Ferreira dos Santos" in W.H.Beezley & J.Ewell [eds.] *The Human Tradition In Latin America: The*

- Twentieth Century (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1987), p.245-57; also the story of Azuleika Sampaio in Daniel H. Levine & Scott Mainwaring "Religion and Popular Protest in Latin America: Contrasting Experiences" in Susan Eckstein [ed.] *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.203-40.
- 40 Notable exceptions include works coming out of São Paulo's Centro de Estudos de Cultura Contemporânea (CEDEC): for example, Pedro Jacobi "Alcances y límites de los gobiernos locales progresistas en Brasil. Las alcaldías petistas" in *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, (2/95), p.143-62; also Cláudio Gonçalves Couto *O Desafio de Ser Governo: o PT na Prefeitura de São Paulo (1989-1992)* (S.P.: Paz e Terra, 1995). Also see issues of the Brazilian journal, *Pólis*, especially "Participação Popular nos Governos Locais", No.14 (1994).
- 41 For a more detailed and empirically-supported argument of this "institutional learning" in the PT, see Nysten (1997) *ibid.*
- 42 Keck, *ibid.*, p.203. Many other PT local governments reported similar less-than-satisfying experiences with Municipal Councils and Popular Councils. See for example, Ruth C. L. Cardoso, "A trajetória dos movimentos sociais", in E.Dagnino [ed.] *ibid.*, p.293-296; also Kowarick & Singer *ibid.*, p.248-299.
- 43 While PT leaders would like to describe such disputes as normal and even healthy (the result of "internal democracy"), or as overblown by opposition forces and the media in order to discredit the party by presenting it as hopelessly fragmented; the fact remains that these disputes have seriously damaged the party and continue to do so. See Clovis Bueno de Azevedo, *ibid.*
- 44 See Nysten (1997).
- 45 Ricardo Tavares, "The PT Experience in Porto Alegre", in *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol.XXIX, No.1 (July/August 1995), p.29.
- 46 Part of that effort can be found in the published outcome of a series of sector-specific seminars with PT elected officials and administrators organized by the party and held throughout the country in early 1992: Bittar [ed.] *ibid.*
- 47 Information regarding Timóteo is from personal interviews with Luiz Dulci, Secretary of the Government of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais and founding member of the PT (20 July 1995); Geraldo Nascimento, Representative of State Assembly and former Mayor of Timóteo (24 July 1995); Galba Gomes da Silva, former Secretary of City Services of Timóteo (24 July 1995).
- 48 For an illustrative and meticulously presented example in the case of the PT's administration of São Paulo from 1989 to 1992, see Gonçalves Couto, *ibid.*
- 49 Information on João Monlevade comes from personal interviews with numerous former members of the PT's administration including Leonardo Diniz Diaz, former Mayor (10 July 1995); Marco Aurélio Loureiro, City Councilmember and former Economic Secretary (5 July 1995); Dr. Laércio José Ribeiro, former Secretary of Health and the PT's Mayoral candidate in 1992 and 1996 (6 & 13 July 1995); also several long-time residents of Novo Cruzeiro and participants in that neighborhood's OP processes: Antonia Maria Ferreira Dias, Ângela Maria Babosa and Nair da Silva de Cassia.
- 50 Personal interview with Antônia Maria Ferreira Dias (9 July 1995).
- 51 See Rachel Meneguello "Partidos e tendências de comportamento: o cenário político em 1994" in E. Dagnino [ed.], *ibid.*, p.159. Meneguello points out that when asked their party identification, Brazilians continue to respond in large numbers that they identify with "none": 36.8% in 1989, 48.4% in 1990, 43.8% in 1991, 34.2% in 1992 (Presidential election year), 39.2% in 1993 and a whopping 58% in 1994.
- 52 For this argument, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Fear in Military Regimes: An Overview" in J.E. Corradi et al. [eds.], *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992), p.21. A similar argument, that the activism and political significance of non-elite social movements is greater before the restoration of a democratic regime, is made by Phil Oxhorn in "Where Did all the Protesters Go? Popular Mobilization and the Transition to Democracy in Chile", in *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol.21, No.3 (Summer 1994), p.49-68.

William R. Nysten is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stetson University, DeLand, Florida.

Branch Battles: Nixon, Congress and the Veto Power

Samuel B. Hoff

Abstract

Richard Nixon utilized many powers of office during his six-year presidency. While executive privilege, war powers, and impoundment have received the bulk of scholarly attention, few studies have concentrated on Nixon's employment of the veto. The present work uses primary documents from Nixon administration personnel, quantitative methods, and federal court cases to uncover reasons why vetoes were issued, reveal trends about the frequency of vetoes, and explain congressional and judicial responses to them. The findings highlight the extent to which Nixon's personality and background along with the political environment he governed in influenced his legislative success. The study likewise refutes those who attach solely negative connotations to the purposes and impact of President Nixon's veto usage.

This essay analyzes the veto record of Richard M. Nixon thirty-seventh president of the United States. Elected by a 0.7 percent margin of the popular vote, the first chief executive in 120 years to confront an opposition party-controlled Congress at the outset of his tenure, and facing the unparalleled challenges of a divisive decade, Nixon wielded the weapons of his office in order to advance legislative initiatives, control federal spending, and protect the authority of the presidency against usurpation. The veto became a primary tool in the Nixon administration's arsenal.

The study reviews Richard Nixon's personal characteristics, traces his administrations approach to dealing with Congress, delineates the veto strategy formulated to block unwanted bills and reward supporters, examines both regular and pocket veto employment by the Nixon White House together with legislative responses to them, and evaluates the overall impact of veto use on public and scholarly perceptions of Nixon's presidency. The research furnishes a unique perspective as to how a chief executive's background and inter-branch conflict during divided party government have consequences for the

American political system.

Nixon's Background and Character

Several authors describe how Richard Nixon's personal features shaped his life and outlook. Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman observed the following traits about his boss:

There was an insecurity factor, but the interesting and perhaps unique ingredient in Nixon's makeup, as far as I was concerned, was the way he tried to overcome that insecurity. He accomplished it by imposing a rigid self-discipline to shield him from mistakes. That self-discipline was so tight it was unnatural.¹

Jules Witcover contends that "Nixon's self control was forged in the fires of his bitter defeats in 1960 and 1962 and tempered in the next six uncertain years."² Stephen Wayne asserts that "Richard Nixon was not a spontaneous person in his words, actions, or relations with others. He preferred structured situations in which roles were clearly defined."³

Conversely, it would seem, "[c]rises were essential to Nixon's conception of leadership, providing him with a means to test himself and raise his self-esteem by successfully surmounting the crisis."⁴ Nixon "saw every major event in his life as a crisis in which he was beset by enemies who had to be defeated. Each time, he prevailed in the same way, by combining homework, independence, and rhetoric—and sometimes by creating another crisis."⁵

Other writers comment on perceived inconsistencies in Nixon's character. House Speaker Tip O'Neill stressed that, though "Nixon was a brilliant guy, he had a quirk in his personality that made him suspicious of everybody—including his own cabinet."⁶ Kenneth BeLieu believes that Nixon "didn't know government, but didn't like the practical nuts and bolts of it. He could do it but he didn't want to."⁷ John Rhodes scrutinizes Richard Nixon below:

His personal attributes would give

him a mixed score. He certainly had a philosophy and the ability to make decisions. There is grave doubt as to whether or not he really liked his fellow man, and, in the latter days of his administration, his personal integrity was subject to question. As for humility, I doubt that he could even spell the word.⁸

President Nixon relied heavily on his self-confidence in his running battles with the legislative branch.

Legislative Approach and Relations

Richard Nixon's personal traits and skills affected his outlook toward Congress during his presidency. Nixon's "reclusive and introspective style, plus his reluctance to put pressure on members of Congress personally, made for less than satisfactory relations with the legislative branch."⁹

Nixon "was, by all accounts, a very solitary person, unenthusiastic about speaking with members of Congress either in person or by telephone, someone who disliked confrontations of any sort, met regularly with only a few trusted aides, and was inclined to steal off to a hideaway office to work on his own."¹⁰ One reason for Nixon's attitude toward Congress may be that his "own experience in Congress was not an altogether happy one. In the House he functioned as a loner, and as a senator never gained entry into the Senate's inner club of influentials."¹¹ As president, Nixon was ill at ease in most contact with congressional members."¹² His relations with Congress became more formal and less frequent as his administration progressed.¹³

Political considerations also affected Richard Nixon's legislative approach. The president's problems with Congress began with his back-to-back defeats of Supreme Court nominees Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell. As a result, "Nixon now knew he would get little support from the legislative branch and that he would have to use the prerogative powers of the presidency to

affect public policy."¹⁴

The Nixon White House chose the antiballistic missile program as an issue to score an early, decisive victory over the Democratic-controlled Congress. Instead, the near-defeat of the measure Unserved to forecast the trouble the administration would have in its dealings with Congress."¹⁵

Because Nixon was the first president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to be elected without a majority nor his party in either chamber of Congress, conciliation across party lines was obviously in order.¹⁶ But cooperation did not translate into success. Nixon himself notes the following about his maiden-year record in Congress:

I sent over forty domestic proposals to Congress that first year... Only two of these proposals were passed: draft reform and our tax bill... We won some tactical legislative victories over the Democratic opposition, but it would soon become clear that my attempts to get Congress to approve creative and comprehensive proposals were going to be resisted.¹⁷

Over the remainder of President Nixon's first term, "only 35 percent of his publicly requested programs were approved." During his second term, "Congress opposed Nixon more often in 1973 than it had opposed any president in the previous twenty years."¹⁸ The decline in Nixon's job approval ratings "liquidated his political capital with Congress."¹⁹

The combination of personal animosity and political opposition led the Nixon administration to concomitantly attack and bypass the legislature. Richard Nixon "used, to the fullest extent, his constitutional powers as president against the Congress,"²⁰ thereby moving the office "away from its traditional accountability to Congress to a posture of autonomy and secrecy."²¹ Like other chief executives, Nixon "could often block Congress and proceed without majority support in Congress"²² through employing such tools as the presidential veto.

The veto, often regarded as a negative device because it signifies a stalemate between the president and Congress,

nonetheless has utility as a bargaining tool to shape legislation. Correspondingly, Richard Nixon wielded the veto as both a defensive instrument and as a vehicle for influencing legislative action.

Veto Strategy

At various points during President Nixon's tenure, his staff discussed an overall veto strategy as a means of achieving the administration's goals. A 24 December 1970 memorandum from John Whitaker to John Erlichman opined that "[i]t does serve the President very well for OMB to take a fairly rigid veto position on close calls."²³ On 8 July 1972, Casper Weinberger responded to President Nixon's earlier requests for a veto plan with the following:

Veto Strategy

—Narrow definition... a simple list of bills to be vetoed.

—Broad definition... a fiscal policy designed to get and keep control of the budget and master the continually rising tide of federal expenditures thereby insuring the future strength of the private enterprise system.

—Strategy actually began with your January call for a rigid spending ceiling and was furthered by your signing statement accompanying the debt ceiling bill.

—Recommend that you announce to the Congress now your intention of vetoing various bills. You may, however, want to wait until the first such bill comes to you for signature.²⁴

A March 5, 1973, letter to the president from William Timmons included planning for a discussion of a veto strategy in an upcoming meeting with Senator Hugh Scott and Representative Gerald Ford. Below are the talking points suggested by Timmons:

—Your Budget recommendations for social and service programs are at an all-time high. Many programs are being expanded or reorganized to function better. To avoid tax increase or inflation, excessive spending bills must be stopped in Congress—or vetoed and sustained.

—The international community is

also watching to see if the government can hold down spending—so dollar problems abroad are tied to issues in Congress!

—Vetoes are not only Budgetary acts, but political issues. All Republicans must hang tough on vetoes. Haven't heard of any Member being defeated because of a vote to sustain. Members in voting for passage took care of constituents, now must support vetoes.

—There must be party discipline and strong leadership on early vetoes to "sober" Congress. Whips should work for votes, not only poll Members' views. White House staff, Cabinet, and departmental personnel will help win votes.

—In developing GOP unity, leaders must be cutting edge demanding Members' support. Vetoes must be a test of party loyalty.²⁵

In contrasting legislative proposals with vetoes, one Nixon assistant stated that: "It is much easier to turn the veto. You don't have to devote too much energy over too long a time. At the most, the battle will last two weeks."²⁶ A Nixon domestic policy aide weighed the costs of saying no to legislation which the administration opposed:

A veto is the least expensive of any choice, short of doing nothing. Depending upon the original legislation, all a veto requires is a signature. The burden is on the proponents. If the bill squeaked by in the first place, the President doesn't have to commit much at all.²⁷

Regular Vetoes and Congressional Response

Most scholars agree that economic reasons played a major role in President Nixon's decision to utilize the veto power. "He repeatedly vetoed measures passed by Congress that would have expanded U.S. funding of education and social programs."²⁸ Nixon issued more vetoes as his administration progressed because he assumed that "a broad attack on congressional spending had to be launched, given a failure of congressional

compromise by this point."²⁹ In his study of veto justifications from 1933 to 1981, Richard Watson determines that Republican chief executives, led by Richard Nixon, were generally more likely than Democratic ones to make fiscal unsoundness the most important objection to legislation.³⁰ Albert Ringelstein's research into reasons for presidential vetoes from 1953 to 1984 reveals that exactly half of Nixon's total vetoes during his tenure were exercised on economic grounds, by far the largest percentage in this category among the seven presidents analyzed.³¹

Richard Nixon vetoed twenty-six bills during his presidency, of which all but two pertained to public bills. His annual average of public bill vetoes—4.00—ranks eighth among nineteen presidents serving since 1889 (see Table 1).³²

Over his first term, President Nixon vetoed thirteen bills by regular means. Of these, two went unchallenged, three were sustained by the House of Representatives at the first chamber stage, four were sustained by the Senate at the first chamber juncture, and four public bill vetoes were overridden. No public bills were issued in 1969, marking only the fourth time since 1889 that a chief executive did not exercise this option.³³ Not coincidentally, that is the last year that the federal government operated with a balanced federal budget.

Nixon vetoed seven public bills by regular means in 1970, including three appropriations bills, a pay bill for federal blue-collar employees, an employment and manpower measure, a political broadcasting bill, and medical facilities construction and modernization legislation. The final bill above, H.R. 11102, was rejected on 22 June 1970. A relevant passage from the veto message explains the reasons why:

This bill authorizes direct grants which are more than \$350 million in excess of the budget which I have presented to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971. More than that it would (1) significantly restrict Presidential options in managing Federal expenditures, (2) isolate the financing of one group of Federal programs as untouchable without assessing its merits against the

*financial needs for other programs, and (3) to encourage pressures to extend this provision to other areas—thereby further complicating management of the Federal budget.*³⁴

The veto was overridden by the House on June 25, 1970, by a 279 to 98 vote, and by the Senate on June 30 by a 76 to 19 margin.³⁵

Less than two months later, on August 11, 1970, President Nixon vetoed two appropriations bills, one for the Office of Education and one for independent offices. His veto message simultaneously addressed both bills with the following rationale:

*If I were to sign these bills that spend more than we can now afford, I would be saying yes to a higher cost of living, yes to higher interest rates, yes to higher taxes...Acting in the best interest of the nation as a whole, and concerned with the average family struggling to make their incomes meet rising prices, I have drawn the line against increased spending.*³⁶

On August 13, the House overrode the education appropriations bill, 298 to 114, but sustained the independent agency bill, 203-195. Five days later, the Senate overrode the veto of H.R. 16916 by a convincing 77 to 16 vote.³⁷

President Nixon vetoed two public bills by regular means in 1971, including a public works bill and legislation amending the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Both vetoes were sustained by the Senate. Although the Nixon White House vetoed four public bills by regular means in 1972, this total is almost three vetoes less than the average of 6.7 issued by chief executives in the final year of their term since 1889.³⁸ The first two vetoes, one against a public broadcasting bill and the other of an appropriations act, were each sustained by the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the last two were overridden.

The president returned without approval H.R. 15927, a railroad retirement benefits bill, on 4 October 1972, stating that it would be the third Benefit increase in three years—totaling 51.8 percent in all—to be made without an accompanying increase in taxes to finance the benefits.³⁹ Congress

reconsidered the bill on the same day, and each chamber overrode the veto: 353 to 29 in the House and 76 to 5 in the Senate.⁴⁰

Within two weeks, the president rejected S. 2770, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, claiming its Laudable intent is outweighed by its unconscionable \$24 billion price tag.⁴¹ But this was an election year. The Senate overrode the veto, 52 to 17, on the same day, with the House overturning the veto a day later, 18 October 1972, by 247 to 23.⁴²

During his abbreviated second term, Richard Nixon vetoed eleven public bills by regular means. Of these, there were sustained by the House at the first chamber stage, three were sustained by the Senate at initial reconsideration, two were overridden by the Senate but sustained by the House at the second chamber juncture, and one veto was overridden by both legislative bodies. Nine of the eleven regular vetoes occurred in 1973, a figure which tied Nixon with Franklin Roosevelt in 1937 and George Bush in 1989 for the second highest number of initial year vetoes of public bills since 1889 (see Table 2).⁴³ Two second-term vetoes went unchallenged.

Vetoes were issued on a wide variety of issues in 1973, encompassing vocational rehabilitation, minimum wage, emergency medical service systems, a rural water and sewer grant program, appropriations, a bill to amend the Small Business Act, and legislation requiring Senate confirmation of the OMB director.

Ironically, it was President Nixon's last public bill veto of 1973 which resulted in the fifth and final override against his administration. The culprit was House Joint Resolution 542—the War Powers Resolution. It represented the culmination of several years of legislative attempts to recover authority for the conducting of foreign affairs and particularly military conflicts involving American forces. The Vietnam War had shattered bipartisan cooperation as well as trust between the branches of government.

After Congress passed the measure and sent it to the president for action, OMB Director Roy Ash wrote a memorandum to the president outlining agency

recommendations on the historic resolution. The memorandum shows that it was disapproved by the OMB, Department of State, Department of Justice, and the National Security Council.⁴⁴ The president vetoed the resolution on October 24, 1973, the last day he could act on it. In his veto message, Nixon contended that the legislation was unconstitutional, undermined the nation's foreign policy, and that its provisions could be invoked automatically without formal congressional approval. As an alternative, the president proposed the reestablishment of a non-partisan commission of the constitutional roles of Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs.⁴⁵ A memorandum from David Parker to Alexander Haig on November 7, 1973, proposed inviting key supporters to the White House "for a couple of drinks" should the veto, which was being challenged by both chambers that day, be sustained.⁴⁶ However, the drinks would never be poured. The House vote was 284 to 135, five more than the minimum two-thirds margin necessary for override; Senate reconsideration likewise ended in override by a 75 to 18 count.

President Nixon's first public bill veto of 1974 was applied to S. 2589, an energy emergency bill. The veto was sustained by the Senate on March 6, two days after issuance. The second veto of the year was the final one by regular means exercised during Richard Nixon's administration. Released just one day before he resigned the presidency, the veto pertained to an agricultural, environmental, and consumer protection appropriations bill. Unlike most of the vetoes by the Nixon White House, it went unchallenged.⁴⁷

President Nixon's public bill vetoes may be examined empirically. A study of factors influencing annual veto frequency from 1889 to 1989 found that a large number of public laws significantly increased veto use. The mean number of public bills enacted each year over the latter century was 316. However, the average number of yearly public bills enacted into law during Richard Nixon's tenure was 326.⁴⁸ Hence, the burst of lawmaking during the 1969

to 1974 time frame, reflecting the complex, controversial issues of the period, contributed to the administration's proclivity to veto.

We may also probe legislative responses to President Nixon's public bill vetoes by regular means. At the first house juncture of override, Nixon had 17 of 24 vetoes sustained, or 70.8 percent. This figure is eight percent lower than the average percentage of vetoes sustained at initial reconsideration by all chief executives over the last century. At the second chamber of reconsideration, Nixon had five of seven vetoes overridden, or 71.4 percent, slightly higher than the average percentage of final override suffered by all chief executives serving between 1889 and 1989 (70.8 percent). The average vote margin by which the second chamber successfully overrode Nixon's five vetoes was 85.8 percent, about three percent higher than the mean vote ratio for all second chamber overrides over the latter period (82.9 percent).⁴⁹

It was partly because Congress fared well in battles over regular vetoes that the Nixon White House resorted to pocket vetoes.

Pocket Vetoes

The Nixon administration exercised the pocket veto—the power to negate proposed laws sent for approval without the possibility of reconsideration—on 17 bills, of which 15 were public in type. Of this total, one was released in 1970, two in 1971 and 12 in 1972. However, these numbers mask the importance of President Nixon's use of this tool.

On December 26, 1970, the president issued a memorandum of disapproval on S. 3418, a bill designed to promote training in family medicine. But members of Congress, led by Senator Edward Kennedy, challenged the move in the courts, arguing that the pocket veto was invalid since the legislature had only taken a six-day recess for Christmas, not adjourned to end the session. According to Louis Fisher, many Democratic members "felt that Nixon had blatantly misused his pocket veto authority,"⁵⁰ despite two previous Supreme Court decisions which upheld employment of the option during intersession

adjournment⁵¹ and while one chamber of Congress was in recess.⁵²

In its 1973 *Kennedy vs. Sampson* decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia overturned Nixon's pocket veto of S. 3418, offering the following reasoning:

*The plaintiff has urged the Court to hold that the Pocket Veto Clause is applicable only to sine die adjournments and not to any adjournments within a session. Such a holding is not necessary for the determination of this case and this Court declines to swim in waters that the Supreme Court pointedly avoided in Wright... All that is determined here is that the short recess of the Senate in this case, extending only two days beyond the ten day period the President had to sign or disapprove the bill, did not prevent the return of the bill to the Senate in which it originated. It follows therefore that the pocket veto was invalid and S. 3418 became a law without the signature of the President, in accord with Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution.*⁵³

A year later, in 1974, the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling in *Kennedy vs. Sampson*, but did so in much more far-reaching language:

*In summary, we hold that the Christmas recess of 1970 did not prevent the return of S. 3418—a conclusion which may be reached by either of two routes. First, the present case is governed by the logic, if not the precise holding, of the Wright decision. Second, the case is an appropriate one for the disposition of the question of whether any intrasession adjournment, as the practice is presently understood, can prevent the return of a bill by the President where appropriate arrangements have been made for the receipt of presidential messages during the adjournment—a question which must be answered in the negative.*⁵⁴

When the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in 1976

that a December 1973 end-of-first session pocket veto by President Nixon was unconstitutional,⁵⁵ the issue was ostensibly settled. But a decade later, President Ronald Reagan renewed the attempt to clarify the bounds of pocket veto authority. In November 1983, he issued a pocket veto of a bill linking human rights with military aid for El Salvador. Although the United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of Reagan's action,⁵⁶ the District of Columbia Circuit for the United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court ruling by a 2 to 1 vote,⁵⁷ and the Supreme Court vacated that decision by a 6 to 2 margin, holding that the case was moot.⁵⁸ Later, the George Bush administration contended that "the pocket veto may be used any time Congress adjourns for more than three days," although no court cases resulted.⁵⁹

The aforementioned recent history of the pocket veto power illustrates the manner by which the Nixon White House tested the parameters of this tool as well as furnished the impetus for its future utilization by ensuing chief executives.

Richard Nixon's legislative legacy may be critiqued from diverse perspectives. Quantitatively, Nixon ranks fifth out of the last eight presidents in the average annual success which the administration enjoyed on legislation on which it took a public position, and eleventh out of nineteen chief executives who served between 1889 and 1993 on total vetoes issued. The five overrides of his public bill vetoes places fifth among all chief executives over the aforementioned period. In pocket veto employment, Nixon ranks tied for twelfth among presidents over the same duration.

Nixon's performance may also be judged by the way in which he exercised political power and the impact which his tenure had on the presidency. He "was brought up on the imperial presidency and had no serious misgivings about it."⁶⁰ Although his approach toward Congress Unusually took the form of negative as opposed to positive action,⁶¹ it must be understood in the context of a decline of bipartisanship generally and Nixon's status as a minority party president in particular.

Divided party government had an immobilizing influence in the latter part of the Nixon administration. For example, in contrast to Dwight Eisenhower—the last president who faced an opposition party-controlled Congress—Nixon suffered more than four times the annual number of rejected or withdrawn nominees for executive branch positions, had substantially less support among Democrats in Congress and in the public at large, and signed less than half the annual number of bills into law.⁶² The harsh divisions caused by his presidency would remain to confront the next one,⁶³ and the Watergate scandal which forced Richard Nixon from office "provoked Congress to pass a multitude of new laws to curb the powers of the presidency."⁶⁴

Still, a balanced overview of the Nixon record must recognize his administration's accomplishments in domestic policy, including revenue sharing, strengthening of law enforcement, and creation of several agencies dealing with environmental and consumer protection, together with his foreign policy achievements, which encompassed the ending of the Vietnam War, the opening of relations with Communist China, and several agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear and chemical weapons.⁶⁵

As has been elaborated on above, the effect of many of Nixon's regular vetoes was beneficial in that they saved billions of dollars or protected the prerogative power of the presidency. That he sought to expand executive power through his utilization of pocket vetoes was not unusual, and seen in light of recent history, was much more cautious than the cavalier application of that tool by President George Bush. Of course, there is much room to debate the value of Nixon's vetoes issued to promote his policy preferences, just as there is continuing controversy over how he employed the mechanisms of the presidential office. Perhaps the nation "will never be at peace with him,"⁶⁶ but at least we can begin to comprehend how Richard Nixon's personal characteristics together with the political climate he encountered conditioned his legislative orientation and presaged his performance

as the country's thirty-seventh president.

Table 1
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANNUAL PUBLIC BILL VETOES BY PRESIDENTS, 1889-1992

1. Ford	15.30
2. F. Roosevelt	8.75
3. Bush	7.25
4. Truman	6.88
5. Taft	5.50
6. Reagan	4.63
7. Eisenhower	4.38
8. Nixon	4.00
9. Cleveland	3.75
10. B. Harrison	3.50
11. Hoover	3.25
12. Carter	3.25
13. Wilson	3.13
14. T. Roosevelt	2.25
15. Coolidge	2.20
16. Harding	1.67
17. L. Johnson	1.40
18. Kennedy	1.33
19. McKinley	0.25

Table 2
FIRST YEAR PUBLIC BILL VETOES BY PRESIDENTS, 1889-1992

1. Ford (1974)	14
2. F.D. Roosevelt (1937)	9
Nixon(1973)	9
Bush (1989)	9
3. Truman (1949)	8
4. F.D. Roosevelt (1941)	6
Truman (1945)	6
Reagan (1985)	6
5. Harding (1921)	4
6. Kennedy (1961)	3
Johnson (1965)	3
7. Carter (1977)	2
8. Eisenhower (1953)	1
Reagan (1981)	1

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Dr. Samuel B. Hoff is ROTC Director and Professor of History and Political Science at Delaware State University in Dover.

Diplomacy as an Academic Discipline

Ufot B. Inamete

Abstract

An evaluation of diplomacy as an academic discipline reveals that in some academic institutions it has emerged as a distinct field; though in many other academic institutions the larger discipline of international relations submerges it. Nevertheless, the increasing complexity of the international arena has meant the demand for more people who have formal professional undergraduate or graduate degrees in diplomatic studies. This in turn, is breeding the creation or expansion of diplomatic studies programs in some universities and other similar institutions.

An adequate understanding of the meaning of diplomacy, as the processes and structures involved in the implementation of foreign policy, differentiates it from foreign policy-making which some international relations scholars focus on in their subfield of foreign policy studies. This understanding of the meaning of diplomacy thus helps to lessen academic studies about it being confused with the larger discipline of international relations (which has foreign policy studies as a subfield). The United States and Britain are the two countries where diplomatic studies has more clearly emerged as a discipline; though it is still rather small in profile relative to the related discipline of international relations. In many other countries, diplomatic studies exist rudimentarily or it is even non-existent.

The goal of this study is the evaluation of diplomacy as an academic discipline. Additionally, the study of diplomacy, in terms of its profile and development is also compared and contrasted with a related academic discipline (diplomacy and international relations) and academic disciplines in the social sciences and humanities (political science, psychology, anthropology, sociology, management, communications, history, philosophy, linguistics, languages and law).

This study also relates the current opportunities for the study of diplomacy, both in terms of magnitude and intensity, to the functions, duties and needs of all

the professionals who are in the international arena. An examination of the in-house training programs (provided for career foreign service officers) is provided, together with the evaluation of the nature and dynamics of the study of diplomacy in universities and other similar higher education institutions, and contemporary global realities.

In order to evaluate diplomacy as an academic discipline, it is pertinent to adequately rein in the meaning of diplomacy. Diplomacy can be seen as the processes involved in the management of relations with other entities in the international system. According to Harold Nicolson,¹ this sort of definition is both adequately precise and wide. It is precise and wide enough to avoid the definition of diplomacy "straying, on the one hand into the sands of foreign policy, and on the other into the marshes of international law"². Aspects of international law mainly relate to diplomacy in terms of the legal frameworks and traditions governing the actions, immunities and privileges of diplomatic agents and envoys. It is also important to note that the phenomenon of diplomacy is different from foreign policy. A country's foreign policy "consists of its objectives and the principles it seeks to advance in international affairs" and these are, generally, "publicly stated or are inferable from public statements".³

On the other hand, diplomacy "is the means by which governments seek to achieve their objectives and gain support for their principles".⁴ Thus diplomacy is the "process by which policies are converted from rhetoric to realities, from strategic generalities to the desired actions or inactions of other governments".⁵ Nicolson also emphasizes this distinction between policy and process. Indeed, for him the "distinction is in fact vital to any sound democratic control of foreign policy".⁶ Thus in a parliamentary system, the Cabinet formulates the foreign policy and gives it to the legislature to deliberate and decide what to do with it; and if and

when approved and adopted, the foreign policy is given to the foreign service to implement or execute.⁷ In a presidential system, for example the United States, the President, in conjunction with the Congress, make foreign policy. The National Security Council (NSC), consisting of the President (as chairman), the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense as statutory members; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence (serving as advisers); and some other officials (like the Attorney-General often invited to attend) help the President to formulate foreign policy. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the NSC Adviser) can and do play a key role in foreign policy formulation milieu. Henry Kissinger, as an NSC Adviser, for example, was very prominent and dominant in the foreign policy-making arena. Unlike the parliamentary systems, the United States presidential system enables the President to often overshadow the Congress (though the latter does play a significant role) in the foreign policy-making milieu. After a foreign policy has been adopted, it is given to the foreign service of the Department of State to implement.

However, the distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy, in reality, is not totally neat and clear-cut. The foreign service officers, through their advisory roles and their provision of data and information influence and help shape foreign policy-making. Thus those involved in diplomacy, in addition to their main role of managing the processes which implements foreign policy, can, and do also, sometimes influence the foreign policy-making. Additionally, some of those involved in foreign policy-making, do sometimes get involved in the processes of implementing foreign policy. For example, in the United States the NSC staff sometimes do get involved in the implementation of foreign policy, in addition to their main advisory role of helping the national political leadership to formulate foreign policy. The role Colonel Oliver North, an NSC staff

member, played (which led to the Iran-Contra affairs) demonstrates the role of NSC staff in the implementation of foreign policy. North by travelling to Iran to talk with Iranian officials, was doing the work meant for State Department officials. By organizing, training, funding and arming the Contras, the NSC staff officials were doing the work of the Defense Department and/or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Nevertheless, despite these sometimes blurring of the line between foreign policy and diplomacy, the main activities of both still warrant them being seen as being concerned with policy and process, respectively. More importantly, foreign policy-making and diplomacy are both vital. For example, after a foreign policy has been made, diplomacy is essential in providing the machinery and processes that translate the policy from an enunciated goal(s) on paper into an accomplished goal(s) in reality. A lot of foreign policies that are enacted with fanfare and are not followed with implementation do not really make much difference in the relations among international entities. Thus, diplomacy is as important as foreign policy-making. According to Smith Simpson,⁸

It is diplomacy that makes things happen in the international arena and ... without it, principles, proposals, and agreements, in Anthony Eden's phrase, are left flapping in the air. Little or no attention is paid to the warnings of analysts that debate over foreign policy is "little more than empty posturing unless our government and its leaders have the means to turn aspirations into actions.

Although many universities and other similar institutions offer courses in foreign policy studies, through their international relations programs or modules of courses, very few universities and other similar institutions offer courses in diplomatic studies. Thus many students learn a lot about the making of foreign policy, while a very negligible number of students learn about diplomacy (the processes and structures involved in the implementation of foreign policy).

Diplomacy and International Relations as Academic Disciplines

International relations and diplomacy are related disciplines. In fact diplomacy is a discipline that can sometimes come under the umbrella of the more wider discipline of international relations, just like finance as a discipline can sometimes come under the umbrella of the wider discipline of business administration. This close relationship has made many to have "[T]he tendency to equate diplomacy with foreign policy and international relations," and this "has resulted in an immense literature in which the process of diplomacy itself tends to become lost".⁹ Though diplomacy is related to international relations, it does not mean that the two are exactly the same thing. Additionally, diplomacy and foreign policy (which is a subfield of international relations) cannot be equated to each other.

International relations is the study of the nature and dynamics of the relationship between and among entities in the international system. These entities may be countries, governmental international organizations, non-governmental international organizations, transnational business corporations or individuals. An enduring focus of international relations is the configuration, accumulation, use, management and sustenance of power in the international system. The major subfields of international relations are international relations theory, international organizations, national security studies, international political economy and foreign policy studies. Diplomacy, as shown above, is the study of the processes and structures involved in the implementation of foreign policy.

Those who championed the development and growth of the discipline of international relations were much concerned about pushing the field to help "solve the problems of the world".¹⁰ In the areas of national security studies and foreign policy studies, for example, the study of international relations has helped to produce a body of knowledge that has adequately aided the making of foreign

policy. However, international relations has paid very little attention to the study of the structures and processes involved in the implementation of foreign policy (and to such an extent it has not significantly helped in the study of diplomacy). Michael J. Flack¹¹ noted that most international affairs and public affairs programs, even at the graduate level, "do not as yet include courses on diplomacy." Even the few international relations texts that mention diplomacy do not see the latter as one of the core areas of the study of international relations, and often place diplomacy as "separate chapters without any special effort to structure the entire field".¹²

However, in recent years, some universities and colleges have decided to offer diplomatic studies as degree program at undergraduate and/or graduate levels. The study of diplomacy often cover an overview of the development of diplomacy as a key area of human activity; major principles that cover the practice of diplomacy; the nature of inter-agency coordinations; the legal frameworks that cover the actions, immunities and privileges of diplomatic officers; the diplomatic protocol; the art and science of negotiations; the techniques of reporting and analysis; the nature and functioning of the foreign service structure in the home country; the nature and functioning of foreign missions; the functions and the roles of the chief of mission; the functions and roles of other key officials in a foreign mission, for example political officers, economic officers, cultural affairs officers, commercial officers, consular officers, and administrative officers; and the roles of non-members of the foreign service (who serve as attachés) in foreign missions; and new and future trends in diplomacy. A scan of introductory and advanced texts in international relations shows that the above topics (which form the core of the study of diplomacy) are not treated at all, or only touched on tangentially.

Although the disciplines of diplomacy and international relations are related they are two distinct academic disciplines: diplomacy focuses on the structures and processes involved in the implementation of foreign policies, while

foreign policy studies (a subfield of international relations) focuses on the dynamics of foreign policy-making. Additionally, diplomacy is more practice-oriented, or field-oriented than international relations: in fact, diplomacy is to international relations what business administration is to economics (the field-oriented or practice-oriented counterpart). The discipline of diplomacy uses the principles, laws and theories of the nature and the functioning of the international system, that sometimes emanate from international relations and other related social science and humanities disciplines (political science, economics, sociology, psychology, communications, history, philosophy, anthropology, management, linguistics and languages), to aid in the enterprise of managing the structures and processes involved in the implementation of foreign policy.

Some may object that as a practice-oriented discipline, diplomacy may be too vocational to merit a serious academic status. The fact that there are many vocational and applied disciplines in higher educational institutions today, which provide practical knowledge that is also coupled with first-class academic rigor and theoretical underpinnings (like medicine, journalism, engineering, public administration, agricultural sciences and business administration), makes this view untenable. Thus, like public administration, business administration, medicine, engineering and others, diplomacy is a discipline with a sound and solid academic status, which provides a sound practical knowledge of structures and processes involved in the implementation of foreign policy. Diplomatic studies are grounded in serious principles, laws and theories that are generated within the discipline and, also borrowed from other disciplines like political science, international relations, law, philosophy, history, linguistics, languages, economics, sociology, anthropology, management, communications and psychology.

The Study of Diplomacy and Practitioners

In order to adequately fathom the profile and needs of the study of

diplomacy, it is important to analyze the professions and careers that are related to this discipline. Some of the people that benefit from an educational background in diplomatic studies are officials working in the foreign service, military, national security, transnational business corporation, governmental international organizations, non-governmental international organizations, international affairs, policy studies bodies and the media, especially all those who are based abroad and/or focus on international issues.

For foreign service officers, diplomatic studies is a tailor-made academic discipline; especially subjects like the evolution of diplomacy; legal privileges, immunities and actions of diplomatic officials; the art and science of negotiations; the roles of chief of mission; the duties of political, economic, commercial, administrative, cultural, consular, and press officers; the structure and functioning of foreign missions; and of the home office; the practice of diplomacy; the techniques of reporting and analysis; inter-agency coordinations; and diplomatic protocol.

Military officers also benefit from a background in diplomatic studies. Many modern wars are waged in concert with military forces of other countries as allies (both world wars were fought by the two opposing sides consisting of armed forces of various nations). The preparation for war and the actual combat against Iraq (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) in 1990-1991, involved the armed forces of numerous countries. The senior and junior military officers from each country had to adequately coordinate both their strategic and tactical plans on a continuous and consistent basis, while displaying adequate diplomatic sensitivity. The adequacy of such coordination greatly accounted for the success of the allied powers in that conflict. Additionally, the military officers of all the allied forces had to relate to and coordinate some of their activities with Saudi and Kuwaiti political leaders and cultural custodians. This task demanded great diplomatic sensitivity in order to maintain good relations between the allied forces and the Saudis and Kuwaitis. Also in peace-

time, military officers need good diplomatic skills: military alliances, like North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO), demand continuous and intensive coordination of plans and actions by all the armed forces of the member states of that organization; as do officers serving as military attachés in foreign missions, or as advisory officers in foreign countries.

The structures and processes involved in the implementation of foreign policy do not only involve foreign service officers. National security officials, in intelligence organizations and military officers are likewise involved, and demand of them an adequate knowledge of diplomacy. Officials of governmental international and regional organizations like the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as officials of many non-governmental international organizations, like the Red Cross, operate in milieux that specifically demand an adequate knowledge of diplomacy.

In many countries, there are foreign policy studies organizations that seek to provide intellectual inputs (in advisory capacities) for the making and implementation of foreign policies, like the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in London and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos. The policy analysts who work in these think-tanks are particularly focused on the structures and processes in implementing foreign policies. They too can benefit from an educational background in diplomatic studies.

Many newspapers, magazines, radio, television and news agencies have personnel based in their home countries who work as diplomatic or defense correspondents. Some of these media organizations also have personnel stationed abroad as bureau heads or correspondents. The very international nature of the work milieux of such media personnel means that their formal education in mass communication disciplines couple with formal education in international relations and diplomatic studies will much enhance their performance.

The increasing global economic interdependence is a clear testimony to the growing importance of transnational business corporations. It is vital for high-level and middle-level managers of these corporations to combine their knowledge of business management with adequate diplomatic and cultural sensitivities. Workers in transnational business corporations come from many countries. Managers of these corporations have to also constantly interact with managers of corporations in other countries. Transnational business corporations operate in milieux that consist of different laws and policies in various countries; thus also their managers have to continually and intensely interact with the government officials of various countries. All this means that today's managers of transnational corporations need adequate knowledge of business administration, languages, sociology, anthropology, international relations and diplomacy.

Considering the fact that, all over the world, there are many millions of people who play a key role in their countries' foreign relations as foreign service officers, military officers, national security personnel, officials of transnational business corporations, officials of governmental international organizations, officials of non-governmental international organizations, international affairs policy studies organizations analysts and media personnel, it is surprising that the general public's interest in diplomatic studies is quite negligible, and that diplomatic studies remains a relatively obscure discipline in many universities and similar institutions. In noting this lack of interest by the general public concerning diplomacy as an academic discipline and international affairs, J. Martin Rochester¹³ observed that while findings reported in a journal like the *New England Journal of Medicine* are major items in morning news reports, findings in any journal that dwells on international affairs are rarely given such general public exposure. The problem with such a reality is that "[T]he profession of diplomacy certainly is not less complex or demanding than other professions".¹⁴

Such lack of interest by the general public about diplomatic studies and international relations is also matched by lack of adequate educational facilities for those who will engage, or are engaged, in professions that demand knowledge of diplomacy and international relations. Flack¹⁵ notes that those who:

Have had experience with mid-career officers of State, Defense, and other agencies, sent for a year of graduate schooling to universities, are duly impressed by their almost unanimous assertions about their lack of broader functional perspective, and by the appreciation they express for having acquired it in some measure during their year off from direct service.

Flack¹⁶ blames this lack of preparation on their lack of a professional educational background in the arts and science of diplomacy and international relations (since these officials are recruited with "degrees in humanities, the natural sciences, and a variety of social sciences"). "[T]he argument that they will learn "their duties and functions" by doing will not stand: we do not apply it to social workers, physicians, lawyers, and others, and for good reason".¹⁷ Due to this state of affairs, Flack¹⁸ urges that more attention be paid to diplomatic studies by stressing that "Condorcet's statement: 'What you want in the state you must put in the School'" holds in this situation. He further elaborates on his view by saying that:

*Diplomacy as a function and process exists, it is important, and it can be vital in the safeguarding of national and international survival and welfare. As such, it warrants inclusion in curricula that purport to deal with policies and international relationships and that aim to equip new generations to understand them and conduct them wisely. In this day and age, it should bemoan than surprise that so permanent and inherent an operation of public life as diplomacy and negotiation should not find reflection in educational programs that, avowedly and proudly, aim to prepare for such life.*¹⁹

Thus, some government organizations, like the United States Department of Defense, in order to manage this sort of deficiency has had to establish continuous and intimate contacts with the academia.²⁰

The In-house Training of Foreign Service Officer

This general dearth of professional degree programs in diplomatic studies, has meant that many countries recruit their foreign service officers with degrees from various disciplines in humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, and then put them through in-house diplomatic studies programs. For example, the United States Foreign Service Institute provide such educational and language programs.

Without these in-house training for foreign service officers, their performance would be inadequate. The fact that many who join the foreign service in various countries never had the opportunity to take even one course in diplomatic studies, at either undergraduate or graduate levels (often not offered in many universities and other similar institutions) means that in-house training must provide introductory, intermediate and advanced courses in diplomatic studies. If universities and other similar institutions offered some of these courses in diplomatic studies, various countries would not have to spend extra resources to provide an equivalence of a degree program for people who already have undergraduate degrees (and for some graduate degrees also). Additionally, the sort of programs that foreign service institutes provide are more specialized instructions for consular, political, economic, commercial, administrative, cultural and information officers, while these programs are not as broad as the diplomatic studies programs in universities and other similar institutions.

Though foreign service institutions provide good education in diplomatic studies, their educational programs are more often than not available to foreign service officers only. Thus many other categories of peoples who need knowledge of diplomacy in order to perform their duties adequately, are rarely exposed to any formal education in

diplomacy. This reality means that many of these other officials may not be able to perform at the highest level of their ability.

Universities and Other Similar Institutions and the Study of Diplomacy

Some universities offer few courses, undergraduate and/or graduate degree programs in diplomatic studies. An evaluation of the profile, dynamics and needs of these programs will help understand the state of diplomacy as an academic discipline and, possibly also its future.

In the United States, among the numerous universities and other similar institutions that offer programs in international relations and related disciplines, only few of these offer programs in diplomatic studies, like Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the University of Kentucky, Miami University in Ohio, Occidental College in Los Angeles and Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.²¹ In particular, the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce offers a Master's degree in Diplomacy and International Commerce; Miami University in Ohio offers a Bachelor's degree program in Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs; and Occidental College in California offers both a Bachelor's and Master's degree programs in Diplomacy and World Affairs.²² Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, offers a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service (BSFS) and Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) degree programs. The MSFS degree is a professional graduate program that aims at molding seasoned experts for any job in the international arena, in both the public and private sectors. Courses on diplomacy are fully integrated into this degree program in terms of the political, economic, business, legal, socio-cultural, historical and security dimensions of diplomatic practice.²³ Specialized programs like The Karl F. Landegger Program in International Business Diplomacy (IBD) and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

(ISD) within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, particularly play crucial roles in rigorous teaching, research and public service programs in the field of diplomatic studies: the IBD "utilizes case studies of negotiations, transactions and problems drawn from the field of business-government relations" in the international context, and the ISD "concentrates on the processes of conducting foreign policy abroad" and also emphasizes "such practical aspects of diplomacy as reporting, analysis, policy recommendation, negotiations, mediation, conciliation, conference diplomacy, representation, and consular affairs".²⁴ The Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) and the doctoral program offered by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, just like Georgetown University's graduate programs, are also rigorous professional graduate degree programs.²⁵

There are some universities and other similar institutions that offer one course, or few courses (instead of a degree program), in diplomatic studies. For example, the School of International Studies at the University of Washington offers a course entitled "Techniques and Practices of Modern Diplomacy"²⁶; the Department of Political Science of the University of Vermont offers "The Craft of Diplomacy"²⁷; the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University offers "Diplomacy and International Bargaining"²⁸; the Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina offers "Statesmanship and Diplomacy"²⁹; the School of International Service of American University offers "The Conduct of American Diplomacy"; the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia offers "Cultural Diplomacy"; the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh offers two courses on "Diplomacy" and "Diplomacy: Profession, Function, Process"; the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University offers courses on "Negotiations" and "The Conduct of Foreign Policy"; and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and

International Affairs of Princeton University offers "The United States in International Negotiations".³⁰

Many general courses on diplomacy cover the following topics: definition, history and development of diplomacy; the legal framework of diplomatic privileges and immunities; the reporting, analysis, representation, and policy advisory roles of foreign service officers; the theory and practice of negotiations; bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; diplomacy in times of international crises; mediation; conciliation; diplomacy and the role of national leadership; summit diplomacy; structure and functioning of foreign service organizations and overseas missions; roles of heads of foreign missions; consular affairs; diplomatic protocol; changes and new trends in diplomatic practices.³¹ In order to enhance the coherence of professional graduate programs, one scholar³² favors comprehensive examinations for such programs. Encouragingly, many schools do require comprehensive examinations to be successfully undertaken. Many institutions also have a large number of required core courses which are mandatory for all students in order to further enhance the professional profile of their degree programs.

Equally important is the state of the discipline of diplomacy in other countries. While the foreign service organizations of many countries have some in-house training programs for their diplomatic personnel, diplomacy as a discipline is often non-existent or rudimentary within the higher education systems of many countries. In fact, in some countries, the discipline of international relations (the umbrella discipline covering also the discipline of diplomacy) is likewise rudimentary in nature or has a major identity problem, being submerged by other related disciplines, thus leaving the discipline of diplomacy as obscure, or non-existent. Even in a major country like France, Deriennic and Moisi³³ note that "[T]here is less autonomy in France than in other countries" for the discipline of international relations, and that even though that "autonomy is likely to grow in the future it will never be total given

the close and indissoluble ties between "international relations" and other related fields such as sociology, law, economics and history." In an academic milieu like that, where even the prominent and larger discipline of international relations is significantly insecure, the discipline of diplomacy has a harder time getting itself established in any autonomous way.

In a country like Britain, instead the study of diplomacy has good foundations and like in the United States, it is adequately developed as a sound and solid academic field. However, national boundaries give a different profile to the discipline of diplomacy in the United States and Britain. The umbrella discipline of international relations in the United States, has "closer ties with the social sciences than with history and philosophy," though "[T]here are quantifiers and behaviorists in Britain, just as there are history-oriented students of international relations in the United States".³⁴ Likewise the discipline of diplomacy is as elaborate in Britain as it is in the United States, viewed from the relative sizes of the two countries, although in Britain it is more oriented towards history, philosophy and law, while in the United States it is more oriented towards the social sciences. There are three British universities (Universities of Birmingham, Keele and Lancaster) which confer graduate degree programs in diplomatic studies,³⁵ compared to about five universities in the United States with undergraduate and/or graduate degree programs. Just as in the United States, several universities and other similar institutions offer just one course or module of courses in diplomatic studies. The University College of Wales at Aberystwyth, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the University of Oxford are institutions with major degree programs in the umbrella discipline of international relations,³⁶ while the Universities of Birmingham, Keele and Lancaster offer degree programs in the more specific discipline of diplomacy. Additionally, the University of Oxford has an academic unit called the Foreign Service Program that offers "diplomatic studies lasting one year" for people who already have at least an undergraduate

degree, and the program is "designed to meet the needs of diplomats in the early years of their career," and a "Certificate of Diplomatic Studies is awarded to the participants who satisfactorily complete" the program.³⁷ This program is different from other universities diplomatic studies since it only offers a certificate rather than a degree program. Interestingly, also, the University of Oxford seems to fully recognize international relations and diplomatic studies as being separate disciplines: thus, its certificate program in diplomatic studies and the degree programs in international relations are in very separate academic units, and, unlike other universities, the diplomatic studies program admits only people who are already serving as diplomats.³⁸ Apart from these universities there are many other British universities that offer some type of degree in international relations and related disciplines.³⁹

In India, only Jawaharlal Nehru University's Centre for Studies in Diplomacy, International Law and Economics (within its School of International Studies) has developed a distinct academic unit for diplomatic studies.⁴⁰ However, the larger discipline of international relations is also well established in many other Indian universities.⁴¹ Although the larger discipline of international relations is well established in many other countries, like Nigeria,⁴² the People's Republic of China,⁴³ Israel⁴⁴ and the Netherlands,⁴⁵ diplomatic studies has not emerged yet as a distinct academic discipline. Despite this dearth of diplomatic studies in universities in many countries, the foreign service organizations of such countries provide in-house training programs in diplomatic studies for their diplomatic personnel.

In addition to the above programs that show the increasing strength of degree-granting programs, there are also significant research and public service activities associated with diplomatic studies programs. For example ISD (of Georgetown University) is a very strong organization which has developed vigorous research, publication and public service activities in addition to its teaching in the field of diplomacy.⁴⁶

Research activities in diplomatic

studies have been comprehensive and cover the political, socio-cultural, security, economic, business, and consular dimensions of diplomatic practice: like studies on the roles of ambassadors in the diplomatic system;⁴⁷ the nature and roles of the armed forces and other forms of national security organizations involved in the implementation of foreign policy;⁴⁸ economic diplomacy;⁴⁹ the commercial functions of foreign missions⁵⁰ and the consular dimension of diplomacy.⁵¹ Moreover, numerous reports and technical studies written by diplomatic personnel (especially in international organizations), increase research activities in the field of diplomacy.⁵²

The State of Diplomatic Studies: an Overview of Present and Future Profiles

As shown above, diplomacy as an autonomous discipline is not yet common or elaborate in many universities and other similar institutions, while in many countries it either exists rudimentarily or is wholly non-existent.

Nevertheless, diplomatic studies can be seen as a young plant with a long tap root, which will likely grow tall and strong. The increasing complexity of the international arena demands more professionals who have received formal undergraduate and/or graduate degrees in the field of diplomatic studies, as well as the retraining of diplomatic personnel. Similarly, transnational business corporations, governmental international organizations, non-governmental international organizations, and the armed forces and other national security organizations of various countries are demanding for more people who are professionally trained in the arts and science of diplomatic practice. All this is leading to the increase and expansion of diplomatic studies programs in universities and other similar institutions.

The existence of the relatively new Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA), in the United States, indicates that more universities and other similar institutions with international affairs programs, are likely to provide programs or courses in diplomatic studies, while the creation of

bodies like APSIA should also enhance the stature of diplomatic studies in academia.

Presently, most programs in diplomatic studies are at the Bachelor and Master degree levels. Many who choose to pursue Doctoral degrees often have to earn it in the more larger discipline of international relations or other related disciplines. Thus the increasing demand for rigorously trained high-level practitioners, consultants, teachers, researchers and analysts in the field of diplomacy may lead to the creation of a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Diplomacy. And the increasing number of academic program in diplomatic studies will lead to a more distinct academic identity for the discipline, in terms of its relations with the larger umbrella discipline of international relations and other related disciplines.

Notes

- 1 Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1988), p.3-5.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p.5.
- 3 Simpson Smith, *Perspective on the Study of Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1986), p.3.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 Nicolson, p.3.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 Simpson, p.4.
- 9 Waldo Chamberlain quoted in Elmer Plischke, "The Optimum Scope of Instruction in Diplomacy", in Simpson Smith ed., *Instruction In Diplomacy: the Liberal Arts Approach*, (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1972), p.25.
- 10 Roger Morgan, "The Study of International Politics" in Roger Morgan ed., *The Study of International Affairs: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.273.
- 11 Michael J. Flack, "The Objectives and Purposes of Instruction in Diplomacy" in Simpson Smith ed., *Instruction in Diplomacy: the Liberal Arts Approach*, p.86-87.
- 12 Plischke, p.4.
- 13 J. Martin Rochester, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," *International Organization*, Vol.40, N.4 (Autumn 1986): p.806.
- 14 Flack, p.85.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 *Ibid.*
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 *Ibid.*, p.87.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 Richard D. Lambert, "DoD, Social Science and International Studies," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.502, March 1989: p.94-107.
- 21 *The College Bluebook: Degrees Offered by College and Subject* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989), p.525; *Peterson's Guide to Graduate Programs in the Humanities and Social Sciences 1990* (Princeton, New Jersey: Peterson's Guides, 1989), p.493, 501, 505.
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- 23 *Georgetown University: Master of Science in Foreign Service and Associated Graduate Programs in International Affairs, 1990-1991* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1990).
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Taiwan's International Participation: Problems, Solutions and Impact

Dajin Peng

Abstract

The recent crisis in the Taiwan Straits was at least partly triggered by Taiwan's efforts to seek more international participation. As Taiwan becomes politically democratized and economically rich, it tries to get out of the political isolation it faces on the international stage. The end of the Cold War and American resentment towards Mainland China's records on human rights, trade and other issues changed the U.S. attitude toward China, and to some extent, towards Taiwan. On the other hand, China has enjoyed one of the highest economic growth rates in the world in the past fifteen years. Its self-confidence increased with its economic success. It has become more assertive in international affairs. Beijing is particularly sensitive on the Taiwan issue and is willing to fight against Taiwan's independence at all costs. How to deal with the issue of Taiwan's international participation is critical to the future stability of the Asia-Pacific region. This essay tries to explore the nature and source of the problem and identify a solution for the issue. It also attempts to study the continuous relevance of the Taiwan issue to U.S.-China relations.

Introduction

Taiwan's international status is a very important topic of research, which has been avoided by many scholars because of its sensitivity. However, Taiwan's international role as a country needs serious attention because unless this issue is properly handled it can have very grave consequences, as the recent crisis in the Taiwan Straits demonstrated. It is essential to have scholarly discussions on Taiwan's international status and explore realistic solutions for its international participation. Solving the problem would provide a solid diplomatic basis for a genuine improvement of relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, while providing stability to the Asia-Pacific region and promoting regional economic cooperation. Finally, a consensus on Taiwan's international status and participation is also a pre-

condition for healthy and constructive U.S.-China relations.

The central arguments of the paper is that Taiwan is a special political and economic entity; thus its international status should receive special treatment. On the one hand, Taiwan is not officially an independent nation, therefore it does not have all the rights a Nation-State has. In fact, officially both sides of the Taiwan Straits stress that Taiwan is part of China, although they disagree on who is the "real" representative of this China collective. But since Mainland China is widely recognized as the official representative of China, Beijing should be consulted on Taiwan's international status and participation. On the other hand, Taiwan has been separated from the Mainland for many years and has developed its own political and economic systems not only very differently from, but also more developed than those in the Mainland. Therefore, the rights of the people in Taiwan to retain their strong economic and cultural ties with the international world should be duly respected. Naturally under these circumstances, Taiwan remains a very sensitive issue for China and could become a source of tensions and major conflicts. It is unwise to provoke China on this issue, as it can be seen by the recent evolution in both American and Japanese relations with China and Taiwan.

As a special entity and important economic center in today's world, Taiwan deserves full membership in international economic and technical organizations. But it is unrealistic or even counterproductive for Taiwan to try to re-join the United Nations (U.N.) at this time. Given Beijing's strong international influence and veto power on the U.N. Security Council, there is little hope that Taipei can be accepted into the U.N. without Beijing's consent. Moreover, unless it becomes clear to Beijing that Taiwan's joining will not lead to Taiwan's official independence or permanent separation from the mainland, such a major move will arouse strong

opposition from China to block all together Taiwan's entry also into other official international economic organizations. As for the issue of Taiwan's international participation, it is unconscionable that Taiwan is excluded from almost all major international organizations. But the "pragmatic diplomacy" Taipei pursues today might not be the right approach to solving this problem. A constructive solution should be found first of all in the peaceful and sincere coordination between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.

Taiwan's Special International Status

Taiwan's international status has been a very thorny one in international studies. Since 1949, Taiwan has developed as a separate entity from Mainland China. This resembles the typical separated states of post-World War II, such as the two Germanys, the two Koreas and the two Viet-Nams. But three notable differences have resulted in a differential treatment towards Taiwan in international relations and may still influence Taiwan's future status as well.

The first difference is the great disparity in size. The two Koreas and the two Viet-Nams are close in size. Instead West Germany was much larger than East Germany, but the differences in area and populations were still only 2.1 times and 3.2 times, respectively. This is nothing in comparison with the differences of 266 times in area and 56 times in population between Mainland China and Taiwan. When people argue that Taiwan deserves full membership in international organizations, they often point out that Taiwan is actually larger than most of the other members of the United Nations. While this is certainly a strong argument, it must be remembered that when most people compare Taiwan, they do not compare Taiwan with smaller countries, but compare it with Mainland China. The problem is not that Taiwan is too small, but that Mainland China is too big. Thus, because China is so much

larger and located only 100 miles across the Taiwan Straits, Taiwan can not avoid being influenced one way or the other by China.¹ While the two Germanys, two Koreas and two Viet-Nams enjoy or enjoyed equal international rights, Mainland China has reaped much more international privileges than Taiwan since 1971, basically thanks to China's greater size and political weight. Although few countries really dislike Taiwan, which is a democratic society with free enterprise, still most nations would not establish any formal relationship with Taiwan because they do not want to incur the wrath of Mainland China, which is the most populous country in the world with a nuclear weapons arsenal and veto power in the U.N. Security Council.

The second difference is that of the other split-countries: none really had any serious danger of becoming totally independent or permanently separated from the other side. Yet there is today a growing push for independence in Taiwan: the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) openly advocates independence and many in Taiwan, especially native Taiwanese, want Taiwan to be an officially independent country. In the past century, Taiwan has been unified with Mainland China for only four years in 1945-1949. Prior to 1945 Taiwan was ruled by Japan for half a century. Japanese rule had very strong influence on Taiwan's separate development and played an important part in alienating Taiwan from the Mainland. Then in the recent half a century since 1949, Taiwan remained under Kuomintang (KMT) rule as a separated part of China, constantly calling for re-establishing Nationalist rule also to the rest of the Mainland. Thus, any domestic demand for independence was suppressed until recently, but it never died and has been revived by the influence of the DDP as a strong opposition party. In the case of Germany, Korea and Viet-Nam, even during the periods of most fierce confrontation, there has been no open call for independence. Therefore, when the two Germanys applied for separate membership in the United Nations, there was no grave concern that one side would take advantage of such participation as a

means of working toward total independence.

The third difference is that for a long time, only one of the two sides, either Beijing or Taipei, but never both, was recognized as the legitimate government for the entire China collective: both the KMT government in Taiwan and the communist régime on the Mainland were competing as the sole representative of China in international organizations. Thus, all other countries and international organizations had to make a choice between the two. With the support of the United States, the KMT government had been able to hold on to its exclusive membership in most international organizations as the sole representative of China, including the United Nations, until the early-1970s. Since then however, Beijing has gradually replaced the KMT government as the sole representative of China in almost all the official international organizations, losing on this diplomatic ground to Mainland China the official designation as the sole representative of the China collective. In the other three cases of split-states, although the opposing sides share no less hostility toward each other, they make no persistent efforts to claim that either side is the sole representative of the whole country in international organizations. This difference is important in two aspects: in the first place it has not only led to the loss of membership of Taiwan in official international organizations, but also has made Taiwan's re-joining any international organizations all the more difficult. Now most countries have got used to the idea that between the two "Chinas", only one can be the legitimate sole representative in the international world. Moreover, seeing the fierce struggle between Mainland China and Taiwan for membership in international organizations, few countries wish to be involved in this dispute. Many Third World countries have even treated China's membership as a political issue of North-South relations. Many scholars may still remember vividly the wild celebrations of some African and Asian delegates in the U.N. after the defeat of the U.S. proposal to treat China's membership issue as a major issue that

requires two thirds of the vote. Today China still counts on many friends in the Third World, as the strong support of Asian and African countries in China's bid to hold 2000 Olympics demonstrated. The other aspect of this intra-Chinese dispute is that long-time competition made the change of Taiwan's attitude a very sensitive issue. Because of the existence of a strong force demanding independence in Taiwan, the change of Taipei's attitude will easily lead to suspicion that Taiwan is moving towards independence. Recently, Taiwan has adopted a more flexible position in foreign affairs and has tried to establish diplomatic relations with countries that already have official relations with Mainland China and join international organizations in which Mainland China is a member. But these developments have fostered serious doubts in the Mainland that such changes might eventually lead to Taiwan's official independence, or permanent separation from the Mainland.

Some people, especially in Taiwan, argue that it is perfectly all right for both Beijing and Taipei to have dual seats in the United Nations. They cite the case of the former-Soviet Union which had three seats in the U.N., thus pointing out the technical possibility for specific countries to have two or more seats in the United Nations. But other than this technical similarity, the cases of dual China seats versus the multiple USSR seats are actually very different. In the USSR case, the trilateral seats issue was a trick the Soviet Union played in 1945 to secure more seats to lessen the problem of its initial minority position in a Western-dominated United Nations. This was won also thanks to the important role the USSR had played in World War II, and in fact the case was always one of "one single country (or government), three seats". This kind of exceptional multi-membership for one country in the U.N. is unlikely to be repeated. In the case of dual membership of China, what is argued for is instead two seats for two different governments, and these two governments do not even recognize officially each other or have any formal ties. It can be predicted that even if Beijing and Taipei do receive dual

memberships in the U.N., it would not be considered as a case similar to the multi-membership of the former-Soviet Union.

Taiwan's international participation is strongly affected by its peculiar international status: Taiwan and Mainland China are widely recognized as indeed two "separate parts" of the same China collective. But the differential in size between the two is so huge that only Beijing is considered the legitimate government of China. Thus Taiwan's formal return to the international society will depend largely on China's prior consent. Because of the existence of a strong movement for independence in Taiwan, an aggressive unilateral drive for international participation can easily lead to Beijing's fears that Taiwan is indeed moving toward a permanent separation, or even independence from Mainland China. Such a drive might even lead to dangerous confrontation, as the recent Taiwan Strait Crisis following Lee Tang-hui's visit to Cornell clearly demonstrated. Of course, Taiwan deserves a proper position in the international world. But since Taiwan's international status is very special, a special solution has to be found.

Taiwan's Role in the International World

Today Taiwan does not have the diplomatic position in the international society it deserves and the problem of Taiwan's international participation should receive special attention of the international community. Appropriate arrangement should be made to allow Taiwan to take part in all international economic and technical organizations upon the understanding of Taiwan's important economic role in the world and the right of the Taiwanese people for full international participation. It should also be made with a mutual political understanding between Beijing and Taipei. Such an arrangement, if found, will help Taiwan to attain an extensive international participation. It will also promote peace and cooperation between the two sides of Taiwan Straits, as well as in the broader Asia-Pacific region.

Taiwan has an area of 36,000 square

kilometers, which is larger than that of Belgium. It has a population of 21 million, more than that of Australia. Taiwan's GDP is more than those of Indonesia and the Philippines put together.² Taiwan's per capita GNP is higher than those of two E.U. members: Greece and Portugal.³ Taiwan has one of the highest reserves of foreign currencies in the whole world, the figure being as high as \$110 billion by June 1995.⁴ All these figures demonstrate that Taiwan is an important economic power capable of making a major contribution to the international world.

These absolute figures are very impressive, but what is more important is the momentum of Taiwan's development. Taiwan has achieved one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. Only thirty years ago, Taiwan was still a very poor society with a per capita GNP lower than that of Zaire.⁵ Today Taiwan's per capita GNP is already higher than some West European nations. With its economic dynamism, Taiwan will reach the average economic level of the OECD countries in 10-15 years. Taiwan has set an excellent example for other developing countries: for a long time, the dependency theorists insisted that it was impossible for any developing country to ever become developed, because the structures and dynamics of the world economy were controlled from the centers - particularly the United States - which locked peripheral societies into permanent under-development.⁶ Taiwan's case has proved that this is not true: Taiwan and other East Asian newly industrialized economies have created a new version of capitalism which have overcome the barriers of development. Thus, the "Taiwan Model" has attracted wide attention and is a constant stimulus and encouragement to other developing countries.

Taiwan is not only a model of economic development, but also a model of political democratization. Accompanied with its high economic growth, Taiwan has achieved great progress in political democratization. The government and parliament are now basically freely elected. Restrictions on individual freedom are largely removed.

Both the economic success and political democratization have increased the legitimacy of the government in Taiwan. This is a sharp contrast to the régime in Beijing, which bloodily repressed peaceful demonstrations for democracy a few years ago.

Taiwan has also made a number of important international contributions. It has provided substantial financial and technical aid to some Latin American and African countries. Almost all the countries that still maintain official relations with Taiwan have received some form of aid in one way or another. The rich foreign exchange reserves have given Taiwan much diplomatic leverage. But given the lack of official international ties, Taiwan's official foreign aid policy is not a good measure of its international contribution. Instead it is the level of unofficial or informal international contributions that are the best index to measure Taiwan's international role, which is greater than most people realized. Today Taiwan is a major investor in East Asian countries, and one of the top ten investors in the world.⁷ At the end of 1993, it was the biggest investor in Viet-Nam, second in China and Indonesia, third in Indonesia, fourth in Thailand and fifth in the Philippines.⁸ More importantly, the huge inflow of Taiwanese investment came at a time when U.S. and other Western investments has slowed down. The foreign direct investment (FDI) from Taiwan and other East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) is one of the major reasons why some East Asian developing countries could keep high growth rates despite shrinking Western capital and markets. No wonder some ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have set up industrial parks to specifically attract Taiwanese investment. Thus Taiwan's international business activities have greatly promoted the regional integration of the Asia-Pacific region.

In all respects, Taiwan possesses the basic features of an independent international entity. It has its own "national" government and its own effective customs. Moreover, Taiwan has a strong military force to defend itself. Traditionally, both the Beijing and Taipei

governments have considered Taiwan as a province of China, although they define "China" differently. Both governments also claim their long-term goal is unification. But in the near-term, unification is not very likely: Taiwan has a very different political and economic system from Mainland China, while the gap in economic levels between the two countries is also very wide. Thus as it is very likely that Taiwan will continue to exist as a separate body from the Mainland for quite some time, it is also quite unconscionable to exclude this important "de facto" independent country from the rest of the international community.

Given Taiwan's importance in international and especially regional economy, Taiwan's full representation in international organizations will enable Taipei to make even greater contributions to the region and the world. Taiwan's official foreign aid will increase and Taiwan's technology is especially suitable for the use of developing countries. Taiwan can also contribute its technology to less developed countries through the activities of international technical organizations.

Taiwan's international position will be enhanced by its return to official international organizations. While Taiwan is playing a more and more important role in the regional economy, it has not received full respect in the international society. So it is not strange that Taiwan strongly desires to have a larger role in the international world. As a member of international organizations, Taiwan's international interests will be better protected. There are cases that Taiwanese interests are violated in other countries because of the lack of normal state status of Taiwan.⁹ Taiwanese business people and others who travel abroad find the absence of official relations or diplomatic support a major irritant in their efforts.¹⁰ Now Taiwan's political leaders are avoided by the leaders of most other countries because of Taiwan's ambiguous international status, even though many of those countries are smaller and poorer than Taiwan. The problem of Taiwan's status also often stands in the way of broader regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

region. Particularly, any regional security arrangement will remain extremely difficult to achieve if Taiwan's international status is uncertain and the potential of military confrontation across the Taiwan Straits exists. A constructive measure must be found to allow Taiwan to play a larger official role in the international stage.

The fact that Taiwan has been admitted into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) and the Asia Development Bank (ADB) illustrates that Taiwan's participation is possible if appropriate arrangements are made. Ideally, Taiwan and Mainland China might reach an agreement about Taiwan's international participation and formally coexist in all international organizations. In this context also some kind of security arrangement could be arranged. Unfortunately, recent developments have not led to a productive path in that direction.

Recently, Taiwan has taken pragmatic steps trying to return to the international stage. In dealing with international organizations, Taiwan has reluctantly agreed to join certain international organizations under the name of "Chinese Taipei". Taiwan has also tried to establish diplomatic relations with countries that already have diplomatic ties with the Mainland China. Since 1993 Taiwan has tried to rejoin the United Nations under the name of "Republic of China in Taiwan". These more flexible diplomatic measures have won Taiwan some positions in the international world. In addition to joining APEC and ADB, Taiwan has also made some progress in returning to the World Trade Organization (WTO). But in general the achievements of such more flexible foreign policy have been limited: Taiwan has not been able to go back to any major worldwide inter-governmental organization. The countries that establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan under the "parallel diplomacy" are both few and very small. While Taiwan was able to broaden its diplomatic "living space" through its "pragmatic diplomacy, Beijing is also expanding its influence. In 1990, Beijing established diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore, which had

refused to normalize relations with Communist China for a long time. Even Saudi Arabia and South Korea, Taiwan's long-time allies, have broken official ties with Taipei to establish formal relations with Beijing. Thus Taiwan's difficulties in the diplomatic front has not been lessened by its "diplomatic diplomacy". It is apparent that while Taiwan does deserve full membership in international organizations, whether Taiwan can return to the international society does not depend solely on Taiwan itself, nor can it be taken out of the vital context of bilateral relations between Mainland China and Taiwan, because Taiwan's international participation will depend on the favourable development of Beijing-Taipei relations. Without Beijing's consent, any "pragmatic" diplomacy will not be possible.

Mainland-Taiwan Relations and Taiwan's International Participation

In the past decade and a half, the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits has improved significantly. Both governments have taken measures to reduce tensions and have relaxed their restrictions on mutual exchange and communications, while unofficial contacts have flourished. In general however, official bilateral relations have been far from satisfactory. The two sides are in a deadlock on two major fronts: Beijing has been very harsh in restricting Taiwan's international activities, while Taipei has been stubborn in refusing to establish direct channels of bilateral exchange.

So far Beijing has insisted that Taiwan is a province of China and that it alone is the only government that legitimately represents all the people of the two Chinas. Taiwan should have no place in inter-governmental organizations, nor should it be entitled to have diplomatic relations with other countries. Thus Beijing defeated Taiwan's first attempts to reenter the United Nations and keeps threatening to cut official ties with any country which establishes diplomatic relations with Taipei. Taiwan's "personal diplomacy" in South-East Asia and towards the United States also faced the strong opposition of Mainland China.

If Beijing has a virtual veto power over Taiwan's international participation, Taipei has more leverage over bilateral relations. Until today, Taipei still refuses to allow direct trade, transportation and communication with the Mainland. All trade, investment, travel, mail and so on have to go through a third port, mostly Hong Kong. Moreover, Taipei still retains many restrictions in economic, cultural and other exchanges with Mainland China. Beijing, eager to seek some kind of unification, has made quite some concessions to Taiwan and has tried hard to encourage more contacts with Taiwan.¹¹ But Taipei still does not allow direct contacts. Taipei's reluctance is to some degree understandable, given the long-time severe confrontation between the two sides. Moreover, Taipei has to be more cautious because Taiwan is much smaller than Beijing and is more vulnerable. But such refusal may incur ever higher costs, given China's growing economic importance and Beijing's frustrations over Taipei's stubbornness in rejecting any direct exchange.

Despite the lack of direct contacts, informal contacts between mainland China and Taiwan have developed rapidly. From 1979 to 1993 the two-way trade has expanded nearly 200 times, while Taiwan's investment in the Mainland has also increased nearly 100 times. In 1993 Taiwan's FDI in the Mainland reached \$3.17 billion and surpassed Japan as Mainland China's second largest investor, next only to Hong Kong.¹² Taiwan is also now the fourth largest trade partner of Mainland China. The informal economic cooperation between the Mainland and Taiwan has greatly benefitted both sides. Taiwan's and other overseas Chinese investment is one of the main factors behind mainland China's high growth and industrialization. The mainland market is also a major source of Taiwan's continued export expansion. The large inflow of Taiwanese capital, technology and management experiences has greatly helped the Mainland, especially South China, to take off economically. It should be noted that Taiwanese capital inflow continued to increase greatly after the Tiananmen Square incident, just when Western countries were withholding or

even withdrawing their investment in the Mainland. This helped to maintain China's continued economic boom after the incident. On the other hand, Mainland China has become Taiwan's second largest export market. In 1995 Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of \$8.1 billion,¹³ but its trade surplus with the Mainland was \$14.8 billion.¹⁴ So without its sizable trade surplus to the Mainland, Taiwan would actually have had a trade deficit that year.

The rapidly expanding economic integration among the Chinese regions has come at such a scale that some people suggest that a "Greater China" is being formed and the South China-Taiwan-Hong Kong Triangle is the axis of this Chinese economic community.¹⁵ "Greater China" is actually a combination of sub-regional economic zones (SREZs) among the Chinese economies and overseas Chinese business networks based on cultural and ethnic ties. The economies within the SREZs and networks are highly complementary. East Asia is a vastly diversified region. The high heterogeneity of the region greatly increases the transaction costs for regional economic exchanges. The commonality in culture, language and tradition reduces the transaction costs and makes the economic cooperation among the Chinese regions fruitful. The emerging "Greater China" has great potential for future development.

Many people point out that Japan and East Asian NIEs could develop well because of the right timing, i.e., because of the postwar expansion of western industrial countries, especially the open U.S. market. Now the western market is shrinking relatively and the rising protectionism of the western world will make the industrialization of other developing countries more difficult.¹⁶ Some even argue that the success of East Asia has made the rise of other developing countries impossible.¹⁷ However, this study takes a less pessimistic view about the continuing expansion of the Chinese regions. One of the factors in support of the optimism is the formation and development of the "Greater China". China will get more capital, technology and management skills, and business channels from the

overseas Chinese, especially from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Once China has firmly taken off, it will become a powerhouse of high growth in other Chinese regions. According to the Chiang Ping-kwun, Political Vice Minister of Taiwan's Economic Ministry, Mainland China is the only country that may replace the United States as Taiwan's largest market. He also pointed out that whether another Taiwan economic miracle can be made depends on the healthy development of the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits.¹⁸

The close economic cooperation between the two sides will produce the economic interdependence that should reduce security tensions between the two sides. History tells us that highly interdependent economies tend not to fight against each other, because such a war will be too costly. Some fear that the close ties will make Taiwan dependent on the mainland.¹⁹ But they forget that Taiwan can also greatly influence the other side. In fact, since Taiwan has allowed its residents to visit the Mainland, the people in the Mainland have been deeply impressed by the economic success in Taiwan and the "Taiwan style" has influenced the Mainlanders' way of living and social and business practices, as well as their economic development, although some Chinese officials may not want to admit that openly.²⁰ The Chinese did begin their learning for industrialization by following the model of more advanced Western countries, but they soon found that experience from the East Asia NICs, especially that of Taiwan, suits China much better. The "Taiwan miracle" better than political propaganda or anything else, convinced the Mainland Chinese that capitalism is clearly superior to socialism. If Hong Kong's businessmen are confident that they will "capitalize" Mainland China, a much larger and stronger Taiwan is apparently in a better position to do so. The truth is that contacts rather than restrictions are a better way to handle Taiwan-Mainland relations.

Both Beijing and Taipei maintain that their ultimate goal in Mainland-Taiwan relations is unification and they adhere

to "one China" principle.²¹ Of course total unification can be only a long-term goal. The process of unification should be peaceful and gradual. A lot of measures have to be taken to narrow the gaps of all kinds, political, cultural, social and economic ones. Economic integration is the most effective way to promote unification. It can link the lives of different societies together, increasing commonalities and reducing differences. Until today, however, official ties between Mainland China and Taiwan remain almost non-existent, except for a few "informal" talks between the officials of the two sides at a third place. Because of the many restrictions from Taipei to trade and investment with the Mainland, the great potential of economic cooperation between the two areas has not been realized. This is bad for both sides, especially when both sides are in a crucial period of industrial upgrading and market expansion. The deep distrust and misunderstanding are difficult barriers here. Great and sincere efforts from both sides are needed to break the deadlock, with each side respecting the concerns of the other. For example, since Taiwan is the smaller of the two sides, its primary concern is security. For Mainland China, the ultimate concern is Taiwan's permanent breakaway from the Mainland. Therefore Beijing should clearly renounce the use of military force to unify Taiwan, as long as Taipei does not change its commitment to eventual unification. China should also allow Taiwan to join all the international economic and technical organizations. Taiwan should remove restrictions on economic and cultural exchange with the Mainland.

At this time, it is not realistic to expect Mainland China-Taiwan relations to make a dramatic breakthrough. For instance, Taiwan's return to the international society may be good to the overall Chinese community and the international society, as some have argued.²² But Beijing would not allow that to happen unless it is convinced that Taiwan's rejoining the international organizations will not prevent Taiwan from eventual unification with the Mainland. Many Mainland Chinese will be very happy to see that Taiwan, as part

of the Chinese community, enjoys a respectful international status it deserves. But they will not support Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy", for fear that it will be taken advantage to enhance Taiwan's separation with the Mainland. They hope to see a settlement about Taiwan's status between both sides. After that Taiwan can do anything it wants to do under that status, including applying to international economic and technical organizations.

Taiwan Issue and U.S.-China Relations

Taiwan's international status is a very important issue because it also has great impact on the international relations in the Asia Pacific region. Particularly, it has very strong influence on U.S.-China relations. Historically, how the Taiwan issue was handled always had great impact on the U.S.-China relations. On the other hand, U.S. policy towards Taiwan also changes as the U.S.-China relations change. Today Taiwan re-emerges as the most vexing issue in U.S.-China relations.²³ The recent change of the U.S.-China policy is a major source of the trouble.

Since the Truman Administration dispatched the Seventh Fleet to prevent the Chinese Communists from attacking Taiwan in June 1950 as a response to Kim Il-Sung's attack on South Korea, the Taiwan problem has been a major irritant in the U.S.-China relations. China's resentment against American's hindrance of China's unification was a major factor in Beijing's entry into the Korean War.²⁴ In 1954 Washington signed a mutual defense treaty with Taipei, which added to the tensions with Beijing. In 1958 China's military action against Quemoy and Matsu created a major crisis between the US and China. Tensions between the United States and China on the Taiwan issue did not lessen until the signing of the "Shanghai Communiqué" in 1972. But formal diplomatic relations between the two was not established until 1979, since China set three preconditions for normalization: cutting diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawing troops from the island, and termination of the defense treaty.²⁵ It was the Carter Administration that finally

accepted those conditions. After the United States cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act to preserve, as much as possible, the bilateral relationship through unofficial government contact with Taiwan.²⁶

In general after the Nixon Administration, the United States tended to try to improve its relations with China and gradually reduced and adjusted its relations with Taiwan. Both the Republicans and Democrats wanted to enhance the friendship with Beijing.²⁷ The United States welcomed Beijing's reform policy and needed China's help in confronting the Soviet Union. But after the June 4th Incident, U.S.-China relations deteriorated and the end of the Cold War reduced the need of the U.S. to play the China card. A change of the Taiwan policy in the US was to take place and Taiwan was to be the beneficiary of the policy shift.²⁸ This is reflected in the U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. After an agreement was reached between Washington and Beijing in August 1982, the U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan were maintained at the 1980 level and the amount reduced \$20 million each year.²⁹ But in 1992 the Bush Administration agreed to sell 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, which had been long requested by Taiwan but had been refused by the U.S. many times. The amount of the sale was \$5.8 billion, seven times more than the limit set in the 1982 agreement.

Under the Clinton Administration, U.S.-China relations have had a more rocky ride. Clinton had an ambitious foreign policy initiative, hoping to make breakthroughs in foreign fronts. While pressing Japan hard to import more U.S. goods, the Clinton Administration also tried to use MFN status to pressure China to improve human rights. A number of clashes took place. In May 1993, China was accused of violating its 1992 agreement to stop exporting goods produced by prison labors to the United States. In October 1993 after strong protests from the U.S. Congress, China lost a bid to host the 2000 Olympics. However, China refused to give up. As the mostly rapidly growing economy in the World War in the past decade and a half, China is a market that the U.S.

could not afford to lose. In May 1994 Clinton had to delink commercial issues from human rights problems, contradicting his own criticism at the election debate that President Bush was bowing to China. But this "loss of face" made Clinton more vulnerable to congressional pressure. In December 1994 the U.S. stopped China's entry to the WTO.

But neither human rights tensions nor trade disputes had resulted in major face-offs between the two powers yet. It was the Taiwan problem that really escalated the strains. On 8 September 1994 the U.S. State Department announced a shift in official policy toward Taiwan. Among the changes in policy, high-level bilateral meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials would be permitted in most U.S. government offices. Also the official name of Taiwan's representative office in Washington, D.C. would be changed from "Coordination Council for North American Affairs" to "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative's Office in the United States."³⁰ This policy change greatly agitated China.

The real trouble came after Clinton yielded to congressional pressure and allowed Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the United States in spite of the repeated assurances of U.S. envoys that such a visit would not take place. Beijing now felt alarmed that the U.S. might be altering its One China Policy, although the U.S. officials still pledged that this would not happen. But the Chinese government would not listen, given the failure of the U.S. administration to keep its promise about Lee's visit. No issue in Sino-U.S. relations - not proliferation, human rights, or trade has had the devastating impact or unrelenting tenacity of the Taiwan question.³¹ For China, Taiwan is a principal issue of national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of China.³² China would prevent Taiwan's permanent separation at all costs, even if it means sacrifice of economic development. The Clinton Administration's bungled diplomacy "forced Beijing into a corner."³³ Beijing reacted very strongly to Lee's U.S. visit. After the visit, Sino-U.S. relations were in a free fall.³⁴ China canceled a few official visits to the United States,

including that of the Chinese Defense Minister. Beijing also recalled its U.S. ambassador. Harry Wu, an American citizen whose testimony triggered the accusations about prison labor in China, was arrested in China for "stealing state secrets".

Beijing was particularly upset with "Taipei's attempts to perpetuate Taiwan's political separation from China".³⁵ Since the late 1970s China has consistently tried to promote bilateral exchanges with Taiwan. It has adopted a rather generous policy towards the Taiwanese. It welcomed Taiwanese to visit the mainland. It gave very favorable trade and investment treatment to Taiwan. In April 1980 China announced that all Taiwanese goods are considered as domestic ones therefore be exempted of tariffs. In July 1988, China also granted Taiwanese investment special privileges.³⁶ What China has been seeking is not necessarily an immediate unification. China hopes to establish close economic and cultural ties with Taiwan so that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits can be unified as the economic gap narrows. But Lee Teng-hui evidently wanted to avoid being forced on to the road of unification.³⁷ Although Taipei did gradually relax its Mainland policy, it has refused to allow direct exchanges with the Mainland. While Taipei has been quite passive in expanding exchanges with the mainland, it is very active in promoting "pragmatic diplomacy", taking advantage of the shift of the U.S. policy. After its attempt to make official breakthroughs failed, Taipei began to make "private visits" for their high-ranking leaders. Although those visits were labeled "private", they were obviously intended as the first steps for upgrades of political ties. Lee's visit to the U.S. was considered a major diplomatic "victory" in Taiwan. For Beijing, this is a clear indication that Taipei is seeking "permanent separation". China conducted threatening missile tests in the Taiwan Straits. The tests initially caused financial chaos in Taiwan and support for the pro-unification New Party went up at the cost of the KMT. But as the Presidential election drew close, Beijing escalated its war-game and fired missiles to waters close to the Island.

The U.S. responded by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the nearby waters and this helped boost support to Lee's bid for the Presidency, which he won overwhelmingly. Meanwhile Beijing publicly emphasized that support for the DPP which advocate independence declined dramatically in the Presidential election.

The tensions relaxed somewhat after the Presidential election. China began to lessen its criticisms towards Lee. Taiwan also made some gestures to reduce the tensions. Even though certain senators in the U.S. expressed the hope to invite Lee to visit the United States after his inauguration, Lee would not think of making such a visit. The U.S. State Department also indicated that visits from top Taiwanese leaders would be unlikely in the future, although they would not totally rule them out. The Clinton Administration enhanced its "engagement" with China: National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's trip to Beijing last summer was successful and is widely expected that Clinton will visit China after he wins his second term. Pro-Taiwan groups in the U.S. Congress stopped advocating upgrading relations with Taiwan.

What is the implication of the recent Taiwan Straits Crisis following Lee's visit to Cornell? There are sayings that Lee won the face-off, citing the strong support he won in the Presidential election and Beijing's failure to make Taiwan back off. An in-depth analysis will find, however, that such claim is not well grounded. A widely held view is that China adopted the hardline in order to erode popular support for Lee. This may be what Chinese leaders wanted but Beijing's true target was actually to keep the majority of Taiwanese away from supporting independence.³⁸ Lee would have won this election anyway, given the strength of the Nationalist Party. In the election of the legislature, which was influenced by China's war-game, the New Party gained a surprising number of seats, which reduced the dominance of the Nationalist Party. The new "Three Party" configuration makes the post-election operations of the legislature more difficult for the ruling party. Beijing may have lost some face

but its strong reaction has sent a clear message that any action to change the status quo of Taiwan's international status will be an invitation to direct confrontation with China. The Taiwan-related concerns trump China's short-term economic interests as well as its concern over American, Japanese or ASEAN reactions.³⁹ Further upgrading of Taiwan's international status has been stopped. It is very hard to judge who has really won or lost in the conflict.

America used the incorrect standard to judge China and Taipei. While there is no doubt that Taiwan is more developed than Mainland China, the historical conditions of the two are very different. It should be noted that China has achieved no smaller progress in human rights and democracy than Taiwan since 1977, although the absolute level of democracy in China is still much lower. It is a mistake to think of the Beijing-Taipei face-off as a confrontation between democracy and dictatorship. The difference is actually that between pro-independence and pro-unification. The pro-unification people in Taiwan would mock Taipei's presentation of itself as a defender of human rights and democracy as a "clever gambit".⁴⁰ It is pointed out that the so-called "rule of man" continues to dominate political culture in Taiwan as well as in China, although the story is presented completely different in the international media.⁴¹ Even after China becomes democratized, its attitudes on the unification issue would remain the same, given the consensus of all sectors of politically aware Chinese society on the legitimacy of using all necessary means to prevent Taiwan's independence.⁴²

The problem is: how to maintain stable and healthy U.S.-Chinese relations? The key is to have a consistent China policy. There are numerous twists and turns in its dealings with China by the Clinton Administration. This is certainly an ineffective way to engage China. As a rising power China is becoming more assertive in foreign policy and hopes to get more respect. It is true that China still has many problems and its abuse of human rights are annoying not only for Americans but also even more to the Chinese themselves. But pressuring

China is counterproductive. The historical memories of being mistreated by western powers made China particularly sensitive to foreign pressure. Taiwan in particular, was a symbol of humiliation.⁴³ It is erroneous to think that China would not confront the U.S. because its dependence on the U.S. market. China was much more dependent on the Soviet Union in the late-1950s but such dependence did not prevent China from turning against Moscow. Moreover, it is impossible for the U.S. to isolate China since other countries will not follow up. If the U.S. cannot successfully isolate a small Cuba, it is highly unlikely that it can do that to a much stronger dynamic China. Some Americans complain that while the U.S. is doing the nerve-jangling containing, Europe is doing the lucrative engaging.⁴⁴ But the apparent double standards the U.S. apply - magnifying the human rights problems in China while downplaying human rights abuses in Chechnya and Saudi Arabia - does not make the U.S. human rights rhetoric appealing. America's general inattentiveness, high-caste political moralizing and unpredictability combine to dilute the authority America might have exercised in Asia after the Cold War.⁴⁵

To have a consistent China policy, it is important to know why America has had one. China policy. First, some of the goals the U.S. had in China were unrealistic. After World War II the U.S. tried to forge a "united China inclined to democracy" and thought that only such a China could contribute to the Far Eastern policy of the United States.⁴⁶ While America apparently favored the Chinese Nationalists, it tried to force Chiang Kai-shek to compromise with the Communists. Such a policy not only ended up displeasing both sides of the Chinese civil war, but also contributed partly to the rise of communist China, the worst scenario the U.S. had feared. Americans did not realize that their "ideal" model did not work for China. In the post-1949 period, the simplified "containing China" policy was very costly and eventually resulted in the American withdrawal from mainland Asia. Only when the U.S. changed its attitudes towards China for the need to confront

the rising Soviet threat, did the U.S.-China policy become pragmatic and productive. But with the end of the Cold War, impractical elements of the U.S.-China policy again increased, while haggling with China on every (many times untrue) accusation such as prison labor, child abuse and nuclear and chemical weapon proliferation serves to frustrate both countries. It is true that the human rights situation in China is not as good as that in the West and the Chinese government is still repressive in many ways, but democratization is a long-term process. It took more than forty years, despite strong American pressure, for a small Taiwan to become democratized. The fist fights in Taiwan's legislature still ridicule Taiwan's democracy. But China's reform has been less than twenty years old and it has already made great progress. At this stage of development, there are many other pressing issues for the ordinary Chinese. Economic development is more important than anything else. In effect, the human rights pressure the U.S. apply ironically help to drive the Chinese with democratic ideas closer to Beijing, for any Chinese who cares about China will oppose policies that will hurt China's development, despite their dislike of the current Chinese régime. They know too well that any policy that aims to improve China's human rights in the long run has to be the active engagement of China rather than to contain it. In this aspect a "patient engagement" is necessary.⁴⁷ Moreover, mutual respect is required to develop constructive bilateral relations. While it is important to hold on to the principles such as the cases of Chinese dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, it is also critical to avoid fighting with China on every issue of human rights abuse or other "improper behavior". Even the most outspoken Chinese students studying in the U.S. who once strongly condemned the Tiananmen massacre are now criticizing the human rights policy of the U.S. towards China.⁴⁸ Most fundamentally, the U.S. has many vital interests ranging from regional security arrangements, developing business strategies that will take advantage of the high growth in East Asia, prevention of nuclear proliferation.

It is critical that economic reform in China succeeds which will eventually make China democratic. Only by actively engaging China can the U.S. exert positive influence on China.

Japanese Role in Taiwan's International Participation

Relative to the U.S., Japan has much less problem with China about the Taiwan issue. Politically, Japan has kept a low profile in its dealings with Taiwan. Economically, Japan has never failed to maintain strong ties with Taiwan. After official ties were broken in 1972, Japan continued economic and other non-political contacts almost as before. Japan's strategy - breaking formal diplomatic ties while keeping relations otherwise undisturbed - became known as the "Japan Formula" followed by many other nations as a model when shifting diplomatic ties to Beijing.⁴⁹ As a country which understands China well, Japan had a practical attitude toward China. Then Prime Minister Yoshida wished to open up relations with China as early as 1951 and gave up the idea only after American pressure. He did not think that China is as aggressive as many Westerners believed. To the contrary, he thought that Chinese are peaceful by nature.⁵⁰ He did not believe that China and the Soviet Union were an iron bloc. He thought that it was not an illusion to alienate China and Soviet Union. He hoped to engage China so that China could open up again.⁵¹ But Japan was highly dependent on the U.S. at the time and Japan could only follow the U.S. to contain China. Following the U.S., Japan had official ties with Taiwan. Although there was strong demand in Japan to establish diplomatic relations, the successive Japanese governments faithfully followed the U.S. lead and refused to switch its recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In 1971 however, the Nixon Administration began contacting China (the Kissinger Mission) without notifying Japan before hand. This caused a political earthquake in Japan and the Sato government had to resign. The succeeding "pro-China" Tanaka government quickly switched official recognition to Beijing in 1972. Ever since Beijing and Tokyo have maintained relatively stable and good

relations.

Both before and after 1972, Japan kept extensive economic ties with Taiwan. Japan has been the largest investor in Taiwan. Used to be a Japanese colony, Taiwan was soon integrated with the Japanese production networks after Japan restored its industrial strength in the 1960s. The interactions between Japan and Taiwan reflects a strong dualism typical of Japan's ties to East Asia.⁵² On the one hand, there are harsh memories of Japan's colonial rule. The Taiwanese were treated as second-class citizens and they were not allowed to engage in major manufacturing industries. On the other hand, Japan developed Taiwan's economy as part of the Japanese economic system and by 1945 Taiwan already had some industries and basic infrastructure.⁵³ Japanese policies of cultivating local leaders had strong influence on Taiwanese leaders. As a consequence, popular unease with Japan is sometimes accompanied by elite-level cooperation and understanding.⁵⁴

On 30 April 1994, Lee declared himself as have been Japanese before the age of 22 and proudly acknowledged his associations with Japan.⁵⁵ He made subtle moves to upgrade Japan's status in Taiwan—for example, by always avoiding attending ceremonies celebrating China's victory over Japan, by recruiting Japanese academics to be his private advisors, and by telling his fellow citizens not to resist Japan. All these aggravate Beijing's strong sense that Taipei is exhibiting colonial-style attitudes of superiority.⁵⁶ But until present, Japan has basically kept a consistent China policy. It has not allowed human rights issues to become a major directive to its China policy. It believes that engagement is critical to ensure that China to continue in his path of reform. It refuses to follow the United States to pressure China on human rights. It was Japan that persuaded other Western countries to relax sanctions on China after the Tianamen Incident at the Houston G-7 Summit in 1990. Japan has consistently used economic means to create and enhance its economic interdependence. This will not only reap economic dependence, but will also increase Japan's political influence. The

Japanese understand that the more the Chinese economy becomes dependent on Japanese capital, technology and managerial skills, the greater influence Japan hopes to be able to exercise over the general direction of its neighbor's policy.⁵⁷ But rather than frequently pressuring China on issues of human rights or provoking China on Taiwan or Tibet issues, Japan only tries to influence China's general direction and on key issues such as North Korea, the Gulf Crisis (not to veto the U.N. authorization of war against Iraq, nuclear tests.

On the matter of Taiwan, Japan was generally satisfied with the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan is all important for Japan. Economically, Taiwan remains a very important market for Japan, which is the second largest trader for Taiwan and enjoys a sizable trade surplus (\$14.6 billion in 1995).⁵⁸ Japanese investment in Taiwan is considerable. Japan also has considerable security interest in Taiwan. But Japan wants to remain aloof from any conflict over the island. Relations with Beijing are at the center of Japanese policy in Northeast Asia.⁵⁹ While the Japanese would like to see Taiwan to be represented in international, economic and technical organizations, they certainly do not want this issue to push them into a confrontation with China. So they would also like Taipei to keep a low political profile. They would not invite Lee Teng-hui to his Kyoto University alma mater for a "private visit".⁶⁰ The lack of official diplomatic ties with Taipei did not prevent Japan from developing strong economic ties with Taiwan and any move that would provoke costly confrontations is unwise.

Why is the Japan policy towards China and Taiwan so different difference from the U.S. policy? One important reason is the different conceptions of China. The Japanese do not see China as a security threat, as many Americans do. The Japanese seem to worry more about the environment degradation than about the Chinese military.⁶¹ China is busy engaging in its economic development and an aggression war will cost China most of its international market and source of capital and technology. Second, the Japanese believe more in long-term

economic interactions than quick political fix. Japan considers its present economic and technical superiority more effective means to steer China into constructive engagements. Third, Japan's China policy is built on pragmatic goals and political rhetoric plays a much smaller role. The Japanese administration has much less check from the Diet than the U.S. administration from the U.S. Congress. Fourth, there is strong pacifism in Japan, and Japan does not seek to be a political superpower in Asia.⁶² It believes more in economic interdependence than military confrontation. Last, but not the least, being an Asian country itself, Japan has a better understanding of the region than the United States. The Japanese experience in dealing with China and Taiwan is certainly important reference for the United States.

Finding A Solution for Taiwan's International Participation

Coming back to the issue of Taiwan, Taiwan had, in almost all senses of the term, *de facto* independence before the recent crisis.⁶³ It is reasonable that Taiwan seeks a larger voice in the international society, given the rising democracy and economic prosperity on the island. But any action that is moving towards permanent separation is not acceptable to the Chinese society. The U.S.-China relations will be very problematic if Americans are perceived as encouraging Taiwan to move towards that direction. A return to the status quo before the crisis, especially to the principles articulated by the Reagan administration in 1982 should be helpful.⁶⁴

The Taiwanese leaders tried all means to be "pragmatic" in dealing with foreign governments. Lien Chan, Taiwan's vice president and prime minister, even "disappeared" after he stopped in the U.S. and secretly went to Ukraine, finally reemerging in Taipei. His staff said that he "privately" met the leaders of Ukraine, only to be vehemently denied by the Ukrainian government. At the same time Taiwanese leaders stubbornly refused to allow direct exchanges with the Mainland. Such "pragmatic diplomacy" is actually highly impractical and will

not serve Taiwan's long-term interests. After other countries understand what the "pragmatic diplomacy" really means and what response they will get from Beijing if they accommodate those seemingly mild actions of Taiwan, such diplomacy will lose its appeal. Unless their actual purpose is to seek confrontation with China, as some scholars from Taiwan itself pointed out, such policy is not going to work.⁶⁵ More constructive and truly pragmatic solutions have to be found.

It may take some time before a total breakthrough to solve the problem of Taiwan's international participation is reached, but there is a lot that the two sides can do now. Although the Mainland-Taiwan relations remain tense today, many gradual steps can still be made if both sides have sincerity to cooperate. International economic and technical organizations are good ones. First the non-political nature of those organizations make Taiwan's membership issue less sensitive to Beijing: Mainland China thinks that Taiwan is an independent economy, although it does not think that Taiwan is an independent country. Therefore, it is possible that special arrangements can be reached to let Taiwan join international economic and technical organizations as an independent economy. Second, economic and technical areas are where Taiwan's relative strength lies. Taiwan's participation is also more easily accepted by those organizations. As an important trader in the world, for instance, Taiwan is being seriously considered for its application to the WTO. Given the importance of Taiwan as an economically important entity, international economic and technical organizations are always willing to accept Taiwan as a member under some special arrangement, as long as Beijing does not oppose it. Third as a special entity, participation in international economic and technological organizations is critical to Taiwan's long-term development. For instance, Taiwan wants to become a financial and transportation center of East Asia. But without membership in international economic and technical organizations, this will be something very difficult to achieve.

But what can persuade Beijing to allow

Taiwan to take part in international economic and technical organizations? Apparently Taiwan's participation in international economic and technical organizations is not a matter of principle for Beijing, since they already gave consent to Taiwan's participation in the APEC and ADB. But they must be convinced that Taiwan is not seeking permanent separation from China before they make concessions to Taiwan's international participation. In fact, both Beijing and Taipei are playing cards against each other. Taiwan's international participation and the direct exchanges between the two sides are hostages of politics. This is not fair to the people on either side of the Taiwan Straits. Both governments must take bold measures to break the deadlock. Beijing should be much more flexible to the question of Taiwan's international participation. Taiwan definitely deserves membership in all the international economic and technical organizations. Trying to isolate Taiwan all the way is of no help to promote mainland-Taiwan relations. Taipei should also take measure to open direct economic linkages with the Mainland. Broad economic integration between Mainland China and Taiwan is inevitable. The law of economics tells us that complementary economic factors (rich capital and advanced technology in Taiwan and cheap labor and production materials) will always go together. Because of the historical, cultural, social and language commonalities of the two areas, the economic integration between the two is just not stoppable. It will be much wiser for the governments to lead the process rather than to be pushed around. Public opinion in Taiwan favors widening the scope of permissible dealings with the mainland.⁶⁶ Taipei has been very active in dealing with its international relations in recent years, but it has been quite passive in dealing with its relations with the Mainland. Playing cards may be necessary in dealing with external relations. But if one holds a card for too long, no matter how good the card is, he or she may risk of losing the power of the card. A more constructive and active Mainland strategy may be necessary for Taipei to put itself in a better position.

The long-term prospects for Taiwan's international participation are very good. This may sound too optimistic in light of the recent crisis in the Taiwan Straits. But the future trends in both sides are generally favorable to Taiwan's international status. As economic cooperation (so far basically unofficial) between the two sides further enhances, and the two sides will have to take more conciliatory stands toward each other. The recent conflicts have proven that tensions are to the interests of neither side. While unification is the ultimate trend for the Mainland and Taiwan, it is very likely that the two will remain separated for a very long time. Most Chinese, even the most active advocates for democracy in Mainland China do not want Taiwan to be independent. Some of their motives are perhaps "selfish". They do not want Mainland China to lose a great model for economic development and political democratization. But many Chinese also understand Taiwan's unwillingness to unify with the Mainland at this time. So the unification should only be a long-term goal. How to coexist in the real World War in this long period is an important issue for both sides. The potential gains from mutual dependence is very great. Beijing should at least allow Taiwan to have a reasonable "diplomatic living space", and Taipei should allow direct contacts between the people in both areas. Only compromise, not confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, can solve the problem of Taiwan's international participation.

Notes

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The Florida Consortium for Political Research

Angela Halfacre, David Hill, Michael Martinez and M. Margaret Conway, University of Florida-Gainesville

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