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Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.



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- Table of Contents -

Illustrated Florida Cover	1
Table of Contents	2
Editorial Board—Florida Political Chronicle	3
Officers & Executive Council—Florida Political Science Association 2019-2020	4
FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION—Membership (www.fpsanet.org)	7
FPSA Publications: Florida Political Chronicle & The Political Scientist	5
Florida Political Chronicle—Submission Guidelines	6
Call for Papers: Florida Political Science Conference, Stetson University, 4 April 2020	8
* President’s Message	
by FPSA President Mark Logas, M.A. (Valencia College in Orlando)	9
* Editor’s Introduction: New Essays on Domestic and International Issues	
by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair E.U. College of Europe-Bruges)	11
* Machiavelli on Leadership Studies: Chapter XIV of <i>The Prince</i>	
by Hudson G. Reynolds, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University, near-Tampa)	15
* Scott, Nelson, DeSantis, Gillum & Beyond: A Look at 2018 Florida Precinct Returns	
by Jack Reilly Ph.D., Jack K. Belk Jr. M.A., Annika Kufrovich, Jennifer Lin & Rory Renzy (New College of Florida in Sarasota)	23
* The Political Gates of Hades: Explaining U.S. Policy towards the Orthodox Church	
by Amir Azarvan, Ph.D. (Georgia Gwinnett College in Lawrenceville)	37
* Moving Away from the West or Taking Independent Positions? A Structural Analysis of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy	
by Suleyman Senturk, M.A. (University of South Florida-Tampa)	48

- * **The Institution of Elected Sheriffs: Implicit Bias and Government Failures**
by James Cockerham, ABD & MPA (Florida State University in Tallahassee) 111
- * **Immigration and Demise of Social-Democratic Parties in Western Europe: France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy**
by Davide Dell'Isola, ABD & M.A., *2019 Winner Best Graduate Paper Award*
(University of Central Florida in Orlando) 125
- * **Rethinking Leadership: Women Commanders, Rebel-Groups and Sexual Violence against Civilians—Cases of Colombia and Sierra Leone**
by Sara Belligoni, ABD & M.A., *2019 Runner-up for Best Graduate Paper Award*
(University of Central Florida in Orlando) 144
- * **Differences in Vote Margin of Candidates in the Florida Legislature**
by Meghan L. Stevens, B.A., *2019 Winner Best Undergraduate Paper Award*
(University of Central Florida in Orlando) 158
- * **Does the U.S. Support Unfair Labor Practices Through Trade Negotiations?**
by Jamie Dietrich, B.A., *2019 Runner-up for Best Undergraduate Paper Award*
(University of Tampa, Florida) 175

Announcements:

- ❖ **Book Review: Amin Saikal, *Iran Rising: Survival & Future of the Islamic Republic***
by Houman Sadri, Ph.D., Deputy-Director Information & Policy Analysis Center
(IPAC/University of Central Florida in Orlando) 197
- ❖ **Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: IPAC/University of Central Florida-Orlando** 199

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FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION



OUR MISSION: The Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) is committed to promoting Political Science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our board of officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. Spanning from the University of West Florida-Pensacola, to University of Central Florida-Orlando, to Barry University, to Flagler College, to Florida International University, to University of Miami, to Saint Leo University, etc., our regional scholarly association covers the “Sunshine State” bringing together Political Scientists and International Affairs professionals from public and private institutions to network, collaborate on research and discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

MEMBERSHIP: Join FPSA!

To become a member the Florida Political Science Association choose either **Plan A** or **Plan B**:

please go to FPSA website: <http://www.fpsanet.org/>

then at bottom of page click on: [Join FPSA](#) or <http://www.fpsanet.org/join-fpsa.html>

PLAN A—FPSA New Annual Membership or Renewal plus Annual Conference Registration:

- Faculty/Others: **\$75 pre-registration** (includes membership fee) vs. **after 1 March on-site registration \$85**
- Students: **\$35 pre-registration** (includes membership fee) vs. **after 1 March on-site registration \$40**
- Includes annual Membership & Subscription to *Florida Political Chronicle* & *Political Scientist Newsletter*.

PLAN B—FPSA Simple New Annual Membership or Renewal (NOT attending Annual Conference): \$40

- New Membership with NO Conference Registration: \$40 or
- Renewal of Membership with NO Conference Registration: \$40
- Includes annual Membership & Subscription to *Florida Political Chronicle* & *Political Scientist Newsletter*.

Any problems contact FPSA Treasurer Dr. Aubrey Jewett at e-mail: Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

See on page 8 the Preliminary Announcement for the next FPSA Annual Conference.

PUBLICATIONS:
FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Florida Political Chronicle

<http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html>

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the bi-annual scholarly publication of the Florida Political Science Association, which encourages submissions from all the discipline's sub-fields. Submission Guidelines here on p.7. Please contact the journal's **Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.** of Saint Leo University at marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu for more information.

The Political Scientists:
Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association

<http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html>

The Political Scientists newsletter is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact for information and Submission Guidelines to *The Florida Scientist* its newsletter's **Editor Denis Rey** of University of Tampa at denis.rey@ut.edu or **Guest Editor Kelly McHugh** of Florida Southern College at kmchugh@flsouthern.edu

See FPSA website: www.fpsanet.org



Florida Political Chronicle

– SUBMISSION GUIDELINES –

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SUBSCRIPTIONS for FPSA, FPC & PS:

go to the FPSA website:
<http://www.fpsanet.org/>
then at bottom page click on:
[Join FPSA/Conference Registration](#)
Any problems e-mail the Treasurer:
Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu

Current and past issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, as well as on-line Archive of older issues are **FREE** for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Science Association's Website either: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>

– ESSAYS & BOOK REVIEWS SUBMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS –

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, printed on-line twice annually to serve the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical and analytical way. This scholarly journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Science disciplines: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Affairs and Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and Organizations.

Please e-mail Editor Marco Rimanelli (Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) all essays for consideration:

1. **Essays & Book Reviews** in **Word** not PDF (Maps/Graphs/Tables welcome).
2. **Author's Biography** at end paper (2-paragraphs, with Ph.D. and M.A. Degrees, position, books).
3. **Abstract & Bibliography** (preferred use Manual of Chicago Style, but other styles accepted).
4. **Do not use First Person ("I")**; instead use the neutral "The author", "The study" or "This work".
5. **Footnotes** preferred style (at end of each page) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has a finished work for review. Otherwise consult the Editor.
6. Standard length varies, with maximum length at 10,000 ca. words and 1-inch margins. Tables in the text or appendixes must fit 1-inch margin (**no landscape-size Tables! Make them fit as portrait-size!**).
7. All essays are selected based on a "2 Blind Reviews" process (yes, I have 2 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
8. **Book-Reviews** WELCOME on any related topic! Submit 2-to-7+ pages-long Book-Reviews in **Word**.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.



Florida Political Science Association Call for Papers Annual Conference: Saturday 4 April 2020 Stetson University, DeLand, Florida

Program Chair: Dr. Zachary Baumann
Florida Southern College, Lakeland
Phone: (863) 680-4962
E-mail: zbaumann@flsouthern.edu

Arrangements Chair: Dr. David Hill
Stetson University, DeLand
Phone: (386) 822-7010
E-mail: dhill@stetson.edu

The 2020 FPSA Annual Conference will be held at **Stetson University in DeLand, Florida**. All information on conference program, driving directions, parking and hotels will be posted on the FPSA website by **January**.

PRE-REGISTRATION before Conference Day is \$75 for faculty and \$35 for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants please pre-register. **REGISTRATION AT CONFERENCE is \$85 for faculty and \$40 for students.** Registration includes conference, lunch, refreshments and subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle*. **To pre-register go to FPSA website: www.fpsanet.org or www.fpsanet.org/annual-meeting.html**

Faculty, talented graduates and undergraduate students are encouraged to submit papers. **Please send all Paper Proposals to the Section Chairs below by 30 December 2019. Accepted papers will be notified by late-January 2020.** Proposals must include: Name, Institution, Rank (Faculty, graduate students, undergraduate students, or general public), Contact Information, Paper Title and Abstract of 150-to-250 words.

A **\$250 award** is given to the *FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award* and a **\$200 award** to the *FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award*, both presented at the annual conference.

Selected Faculty papers, plus all Best Award Papers and Runner-ups are also **published in the *Florida Political Chronicle***.

Sections/Panels	Section Chairs	Contact Information
American National Politics	Gary Boulware University of Florida	gboulware@pky.ufl.edu 352-392-1554 x-243
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Roundtable: Media & Politics	Frank Orlando Saint Leo University	francis.orlando@saintleo.edu 352-588-8414
Roundtable: Centennials of World War I & League of Nations	Marco Rimanelli Saint Leo University	marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu 352-588-8277
Roundtable: Centennial of Women's Political Rights & ERA	Susan MacManus University of South Florida	samacmanus@aol.com

Call for Submissions to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal. Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome as well as other papers that have not been previously published. Please contact and submit to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu to start the peer review process.

See the FPSA website for conference information and archives of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist*: www.fpsanet.org

President's Message

by FPSA President Mark Logas, M.A., Valencia College-East Campus in Orlando

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Florida Political Science Association. The FPSA is committed to advancing the understanding of the importance of government. Each year, the FPSA hosts an annual conference with several seminars and workshops. Several professors who are members of the FPSA share their research and participate in roundtable discussions of timely events that shape our current political environment, examine historical events that have caused changes worldwide and enhance the knowledge of government for graduate and undergraduate students. I am proud that both the graduate and undergraduate students who attend our conference do not just observe, many of these students present their research in informative structured panels and break-out sessions. In addition, our annual meeting is now attended by colleagues from other countries, both as participants and observers.

As this year's President, I have identified three key areas for our organization to consider as we move into uncharted territory.

First, we are professionals and there are many members of the FPSA who I believe would be tremendous assets to the Florida State Legislature. Many times, elected officials make decisions that have unintended consequences for both academia and for citizens. My proposal is for the FPSA to reach out to our elected representatives to let them know that we are available to share our knowledge if they are willing to listen. This proposal is by no means intended for our members to serve as lobbyists. A few members of our organization have already established good working relationships with those who serve in Tallahassee. The conversation about what, if any, role that our membership will play will continue to be discussed in Fall 2019.

Second, it is imperative to me that every student learns about our government, from its founding to current day decision making. The United States of America is indeed a unique experiment and we are an exceptional nation that many in this country don't appreciate or understand. Therefore, I will continue to work openly with the Florida State Legislature to expand the Civics Literacy Requirement and make U.S. Government a mandatory class once again for all A.A. and A.S. Degree seeking students.

Finally, colleges and universities must become more informed and involved in providing services for our Veteran students. Sadly, some in academia are either uninformed or simply not providing the services that we are legally obligated to provide for our Veterans. In Fall 2019 I will be asking the FPSA to create a formal guideline document that can be shared with each of the colleges and universities throughout our great Sunshine state. Some of those who have served with honor have come home only to face hardships related to misinformed faculty and/or administrators who do not know the legal protections afforded to student-Veterans who are called back to service in the middle of a semester or who are ordered to appear at official military functions.

In the meantime, I hope that you will get to know about our organization through the fine work of those who are its members by reading the *Florida Political Chronicle* Journal and also *The Political Scientist* Newsletter.

I also hope that you will also be able to join us for the *2020 Florida Political Science Association's Annual Conference* on the campus of Stetson University in DeLand, FL, on Saturday 4 April 2020.

Please contact me if you have any questions about the FPSA and/or if you are interested in becoming involved in the work that we are doing.

Sincerely,

Mark Logas,

**Professor Mark Logas, M.A.
President Florida Political Science Association
Professor of Political Sciences
Valencia College-East Campus, Orlando**

Editor's Introduction: New Essays on Domestic & International Issues

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and "Fellow-Travelers",

welcome to a new edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, the regional journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) published on-line and in colour, with all issues free on the FPSA website (www.fpsanet.org) as resource for members, scholars, students and public interested in domestic and international affairs, as well as the work of the FPSA. Equal pride comes from having since 2018 the EBSCO Library collection of sources now include also the *Florida Political Chronicle* and all its past issues as current references in all library and university searches.

This *Florida Political Chronicle* issue is again at 200 pages (vol.27, n.1, Summer 2019) and welcomes our readers as introduction to our "President's Message" (p.9-10) from our new President of the Florida Political Science Association, Professor Mark Logas of Valencia College-East Campus in Orlando, on current educational initiatives by the FPSA to influence State policy-makers in Tallahassee. This is followed by 9 essays (inclusive of the 2019 Winners of the FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award conferred to Davide Dell'Isola, ABD & M.A. of the University of Central Florida, and Best Undergraduate Paper Awards conferred to Meghan L. Stevens, B.A., also from the University of Central Florida in Orlando), concluding with our Book Review.

The first essay, "Machiavelli on Leadership Studies: Chapter XIV of *The Prince*" (p.15-22) is by Senior Associate-Professor Hudson G. Reynolds, Ph.D. in Political Science and ex-Honors Director at Saint Leo University, near-Tampa. As one of the last remaining "Western Straussian" scholars (West Coast disciples of renown political philosopher Leo Strauss) is an "old hand" in distilling in the classroom the leadership lessons of Political Philosophy, Classical studies, American government and U.S. Supreme Court. In his latest political philosophical studs, Dr. Reynolds analyses the notorious Foreign Minister of Renaissance Florence Niccolò Machiavelli's controversial book, *The Prince*, as being both the most infamous treatise on cut-throat politics in Renaissance Italy, and an actual leadership education manual (especially its Chapter XIV) to teach hands-down with pertinent historical examples the multifaceted craft of government, wise leadership and survival for any new ruler rising to power, both at home and abroad.

The second essay, "Scott, Nelson, DeSantis, Gillum and Beyond: a Look at 2018 Florida Precinct Returns" (p.23-36) is a collective work by Associate-Professor Jack Reilly, Ph.D. with Jack K. Belk Jr., M.A. and Undergraduate students Annika Kufrovich, Jennifer Lin & Rory Renzy of New College of Florida in Sarasota. This study analyzes how Midterm elections are typically seen as a repudiation of sitting Presidents of the United States, but in 2018, despite a general popular discontent against President Donald Trump that produced sweeping Democratic advances in the national U.S. House, state Governorships, state Houses and state Senates, this nation-wide trend was apparently contained nationally by an advantageous U.S. Senate map that remained in Republican hands and by Florida's performance as a prototypical purple state at the national level, but solidly Republican at the state-level. Thus, Florida 2018 state-wide races only elected a single Democrat as Agriculture-Commissioner Nikki Fried, while the most prominent races for U.S. Senate and Governor, Republicans won unexpectedly, albeit by vanishingly small electoral margins. This paper used fine-grained precinct-level data and Florida voter files to examine geographic and demographic correlates during the 2018 Midterm Elections, but such narrow races vs. a national counter-trend requires further analysis on the impact of the impending confrontational 2020 U.S. Presidential Elections over Trump's and the Republican Party's hold on power.

The third essay, “The Political Gates of Hades: Explaining U.S. Policy towards the Orthodox Church” (p.37-47) by Assistant-Professor Amir Azarvan, Ph.D. of Georgia Gwinnett College in Lawrenceville, describes U.S. policy towards the Orthodox Church, balancing official statements that U.S. policy is motivated by humanitarian interests vs. the Cold War desire to curb Soviet and then in the post-Cold War also Russian political influences. Drawing extensively from declassified government documents, this study assesses both of these rival explanations and concludes that the political significance of the Orthodox Church in U.S.-Russian relations is based on Washington’s bid since the Cold War to counter Soviet and Russian threats U.S. interests in the Balkans and Turkey. Thus, consistently the U.S. has pursued politico-religious policies that in practice undermined Orthodox unity and the Church’s governance in its efforts to isolate the Kremlin, while unwittingly also aggravating at the religious level the post-2014 anti-Russian political-ethnic instability in Ukraine by supporting the secession of a schismatic Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent from Moscow.

The fourth essay, “Moving Away from the West or Taking Independent Positions? A Structural Analysis of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy” (p.48-110) by Suleyman Senturk, M.A., University of South Florida-Tampa and officer in Turkey’s Armed Forces. This is a ground-breaking, comprehensive and long country-study report on explaining the changes in Turkish foreign policy since the last decade. While many observers have criticized Turkey as abandoning its Western-centric alignment, the author’s thesis argues that rather than a shift, Turkey has taken a more independent position, despite a degree of contrasts with the U.S. and NATO. This is the result of the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international structure from bipolarity to unipolarity which have provided incentives for some Western-aligned countries with some degree of material capabilities to pursue a more independent regional posture from U.S. policy-preferences. This study’s empirical research analyses the structural effects on Turkey’s behavior and how these observed changes in Turkey’s foreign policy are the outcomes of more independent positions to maximize its national objectives.

The fifth essay, “The Institution of Elected Sheriffs: Implicit Bias and Government Failures” (p.111-124) by James Cockerham, ABD & MPA of Florida State University in Tallahassee, is one of few studies in the literature that examines the effects of elections on law enforcement officials and especially Sheriffs who hold a unique status as an official politicians. The author examines the behavior of Sheriff deputies across Florida from 2005 to 2016 to see to what extent elected county Sheriffs change their behavior and practices. In response to election cycles, the author theorizes that Sheriff deputies are more likely to be tough on harsh crimes in the year leading up to an election, and less active with regards to non-violent crimes since these crimes are associated with less public support and are potentially committed by citizens that are more likely to be constituents. Thus, the author argues that the institution of electing criminal justice figures such as Sheriffs, can be considered as a U.S. local government failure.

The sixth essay, “Immigration and the Demise of Social-Democratic Parties in Western Europe: France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy” (p.125-143) by Davide Dell’Isola, ABD & M.A. of the University of Central Florida, is the *2019 Winner of the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper*. This is a long comprehensive country-study report using four country-studies (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy) to see how the rise of right-wing populism and demise of traditional social-democratic or conservative parties and governments is related to either economic crisis and/or attitudes towards immigration policy. Contrary to main theories in literature, contemporary European politics show how the stance of leaders and political parties do not drive party-support and the electors’ preferences are not based on fixed partisanship, but on issues at stake. Thus, voters of traditional Social-Democratic parties will shift their vote to other parties and even anti-immigrant parties, due to the inability of their own original parties to face the increasing challenges of illegal immigration and support of wrong electoral strategies on open immigration in the European Union’s internal open borders.

The seventh essay, “Rethinking Leadership: Women Commanders, Rebel Groups and Sexual Violence against Civilians—Cases of Colombia and Sierra Leone” (p.144-157) by Sara Belligoni, ABD & M.A., of the University of Central Florida, is the *2019 Runner-up for the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper*. This essay compares how in conflicts gender-based violence is used as a strategy of war against women as a passive, vulnerable group vs. the occasional role of women as active combatants within rebel-groups. This study uses as case-studies the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) vs. the *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) in Sierra Leone to investigate variations in incidence of sexual violence against civilians by rebel-groups among which women either held positions of command or were mere soldiers, camp-followers and sexual slaves. In Colombia, sexual violence against civilians by the FARC were almost absent in the last years of the civil war when women held field leadership and command positions, even if women remained absent in the FARC’s highest body—the Secretariat. Instead, in Sierra Leone the RUF frequently used sexual violence against civilians, while women were only enlisted in this rebel-group as soldiers, camp-followers and sexual slaves.

The eighth essay, “Differences in Vote Margin of Candidates in the Florida Legislature” (p.158-174), by Meghan L. Stevens, B.A., of the University of Central Florida in Orlando, is the *2019 Winner of the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award*. This complex research study focuses on all 160 legislative races in 2016 (120 House and 40 Senate elections) with two sets of analyses (all races vs. just competitive races) to explain differences in the margin of victory in Florida legislative races. In all races, five variables are statistically significant in the multivariate model: 1) District party registration difference has greatest positive impact on margin of victory; 2) races between two major party candidates have a much smaller margin of victory; 3) races between a major party vs. a minor party (or No Party Affiliation candidate) have a smaller margin of victory; 4) races with only a write-in opponent candidate have a wider margin of victory; 5) House races had smaller margins of victory compared to Senate races. Finally, in competitive races between two candidates only two variables are statistically significant on margin of victory: District party registration differences, and races involving a minor party candidate as main challenger.

The ninth essay, “Does the U.S. Support Unfair Labor Practices Through Trade Negotiations?” (p.175-196), by Jamie Dietrich, B.A., of the University of Central Florida, Orlando, is the *2019 Runner-up for the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award*. This essay studies how U.S. support for human rights domestically and internationally clashes with global trade markets, particularly in Asia, over unsafe labor conditions (sweatshop labor and forced child labor). The author looks at three case-studies with countries where the U.S. has strong trade deals (Laos, China and Vietnam) by examining the number of trade agreements, trade openness and multilateral vs. bilateral accords’ influence on labor standards and laws, while using the U.S. State Department’s Report on Human Rights to measure the number of laws and violations for each case-study, as well as how likely they are to report and act against violations.

This Book Review is on Professor Amin Saikal’s *Iran Rising: Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic* (p.197-198) by Houman Sadri, Ph.D., Associate-Professor and Deputy-Director of the Information and Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida in Orlando. The book explains the political development, domestic politics and foreign relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and is highly recommended as a very well-researched and written book, authored by a respected scholar of Iranian politics, tailored for a wide audience (students, scholars, policy-makers and ordinary readers). *Iran Rising* focuses its analysis on the evolution of Revolutionary Iran vs. its significant domestic and international challenges, by explaining the nature and structure of Islamic Iran’s theocratic order, how Islamic Iran survived brutal regional Middle East politics, as well as domestic and international opponents. It then explains how today, despite sanctions, Tehran continues to pursue subversive policies against hostile regional and global Powers, including mounting pressures from U.S. President Donald Trump.

Finally, the Back-Cover (p.199) of this *Florida Political Chronicle* issue traditionally highlights the institutional profile of current FPSA University Members and sponsors. Deputy-Director Houman Sadri, Ph.D. of the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida, Orlando (he was also ex-FPSA President in 2012-2013) generously funds the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to meritorious candidates in 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Dr. Sadri confirms that IPAC will continue to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards.

Our Mission: since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Science and International Relations in a balanced, apolitical, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association's and U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is registered on EBSCO and encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; and International Law & Organizations (submissions requirements on p.6 above). Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from current and past FPSA members, as well as domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference or support our organization's mission.

Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle*, and best wishes to all for preparing the future 2020 FPSA Annual Conference coming to Stetson University in DeLand on Saturday 4 April 2020 (see the draft info-sheet at p.8)!

Most sincerely,


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Machiavelli on Leadership Studies: Chapter XIV of *The Prince*

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ABSTRACT: Renaissance Florence’s notorious Foreign Minister Niccolò Machiavelli is forever associated with his controversial masterpiece, *The Prince*, as both the most infamous treatise on cut-throat politics in Renaissance Italy, and a deeply practical education manual to teach any new ruler rising to power the multifaceted craft of wise leadership to govern politically and militarily (see especially Chapter XIV), as well as how to hold power and survive by applying non-moral principles of *Realpolitik* at home and abroad. *The Prince*’s Chapter XIV is a condensed treatise on the education for leadership, which is not limited to officer training, but uses a hands-on, experiential alternative to formalistic early-Humanist instruction in the Classics, by providing a new understanding of the use and abuse of history for life and leadership.



Left: Machiavelli’s tombstone inside Santa Croce Cathedral in Florence, Italy. Center: cover-page of *The Prince* (Florence: 1532). Right: statue of Machiavelli outside The Uffizi Museum, Florence. All photos public domain.

Considering today’s increasing popularity of leadership studies, it seems somewhat odd that Chapter XIV of the notorious book, *The Prince* (“*De Principatibus/Il Principe*”, circulated as manuscript since 1513 and printed in 1532) by Renaissance Florence’s cunning Foreign Minister Niccolò Machiavelli (3 May 1469-21 June 1527), which is devoted exclusively to prescribing the proper education for an aspiring ruler, should be largely overlooked.¹ Indeed, we can read about the leadership secrets of Attila the Hun, or Osama Bin Laden, or Santa Claus, for that matter, but what has been written about the leadership secrets of the great Realist prophet of the modern state, Niccolò Machiavelli? Only a few academic commentators have even touched upon it.² This essay seeks to clarify Machiavelli’s political teaching on education and restore it to the position it deserves in modern political thought and leadership analysis.

¹ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 2nd ed., translated by Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

² Today, there are two admirable studies of Machiavelli’s political thought which touch upon the educational aspects of his Book XIV of *The Prince*. Harvey Mansfield notes the observation of local topography as an exercise in the use of imagery to convey similitudes, which he identifies as part of Machiavelli’s “new science”. Catherine Zuckert highlights the mental training involved in hunting and the posing of tactical hypotheticals as serious educational propositions, but she clearly challenges the exemplarily status of Machiavelli’s use of historical figures such as, Philopoemen or Heiro. As she says: “Readers are led to suspect that the imitation of a great general is not Machiavelli’s last word about the necessary content of a prince’s education”, which I regard as an understatement. Anyway, neither Mansfield nor Zuckert interpret the educational scheme of Machiavelli’s Chapter XIV as an alternative to early-Humanist education. See: Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli’s Virtue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p.167-169; Catherine H. Zuckert, *Machiavelli’s Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), p.75-76.

In Chapter VI of *The Prince*, Machiavelli reveals that the most difficult political task is to lay the foundations for a new state, introducing “new modes and orders” that will initially incite the privileged to armed resistance and in a very short time confound and alienate those calling for political change. The founder of a radically new state must therefore project the vision of a new society in a way that captures and holds the imagination of the discontent, but he must also field an army capable of crushing any organized opposition. He must unite the qualities of a visionary prophet and a military commander. Founding a new state requires a rare combination of aptitudes, a revolutionary spirit, and a unique political and military preparation.³

Likewise, towards the end of Machiavelli’s dialogue on *The Art of War (Dell’Arte della Guerra*, printed in 1521), the principal interlocutor, the experienced *condottiero* (Italian mercenary general) Lord Fabrizio Colonna, insists that “men who have any great design in view ought first to make preparations and qualify themselves properly to carry it into execution when they have a fair opportunity of so doing”.⁴ This is entirely in keeping with Machiavelli’s opening prescription in *The Prince’s* Chapter XIV that: “A prince, then, ought to have no other object, no other thought, nor take anything else for his art, but war, its order and its discipline; for this is the only art awaiting one who commands.”⁵ Shortly thereafter Machiavelli emphatically underscores the need for continuous and exclusive meditation upon and practice of that art: “[The aspiring Prince] ought never to lift his thought from the exercise of war, and he ought to exercise more in peace than in war.”⁶ What does “never” mean? Any and all spare personal time must be sacrificed to a course of military studies and a rigorous regimen of martial discipline.⁷

The military education Machiavelli has in mind is intended to provide a complete education of the body and mind, but also of the spirit, as can be deduced from the recommendation made at the close of *The Prince’s* Chapter XIV to read biographies of great military commanders, not merely to learn tactical strategies, or to deal with setbacks, but to arouse the passion of emulation necessary to nourish and sustain such an arduous preparation and perilous commitment. We may conclude that an education of the spirit is fully intended to fit between those of the mind and body.

Moreover, to properly learn the art of war the future leader cannot simply be packed off to military school but must serve as his own instructor as well as that of his lieutenants. He must fashion his army from the top down. Perhaps this insight lies behind *The Prince’s* Chapter XIV puzzling title, “What a Prince Should Do About the Civic Militia”, when literally nothing is said about the organization or operation of the military, and every thought is directed towards the implementation of a novel educational program.⁸

It is likely that under the tutelage of the humanist scholar Bartolomeo Scala, a close friend of his father Bernardo, and perhaps of other humanist luminaries such as Marsilio Ficino, young Niccolò Machiavelli was immersed in the study of Classical literature at the renown *Scola* (Renaissance Florence’s own university). As former-Chancellor of the restored Republic of Florence, Bartolomeo Scala may have used his influence to secure a position for his prize student in the reorganized bureaucracy as Secretary to the Second Chancery (*Cancelleria*) in charge of foreign policy, after the fall of the controversial previous city ruler, the fanatical Dominican friar and anti-corruption apocalyptic preacher Girolamo Savonarola (excommunicated, executed and burned as heretic in 1498).⁹

³ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. VI.

⁴ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, translated by Ellis Farnsworth (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, reprinted 2016); Ryan Evans, “Machiavelli’s 27 Rules of War” in *War on the Rocks Multimedia* (3 August 2014), see: <https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/machiavellis-27-rules-of-war/>

⁵ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

⁶ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

⁷ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

⁸ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

⁹ Miles Unger, *Machiavelli: a Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Harvey C. Mansfield, “Niccolò Machiavelli: Italian Statesman and Writer” in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, see: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Niccolo-Machiavelli>

Is it not worth noting, then, that the education Machiavelli prescribes for the aspiring Prince in his Chapter XIV does depart radically from the humanist education he himself received? Instead of promoting total immersion in the Classics as preparation for a public career, Machiavelli advocates reading only one classical work, Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*, strategically omitting the word "Education" from its title: he simply calls it Xenophon's *Life of Cyrus*. No other text, ancient or modern, is referred to by title in *The Prince*.¹⁰

It is of no surprise, then, that Machiavelli endorses hunting as the appropriate recreational pursuit for a ruler-in-training, since Xenophon's Cyrus the Great (mid-500 B.C.) engaged in hunting as a pastime in his youth before he ever tasted the excitement of battle. He so loved hunting that when granted permission to hunt in his grandfather Astyages' royal game preserve, Cyrus killed all the large animals that had been brought into the park and then begged to go hunting in the wild with his young companions, the sons of the local nobility, much to the consternation of his grandfather.¹¹

Hunting indeed, provides training in body, spirit and intellect. It requires strenuous physical exertion and exposes the body to the harsher elements, which disciplines the spirit to endure hardship, or "roughing it" as Theodore Roosevelt called it.¹² We can be certain that Machiavelli is not limiting the practice to the hunting to small game, such as ground birds and rabbits, which may be conducted as a solo activity, but has in mind the hunting of large game, done on horseback, often with dogs accompanying, as a cooperative sport. Going after large game, like deer, boar, bears, or lions is a dangerous activity involving a degree of uncertainty in outcome, particularly if you are using arrows or spears at close range. It is also quite bloody and generally cruel: dogs are commonly disemboweled, horses gored and hunters themselves not infrequently injured.

In Chapter XVII of *The Prince*, entitled "Of Cruelty and Mercy, Whether it is Better to be Loved than Feared or the Contrary", but really focused on the requirements of military command, Machiavelli prefers as example of a model general the famous Carthaginian Commander Hannibal Barca (247-182 B.C.) to the Republican Roman general and Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio *Africanus* (236-183 B.C.) who was favored as model of leadership by the great orator and Consul Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.), despite the fact that it was Scipio who ultimately defeated Hannibal before the gates of Carthage (thus inheriting the title of *Africanus*). Indeed, as Machiavelli points out, it was Hannibal who knew better how to unify and discipline an ethnically diverse and polyglot Carthaginian-led army by cultivating a reputation for treating dissenters within the ranks with exemplary cruelty, while Scipio was altogether too merciful towards rebellious troops and nearly lost control of his Roman army because he refused to decimate it as punishment for disobedience. Cruelty in warfare often arises as a product of hatred directed against the murderous acts of the enemy, but a disposition towards cruelty can be learned in the killing of animals. It is well known that serial-killers often practice torturing pets and other small helpless creatures before turning to human prey.¹³

Of course, the experienced hunter does not rely strictly on force of arms. Hunting provides experience in setting traps and nets along habitual pathways, concealing one's approach to the game, steering fleeing animals into narrow passages or *cul-de-sac* where they can be easily contained and confronted – in short, all manner of fraud and deception comes into play. And let us not forget, how over the millennia human beings have proven to be more successful by hunting in packs, where activity is largely coordinated on the fly. Large game hunting therefore provides the opportunity to develop leadership skills which, according to Xenophon, young Cyrus cultivated with great enthusiasm and acumen over his own peers.¹⁴

¹⁰ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV; Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, translated by Wayne Ambler (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press/Agora Editions, 2001).

¹¹ Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, *ibid.*, Book I, Chp. 4.

¹² Nathan Miller, *Theodore Roosevelt: a Life* (New York: Morrow, 1992); Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (New York: Random House, 2001).

¹³ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XVII; Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, *ibid.*; Oliver L. Spaulding & Hoffman Nickerson, *Ancient and Medieval Warfare* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993); Anthony Everett, *Cicero* (New York: Random House, 2003).

¹⁴ Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV; Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, *ibid.*

After hunting or perhaps in conjunction with it, Machiavelli recommends excursions into one's own countryside to learn local geography. This is an activity that involves less physical endurance and exertion, but more intellectual effort. Machiavelli says that the ruler must acquaint himself with the diversity of the terrain, its effect on the conduct of warfare and must put this to memory since there is similar terrain to be encountered when travelling abroad. Of course, the commander who is acquainted with his own territory can position his troops advantageously when his country is invaded. But, more importantly, when engaged in enlarging one's own dominion by moving troops through foreign territory, the commander must think analogically, identifying similarities to the geography of his own country.¹⁵

In contrast, we recollect that Socrates in Plato's *Republic* requires rulers-in-training to submit to the study of arithmetic, geometry and even more refined forms of mathematics for the purpose of disciplining the mind before proceeding to the study of dialectics, that exalted practice of conversational inquiry into the "what-is?" questioning of things, the mastery of which admits the apprentice philosopher to a 15-years internship in political affairs, before being allowed to don the robes of a "Philosopher-King". Machiavelli substitutes a speedier and more down-to-earth training in visual memorization and analogic reasoning for the years Plato would have his students devoted to the study of pure mathematics.¹⁶

Although oceanographic charts were in common use among seafarers during the XVth Century, accurate topographical maps used to guide military campaigns only began to make their appearances in the early-XVIth Century. In 1503 Machiavelli witnessed Leonardo Da Vinci presenting to the pro-French infamous Duke Cesare Borgia of Valentinois (nicknamed handsome "Valentine", but the most ruthless of many sons of corrupt Pope Alexander VI Borgia) the very first accurately-scaled aerial map of the Arno River basin, which Leonardo had drawn as military architect and engineer for this cruel *condottiero* and former-Cardinal, whose brilliant conquest and fights for state power in Romagna inspired Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Later, Machiavelli backed Leonardo Da Vinci's grand plan to divert the Arno River to bypass Florence's great rival, the Maritime Republic of Pisa, which sat at its estuary, but this grand scientific effort to employ accurate topographical knowledge to solve strategic issues remained ultimately futile.¹⁷

In any case, the study of geography logically proceeds training in quasi-dialectical conversation. Consideration ought also to be given to the difference between the study of geometry and that of geography with respect to sameness and likeness. Geometry involves the recognition of sameness and identity, whereas the study of geography according to Machiavelli seeks only the awareness of similarities and differences. Thus, if the territory of the state is sufficiently large and geographically diverse, invasion forces may be trained on ground analogous to that they will encounter abroad. In any case, Machiavelli emphasizes the value of obtaining thorough knowledge of local geography both to repel enemy invading armies and expand into foreign lands.¹⁸

Machiavelli combines the acquisition of geographical knowledge with instruction in "dialectical" reasoning. Here I use the term "dialectical" loosely, simply to mean conversation which proceeds through a series questions and answers. Machiavelli presents the case of the Greek general and statesman Philopoemen (252-182 B.C.), who turned the Achaean League into a real military force and is credited with leading the forces that finally crushed Sparta at the Battle of Mantinea (207 B.C.). Machiavelli refrains from direct praise of the general himself, perhaps because he did not command his own troops, but notes other writers who commend Philopoemen's practice of intermittently halting his geographical excursions to engage in conversation with his companions, asking them "what-if" questions, not "what-is" questions:

¹⁵ Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, *ibid*; Machiavelli, *Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

¹⁶ Plato, *The Republic*, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Internet Classics Archive), see: <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html>

¹⁷ Charles Nicholl, *Leonardo Da Vinci: Flights of the Mind* (New York: Viking Press, 2001), Chp.59 "Moving the River"; Miles J. Unger, *Machiavelli: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Wikipedia, "Cesare Borgia" in *Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia* (2019), see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cesare_Borgia

¹⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

“What if the enemy occupied that hill and we were found here with our army, who would have the advantage?” and so forth.¹⁹ Machiavelli reports that Philopoemen “listened to their opinions, expressed his own” and most tellingly, “supported his opinion with reason.”²⁰

There are a couple of ways to interpret this passage, the first using the common analogy of the coach who decides the overall game-plan, communicates it to his players and then prepares them to adjust tactics during the game depending on the responses of the opposing team. In the same way, the military commander operates as the team-leader who instructs his lieutenants to execute the general plan, but also trusts them to think for themselves and to seize such opportunities as may arise on the field of battle. This non-dictatorial style of leadership unites strategic thinking with tactical flexibility. The terrain upon which the battle is fought may be fixed and known, but the maneuvers that can be performed on that terrain are multifarious and indeterminate.²¹

Another way to look at this is through contemporary educational theory that recommends “contingent responding” as a way of teaching Kindergarten children. A pre-K class manual notes that contingent responding insures: “The conversation is engaging for students because the teacher actively listens, contributes relevant responses, and asks related questions”.²² This conversational activity of “contingent responding”, though employed to focus the attention of such highly distracted pre-schoolers, is an informational-exchange practice transferable from military field command to the Council Chamber. To properly learn the art of war the future leader cannot simply be sent off to military school, but must serve as his own instructor, as well as that of his lieutenants.²³

And now we come to the final passage of Chapter XIV: the one that covers the use of core texts in self-education. Machiavelli recommends devoting time to the reading of military history. Several scholars have pointed to *The Prince* as a response to Cicero’s *De Officiis* (“*On Duties*”). In this particular passage, Machiavelli is clearly ruminating on Cicero’s *Pro Archia* (“*Speech for the Poet Archias*”), the text that the Medieval Italian Poet-Laureate Petrarch from Florence recovered from a monastic library in 1333, which reignited enthusiasm for the study of Classical rhetoric and kick-started the idea of a Humanistic education.²⁴ In *Pro Archia*, Cicero recommends total immersion in literary studies for young men who are seeking to advance themselves, but quickly shifts emphasis to the study of military history, which he claims is responsible for Ancient Rome’s most successful generals. He argues that reading about the exploits of successful Roman generals will inspire young Romans to seek fame in defense of the Republic. Contemplating the glory of others stirs in the young reader the passion of emulation, which inspires one to undertake an arduous preparation for participation in public life. So Machiavelli is in fact copying from Cicero, who himself borrows from Aristotle’s treatment of the passion of emulation in Book II of *The Rhetoric*.²⁵

The early-Humanist educational program trained the student to copy exactly the Classics, whether drawing from ancient sculptures, adhering to the unities in poetic composition, practicing medicine or observing the heavens. In contrast, Machiavelli’s educational program focuses on hunting – which trains

¹⁹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XVII; Editors, “Philopoemen: Greek General” in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, see: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Philopoemen>

²⁰ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

²¹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

²² Stacy Camp & Virginia Scates, “Putting the Shared Back into Shared Reading: Keeping it Real with 4K/5K Shared Reading Experiences”, see: <https://cherokee1.instructure.com/courses/11520/files/542793/download>

²³ Stacy Camp & Virginia Scates, “Putting Shared Back into Shared Reading”, *ibid.*; Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

²⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV; Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Officiis* (“*On Duties*”, 44 B.C.), translated by Walter Miller (London: W. Heinemann, 1913), see: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01A7RJ9H0/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1; Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Pro Archia* (“*Speech for Aulus Lucinius Archias, Poet & Orator*”, 62 B.C.), translated by C.D. Yonge (London: H.G. Bohn, 1856), see: <https://www.forumromanum.org/literature/cicero/arche.html>; Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Selected Political Speeches* (New York: Penguin, 1969).

²⁵ Cicero, *Pro Archia*, *ibid.*; Aristotle, *The Rhetoric* (350 B.C.), translated by W. Rhys Roberts (1924), see: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B005GQ7WK4/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1

the body to endure arduous labors – on geography – which trains the vision and memory to grasp likenesses, not sameness – and on contingent responding – which teaches students to ponder accidents and probabilities, not seek for absolutes and certainties. We must therefore ask the question: “How could this rigorous preparation of body, spirit and mind not affect the way in which the Prince assimilates history as lessons in leadership or comprehends the utility of history in general?”²⁶

When Machiavelli asks his student to read the lives of famous military commanders and to take notes on both their victories and defeats, so as to secure victories for himself and avoid common pitfalls, it is likely that such a student, disposed to contingent inquiry in the field, will engage in contingent thinking in the study. “What if Hannibal had proceeded directly against Rome after the disastrous defeat of the Romans at the Battle of Cannae?” in 216 B.C. during the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), he might well ask.²⁷ As Commander-in-Chief, will not a Machiavellian “Prince” be on the look-out for strategic situations that are not precisely the same as those he read about, but in many respects similar? Contingent reasoning will make him a more flexible commander; it will allow him to be adaptable and inventive.²⁸

In Machiavelli’s *The Art of War*, immediately preceding the passage quoted earlier about the necessity to undertake an arduous preparation for leadership, Fabrizio asks his companions: “What is the one thing that makes for a great commander?”²⁹ and answers rhetorically that it is the power of “invention” (*invenzione* as the exact word he employs), meaning the ability to be genuinely creative. He provides an example in Alexander the Great’s tactical innovation of having the front ranks of his army kneel, planting the butts of their spears in the ground, to repel a vigorous onslaught from the enemy cavalry. Fabrizio observes that Alexander has been portrayed in sculpture kneeling in this very position. He is immortalized as much for tactical inventiveness as for his strategic world conquest.³⁰

Everyone is familiar with Machiavelli’s three-tiered classification of intellects that takes place in Chapter XXI of *The Prince*, “On How to Deal with Flatterers”.³¹ The best minds are those that understand on their own, the second best those that can follow the explanation of others; the worst and quite useless, are those that can do neither. In making such distinction, Machiavelli contends that what truly separates first-rate and second-rate minds is not that first-rate intellects are drawn to active contemplation, but that they exercise their capacity for “invention”, the same term which he used in *The Art of War*.³²

Leonardo Da Vinci clarifies the source of *invenzione* in the introduction to his *Treatise on Painting*, where he explains that it was his great good luck not to have received a formal humanist education, that others who did have much suffered by it, and that the reason he is so incredibly inventive is that he observes nature directly through the senses, rather than having his experience mediated through the Classical texts.³³

In *The Prince*’s Chapter VI, Machiavelli describes the founder of a new state as a true visionary, someone who sees the possibility of new order of things, which even his followers do not completely grasp and someone who possesses the art of the commander, along with a disciplined military force entirely of his own creation, to realize his vision. The educational scheme of the following Chapter XIV discloses the source of that vision in the power of *invenzione*.³⁴

²⁶ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

²⁷ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.; O.L. Spaulding & H. Nickerson, *Ancient and Medieval Warfare*, *ibid.*, p.112-144.

²⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

²⁹ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, *ibid.*; R. Evans, “Machiavelli’s 27 Rules of War”, *ibid.*

³⁰ Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, *ibid.*; R. Evans, “Machiavelli’s 27 Rules of War”, *ibid.*; O.L. Spaulding & H. Nickerson, *Ancient and Medieval Warfare*, *ibid.*, p.75-100.

³¹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XXI.

³² Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, *ibid.*


³³ Leonardo Da Vinci, *Treatise on Painting* (CreateSpace Independent Platform Publishing, 2018), see:

https://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Painting-Leonardo-Translated-Illustrated/dp/1379598931/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=

³⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chps. VI & XIV.

A final point: immediately after repeating Cicero's observation in *Pro Archia*, that Alexander the Great was inspired by the fame achieved by Achilles through the works of Homer,³⁵ Machiavelli observes how Cicero's ideal general, Scipio *Africanus* copied the moral qualities of Cyrus the Great to which he was exposed by reading Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*.³⁶ Through his absorption of the teachings of the Socratic philosopher's core text, Scipio *Africanus* was moved to imitate Cyrus's chastity, affability, humanity and generosity; and, in so doing, actually became virtuous. This is, of course, also the teaching of Cicero's *De Officiis*, that the most "virtuous" public servant is the most effective and most successful practitioner of the political art, which runs directly counter to Machiavelli's teaching that "virtue", being merely a habitual disposition, may prove a handicap in a world of accidentals and contingencies. It is far better to remain intellectually adaptable and morally pliable.³⁷

In conclusion, Chapter XIV of *The Prince*, is a condensed treatise on the education for leadership. It is not limited to officer training, but is intended to supply a hands-on, experiential alternative to the studious, formalistic early-Humanist instruction in the Classics. In argument and intention, it culminates in a new understanding of the use and abuse of history for life. And in so doing it prepares the ground for human creativity and for the modern notion of bending the world to our will.³⁸



Left: Machiavelli Wooden bust, Cancelleria Vecchia, Palazzo della Signoria, Florence (1500s). Center: Palazzo della Signoria, Florence, Italy. Right: Machiavelli oil portrait by Santi di Tito at Cancelleria Vecchia, Palazzo della Signoria, Florence (1500s). All photos public domain.

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³⁵ Cicero, *Pro Archia*, *ibid.*; Georges Radet, *Alessandro il Grande* (Milan: Mondadori, 1974); Homer, *The Iliad & The Odyssey* (*Unabridged* 800 B.C.), (2017), see: https://www.amazon.com/Iliad-Odyssey-Unabridged-Original-Version/dp/1548670081/ref=olp_product_details?_encoding=UTF8&me=

³⁶ Cicero, *De Officiis*, *ibid.*; Xenophon, *Education of Cyrus*, *ibid.*; Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

³⁷ Cicero, *De Officiis*, *ibid.*; Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chp. XIV.

³⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, *ibid.*, Chapter XIV.

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Scott, Nelson, DeSantis, Gillum & Beyond: A Look at 2018 Florida Precinct Returns by Jack Reilly Ph.D., Jack K. Belk Jr. M.A., Annika Kufrovich, Jennifer Lin & Rory Renzy, New College of Florida in Sarasota

ABSTRACT: Midterm elections are typically seen as a referendum on the sitting President of the United States. In 2018, general popular discontent with Donald Trump led to sweeping Democratic advances in the national U.S. House, state Governorships, state Houses and state Senates. Only an advantageous national Senate map prevented national Republicans from suffering losses on almost all fronts. Yet Florida seemed to buck the nation-wide trend. Perhaps the prototypical purple state at the national level, but typically Republican at the state-level, Florida only elected a single Democrat in a state-wide race in 2018: Agriculture-Commissioner Nikki Fried. In its two most prominent races, for U.S. Senate and for Governor, Republicans won by vanishingly small margins. Such narrow races, along with the general counter trend to the national stage, begs for further analysis. This paper uses fine-grained precinct-level data, along with the Florida voter file, to examine geographic and demographic correlates of the 2018 vote in the Sunshine State.

The 2018 United States Midterm elections were—to use the scientific term—a big deal. Framed largely as a political referendum on the mold-breaking Trump Presidency, Democrats were favored from the beginning and enjoyed clear advantages in candidate recruitment (and retirements),¹ fundraising² and polling.³ The question, rather than whether the Democrats would improve their standing, was how much they would or even secure a “Blue wave” victory. Media headlines almost wrote themselves. Would voters issue a stunning rebuke of the first two years of Donald Trump’s Presidency? Or would strong economic numbers and the President’s controversial characteristic style staunch the bleeding and keep the Republican Party on track? Would progressive backlash and eye-popping Democratic fundraising numbers be enough? How would the uneven U.S. Senate map—dominated by Democrats, many in tough races in Red Republican states—play into all of this?

Amid all of the swirling uncertainty, it seemed to some that Florida, of all places, was primed for a year of predictable change. Polls consistently suggested narrow, but clear margins for Democrats in the two major statewide races: Bill Nelson appeared on track to secure reelection to the United States Senate over Rick Scott,⁴ while Andrew Gillum held an even more stable lead over Ron DeSantis and appeared likely to win the Governor’s mansion.⁵ Most forecasters concurred. All of FiveThirtyEight’s three models suggested that each Democrat had at least a 70% chance of winning,⁶ Larry Sabato’s Crystal Ball classified each seat as “Lean Democrat,”⁷ and betting markets identified both Gillum and Nelson as slight favorites.⁸

Of course, Florida did not behave as expected. While the “Blue wave” swept Democrats to power in the U.S. House, added Democrats to governorships, and saw increased numbers of Democrats in State

¹ <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/05/25/candidate-recruitment-2018-election/>

² <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/election-update-the-democrats-unprecedented-fundraising-edge-is-scary-for-republicans-and-for-our-model/>

³ <https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-generic-ballot-polls/>

⁴ https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2018/senate/fl/florida_senate_scott_vs_nelson-6246.html

⁵ https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2018/governor/fl/florida_governor_desantis_vs_gillum-6518.html

⁶ Silver 2018a; Silver 2018b.

⁷ <http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/2018-senate/> & <http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/2018-governor/>

⁸ <https://floridapolitics.com/archives/280258-gillum-nelson-predictit>

Senates and State Houses across the county, Florida largely—in its two most watched races—bucked the trend. Ron DeSantis and Rick Scott each squeaked out razor thin victories, with DeSantis beating Gillum by just 32,463 votes and Scott taking Nelson’s U.S. Senate seat by an even more scant 10,033 votes. A third high-profile race—that for Agricultural-Commissioner—was even closer, with Democrat Nikki Fried beating Republican Matt Caldwell for Agriculture-Commissioner by a mere 5,307 votes.⁹ The narrow margins triggered recounts and clashes between candidates and parties. With the specter of the 2000 Presidential recount in the background, both sides of the aisle accused each other of attempts to steal the election, irregularities in Broward county (again) muddied the issue, and in the end after a long the election night the controversial winners ultimately were confirmed victorious.¹⁰

Nonetheless, the razor-thin margins inspire curiosity. With over 6,000 precincts in Florida, a difference of just one to three votes per precinct could have made the difference in these three races, making it feel like every vote and everything mattered to the election. Small fluctuations in turn-out, ballot design issues, third-party candidacies, minor candidate decisions on the campaign trail—each and any of these might have been the difference between a Gillum or DeSantis as Governor, or a U.S. Senator under Nelson or Scott, or an Agricultural Commission headed by Fried or Caldwell.

For example, 31,517 people who voted for a candidate in the Governor’s race did not cast a ballot in the U.S. Senate race. However, despite the heightened participation in the Governor’s race, Gillum attracted fewer total votes than Nelson did. This complicated state of affairs is possible because the Governor’s race included several third-party candidates, while the U.S. Senate race never does. In other words, a significant number of people who voted for the Democratic Senate candidate did not vote for the Democratic candidate for Governor. If every Florida voter who cast a ballot for Nelson had also cast a ballot for Gillum, Florida would likely now have a Democratic governor.¹¹

This, of course, is not unheard of. People often, maybe even usually, feel differently about different politicians, even when they share the same party and third parties playing spoiler is as old a story as exists in American politics, not to mention in single member district plurality elections more generally.¹² In this case, there are countless reasons why voters might have felt more comfortable supporting Nelson. Bill Nelson was more experienced, and a well-known figure in Florida politics. He was also running as an incumbent, having served in the U.S. Senate for almost 20 years. He was also older than Andrew Gillum, potentially a key factor in a state where more than 25% of the voting age population is older than 65.¹³ Nelson, unlike Gillum, ran on a centrist platform, which may have won him the support of independents and some Republicans. And finally, candidate race may have played a factor, with Bill Nelson being White and Andrew Gillum Black. Differences on the Republican side were just as noteworthy: compared to DeSantis, Scott was older, had a much more prominent prior career in politics and business, and arguably possessed a much more polarizing political history.

Yet despite all these reasons voters may have been more inclined to support Nelson than Gillum (or Gillum than Nelson, or Scott than DeSantis, etc.), the striking thing about the 2018 results is just how rarely

⁹ Two other statewide races were close but a little more decisive, with just under three points separating Jimmy Patronis from Jeremy Ring in the CFO race and six points separating Ashley Moody and Sean Shaw in the Attorney-General race.

¹⁰ Many voters in Broward County—the State of Florida’s second most populous county—may not have seen the Florida Senate race on the ballot due to ballot design issues. See: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/12/how-badly-designed-ballot-might-have-swayed-election-florida/>

¹¹ 8,220,494 ballots were cast in the Governor’s race, with DeSantis winning 4,076,186 votes, Gillum winning 4,043,723, and the remaining candidates taking the rest; 8,188,977 ballots were cast in the U.S. Senate race, with Scott winning 4,099,505 and Nelson winning 4,089,472.

¹² Duverger 1954.

¹³ https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2016/comm/citizen_voting_age_population/cb16-tps18_florida.html

these differences mattered, and how much pure partisanship seemed to drive the results. At a county level, the correlation between the two-party vote share in the Governor's race and the two-party vote share in the U.S. Senate race is a striking 0.99—as is the correlation between either one of the aforementioned races and the two-party vote share in the 2016 Presidential elections. County level vote shares in the final close race, that of Democrat Nikki Fried and Republican Matt Caldwell for Commissioner of Agriculture, were also correlated at 0.99 with each of the other races as well. Voters, it seems, are casting party-line ballots more and more, and at least in Florida, seem to have remained remarkably consistent from the 2016 to 2018 elections.

Yet in an election with its two major races decided by just tens of thousands of votes out of a total of 21 million citizens and 13 million voters, we cannot help but wonder: what differentiated those few tens of thousands? What voters could Gillum or Nelson (or Caldwell) have convinced to join their cause? In the world of casual conversation, conjecture is king. But if we want to offer anything more than a half-hearted “maybe if...” we need to turn to the evidence. Do any of the proposed explanations survive empirical testing? In other words, can we make any confident claims as to why some people voted for Democrat candidate Bill Nelson, but not for Democrat Andrew Gillum? Or why Fried, alone among Democrats, was able to cross the line first and seal the deal? If not, can we at least make some claims as to the kinds of precincts, if not people, that granted Fried and Nelson extra support?

In this paper, we make use of publicly available data from the Florida Voter File and precinct-level election returns to identify, at the margins, where voters (via their precincts and counties) differed in the 2018 elections. This data affords us the ability to look at, with as fine-grained a method as possible, the differences between the kinds of places that voted for different candidates in the 2018 elections. Beyond the notable cases of the Senate and Governor races, we also examine the three additional statewide competitions: the race for Florida's Attorney-General, Commissioner of Agriculture and Chief Financial Officer, with the Agriculture race being particularly interesting as the only race where a Democrat (Nikki Fried) won.

Demographics and Voting

A long and coherent stream of literature establishes that demographic factors, such as education, income, age, marital status, place of residence and race, are associated with both turnout as well as support for particular candidates and parties.¹⁴ Some of these trends form the most well-known truisms of American politics: minorities (and especially African-Americans) do prefer Democrats, the young also prefer Democrats, while the wealthy prefer Republicans, and so on and so forth. Furthermore, individual candidate factors, such as gender, race, experience, incumbency and even vocal pitch can influence voters' support for candidates.¹⁵ Many voters have preferences for representatives like them and their communities, or candidates that they feel they could “have a beer with”; such familiarity can stand as a proxy for similarity of political interests and is easier to process than understanding the interests of the entire country,¹⁶ especially given citizens' general low lack of knowledge about politics and lack of political ideological constraint.¹⁷

Of particular relevance for this paper, given the candidates in the top-line races in the 2018 Florida general election, is the role played by race—of the candidate, of the voter, and of the interaction between the two. Race and racial attitudes continues to play an important role in recent American elections,¹⁸ and furthermore, there is a clear link between the race of a candidate and their electoral performance.¹⁹ Perhaps most famously, the Bradley effect suggests that black candidates may earn fewer actual votes

¹⁴ Campbell et al. 1960; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Anoll 2018.

¹⁵ Lawless & Fox 2010; Miller & Shanks 1996; Klofstad 2016.

¹⁶ Harden & Clark 2016.

¹⁷ Converse 1964; Zaller and others 1992; Carpini & Keeter 1996.

¹⁸ Algara & Hale 2019; Hooghe & Dassonneville 2018; Schaffner, MacWilliams & Nteta 2018.

¹⁹ Sonenshein 1990; Sigelman et al. 1995.

than polls indicate, due to the fact that whites from both major parties are less likely to vote for black candidates than they claim in public opinion surveys.²⁰ Bowen and Clark found that at least some part of this phenomena can be seen as an outgrowth of “descriptive representation”—the tendency for voters to generally prefer representatives that look like they do.²¹ Therefore, it seems likely that in-group effects especially based on race might be at play in a large, diverse state such as Florida. This analysis can also be expanded to understanding the influence of age or gender in candidate support.

County Geographic Analysis

Existing research indicates that analyzing comprehensive statewide data is an effective way to explore the relationship between demographics and voting.²² To that end, we make use of the publicly-available Florida Voter File and precinct-level returns released by the Florida Department of State to take a detailed look at the 2018 Florida Election. Although it is possible that the reasons behind the observed vote differential could be purely policy-based, because most voters are political, ideological, and policy innocents, we expect that demographic features such as race, age, gender, income and party registration at the precinct level will be significant predictors of candidate preference.²³

In Figure 1, we present choropleth maps of Florida counties where each county is colored by the two-party vote share. A few things immediately stand out. First, the maps make clear that most of the counties in Florida lean Republican, while more dense urban counties lean Democratic—a feature common to elections across the United States and Florida.²⁴ As mentioned earlier in this paper, the majority of residents in Florida tend to be older and white individuals, and this is especially the case in rural areas. Urban and rural areas, however, are not universally Democratic or Republican; some counties with major urban centers (such as Miami-Dade, Broward and Orange) show strong Democratic support, while others (Hillsborough, Pinellas and Duval) are much more restrained and even occasionally Republican. Likewise, smaller areas tend to be more Republican, but this also varies. Some counties around the big bend region and panhandle are particularly dark shades of red (Dixie, Lafayette, Gilchrist and Holmes), while others appear in lighter shades—or even blue, in the case of counties with small cities in them (Alachua County and Gainesville, Leon County and Tallahassee as state capital).

Overall, while such maps are visually tantalizing, it is difficult to draw authoritative conclusions. For many of the counties, the shading differs only marginally between each of the sub-figures. It is much more informative to look at Figure 2, which compares the performance of the Democratic candidates in the three closest races. In addition, Figure 2 shows the performance of the two less close races compared to the U.S. Senate race.²⁵ Effectively, this map shows which Democratic candidate outperformed the other in which county. For instance, in Sarasota county, Bill Nelson won 46.05% of the two-party vote, while Andrew Gillum won 45.62% of the two-party vote. Thus, while both candidates lost, Nelson slightly outperformed Gillum, and so Sarasota County is colored as a light Nelson advantage.

These figures make it easy to see, for instance, that Fried performed slight better than the top-line candidates, and that Shaw floundered in nearly every corner of the state. Based only on this visual investigation, it would appear that both Gillum and Fried did very well in Democratic strongholds such as Broward, Orange, Osceola, Duval and Miami-Dade County. Fried did especially well on the Florida west

²⁰ Washington 2006; Hopkins 2009.

²¹ Bowen & Clark 2014.

²² Hersh & Nall 2016.

²³ Converse 1964.

²⁴ Gelman 2009; Cramer 2016.

²⁵ For ease of discussion, we talk mostly about “Democratic” candidates here, but as all vote shares are just two-party-vote shares, what is said can be easily directly reversed for the Republican perspective.

coast as well, and over-performed in Citrus, Hernando, Pasco, Pinellas, Hillsborough, Polk, Sarasota and Manatee counties when compared to Nelson. While Fried did not outright win each of those counties, her comparatively robust performance there was crucial to her statewide victory.

What is perhaps most noteworthy about these maps, though, is how much better Nelson did compared to the other Democrats—and especially to Gillum—in rural areas in general, and especially along the Big Bend Counties of Dixie, Lafayette, Gilchrist, Taylor and the surrounding areas. While, given the strong correlation between county vote shares overall, we should be careful to not overstate the magnitude of the effect, it is clear that Nelson remained a slightly different kind of candidate than the other Democrats—one whose incumbency, perhaps, buoyed him a little more in White rural areas than an ordinary Democrat could expect. We will keep this insight in mind as we take a deeper look into the demographic correlates of precinct voting behavior.

Figure 1: Florida Counties Colored by the 2018 Two-Party Vote






Figure 2: Florida Counties Colored by Relative Democratic Candidate Performance

Nelson (Sen.) and Gillum (Gov.)



Gillum (Gov.) and Fried (Ag. Commissioner)



Nelson (Sen.) and Fried (Ag. Commissioner)






Figure 3: Florida Counties Colored by Democratic Candidate Performance Compared to Nelson



Precinct Statistical Analysis

Table 1: Predicting Democratic Share of Two-Party Vote in Florida Precincts with a Party ID Variable

	Governor	Senate	Attorney Gen.	Ag Comm.	CFO
Pct. Female	0.058*** (6.05)	0.052*** (5.24)	0.036*** (3.76)	0.053*** (5.30)	0.052*** (5.38)
Median Age	0.017 (1.84)	0.015 (1.51)	0.040*** (4.35)	0.029** (2.97)	0.048*** (5.12)
Pct. Black	0.704*** (63.17)	0.701*** (61.12)	0.733*** (67.23)	0.698*** (60.15)	0.716*** (64.15)
Pct. Hispanic	0.176*** (22.60)	0.167*** (20.82)	0.208*** (27.40)	0.180*** (22.19)	0.189*** (24.26)
Pct. Other Race	0.305*** (36.47)	0.296*** (34.34)	0.304*** (37.13)	0.308*** (35.29)	0.311*** (37.04)
Median Income	0.006 (0.79)	0.009 (1.15)	0.014 (1.81)	0.017* (2.01)	0.004 (0.55)
No. of registered voters	-0.029*** (-4.03)	-0.042*** (-5.67)	-0.038*** (-5.43)	-0.034*** (-4.56)	-0.037*** (-5.12)
R^2	0.724	0.707	0.736	0.701	0.723
N	5613	5614	5613	5613	5613

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

For statistical analysis of demographic vote trends, we turn to a smaller geography: the precinct. This allows for more precise estimates of demographic trends, as well as a significant increase in sample size for statistical modeling. At core, the primary story remains the same: Democratic and Republican vote shares across precincts are highly correlated. In fact, the weakest correlation between candidate performance is 0.987 (the correlation between two-party vote share in the race for Attorney-General and U.S. Senate).

In Table 1, we use ordinary least squares to model the Democratic share of the precinct level two-party vote as a function of standard demographic indicators, including gender, race, age, income and the number of registered voters in the precinct. Precinct race, age, gender and number of registered voters are all generated directly from the Florida voter file, yielding maximally precise statistics of the make-up of voters who actually turned-out to vote in their precincts. Median income, which does not exist in the voter file, was created from Census data mapped on to precincts as closely as possible.²⁶

Table 2 models the Democratic share of the vote in a similar way, but adds precinct party identification percentages in as well. To allow for easy comparison of estimated effect magnitudes, we make use of standardized regression coefficients. Positive coefficients indicate greater support for Democratic candidates, negative coefficients indicate weaker support for Democratic candidates. Thus, based on Table 2, we can suggest that a standard deviation increase in the percentage of Hispanic voters in a precinct yields a 0.033 standard deviation decrease in the precinct vote percentage for the Democratic candidate (Gillum) in the Governor’s race, a standard deviation increase in median income yields a 0.053 standard deviation increase in precinct vote percentage for Gillum, etc.²⁷

²⁶ To estimate median income at the precinct level, we take the Zip Code level median income estimates from the Census American Community Survey and match it to each individual in the Florida Voter File by zip code. From there, we aggregate up to the precinct, creating a weighted average of zip code median income at the precinct level.

²⁷ There are several especially small precincts that make statistical modeling difficult and often prove to be significant, high-leverage outliers. As a result, we exclude precincts with fewer than 100 registered voters (192 precincts or 3.3% of the total dataset) from our regression analyses. Including these precincts does not fundamentally change the substance of our conclusions, just decreases their statistical certainty and diminishes the predictive power of the model slightly.

Table 2: Predicting Democratic share of Two-Party Vote in Florida Precincts with a Party ID Variable

	Governor	Senate	Attorney Gen.	Ag Comm.	CFO
Pct. Republican	-0.835*** (-124.09)	-0.887*** (-134.25)	-0.841*** (-133.76)	-0.875*** (-131.27)	-0.853*** (-136.49)
Pct. No Party	0.038*** (6.78)	0.015** (2.70)	0.015** (2.90)	0.049*** (8.81)	0.038*** (7.33)
Pct. Female	0.017*** (3.98)	0.008 (1.85)	-0.007 (-1.66)	0.011* (2.46)	0.010* (2.49)
Median Age	-0.003 (-0.63)	-0.005 (-1.30)	0.021*** (5.41)	0.008 (1.84)	0.028*** (7.15)
Pct. Black	0.168*** (22.62)	0.125*** (17.14)	0.186*** (26.86)	0.140*** (19.02)	0.169*** (24.57)
Pct. Hispanic	-0.033*** (-7.95)	-0.042*** (-10.34)	0.009* (2.38)	-0.043*** (-10.50)	-0.024*** (-6.13)
Pct. Other Race	0.041*** (9.75)	0.024*** (5.88)	0.046*** (11.78)	0.028*** (6.67)	0.042*** (10.58)
Median Income	0.053*** (14.37)	0.062*** (17.15)	0.063*** (18.50)	0.064*** (17.69)	0.052*** (15.24)
No. of registered voters	0.027*** (8.25)	0.019*** (5.86)	0.019*** (6.31)	0.024*** (7.40)	0.020*** (6.66)
R^2	0.945	0.947	0.952	0.946	0.953
N	5613	5614	5613	5613	5613

Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As we expected, these demographic models perform well. Across all races, we are able to explain roughly 70% of the variation in vote share without including party identification, and 95% of the variation in the dependent variable with party identification. Our independent variables, for the most part, behave as expected. Precincts with more Republicans are less supportive of Democratic candidates, but the opposite is true for Independents.²⁸ It would appear, actually, that precincts with more voters registered as “no party” are more supportive of Democratic candidates across the board than precincts with high levels of Democratic registration, likely illustrating the number of old “Southern Democrat” voters who have still not changed their registration in Florida, despite primarily voting for Republicans.²⁹

The interpretation of the gender variable is somewhat more ambiguous and inconsistent across models, especially once party identification is controlled for, with Table 2 suggesting that more female voters in a precinct yielded larger vote shares for Democrats in every race but Attorney-General, where the coefficient is statistically insignificant, but slightly negative, indicating greater Republican support. Given that

²⁸ Voters that are not members of any party, typically referred to as “independents” are recorded as “no party affiliation” in Florida records.

²⁹ Black & Black 2002.

Republican Attorney-General candidate Moody was female, this is, if not expected, unsurprising. The overall weakness of gender as a predictor, however, is noteworthy—especially compared to other demographic features like race—and underscores an important yet frequently misunderstood truth of voting behavior and ideology: the gender gap is typically not nearly as wide as the race gap in American politics.³⁰ That said, there is not much variation by gender across precinct compared to variation by income and especially race, so gender is somewhat difficult to interpret in these models. As with gender, minimal variation in age across precincts also makes it somewhat more difficult to distinguish meaningful relationships between the median age of a precinct and support for the Democratic candidate.

Interpretation of the race variables, however, is straightforward: precincts with more black voters are more supportive of Democratic candidates, and this relationship is especially pronounced when the candidate in question is Black. After the party registration variables, this variable is the most important term in the model. In fact, if we remove every other independent variable and only use Pct. Black to predict the Democratic vote share in each race, the value exceeds 0.5 for all five models (not shown). Interestingly, this association does not exist for all minority groups. Once we control for party identification in Table 2, precincts with more Hispanic voters favor Republican candidates. This might seem unusual, but two features of help explain it. First, unlike most Hispanics, Cuban-Americans, one of the largest Hispanic groups in Florida, tend to prefer the Republican party.³¹ Second, DeSantis' running mate Jeannette Nunez is Hispanic, potentially providing additional reasons for Hispanic voters to lean towards Republicans this year, as well as potential increase in women support. Precincts with larger populations of other minority groups lean more towards the Democrats.

The median income variable suggests that wealthier precincts are more Democratic, which is somewhat surprising considering that wealthy individuals historically vote for Republican candidates, even if the strength of this relationship is changing recently.³² However, it must be remembered that precincts with more wealth are also more urban, while the actual rurality of a precinct is difficult to measure and thus not controlled for here. While we control for the number of voters in a precinct (and increased numbers of voters does suggest a more Democratic precinct), using population size alone is a notoriously poor measure of rurality and urbanity.³³

To aid interpretation of the overall model, we present the predicted vote share received by each statewide candidate in different hypothetical precincts in Table 3. The first row of the table, for example, indicates that our model predicted that Andrew Gillum would take 52.1% of the vote in an average precinct, Bill Nelson take 52.3%, Sean Shaw take 49.5% and so on.³⁴ In this case, an “average precinct” is one where all of the demographic variables are at their mean. The next row lists the predicted vote share for each of the five candidates in a hypothetical precinct where the percentage of female voters is two standard deviations above the mean (this would be a precinct where 65% of the voters are female); the following row shows predictions for a precinct where the percentage of female voters is two standard deviations below the mean. We do this for each independent variable in the model, allowing us to examine what would happen to hypothetical precincts if we just altered one demographic characteristic at a time, keeping other

³⁰ Tyson 2018.

³¹ Krogstad and Flores 2016.

³² Gelman 2009.

³³ Waldorf 2006; Belk 2019.

³⁴ While these numbers may seem odd, at first, given that Senator Bill Nelson did not win re-election in 2016, it is important to remember that the average precinct does not represent the average voter and that precincts have varying numbers of voters in them. Even if Nelson won the average precinct, the average voter was relatively less likely to vote for him than for ex-Governor Rick Scott as the 2016 voting showed, while Scott was by far the most active everywhere on the ground.

demographic features the same.³⁵ However, because these precincts are hypothetical, it is important to recognize that they do not exactly match what real precincts look like. Instead, this table is a useful way to explore the relative performance of each candidate with different groups. For instance, the row for “Median Age (-2 sd)” tells us that Gillum and Nelson both did slightly better in younger precincts, but Shaw (Attorney General), Fried (Agriculture) and Ring (CFO) all did slightly worse.

Table 3: Predicting Democratic Performance in Florida Precincts.

	Governor	Senate	AG	Agriculture	CFO
Average Precinct	0.521	0.523	0.495	0.524	0.507
Pct. Female (-2 sd)	0.511	0.519	0.499	0.518	0.502
Pct. Female (+2 sd)	0.530	0.527	0.491	0.529	0.513
Median Age (-2 sd)	0.522	0.525	0.486	0.521	0.496
Median Age (+2 sd)	0.520	0.521	0.504	0.527	0.519
Pct. White (+2 sd)	0.487	0.504	0.450	0.500	0.472
Pct. White (-2 sd)	0.576	0.555	0.569	0.561	0.565
Pct. Black (+2 sd)	0.584	0.570	0.562	0.577	0.569
Pct. Black (-2 sd)	0.499	0.507	0.471	0.505	0.485
Pct. Hispanic (+2 sd)	0.488	0.494	0.477	0.492	0.478
Pct. Hispanic (-2 sd)	0.533	0.534	0.501	0.535	0.518
Pct. Other (+2 sd)	0.539	0.533	0.515	0.535	0.525
Pct. Other (-2 sd)	0.507	0.516	0.480	0.515	0.494
Pct. Rep (+2 sd)	0.158	0.164	0.133	0.150	0.140
Pct. Rep (-2 sd)	0.882	0.880	0.854	0.896	0.873
Pct. NPA (+2 sd)	0.601	0.594	0.566	0.610	0.589
Pct. NPA (-2 sd)	0.431	0.443	0.414	0.427	0.416
Pct. Dem (+2 sd)	0.727	0.743	0.715	0.731	0.717
Pct. Dem (-2 sd)	0.303	0.292	0.263	0.304	0.286
Income (-2 sd)	0.500	0.500	0.469	0.498	0.486
Income (+2 sd)	0.542	0.547	0.521	0.549	0.528
Registered Voters (-2 sd)	0.513	0.518	0.489	0.517	0.501
Registered Voters (+2 sd)	0.532	0.531	0.503	0.533	0.515

Overall, these results largely confirm standard expectations. Increasing the number of voters who are female gives the largest boost to the female candidate and actually penalizes Shaw, who ran against a female opponent. The fact that Democrats have a larger projected vote share in wealthy and large precincts is strong indirect evidence that Democrats did better in urban areas. Although all Democrats benefit from

³⁵ When we adjust values for race or party registration variables, we update complimentary values so they always sum to 100%. In other words, when we “increase” the percentage of a precinct’s voters that are Black, we adjust the percentages for Whites, Hispanics and “other race” individuals so that we are not using impossible parameters to make predictions.

increasing the percentage of a precinct's voters who are Black, such a theoretical increase gives a much larger boost to the two Black Democratic candidates.

The same cannot be said for hypothetical adjustments to the percentage of a precinct that is White. Compare the performance of each candidate in a precinct where the percentage of registered Whites is 2 standard deviations above and below the mean. Gillum (Governor), Shaw (Attorney-General) and Ring (CFO), all suffer a roughly 10 points drop in expected performance when the percentage of Whites increases. In sharp contrast, Fried (Agriculture) and Nelson (U.S. Senate), the two Democrats who performed best in this most recent election, do not see the same type of swing; their expected performance dips by only 5 points. It is not clear that being a white candidate is the cause of this performance difference: Ring (CFO) does not perform well in these hypothetical very White precincts even though he is White. But whatever the cause, this clear difference in performance based on the Whiteness of a precinct almost certainly helps explain the strong statewide performance of Fried and Nelson. The majority of Florida's voting age population is White, so candidates have much to gain by limiting their losses in very White precincts.

At the same time, the estimated percentages also suggest how minor many of these demographic effects are next to partisanship. While two standard deviation changes in partisanship result in wild swings in estimated precinct vote percentages, most of the other demographic features result in comparatively minor vote shifts, underscoring again the important role that partisanship plays in voting decisions.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, we took a preliminary look at how precinct-level demographic indicators could be used to better understand the sources of votes for the five statewide Democratic candidates in the 2018 Florida midterm elections. By using publicly-available statewide data, we built models that provide us with what we believe is the best look at understanding how five candidates of the same party could have slightly different vote totals and bases of support. Indicators such as race, gender, age and party identification can provide insight on what individuals desire from a politician, and who they are most likely to support. As expected, where "descriptive representation" could arise, most typically in the form of race and gender, it did, although party identification remained a much more important factor—as would be expected, given the closeness of and high level of correlation between vote totals in all races.

Moving towards analyzing vote results at the precinct level allows us to look at very fine grained data about candidate performance and turnout without relying on noisy survey and exit poll data. While limitations remain—we can only talk about precincts, not individual voters—this kind of analysis is particularly useful for drawing conclusions when races are extremely close. For example, the largest publicly available election survey in 2018 (measured by sample size) is the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, with 60,000 respondents across the United States and 3,846 in Florida alone. Yet using this survey to look at differences in the Scott/Nelson race and DeSantis/Gillum race is extremely difficult. The kind of ticket splitting that we examine here is so uncommon that there are not enough observations in the CCES data to make analyzing it worthwhile. Without tens of thousands of survey responses in Florida it is not possible to make confident claims about individual level behavior at such narrow margins.

In conclusion, while the results of the 2018 Florida election were strikingly close, there are a few interesting tidbits that can be drawn out. Fried, for example, did not win by commanding a dramatically different base than the other Democrats—she won by performing just a tiny bit better with independents, almost as well as Gillum among African-Americans, and better than all other Democrats other than Nelson among whites. She also held down Republican margins in crucial areas of the state compared to Gillum, especially bordering the Gulf Coast, while marginally outperforming Senator Nelson in South and Central Florida. There is no magic bullet for Democrats lurking in this data—just a

few minor differences in an otherwise very similar coalition that turned out to be just enough for Fried, but not enough for Nelson and Gillum.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Select Precinct Level Variables

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Median	Max	N
Pct. Female	0.54	0.06	0.00	0.53	1.00	5812
Median Age	55.05	6.99	20	54	90	5812
Pct. White	0.63	0.30	0.00	0.74	1.00	5812
Pct. Black	0.15	0.22	0.00	0.06	1.00	5812
Pct. Hispanic	0.15	0.21	0.00	0.07	1.00	5812
Pct. Other Race	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.05	1.00	5812
Median Income	53902.53	17481.74	19138.00	50565.00	177000.00	5806
Pct. Republican	0.37	0.17	0.00	0.39	1.00	5812
Pct. Democrat	0.41	0.18	0.00	0.38	1.00	5812
Pct. No Party	0.20	0.07	0.00	0.21	1.00	5812
No. of registered voters	2273.18	1546.48	1.00	2003.50	13353.00	5812
Dem. Governor vote share	0.52	0.21	0.00	0.50	1.00	5810
Dem. Senate vote share	0.52	0.20	0.00	0.50	1.00	5811
Dem. Attorney Gen. vote share	0.49	0.21	0.00	0.46	1.00	5810
Dem. Ag Comm. vote share	0.52	0.20	0.00	0.50	1.00	5810
Dem. CFO vote share	0.51	0.20	0.00	0.48	1.00	5809

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The Political Gates of Hades: Explaining U.S. Policy towards the Orthodox Church

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ABSTRACT: What are the causes and consequences of U.S. policy towards the Orthodox Church? The official line is that U.S. policy has been motivated primarily by humanitarian interests, whereas others insist that it has been driven mostly by the desire to curb Soviet and later Russian political influence. Drawing extensively from declassified government documents, this study assesses the relative strength of these rival explanations. This study highlights the political significance of the Orthodox Church in U.S.-Russian relations and concludes that in its bid to counter the perceived Russian threat the U.S. has undermined Orthodox unity and the Church's governance, as well as aggravating at the religious level the post-2014 political-ethnic instability in Ukraine.

I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike her Catholic counterpart, the Orthodox Church is a highly decentralized organization, divided into self-governing autocephalous churches, where the Head Bishop (or Primate) is chosen internally and answers to no one, among autonomous and virtually independent regional churches (see Appendix), although their Primates are chosen or confirmed by one of the autocephalous churches. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch (EP) has been recognized the "first among equals", enjoying "a position of special honour among all the Orthodox communities" (Ware 1993, p.7), the fierce resistance to interference in Church affairs beyond the Ecumenical Patriarch's jurisdiction is a hallmark feature of Orthodox ecclesiology.

This resistance was exemplified last October when the Russian Orthodox Church decided to break communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.¹ Presupposing a right that most Orthodox hierarchs deny that he holds, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I had announced his decision to grant autocephaly to two schismatic bodies that sought independence from the Moscow Patriarchate (MP): the "Kiev Patriarchate" (UOC-KP) and "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church" (UAOC). Patriarch Bartholomew called on church leaders to recognize Ukraine's autocephaly, going so far as to make an eschatological appeal: "Should we choose to ignore our brethren who are experiencing moments of agony in Ukraine, we will not have any justification [to give] on the Day of Judgment" (*Orthodoxia* 2019).

To date, however, not a single local church has recognized the newly-formed, supposedly autocephalous body Ukraine. In a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Patriarch of Antioch, John X (2019), expressed his regret at Patriarch Bartholomew's "alarming" decision on Ukraine, which "disregards the opinions of the local Orthodox Churches." He goes on to urge him "not to take any decision that does not carry the consensus of the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. For it is unreasonable to end a schism at the expense of the unity of the Orthodox world." Similarly, the spokesman for the Serbian Orthodox Church, Bishop Irinej of Backa (2018), asserts that the "Patriarchate of Constantinople made a canonically unfounded

¹ The author is indebted to Timothy Connelly for his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Throughout this paper the shorthand designation "*Phanar*" (named after the area of Constantinople in which the Patriarchate is located) is used in place of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

decision...,” and thus “the Holy Assembly of [Serbian] Bishops considers this decision of the Synod of Constantinople non-binding for the Serbian Orthodox Church.”²

Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department (2018) celebrated Patriarch Bartholomew’s controversial move as a step towards “religious freedom” in Ukraine. Furthermore, President Petro Poroshenko in 2018 claims to have received the assurance that U.S. support for his country’s right to autocephaly will continue. What inspired the United States to take interest in what, at first blush, appears to be nothing more than an ecclesial matter detached from any issue of national significance? What explains its overall foreign policy, as well as those of its allies, towards the Orthodox Church? Further, what accounts for Patriarch Bartholomew’s apparent willingness to risk Church unity? This study will address these questions in the sections that follow and explain that current developments in Ukraine as the result of a process that dates back to at least the start of the Cold War, and now aggravated in the Post-Cold War at the religious level by the political-ethnic instability in Ukraine since 2014.

II. OVERVIEW

This study argues that the foreign policies of the U.S. and Allies towards the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Orthodox Church as a whole, are driven principally by a desire to weaken Russia politically. This study attributes the success of these policies to a common distrust of Moscow, as well as Constantinople’s dependence on, and subservience to, foreign governments.

Furthermore, this study contends that these policies have been pursued to the detriment of the Orthodox Church. The obvious problem that arises whenever a government meddles in religious affairs is that its priorities may not perfectly coincide with those of a religious organization, in which case it is unreasonable to expect that its involvement will necessarily be motivated by what is specifically in the latter’s best interests.³ The government will not likely hesitate to help promote individuals or groups whose commitment to religious authority or teaching is otherwise questionable, if doing so serves its interests. The effects that such conflicts of interest can work on religious organizations can be disastrous. In the specific case of the Orthodox Church, this study argues that foreign meddling has undermined ecclesial unity, both by intensifying competition between the Ecumenical and Moscow Patriarchates, and by indirectly promoting religiously divisive ideas and practices. The most recent fruits of these policies have included political instability, persecution and even violence, as today in Ukraine.

III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CONSTANTINOPLE AND WHY IT SUCCEEDED

Humanitarian Motives or Realpolitik?

Historian, Alexandros Kyrou, suggests that U.S. support for Constantinople is “consistent with the principle of religious freedom”. The *official* view, he notes, is that the Ecumenical Patriarch has been a “unique partner for emphasizing democratic ideas abroad and for advancing humanitarian objectives throughout the world” (2014). Yet there is reason to call this view into question, as the rest of Kyrou’s analysis makes clear. Throughout the Cold War, the CIA regarded the Russian Orthodox Church (under the Moscow Patriarchate) as a Soviet pawn and ascribed to it the intention of undermining the Ecumenical

² While the Church has long recognized Moscow’s jurisdiction over the Kievan Metropolis—having acquired it from Constantinople in 1686—proponents of Ukrainian autocephaly maintain that the transfer of jurisdiction was done illegally (Danylyuk 2018) and/or under Muscovite (and Ottoman) pressure (Haran 2009). Although the author is in no position to resolve this complex historical issue, it is worth underscoring the heavy emphasis that the Orthodox Church has historically laid on the importance of consensus-building; hence Bishop Irinej’s (2018) distinctively Orthodox advice “to discuss the issue of autocephaly and the Orthodox diaspora at a Pan-Orthodox Council.”

³ This is especially true in cases involving governments of countries that do not profess the same faith.

Patriarch's influence. In a 1950 diplomatic letter, the Assistant-Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, opined that the U.S. "should, in general, avoid involvement in the matter of Orthodox appointments and personalities except where it may be necessary to combat direct, obvious and serious Soviet efforts at penetration of the Church."⁴ Note that the promotion of humanitarian goals is not added to this exception.

In their quantitative study, moreover, Apodaca and Stohl (1999) conclude that a state's human rights record does not impact the amount it receives in U.S. military assistance (see also Hansen 2018). If the U.S. were genuinely motivated by a concern for religious freedom, then one might expect it to have displayed a similar concern towards, say, the Baha'is of Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution,⁵ or the Christians in the Middle East and North Africa, who presently face "pervasive persecution... sometimes amounting to genocide" (Wintour 2019). Below this study offers a more plausible explanation for U.S. policy towards the Ecumenical Patriarch.

A Confluence of Interests Between Constantinople and Washington (and the Allies)

Multiple factors account for the relationship between the U.S. and the Ecumenical Patriarch, including their mutual distrust of Moscow as well as the warm, cooperative relationship between Athenagoras I (Greek Orthodox Archbishop of North and South America), and key figures in the U.S. political establishment. His help was of "signal value to the War effort," wrote U.S. intelligence officer, Ulius Amoss (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1942).⁶ William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services — the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency — praised his "loyal and patriotic assistance."⁷ "I am ready," assured Athenagoras I in a letter to Donovan, "to submit myself to any duty and to make every possible sacrifice for our beloved country."⁸

Several years later, Athenagoras I ascended the Ecumenical Throne, having been flown directly to Constantinople aboard President Harry Truman's presidential airplane. There, the "firmly anti-communist" (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951) Patriarch continued to cooperate with the United States.⁹ Constantinople's distrust of Moscow appears to have continued well after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as confidential cables obtained by Wikileaks suggest. The current Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, was reportedly suspicious that the Moscow Patriarchate has "expansionistic" and

⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Near East, South Asia & Africa*, Vol. V, n.695 (26 April 1950).

⁵ After all, Iran — a U.S. ally that depended heavily on U.S. assistance — could have been successfully pressured to ameliorate its treatment of this religious minority, which periodically faced persecution under the Shah Mohammad Reza Palhevi. Nevertheless,

The apparent American...preference for Iranian regimes that violated human rights is too strongly supported by historical evidence to be ignored. Because of its politico-economic strategic position, Iran has been of exceptional importance in the contemporary great power conflict. And the great powers have shown every sign of preferring the stability which authoritarian or totalitarian regimes can provide.

See Richard W., "Human Rights in Iran under the Shah" on *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 12 (1980): p.121-136, especially p.132.

⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, "Letter from Ulius L. Amos to Archbishop Athenagoras" (14 May 1942), CIA-RDP13X00001R000100400001-9

⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, "Letter from William J. Donovan to Archbishop Athenagoras" (14 May 1942), CIA-RDP13X00001R000100400001-9

⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, "Letter from Archbishop Athenagoras to William J. Donovan" (16 July 1942), CIA-RDP13X00001R000100400001-9

⁹ When it was reported that the reputedly pro-Soviet patriarch of Antioch had planned to visit Moscow, Patriarch Athenagoras I was said to have assured the U.S. Consul in Constantinople that Antioch would not 'stray from the fold.'" Central Intelligence Agency, "Daily Digest" (1 August 1951), CIA-RDP79T01146A000300300001-6

“imperialistic” intentions.¹⁰ Further, a Metropolitan of the Ecumenical Patriarch was reported to have said that he and the Ecumenical Patriarch “view Russian Orthodoxy with great suspicion, and believe that it is deeply entangled in the political needs of the Russian state.”¹¹

A “Client Church”? Constantinople’s Dependence and Subservience to U.S.A. (and the Allies)

The foregoing discussion implies that that the U.S. and other governments have leverage over the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In this section, the essay explains that the basis of this leverage is the *Phanar*’s financial and, indeed, existential dependence on these governments. To begin, were it not for foreign government support, the Ecumenical Patriarch’s very presence on Turkish soil would be threatened, given what one U.S. National Security staff member described as Ankara’s “strong opposition” to it (U.S. Department of State, 1972).¹² Alleged persecution of the country’s Greek Orthodox community and repression of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, itself, was underscored in a 1982 letter in which U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Percy, urged Secretary of State Alexander Haig to “raise these points” during talks with Turkish leaders. Today, the issue over the reopening of the Halki Seminary, which was used (until the Turkish high court ordered its closure in 1971) to educate future church hierarchs and theologians (Wunner 2010), remains unresolved. Highlighting “the respect and support the Ecumenical Patriarch receives from all branches of the USG (United States Government),” Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, reportedly assured Bartholomew I of the U.S. government’s ongoing support and, as evidence of this support, encouraged Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdoğan, that “it was in Turkey’s interest to re-open” the seminary.¹³ Evidently, Patriarch Bartholomew was anxious for such support. He reportedly invited President George W. Bush “Jr.” to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, expressing that he would be “‘honored’ if the U.S. President could visit the Patriarchate, even briefly,” during his trip to Turkey for the May 2004 NATO Summit. “Such a visit would send an ‘important message in many directions’ about U.S. support for religious freedom.”¹⁴

Furthermore, not only was the *Phanar* believed to have been “dominated financially by the Greek government,”¹⁵ but the very manner in which ecumenical patriarchs continue to be chosen evinces a high level of dependence on foreign governments. The sentiment expressed in a declassified CIA document¹⁶ was that the Greek and Turkish governments “virtually control the Patriarchal elections.”¹⁷ In fact, the Turkish government reportedly has long tolerated the Patriarchate’s continued presence only on the condition that it retain “strong ...surveillance and control, including the custom of Turk veto over the selection of a patriarch as had been the case under the Sultan since 1862.”¹⁸

¹⁰ Wikileaks, “Ecumenical Patriarch: More Concerned About Russians Than Title of Ecumenicity” (25 November 2008), Cable no: 08ISTANBUL595_a. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ISTANBUL595_a.html

¹¹ Wikileaks, “Leadership in the Orthodox World: the Ecumenical Patriarch and Russian Competition” (29 May 2003), Cable no: 03ISTANBUL760_a. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03ISTANBUL760_a.html

¹² U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean*, Vol. XXIX, n. 456 (13 July 1972).

¹³ Wikileaks, “U.S. Burns’ Meeting with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I” (26 September 2007). Cable no: 07ISTANBUL873_a, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ISTANBUL873_a.html

¹⁴ Wikileaks, “Ecumenical Patriarch Invites President Bush to Visit” (3 September 2003), Cable no: 03ANKARA5547_a., https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03ANKARA5547_a.html

¹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, “Greek Orthodox Church Affairs; Meeting of the Pan-Orthodox Council” (3 July 1947). CIA-RDP82-00457R000700240003-9

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, “Near East/Africa Branch: Intelligence Summary” (11 August 1948). CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010015-3

¹⁷ To this day, Turkish law states that the Ecumenical Patriarch must be a Turkish citizen. This drastically narrows the pool of eligible candidates among Turkey’s dwindling Greek Orthodox population.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976” *Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean*, Vol. XXIX, n. 456 (13 July 1972). Turkish influence was also evidenced in the election of Patriarch of Demetrios I (1973-1991), in

It is particularly noteworthy that these U.S. allies and soon-to-be NATO members reportedly disapproved of Patriarch Maximos V (1946-1948) on the grounds that he was “incapable of coping with recent *Soviet* efforts to use the church as a political instrument” [emphasis added].¹⁹ The document correctly predicted the election of his successor, Athenagoras I, stating that he was “virtually assured of obtaining the patriarchate,” thanks to the “powerful support of these two governments” (Ibid.).

The short tenure of Maximos V deserves special mention. The CIA cited a report alleging “that the trip of Patriarch Maximos from Istanbul to Greece in May was not [per the official line] for reasons of ill-health.”²⁰ Indeed, the Soviets reportedly claimed that he was forced to resign on account of his alleged ties to Moscow: “You [i.e., the Turks] represented Maximos as sicker than he was, because he was regarded as our friend, and when they took him to Athens recently, on the pretext of treating him, they sought principally to compel him to resign.”²¹ For over a year, in fact, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate had sought to compel his resignation, according to a 1948 weekly intelligence summary.²² Each time he learned of their plans, the Patriarch contemplated “dissolving the Synod” and was dissuaded from doing so.²³ The latter claim is especially relevant since, if the patriarch does, indeed (as this document implies) have the power to dissolve the Holy Synod, then it can be inferred that he has significant power over whom this body chooses as his successor. This may help to explain the remarkable continuity among Constantinople’s successive patriarchs with respect to their positions on ecumenism and relations with Russia.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. POLICY ON THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

a. The Role of Ecumenism

It is not an insignificant fact that Patriarchs Meletios (1921-1923) and Athenagoras (1948-1972) were both Freemasons.²⁴ For, according to religious historian David Hackett (2014, p.120), Freemasonry promoted the individualistic, liberal and materialist values that came to define post-revolutionary American society (and which American Protestantism uncritically accepted). By the standards of traditional Christianity, the order’s beliefs and rituals were, according to the testimonies of former members, blasphemous and immoral (Hackett 2014, p.112 & 115).²⁵ Despite its religious character, the fraternity exhibited a “disinterest in doctrinal and sectarian differences,” (Hackett 2014, p.120) as evidenced by its inclusion of skeptics, druids, pantheists, deists, and Jews, as well as Christians of different sects among its members (Hackett 2004, p.2-3). Perhaps this prototype of the “spiritual, but not religious” mindset in vogue today inspired the controversial ecumenical efforts undertaken by Patriarchs Meletios

which it reportedly refused “to allow the two most prominent candidates...to be entered in the balloting.” See James Barron, “Dimitrios I, Eastern Orthodox Patriarch, 77, Dies” in *New York Times* (3 October 1991), <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/03/world/dimitrios-i-eastern-orthodox-patriarch-77-dies.html>

¹⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Near East/Africa Branch: Intelligence Summary” (11 August 1948). CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010015-3

²⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “Greek Orthodox Church Affairs; Meeting of the Pan-Orthodox Council” (3 July 1947). CIA-RDP82-00457R000700240003-9

²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Situation in Greece” (19 January 1949), CIA-RDP82-00457R002200800010-2

²² Central Intelligence Agency, “Near East/Africa Branch: Intelligence Summary” (11 August 1948). CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010015-3

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Grand Lodge of Greece, “Meletios B (Metaxakis).” Date Unknown. http://www.grandlodge.gr/meletios-v-metaxakis-w-97473.html?fbclid=IwAR3X6e0q79X8sW83255V2bunQWIH15qCp5yIG_SozhdqJrNQjz2BUnTN00 (accessed January 29, 2019); and Grand Lodge of Greece. “Athenagoras.” <http://www.grandlodge.gr/athinagoras-w-57864.html?fbclid=IwAR1uyP90ObYiBUHJs04jGRsU4MLzq3Yb0vplYe96Oc4dHIMgftYVYeZaDRE>

²⁵ One such Masonic apostate -- Baptist preacher, David Bernard -- wrote of the “‘awful oaths’ of obligation he had taken, which promised a grisly death to any who broke them” (Hackett 2014, p.116).

and Athenagoras — efforts which, according to a prominent Orthodox priest, have “done more to split the Orthodox Church than unite Her” (Heers 2007, p.44).

It is likely for this reason, especially, that the Orthodox Church has long been suspicious of this secret fraternity. As early as 1933, the Church of Greece condemned Freemasonry: “...true Christianity is incompatible with Freemasonry... Therefore, all who have become involved in the initiations of masonic mysteries must from this moment sever all relations with masonic lodges and activities” (Orthodox Christian Information Center, Date Unknown).

It is doubtful, moreover, that Athenagoras was unaware of the Church’s repudiation of freemasonry as he ascended the Church’s hierarchy, and yet apparently had few if any qualms about assuming the highest ecclesial office. This, in itself, casts doubt on his suitability to assume the position of “first among equals”. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that such a person would be accused of “unorthodox behavior”²⁶ or being “inclined towards Protestantism”²⁷ after his enthronement.

But how could Athenagoras have been installed in this position in the first place? According to Kyrou (2014), there is evidence suggesting that Athenagoras’s “candidacy for Patriarch had enjoyed the active support and ...possible involvement of the Truman administration.” “It is remarkable,” he comments, “that at the moment the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople became the centerpiece of Truman’s plan to bring the Orthodox world into his pan-religious coalition, an American citizen became Patriarch” (Ibid.). Such direct foreign involvement on the part of U.S. allies has already been noted.

If it is more rational to assume that these governments favored Athenagoras more for his anti-communist reputation (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1951) than for his commitment to Orthodox tradition — as if they had reason to care about the latter and were in a position to assess this commitment — then the apparent role they played in elevating him to the Ecumenical Throne represents, from a traditional Orthodox perspective, a conflict of interest, the effects of which arguably continue to this day.

Before proceeding to the next arguable consequence of U.S. foreign policy on the Orthodox Church, it may be worth noting that it was not only masonic ideas that were believed to have infiltrated the Church. Jesuit influence has been alleged, as well (though to what effect it cannot be ascertained). Reporting on its interrogation of Albert Hartl, a former Catholic priest who had been active in the Nazi party from 1934-1945, the CIA referred to the “fact that the Vatican for some time [had] been dispatching Jesuits as Orthodox priests into the ranks of the Orthodox church.”²⁸

This “successful experiment” was cited as one of the “positive achievements” of the “Vatican Intelligence Service.”²⁹ The ultimate goal, allegedly, was to convert Russia to Catholicism, and Bolshevism was commonly viewed as an instrument through which God would “remove the Orthodox Church and...make way for Vatican mission work in Russia.”³⁰ The veracity of these claims cannot, however, be assumed, for although the CIA sought to verify all of Hartl’s statements through third parties,³¹ the prisoner was characterized as “entirely without conscience”³² and “not fully reliable.”³³

²⁶ Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, attributed this Allegation to “Phanar Politics” in U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, the Near East, South Asia and Africa”, Vol. V; n. 695 (26 April 1950).

²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Russian Church Activities Aimed at Weakening Ecumenical Patriarchate” (11 January 1953), CIA-RDP80-00809A000700220228-0

²⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, “Final Interrogation Report (CI-FIR), N.123” (9 January 1947), 519697ee993294098d50d1c7, p. 52.

²⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Final Interrogation Report (CI-FIR), N. 123,” p. 29.

³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “Final Interrogation Report (CI-FIR), N. 123,” p. 33.

³¹ Central Intelligence Agency, “Final Interrogation Report (CI-FIR), N. 123,” p. 25.

³² Ibid.

³³ Central Intelligence Agency, “Final Interrogation Report (CI-FIR), N. 123,” p. 2.

b. Patriarch Bartholomew I's Reversal on Ukraine

Decades before he announced his intention to grant autocephaly to the UOC-KP and UAOC last year, Patriarch Bartholomew originally sided with the Moscow Patriarchate on the Ukrainian schism. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's longtime dependence on the United States and its allies may explain why Patriarch Bartholomew ultimately reversed his position on Ukraine. In a 1992 letter reportedly sent to Patriarch Alexei II of Moscow, Patriarch Bartholomew recognized "the fullness of the Russian Orthodox Church's exclusive competence on this issue [concerning Ukraine's schismatics]" and "synodally [accepted] the decisions regarding the one in question [i.e., the defrocked schismatic leader, Philaret Denisenko]" (Romfea 2018). Five years later, Patriarch Bartholomew reiterated his position: "We informed the hierarchy of our Ecumenical Throne of [the anathematization of Philaret Denisenko] and implored them to henceforth have no ecclesial communion with the persons mentioned."

That a "hierarchy of world Orthodoxy [could] change his position so radically" demands an explanation (Alexandrov 2018). It is unlikely, to put it mildly, that Patriarch Bartholomew was ignorant of the probable consequences of proceeding with his plans. The Moscow Patriarchate had warned last September that such a decision would result in the breaking of Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarch (*Daily Sabah* 2018). If it is assumed that Patriarch Bartholomew does not value division for its own sake, then it appears reasonable to conjecture that he changed his position only reluctantly, and under foreign pressure.³⁴

c. Religious Persecution and Violence in Ukraine

The prospects for peaceful coexistence between the UOC-MP and the putatively autocephalous "Orthodox Church of Ukraine" appear now grim. In December 2018, then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a bill requiring the UOC-MP to change its name so as to explicitly indicate that it is tied to the Moscow Patriarchate, a move that the Moscow Patriarchate warned "could trigger sectarian violence" (*Associated Press* 2018). There are, in addition, a number of church seizures that have been reported. Although "both sides seized churches," Moldovan (2018) notes, "the Moscow Patriarchate lost the most. Sometimes Moscow Patriarchate churches were seized through parishioners' uprisings. The Moscow Patriarchate claims that, more often than not, right-wing paramilitaries seize churches by driving out their priests and believers." Furthermore, the Office of the United Nations' High Commission for Human Rights (2018) recently reported that the current dispute has contributed to "tensions among parishioners" and "incidents of verbal and physical attacks targeting clergymen and church property." In short, the destabilizing effects of the U.S.-backed recognition of autocephaly are already manifest as aggravating in the Post-Cold War at the religious level the political-ethnic instability in Ukraine since 2014.


V. CONCLUSION

This study argues that U.S. support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate is largely derived from the long, ongoing and multi-layered battle to weaken Moscow's politico-religious influence since the beginning of the Cold War (1946-90). This study also suggests that Patriarch Bartholomew I's about-face on the current ecclesial crisis in Ukraine since 2014, as well as his probable knowledge of – and thus willingness to accept – the likely and deleterious consequences of his decision to grant autocephaly to the schismatic Ukrainians has aggravated at the religious level the Post-Cold War political-ethnic instability in Ukraine. Additionally, this implies that the Patriarch is keener on defending U.S. interests more than those of the Orthodox Church as a whole, because Constantinople since 1945 relies on U.S. political support for its continuing status – indeed, perhaps its very survival vis-à-vis interference from Russia and Turkey.

³⁴ For an overview of as-of-yet unsubstantiated allegations of U.S. pressure, see Jim Jatras, "What's Really behind the State Department's Meddling in Ukraine?" in *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture* (11 April 2019), <https://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/whats-really-behind-the-state-departments-meddling-in-ukraine/>

APPENDIX

EASTERN ORTHODOX POPULATIONS



A Listing of Autocephalous Orthodox Churches

- 1. The Church of Constantinople
• Hierarchy: Patriarch Bartholomew
- 2. The Church of Alexandria
- 3. The Church of Antioch
- 4. The Church of Jerusalem
- 5. The Church of Russia
- 6. The Church of Georgia
- 7. The Church of Serbia
- 8. The Church of Romania
- 9. The Church of Bulgaria
- 10. The Church of Cyprus
- 11. The Church of Greece
- 12. The Church of Albania
- 13. The Church of Poland
- 14. The Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia
- 15. The Orthodox Church in America*
- 16. *The Church of Ukraine?*



*The Orthodox Church in America's status as autocephalous is not universally recognized.



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Moving Away from the West or Taking Independent Positions? A Structural Analysis of Turkey's New Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on understanding and explaining the changes in Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the last decade. Many observers have expressed suspicions that Turkey is abandoning its old Western-centric alignment and gradually shifting its axis. The thesis argues that rather than a shift, Turkey is taking an independent position. It maintains that the 1990 end of the Cold War and changes in the international structure from Bipolarity to U.S.-based Unipolarity have provided incentives for countries with some degree of material capabilities to pursue more independent policies from U.S. policy-preferences. This study analyses structural effects on the behavior of Turkey, followed by observed changes in Turkey's foreign policy as the outcome of taking more independent positions to maximize its objectives. Empirical research prove this analysis.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2009, there a heated debate has emerged over recent changes in Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Controversial Turkish policies, like hosting Palestinian *Hamas* leaders in Ankara, or the temporary severing of relations with Israel, or voting at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) against sanctions on Iran, or the development of close relations with Sudan and Russia, have all contributed to weakening diplomatic-security-economic relations with the West. Further, some argue that Turkey's increased interactions with anti-Western Russia and China are evidence that Turkey itself is progressively detaching from the West.

This study aims to reveal why Turkish foreign policy has been transformed in the period 2009-2018 and what lies behind the perceived change. In the last decade in particular, many observers have expressed a suspicion that Turkey is abandoning its Western-centric alignment, gradually shifting its axis. Some argue that this change is the result of an Islamist-oriented administration's ideological commitments (Altunisik, Meliha & Tur, 2004a; Altunisik, Meliha & Tur, 2004b; Benli Altunisik, 2009; Pipes, 1993; Yanik, 2011). Others see in current Turkish foreign policy signs of neo-Ottomanism, a reawakening of Turkey's hegemonic desires. Many champions of social and institutional analysis argue that Turkish élites' increased emphasis on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic identity of the nation have caused the change (Constantinides, 1996; Erşen, 2013; Taspinar, 2008; Walker, 2009; Yavuz, 1998).

The central argument of this thesis is that these explanations largely overlook structural changes in the region and their effects on Turkey's foreign policy behavior. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the regional international order has become Unipolar, with the United States as the sole SuperPower, an actor unchecked by another equivalent rival peer-state. This structure has provided the opportunity for Washington to pursue interventionist policies in the Middle East that have become the primary source of instability in the region. Confronted by unrelenting wars and sanctions in its close neighborhood that have been instigated by the U.S., Ankara realized that a dependent alliance with Washington is not solving its problems anymore.

This thesis also asserts that the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy is enabled by Turkey's growing material capabilities, which allow its government to adopt a more independent position to maximize its objectives. The observed change is a reflection of Turkey's government centralizing national

interests, rather than prioritizing relations with the U.S. and West. In that context, this work reveals that Ankara has adopted a more autonomous strategy that visibly contrasts with its previous submissive attitude.

This research study is organized into four parts. Chapter 1 offers a background to the argument through a historical perspective. It analyzes the evolution of Turkish foreign policy from the Republic’s establishment to 2019 in order to describe the transformation from a West-centric foreign policy to the new policy, which has been subjected to so much criticism. Chapter 2 reviews the literature regarding different explanations for this foreign policy change. This part of the work points out a serious gap in the literature, in particular a lack of system-unit level explanations. Chapter 3 attempts to prove that a unipolar systemic structure incentivizes countries with adequate material capability to adopt a self-help approach. It devises and tests a mechanism to explain the behaviors of Middle Eastern states. In Chapter 4, the study endeavors to prove that Turkish foreign policy makers have adopted an independent position to maximize Turkey’s objectives. In the conclusion, the work highlights some of the major findings, points out the major contribution of this study and offers topics for future work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents & Tables/Figures..... 48

Abstract..... 48

Introduction 48

Chapter One: Background for Turkey’s Relations with the West..... 51

- Introduction 51
- The Fledgling Republic’s Pillars: *Status quo*, Restraint and Westernization 51
- Existential Threats (WW II, USSR): Flexibility, Engagements and Alignment..... 52
- Turkey’s Involvement in the Middle East 53
- Diminishing Security Concerns: Reconceptualized Activism..... 54
- The Era of Transition in the Post-Cold War (1999-2008) 55
- The Era of Intense Criticism in the Post-Cold War (Post-2009) 56
- Conclusion 57

Chapter Two: Review of the Literature 57

- Introduction 57
- Domestic Level (State Structure) Analyses 58
- Individual Level (Characteristics of Individual) Analyses 59
- International Level (State System) Analyses 23
- Conclusion 60

Chapter Three: Effects of a Unipolar Systemic Structure on Regional States 60

- Introduction..... 60
- The Research Question and Justification of the Study..... 61
- The Concept of the Study 61
 - Turkey Takes an Independent Position 62
 - The Scope and Assumptions 63
- Systemic Effects of a Unipolar International Structure on the Regional States..... 63
 - Power Redefined 64
 - Rethinking the Middle East Regional Order under the Unipolar System 66
- Behavioral Mechanism for the Regional States and Testing the Theory 68
- Classification of Relevant Actors 68
- The Position of the Regional States in the Structural I.R. Spectrum 70
 - The Hierarchical Structure 70
 - The Anarchical Structure 73
- Conclusion 77

Chapter Four: Turkey Takes Independent Position	77
o Introduction.....	77
o The Primary Objective of Turkey in the Middle East: Seeking Stability	78
o The Paradigm Shift and New Strategy for Maximizing Stability	80
o The Paradigm Shift	80
o Strategy to Achieve Objectives.....	83
▪ Establish, Maintain and Restore Stability	83
▪ Defusing Security Risks	89
▪ Active Economic Development.....	95
o Proving the Argument	96
o Methodology	96
o Analysis.....	97
o Turkey’s Behavior is Independent and Correlates with its Growing National Power	99
▪ Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior is Coherent with its Objectives	100
o Conclusion	102
Conclusion	104
o Summary of the Findings	104
o Contributions to the Literature.....	104
o Future Research	105
Bibliography	105
Author	110

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Increase of Turkey’s GDP in Current U.S. Dollars.....	74
Table 2: Increase of Turkey’s GDP in PPP	74
Table 3: Export of Turkish Defense Industry	75
Table 4: Military Expenditure of Turkey in constant U.S. Dollars	76
Table 5: Turkish Military Expenditure and Share in GDP in Percentages	76
Table 6: Objective and Means for Turkish Foreign Policy.....	83
Table 7: American-Turkish Relations during the Unipolar Systemic Structure.....	97
Table 8: American-Turkish Cooperative Policies.....	98
Table 9: Turkey's Opposing Policies to the U.S.	98
Table 10: Future Projection of U.S.-Turkey Interaction in the Middle East	103

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Elements of National Power.	64
Figure 2: The Structure of International System.....	65
Figure 3: The Behavioral Mechanism for the Regional States.....	71
Figure 4: Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy.....	79
Figure 5: The New Conceptualization of Turkish Foreign Policy.....	83
Figure 6: Turkey-U.S. Relations (1990-2002)	99
Figure 7: Turkey-U.S. Relations (2002-2008)	99
Figure 8: Turkey-U.S. Relations (2008-2018)	100
Figure 9: American-Turkish Relations during the Unipolar Systemic Structure	100
Figure 10: Cooperation Areas of Turkey with the U.S. (1990-2018).....	101
Figure 11: Opposing areas of Turkey against the U.S. policies (1990-2018)	101
Figure 12: Effects of Material Capability on Turkey's Opposing Stance	102

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND FOR TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH WEST

Introduction

This Chapter will explain the reasons behind Turkey's West-centric orientation and the contemporary arguments about the change in its preferences. The general purpose is to define historical foreign policy attitudes of the country against systemic pressures of international structure. Firstly, it will cover the élite's motives, which endorsed fast rapprochement with important European countries just after the independence war that took place against them. The second part will focus on Turkey's behavior during the Cold War (1946-1990) and the subsequent existential Soviet threat that bolstered the desire of Ankara to form institutional ties with the West. The third part will account for Turkey's Middle East policies as part of the Western security organization. Later, the study will cover the period when the security threat decreased, and the eagerness to reformulate Turkish foreign policy has strengthened. The final part will aim at recalling the most significant current issues that have ignited a wide-spread debate regarding the new orientation of Turkish foreign policy.

The Fledgling Republic's Pillars: Status quo, Restraint and Westernization

The mindset of the Turkish founding fathers that gave direction to Turkey's foreign policy (TFP) was forged by two inescapable factors. First and foremost, since the regression period, the Ottoman rulers' priority had been to modernize their Empire's military structure in the fashion of European armies, which exposed soldiers to the Western institutional mindset. Therefore, the military became the pioneer in reforming the state. Secondly, during World War I (1914-1918), some ambitious Ottoman statesmen pursued pan-Turkic policies without considering the existing gap between their objectives and the Empire's capabilities, which increased the suffering of the nation and pushed the country to the brink of total collapse (Ulgul, 2017).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a former-Ottoman Army general with high intelligence, had already espoused a Western mindset and believed it important that Turkish leaders be realistic when establishing policies and set goals that were within reach of the nation's resources. The dual impact of Turkey's defeat in World War I and her successful 1920s War of Independence, made him fully aware of the nation's significantly depleted resources and human capital. Therefore, as leader of the national struggle and President of the newly-created Turkish Republic, Atatürk prioritized the consolidation of territorial gains and modernization of the country. Consequently, he directed that the foreign policy of the new Turkish state be established on two principles: Westernization¹ and maintenance of the *status quo* (Ucarol, 2008).

According to Ulgul, after the War of Independence, Turkey sought to re-establish close relations with the Western powers for practical and ideological reasons. Practically, these states became neighbours, due to the League of Nations' colonial Mandate régimes of Great Britain and France over Palestine, Iraq and Syria. Following its defeat in World War I, Turkey was insufficiently powerful to systematically oppose these Great Powers in its pursuit of its goal of resolving the remaining problems of the Treaty of Lausanne after July 1923. Thus, the leaders of the country preferred diplomacy over aggressive strategies, which facilitated the resolution of issues related to the Treaty of Lausanne and the development of close relations with the Western world. Turkey positioned itself as a defender of the status quo by prioritizing policies that respected regional borders and territorial integrity.

Ideologically, the political élites considered that being part of Western civilization was the only way to modernize the country. They felt that a stable international environment and good relations with the Great Powers were essential to the success of the comprehensive reforms aimed at building a secular

¹ The term "Westernization" is used to describe efforts to achieve the civilization level of the developed countries through emulating the administrative and social structures of those states.

nation-state. Thus, Turkish foreign policy favored close relations with the West, seeing such relations as crucial to overcoming the fledgling state's internal and external challenges.

After World War I, when Europe began to witness revisionist nationalist leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler, Turkish partnership became more valuable to the supporters of the *status quo*. Great Britain and France began to feel pressure inside Europe, which incentivized them to make concessions in more peripheral issues (Ucarol, 2008). Using the change in political environment, Turkey managed to resolve most border issues, like Hatay with France and Mosul with Great Britain via diplomacy. In turn, Ankara received their support for the Montreux Convention regarding the Turkish Straits (Hale, 2013). The pursuit of development through Westernization, preference for the *status quo* and peaceful approach towards the Great Powers to solve controversial regional issues enabled Turkey to develop close relations with the West.

Existential Threats (WW II, USSR): Flexibility, Engagements and Alignment

During World War II (1939-45), although it favored the *status quo*, Turkey adopted "active neutrality" towards the warring states as a way to stay out of the war (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016). However, in the aftermath of this global war, the increasing Soviet threat encouraged Ankara to prioritize a security-oriented approach, which bolstered its desire to seek closer relations with the "Allies." This trend encouraged Ankara to seek institutional integration with the U.S.-led West. (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016)

The Soviet Union (USSR) clear intention to expand communism to Turkey forced Ankara to forgo a neutrality strategy and align itself with the ideologically closer West. When the Soviet communist régime had begun militarily seized Eastern and Central European countries, it also started to put pressure on Turkey, Iran and Greece. Ankara associated itself with the U.S., which was the only country capable of resisting the USSR (*tarihbilimi.gen.tr*, 2015).

Turkish security concerns peaked when the Soviet Union demanded since the 1945 Yalta Allied Summit a naval base and mutual control over the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), as well as increased Soviet naval activities in the Black Sea. In order to cope with the situation, Turkish officials sought support from Washington and London. Meanwhile, as the Soviet Union had become a major security threat, the U.S. formulated its new policy of "Containment" since 1947, in which Turkey was granted a significant role in barring Soviet expansion outside the Black Sea.

In this context, the U.S. 1947 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which were enacted to increase the ability of all threatened European countries to resist Soviet communist aggression, also facilitated the establishment of military and economic ties between Turkey and the U.S., with Ankara actively working to build a more sustainable and institutional alliance with the West, and eventually become a NATO member since its foundation in 1949. However, this desire was hampered, especially by the Scandinavian states and Britain, which were concerned about the possibility of being entangled in a war outside of Europe. These states argued that the acceptance of an underdeveloped Muslim Turkey in NATO would deteriorate the unity of the Transatlantic Alliance and that the modernization of the Turkish army would require a significant amount of financial support (Yilmaz, S., 2006).

However, two crucial development changed the unfavorable strategic environment that allowed Turkey to become a member of NATO. First, during the 1950 election, the long-ruling *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP or Republican People Party-RPP) lost the elections, and the Democrat Party took control. This incident was perceived as proof that Turkey had a functioning democracy. Second, the newly elected Democrat Party leaders swiftly decided to dispatch a regiment to support South Korea following the U.N. Security Council Resolution 82 in 1950. During the Korean War (1950-53), the effective fighting capacity of the Turkish forces and the decisiveness of the government increased Turkey's prestige and its standing in the international arena (Bilgin, 2009). Sending troops to Korea was an early example of a decision that indicated Turkish foreign policy was shifting toward "engagements" as a part of the Western world.

Seeing it as a timely opportunity, Turkish officials sent a request for admittance to NATO in August 1950. Because of the military advantages the location of Turkey could provide the alliance, reinforcing NATO's Southern Flank (NATO, 2018) and forcing the USSR to divert forces from Europe, the U.S. sponsored the entry of Greece and Turkey as full members of NATO. However, Great Britain, intimately concerned with the security of the Suez Canal, had contemplated forming an organization within which Turkey would have an important role, and London insisted on accepting Turkey's membership to NATO only if Ankara showed a willingness to participate in those British regional arrangements (Yilmaz, S., 2012). In the end, after Turkey and Great Britain agreed on cooperation in the Middle East, London yielded to the U.S. pressures and accepted Turkey as a member state of NATO. On 18 February 1952, Turkey finally succeeded in institutionalizing its relations with the West through membership in a permanent security alliance.

Turkey's Involvement in the Middle East

The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic remained Europe-centric until the end of World War II. However, in its immediate aftermath, by 1947 Great Britain announced that it could no longer sustain its responsibilities undertaken in treaties and could no longer prevent Soviet expansion toward the Mediterranean and the south following the communist satellization of Eastern Europe, the communist-inspired Greek Civil War (1944-1948), Soviet control of Iran's Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, and Soviet pressures for a naval base in the Turkish Straits. London urged Washington to take-over her anti-Soviet "containment" duties, or the dangers of Soviet expansion would become unchecked (Ucarol, 2008).

At the same time, between 1945 and 1975, the decolonization process of the European colonial empires gave independence to 67 new states, 36 of which were in Africa. The freshly founded states became a new front for strategic competition between the U.S.-led West and the USSR-led East. The decolonization process and the changing balance of power encouraged the Soviet Union to increase its influence and pursue policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with an eye to achieving several goals. First, while the USSR had consolidated its western border through the occupation of satellite countries, its southern flank remained open. Second, because the British and French were weakened by war and Italy was among the defeated states, an opportunity appeared for the Soviet bloc to fill the power vacuum in the Southern Mediterranean region and former Western colonies. Third, the USSR was contemplating expansion toward the Mediterranean and Gulf regions and seeking a presence even in the Atlantic. Finally, spreading ideology and securing economic benefits were among Soviet objectives.

On the other hand, after the United States had taken over responsibility for the Middle East from the United Kingdom through its new strategic policy of anti-Soviet containment, Washington tried to shape both the European and Mediterranean region in a way that would prevent the expansion of the Eastern Bloc. At the time, the U.S. was contemplating the construction of a Middle East security structure associated with the NATO-led West in which newly independent Israel would be integrated. However, because such a policy ran the risk of provoking immediate push-back from regional Arab states, Washington abandoned this strategy and focused on building regional security organizations in which Israel would not participate.

Pursuant to the abovementioned policy and in order to consolidate the Middle East's security and prevent Soviet expansion in the region, on 24 February 1955, Turkey and Iraq established the Bagdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization/METO). Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined METO that same year. Thus, a new security bloc or so-called Green Belt was formed to prevent Soviet expansion in the region. Although the Bagdad Pact and its immediate successor the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) did not perform well, due to the bloody 1955 Iraqi Coup that led this country to leave the pro-Western bloc, this pro-Western bloc became crucial to prove the commitment of Turkish foreign policy to the Western community and security.

During this time, as a founding member of the pact, Turkey pursued an active policy of enlisting Arab members, which antagonized Egypt and its allies. Interestingly, Turkey voted against the Egypt-backed Algerian independence in 1956 in the U.N. General Assembly. A year later, Turkey expressed strong resentments against Syria and threatened Damascus with the use of force because Ankara perceived internal developments in that state as a Soviet plot. By 1958, Ankara joined the so-called Peripheral Pact and permitted the U.S. to use its Incirlik airbase to intervene in Lebanon.

Although Turkey became quite *active* in the Middle East region in the 1950s, it was only involved in those regional arrangements proposed by the West and defined its national interest in the context of the Cold War. In addition, Turkey was eager to prove itself useful to its allies. As a result, Turkey engaged with the region as an extension of the Western security system, without considering itself a part of the Middle East sub-region (Benli Altunisik, 2009). After the 1960 military coup, Turkish foreign policy became more withdrawn. Despite the brief interruption during the 1974 Cyprus military intervention, Turkey's Western orientation remained unquestioned. This preferred policy orientation continued until the end of the Cold War when Turkey become aware of new opportunities to chart a more autonomous regional foreign policy.

Diminishing Security Concerns: Reconceptualized Activism

In 1980, Turkey shifted from an inward-oriented economic approach to a neoliberal market structure. Turgut Ozal, the architect of the new economic system, applied a comprehensive program aimed at promoting free markets and integrating the national economy into the world system (Özdemir & Serin, 2016) This reform brought along with it a new foreign policy perspective, one which required a substantial reformulation of Turkey's relations with the periphery. The change in industrial policy from one focused on import-substitution to one focused on exports demanded the establishment of stable trade networks. Therefore, the structural change in the Turkish economy encouraged Turkey to pay closer attention to regional affairs (Karaosmanoglu,2000). However, Turkey's attempts to develop new policy approaches did not become observable until the 2000s; until then, in practice, Ankara continued to formulate its relations with neighboring countries based mainly on security concerns.

The end of the Cold War in June 1990 was a milestone of change in Turkish foreign policy (Danforth, 2008; Onis, 2011). During the 1990s, Turkey abandoned its regional non-interference policy and became involved in the First Gulf War. Ankara deployed a substantial number of troops along the Iraqi border, opened airspace to U.S. aircraft, and provided support to the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. Moreover, Turkey nearly initiated a conflict with Syria over its support of the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*; Kurdish Workers Party) and nearly went to war with Greece over control of the Kardak Islets.

During the same decade, through emphasizing their cultural and historical similarities, Turkey attempted to establish politico-economic ties with post-Soviet Central Asia, where many Turkic republics emerged as independent states after the December 1991 dissolution of USSR (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Likewise, to overcome the regional economic compartmentalization caused by the Cold War, Turkey initiated the Black Sea Economic and Cooperation Council in 1992 (Kirisci, 2009). At the end of the 1990s, Turkey's interest in E.U. membership increased.

The most important foreign policy decision-makers in the 1990s; Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel and Ismail Cem, believed that Turkey needed a multi-dimensional and engagement-based policy orientation. For that reason, they continuously emphasized the need to make use of Turkey's cultural and historical identities, while criticizing the established rigid approach. However, although the end of the Cold War bolstered Turkish willingness to engage with and mold the surrounding environment, the country was significantly lacking in the capabilities to extract benefits from these engagements (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016; Muftuler Bac, 2011; Oguzlu, 2008). As a general tendency, even though some policies of the U.S. in the region were detrimental to Turkey's national interests, Turkey's leaders

engaged in activism in this period while being careful not to detach their nation from the Western security framework (Ulgul, 2017).

The Era of Transition (1999-2008)

One of the most significant security issues that effect Turkey's foreign policy is the emergence of the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*; Kurdish Worker Party). Abdullah Ocalan established PKK in 1979, as a response to socio-economic backwardness in mostly Kurdish populated areas, (where the majority of ethnic Kurds lived in villages under conditions similar to feudalism created by landed tribal leaders) and Turkey's nationalistic ideology that centralized "equal citizenship" around Turkishness (Tezcur, 2015).

Since the nation-building period after 1923, the existence of different ethnicities was seen as a threat for long-desired homogeneous society. The possibility of Kurds to become a separate political actor had been perceived as an element that can hinder the centralized unity and even harm the territorial integrity of the state. In the 1980s to 2000s, as a continuation of this policy, the Turkish state rejected the presence of any other ethnic group and associated the problems in these regions with tribalism, reaction to secularism and modernity, and regional socio-economic backwardness. This situation has increased the perception of political exclusion for Kurdish identity (Yegen, 1996).

Primarily, Abdullah Ocalan aimed a change inside the Kurdish society and initiated armed struggle in 1979 against the powerful landlords, which he believed were the real suppressors of the Kurds (Tezcur 2015). Later, the PKK has initiated armed conflict against the Turkish state since 1983. Because the geographical areas where the PKK initially confronted the landlords was not favorable to conduct guerilla warfare against the Turkish military, it relocated its forces to the mountainous Iraqi border region, where the state authority was historically weak.

Also, border regions were suitable for PKK to receive backing from its external branch members located in the neighboring countries as well as from the adjacent states' administrations. For example, because of the water problems and territorial disputes with Turkey, the Syrian government considered the existence of PKK as leverage against its northern neighbor (Tejel, 2008). After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, Syria offered refuge to the PKK leadership as part of a balancing strategy against Turkey (Schott, 2017). Syria allowed the PKK to open political offices in many cities, which turned the PKK into the only Kurdish political movement that can operate in the country without interruption. Moreover, the 1990-91 First Gulf War and the power-vacuum left by Saddam's defeat provided the PKK with an opportunity to use Iraq as a sanctuary, where from it can organize attacks against Turkey.

At the end of the 1990s, Turkey began to feel some destabilizing effects from U.S. policies, especially America's policy in Iraq. The no-fly zone and the subsequent central government's decreased control provided the PKK with a safe haven. That situation became the harbinger for the future dissatisfaction of Turkey against the U.S. methods in the region. For example, on 24 January 1999, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, a social democrat, requested a dialog with the U.S. to clarify some uncertain policies regarding Iraq. Ecevit expressed his concerns about the risk of regional war, stating that the U.S. policies toward Iraq were his primary concern (Aydin, Erhan & Erdem, 2001).

In 2002, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (JDP) government followed a multi-dimensional and active foreign policy similar to that of Ozal and Cem. Turkey initiated unprecedented engagements with its neighbors as well as previously neglected regions such as Africa and Latin America. Similarly, Ankara prioritized the negotiation process for obtaining full membership in the E.U. and boosted relations with the Central Asian states. Turkey has enlarged the amount of provided foreign aid, increased its presence in peace-keeping operations, become more visible in international organizations, increased foreign missions by opening new embassies, and established direct air travel to many new destinations (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016).

One of the most prominent examples used as evidence of Turkey's divergence from the West occurred during this period, when the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) refused to grant permission to the U.S. forces from Turkish soil against Iraq in March 2003 during the Second Gulf War. Although this event was a significant blow to U.S.-Turkey relations, Europeans shared an anti-war view similar to that of Turkey, suggesting this incident is not in fact clear evidence of Turkey's departure from the West (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016). Still, actions such as accepting Hamas officials in Ankara in 2006, an event received by the U.S. with caution, raised eyebrows about Turkish activism in the region.

The Era of Intense Criticism (Post-2009)

The real discussion about the shift in Turkish foreign policy emerged after 2009, when Turkey ceased diplomatic relations with Israel over the ship *Mavi Marmara* incident, voted in the U.N. against sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program, continued relations with Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, and improved its relations with China and Russia, while decreasing its interest towards the E.U.

This transformation in Turkish foreign policy started the "axis shift" arguments, which created an extensive literature about the orientation, goals, and causes of the observed change. Despite the debate, initially, Turkey continued to cooperate with the U.S. In 2009, President Barack Obama made his first overseas visit to Turkey, to emphasize its role as a model country that could successfully accommodate liberal markets, Islam and democracy. At the time, the U.S. viewed Turkey as a perfect model of the sorts of democratic governments that it was hoped would replace the authoritarian administrations of the Middle East after the Arab Spring (Ulgul, 2017).

However, the U.S. administration abandonment of the moderate Islam project (Hamid, Mandaville & Mccants, 2017), bad relations with Israel and the policy conflict in Syria worsened the relations to a historic low. The U.S. lost interest in the Syrian Civil War and prioritized the fight against ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). Consequently, Washington stopped its contribution to the opposition and started to support the YPG (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* or People Protection Unit), which was the Syrian branch of the PKK, as local partners in the fight against ISIS. Moreover, on 19 October 2014, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition dropped small arms and ammunition as well as other provisions to YPG elements. In June 2015, the YPG captured the border town Tel Abyad from ISIS with the help of the U.S. led-coalition. Turkey vocally criticized this development that allowed the PKK's sister organization to control over 250 kilometers of the Turkish-Syrian border. At the end of January 2016, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for the fight against ISIS, Brett McGurk, visited northern Syria and posed together with PYD militias, which caused an uproar in Turkey.

Subsequently, after harshly criticizing Washington, Turkey began to openly oppose the U.S. policies and objectives in the region by actively projecting force and organizing diplomatic initiatives. On 24 August 2016, Turkey launched operation "Euphrates Shield" against ISIS and PKK-related Kurdish PYD militias (Kanat, Diptas & Hennon, 2017). On 24 April 2017, Turkish warplanes conducted raids against PKK/PYD positions in Iraq and Syria; some of these raids took place just 10 miles away from U.S. forces. On 13 December 2017, Turkey called Organization of Islamic Cooperation (ICO) members in Istanbul to condemn Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. On 29 December 2018, Ankara finalized a contract with Moscow for the acquisition of the Russian S-400 air-defense system. Turkey moved ahead with the contract despite the strident opposition of NATO and the threat of the U.S. to cancel the sale of F-35 jet fighters. On 20 January 2018, Turkey initiated "Operation Olive Branch" to curb the PYD/YPG control in Afrin city, a move that put U.S. policymakers between a rock and a hard place (Cavusoglu, 2018).

Further deviating from U.S. policy preferences, Turkey has begun to participate in diplomatic initiatives organized by Russia. Ankara refused to abide by the unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S.

after unilateral withdrawal decision from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Moreover, Turkey was one of the leading states to lobby against the U.S. decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.

A vigorous discussion has emerged about the Turkish foreign policy transition which saw Turkish policy evolving from complete submission to open opposition against its traditional Allies, especially since 2009. A concise review of Ankara's general foreign policy evolution hints at a persistent trend towards displaying more agency in international relations. The following chapter discusses a variety of views in the literature regarding the change in Turkey's foreign policy.

Conclusion

This Chapter has attempted to recapture the motives behind Turkey's Western proclivity. During the first years of the fledgling republic, improving relations with the major Western states was unavoidable because of the preferred path for development and security reasons. Later, the devastating effects of World War II (1939-45) and the subsequent Soviet threat raised Turkey's security risk perception and bolstered its willingness to establish stronger ties with the U.S. led West.

Throughout the Cold War (1946-90), Turkey clung to the West and acted as an extended arm of the NATO Alliance framework. Ankara defined its national interests in parallel with the West and attempted to prove itself useful to its Allies.

However, when the security threats have diminished, and Turkey transformed into a new economic model that has required an outward looking for development, regardless of which spectrum they belong to, Turkish élites attempted to reformulate foreign policy approach. They developed a multi-dimensional and engagement-oriented foreign policy rhetoric but hardly realized any of its objectives.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, Turkey's behavior has changed dramatically. Ankara has diverged from the traditional policy and took a more confrontational stance. Currently, Turkey has many unsolved diplomatic problems especially with the U.S., which produced myriad arguments about the cause for its foreign policy transition.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter will explore different explanation regarding the change in Turkish foreign policy by examine the main arguments and the core of their assumptions. It aims at discovering viable interpretations of the phenomenon and define the gap in the literature.

The literature regarding the substantial change in Turkish foreign policy preferences since the end of the Cold War has received great deal of attention, especially in the last decade. Nearly all of the studies agree that Turkey has become a more assertive actor and its activism has dramatically increased around its surroundings. There is a consensus that Turkey has exhibited a propensity to act more independently, which contributes to a belief that there has been a "shift of axis" or departure from Western orientation. Many argue that the shift stems from ideational reasons, while some stress the weight of material factors. Analyses which are focused on Turkey's domestic dynamics dominate the scholarly opinions, outnumbering systemic approaches.

The literature which explains interstate relations and changes in foreign policies usually categorizes the competing theories according to their "level of analysis." Since the descriptions about the Turkey's foreign policy transformation are dispersed, and the arguments usually do not follow a specific approach, this study will classify them according to the Waltz's "level of analysis" approach, which entails three levels. The first level, the "systemic" (international) analysis, focuses on the place of the actors in

the international system and posits that the structure exogenously determines the behaviors of the states. He classifies as second level explanations those based on “domestic” factors of nation-states, such as culture, society and institutions. This category includes theories which claim that states do not merely respond to the structure but consciously built it. Finally, in the individual-level classifications, he takes the personal attributes of individual statesmen as the unit of analysis (Evans, Jacobson & Putnam, 1993; Singer, 2006; Waltz, 1969).

Domestic Level (State Structure) Analyses

For the most part, scholarly studies have chosen domestic level analyses to explain the change that has occurred in Turkey’s foreign policy. Among the proponents of this method, some scholars have affiliated the new policy preferences with the shift of social dynamics and subsequent change in political power from secular elites to conservative parties, while others contend that the change has occurred within the neo-Ottoman concept.

The champions of the social change argument claim that, since the Ozal Administration,² ruling political leaders have continuously emphasized the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic identity of the nation. This change in the perception of history reversed the nation-building ideology of the founders, who not only rejected the Imperial background and Islam as the essential elements of society but staunchly favored Western values and structures (Altunisik & Tur, 2004; Benli Altunisik, 2009; Pipes, 1993; Yanik, 2011). Similarly, Muftuler and Bac believe that the change in the power balance among internal actors with unlike worldviews is vital to understanding the transformation of Turkish foreign policy (Muftuler Bac, 2011).

Fuller argues that the rising social and economic power of the conservative Anatolian business class, most of whom backed Justice and Development Party (JDP) and identified themselves as the progeny of the Ottoman Empire, has accelerated this tendency. He asserts that their domination over the Western-centric élites facilitated the establishment of a connection with Turkey’s historical past and its religious tradition (Fuller, 2008; Kirisci, 2009; Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014).

On the other hand, institutional explanations focus on Turkey’s relations with European allies. They claim that despite Turkey’s genuine desire to be a full member, E.U. unwillingness to accommodate a country with a different culture and identity has severely changed public opinion and created a nationalistic backlash. Obstacles to becoming a full member state of Europe forced Turkey to look for other geopolitical alternatives (Başer, 2015; Kirişci, 2012; Onis, 2011). Similarly, Taspinar considers the change to be the result of Turkey’s growing self-confidence vis-à-vis the West and its disappointment with the Transatlantic bloc (Taspinar, 2011).

The proponents of neo-Ottomanism as the explanation for the change in Turkish foreign policy have produced copious arguments to explain why Turkey has distanced itself from the West. One can observe that the popularity of this concept increased in two distinctive periods. It appeared in the literature for the first time when Turkey increased its interactions with Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The breakdown of the USSR and Russia’s relative weakness at the time created a power vacuum in the Balkans and Central Asia. Turkey’s desire to develop ties based on ethnic and cultural similarities was widely interpreted as an attempt to resurrect the Ottoman Empire (Constantinides, 1996; Erşen, 2013; Taspinar, 2008; Walker, 2009; Yavuz, 1998).

Fuller describes this first version of neo-Ottomanism as a development of Turkey-centric view, in which it stays in the middle of the reemerging world “rather than at the tail-end of a European world” with “a renewed interest in the former territories and people of the Empire”(Fuller, 1992). The second

² Turgut Ozal was Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and President between 1989-1993.

version surfaced with Ahmet Davutoglu's "Strategic Depth" concept.³ Although officials refrained from using the term, this new idea of neo-Ottomanism was based on a belief that the Ottoman past is not only an advantage in the conduct of foreign policy, but also places responsibility on Turkey to get involved in regional problems (Benli Altunışık, 2009; Murinson, 2006). The advocates of this version argue that Turkish foreign policy is closely related to national identity, that a newly emerged adherence to an Ottoman-Islamic narrative has influenced the preferences of the state (Yavuz, 1998).

In some views, recalling the Ottoman multinational legacy allows Turkey to embrace the Kurdish population and reconfigure the definition of "citizenship" as less ethnic and more multinational. This relaxed version of "citizenship" emphasizes Islam as a common denominator between Kurds and Turks, and in turn facilitates the finding of commonalities in the Middle East. Taspinar argues that if neo-Ottoman visionaries can embrace such controversial domestic issues, they may also have a serious impact on the international level (Taspinar, 2008).

For others, Neo-Ottomanism principally tries to utilize the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman legacy to exert influence on populations from differing cultures (Meral & Paris, 2010). As such, many believe that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) endeavors to utilize multi-culturalism in relations with the states around its periphery by embracing the Islamic world outside the West (Gullo, 2012). Thus, while the first version of neo-Ottomanism was based on attempts to reconcile Turkey's Eastern and Western identity as an asset, the second version emphasizes an Islamic identity, which is in harmony with democracy and the West (Benli Altunışık, 2009; Gullo, 2012).

Furthermore, some assert that the shift is caused by a hybridization of geography and history, which helped Turkish elites to formulate an indigenous self-image as an "exceptional" nation. The central geographical position in-between the civilizations and the multi-cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire has empowered Turkish policymakers to position themselves not only as mediators or peace brokers, but also to define the future role of the country as a "rising power" (Yanık, 2011)

Nonetheless, many argue that the current "change" argument may not be a new phenomenon since the social and historical context proves continuity in the evolving trend. They hint that affiliating the transition of the Turkey's foreign policy to the ideological orientation of JDP prevents considering the observable facts (Benli Altunışık, 2009; Dietrich Jung, 2011; Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016; Ulgul, 2017). Danforth analyzes policies from the foundation years to the Erdogan period and stresses that pragmatism, not ideology, shapes Turkish preferences (Danforth, 2008).

Individual Level (Characteristics of Individual) Analyses

Proponents of analysis at the level of the individual emphasize the influence of several political leaders on Turkish foreign policy. Their arguments focus on leaders who diverged from traditional West-oriented policies and propagated a new national identity that meshed with the multi-culturalism of the Ottoman past and Islam. Advocates of this approach point to the powerful influence of Turgut Ozal, Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who have Islamic backgrounds. They believe that the conservative ideology of these leaders has led to their enacting active policies in the former-Ottoman space and produced an adversarial stance with the West.

Furthermore, the new course of Turkish foreign policy has been attributed to the rise of Islamism in the country and its popularity in the region. According to the supporters of this view, since the founders of JDP (Justice & Development Party) are well known members of political Islam, which has some anti-

³ Ahmet Davutoglu is a prolific scholar and prominent figure in Turkish politics. He became a political adviser to Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2003. During his service he was dubbed the shadow foreign affairs minister. In 2009, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Between 2014 and 2016 he held the office of Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.

Western sentiments in its character, it should not be surprising to observe a substantial shift of axis (Çınar, 2011; Eligür, 2010; Heper, 2013; Sambur, 2009).

Recently, most of the critics are attributed to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is ruling Turkey since 2002. Some assert that President Erdogan's complete control over the Turkish state limited the U.S. influence to decision making through previously practiced strong institutional ties. Therefore, the decrease of institutional share in the decision making resulted in more centralized state structure which prioritizes the President's worldview and domestic political imperatives (Hoffman, Makovsky & Werz, 2018). Stein adds that the unpopularity of Western organizations such as NATO and E.U. among the Turkish nationalistic population has incentivized Mr. Erdogan to use anti-Western and confrontational policies against U.S. and E.U. as a source of consolidating domestic support for his policies. In this view, Turkish politicians are accused of using foreign policy as an instrument for populist political gain (Stein, 2018).

International Level (State System) Analyses

Interestingly, the systemic level analysis regarding the changes in Turkish foreign policy has received little attention, leading to a significant gap in the literature. Although some scholars attribute Turkey's changing preferences to the nation's increased material capabilities, their analyses remain limited to correlating the rise of GDP with the emerging behavioral pattern.

For instance, Kirisci argues that the growing export-oriented industries have encouraged leaders to develop stronger relations with potential markets in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa (Kirisci, 2009). Similarly, Tezcur and Grigorescu assert that after the end of the Cold War in 1990, emboldened by its increase in GDP, Turkey adopted a more independent position and assertive foreign policy (Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014). Some parallel views emphasize the increasing GDP as the indicator of growing Turkish national power, which grants Turkey capabilities to conduct more independent policies (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016).

Bac believes that the major international transition of the end of the Cold War challenged the traditional paradigm of Turkish foreign policy and revealed alternative perspectives. Also, the collapse of the USSR eased pressure on Turkey and provided an opportunity to influence surrounding places, which led to redefining the historical/cultural dimension in Turkish foreign policy. Thus, she claims, the transition in the international systemic structure provided a context for re-thinking Turkish foreign policy (Muftuler Bac, 2011).

On the other hand, Aslan eloquently delineates a generic mechanism between material capacity and ideological factors and their effects on asserting agency in International Relations (IR). He assumes that accompanied by increasing material capabilities, Turkey seeks autonomy and active agency in the system. Thus, the country's recent preferences prioritize national interest at the expense of being perceived as a faithful follower of West (Inat, Aslan, & Duran, 2017).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the ongoing scholarly discussion about the causes of the changed Turkish foreign policy. It has deployed the level of analysis approach to categorize the standpoint of the authors meaningfully. Since the study favors a system level interpretation, doing so has provided a clear map beneficial to reveal the gap in the literature. Also, it has helped to eliminate the works that randomly aggregated arguments to extract some meaning.

CHAPTER THREE: EFFECTS OF A UNIPOLAR SYSTEMIC STRUCTURE ON REGIONAL STATES

Introduction

This chapter will focus on explaining the systemic effects of unipolar international structure on the behavior of regional states and link the findings with the observable aspects of Turkish foreign policy. In the first section, it will provide arguments that justify the purpose of the work. The next part will twist the structural realist approaches to conceptualize a regionally relevant testable theory for the Middle East. Finally, the chapter will lay out a mechanism that describes how the effects of systemic change incentivize Turkey to take an independent position and test the assertions.

The Research Question and Justification of the Study

This study attempts to find an answer to the question “Why have Turkey’s foreign policy preferences changed?” The existing literature provides an extensive account of relevant socio-political events that successfully elaborates the observed reality based on domestic dynamics. However, even though most of the studies aim at explaining the “why” question, they frequently end up either with extremely reductionist answers or with responses that describe not “why” but “how” the change has occurred.

First, the existing literature accepts the end of the Cold War as an influential factor, but almost all studies treat it as a given fact. Despite the well-known reality that Turkey could never escape from international turbulence and geographical shifts of power, the scholarly attention to the structural changes and their effect on the country’s political preferences has received inadequate consideration. While many studies take the collapse of the USSR as a starting point in describing the observed Turkish activism, they quickly delve into a more popular discussion of the ideational disposition of governing élites. Thus, many scholars concentrate their attention on the ideational dissimilarities of current elites with those of previous decision makers and base their findings on these differences.

Second, the majority of proponents of unit level explanations acknowledge Turkey’s desire for autonomy, influence and responsibility in the region without succeeding in explaining, or even attempting to explain, why Turkey felt this desire. First of all, the élites who are at the center of the discussion and draw most of the criticism and bear most of the responsibility for policy changes have not created a new concept or set of objectives different from their predecessors. For example, Turgut Ozal (Prime Minister, 1983-1989; President, 1989-1993), a statesman with strong ties to the Islamic community, had a powerful desire to change Turkish foreign policy and depart from the established views by searching out alternative options. He was the first politician to introduce the Ottoman cosmopolite past and Turkish dual identity as an asset, and he advocated pursuit of a more active policy in Central Asia and the Middle East. However, during his tenure, he was a steadfast advocate of acting together with the U.S. (Benli Altunışık, 2009).

Likewise, Ismail Cem, a prominent center-left Turkish foreign affairs minister who served between 1997-2002, contemplated a conceptual renewal of Turkish foreign policy based on Turkey’s dual identity. He was known as a statesman who accentuated the importance of pursuing active and assertive policies (Benli Altunışık, 2009). In his book, Cem defines his policy objectives as utilizing the cultural and historical assets in the region by highlighting Turkey’s multi-civilizational identity, exploiting Turkey’s potential as a role model in the region, and solving problems with Turkey’s neighbors, especially in the Middle East (Cem, 2001).

The similarities of the foreign policy objectives (re-defining multicultural identity, reducing problems with neighbors, and adopting an active approach) of the ruling JDP, which represents the conservative right, and the center-leftist parties, which delegated foreign affairs to Ismail Cem, are striking. These similarities across political parties lead one to ask how the ideological affiliations of the actors can be presented as a dependable source for the perceived change in the Turkish behavior pattern, and if we can expect to see Turkish foreign policy revert to its West-centric character after the current political leadership hands over power to élites with a different worldview.

Third, there is considerable evidence that contradicts the theory that the current government's Islamic tendencies and its affiliation with political Islam is a source for the observed changes in Turkey's foreign policies. The proponents of this view believe that souring relations with Israel, open opposition to U.S. policies, increased engagement with anti-American Iran, Hamas and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, are evidence that Turkey's foreign policy is ideologically motivated. However, ideology can hardly explain why Turkey has moved to improve relations with ideologically irrelevant Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, Brazil, Turkey's historical enemy Russia or the Chinese Communist Party, which actively excludes and suppresses the Islamic identity of the Uyghurs' of Xinjiang province. If relations with these parties are merely motivated by anti-Americanism, then how to explain Turkish-U.S. cooperation in endorsing the democratization agenda in the Middle East during the Arab Spring? The JDP since 2002, has proven numerous times that it is one of the most pragmatic governments the Turkish Republic has ever had.

Unit level analysis significantly fails to explain Turkey's relations with its regional rival Iran. Both countries are champions of rival religious camps that cannot compromise their spiritual values. Both countries frequently blame each other's policies for the sectarianism in the Middle East. Turkey cautioned Iran against the use of Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, while Tehran blamed Ankara's support of the opposition in Syria, which mostly consisted of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, for the strife in that country. Seeing as re-imposed sanctions had the potential to seriously limit Tehran's political and economic influence in the region, why did Turkey resist U.S. sanctions policies which aimed to isolate Iran?

Finally, neo-Ottomanist explanations heavily emphasize historical aspects, while underestimating the importance of security and economic perspectives. Significantly, these explanations fail to consider the inadequate material capability of the current Turkish state to invigorate such an imperial structure. Although the evidence indicates that Turkey prefers "soft power" and trade as a proper instrument to increase influence and extract benefits from the region, these views imply hegemonic intentions, which openly disregard the material capability gap of Turkey. For example, the proponents of this approach argue that the Turkish incursion in Syria is aimed at annexing the territories once believed to be part of the nation while disregarding the role of massive security threats and the already devastating spill-over effects to Turkey in inspiring the interventions.

While admitting that the contributions of existing studies have some value, in the light of the literature review, this study assumes that the explanations of the phenomenon remain parsimonious and fail to provide a comprehensive mechanism which can meaningfully delineate the current and future evolution of Turkish policy preferences. The central fallacy of the current analyses is their tendency to interpret certain events and actors, which are only the "means" to achieve certain "ends", as the primary source for explaining Turkish foreign policy. The existing literature is deeply involved in unit level studies, and they tend to link the observed foreign policy behavior with the "instruments" of conducting politics rather than with the "objectives" of a state, which has an inherent desire to develop economically in a very advantageous but volatile geography. Therefore, this study aims to provide an alternative explanation, a sound systemic analysis, which can define the external pressures on Turkey and correctly position the domestic explanations in an appropriate context.

THE STUDY CONCEPT

Turkey Takes an Independent Position

This work claims that the perceived change in the Turkish foreign policy is mainly structural. Since the end of the Cold War, the global international systemic structure has shifted from bipolar to unipolar. This new structure lacks the threat of the USSR and has incentivized Turkey to reshape its traditional alliance relations. The diminished risk perception and the actual entrapment in poorly calculated American

interventionist regional policies, which have turned out to be detrimental to Turkish national interests, pushed Ankara to pursue more “independent” policies.

In contrast with the Cold War, a policy of outsourcing the nation’s security needs by closely adhering to one great power and its alliance system is now unproductive for Turkey. Indeed, the U.S. no longer being checked by another peer power, it is now U.S. policies that have become the primary destabilizer of the region. Realizing that it cannot completely rely on the U.S. to materialize its national objectives, Turkey has preferred to reduce its dependence on the U.S. and (with the help of increased material capabilities) has adopted a self-help approach.

The preference of pursuing autonomous policies has transformed Turkey from a peripheral country in an alliance system into a central state which has to conduct its own affairs actively. Therefore, in order to fill the vacuum that has occurred as a result of rejecting a predominant state’s policy preferences, Turkey has become an active regional actor whose policies sometimes have contradicted those of the Unipole.

The Scope and Assumptions

The thesis of this international security study assumes that the change in TFP is *structural*. It posits that the shift from a bipolar to a Unipolar international system and the state’s growing national power has incentivized Turkey to deploy a self-help approach that requires a high level of political and security activity to replace previous arrangements.

To prove the claim, this chapter will conceptualize a regionally relevant testable structural theory for the Middle East, which can be utilized to describe the behavior patterns of local states as well as Turkey. It will lay out a mechanism that describes how the effects of systemic change incentivize Turkey to take an independent position. Later, in Chapter 4, the work will focus on explaining the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy. That part of the study claims that the shift in Turkish foreign policy is the outcome of attempting to materialize national objectives through independent policy choice. Also, it will empirically test whether the claim of the thesis is correct.

Since it is a structural analysis, the work focuses on system-unit interactions. It also assumes that the current structure of international relations is unipolar. Therefore, the study accepts Turkish-American engagements as the most lucrative area to investigate, because the U.S. preferences represent the system itself. Moreover, nearly all bilateral interactions are linked to or take place in the Middle East. For that reason, the analyzed incidents are limited to the Middle East and the period from 1990 to 2019.

Systemic Effects of a Unipolar International Structure on Regional States

The study values the explanatory capacity of the structural realist theories. Yet, since these theories mainly focus on major powers and are narrow in their formulations, this work creates a tweaked version of a Structural Realist approach suitable to apply at the regional level. Mainly to do so, the study reformulates some concepts to close the gap between the theory and the observable facts.

First, both “defensive” and “offensive” realists have a very narrow definition of power, one which focuses primarily on military might and economy. To avoid being restricted in measuring the actors’ actual national power and their relative positions in the international system, the study redefines power and deploys the DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic) methods.⁴

Second, Structural Realists always describe the nature of the international system as fundamentally anarchic. This definition may be relevant in the Balance of Power School when the structure of the international system is either Multipolar (“offensive” Realists) or bipolar as in the Cold War system (“defensive” Realist). However, all measurable facts indicate that—even though it is eroding—the

⁴ DIME is a method extensively used by policy-planners in the military to evaluate the national power of actors of interest.

structure of the international system is still Unipolar⁵. As the Power Preponderance School posits, in a system where the distribution of power lies in the hands of a single state, the nature of the international structure is expected to be hierarchic. Therefore, in order to be consistent with observable facts, this work reconciles the Balance of Power (BOPw) school's anarchical definition with the Power Preponderance (PP) school's hierarchical order. In other words, the study extends structural Realist theory's explanatory power into the Unipolar systemic order by redefining the nature of the international system at regional level.

Third, employing DIME analysis, the work evaluates the position of the Middle Eastern states in the regional structural spectrum and aims to provide a meaningful behavioral pattern that describes how regional states act under the systemic pressure of a Unipolar international order. Finally, it checks the validity of the theory.


Power Redefined

The purpose of seeking a comprehensive definition of the concept of power is to take a realistic snapshot of the current Middle East regional security system structure and evaluate the regional states' positions in this system.

The Realist's approach to defining the concept of "power" is holistic and mainly focused on military and/or economic dimensions. However, these definitions are very simplistic and have a limited ability to accurately describe reality.

The academic debate about the definition of power is extensive. Some argue that states' material capacity (military or economy) remains always of primary concern. However, others also give primacy to non-material domestic factors such as national identity, practical procedures, ideologies that help to mobilize power in a specific direction, and strong leadership. Apart from the theoretical debates, the observable facts indicate that both material capacity and non-material factors are essential to generate "power" that can serve to advance the national interests of states. Therefore, to adequately define the power of states, which is essential for evaluating their international behavior, this section will operationalize the concept of national power within the global arena.

Figure 1: Elements of National Power



⁵ The problem of polarity after the Cold War has hardly reached a consensus. The USSR implosion unequivocally brought the Bipolarity to the end. However, the debate whether the supremacy of the U.S. could create a substantial Unipolar system produced different explanations. Some scholars have argued that the Unipolar moment would inevitably be followed by Multipolarity (Kegley & Raymond, 1994; Waltz, 2002; Kupchan, 1998; Calleo, 1999). Others such as Samuel Huntington's idea of "Uni-Multipolarity" tried to come up with some mixed versions (Huntington, 1999). Some favored a resistant and stable Unipolarity around the U.S. predominance (Mastanduno & Kapstein, 1999; Walt, 2009; Wohlforth, 1999). Similar to Buzan et al, this study believes that the definition of polarity is strongly dependent on the concept of "Great Powers." At the moment, despite the high prospect of China, the current major powers have various defections to become full-fledged Great Powers (Buzan & Waeber, 2010). Also, in the Middle East context, China avoids exerting agency against the U.S. regional policy preferences, while Moscow's eagerness to challenge Washington globally still lacks significant capability.

While there are many accepted “*elements for national power*,” this paper will neglect the static components like geography or historical complexities and will focus on the dynamic elements, namely Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy (DIME) (Farlin, 2014). In this analysis, “D” (Diplomacy) is accepted as a method that nations use to convince other actors to act in favor of their national interests. It entails the ability of a state to have access in influential International Organizations (IO), aptitude for communicating with important actors of occurring conflicts, potential to initiate or actively navigate a bargain, peace talks or agreement, and the ability to create relationships with states of interest.

“I” (Information) as an instrument of national power refers to the ways a state uses information to shape the environment in which the realization of interest will take place. While the narrow definition of “information” is frequently associated with the intelligence that is essential to grasping the international environment, in the DIME method “information” refers more broadly to the strategic communication of objectives and the presentation of a nation’s interests in the most persuasive manner.

Thus, the informational domain describes the ability to create a favorable environment for the national interest and reduce the opposition to the nation’s policy preferences. In the regional context, information as an element of national power, the ability to present a message that will be accepted by the other states is significant. A state’s ability to successfully present itself as a protector of a religion, a supporter of special minority groups, a benevolent actor toward neighbors, or an admired model country, or to convince other states that its military interventions are necessary actions, are good examples.

The “M” (Military) element of national power embodies the actual armed components or the military might of a nation. A credible threat to use a well configured hard power often provides options to policy—and decision-makers that can help them achieve national interests. Yet, due to the high cost of military action and the unpredictability of the outcomes of military conflict it is an element of the last resort.

The configuration and the source of military power have a direct effect on the behavior of the Middle Eastern states. States which perceive regional rivalries or major power threats have a motivation to configure a military with relevant capabilities. The criteria used to distinguish if a regional military power should be considered capable and modern include its ability to project power within the immediate neighborhood and the technological level of its domestic arms production. As mentioned before, in the regional perspective there are limits to the accumulation of power, and limits also apply to the development of military capacity.

Recent regional conflicts prove that modern warfare occurs in areas where air superiority is not contested. Since the U.S. and recently Russia have demonstrated the power to deny air space to any other actor, conflicts in the region are fought against proxy groups and with the coordinated consent of the major powers. Thus, nations with the capabilities to produce and use precision-guided ammunition, advanced surveillance systems, modern fire support configurations and armed drones gain a significant advantage—the ability to export a disagreement into a neighboring state, because of the lower cost of conducting a military operation. On the other hand, due to the widespread application of arms embargos and selective arms sales in the Middle East, states that outsource these abilities and must import military equipment frequently face obstacles in the pursuit of their national interests. For example, due to humanitarian concerns over Yemen and Saudi government officials’ involvement in the murder of an opposing journalist, the U.S. banned sales of precision-guided ammunition to Saudi Arabia and stopped fueling the operations of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition, which significantly stalled its operations.

“E” (economy), the economic instrument of national power is the primary enabler of other dimensions of the DIME. Therefore, it is not only related to the issues of national economic resilience, but also with the way of organizing it as a tool of influence abroad. Many of the regional regimes lack popular

support, and their hold on power is hardly legitimate. As such, while resorting to authoritarian measures helps to control the populations, inefficiency in economic development can be extremely dangerous--in many states, the ability to provide benefits to the populations replaces popular support as a source of legitimacy. Therefore, regional states assiduously take into account any possible economic losses or gains when formulating policies. This domain includes a wide range of elements like a nation's GDP, trade, foreign investment, economic assistance, financial position, and trading arrangements.

This study uses the DIME methods to create a valid evaluation of the Middle Eastern states' national power in the current regional system.

Rethinking the Middle East Regional Order under the Dynamics of the Unipolar System

The theories of International Relations (I.R.) are more concerned with the global level and major powers, so they tend to neglect specific features of the regions and their actors. Since there is a lack of relevant structural theory applicable to the Middle East region, it is not surprising to observe that many scholars refrain from adopting comprehensive explanations based on system-level analyses. This study tweaks the structural approaches to devise an eloquent mechanism in accordance with the observed facts in the Middle East.

This part of the paper argues that at the *regional level* the system of international relations encompasses both *anarchical* and *hierarchical* features. It explains why the Unipolar structure incentivizes some regional countries to pursue autonomy or adopt a self-help system. Finally, it presents an analysis of regional states that can prove the validity of the theory and its ability to explain the behavior of Turkey.

Realism as International Relation theory attempt to delineate the nature of the international system, define the concept of power, determine the dominant state behavior, and describe whether state preferences are exogenous or domestically driven. However, both the most preeminent Balance of Power (BOPw) and Power Preponderance (PP) theories are exclusively focused on the global level, and they look at the world from a great power point of view.

The Balance of Power (BOPw) Realist school assumes that the nature of the international system is anarchic and that all states rely on their own capabilities to ensure national survival. Therefore, the sovereign nations in the international system are all self-help actors and the relations between the states are extremely competitive (Morgenthau, 1961). In addition, the proponents of BOPw argue that "balancing" is the dominant state behavior. While admitting that the nature of the international system is anarchic, in contrast with Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer emphasize that it is not human nature but the international structure that is the decisive element in guiding state preferences. Accordingly, it is military capability that defines the concept of power (Mearsheimer, 2007; Waltz, 1982). On the other hand, Power Preponderance (PP) advocates argue that the nature of the international system is hierarchic; the dominant state behavior is "band-wagoning" while the size of the economy (GDP) best defines the concept of power (Organski & Kugler, 1980).

However, the visible evidence in the Middle East refutes both schools' expectations and reveals their explanatory capacities to be rudimentary to explain regional dynamics in the Post-Cold War. Since 1991, the U.S. is the unchallenged superpower in the region regarding all dimension of power (G. John Ikenberry, 2009; William C. Wohlforth, 1999). Yet, the regional states' behavior cannot be categorized flatly as band-wagoning or as balancing. In the region, while some countries continue to follow loyally the traditional U.S. hierarchy system (and band-wagoning), some states have recently adopted a self-help system and act autonomously or independently from the security preferences of the "Unipole" Superpower. Therefore, in the Middle Eastern regional systemic level, the nature of international relations has characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy.

While in any international system the only fundamental security threat to a major power is another major power or an alliance of hostile states, at the regional level, Middle Eastern countries face multiple

threats. They must deal with security threats stemming from global actors and regional rivals, as well as with internal instabilities which are triggered by the spill-over effects of local conflicts, ethno-sectarian rifts or social resentments. Besides, as much as security, economic development remains a top priority for all regional states. Failure in achieving a certain level of economic prosperity has significant potential to weaken the stability of a state and the already dubious legitimacy of its régime.

Thus, the hierarchical nature of the region derives from the ongoing necessity to balance national and regional security risks vs. economic development. Bilgel argues that—in contrast to the Great Powers—the states in the Middle East have goals other than simply achieving security goals, like internal development. Therefore, most of them need to trade-off their autonomy and depend on a benevolent Great Power to whom they outsource their security needs in order to concentrate on other essential objectives (Bilgel, 2014). Also, the lack of capabilities to cope with regional rivalries or internal threats makes weak states dependent on a security provider. Moreover, many governments have limited domestic or international legitimacy due to their inclination toward authoritarianism, non-democratic applications, and dire human rights history. Thus, accepting U.S. preponderance with a hierarchical bond is one guaranteed way to avoid fierce American “Unipole” criticism/intervention and ensure internal and external acceptability.

On the other hand, after the Soviet threat of the Cold War era dissipated, the unchecked American activism in the Middle East has created various stability problems. The lack of another peer power in the system which could effectively check the U.S. actions allowed America to act with impunity and unilaterally (Walt, 2009). Sometimes, apart from its intention, the U.S. can also inadvertently harm a regional nation’s interests. Since the geographical distance of the U.S. from the Middle Eastern region provides an extra secure buffer zone for adventurous policies and their uncalculated spill-over effects, it finds leeway to act more irresponsibly. Consequently, in the Middle East, under the Unipolar global order, aligning with the unrestrained U.S. has become less effective at solving a regional state’s security problems.

Since 1991, many of the regional countries including Turkey have come to see American policies such as invading Iraq, supporting régime change in Iran and applying never-ending sanction régimes to regional states, as destabilizing acts. These policies have created ungoverned spaces and flocks of refugees, reduced local economic transactions and exacerbated ethnic and sectarian tensions.

Therefore, the nations with rising trajectories and sufficient material capabilities, which profit from the current *status quo* and have vested interest in the continuation of the regional stability, have twisted the nature of the regional structure towards anarchy by rejecting interventionist policies and pursuing more autonomous strategy (Bilgel, 2014). For example, Iran, a state directly threatened by the U.S., took up a policy of internal (hard) balancing and began to develop nuclear weapons, as well as proliferating Shi’a proxy groups to counter the Unipole in the Greater Middle East as a part of its forward defense strategy. Another example is Turkey, which was a loyal NATO ally with a complete Western-centric alignment during the Cold War, but has begun to pursue a more independent policy, including policies that sometimes are in conflict with U.S. strategies.

Analogously, in his analysis of the East Asian regional order, Sun Xuefeng asserts that the system in East Asia is a quasi-anarchical one, within which the states form hierarchical sub-systems in terms of security relations. In other words, it is a system which encompasses a hierarchical sub-system regarding security issues. He divides states into three different categories according to how they seek security. He describes the first type as the security guarantor, a state which can provide security guarantees to its client states, as well as defend itself. The second category includes the client states, which lack the ability to respond to main security threats and depend on the security of a guarantor state. He categorizes the third type countries as the self-help states, which rely on their own capacity to deal with threats but are not capable of providing protection to other nations. Later he classifies the predominant security relations in

a quasi-anarchical system primarily as competition (between two self-help states or between self-help states and the security guarantor) and as dependence relation (between client states and the security guarantor) (Xuefeng, 2013).

Similarly, Walt maintains that in a unipolar world order, in which security threats have diminished, the smaller partner of an alliance may prefer to take back its autonomy. However, he also presents another mechanism, which is relevant to the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy, positing that alliances are affected in multiple ways in the unipolar world order. These include the so-called twin dangers of “abandonment” (not receiving support in case of crisis or war) and “entrapment” (being compelled to participate in a conflict unwillingly). In unipolarity, because the Unipole’s need for smaller partners decreases, weaker states have to be concerned more about abandonment.

On the other hand, the stronger partner (in this case the U.S.) will worry less about entrapment (being pulled into a conflict) by a reckless ally. Still, free from peer power opposition, the Unipole becomes more prone to fight wars. Walt argues that, in contrast with the findings, just as happened during the 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq, the U.S. can put intensive pressure on weaker states to make them join the war on its side. Therefore, they become more vulnerable to the risk of becoming entrapped exclusively in the Unipole’s policies (Walt, 2009).

In conclusion, it is possible to state that the unipolar structure triggered two critical dynamics in the system. First, it has eased the risk perception, which induced Turkey to get its autonomy back. Second, being entrapped in the constant interventionist policies of the “Unipole”, which has significantly hindered economic development and created spill-over effects that produced existential security threats, Turkey has chosen to be a more independent actor.

Up to now, this section attempted to explain the most relevant structural effects on Turkey’s changed foreign policy. In the next part, the study will focus on testing the arguments mentioned above.

Behavioral Mechanism for the Regional States and Testing the Theory

Since a part of the thesis posits that the systemic change and the increased material capabilities of Turkey are the leading causes for the changed (independent) behavior, it should be valid for the other states, which share the same structural effects. Also, the theory must prove that if the material capabilities are not sufficient, the states develop more dependent relations with their security providers. Moreover, one should observe a correlation between fear of abandonment and insufficient material capability as well as between fear of entrapment and potency to cope with security threats.

This part of the study will focus on testing the claim. In order to explain the regional states’ behaviors in relation to other powers in the system, there is a need to categorize all related actors hierarchically and functionally.




Figure 2. The Structure of the International System

Classification of Relevant Actors

In this study, after a review of the literature,⁶ the term “Great Power” since the end of the 1946-90 Cold War is used for states that have global power projection capabilities, as well as an interest in running the global order. These states show stable power trajectories with minimal internal and developmental problems. They are capable of providing security to the aligned states at the global level. Most recently since the Cold War, the USSR and the U.S. were the only two actors that deserve to be named as Great Powers or Superpowers. Today, as the sole Superpower, the U.S. is generally described with the terms “Unipole”. It is under the “Unipole” therefore, that the whole systemic structure is constituted and dominated by its preferences. States experience U.S influence in nearly all interactions within the international system. Thus, the Middle East nations’ relations with the U.S. widely represent *unit-system* exchanges with the system. Similarly, this study accepts Washington-Ankara relations as a strong indicator to evaluate structural pressures on Turkey. Indeed, the test case of the thesis focuses on the Middle East region, where most of the interactions between Turkey and the U.S. occur.

On the other hand, the term “regional power” refers to countries that are part of a particular region and have the capability to defend themselves against any coalition of other states in the region, states which are highly dominant in regional affairs and have the potential to become a Superpower sometime in the future (Neumann, 1992). They are not “Great Powers” yet, because they have problems such as domestic instabilities or insufficient overall economic development. In addition, they can be categorized as states with region-wide (not global) power projection capabilities and actors with the ability to provide limited security guarantees to other the countries in a regional context (Nolte, 2010). These states are highly influential on the “Unipole”’s regional policies, but they are not necessarily considered seriously in calculations regarding the other parts of the globe (Buzan & Waever, 2010). In the system, they are potential peer competitors and the best available option to check the “Unipole”’s destabilizing policies. Therefore, these powers function as viable hedging or balancing options for the Middle Eastern states. They are the states that enable the anarchical international system in the region and provide options for self-help seeking countries. In the contemporary conjuncture, nations like China, Russia and to some extent the E.U. best fit the aforementioned description.

In the next level of the hierarchical order come the “regional powers.” These states may have a formidable army, large populations, or a relatively significant GDP. However, they cannot balance the major powers systematically, and they have unstable power trajectories (Bilgel, 2014). The characteristic features of these states are a necessity for sustained economic development, the existence of internal instabilities, threats to régime survival, and territorial integrity. In addition, these countries are reactive to the regional balances and they indicate willingness and capacity to assume the role of stabilizer, peacekeeper or peacemaker (Gilley & O’Neil, 2014).

To be more specific and relevant with the general argument, regional powers also need to be divided into two sub-categories:

- 1) rising and
- 2) inert regional powers.⁷

⁶ See for example, Detlef Nolte, "How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics" in *Review of International Studies*, 36, n.4 (1 October 2010): p.881-901, and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Lonely Superpower* (1999), or Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics" in *Small States in International Relations* (2006): p.55-76.

⁷ Bilgel classifies these states as rising or declining states. However, naming some states as declining does not fit necessarily with the observation of actual situation and behavior. While the term “rising states” is an appropriate term to describe nations that can

In this context, “rising regional powers” are the states which have the ability to efficiently deal with internal risks and capability to defend themselves against another regional rival. These states’ power projection capabilities are mostly sourced and sustained domestically. They have diversified economic activities and trade relations in the region accompanied by potent leadership that can orchestrate national power elements. These states have a stake in the existing regional balance, which has made them a prosperous and dominant actor in the region. They perceive the existing regional *status quo* as favoring their interests. Rising regional powers have a vested interest in maintaining the stability of the system because they have the potential to advance their national interest if it is not interrupted by an extra-regional power. Israel, Turkey and Iran are good examples that meet these criteria.

On the other hand, inert regional powers are states which may have relatively adequate resources in comparison with the rising regional states, yet they are bereft of the capability to deal with internal and external threats effectively. Also, their military power mostly originates from arms imports with a relatively small proportion of indigenous production of modern military equipment. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt and partly the United Arab Emirates (UAE) can be classified as “inert regional powers”.

According to a survey done in spring 2017 by Pew Research Center, among the five major Middle Eastern states (Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) the key Middle East public see Turkey (63%) and Iran (53%) playing a larger role in the region in comparison with 10 years ago. Fewer said Saudi Arabia’s role in the region had grown (41%) and even fewer expressed a belief that Egypt’s prominence had increased (19%). About half of the public saw Israel playing a larger role (46%) (Fetterolf & Poushter, 2017).

The final category is smaller states. This category contains geographically small countries, failed states or administrations that lack many capabilities or resources to act effectively against other actors. Therefore, they resort to aligning themselves with another power. Countries like Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon and Qatar fit into this classification.

THE POSITION OF REGIONAL STATES IN THE STRUCTURAL SPECTRUM

The Hierarchical Structure.

Figure 1 previously depicted the hierarchical order position of Middle Eastern regional states in two categories: inert regional powers vs. small states. Their common features are:

- 1) internal insecurity and a lack of régime legitimacy,
- 2) inadequate internal balancing capacity against regional rivals, and
- 3) non-existent or minimal power-projection capabilities.

The most important common denominator is that all these states have régime legitimacy issues and internal insecurities. They are absolute monarchies who cannot be confident of popular support, authoritarian minority régimes or states that have failed due to internal unrest. For example, the KSA and UAE, the two most capable Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), are absolute monarchies that eliminate any political opposition. Therefore, they are afraid of popular Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movements that endanger the reigning families’ rule. Likewise, Bahrain is a small island state where a 60% Shi’a population is ruled by a Sunni administration. Iraq, Syria and Yemen remain at crisis points, mired in various sectarian and ethnic conflicts.

Second, these countries are incapable of dealing with regional rivalries and spillover effects of conflicts, due to limited domestic resources. Small states like Jordan, Oman, Kuwait and Qatar, even though they suffer relatively few domestic tensions, cannot handle regional rivalries on their own and prefer to outsource their security needs. Also, they are too small to resist the pressure of the U.S. and escape from

mobilize their potential to embrace new opportunities in the existing regional order, describing states as declining does not fit with reality. These states may not be able to prevail in the region due to the various structural or conjectural reasons, but they do not necessarily decline. Therefore, in this study they will be termed “inert” states.

the “Unipole”’s gravity. For example, as an economically developing country, Jordan depends on the KSA and U.S. monetary support. Since June 2018, Jordan has faced grave internal economic and political tensions, triggered by the spill-over effects of the regional crises in Iraq and Syria (Younes, 2018). Sharing borders around crises points such as Israel, Palestine and Syria, it depends on the U.S. to establish stability.

The Behavioral Patterns of Regional States




Figure 3. Behavioral Mechanism of Middle Eastern Regional States

Since June 2017, the KSA and some other countries have severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and threatened that state with isolation if it fails to meet their demands to cease supporting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In response, Doha has developed even closer security relations with Washington. It signed \$20 billion worth in contracts to buy new fighter jets from the U.S., Great Britain, and France as a means of gaining Western support (*Economist*, 2018a). In August 2018, Qatar decided to expand Udeid Air Base, which is the largest U.S. military facility in the region (Reuters, 2018).

Oman is a country which strongly disagrees with KSA and UAE policies. Even though it is a member state of the GCC, Sultan Qaboos bin Said does not share Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s view of Iran. Historically, Oman has had a strong relationship with Great Britain and kept its distance from the U.S. Yet, despite its lack of interest in such regional American-led initiatives as the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), as a member of the GCC it cannot resist the pressure of the U.S. Similarly, Kuwait does not favor the idea of an aggressive approach to countering Iranian influence, but it as a GCC member it was entrapped in the MESA Initiative (*Economist*, 2018b).

Some states like Iraq, Syria and Lebanon lost their national unity due to prolonged conflicts and sectarian divides. Currently, Iraq is endeavoring to rebuild its destroyed cities and faces difficulties in dealing with the social unrest in Basrah Province. Also, despite the successful election on 12 May 2018, due to the polarization of the state, Iraq cannot establish a government as of the time of writing. Similarly,

due to the prolonged civil war and many exogenous involvements, Syria's Assad régime has become dependent on Iranian and Russian military support. Today, in contrast with other Arab nations, it has become a client state of Russia (just like in the past it was under the USSR).

Finally, the "inert regional states" (Egypt and KSA) do not possess sustainable power projection capacities. The KSA generates an enormous amount of wealth and has significant military force which possesses first-class American equipment. According to the *CIA World Factbook*, in 2017, with a GDP of \$1,798 Trillions in purchasing power parity terms (\$687 billion in current U.S. Dollars) the Saudi economy ranked 16th largest in the world. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that KSA military expenditures for the last three years (2015-2016-2017) exceed 12% of its GDP, which equals \$76.7 billions a year. When we compare this to Russia (\$61.2 billion), France (\$48.6 billion) and Germany (\$41.7 billions) we see that it is an extraordinary level of spending (Cordesman, 2018). Although in terms of GDP and the size of its existing military force, the KSA could be classified as a rising regional power, the Yemen War proves that Riyadh does not possess capable power projection capacity in its close neighborhood.

First, the campaign in Yemen, which primarily was devoted to countering Iranian influence, has been heavily dependent on U.S. air re-fuel capability and the import of American precision ammunition. Second, nearly all of the arms that are the prerequisite of conducting the operations in modern warfare fashion are purchased from abroad. Riyadh is the world's largest armaments importer and its domestic contribution to arms production is negligible (www.globalsecurity.org, 2018). Thus, the KSA stays in the hierarchical order with high dependence on the U.S. as a security provider.

Likewise, following the Arab Spring upheaval, Egypt has fallen in the hands of a weak and insecure authoritarian régime, which is mainly occupied with internal threats and is not capable of maintaining its traditional leadership role in the Arab world. With a population of 97.55 million people, Egypt is the region's most populous state. However, its GDP is relatively low and has dropped sharply from \$333 billion (in 2016) to \$235 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2019). Its wealth ranks far below that of Israel, which has 8.71 million people and a GDP of \$351 billion. Since 2015, in an attempt to boost economic growth, the Egyptian administration has embarked on an economic reform plan, which has become a significant problem for the majority of the low-income population (Barfi, 2018).

Egypt receives the third largest amount of American aid in the region (Israel and Iraq receive more). In 2017, Egypt devoted 88% of the total \$1.475 billions in aid it received from the U.S. to the modernization of its military. Egypt is the largest arms producer in the Arab world, but most of its industry is low tech and is incapable of producing the state-of-the-art weapons that are required in modern warfare (Lee, 2018; USAID, 2018). One of the clearest examples of Egypt's lack of efficiency and power-projection capacity is the 2018 operations against the ISIS-allied Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group in the Sinai Peninsula. The Peninsula has a long history of insurgent activity against the government, and since the start of the Libyan civil war, Cairo has had difficulties in preventing the infiltration of more sophisticated weapons into the region. The targeting of an Egyptian ship with a Kornet anti-tank missile and the downing of a civilian Metrojet Flight 9268 in October 2015 increased government determination to eliminate terrorism (Ghafar, 2018). Subsequently, the government launched large scale anti-terror operations, as a result of which at least 172 terrorists, 100 Egyptian soldiers and 500 civilians lost their lives in 2017. The rate of losses are much higher compared to international standards of Counter Terrorism-type (CT) operations.

The *New York Times* revealed a significant event by reporting that Israel had carried out more than 100 air strikes in Sinai with the knowledge of Egyptian authorities (Kirkpatrick, 2018). According to the article, some American officials claimed that Israel's air campaign made a decisive contribution to the Egyptian anti-terror campaign, enabling the Egyptians to gain the upper hand over the militants (Frantzman, 2018). Previously, accepting military support from Israel would not have been considered even as a last resort. These developments indicate the lack of capacity of Egypt to project power even

inside its territory due to a lack of advanced abilities. Therefore, the KSA and Egypt hold the position of “inert regional power,” the policy preference of which is staying aligned with the “Unipole”.

On top of everything, all of the hierarchical order states have a common anxiety, which is the possibility of “abandonment” by their sponsor states (Walt, 2009). Being unchecked by a peer power, which is a sharp divergence from Cold War times, the U.S. has become less bound to its commitments and has become a less reliable actor. Therefore, the states of hierarchical order strive to guarantee the predominant state’s commitments to them by moving closer to the sponsor or hedge against possible insecurities by approaching other major powers to consolidate commitments. The best examples in the region of a state getting closer to the “Unipole” with the objective of avoiding abandonment are the KSA’s and Qatar’s large-scale arms purchases. Even though both of these states do not have adequate personnel to run their existing equipment, they continue to import additional arms. In other words, states with sufficient monetary assets try to avoid abandonment by buying the continuation of the “Unipole”’s political support in the form of military contracts.

Other states prefer to hedge the U.S. by developing ties with Russia and China. A clear example of this strategy is presented by Egypt’s behavior. Being afraid of abandonment, Cairo invites another major rival into the region in order to secure the U.S.’ perpetual commitment. Today, Egypt is applying a clear hedging strategy toward U.S. policies by seeking Moscow’s cooperation in the military domain (*Defense Industry Daily*, 2016). After Democrat U.S. President Barack Obama initially froze bilateral military relations due to Egypt’s military coup against the ruling Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, Washington normalized its diplomatic relations with Cairo and released previously suspended monetary support (Lee, 2018). While the U.S. under the successor Republican President Donald Trump reinvigorated bilateral military ties and combined exercises (Belnap, 2018), yet Egypt enhanced its autonomy by granting air access to Russia and participated in similar exercises with Moscow (Egypt Defence Expo, 2018).

The Anarchical Structure.

The second category in Figure 1 is comprised of the states which are previously defined as rising regional powers. These countries show proficiency in dealing with internal problems and they can internally balance any regional rival. Therefore, they are more interested in peer competitors and great power interventions, which can significantly damage their interests. These states are in the ascendant because they benefit from the existing structure. The last thing they would like is an intervention that could destabilize the existing friendly environment and prevent the extraction of benefits. Also, these states are concerned with policies of the “Unipole” that might be detrimental to their internal security, territorial integrity or national interest. In an effort to prevent adverse outcomes and maximize regional stability, these states pursue policies that are more autonomous and sometimes at odds with the U.S.

Iran. For example, Iran, a country that is directly threatened by the “Unipole”, tries to balance the U.S. internally (with nuclear weapons and proxy groups). As of 2019, despite reliance on outsourcing some sophisticated aerospace technology, Tehran has developed an arms program and self-sufficient domestic production of military hardware. Iran can manufacture armored personnel carriers, tanks, missiles, radars of all kinds, small ships, submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a fighter plane. This equipment includes UAVs with assault capabilities, electro-optically guided glide-bombs and 2000 km.-range cruise missiles (Globalsecurity.org, 2016), essential elements of modern warfare.

Its special forces operatives, also known as Quds forces, have left their fingerprints on the mobilization of Shia groups which have become effective political actors in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. For example, the Iranian intelligence and security services, which have advised and assisted the Syrian military, were the decisive component in Bashar al-Assad’s success in reclaiming power in Syria. Tehran has an expeditionary force in Syria comprised of Quds Force, Islamic Revolutionary

Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces and law enforcement and intelligence services. The deployment of the IRGC to fight in a foreign country is significant evidence that shows Iranian ability to project power beyond its borders (Fulton, Holliday & Wyer, 2013).

Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has opposed the U.S. presence in the region and actively attempts to counter Washington policies by using an asymmetrical approach. Showing a particular ability at force-projection powered by domestic material sources, Iran is the primary actor which balances the “Unipole” with other major powers. Having a common anti-Western foreign policy attitude, Tehran cooperates with Moscow to balance Washington’s activities. For example, during the Syrian Civil War, Iran’s pervasive pro-regime land forces created a suitable venue to extend Russian strategic air capabilities. Through cooperation with Iran, Russia has boosted its limited military presence in Syria and managed to gain the status of the security provider to the Assad régime. With self-sufficient domestic arms production, a population of 82.4 million people and a GDP that approaches half a trillion (World Bank, 2018); Iran is a state that cannot be coerced to submit and accept the hierarchical order of the “Unipole”.

Turkey. After overcoming a devastating economic crisis at the beginning of the 21st Century, Turkey’s economy has improved significantly. Table 1 below displays GDP improvement of the country since the end of the Bipolar world order and the ratio between American and Turkish economies.

Table 1. Increase of Turkey’s GDP in Current U.S. Dollars-World Bank, 2018⁸

GDP Current US Dollar (Billion)														
	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
TR	\$150,676	\$180,170	\$181,476	\$255,884	\$238,428	\$501,416	\$764,336	\$832,524	\$873,982	\$950,579	\$934,186	\$859,797	\$863,722	\$851,102
USA	\$5,980,000	\$6,879,000	\$8,100,000	\$9,661,000	\$10,978,000	\$13,094,000	\$14,719,000	\$15,518,000	\$16,155,000	\$16,692,000	\$17,428,000	\$18,121,000	\$18,624,000	\$19,391,000
Ratio	39.6	38.1	44.6	37.7	46	26.1	19.2	18.6	18.4	17.6	18.7	21.1	21.5	22.8

While the U.S. was nearly 40 times a bigger economy at the beginning of the unipolarity, the ratio had fallen in half after 2008, which coincides with the Shift of Axis argument. Considering that the U.S. represents the structure of the system by itself, Turkey’s self-confidence in opposing U.S. policy preferences correlates with its increased material capability. Organized in terms of purchase power parity (PPP), Table 2 depicts a more revealing approach to the structure (U.S.) and unit (Turkey) comparison. PPP provides an alternative aspect by removing currency differences and displays the actual material meaning of the GDP for each regional actor.

Table 2. Increase of Turkey’s GDP in Power Purchase Parity--Constant 2011 in Dollars World Bank, 2018⁹

GDP, PPP (Constant 2011 international Dollar in Billions)														
	1990	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2008	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
TR	614,717	700,08	773,111	822,053	877,379	1,107,000	1,256,000	1,443,000	1,512,000	1,641,000	1,726,000	1,831,000	1,889,000	2,029,000
USA	9,252,000	9,836,000	10,911,000	12,465,000	13,336,000	14,706,000	15,321,000	15,518,000	15,863,000	16,129,000	16,544,000	17,017,000	17,270,000	17,662,000
Ratio	15.2	14.04	14.1	15.2	15.2	13.3	12.2	10.8	10.5	9.8	9.6	9.3	9.1	8.7

⁸ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=US-TR&start=1960&view=chart>

⁹ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD?end=2017&locations=US-TR&start=1960&view=chart>

The figures show that since the beginning of the Unipolar world order, Turkey has gradually decreased the discrepancy between the scales of the two economies by half. Also, one can observe that the Turkish economy has grown nearly five-fold between 1990 and 2008 according to nominal GDP (see Table 1). According to the *CIA Factbook* and World Bank, Turkey has the world’s 13th largest GDP in terms of PPP, and 17th in nominal prices.¹⁰ Thus, with an economy of this size, Turkey is a member of the G-20.

Concurrently, the Turkish defense industry, which had contributed only 20% of the total needs of Turkey’s armed forces at the beginning of the 2000s, increased its proportion to 65% in 2019. At the opening ceremony of Turkish defense firm BMC’s 500 million dollars’ worth new factory, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that “Turkey’s dependency on imported military hardware has been reduced from 80% to 35% over the last 16 years.” He also praised the defense industry’s success as exporters in 2018; exports had increased 17% over 2017 and had exceeded the goal of \$2 billion (*Daily Sabah*, 2019).

In 2017, SIPRI named Brazil, India, and Turkey as the “emerging producers” because of their companies on the Top 100 list.¹¹ After affirming the 24% rise in the arms sales of Turkish companies in 2017, the report recognized Turkey as a country with ambitions to advance its military industry in order to fulfill the growing domestic demand for arms and due to a desire to become less reliant on foreign suppliers (SIPRI, 2018). The Turkish desire to equip its armed forces with the product of domestic industry is linked to various embargos that Turkey has faced during past national crises. The embargo decision of the U.S. in 1974 as response to Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus, had a profound impact on the Turkish psyche. This embargo hindered Turkey’s ability to acquire military equipment between 1975 and 1978, including jets which had already been paid for and spare parts for the Western platforms that were in its inventory. At a public event President Erdogan noted: our strategic partners disabled the military systems they sold to us back in 1974. Turkey was punished by its own allies when it intervened against the genocide of the Turkish-Cypriots. But Turkey is now capable of building its own facilities."

Also, he emphasized that this embargo cost Turkey billions of dollars and that Turkey needed to mobilize the country’s industrial base in support of the defense industry in order to avoid falling into a similar situation again (*Daily Sabah*, 2019). A similar event occurred in 1992, when the German government, fearful of unrest among the Kurdish population in Germany, placed restrictions on the usage of German made equipment in Turkey’s fight against the PKK in South East Anatolia (Yilmaz, 2015).

Being located in a very volatile region, Turkey believes a modern and self-reliant military is essential for its national security. Therefore, in the last decades, Turkey has increased its domestic military production capacity by investing in the defense industry. While procuring needed military goods domestically, Turkey has also become a fast-growing exporter of military equipment (Tekingunduz, 2018). The military industry reached \$6.7 billion of the economy, exports of which was \$1.82 billion in 2017 and \$2.04 billion in 2018. According to Turkey’s Defense and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association, its received orders in 2018 were \$8 billion and the Turkish defense industry created job opportunities for 44,740 people in total (SaSaD, 2018).

Table 3. Exports of Turkey’s Defense Industry (Baran, 2018).

Export of Turkish Defense Industry						
Years	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Million \$	1570	1855	1929	1953	1824	2040

¹⁰ For 2018, IMF prediction for nominal prices ranks Turkey as the world’s 19th largest economy, while the *CIA Factbook* and World Bank estimates as 17th. There is no discrepancy about the rank in PPP terms.

¹¹ Turkey has two companies in the Top 100: Electronics producers ASELSAN ranking as 61 (68th in 2016) and the aircraft producing Turkish Aerospace Industries at the 70th rank (77th in 2016). Brazil had only one company ranking 84th on the list.

As of January 2019, the Turkish defense industry has signed significant contracts, such as 30 indigenous T129 Advanced Attack and Reconnaissance Helicopters, \$1.5 billion worth warships deal with Pakistan, an order for ten helicopters from the Philippines and an order for 12 *Bayraktar* TB2 operational unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Ukraine (*Daily Sabah*, 2019).

While many NATO members decreased military spending after the Cold War (so-called “Peace Dividend”), Table 4 shows that Turkey did not. Indeed, its military spending is closely related to the intensity of the national fight against the terrorism of the PKK. After the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan at the end of 1998, expenditure gradually dropped and began to increase when only the Counter-Terrorist (CT) operations intensified again. Also, the Syrian Civil War and the emergence of ISIS increased the burden of military expenditures.

Table 4. Military Expenditure of Turkey in Constant U.S. Dollars

Military expenditure of Turkey in constant (2016) US\$ m., 2009-2017 © SIPRI 2018									
1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
10770	11071	11645	12875	12588	12932	14478	15084	15806	17452
2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
16890	15483	16474	14869	13569	12846	13784	13252	13401	14340
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
14050	14187	14498	14857	14942	15412	17854	19580		

Based on the SIPRI database, Turkish military expenditure’s share of GDP is around 2%. However, a rare study by Yenturk (Table 5) shows that (including all resources) military spending is higher than 2%. Also, it is possible to observe how the increased national GDP has provided more financial allocation, despite the constant share in general (Yenturk, 2014).

Table 5. Turkish Military Expenditure and Share in GDP %.

Military Expenses of Turkey (Includes Foundations and Other Resources)										
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total military expenses	19,416	20,349	22,727	25,879	27,610	29,742	33,815	37,562	41,104	44,332
Share in GDP %	2.56	2.41	2.39	2.72	2.51	2.29	2.36	2.39	2.36	2.29

In addition, in order to increase efficiency, the Turkish Armed Forces has transformed its structure to smaller and flexible units, which are better suited to conduct urban warfare and CT operations. In 2009, due to the public debates regarding the conscripted soldiers’ ability to fight against seasoned terrorists, the Supreme Military Council decided to increase the proportion of professional units. These moves significantly extended Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) operational capability as well as the ability of the nation to handle prolonged conflicts.

Even after the 15 July 2016 failed military coup attempt, which resulted in the purge of many military professionals, Turkey successfully conducted “Operation Euphrates Shield” (24 August 2016-30 March 2017) and “Operation Olive Branch” (January-March 2018) in Northern Syria. These operations were an excellent opportunity to test the resilience of TAF structure and the efficiency of domestically produced modern warfare arms. Moreover, by organizing and using the Free Syrian Army, which was comprised of moderate opponents of the Syrian régime, Turkey proved that it could also project power by using local partners and groups as proxies.

In conclusion, having been in a constant struggle against terrorism and instabilities in the region, Turkey has improved its military structure and has increased self-sufficiency by producing the critical arms that are required in modern conflicts. In addition, the military coup attempt organized by Fethullah Gulen supporters became a good test case for régime resilience and ability to overcome internal threats. Thus, with a growing GDP and military competence, Turkey increased its national power and its ability to pursue a more independent policy, a decisive factor in fostering the observed changes in Turkish foreign policy.

Israel. Israel has exceptional ties with the U.S. Despite this close relationship, occasional tensions between the two states do occur. However, when a U.S. policy becomes detrimental to Israeli interests, Tel Aviv uses its vast influence on the U.S. domestic political establishment. For example, during the Obama administration in 2015, there was a fundamental disagreement between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama over the approach to Iran's nuclear program.

In 2015, the Israelis and the Republican Party majority leader arranged a joint session in Congress for Israeli president Netanyahu without notifying the White House. During the event, he criticized Obama administration policies, which infuriated the administration. The Obama Administration perceived the incident as Israel and the opposition party working together to interfere with presidential authority over foreign policy and undermine efforts to strike a nuclear deal with Tehran (Beauchamp, 2015). Due to its economic situation and power projection capabilities, Tel Aviv is not a dependent state. Since the U.S. has an interest in Israel's well-being, frequently their policy preferences converge. Although Israel greatly benefits from the U.S.' pro-Israeli stance, it does not hesitate to act against the U.S. when it perceives a need to do so. Tel Aviv frequently uses balancing strategies when it feels that the U.S. obligations to meet international expectations regarding the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) can *entrap* Israel into making a compromise which it deems unacceptable.

With arms exports of \$7.9 billion, Israel accounted for 2% of the total revenues of the Top 100 defense companies. Although it is a small state, Israel's arms sales are relatively high (Kuimova, Tian, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2018). Israeli defense industry produces arms, which meet U.S. equivalent high-tech specification. Also, the Israeli military frequently displays its power projection capability in its close neighborhood. Currently, the Tel Aviv government has proved its willingness to use the military against Iranian formations in Syria. Its self-sufficient military and proven power projection abilities facilitate Israel's ability to diverge from U.S. policy preferences and pursue a more autonomous path. For that reason, it takes the position in the hierarchical order in the regional structural spectrum.

Conclusion

In this Chapter, the study formulated a mechanism for describing regional states' behavior in a Unipolar systemic structure. The analysis showed that states with improved national power tend to act more independently vis-à-vis regional policy preference of the "Unipole". Countries that can be classified as rising regional powers adopt a self-help system that provides a certain amount of autonomy from the "Unipole". These states are the source of the hybrid nature of I.R. regional structure in the Middle East under Unipolarity.

It also revealed that in the Middle East a sound economic situation is not enough to enable pursuit of independent policies. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter accidentally discovered that a pure military built-up is not enough to take an independent position. It is the armed forces, which have power projection capabilities based on domestic military procurement, that allow autonomous actions. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a military equipped with top-notch American equipment and arms. Yet, it had to be submissive to U.S. demands regarding the campaign in Yemen after the looming arms embargo.

CHAPTER FOUR: TURKEY TAKES INDEPENDENT POSITION

Introduction

This chapter claims that Turkey is taking an independent position to realize its foreign policy preferences by linking the objectives of Turkey with the evolution of debated policy changes. It asserts that Ankara's increased regional engagements are the outcome of taking an independent position and they are intended to pursue national objectives.

The first section defines the national objectives of the state. Later, it will describe how the transformation of the international systemic structure and its effects on Turkey created a paradigm shift about the existing alliance relations.

Afterward, to describe the changed behavior, it connects Turkey's need for maximizing the national objectives with the new approach of realizing them. This part of the study emphasizes Ankara's inability to defuse security threats and achieve economic development by staying allied to Washington as the primary cause that endorsed policymakers to reduce dependence on the U.S. and to adopt a self-help approach.

Finally, it conducts an empirical analysis, which encompasses the most significant events since the beginning of the Unipolarity, to diagnose whether Turkey pursues an independent approach or shifting axis.

The overall aim is to overcome the fallacies of half-way explanations that mostly describe the objective of Turkish foreign policy as "increasing its influence" in the region. Frequently, the advocates of axis shift, neo-Ottomanism or other unit-level explanations implicitly link or present it as an "end in itself." Thus, Turkey's changed behavior patterns and increased activities across the DIME are erroneously interpreted as actions with *hegemonic purposes*. Since the U.S. has already dominated the region and Turkey does not have the ability or desire to alter the power-distribution, explanations of Turkey's foreign policy are based on erroneous assumptions.

Besides, while many criticize Turkey's new independent policies as distancing itself from the West, they fail to discern the internal tensions in the Transatlantic block. For example, due to geographical proximity, Europeans are also endangered by the spillover effects of the U.S. over activism. Therefore, Turkey's position regarding the invasion of Iraq or Iran's nuclear program is very close to that of the E-3 (France, Germany and Great Britain). Also, criticism of American activities in Falluja or of Israeli abuses of human rights much like those voiced by Turkey are not uncommon in Europe (Danforth, 2008). Since there is no consistent Western position, it would be deceptive to describe Turkey's refusal to comply with U.S. demands as an indicator of its split with the Western bloc (Ozcan, 2008).

The Primary Objective of Turkey in the Middle East: Seeking Stability

Since the 1923 foundation of the Turkish Republic on Kemal Atatürk's vision, its key objectives were:

- 1) consolidate/secure the state's international and domestic sovereignty, and
- 2) reach the level of contemporary Western civilizations in development. In parallel with the founding fathers, Turkish élites always valued national economic development, just as security.

Efforts to build the nation by advancing social development and reconstruction of the country by increasing industrial and economic capacity continued after the establishment of the state. During most of the Republic's history, development and welfare were central to the rhetoric and vision of the ruling élites.

Most recently, in the "2023 Vision," Turkey still heavily prioritized development projects. This plan sets as the nation's objective becoming one of the top ten economies in the world by 2023. Turkey has envisaged expanding its GDP to \$2 trillion, achieving a per capita income of \$25,000, attaining a balanced annual trade size of \$1 trillion, increasing the employment rate to over 50% of the population, reducing unemployment to 5% and decreasing the level of government involvement in many areas (Republic of Turkey Investment Support and Promotion Agency, 2011).

To achieve a high level of export volume, Turkey plans to increase the numbers of exporters, create internationally known brands, support high-tech value-added products, and assist critical sectors, such as automotive, machinery, steel, textile, electronics and chemicals. In order to reconstruct the nation, Turkey has made infrastructure investments which can support economic productivity such as 16 new large-scale logistic centers, 36,500 km of dual carriageway, 7,500 km of motorway, 70.00 km with bitumen hot-mix asphalt, a submarine tube for cars in Istanbul, three bridges on the Bosphorus, a bridge on the Dardanelles, and railway projects to connect Turkey with the Middle East, Caucasus and North Africa.


Moreover, Ankara envisaged building new airports with capacity for 400 million passengers per year, a 750-plane fleet and two aviation maintenance and training centers, connecting main ports with railways, establishing transfer ports, and having at least one of the top 10 ports in the world by 2019. To exploit the advantage of its location, Turkey has planned to reach 32 million TEU (20-foot equivalent unit) handling capacity for container transport, handle 500 million tons of solid & 350 million liquid load, reach 10 million deadweight tonnage shipbuilding ability and construct 100 marinas with 50,000 yacht potential.

In addition, Turkey has a target of 30 million broadband subscribers, plans to increase the proportion of national contribution to 50% in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, raise the ICT sector's share of GDP to 8%, become one of the top 10 countries in e-transformation, and to provide all public services electronically by 2019. There are also essential objectives in securing energy, reaching 50 million tourists with \$50 billion in revenue, and increasing innovation by supporting Research and Developments activities with up to 3% of GDP.

In the realm of defense, Turkey has undertaken the production of rifles, artillery, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircraft domestically. Development of a domestic tank and fighter plane industry continues; the armed forces have already received delivery of the other military hardware.

A high proportion of the national objectives focus on national development. During the import-substitution era, non-involvement in the volatile Middle Eastern region was a viable option to create a conducive environment for development. Since the transition to the neoliberal market economy, within which growth and prosperity come from exports, traditional isolationist policies were no longer an appropriate strategy for national development. To maximize growth, the new "outwards looking" economic approach has compelled Turkey to develop mechanisms for global and local integration within the regions, where Turkey can potentially flourish. However, the constant regional conflicts have continuously created domestic and regional security concerns that have interrupted much needed economic integration. Therefore, sustaining "regional stability" became the intersection and the prerequisite to achieving both security and economic integration in the Middle East (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy



During the Cold War, Turkey was the unquestioned ally of NATO and the West against the USSR and Warsaw Pact, which was the most significant threat at the time to national and European security. Ankara in that period defined its national interest in the Middle East in parallel with the West and considered its involvements as an extension of the Western security system (Benli Altunisik, 2009). With the end of the Cold War and U.S. emergence as the world's sole Superpower, the new architecture of the international system was transformed into unipolarity (G. John Ikenberry, 2009; William C. Wohlforth, 1999) in which liberal democracies were the winner. The new structure was meant to enforce democracy as the normative way of governance and neoliberal markets as the prevailing economic approach. Having the willingness to adopt both, Turkey was favorable to the U.S.-dominated world order. However, Turkey's traditional relations with its Cold War ally have begun to change after the new effects of unipolarity become visible.

The new international structure has provided the U.S. with many advantages. No other major competitor exists that can restrain the U.S. and it can act with near impunity worldwide. After the end of the Cold War, since the stability in the Middle East was frequently disturbed by the unchecked "Unipole", Turkey has begun to experience difficulty in managing security risks and obtaining stability in the region. After the international systemic structure transformed into a Unipolar world, the functionality of traditional relations has eroded, which has brought along a substantial paradigm shift in the methods of maximizing regional security and stability.

Paradigm Shift and the New Strategy for Maximizing Stability

The Paradigm Shift

In light of the evidence, this study assumes that the structure of the international system is Unipolar and the U.S. is (still) the "Unipole" (G. John Ikenberry, 2009; Lim, 2015; Walt, 2009; William C. Wohlforth, 1999). Therefore, Turkey's (unit) interaction with the system (the "Unipole") is defined best in American-Turkish relations. After the First Gulf War in 1990-91, the U.S. became Turkey's new neighbor on its southern border and their relations have been impacted mostly by developments in the Middle East. Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has always had concerns about:

- 1) the actions of major powers,
- 2) regional rivals,
- 3) internal destabilizing factors, and
- 4) economic development of the country.

With the beginning of the unipolar order, despite some change in intensities, these concerns have continued to be determinants of TFP. While the first three are security concerns, the fourth element is economy-oriented. Thus, to "defuse security risks" and maintain "economic development" have been the dual main objectives that have motivated Turkey's relations.

During the Bipolar Cold War era (1946-90), Turkey had successfully addressed these concerns through a close alliance with the Western bloc. With the beginning of the unipolar international structure, Turkey's security concerns were expected to diminish. After all, Ankara was on the side of the great power that won the Cold War; it was a large regional state with institutional ties to the world's strongest security alliance (NATO) that rendered it a hard target for regional rivals. Besides, despite the high cost, Turkey was able to deal with internal instabilities such as PKK terror and political volatility.

Since its main ally, the U.S., was already dominant in the region, Turkey's major power threat concerns were expected to decrease significantly. However, developments showed that even though Turkey was not the target, the spill-over effects of the unrestrained "Unipole" posed severe security threats to the country's territorial integrity and domestic stability.

During the 1990-91 First Gulf War, Turkey supported the U.S. decision to fight with dictator Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who had invaded Kuwait. During the coalition operation Turkey amassed its

troops to force Iraq to reserve a considerable amount of its military resources located near the distant border with Turkey (Lally Weymouth, 1991). After the operation, Ankara allowed coalition forces to fly from its territory to enforce the northern No-Fly Zone, which was formed to protect the refugees from Saddam (Haldun Çancı & Şevket Serkan Şen, 2011). Turkey was submissive to almost all policy decisions of the U.S., even to the ones that openly damaged national interests, such as accepting the closure of Turkish-Iraqi oil pipelines and strictly abiding by imposed international sanctions.

By the mid-1990s, developments in Northern Iraq caused severe tensions in U.S.–Turkish relations. In the political debates, the U.S. was accused of supporting the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq. Also, during the post-war era, due to diminished central government control, the PKK managed to find a safe haven in the north of Iraq and increased its cross-border assaults on Turkey. The unlimited support during the first Gulf War to the U.S. cost \$80 billions in lost trade and increased cross-border PKK attacks left 20,000 deaths (Altunisik, 2013). Besides, Turkey had to deal with half a million refugees when Saddam attempted to control the northern part of the country. Thus, Turkey has experienced that destabilized neighbors have direct effects that jeopardize national security, because of the spill-over effects such as refugees, ungoverned places suitable as bases for terrorist activity and diminished economic benefits.

In 2003, although the *status quo* was not in favor of Turkey, Ankara had similar concerns about the spill-over effects of a potential war against the Saddam régime. Yet, the war occurred despite Ankara's refusal to grant access for the U.S. troops to enter Iraq from its soil. Just like after the First Gulf War in 1991, the 2003 U.S. policies of military intervention increased concerns about Iraq's territorial integrity, which had the potential to severely affect Turkey (Kanat, 2017).

After the conflict, Turkish officials have become increasingly suspicious of U.S. policies because of the considerable gap between the declared intentions and emerged outcomes. For example, the arguments of the U.S. for invading Iraq in 2003 were mainly linked to terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) concerns. However, the post-invasion developments showed that there were no WMD in Iraqi and the link between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida was artificial. Also, the human rights abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison put American credibility into question. What is more, the U.S. ensured the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as an autonomous entity in Iraq, which increased the risk-perception regarding territorial integrity of Turkey.

During the occupation of Iraq, Ankara also resented Washington's policies meant to stabilize Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal. For example, in the 2010 elections, although the Sunni Iraqiya came out as the first party from the parliamentary election, the U.S. assigned Maliki, who was the leader of the second party, to form the government (Nasr, 2013). In his book, Nasr describes him as a revenge-seeking Shi'a, a weak manager with authoritarian tendencies who pursued a sectarian policy to ensure a Shi'a rise to power with the support of Iran. After his inauguration, Maliki decided to eliminate his primary rival, Hashemi, who was the leader of the leading Sunni party. During his visit to the U.S., he measured the possible U.S. reaction and felt free to implement sectarian policies based on Shi'a dominance. As a result, Hashemi fled to Iraq's Kurdish region and the conflict among sectarian and ethnic groups revived. Thus, while internal movements against Iraqi unity gained pace, foreign actors were involved in the theater.

Moreover, regardless of the ongoing struggles, U.S. policymakers contemplated an exit strategy of forming a security state under an authoritarian leader which would secure American interests and deliver a new Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) that would secure future U.S. military and political influence. The U.S. realized, however, that things were not going as planned, as Maliki was eager to work with Iran, rather than the U.S. and was reluctant to deliver a new SOFA agreement (Nasr, 2013).

Many believe that the poorly conceived U.S. exit and its support for Maliki created a power vacuum that caused the emergence of Isis. Maliki's sectarian policies have disenfranchised the Sunni Iraqis and the

lack of U.S. intention to maintain a presence in the region devastated Iraq's integrity, while producing further destabilizing effects for the area.

Similarly, continuous efforts of the U.S. administrations to isolate Syria and Iran have negatively impacted Turkey's efforts to integrate its economy with the lucrative Middle Eastern markets. Frequently, U.S. regional interventions have been part of an effort to foster liberal democratic values in these states. Even though Turkey was not happy with the existing régimes, it considered part of the geography that should not prevent normal relations between neighboring states. Any pressure which might destabilize these states was considered dangerous because of possible spillover effects into Turkey. Therefore, as a NATO Ally of the U.S., besides dealing with the spill-over effects of the “Unipole”'s policies, Turkey has been continuously entrapped in never-ending sanctions and political restrictions in the region.

Turkey has begun to vocalize a new security paradigm, in which “the U.S. is both an ally and a potential threat.” This new concept suits the structural model described in the previous chapter. Since the “Unipole” does not have a peer competitor, the U.S.' need for allies has diminished. Thus, it does not have to stick to its previous commitments. The U.S. does not constitute a direct threat to Turkey as it does to Iran, but it continues inadvertently harming Turkey's vital interests (Walt, 2009). For example, in the “Turkey Social Attitudes Research-2018,” Kadir Has University found out that, at the end of 2018 around 81.9% of Turkish population believes that the U.S. is the number one security threat to Turkey, an increase of 17.6% over previous year (Aydin et al., 2019).


This situation has become more evident as the U.S. has begun to choose controversial regional partners and has attempted to create new formations that Turkey regards as a risk to territorial integrity and regional stability. Since the “Unipole” has leeway to change its partners depending on the mission (Bilgel, 2014) and its regional policies have proven to be potentially harmful to Turkey's national interests, completely aligning with the U.S. (as Turkey did during the Cold War) has lost its functionality and validity as a practical option to maximize Turkey's security needs.

Realizing that Turkey cannot wholly rely on the U.S. to defuse threats, policymakers have preferred to manage Turkey's regional security needs by reducing dependence on the U.S. and adopting a self-help approach. In other words, Turkey, which has previously delegated responsibility for security to the U.S., has taken this responsibility back. Yet, in order to compensate the security vacuum created by the rejection of the “Unipole” as main policy describer, Turkey has needed to displace arrangements previously managed by the U.S. Therefore, depending on itself, Turkish Foreign Policy has begun to display unprecedented diplomatic activities, establishing new military and economic links, and undertaking an active approach in conflict resolution. Bilgel argues that those states which adopt an independent approach will attempt to position themselves at the midpoint of the politics in their region (Bilgel, 2014). These aims are reflected in former-Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's policy vision as:

- 1) effective regional integration through security and economic cooperation,
- 2) mediation of regional conflict resolution, and
- 3) active participation in global affairs and international organizations (Davutoglu, 2011).

From its own perspective, all these displacement attempts have been deployed to stabilize the region in order to maintain the relative advantage that the Middle East had provided to Turkey. It is important to stress that the threat is not the “Unipole” itself, but the spillover effects of its regional policies. Thus, Turkey does not aim to oppose the U.S. and pursue conflictual policies systematically but rather to obtain enough independence to shape some of the outcomes that destabilize the region. In that sense, by re-positioning Turkey's national interests in the center of its foreign policy, Turkey transformed itself from a small peripheral partner to an actor, which desires to exert agency in the issues that have effects on its objectives. This new stance has become the primary source of mixed relations with the U.S.

Figure 5. The New Conceptualization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy.



Contrary to the shift of axis argument that assumes the change of Turkish Foreign Policy is a choice of preference of East over West, or the Neo-Ottomanism theory that suggests Turkey aims to dominate the region, this study claims that Turkey has taken an independent position to achieve its objectives. This conceptualization of Turkish Foreign Policy is also consistent with the observed reality in Turkish-American relations. Ankara does not flatly oppose the U.S., but in fact enjoys cooperating with Washington. Thus, Turkey aims at maximizing stability in the region through cooperation and, if needed, through indirect confrontation.

Strategy to Achieve Objectives

Frequently, depending on how relations will affect the (*in*)stability of the region, Ankara has begun to *cooperate* or *oppose* Washington’s policy preferences. This study assumes that linking *main objectives* with the *means* to achieve them can clarify the changing nature of Turkish Foreign Policy. Table 6 below displays the main objectives and the way of realizing them. Basically, all of the Turkish Foreign Policy activities in the Middle East are addressed in the below-presented table.

Table 6. Objective and Means for Turkish Foreign Policy

	Objectives	Means
1	Establish/Maintain/Restore Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrate with the region Pursue active diplomacy to mediate regional problems Prevent destabilizing developments Actively participate in restoring stability in favor of national interest
2	Defuse Security Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Active diplomacy Military cooperation Military Bases Military intervention
3	Achieve Economic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remove obstacles to economic activities Integrate with the regions that are potential markets Increase attention to previously neglected areas

Establish, Maintain and Restore Stability

Turkey, as a rising country in the region, is the primary beneficiary of stability in the Middle East. Since it has adopted a self-help system to shape a more approachable region, Turkey has developed mixed relations. Even though the changed Turkish foreign policy has been labeled a general opposition to U.S. policy preferences, Ankara has continued to cooperate with Washington in many domains. Since the hypothesis of this study asserts that Turkey has adopted an "independent" approach, which puts its own interests in the center of the policy actions, one must observe both cooperative and confrontational policies depending on their service to national objectives. Therefore, delineation of several controversial historical incidents that links "ends" with "means" will be beneficial to clarify the analysis.

In the beginning, it is crucial to elaborate on the different views of the U.S. and Turkey regarding the definition of stability in the region. One of the striking differences in how these two allies perceive the region regarding the regime types of the existing states becomes evident in an interview conducted by Stephan Kinzer in 2002, who asked then Turkish President Abdullah Gul about Turkish policies that cause problematic relations between US and Turkey regarding the developments in its close neighborhood. Gul stated that Turkey cannot change the geography and its neighbors. He also emphasized that while Ankara does not necessarily like the regimes of the surrounding countries, it should not be afraid to have relations with them. Therefore, he stressed the need for constant engagements with these states (Lutsky, 2002).

On the other hand, for the U.S., stabilizing the Middle East was equal to the establishment of liberal markets, secure energy flows, protection for Israel, secure maritime routes, and advancing norms of democracy. The issue of Iraq presents a good example of how the two countries' points of view differ. The American objective was to contain and topple the Saddam régime in Iraq, which was a threat to Israel and neighboring countries. To achieve that objective, it crippled central Iraqi government control and promoted Kurdish administration of northern Iraq, policies which caused problems for Turkey in both the security (increased PKK attacks) and economic (decreased trade with Bagdad) domains.

Moreover, in an attempt to contain Iran, America sold nearly \$125 billion worth of conventional arms to Middle Eastern countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This increased militarization was not consistent with Turkey's regional vision of stability. Indeed, for the USA and Turkey, Iran has always been a significant source of concern for regional stability. Both states see benefits from limiting Iran's expanding sphere of influence in the broader Middle East and preventing it from becoming the epicenter of the Shi'a population (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). Although Turkey competes with Iran for influence in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq (Ozel, 2012), Turkey believes that regime change in the region should not include military intervention or cause misery for millions that instigate mass population movements. Also, pressure that can destabilize Iran might create ungoverned places, where the Iranian branch of the PKK could find safe zones to direct attacks on Turkey.

Moreover, Ankara maintains that threatening these governments and their authoritarian régimes makes them more dangerous. From the perspective of Turkish officials, Iran's nuclear program is in part a result of American threats against the establishment in Tehran. The resolutions of the problems posed by authoritarian régimes like those in Syria and Iran, therefore, should be conducted through diplomacy, trade and political engagements. While Ankara has as much disdain for the Iranian and Syrian régimes, as does the U.S., Turkey opposed the isolation policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. In 2010, Turkey tried to prevent another U.S. attempt to isolate Iran. Together with Brazil, Turkey reached an agreement which was the first of its kind regarding the Iran nuclear issue. Turkey's arrangements with Iran and Ankara's constructive approach to the nuclear issue were received cynically by the U.S. as an Iranian attempt to buy time. Turkish-U.S. relations suffered a significant blow when Ankara voted "no" on the resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that would impose another round of U.N.

sanction on Iran (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). From Ankara's perspective, the attempt to isolate Iran would harm bilateral trade relations (Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014).¹²

Recently, the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-imposition of tight unilateral sanctions, which are aimed at destabilizing the regime, have been strongly opposed by Ankara. Many Turkish officials vocally declared that Ankara would not abide by the sanctions. Besides the concerns mentioned above, especially after the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has become more anxious about any potential turmoil in Iran, which can destabilize the country and cause significant refugee and security issues for Turkey.

In Syria, relations between two allies collided even more volatily. Turkey had difficult relations with Damascus until the end of 1998, when Hafez al-Assad agreed to end its support for the PKK and expel its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. After the conclusion of the Adana agreement in 1998, bilateral relations stabilized. However, the United States enthusiastically campaigned for the isolation of Syria and openly tried to dissuade Turkey from seeking a rapprochement with Damascus. Philip Robins maintains that Turkey was unwilling to endanger the hard-won improvement in bilateral relations and despite U.S. pressure it continued to support the Assad régime (Robins, 2007). Even after the murder of Lebanese leader Hariri, for which substantial evidence was found indicating the Syrian government's involvement, Turkey defied the USA by continuing to engage with Syria. Ankara believed that maintaining good relations with Syria might produce more leverage on the Ba'athist régime (Ozel, 2012).

Turkey's willingness to integrate with the Middle East created even more severe tension when Turkish-Israel relations worsened. The first problem that stood on the way of integration was the hostility of Arab nations towards Turkey's relationship with Israel. Israel-Turkish relations were established in 1949 when Ankara officially recognized the formation of the Jewish state. Ankara developed friendly economic and diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. However, the Arabs' distaste for Israel was a major obstacle to Turkey's relations with the Arab states (Litsas, 2014).

Israeli-Turkish relations got even closer in the second half of the 1990s when both sides began to conduct military exercises to deal with their common arrogant neighbor, Syria (Erdurmaz, 2013). Also, Freedman argues that in the 1990s good relations with Israel were beneficial for Ankara to counter increasing pressure from the Armenian and Greek lobbies in the U.S. (Freedman, 2010). Relations between Turkey and Israel became even warmer when the U.S. began to channel Turkish arms purchases to Tel Aviv. The amiable interactions proceeded untouched during the first period of the JDP government; for example, during that time Turkish leaders strongly condemned the statements of Ahmadinejad, who was announcing that "Israel should be wiped off of the map" (Onis, 2011).

Ankara desires a peaceful regional order, and that depends on political stability and economic integration. According to Altunisik, for Turkey, achieving peace between Arabs and Israel was the precondition of economic integration and political stability. She maintains that "Ankara operates on the assumption that Israel's current policies are blocking this path of regional integration" (Altunisik, Meliha Benli, 2013). Accepting that one of the reasons for U.S. involvement in the Middle East was to secure Israel, Turkey has also linked the centrality of MEPP with the U.S. stance against Iran and other "rogue states" (Ulgul, 2017). For example, on 2 October 2006, after an Oval Office meeting in Washington, Prime Minister Erdogan stated: "Today Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a major factor in the rise of regional and global tensions. In order to establish peace in the Middle East and in the world, a permanent and fair solution to this problem must first be found primarily" (Kanat et al., 2017).

Thus, in 2008 Turkey ramped up diplomatic efforts to mediate the Israel-Syria conflict. Mending relations between the Jews and the Arabs, which were a primary obstacle standing in the way of Turkey's

¹² Turkey was concerned that the upcoming isolation could prevent transborder cooperation against PKK and foil national energy security, due to export restrictions (Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014). According to Tezcur and Grigorescu, in 2010, the percentage of Turkish exports that went to Iran was 2.67%, while 6.41% of Turkish imports came from Iran.

further integration with the region, was the initial choice of Turkey. The announcement regarding the peace talks came on 21 May 2008, when the U.S. was trying to isolate Syria. The negotiations appropriately advanced and the signing of a peace agreement was expected during Israeli Premier Ehud Barak's visit to Istanbul. However, the process abruptly ended when Israel broke the negotiated ceasefire and launched a full ground invasion of the Gaza Strip at the end of the year (Kanat et al., 2017).

Recognizing the difficulties of mediating such a complex issue, Turkey has chosen to distance itself from Israel. Some analysts have asserted this change is an ideological choice and have attributed it to the Islamist JDP government's anti-Semitic sentiments. However, the way relations later unfolded hints of clear political choices behind this strategy.

The first sign of this change emerged during the Davos World Economic Forum in 2009 when Mr. Erdogan vocal criticism against Israeli actions during the Gaza War widely echoed in international media. Many scholars believe that after the Davos incident, Turkey openly shifted to favoring the Palestinian cause, putting at risk long-entrenched bilateral economic, diplomatic and security relations with Israel (Oguzlu, 2010). Indeed, the cost was high, but the benefit appeared to be bigger. The "one-minute" objection of Erdogan against the double standard of the moderator, who was trying to avoid Erdogan's critics by limited his speech time went viral throughout the Middle East. Immediately after the 2009 Davos forum, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan enjoyed the popularity of a rock star among the Arab populations, who resented their own leaders' failure to take a firm stance against Israel. Iranians and Arabs could hardly believe that a Turkish leader of a secular Muslim state is acting more radically toward Tel Aviv than any of his Muslim counterparts. The incident instantly flushed away the centuries long Turkish-Arab mistrust (Steinvorth, 2009).

Previously, when Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council Election, Turkey accepted the demand of Hamas for a meeting. This incident was widely interpreted as evidence of the rise of an Islamist Turkish foreign policy. However, the nature of the meeting and messages to Hamas reveal Turkey's endeavors to integrate into the region. Turkey has expressed many times the fact that Hamas is part of the solution to the Palestinian issue and that, without Hamas involvement, prospects for peace are very thin. In one of the public meetings, Erdogan explained how the visit had occurred. He said that they had presented two options to Hamas leaders. If they received official assignments, they would be welcomed as state officials. If not, then they would be accepted as the guests of the JDP (*Sabah*, 2006). During the meeting the JDP officials urged Hamas to immediately recognize Israel, cease the terrorist attacks, seek a two-state solution, and accept the previously signed agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel (Oguzlu, 2008). However, Turkey's close position to Hamas strained relations between the U.S. and Ankara, especially after Erdogan dubbed the Israeli operation that killed the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin an act of "State Terrorism" (Freedman, 2010).

Next, the Gaza War and the subsequent naval blockade of the Gaza Strip led to the May 2010 Marmara flotilla incident, which changed the course of relations significantly. Turkey was against the blanket blockade that was prohibiting any goods from reaching Gaza, ostensibly to prevent the flow of arms. The flotilla intended to highlight the blockade by delivering humanitarian aid. However, it encountered aggressive intervention from Israeli commandos, which killed nine activists including one U.S.-Turkish dual-citizen. Turkey reacted strongly and cut its diplomatic relations with Israel.

Although U.S. mediation succeeded in restoring Turkey-Israel relations in 2013, the stance of Turkey on the Middle East Peace Process and against Israel has not changed. By acquiring a reputation as an ardent supporter of Palestine, Turkey has achieved its objective of integration with the Arab world in the Middle East. Turkish TV serials have achieved wide popularity, many political entities have begun to emulate the JDP as a model, Turkish firms obtained a friendly business environment, and Arab columnists praise Turkey's way of acting against perceived injustices against the Muslim Palestinian population. Thus,

the popularity of Turkey, an exceptional country with a Muslim population, a democratically elected Islamic government and a discernably rising GDP, has significantly increased in the region.

Since the flotilla episode, Turkey has deliberately distanced itself from Israel and has made an effort to maintain its newly acquired status in the Middle East, regardless of U.S. concerns about hostile relations with Israel. Therefore, poor relations between Turkey and Israel have had the effect of worsening engagements between Ankara and Washington (Cook, 2011). Moreover, following the flotilla incident Turkey has continued to position itself as a supporter of the Palestinian cause, furthering its integration with the Arab world and thus serving its national interests. For example, the U.S. voted against the 2010 draft U.N. Resolution¹³ that was strongly supported by Turkey that accused Israel of violating international humanitarian law and human rights law (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). President Erdogan also criticized the November 2012 Gaza operations of Israel, as well as the U.S. for supporting Tel Aviv after the attacks. He disapproved of the “no” vote cast by the U.S. on the resolution to upgrade the status of the Palestinian Authority to “non-member observer state.” He stated: “You were the ones who wanted a two-state solution. Now, why do you stand against Palestine as a state? I cannot understand that” (Altunisik, 2013).

Similarly, after Trump's decision to move the American embassy to Jerusalem, Turkey strongly condemned the move and Tel Aviv for “committing a massacre” against the Palestinian protestors. Moreover, Turkey, as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) term president, initiated an extraordinary summit in Istanbul to protest the U.S. decision, which was in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions (Anadolu Agency, 2017). Turkey led the biggest Muslim body to act against the move of the embassy and condemn the U.S. decision. Also, Turkey was the most active state in lobbying the U.N. to act against the decision and condemn the U.S. action, which is against the law “to alter the character and status” of the city before the peace process has concluded (Dwyer, 2017).

As Israel's security is one of the most vital interests of Washington, Ankara's stance, which is unfavorable to Israel, strained Turkey's relations with the “Unipole”. Since the problem could not be solved through mediation, as part of assuming active diplomacy, despite facing criticism, Turkey prioritized its national interest. It is essential to express the fact that despite harsh rhetoric, Turkey supports Israel's right to exist, the goal of a two-state solution and a negotiation process for peace (United States Congress, House, CFA, 2010). Turkey's objection to Israel has never turned into opposing its presence in the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey rarely announces arguments that are not shared by European states. However, the high-pitch manifestation and Turkey's influence on the population of other regional nations distinguishes the dose of criticism.

Therefore, it is hard to claim that the ideological elements of the government drive Turkey's behaviors. The Turkish public is very sympathetic to Palestinian cause and Israel has been seen as an oppressor state since the beginning of the *Intifada*. At the same time, Turkish views of the U.S., which hardly fulfills the image of an honest broker on the issue, are very negative (Quandt, 2011). Under these conditions, no government can change its stance toward Tel Aviv. Besides the JDP government, many other Turkish leaders and opposition parties continuously denounce Israeli activities. Many other countries, including the E.U. members that are the closest allies of Washington, disagree with American policy on Israel and share Turkish concerns. Having strained relations with Israel is not the objective of Turkey. After the unsuccessful attempt to normalize Israel with the regional states, it has become an instrument for the country's regional integration.

Despite the opposition because of the difference in views, Turkey has also cooperated with the U.S. on broader Middle East policies aimed at stabilizing the region. Turkey's opening in the Middle East

¹³ Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance,” Human Rights Council, U.N. General Assembly 15th Session, A/HRC/15/21 (27 September 2010).

cultivated good results in the first decade of the 21st Century. During that time, it has increased its economic prestige in the region by becoming the world's 14th largest economy and its cultural impact through widely broadcast Turkish TV serials. In addition, Turkish democratic experience was unique among the nations in the area of Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) and Ankara disseminated a liberal agenda.

Thus, the Turkish government's effort was highly complementary to Washington's moderation and democratization endeavors. Also known as the Greater Middle East project, Turkey had a vital role in this effort due to its strategic and geographical location. Turkey, a secular Muslim state, was considered by the USA to be a "model" for Middle Eastern countries (Dagci, 2015). For example, during her time as National Security Adviser in the G.W. Bush "Jr." Administration, Condoleezza Rice wrote an article in which she noted the politico-economic transformation of 22 countries through freedom, democracy, tolerance and welfare (Dagci, 2015).

For the U.S., Turkey was a major soft power contributor, which has provided a broader legitimacy to Washington in its war against terrorism. Since 2002, Ankara has had an implicit agenda that has promoted Islam as a religion compatible with democracy. This was complementary to the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) that aimed to "strengthen cooperation with the governments, business and civil society of the region, in order to strengthen freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all" (Dagci, 2015). Having been presented by the Bush administration in June 2004 during the G-8 meeting, the BMENA Initiative emerged as a method to fight extremism and radicalism by promoting moderation and democratization (Hale, 2013). The Bush "Jr." Administration promoted Turkey as a model to the Arabs and the Islamic world. As a democratic and pro-Western Muslim country, Ankara was a useful example in refuting the fallacies that Islam and democracy are incompatible and that all Muslims are anti-Western. In this respect, Ankara was the primary supporter of Washington's efforts (Hale, 2013).

From the Turkish perspective, being endorsed as a model country by the U.S. was a significant opportunity to integrate with the region. Due to the JDP's economic and political success in Turkey, some political parties in Arab states had already begun to emulate its system. Before the Arab Spring began, Turkey's JDP had already been invited by many regional political entities to share their experience and organizational knowledge (Yesilyurt, 2017). The receptive environment for Turkey's political system was because Islamist parties were the most organized political entities with robust, large and conservative constituencies (Hamid, 2017).

Moreover, during the Bush "Jr." Administration, in Iraq, Turkey's efforts to integrate the Sunnis into the political process and ability to speak with all the Iraqi Arabs, as well as Ankara's constructive initiatives for mediation, gained the genuine appreciation of all parties (Ozel, 2012). In addition, in order to counter Saudi and Iranian influence, the Obama Administration contemplated Turkey playing the role of stabilizing power after the U.S. withdrawal. Ankara's vested interest in a stable Iraqi government and willingness to improve relations with every party (Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds) constituted a crucial part of the post-withdrawal U.S. strategy (Altunisik, 2013).

During Obama's Presidency, relations between the U.S. and Turkey evolved from a "strategic partnership" to a "model partnership." Dagci maintains that while the first denotes two states acting together against a common threat, "model partnership" describes a mutually agreed upon framework and a collective will to rehabilitate the region in which the USA and Turkey would intensify their partnership (Dagci, 2015).

The eruption in late-2010 of the grassroots Arab uprising in Tunisia and its spread to other Arab countries ("Arab Spring") was a serious threat to regional stability. Therefore, according to the new Turkish foreign policy approach, the outcomes of the Arab uprising needed to be controlled, which furthered cooperation between Turkey and the USA in the Middle East. Both Turkey and the USA adopted a position of supporting the transformations in the region. Again, as a secular and democratic Muslim state, Turkey served as a perfect model for the post-revolutionary Arab states. Furthermore, in parallel with Washington's stance, Ankara displayed more support for popular movements than autocratic regimes

(Cagri & Sivis, 2017). The collapse of once-stable Arab authoritarian regimes and threats to the stability of the region had incentivized Turkey to adopt an active approach to re-establish or influence the outcome of the uprisings in hopes of securing a friendlier environment.

The U.S. and Turkey cooperated in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, with some nuances. Here again, there is a need to point out that Turkey's first preference has been maintaining stability in its region and that it has chosen to act only after it has become clear that restoring the previous order is impossible. At the initial stage of the conflict in Libya, Turkey was against NATO's involvement and remained in contact with the Qaddafi régime. It made a priority of securing the lives and safety of Turkish citizens while insisting that Gaddafi peacefully meet the demands of the Libyan people. Only after Turkey was convinced that Gaddafi's attitude would not change did it sever relations and became supportive of military intervention (Bagci & Erdurmaz, 2017).

In Syria, in contrast to the U.S. administration, which desired a change in régime and immediately supported the opposition, Turkey tried to convince Assad to accept a democratic solution. Erdogan continued to engage with Bashar al-Assad until he openly ignored Turkish pleas to accept reforms and stop killing Syrian citizens. After eight months of ardent diplomatic efforts, Ankara finally adopted a position parallel with Washington's when negotiations had failed to persuade the Assad régime to accommodate the demands of the people (Ozel, 2012). In the end, the U.S. and Turkey agreed to act together against Assad. They condemned Damascus and worked to organize the opposition. However, due to the U.S. upcoming election, Washington's attention wavered and the two countries' methods in dealing with the Syrian issue diverged (Cagri & Sivis, 2017).

Relations between Ankara and Washington were positive when a boost in "soft-power" was useful to the U.S. Due to the JDP's foreign policy; Turkey was very popular among the Arab population. The Turkish government's Islamic orientation provided links with grassroots religious movements in the region and Turkey was perceived by the U.S. as a useful element that helped to keep the desired transformation manageable (Hale, 2013).

Defusing Security Risks

Currently, Turkey's security risks can be categorized as:

- 1) the internal and cross border threat posed by PKK (*Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan: Kurdistan Working Party*) terrorism,
- 2) the activities of violent extremist organizations,
- 3) the refugee crisis,
- 4) the Gulenist terror movement (FETO: Gulenist Terror Organization), and
- 5) threats to territorial integrity.

While Turkey frequently cooperated with the U.S. in coping with the challenges posed by terrorism, the two states remain at odds due to spill-over effects of Washington's policies. Indeed, this fact is the primary cause of Turkey's divergent diplomatic-security policies.

PKK terrorism, which has the potential to instigate internal instability and endanger territorial integrity through its link across the border, is the most critical security issue facing Turkey. Indeed, one of the most converging elements of cooperation in foreign policy between the U.S. and Turkey has been the fight against terrorism. Since the 1980s, Turkey has been threatened by terrorism caused by the PKK, which began its activities as a Kurdish secessionist movement. Besides its effects on Turkey's society and economy, Turkey has suffered 40,000 dead during the fight. PKK is an organization that directly endangers Turkey's territorial integrity and its good relations with its neighbors (especially Iraq and Syria).

Moreover, the PKK's ideology is a significant threat to the social integration of Turkey, because it directly targets the traditional commonalities between Turks and Kurds. The PKK's strategy has been

to launch attacks on powerful landlords/tribes and their oppressive implementations of tribalism. The PKK's promotion of leftist ideology and egalitarianism has inspired a reactionary counter-traditionalist opposition against the conservative lifestyle (Yüce 1999). Initially, PKK's ideology was based on socialism, but evolved in the last 30 years into hostility to universalist values. As it evolved, the ideology of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan abandoned most of its leftist values and embraced ethnicity-based ideals, which transformed the organization into one devoted to ethnic socialism (Komecoglu, 2012) and a separatist ideology.

Even though their relations could be volatile, Turkey and the U.S. were mostly supportive of each other. For example, after Ocalan was expelled from Syria in 1998, he subsequently ended up in Turkey with the help of American intelligence services in Afrika. For its part, Turkey has provided military support, financial tracking of suspected terrorist networks, and contributed substantial military participation to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates in Afghanistan.

However, U.S.-Turkish relations regarding the fight against terrorism have had ups and downs. While the U.S. was always supportive rhetorically, its action, especially against PKK bases inside Iraq, was very limited. Therefore, Turkey conducted cross-border operations into Iraqi territory. In 2007, facing the prospect of another unilateral Turkish Armed Forces cross-border military operation, the Bush "Jr." Administration agreed to provide Turkey "real time" intelligence on the Iraqi-based PKK (Hale, 2013). Ozel maintains that the Bush administration's 5 November 2007 announcement that declared "the PKK as the enemy of Iraq, Turkey and the U.S." and the subsequent decision to provide actionable intelligence was also aimed at improving Ankara's relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In addition, Americans supported the trilateral consultation structure among Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. to deal with the PKK issue (Ozel, 2012).

While there are many examples of the U.S. and Turkish governments working together, when American actions have begun to endanger the stability of the adjacent states and jeopardizing territorial integrity, Ankara has preferred to confront Washington.

At the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, U.S.-Turkey relations remained frayed because Ankara insisted on maintaining contact with the Assad régime, while the U.S. favored intervention. After Ankara finally adopted a parallel position with Washington the two allies diverged again when Islamist movements dominated the Syrian opposition. Consequently, the initial cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. began to diminish and completely ended in 2017, after the Trump administration's announcement that the U.S. was ending support for the groups fighting the Syrian Civil War (Itani, 2017). Relations deteriorated further to an historical low when the U.S. decided to fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) by supporting the leftist Kurdish group PYD/YPG, the offshoot of the PKK in Syria, which caused havoc in Turkey (Harris, 2015).

Background to Turkey's Fiercest Ever Opposition to U.S. Policy. Without knowing the significance of PKK activities and their influence on Turkish society, it is hard to understand Turkey's fierce opposition against the U.S. policies and relation with PYD/YPG in Syria. The current complex relations of Ankara with different Kurdish groups is closely related to the evolution of their ideologies and the methods they prefer to apply.

Historically, a perception of exclusion created dissatisfaction that has motivated the emergence of Kurdish political and armed movements. Over time, the methods and the objectives of this activism have changed significantly. While in the 1970s, aspirations for an "independent Kurdish nation-state" were circulated (Galip, 2015) during and after the First Gulf War a concept of "gradual and structured separation" has been espoused (Kaya & Whiting, 2017). The theory of how a future independent Kurdish state should be constituted evolved into an unusual form in Syria with the introduction of "Democratic Confederation," a system that was formulated by Abdullah Ocalan and has begun to be implemented by the PYD (*Partîya Yekîtiya Dêmokrat* or Democratic Union Party) in north Syria (Sary, 2016).

Syria contains a tiny proportion of Kurds which is disconnected from the greater Kurdish community by national borders. Their politicization has occurred through intra-Kurdish rivalries, which manifest themselves in competition for influence by forming affiliations and branches in neighboring states. Therefore, for the greater Kurdish community, Syria can be characterized as an area where rivalries for influence are played out mainly between leftists (PKK sympathizers) and traditionalists (who favoring KDP) (Kaya & Whiting, 2017). Each movement has tried to form transnational connections, which were useful in mobilizing Syrian Kurds as human resources for their competing movements in Iraq and Turkey. In the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of Syrian Kurds were recruited mainly by KDP as *Peshmerga*. It is estimated that up to 10,000 Syrian Kurds were killed as PKK militants in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s (Tejel, 2008).

Coming into existence in 2003 as an outcome of intra-Kurdish rivalries, PYD owes its current success mostly to be an offshoot of the PKK, which has been one of the most significant actors since the beginning of the Kurdish movements in Syria. Because of water problems and territorial disputes with Turkey, the Syrian government considered the existence of the PKK an advantage against its neighbor (Tejel, 2008). After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, Syria offered refuge to the PKK leadership as part of a balancing strategy against Turkey (Schott, 2017).

The PKK was allowed to open political offices in many cities in Syria, and enjoyed the privilege of being the only Kurdish political movement permitted to openly operate in that country. Except for the PKK, the régime banned all other Kurdish movements and prosecuted their crucial personnel (Self & Ferris, 2016). During this period, the PKK was very cautious to direct all its activities toward Turkey and to not upset its host nation.

In 1998, the Turkish state openly threatened the Syrian government over its support of the PKK and forced the Syrian state to expel Ocalan. Intimidated by threats from Turkey, the Syrian regime cracked down on PKK remnants, and banned PKK activities. However, the existence of other local leftist Kurdish movements, like the *Yekîti* (or Union) Party, which began to fill the power vacuum, stimulated PKK to restore local support in Syria. In 2003, the clandestine Democratic Union Party (PYD: *Partiya Yekîti ya Dêmkokrat*) was established as a successor to the Syrian part of the PKK. The PYD joined other Kurdish movements to confront the Syrian régime's exclusionist policies.

Just a year after the founding of the PYD, in 2004, a football match in Qamishlo escalated into a Kurdish revolt against the régime, which lasted for 13 days and resulted in 43 deaths. The event sparked vigorous opposition to the Assad régime among Syrian Kurds, politicizing the ethnic community and creating a relatively unified front for Kurdish identity. The *Yekîti* party and the PYD inspired the resistance and stood out as prominent leaders of the Kurdish movement in Syria (Allsopp & Harriet, 2016).

Another historical incident that led to the consolidation of PYD power in Syria was the start of the Syrian Civil War, which began as a part of the Arab Spring in March 2011. At the beginning of the Civil War, the Kurds were trying to figure out what their stance should be towards the conflict. Some of the Kurds, including PYD, were suspicious about the Arab opposition movement, which was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a group that did not favor Kurdish political activities. Thus, there was a debate about whether to act together with the Arabs or maintain distance from their activities.

Arabs had already founded the Syrian National Council (SNC) in 2011, an umbrella group comprised of Syrian opposition parties based in Istanbul. Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish Region in northern Iraq, strongly backed the Syrian opposition, in alliance with Turkey. He urged his party's Syrian branch (KDP-S) members to host meetings to unite Kurds under one umbrella to fight the Assad régime. In October 2011, with the support of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Kurdish National Council (KNC), comprised of Syrian Kurdish parties, was established to oppose Assad (Schott, 2017).

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime, in an attempt to exploit the lack of unity among the opposition and draw the Kurds closer, announced new edicts that met some of the traditional Kurdish demands.

Consequently, pressure on the Kurds was relieved, which provided them with the opportunity to expand their activities. This move of the Syrian Assad régime managed to increase the fault lines between the Kurds and Arabs in the country (Allsopp & Harriet, 2016).

Strongly influenced by leftist ideology, PYD separated itself from the opposition to Assad and pursued a different agenda. It had already taken control of the predominantly Kurdish areas in August 2012 when government forces had withdrawn from the mostly Kurdish populated areas in order to consolidate their hold on more strategically valuable areas. PYD withdrew from the KNC and closely affiliated itself with PKK ideology. Salih Muslim, the head of the party, declared that they did not only want a régime-change, but a system change. Asya Abdullah, Co-President of the PYD, offered "the third line," an agenda centered on self-defense and the primacy of non-violent solutions. She clarified this strategy by saying: "The third line is an independent and open track, which does not support either the régime or the opposition... The third line is based on the organization of society and the formation of cultural, social, economic and political institutions in order to achieve the people's self-administration..." (Sary, 2016).

In 2013, the PYD began to govern territories under its control by creating the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM: *Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk*). This organization was a coalition of civic associations and political parties (Balanche, 2018) founded by cadres previously active in the PKK and later in its sister-party, the PYD (Jongerden & Knapp, 2016). In 2013, TEV-DEM announced the creation of an autonomous administration named "Rojava," which comprised the three ethnic cantons of Cizire, Kobane and Afrin. These ethnic cantons were supposed to be governed by an elected assembly that controls Rojava's executive bureau. Each canton had a Kurdish Prime Minister aided by two Vice-Prime Ministers, who are non-Kurdish (Balanche, 2018).

The looming threat of ISIS made the PYD even more attractive to the locals; In the absence of Syrian government forces, the PYD was the only political entity in the area with any significant military power. The People's Protection Units (YPG: *Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*), the armed branch of the PYD, was formed after the Qamishlo Revolt in 2004 with the backing of the PKK (globalsecurity.org, 2018). Through the YPG, PYD effectively offered protection from ISIS to the people in Northern Syria, which decisively sidelined the KNC. As a result, the PYD outmaneuvered all other Kurdish factions and unilaterally declared autonomy (Schott, 2017).

The emergence of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and its spread in Syria was a decisive factor that provided PYD to consolidate its authority. Its indiscriminate and savage attacks made ISIS an enemy of the international community, as well as of the Kurds and PYD's willingness to fight against ISIS made them a legitimate member of the U.S.-led international coalition that was formed to fight against the Islamic State. In October 2015, the PYD was integrated into a new alliance consisting of Arab, Assyrian/Syrian and few other ethnic group forces. In December 2016, U.S. officials announced that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) consisted of 45,000 fighters including more than 13,000 Arab fighters; the group, however, was dominated by the YPG and relied on it for logistics and veteran fighters (militaryperiscope.com, 2017). The material and monetary support of the coalition expanded the PYD's influence and brought additional territories under Kurdish control.

For Ankara, the expansion of PYD rule was unacceptable because, unlike the Iraqi Kurds, who had good relations with Turkey, PYD followed the same ideology of Ocalan as the PKK. For example, KDP's system is closer to the "Middle Eastern state model where authoritarianism, a centralized state, and tribal and economic élites are interlinked with the political elite" (Kaya & Whiting, 2017). With the emergence of the PYD in Syria, the Rojava experience that is based on alienating populations from their traditional bonds and getting rid of commonalities could amplify the appeal of the PKK's ideology among Kurds and carve an assertive space that can increase polarization in the border areas.

Turkey grew even warier of the PYD because the failure of negotiations with the PKK was closely related to the Syrian Kurds' new recognition in the international arena. In 2009, official peace talks between Turkey and PKK began under the name of "democratic opening" or "peace process" (Oney & Selck, 2017). For the first time in the history of the Republic, the Turkish government was abandoning the policy of categorical denial of Kurdish rights and open to granting linguistic and cultural rights to Kurds (Gunes & Gurses, 2017). However, Kurdish élites claimed that their political demands had not been met and that all the rights offered them were merely cosmetic. During the talks, the Kurdish battle for the city of Kobane against ISIS, which united all Kurds and formed a very distinctive identity that had never been seen before among the Kurdish community, took place. Having exited from the emerging opportunities in Syria, the PKK broke the peace and initiated armed conflict in urban and rural areas inside Turkey and Iraq.

In order to seize the newly emergent opportunity, the PKK leadership and fighters went to Syria to organize PYD and enlarge the capacity of YPG. Hundreds of PKK militia members crossed the Iraqi border to become the core of the YPG units (Self & Ferris, 2016). After clearing the region of ISIS fighters, the PKK moved its Headquarters elements to Mount Sincar, which stretches across both Syria and Iraq and provided covered access to and transport across the border. Threatened by the organic collaboration between these organizations and PKK's attempts to consolidate its presence in Syria, Turkey declared the PYD/YPG an affiliate of PKK and began to openly target them as terrorist organizations.

At the same time, the U.S. continued to accept the YPG-led SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) as local partners, claiming they were the best option to fight against ISIS, though U.S. officials accepted that Turkey had a "legitimate concern." They had announced numerous times that the PKK is a terrorist group, but had not made the same determination about the PYD/YPG (Kheel, 2018). Also, they claimed that SDF was a force made up of many local groups, with Arabs as the majority. In addition, The U.S. did not accept the Turkish proposal to use Turkish military forces and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to liberate the ISIS capital of Rakkah from the terrorists. American insistence on using the YPG as the primary forces of the U.S.-led coalition infuriated Turkey. Turkish officials frequently expressed that they would "not let a terror corridor on along its border," criticized the method of "getting rid of one terror group with another" as a wrong choice (Yenisafak, 2016). Moreover, Mr. Erdogan strongly stated that "Turkey will deal with the terror threat of its own accord", signaling that the self-help approach was on the way.

After the liberation from ISIS of Menbic, an Arab town west of the Euphrates River, the YPG was supposed to withdraw, but refused to do so. Formerly, Turkey had announced that no YPG forces would be tolerated west of the Euphrates River. That movement increased Turkish distrust of the PYD's intentions, which were to unite the cantons and seek possibilities for a passage to the sea. Turkey immediately launched two military operations to prevent this Kurdish aspiration and hinder the PKK's further positioning in the north of Syria along its southern border. First, Turkey launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" against ISIS and the YPG and entered as a wedge between the Afrin and Kobane cantons. Secondly, by launching "Operation Olive Branch," Ankara wrested control of Afrin canton from the PYD by force and threatened to do the same in Menbic, if the U.S. failed to keep its earlier promise to leave the city.

These two operations were actively directed against elements for whom the U.S. had repeatedly expressed full support. Sometimes Turkey operated very close to the U.S. troops, increasing fears of a possible confrontation. Moreover, Turkey began to actively participate in mechanisms such as the Astana and Sochi processes that had been created together with Russia and Iran in order to ease the tension of the war. Yet, Ankara also cooperated with the U.S. and remained in close coordination with the Americans in Menbic. After Turkey increased its pressure for resolving the Menbic issue, a mechanism known as the "Menbic Road Map" was created, which entailed combined U.S.-Turkish patrols and subsequent YPG withdrawal from the region.

Although the significance of the PYD/YPG threat to Turkey has never been appropriately emphasized in the Western media, the stakes for Turkey were high. The U.S. decision to support PYD as a partner in the region significantly tipped the balance of power in favor of the PKK/PYD, with many future implications for Turkey. Its ability to project power and economically sustain forces across the border allowed Turkey to employ an independent approach, which conflicted with the “Unipole”’s policy preferences but was useful in restoring, or at least preventing further changes in the regional balance of power.

Another example of Turkey’s independent approach and cooperation with the U.S. is the early warning radar system established in Malatya. Although Turkey was upset with Washington because, just a year before, the U.S. had rejected the Iranian nuclear deal (Tehran Declaration) negotiated by Turkey and Brazil and had insisted on imposing sanctions on Tehran, Ankara decided to cooperate in the interest of stability. Despite suspicions that the radar’s real purpose was to detect Iranian missiles, Turkey forwent its opposition regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis and accepted the stationing of the system during the G-20 Summit in June 2010. The U.S. officials hailed it as “probably the biggest strategic decision between the U.S. and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years” (Altunisik, 2013).

The time of this agreement coincided with heated debates over Israel’s interception of the Marmara Flotilla debates and U.S efforts to isolate Iran. Despite the absence of any perceived threat posed by Tehran, involvement in a defense system against Iran was politically awkward. However, Turkey cooperated in such an adversarial situation because the system was defensive and did not have a direct impact on regional stability (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013).

Another reason for tension between Turkey and the U.S. is the U.S.-based "Gülen movement," which has organized several operations, including a failed military coup, against the JDP government. Washington has not met Turkey's demand to hand Fethullah Gülen over to Turkish authorities. Perceiving the organization as a serious threat to the political establishment, Turkey has declared Fetullah Gülen’s movement to be a terrorist organization and purged thousands of government employees who had ties to the movement (Cagri & Sivis, 2017).

During the sweeping crackdown in 2016, Turkish authorities arrested American citizen Andrew Brunson, an Evangelist Christian Pastor at his church in Izmir, accusing him of being a spy working for the Pennsylvania-based Gülen and of having links to the PKK (Nugent, 2018). Many believed that Brunson was a secret card to force the U.S. into a swap with Gülen. When the Evangelist community, Vice-President Mike Pence and President Trump got mobilized on this issue, it also reverberated on a myriad of other disputes between two countries from U.S. support for the YPG, the U.S. detention of a Halk Bank manager for allegedly circumventing the Iran sanctions, to Turkey's controversial purchase as a NATO Ally of the Russian S-400 Air Defense System and the U.S. reaction to stop selling its “state-of-art” F-35 jet-fighters.

Turkey did not immediately meet U.S. demands that Brunson be freed. Subsequently, on 26 July 2018, Vice-President Pence tweeted a warning that the U.S. was prepared to levy significant sanctions if the Evangelical Pastor was not released. On 1 August 2018 the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Turkey's Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gül and Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu, because of their allegedly leading roles in the detention of Brunson (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2018). Moreover, the U.S. imposed tariffs on imports of Turkish aluminum and steel, creating an unprecedented currency crisis. On 10 August 2018, Mr. Trump's Tweet: "I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish *Lira*, slides rapidly downward against our very strong Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this time!" caused a tremendous loss of value to the Turkish lira—on 11 August 2018, the Turkish *Lira* had lost 57% since the beginning of the year (BBC, 2018).

The currency crisis, increased inflation and the negative outlook of the Turkish economy significantly raised the cost to Turkey of resisting U.S. demands on this issue. Turkey released Brunson after a trial that sentenced him to three years in prison. However, considering the over one year of time he had spent in custody since 2016, he was released.

The Brunson incident provides a clear piece of evidence from a different perspective that supports the theory that Turkey has pursued independent politics to maximize its objectives when its national power could afford the cost; but cannot follow the independent approach, even concerning issues related to a primary internal threat, when its material capability is restrained. In the case of arrested American Evangelical Pastor Andrew Brunson, the potentially devastating effect of U.S. sanctions quickly forced Turkey to abide by Washington's demands.

Similarly, after the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from Syria at the end of 2018, a possible attack by the Turkish military on the YPG/PYD became a central question in the U.S. After the announcement, to clarify the U.S. position and ensure that withdrawal would not affect its commitments to its allies, officials including National Security Adviser John Bolton paid visits to several regional capitals. During Bolton's Israel visit, he held a press conference with Netanyahu, where he stated that the withdrawal was conditioned on Turkey's promise not to attack YPG/PYD Kurds in Syria.

On 8 January 2019, during a speech in Parliament, Erdogan publicly lashed out: "Bolton's remarks in Israel are not acceptable. It is not possible for me to swallow this. Bolton made a serious mistake. If he thinks that way, he is in a big mistake. We will not compromise." During the televised speech to lawmakers in his party, he continued his remarks by saying that all the preparations to neutralize the YPG/PYD (a U.S. ally) were complete and those who take part in the terror corridor along Turkey's southern borders were going to receive an appropriate response (Bianca Britton, Isil Sariyuce, Nicole Gaouette & Kevin Liptak, 2019).

Yet, on 13 January 2019, after a tweet from President Trump stating: "Starting the long overdue pullout from Syria while hitting the little remaining ISIS territorial caliphate hard, and from many directions. Will attack again from the existing nearby base if it reforms. Will devastate Turkey economically if they hit Kurds. Create a 20-miles safe-zone...", Turkey immediately accepted the creation of a safe zone. While Turkey had already offered this option to protect refugees at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, its functionality is dubious at this stage. Besides, it is evident that the creation of a safe zone is aimed at protecting YPG/PYD rather than providing comfort to Turkey's security concerns. Yet, due to the vulnerability of its economic situation, Turkey has lost its ability to pursue an independent politics and has entered a phase of reconsidering its strategy to achieve its objectives.

These incidents further indicate that Turkish foreign policy behavior is structural. In order to maximize its security, Turkey adopted an independent position, which entailed open confrontation with the "Unipole"; however, when it lacked the material capabilities to successfully pursue an independent course, its behavior changed to a more submissive position.

Achieve Economic Development

The instability in post-Saddam Iraq greatly intensified Turkey's security concerns. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Policy has focused on stabilizing Iraq, which had become important to Turkey's economic interests. Before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq was a significant trading partner for Turkey, but the war and the subsequent U.N. sanctions effectively ended those bilateral commercial relations. Likewise, Turkish élites were primarily concerned that any new tension between Iran and the United States might undermine their nation's economic interests. Naturally, Turkey has developed a reflex that has served to avoid a similar situation.

By 2011, Turkey had improved its economic position, undertaken prestigious projects and economically turned into a pole of attraction for its smaller neighbors and surrounding region (Hale, 2013).

Endeavoring to find markets for its manufacturing industry, Ankara increasingly has begun to benefit from stability and open relations with the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, policies contributive to stabilization of the region and free trade have inspired cooperation, while U.S. activities which threaten stability have invited Turkish opposition.

Turkey's GDP increased through an outward-looking export-driven economic approach which needs stable areas conducive for business. While previously Turkey has channeled its trade to traditional Western markets, expanding into neglected markets has brought much growth, investment and new export markets in the Middle East and Eurasia (United States Congress, House, CFA, 2010). This success came as a part of removing visa requirements, embedding large business delegations into official state visits and improving the image of Turkey.

Moreover, Turkey has intensively invested in efforts to improve relations in Africa. For example, on 9 January 2019, during the opening of the embassy in South Africa, in his speech Mr. Erdogan related that Turkey has increased its diplomatic missions from 12 in 2002 to 41. Also, he stated that 10-15 years ago, Turkey was visible only in specific regions and areas, while the country today has the 6th most extensive diplomatic network in the world (Hurriyet, 2019).

Turkey has preferred to cooperate with the U.S. when economic gain or compensation of economic loss is available. For example, Ankara extensively cooperated with the U.S. in Central Asia, while Washington was supportive of Ankara (against Russia) in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, which was planned to carry Azerbaijani and Central Asian oil via Turkey to Europe. Also, in 2003, Turkey agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in the Second Gulf War against Iraq only after the military campaign began (and became irreversible) and Washington released direct monetary support that could make good for Turkish economic losses.

Moreover, being in the center of its politics, Ankara has improved and maintained good relations with countries with whom the U.S. is in conflict. Two structural dynamics are essential to defining this behavior. First, Turkey is surrounded by states that the U.S. wants to isolate or whose political establishment the U.S. wants to transform. Second, the "Unipole" has the power to isolate Turkey by putting stress on its banking system and weakening confidence in the Turkish economy if its conflictual stance surpasses the threshold of tolerance. Therefore, multi-dimensional economic and political relations, especially with those states that have completely rejected U.S. dominance, increases the resilience of Turkey's independent position. In addition, such places as Sudan, Venezuela and Iran are the most lucrative markets, since the volatility of their régimes discourages many competitive Western companies from investing in them. Faced with U.S. financial coercion, Turkey has a genuine interest in improving its economic ties with those states in a similar position, like Russia and Iran, which have also experienced currency crises due to economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. (Lewitt, 2018). Moreover, Turkey imports nearly all of its energy needs and seeks to balance its trade deficit with energy-exporting states. Developing political and economic relations with these states provides a sound opportunity to compensate for some part of the loss.

In conclusion, Turkey means to maximize its objectives are related to the need for balancing security requirements and economic development. In accordance with the structural pressures, when its economic condition is strong, Ankara pushes harder to maximize its security through adopting an independent approach. Yet, it forgoes autonomy and becomes more receptive to the "Unipole"'s preferences when its objectives for development are at risk.

Proving the Argument

This part of the study is intended to address whether Turkey really tries to be independent or is instead moving away from the West. If Turkey has picked a side, then a systematic opposition towards the U.S. policy preferences would be expected. On the other hand, if Turkey has opted to be independent, instead of total replacement or rejection, both cooperation and confrontation would be observed.

Methodology

First, the empirical research chronologically collated prominent incidents in the relations between the U.S. and Turkey since the beginning of Unipolar order in 1990. It added to a comprehensive list the announcements after a Presidential visit or sideline meetings; agreements, minister or higher-level important messages that initiate, maintain or change any significant policy; and military and economic activities such as agreements or sanctions. The Turkish Yearbook *Chronology of Turkish-American Relations* was the principal source for the selected cases from 1990 to 2002 (Aydin et al., 2001). For the period 2002 to late-2017, the *Almanac of U.S.-Turkey Relations Under the AK Party* served as the primary source (Kanat et al., 2017). Incidents during 2018 were selected by the author through scanning the press.

Secondly, through the examination of the literature, the most important categories that have the most volume and impact on Turkish-American relations have been determined. By looking from Turkey's perspective, events that have links to stability, economy, military cooperation, territorial integrity, terrorism, being a model country, relations with Israel, internal political instabilities and energy security have been classified and marked under categories of proper context. Finally, after fixing the occurrence rates, the data have been visualized by using charts.

Analysis

The study asserts that Turkey pursues independence to maximize the outcomes of its objectives. Therefore, the empirical analysis needs to prove that:

- 1) Turkey behaves independently rather than picking a side,
- 2) the visibility of independent behavior correlates with growing national power,
- 3) the Presented objectives are coherent with Turkey’s foreign policy behaviors.

From a structural perspective, the material capability of a state is one of the primary elements that affect its behavior. Therefore, the study accepts "2008" as a decisive point in the analysis because of the discernable increase in the elements of Turkey's national power. Also, it takes “2002” as a marking point for the beginning of JDP party rule in Turkey and compares its behavior before and after 2008.

Table 7 depicts the overall results of important events in relations between Turkey and the U.S. since the 1990 end of the Cold War. It must be noted that the time span 1990-2018 depicts the total interactions since the beginning of the unipolarity. The 1990-2008 period is meant to point out the era of low national power, while the time between 2008 and 2018 indicates the increased capabilities. Finally, 2002-2008 depicts the era of JDP rule during the era of restricted capabilities. Table 7 provides a dataset for comparing the general tendency of Turkey’s behavior under different structural conditions.

Table 7. U.S.-Turkish Relations during the Unipolar Systemic Structure

U.S.-Turkish Relations during the Unipolar Systemic Structure				
Years	Cooperate	Oppose	Disagreement in Methods	TOTAL
1990-2018	73	43	5	119
1990-2008	47	13	0	57
2002-2008	13	4	0	24
2008-2018	29	30	5	67

Table 8 (next page) provides the results for cooperative policies between the two allies in different domains. The events with high occurrence rates show the importance of the subject for Turkey. On the other hand, the time spans aim to compare different periods similar to previous table.

Table 8. U.S.-Turkish Cooperative Policies

Turkey's Cooperation with the U.S.												
Years	Stabilize Region	Military Cooperation	Counter Terrorism	Economic Gain	Model Country	Increase Territorial Integrity	Decrease Territorial Integrity	Threatening the Political Establishment	Energy Politics	Economic Loss	Degrade Territorial Integrity	Improve Relation with Israel
1990-2018	39	34	25	18	7	6	4	5	5	4	4	4
1990-2008	21	18	15	13	4	5	4	4	4	3	0	4
2002-2008	10	5	9	4	2	4	1	0	1	0	0	3
2008-2018	21	17	11	5	3	3	0	1	1	1	0	1

Finally, Table 9 belowclassifies the findings of opposing policies between the U.S. and Turkey.

Table 9. Turkey's Opposing Policies to the U.S.

Turkey's Opposition to the U.S.												
Years	Destabilize the Region	Degrade Territorial Integrity	Threatening the Political Establishment	Economic Loss	Military Cooperation	Oppose Israel in MEPP	Stabilize the Region	Counter Terrorism	Economic Gain	Model Country	Increase Territorial Integrity	Improve Relation with Israel
1990-2018	18	11	11	9	6	6	3	2	2	1	2	1
1990-2008	5	2	3	4	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
2008-2018	14	9	8	5	3	6	2	1	2	1	2	0
2002-2008	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1

Turkey’s Behavior is Independent and Correlates with its Growing National Power

The primary sign for being independent can be observed in the direction of the relations. If moving toward one direction is the case, then a systematic rejection of the previous side should be detected. On the other hand, if Turkey behaves independently within its national interest-centric view, the engagement should vary situationally. In addition, since an increase in material capability is a prerequisite to display some degree of independence in foreign policy; the change in behavior should concur with the change in national power.

Between 1990 and 2002, when Turkey was accepted as a Western-centric country, the level of cooperation is overwhelming, which shows an immense preference for siding with the U.S. (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Turkey-U.S.A. Relations (1990-2002)

Between 2002 and 2008, when the current JDP was still in charge, the level of cooperation and opposition changed by only 2% (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Turkey-U.S.A. Relations (2002-2008)

On the other hand, after 2008 the proportion of cooperation and opposition changes significantly. However, the even dispersion of cooperation and opposition complements the argument of the *first assumption*. Also, the concentration of independent policies coincides with the increase in national power, which suits the *assumption number 3*.




Figure 8. Turkey-U.S.A. Relations (2008-2018)

Finally, Figure 9 below depicts the overall relations and the proportion of cooperative vs. opposing policies in different view.




Figure 5. American-Turkish Relations during the Unipolar Systemic Structure


Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior is Coherent with its Objectives

At the beginning of the chapter, the study defined three primary objectives as:

- 1) stabilize the region,
- 2) defuse security risks, and
- 3) achieve economic development as the pillars for Turkish foreign policy.

In the following Figures 10 and 11 it is possible to detect the relation of the Turkish Foreign Policy with its objectives. For example, Turkey has mostly preferred to cooperate with the U.S. to stabilize the region, defuse the security risk and for economic gain (see Figure 10 below).

Figure 6. Cooperation Areas of Turkey with the U.S. (1990-2018)



On the other hand, Turkey's opposition to the U.S. has internal and external security aspects as well as economic concerns (Figure 11). From Turkey's perspective, it opposed the U.S. when it perceived that American policies destabilized the region. Next, Turkey appears to be concerned with policies that may degrade the territorial integrity mainly due to the Kurdish issue. Interestingly, relations seem to get strained when Turkey perceives that the U.S. is threatening the political establishment over human rights issues, democratic values or acts in a supportive/passive stance against the Turkey's perceived internal threat. Finally, again it is observable that Turkey values its economy as much as its security.




Figure 7. Opposing Areas of Turkey against the U.S. policies (1990-2018)

In Figure 12 (next page), it is possible to observe how the increased material capability has affected Turkey's stance after 2008. Although there is a need for further research to decide what the actual effects of the Syrian Civil War and subsequent emergence of ISIS are on relations between the U.S. and Turkey, the picture does not diverge from traditional trends except in the "military cooperation" and the "threatening the political establishment" columns. It is observable that the perception of the U.S. possible involvement and implicit support to the Gulen movement, which has become a central issue in

interactions between two states, has significantly strained relations (Turkey's demand for Gulen's extradition has been repeatedly rejected by the U.S.).




Figure 8. Effects of Material Capability on Turkey's Opposing Stance against the U.S.

Conclusion

This section of the work focuses on exploring the change in Turkish Foreign Policy by linking the national objectives, which are the end state and primary motivation for the country's action, with the instruments to realize them. Through empirical analysis, the study proves categorically that Turkey's national objectives can be classified as "defusing security risks" and maintaining "economic development." Also, the work shows that the level of cooperation vs. confrontation is not enough to claim that Turkey has chosen another side or shifted away from the West. Instead, it depicts an independent position. Moreover, the results of the research provide a sound correlation between the increased material capability and the independent policy preferences of Turkey, which indicates that the cause of change in Turkish Foreign Policy is structural.

The empirical research also provides a powerful prediction tool for future pathways of Turkish Foreign Policy (see Table 10 next page). It shows that Turkey's national power is the primary variable for the methods of maximizing national objectives. Notably, military power projection capability and economic growth appear to be the leading factors for national decision-making. At the beginning of 2019, the national military procurements reached 65% and Turkey began domestically to produce modern arms that provide power projection capabilities. The study predicts that from now on, the successful mobilization of the domestic military industry will depend on the allocated defense funds and potential export opportunities. Thus, the overall national economic health will be decisive in judging the degree of Turkey's regional assertiveness.

On the other hand, the U.S. National Security Policy and the subsequent National Defense Strategy (2018) maintains attention on the Middle East, but prioritizes a pivot to Asia and stress realignment of resources for the forecasted major power competition. Therefore, the Middle East becomes more peripheral to the U.S. interests while attracting more assertive Russia and China. Consequently, the U.S. can adopt “restraint” as a regional grand strategy by narrowing its military objectives, focusing on global access, and actively encouraging its allies to share defense burdens, which can significantly diminish the U.S direct involvement and activist presence in the Middle East.

Since Turkey’s does not direct its opposition to the presence of the U.S. but against its particular interventionist policies, the future interactions between the two allies may fold out based on the economic condition of Turkey and the degree of U.S. activism. Accordingly, if the U.S. activism remains strong and Turkey has a restrained economy, Ankara most likely will act less assertive. However, it does not mean that it will be blindly cooperative. If Turkey maintains a robust economic capability, then its objection to the U.S. policies will depend on the effects of U.S. policies on Turkish national objectives and tactical decisions on how to achieve them.

Table 5: Future Projection of U.S.-Turkey Interactions in the Middle East

	Cold War (Major Power Threat from USSR)	1990-2008 (No existential major power threat, but spill-over effects of the U.S. policies)	2008-2018 (No existential major power threat, but spill-over effects of the U.S. policies)	2018- (Future Projection)	
	Strong U.S. Presence	Strong U.S. Presence	Strong U.S. presence	Strong U.S. Presence	Weak U.S. Presence
Economic Recession	Dependent Cooperative Non-assertive	Cooperative Non-assertive	-	Less assertive but less cooperative	Cooperative Less assertive
Strong Economic Growth	-	-	Independent Assertive	Independent Assertive	Cooperative Assertive

If the U.S. adopts restrain as its grand strategy and cease overactive policies that can produce spill-over effects detrimental to Turkey, then Ankara regardless of either limited or strong economic growth will encourage cooperation with different level of assertiveness. This study assumes that except occasional bilateral disagreements the U.S. will not directly threaten or target its ally Turkey as it does to Iran. However, Washington may deploy economic sanctions to channel Ankara in a specific direction. In this case, regardless of the cost, Turkey most likely will pursue varying degree of resistance against the U.S. on the vital issues such as territorial integrity and threats to its political independence by adopting balancing strategies that involve Russia, China or the E.U.

Turkey’s geostrategic position provides multidirectional freedom of movement, which obstructs adversaries’ attempts of isolation and becomes suitable for Ankara to implementing balancing strategies. Historically, beginning with the Crimea War in 1853, Ottomans and later the Turkish Republic frequently balanced East and West against each other. If the U.S. actions begin to pose a direct threat to Turkey, to preserve its regional role as an autonomous country, the strong nationalistic sentiments may cause stiff resistance and induce any Turkish government to adopt similar balancing strategies between the contemporary emerging Eastern Powers (Russia and China) vs. the traditional West (USA, NATO, E.U.).

CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

The primary purpose of the paper is to find out "why Turkish foreign policy has lost its Western-centric orientation." From among the many different explanations in the literature, this study claims that the change in Turkish Foreign Policy is structural. It posits that the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar international system and growing national power has incentivized Turkey to deploy a self-help approach that requires a high level of political and security activities to displace previous arrangements.

First, the study proves that under the Unipolar systemic structure, in the Middle East, states with improved national power tend to act more independently vis-à-vis the policy preferences of the "Unipole".

Second, it defines causes of change and argues that the transition to a neoliberal market economy, within which growth and prosperity depend on exports, has increased Turkey's desire to create mechanisms for global and local integration. However, perpetual regional conflicts have continuously created domestic and regional security concerns that have interrupted this integration. In time Turkey has realized that it is the "Unipole" that disturbs regional stability the most. Although the U.S. is an ally, it has created many spill-over effects that were detrimental to Turkish national interests. In response, Turkey has begun to vocalize a new security paradigm, in which the U.S. is seen as both an ally and a potential threat.

Third, it formulates the objectives and the new concept of Turkish Foreign Policy. It argues that with the beginning of the Unipolar world order, since Turkey cannot wholly rely on the U.S. to defuse perceived threats, policymakers preferred to manage Turkey's regional security needs by reducing dependence on the U.S. and adopting a self-help approach. Yet, in order to displace previous arrangements, Turkish Foreign Policy has begun to display unusual diplomatic activities, establishing new military and economic links, and undertaking an active approach in conflict-resolution.

Fourth, through empirical analysis, the study proves that growing material capabilities have allowed Turkey to take an independent position and that its increased activism against the "Unipole" (system) is consistent with its national interests. When the rhetoric about the ideological orientation of the administration is stripped from the context, it becomes clear that Turkey prioritizes national interests, rather than its strategic relationship with the U.S.. Thus, the change in Turkish Foreign Policy stems from the emergence of a more independent country, rather than an axis shifting Turkey.

Contributions to the Literature

The study offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it has developed a snapshot of the current political spectrum of the Middle Eastern states through analyses of their national power. It has developed a mechanism that integrates Unipolar systemic pressures with structural actualities (of the units and system) that provides explanatory power for regional states' potential behavior. Also, it has proved that the nature of Middle Eastern international relations is both hierarchic and anarchical. Second, it has discovered that having a sound economy or formidable armed forces is not an adequate prerequisite to act autonomously. Indeed, it is a combination of a relatively good economy and military that has *power-projection capabilities based on domestic arms production* that enables a state to act autonomously.

Finally, the empirical research in this study is the first in its category. Although there is room to refine its results, the existing classification of the events, which is consistent with the literature, provides a good understanding of the nature of the changing behavior of Turkey. Moreover, by discovering the correlation between the objectives and observed activism, it proves that half-way explanations that claim Turkey's actions are motivated by a desire to "increase regional influence" as an end in itself do not reflect the reality. In other words, Turkey has clear objectives and means to maximize them, rather than acting out of open-ended hegemonic purposes.

Future Research

In the literature, there is a consensus that Turkish foreign policy had been formulated with an assumption of a benign environment, where neighborhood participation in defusing security risks was expected. In that sense, the Arab uprising and consequent adverse outcomes were hardly calculated. After the Arab Spring, authoritarianism was resurrected and critical regional states realigned themselves with the U.S., which has seriously challenged Turkey's ability to maximize its objectives through an "independentist" approach.

Yet, two critical structural effects need to be clarified for the future of Turkish Foreign Policy. First, the emergence of near-peer competitors erodes the unipolar system, which has the potential to diminish the regional influence of the "Unipole" and allow better options for balancing. Second, the newly discovered substantial energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have the potential to boost the material capabilities of the regional states and break the energy monopoly of Russia over Europe. This may cause a sub-systemic change in the balance of power and create new regional alliance systems that may have implications for Turkey's ability to follow the autonomous path.

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The Institution of Elected Sheriffs: Implicit Bias and Government Failures

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ABSTRACT: Elected judges have been the subjects of numerous studies that find their behavior and practices change when faced with elections. However, there is very little research that examines the effects of elections on law enforcement officials. Among law enforcement officials, Sheriffs are unique in their status as an official politician. To what extent do elected county sheriffs change their behavior and practices in response to election cycles? The author theorizes that Sheriff Deputies are more likely to be tough on harsh crimes in the year leading up to an election, and less active with regards to non-violent crimes since these crimes are associated with less public support and are potentially committed by citizens that are more likely to be constituents. The author examines the behavior of Sheriff Deputies across Florida in 2005-2016 and using empirical support to prove this theory argues that the institution of electing criminal justice figures, such as Sheriffs, can be considered as a U.S. local government failure.

Introduction

In the United States (U.S.) at the Federal level, all judges are appointed by the President. Although a hallmark of democracy is popular election, the highest determinant of justice in our country, is to be appointed and not elected. There are numerous reasons why federal judges are appointed, the most prominent one is that it allows the justices to be non-partisan in their judgments (Iaryczower, Lewis & Shum, 2013).

Not all judges are appointed; indeed, the American federalist system provides substantial variance on the methods through which judges are selected across states. This variance in selection method naturally brings up questions about the potential of a government failure with regards to elections for judges and other justice system officials more broadly. Elected judges have been the subjects of numerous studies that find their behavior and practices change when faced with elections (Nelson, 2014; Nelson, 2015; Canes-Wrone, Clark & Kelly, 2014; Kang & Shepherd, 2015; McLeod, 2007; Worthington & McGirr, 2013; Gass, 2014). One study (Berdejó & Yuchtman, 2013) finds that elected Washington state judges' discretionary departures above the sentencing guidelines range increase by 50% depending on the electoral cycle, with judges rendering longer and tougher sentences, closer to elections. These effects can also be seen in other justice officials, such as elected District-Attorneys. Additionally, Dyke (2007) finds that during election years, cases that would normally be thrown out are more likely to be prosecuted.

Although many studies focus on the effects of elections on judicial figures, such as judges or district attorneys, there is very little research examining the effects of elections on law enforcement officials, such as elected county sheriffs. Sheriff offices play a unique role in our justice system. As part of the justice system, criminal justice officials have a direct impact on the lives of the individuals with whom they interact, through substantial capacity for discretionary decision making. A person is introduced to the criminal justice system through a criminal justice officer as either as one accused of a crime or as a victim. Generally, a judge does not play a large part in whether a person is arrested; law enforcement agencies arrest offenders. It is currently unclear how elections affect the practices of county sheriffs. As law enforcement officials go, sheriffs stand out in their status as an official politician since they are elected with majority votes in their county.

It is widely documented that elected officials are incentivized to behave strategically in order to optimize their chances of reelection (Haggard & McCubbins 2001). However, the effects of sheriff

elections on their practices is under researched. Surette (1985), in a 30-years-old study, finds that reelection chances increase when a sheriff is tougher in the enforcement of harsher crimes, such as sexual assault and homicide. Although an important preliminary look at the behavior of elected law enforcement officials, Surette's paper does not examine the behavior of sheriffs in areas besides harsh crime.

The author examines the activity levels of sheriffs with multiple categories of arrests including additional harsh crimes, as well as more widely "accepted" crimes (i.e., non-criminal traffic citations). To what extent do elected county sheriffs change their behavior and practices in response to election cycles? The question revolves around the behavior of sheriffs near election time in hopes that this will shed light on the institution of an elected law enforcement official being a potential government failure. Orbach (2013) suggests that a government failure, "...refers to a substantial imperfection in government performance". The author goes on to indicate that government failures are situations that cannot be stopped, however their effects can be mitigated.

Thus, if findings within this paper suggest bias or shortcomings on behalf of the sheriff due to his or her selection mechanism for their post, this may entail the declaration of a government failure. Blatant bias in our criminal justice field passes the test as being a "substantial imperfection in performance". In addition, there is a method to reach an improvement, in which an improvement could be made under a different institutional arrangement (i.e., having an appointed figure). Indeed, if the study at hand does find that sheriffs are a sub-prime choice behind their appointed cousin, the Police Chief, the institution of sheriff will have qualified as a contender for government failure (Orbach, 2013). If it is the case that sheriffs are incentivized to alter their behavior as the election draws near then this particular governmental institution may make matters worse rather than better.

This paper answers this question appropriately by statistically analyzing the sheriffs' practice of arrest. The author examines data on arrests from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) for sheriff offices in 65 of Florida's 67 counties,¹ and how the number of arrests vary in election vs. non-election years, disaggregated by type of arrest for the past 11 years (2005-2015).

This analysis contributes to the literature by:

- 1) breaking new ground in the study of the effects of elections on officials by looking specifically at the arrest behavior of elected county sheriffs during election and non-election years over an 11-years period; and
- 2) providing greater understanding of the possibility of a government failure that elections could bring to the law enforcement offices throughout our nation.

The recent state of relations among law enforcement and citizens, particularly those of color, have brought many issues to the surface (Abbey-Lambertz & Erbenraut, 2016). Biases in law enforcement can have effects that reach beyond unequal or impartial enforcement. It is important to first, uncover these biases in order to address them.

Structure of County Sheriffs

Within the sheriff's offices, the relationship between the top official (Sheriff or Chief) and employees (officers and deputies, respectively) is unique. Whereas police officers are normally heavily unionized and the chief's employment status has no bearing on them, many sheriffs' offices are different in this respect. In many offices, sheriff deputies are "at will employees" and there is always a risk of a new sheriff being elected and ousting the current deputies with those to whom he made political promises (*Associated Press*, 2015). In turn, this encourages the "Good Ole' Boy" system and mirrors the Jacksonian Spoils System that our country parted with at the national level in the 1880s.

¹ Miami-Dade is excluded, due to the local government having an appointed chief law enforcement officer (Florida Sheriffs Association, 2016). Likewise, Duval County is excluded due to its consolidated city/county government.

It is often the case that local and state organizational structures follow a similar format of the federal level. An example is found in State Supreme Courts that mimic their federal counterparts. This is also seen in municipal and most state level law enforcement agencies. In federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the heads of the agency are appointed, normally by the President and approved by the Senate. Similarly, if we look to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), the Head of Agency, Commissioner, is appointed by the Governor of the state (Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2016). However, sheriff offices diverge from this norm since their structure is distinguishable from higher levels of government.

As mentioned, many appointments are also confirmed by a legislative body. In the case of the FBI director, it is confirmed by the Senate (Federal Register, 2007). Municipal governments follow the same format where the Mayor, Council and/or City Manager appoints the Police Chief. Some municipalities also have citizens serve on the hiring board or committee. As mentioned, county sheriff offices do not adhere to this structure and are often held only accountable to their constituency (Falcone & Wells, 1995) through election cycles.

Street Level Bureaucrats

Lipsky (1969) defines street level bureaucrats as follows:

- 1) employees of the government,
- 2) interaction with citizens is a perpetual attribute of their job,
- 3) have a good deal of autonomy in their decisions, and
- 4) have a lasting impact on those citizens with whom they come in contact.

The author goes on to describe the afflictions of these individuals work as:

- 1) scarce resources—personally and within their organization,
- 2) persistence of personal and mental threats, and
- 3) professional expectations that are at times unclear, conflicting, and somewhat impractical. Three professions discussed are police officers (or sheriff's deputies), teachers and district level judges (Lipsky, 1969).

Street level law enforcement officials such as sheriff deputies have a high level of discretion in their enforcement actions such as the issuance of citations and effecting arrests. The activities of law enforcement often involve multiple moving parts, dangerous situations and the need for split-second decisions to be made. Due to these attributes, it can be difficult for management to control the actions of these individuals. The nature of their autonomy makes training, policy and procedures of the utmost importance. Given these issues of ensuring policies are implemented by bureaucrats in the desired manner, the selection mechanisms of managers may also cause leadership difficulty, especially if that manager is elected. Given the desire of politicians to be reelected, they may (as suggested in this paper) alter the actions conducted by officials at the bottom of the organization in an effort to win reelection.

Some studies look specifically at whether street level bureaucrats follow those directives given by elected officials. For example, May and Winter (2007) find that politicians actually have the highest level of impact on street level bureaucrats. The authors indicate that this is suggestive with regards to the level of discretion a bureaucrat may actually relinquish when an elected official is at the reigns of the organizations. Ultimately, even though deputies have high levels of autonomy, it is suggested they are more likely to follow a directive issued by the elected sheriff and forgo their normal levels of discretion.

Selection: Merit vs. Elected Officials

While these agents (police and sheriff) are all street-level bureaucrats, they differ on the type of management (elected vs. merit) they answer to. Just a cursory glance at our current political landscape would illustrate that elected officials are not necessarily more “democratic” and there may be instances

where elected officials may actually have more leeway in their behavior and/or be less qualified than their appointed counterparts.

For example, Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County in Arizona defied a judge's order to terminate his "immigration patrols and raids" of suspected illegal immigrants that were deemed racially profiling. Arpaio's legal battles have cost Maricopa County tax payers \$142 million over his tenure. Although recently pardoned by President Donald Trump, there was a lawsuit filed against him by the U.S. Department of Justice for contempt of court and he was found guilty. Prosecutors in this case insisted that the Sheriff was attempting to raise money and win re-election (Kiefer, 2016; Jeunesse, 2017).

Despite this lack of lawful behavior, the sheriff cannot be taken out of office in the same manner as a police chief. Unlike the sheriff, there is continuous oversight on the Chief of Police, such as the Mayor, City Council, City Manager, etc., and if it is deemed that he or she is acting unethically or unconstitutionally, they will most likely be dismissed or asked to resign. Police chiefs have the aforementioned supervisors and are simply the head of a department within the city government, such as the head of parks and recreation. Chiefs are held politically accountable through the mayor or council members that are elected. In addition, if the city has a city manager, she is likely to decide to fire or hire the chief, providing another check on the chief (Gass, 2015).

Simply because an official is elected does not necessarily make them a better representative of the people (Gass, 2015). Although they do not specifically study police chiefs and sheriffs, Samuels and Shugart (2010) show that directly elected officials are actually less qualified than officials who are selected based on merit. They demonstrate that prime ministers, who are selected by their party, are on average more qualified than presidents who are directly elected by the people. They attribute this to an adverse selection problem brought about by a principle agent relationship. The party must delegate to an official to act as the chief executive, however, when that official is directly elected by the people they must also appeal to the uninformed electorate as well as the informed political élites.

Whereas in a system where the Prime Minister is only selected by the informed elites, the head of government is more qualified. This situation is analogous to the issue of a directly elected law enforcement officials. Since sheriffs are selected by a largely uninformed electorate, there is no requirement that they be particularly qualified. However, merit-based law enforcement officials are chosen specifically according to their qualifications.

As implied by Samuels and Shugart (2010), simply having an election process does not mean that the optimal candidate is always selected. Sheriff Arpaio has been the Sheriff of Maricopa County for 23 years. The fact that an official who blatantly disregards the law has been reelected so many times, draws attention to the fact that voters are often uninformed (see Lupia & McCubbins, 1998). Other studies show that uninformed voters make decisions based on name recognition and not necessarily on the candidate's running platform or past performance (Baum, 1987).

High name recognition means that oftentimes, incumbents are reelected at a high percentage. Studies of the U.S. House of Representatives show that an incumbent's chance of being reelected is 95% (Friedman & Holden, 2009). "Incumbent bias" runs rampant since it is very costly for citizens to monitor their public officials. Oftentimes citizens do not monitor their elected officials and rely on the imperfect mechanism of waiting for interest groups to raise the "fire-alarm" when elected officials are not behaving appropriately (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). This means that elected officials can usually count on various violations and misrepresentations to be overlooked.

There is a similar distinction amongst city managers and elected city mayors with a similarity between their actions and different selection mechanisms for their respective office's. These officials are generally a part of different types of local governments; elected mayor-council or council-manager, however each acting is similar official capacities. Kreft (2007) and others (Raschky & Weck-Hannemann,

2007; Deno & Mehay, 1987) have found that city managers are more efficient than mayors due to their differentiated incentive structure.

In addition, Hessami (2018) finds that elected mayors in Germany show a cyclical change in behavior based on election years, whereas their appointed counterparts did not. Studies involving school superintendents have also shed light on the differences in the productivity in elected versus appointed officials. However, it should be noted that other studies with this topic come to different conclusions. Patridge and Sass (2011) look at the achievement levels of students in public schools in the 67 counties in Florida, each with either an elected or appointed superintendent. The authors find no discernable difference between the two types of officials in student achievement.

Studies and Examples

Although studies that look into the effects of election cycles on sheriff practices have been few and far between, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, there are over 3,000 Sheriff Offices throughout the U.S. (2016). Most studies have concentrated on urban police agencies such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) or Chicago Police Department (CPD) and urban regions where crime is generally higher, due to the structure of cities and their larger populations in smaller regions (Decker, 1979). One study performed in 1985 by Surette, provides support to the research question mentioned above. In devising a predictive model, Surette demonstrated that sheriff election models must incorporate crime and arrest information, particularly murder and rape in order to increase their prospects of being elected (Surette, 1985).

Other studies demonstrate the effect of elections on the practices of criminal justice figures such as judges or District and State Attorneys. For example, studies of the effects of District Attorney (D.A.) elections in North Carolina reveal that during election years, cases that would normally be thrown out are actually more likely to be prosecuted. Defendants have a higher likelihood of conviction during these years. Interestingly, the study finds that effects are more pronounced for defendants charged with property or drug crimes than for defendants charged with violent crimes, and more pronounced in districts with more electoral competition (Dyke, 2007).

Another work (Berdejó & Yuchtman, 2013) calls into question the “effect of political pressure and electoral accountability on public servants’ behavior”. In the study, the authors highlight the influence of elections on judicial discretion. The authors find that sentences are 10% longer at the end of a judge’s political cycle than at the beginning. In addition, judges’ discretionary departures above the sentencing guidelines range increase by approximately 50% across the electoral cycle, which accounts for a large amount of the increase in sentencing severity.

Park (2014) also finds that incarceration rates rise by 2.2-to-2.6 percentage points in Kansas judicial election years. However, this increase in rates is only found for black defendants. Similarly, a study of 22,095 criminal cases in Pennsylvania (Hubor & Gordon, 2004) finds that in terms of sentencing years, 1,818 to 2,705 years can be attributed to higher election year sentencing by trial judges in the 1990s. Moreover, judges involved in partisan elections give out more lengthy sentences than judges involved in non-competitive retention elections. Numerous other studies of publicly elected legal officials, especially judges, also find effects on sentencing from the consequence of election cycles (Nelson, 2014; Nelson, 2015; Canes-Wrone, Clark & Kelly, 2014; Kang & Shepherd, 2015; McLeod, 2007; Worthington & McGirr, 2013; Gass, 2014). With this research in mind, we may see higher enforcement of certain crimes in election years.

In addition to finding that popular opinion influences elected judges in death penalty cases, Brace and Boyea (2008) indicate that by tying judicial officials to elections, they are increasingly swayed by popular opinion as opposed to the rule of law. The findings in the preceding literature seem to be generalizable across all elected officials--elections incentivize officials to engage in strategic behavior.

In the United Kingdom, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011 introduced elected police officials and the politicization of policing, which altered the former institution of merit-based appointments (Sampson, 2012). Some British scholars fear that popular opinion may drive decision making in these newer systems. However, the reasoning behind the shift is for police officials and organizations to have increased accountability to citizens.

Theory: Electoral Cycles

The theory and literature concerning electoral cycles is consequential in filling this lacuna regarding elected law enforcement officials and their practices. Mayhew (1974) claims that members of Congress are single minded seekers of reelection. Based on their elected status, this may be true of county sheriffs specifically. Even in situations where elected officials care passionately about public policy, they must hold office to enact any changes that they care about and therefore it is likely that the majority of elected officials, regardless of divergent goals, are likely to care about being re-elected. In addition, politicians use credit claiming where they make claims to items that benefit their constituency, even where this may actually be a stretch. Elected officials are rewarded for taking a position and not necessarily in effecting improvements (Mayhew, 1974).

If we assume that elected officials are incentivized to both care about re-election and to credit claim in order to make this happen, then it is likely that elected law enforcement officials have some perverse incentives that may hamper their ability to overlook public opinion in order to fairly execute the law. Indeed, building on Mayhew's claims about the importance of re-election prospects, the political business cycle theory indicates that election timing can influence a politician's choices (Dyke, 2007). There exists a principal-agent relationship between voters and those elected to office. Voters, or principles, choose their agent based on congruency of preferences (Barro, 1970). Elected officials may base their choices on voter preferences, as opposed to personal preferences in order to maximize utility by securing reelection. This strategic behavior may become more prevalent as the time draws nearer to reelection cycles (Rogoff, 1990).

The political business cycle is a concept where politicians manipulate the economy in order to win votes (Drzen, 2000). This preys on the information asymmetry found in the principal agent relationship where politicians seek to decrease transaction costs and make decisions centered on voter preference. These decisions are made closer to election times, with the belief that voters will look to these actions more so than the entirety of an agent's actions throughout their term. Nordhaus (1975) also looks at the political business cycle and hypothesizes that voters do not take an *average* of the behavior and actions of the electorate, instead they look to their most recent actions in order to make their voting decision. More specifically, Nordhaus shows that unemployment and deflation improve over the course of the electoral period, as reelection nears. This study is of evidentiary value because it shows that politicians will change behaviors as elections near, in order to better appeal to voters.

Grier and Grier (2000) also show support for this political business cycle theory by showing that politicians with fixed terms are more likely to maximize their utility in terms of personal wealth, whereas officials with the possibility of being elected again and again are incentivized to make decisions that are more beneficial to tax payers. Numerous scholars also find that policy decisions change strategically during election periods (Besley & Case, 1995; Poterba, 1994; Levitt, 1997; Berry & Berry, 1990).

The political business cycle theory is generalizable to the elected sheriff. There is no evidence to suggest that sheriffs are incentivized to behave any less strategically than the other political officials discussed in the political business cycle literature. The sheriff is the agent of county citizens. The citizens entrust him or her to perform the duties of the office in a manner that is congruent with their preferences. In following the political cycle theory, it would behoove the rational sheriff to alter their behavior to the preferences of voters, as election time comes closer (Weiss, 2006; Swisher, 2010; Chevigny, 2003).

Hypotheses

The research question examines empirically the incentives that sheriffs have to partake in law enforcement activity during the time of elections. If we assume that elected officials' incentive is to be re-elected, then we can by extension assume that as election time draws nearer sheriffs will strategically adjust their behavior in order to appease their constituents. Although it is true that only the sheriff is elected and not the entire department, there is a possibility of turnover among lower level employees (including command staff) if current sheriff is not reelected. For example, according to Florida State Statute 30.078, incoming sheriffs can replace their deputies in managerial, confidential and policy-making roles, as well as their part-time deputies (Online Sunshine, 2019). Due to this uncertainty, this study's theory assumes that lower-level deputies are incentivized to act strategically during election time in order to increase the likelihood of the current sheriff being reelected and decrease their risk for turn-over under a new top official.

Since this study has established that sheriffs, as elected officials, are more likely to consider public opinion as the election draws near, we must acknowledge the fact that the public is likely to feel differently towards certain types of crime. Indeed, there is split in public opinion about the usefulness of enforcing certain laws. For this reason, my expectations are two-fold. Given election year incentives, the probabilities increase that sheriff deputies will be more active in regards to serious crime leading up to election, while they will be less active with regards to more widely "accepted" crimes.

Increased law enforcement activity towards harsh crimes will help their election chances since these crimes are widely frowned upon by constituents and will allow sheriffs to claim credit for their enforcement during their campaigning. In addition, the people committing these harsher crimes are likely not part of the sheriff's constituency. Lending support to this reasoning, Surette (1985) finds that reelection chances increase when a sheriff is tougher in the enforcement of harsher crimes such as sexual assault and homicide, while this current study argues that such reasoning applies to the present time as well. In addition, the correlation between an impending election and tougher actions towards crime is well documented in the literature (Dyke 2007).

It is common knowledge that certain crimes are more widely accepted among the public and therefore any associated arrests with these crimes are likely to be seen as controversial. It therefore follows that sheriffs are likely to be more lenient with more controversial crimes in the time leading up to an election since these crimes are more likely to be either committed by constituents (i.e., traffic infractions) and/or are more widely accepted among the public (i.e., recreational drugs).

The two indicators of "controversial crimes" are traffic violations and drug crimes. It probably requires little intuition to reason that the public would prefer sheriffs to pursue crimes such as murder or burglary than traffic violations. The issuance of traffic citations is more controversial than the pursuit of more violent crimes. Indeed, there are several studies that show traffic tickets are used to generate revenue for municipality budgets (Makowsky & Stratmann 2008; Garrett & Wagner 2009). In addition, there is some evidence that officers are moved by personal preferences when giving out traffic citations, which makes them more likely to write traffic citations (Anbarci & Lee, 2008; Antonovics & Knight, 2009).

The pursuit of drug arrests is also relatively controversial. Indeed, it is found most Americans believe habitual drug use should be treated as addiction rather than a criminal offense (De Pinto et al., 2017). A *New York Times* article echoes this sentiment by arguing that police departments have better things to do with tax-payer dollars than chasing offenders of a drug that's been legalized in other states (Wegman, 2014). Making these arrests even more controversial, research also shows that those that were arrested for marijuana usage were disproportionately Black (Adams, 2017).

The differential public perspectives towards these different types of crimes leads to different expected behavior among sheriff deputies. This logic informs my primary hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *During an election year, sheriff offices will be more active than in any other year during their tenure in making felony arrests.*

Hypothesis 2: *During an election year, sheriff offices will be less active than in any other year during their tenure in pursuing more controversial offenses (i.e., drug arrests and non-criminal traffic citations).*

Research Design

The author's dependent variable is the number of arrests/citations by sheriff officials for violent and more widely "accepted" crimes per month. The indicators used for violent crimes are murder, burglary and aggravated assault arrests, while the indicators for "controversial crimes" is the number of non-criminal traffic citations and the number of drug arrests. Rather than simply looking at an aggregate count of total arrests, these five dependent variables will allow us to examine a more nuanced picture of how sheriffs change their behavior as the election approaches.

The independent variable of theoretical interest is the year of election in the county. All county Sheriffs in Florida are elected based on a majority vote. Elections are held every four years without term limits. The author measures *Election Season* as a dummy variable indicating whether the observation was the year before and leading up to an election year, to capture whether these law enforcement officers are changing their behavior near election time compared to these observations from all non-election years. Since elections are held partially through the fourth year, rather than observe only 10 months of behavior, this study opts to examine the year before plus the 10 months leading up to an election. This decision is due to the fact that it is likely that sheriffs announce that they are running for election prior to the actual year that they are up for election. For example, Leon County Sheriff, Walt McNeil, announced he was running for Sheriff in March of 2015 although the election was not until November of 2016.

There are a variety of other factors that are likely to affect the number of arrests such as; population size and demographic variables (age, race, income and education level). The county population is likely to affect the raw number of arrests since high populations generally generate higher arrest numbers than areas with smaller populations (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1999). The characteristics of the population will also play a role in the number of arrests. A smaller population may have a higher level of collective efficacy, the ability of the members of a community to control the actions of its citizen (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). In turn, this will affect the crime and arrest rates.

On average, older populations tend to commit less crime and tend to be victimized less than one that is younger (Bachman, 1992). Also, the author controls for racial factors since minorities are overrepresented in terms of arrest rates (Blumstein, 1982). This statistic ties into the effects that income and educational levels have on arrests. Lower income and education segments of the population tend to commit higher levels of criminal activity and like younger segments of the population, tend to be victimized more often (Lochner, 2004). The author also controls for the overall crime rate since this would have obvious effects on the arrest rate.

Model

Since the dependent variable is a count variable, an event count model would fit the data the best. Thus, this study can either use a Poisson or Negative Binomial Model. The author opts to use Negative Binomial since it eases the assumption that the variance and the mean of the dependent variable are equal. However, since the author uses panel data, it is likely that observations within a county are correlated. In order to account for this, this study reports robust standard errors clustered by county.

Data


The data for the paper are retrieved from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR is published on an annual basis and relies on local agencies to report their statistics. The author looked at specific categories of arrests on crimes such as burglary, robbery, homicide and drug arrests. The data on non-criminal traffic citations came from the Annual Uniform Traffic Citation Report published by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. These enforcement activities cover the number of arrests and traffic citations, respectively, of each sheriff’s office from 65 counties in Florida. The data spans from 2005-2015 (11 years) and the unit of analysis is the county-year.

The distribution of the dependent variables is displayed in Figure 1 and the descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. The histograms in Figure 1 display the number of observations that fall into the range of each variable. Crimes considered harsh are displayed in blue and the less harsh crimes are displayed in green. Note that for the non-criminal traffic citations, the mean and median are quite different. Figure 1 can help explain this—it appears that there are a few county-years with a large number of traffic citations, while for most observations (almost 800) there are a small number of traffic citations per county-year. For example, Taylor County in 2015 had the most non-criminal traffic citations at 686 followed by Hendrix County in 2015 with 626.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables

Variable	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.
Burglary Arrests	219.30	208.50	1	453
Homicide Arrests	17.08	8.00	1	63
Aggravated Assault Arrests	251.00	243.50	1	502
Drug Arrests	396.2 0	404.50	1	794
Non-Criminal Traffic Citations	122.90	2.00	2	686

Figure 1: Distribution of Arrest Type



Analysis and Results

Table 2 reports the results of the 5 models. The first three models correspond with the first hypothesis, which predicts that sheriff’s deputies will engage in more arrests related to harsh crimes during the time leading up to an election. Models 4 and 5 correspond to the second hypothesis relating the expected activity level of sheriff deputies towards more widely “accepted” crimes, drug crimes and traffic infractions.

Table 2: Negative Binomial Models by Arrest Type

Variables	Model 1: Murder	Model 2: Burglary	Model 3: Aggravated Assault	Model 4: Non-Criminal Traffic Citations	Model 5: Drug Arrests
<i>Election Season</i>	0.076 (0.065)	0.071*** (0.025)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.072 (0.050)	-0.043** (0.021)
<i>Population</i>	0.000002*** (0.000003)	.0000002*** (0.000004)	.0000002*** (.0000003)	0.000003*** (0.0000004)	0.000003*** (0.0000004)
<i>Crime Rate</i>	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0008*** (0.0003)	0.0009*** (0.0002)
<i>Percentage Black</i>	-0.017 (.015)	-0.018* (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.023*** (0.009)
<i>Percentage Poverty</i>	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.053** (0.022)	-0.062** (0.028)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.051** (0.025)
<i>Percentage > 65</i>	0.016 (0.013)	0.024** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.028* (0.016)	0.018* (0.010)
<i>Percentage High School</i>	0.037* (0.021)	0.022 (0.020)	0.020 (0.021)	0.061* (0.033)	0.025 (0.020)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.784 (2.223)	2.758 (1.981)	2.990 (2.210)	3.075 (3.040)	4.330** (1.973)
	N = 698	N = 698	N = 698	N = 321	N = 698
	AIC=3144	AIC=7883.6	AIC=8076.8	AIC=6043.8	AIC=9829.7

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10

These models show partial support for my primary hypotheses. *Election Season* is in the expected direction across the first two models and reaches conventional levels of significance for *Burglary* (p<0.001). The effect of *Election Season* on *Burglary* arrests is also substantively significant. In the year leading up to an election, sheriff offices will make an average of 7.72 additional *Burglary* arrests per month than when they are not in the election season, ceteris paribus. *Election Season* is in the expected direction across both Models 4 and 5, but only reaches conventional levels of significance for *Drug Arrests* (p<0.01). This effect is substantively large as well since in the year leading up to an election, sheriff’s deputies make an average of 19.67 fewer *Drug Arrests* per month than at any other time in their tenure.

Some of the control variables also have a statistically significant effect of the various arrests. Across all five models, the *Crime Rate* has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of all types of arrests. This conforms to expectations since the more crimes that are committed the more arrests that should be made. In addition, *Population* has a statistically significant positive effect across all three of the five models. Somewhat surprisingly, *Percentage Black* is negative across four of the five models and

statistically significant in Models 2 and 5. Both *Percentage > 65* and *Percentage High School* are positive across models, but are inconsistently significant.

Discussion

Although the author expected sheriff deputies to engage in strategic behavior leading up to an election, one can argue that sheriff deputies are less strategic with murder arrests than they are with burglary arrests. Since murders are more lengthy and complicated investigations than burglary, an arrest may not come about for quite some time. In addition, these crimes have the tendency to leave their victims incapacitated and/or less likely to report the crime in general, and more specifically, in quick succession after the crime occurs. Burglaries are reported more quickly and normally do not cause physical harm to their victims (Fanflik, 2007).

In terms of credit claiming, burglaries have fewer transaction costs and allow the Sheriff to maximize their utility with electorates (Williamson, 1981). Often, these arrests can be made just after the actual crime occurred, depending on how long the victim takes to report the incident. Sheriff deputies can quickly gather the evidence that night, and seek out the suspects, without requiring an investigator to be called out. Homicides require more specified and advanced investigative knowledge, which may prevent deputies from making a quick arrest.

The results also suggest that sheriff's deputies' actions do not change with regards to the issuance of traffic citation, while drug arrests do indeed change. Given the presumptive unpopularity of each of these actions, we would expect similar alterations in behavior during the election season for both of these more "accepted" crimes. Although sheriff's deputies do not appear to strategically adjust their behavior towards traffic infractions during the *Election Season*, this may not represent the whole picture of what is actually going on. First, a pre-textual traffic stop is when a law enforcement officer uses a traffic infraction as a means of stopping a vehicle, due to their suspicion of a more serious criminal violation (Whren vs. U.S., 1996).

Although overall traffic citations may not increase during the election season, deputies may be strategic with the usage of citations. In this way, traffic citations may continue to be issued at the same rate, with more issued to different demographics. Those suspected of warrant or fleeing criminals who are stopped by deputies may have citations issued at a much higher rate, while those citizens who are the sheriff's constituency will see a reduction in the issuance of citations. Thus, deputies may use citations as a tool in their pursuit of increased arrests, while reducing the number of citations within their constituency which would wash out the variance of this variable. This study's measure of non-criminal traffic citations may not represent this more nuanced situation.

Conclusion

There has been a substantial amount of research conducted regarding the behavior of elected officials and from this we have learned that elections can and do incentivize officials to strategically alter their behavior. Whether it is through justices assigning longer sentences to convicted criminals or district attorneys prosecuting more cases, we know that the probability increases that members of the justice system that face elections will change their behavior as elections draw near. Because elected officials are incentivized to seek re-election, they can stand to gain from adjusting their behavior to appeal to the public. Despite our current state of knowledge on office-seeking politicians in the justice system, not much work has been done on the behavior of the street-level bureaucrats of the justice system—elected law enforcement officials.

The author finds partial support for both of my hypotheses that sheriff deputies are likely to engage in strategic behavior during the election season. Specifically, the author finds evidence that in the time leading up to an election, sheriff's deputies pursue more harsh crimes and make fewer actions with respect to more controversial crimes. Any time there is a change in strategic behavior before an election,

it brings up questions of justice being delivered fairly. This is especially true for employees with the justice system who are supposed to be neutrally competent in their application of the law.

In a democracy, it is normatively desirable for citizens to be as engaged in government as possible. Indeed, the Progressive Era promoted these ideals leaving us with institutions that benefit our country today, such as direct democracy or non-partisan elections. However, depending on the goals of the institution in question, it is also the case that elections can encourage officials to engage in strategic behavior which can be especially concerning for officials that are supposed to neutrally enforce the law. The author points to research conducted regarding the behavior of elected judges compared to those selected on merit to illustrate that it may not be optimal for officials who are supposed to neutrally apply the law to be so linked with the day to day minutia of public opinion. The mandate of all law enforcement officials is to fairly enforce the law. However, if elections cause these officials to behave in a biased manner in order to appeal to the public, then this relationship has important policy implications that should be considered.

As such, the possibility that having such a powerful position as Sheriff being elected versus appointed would shed light on the possibility of this particular institution being a government failure. As mentioned previously, Orbach (2013) indicates that a government failure occurs when there is a “substantial imperfection in government performance” and goes on to suggest that these failures can, however be mitigated. The author argues in this work that having a top-level Constitutional Officer who strategically alters their behavior during their election cycle, should be viewed as a substantial imperfection in government performance.

This is especially true in the case where this involves a figure who is (and is in charge of) the gatekeeper(s) of the criminal justice system and in which he or she has the ability to alter those who enter this system as offenders simply due to an election cycle being upon us. This failure does have the ability to be mitigated since there is a law enforcement administrator who is appointed based upon their merits and has no concern with reelection, although they are concerned with the public’s welfare. The appointed police chief does not have to concern herself with election, however she is held accountable to citizens through elected city officials that have the ability to oust the chief immediately from office if there is a call from electorates to do so, an ability not given to the sheriff’s electorates until the next election cycle.

Given the lack of research on this topic, additional research could build on this study in several different directions. Future research should look into conviction rates during the period of the study. We may find that the influx of arrests during election season could also be correlated with high numbers of arrestees found to be not guilty. Sherriff deputies may pursue additional harsh crimes during election season, but it does not necessarily mean that additional criminals are actually being locked behind bars. As the mantra goes, “innocent until proven guilty”, law enforcement officers are required to have probable cause to arrest a person. Probable cause indicates that the officer is 50% sure that the subject committed the crime.

However, the requirement for conviction is generally proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or 100% surety the person committed the crime. This is the amount of proof that our courtrooms need to establish guilt or innocence. It would also be interesting to compare the behavior of elected sheriff offices to their appointed counterparts, police chiefs, to see if elections have effects on other outcomes, such as qualifications. Are appointed officials more or less qualified than their corresponding elected officials? This analysis examines the behavior of elected Sheriffs across one state. While this makes the units of analysis more comparable, it would be interesting to see if these results hold and can be generalized to other states. Future work would also look to the United Kingdom and the more recent implementation of elected police officials to compare elected and appointed law enforcement behavior across election cycles.

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Immigration and the Demise of Social-Democratic Parties in Western Europe: France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy¹

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ABSTRACT: Great attention in the literature is generally devoted to the rise of populism rather than the demise of traditional social-democratic parties or progressive governments once in power. In the four countries included in the study (France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy) these parties either disappeared from the political scene or they now play a far less relevant role, except for the U.K. Despite the focus on the economic crisis as a reason for this demise, one of the main puzzles that moderate progressive parties must face is their attitudes towards immigration policy. Contrary to some of the main theories in the literature, the situation in Europe would seem to highlight instead how the stance of leaders of political parties does not drive party-support: preferences of electors are not given. As a result, voters of the traditional mainstream progressive parties will tend to vote for other parties if they think the policies of their parties are inconsistent, or they would react to shifts towards anti-immigrant policy voting the already available anti-immigrant parties. In this sense, voters care more about the issues as stakes than partisanship. This effect is particularly strong if the issue is salient, as in the hot debated case of immigration in the European Union. At the same time, we also see a different trend in countries such as the United Kingdom, where the Labor Party was the only European moderate progressive party able to increase its electoral result. The theory presented in this paper is that the demise of the European social-democratic parties lies in the inability of these parties to face the increasing challenges related to immigration and in the pursuit of a wrong electoral strategy based on a hardline immigration policy, with more restrictive policies enacted to drain support from conservative parties. Where these shifts did not happen, and the party was seen as a coherent and credible alternative to the mainstream narrative towards immigration, as in the U.K. where the Labor Party was able to perform well in the last 2017 national elections.

Introduction

The last decade was characterized by a stark downward trend of the mainstream progressive democratic parties in Western Europe in a generalized fashion. Although observers identified this effect as being the result of structural causes, the case of Jeremy Corbyn in the United Kingdom (U.K.) shows that this is not necessarily true, and in other countries the presence of a strong radical left also goes against the “end of ideology theory”. The research question presented here is then: why are some social-democratic parties in Western Europe doing relatively well where others are at risk of disappearing from the political scene? This study’s hypothesis is that the stance of these parties towards immigration explain this puzzle. Progressive parties tried to follow conservative approaches on immigration to reduce electoral supports for the

¹ Large segments of this essay are the results of an independent study project on Immigration and Security at the University of Central Florida in Orlando. Thanks to Dr. Nikola Mirilovic for his valuable suggestions and feedback, as well as to Dr. Barbara Kinsey for her continued mentorship and support with my research on Western Europe. Special thanks to all my fellow Ph.D. students in the program of Security Studies at the University of Central Florida in Orlando for their support and feedback. This paper is submitted to the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and the journal *Florida Political Chronicle* for publication. For all other purposes different from individual use for research purposes, material and contents shall not be reproduced without the permission of the author.

opponents, but they ended up losing votes towards both conservatives and leftist parties as they were not seen as credible by the latter, whereas the former voted for coherently anti-immigrant parties. Where parties were able to present another kind of narrative, appealing to multiculturalism, youth vote and more openness towards immigration, the moderate progressive party performed well in the elections.

To understand this mechanism, we must first refer to the nature of public opinion in politics. This has always been a hotly debated topic. Berinsky (2009) suggests that public opinion follows the indication of leaders. The example he uses is the evolution of the public opinion during the 2003 Second Gulf War in Iraq, and specifically the decrease in the support for the war after the Democrats began to be opposed to it (Berinsky, 2009, p.102). Even if the author does not specify the electoral system where this kind of dynamics take place, it would seem that this situation is more likely to happen in a two-party system. Because in these kinds of systems there are only two parties, the competitors should be saying different things to mobilize voters on both ends of the spectrum. If a change or a strong shift takes place, this must happen within the parties, as there are no credible alternatives outside of those. In proportional systems, instead, strong shifts can yield the effect of a third party entering the arena, and possibly even gaining power, as these parties are perceived as having a possibility to make some kind of impact (Norris, 2005, p.114 argues that radical parties are more likely to gain seats in Proportional Representation systems, although they can have a high vote share in majority systems too).

The hypothesis presented in this paper is that one of the strongest shifts explaining the demise of the moderate progressive parties in some countries of Western Europe is immigration. The argument is that the ambivalent, if not direct, opposition of these parties towards immigration was a reaction to public opinion's perceptions, but at the same time the public opinion preferred the hard-liners of the right and far-right parties, which had a clearer stance on the subject. As cultural acceptance and multiculturalism became in the last decades a core value of leftist parties, people who were more tolerant towards immigration voted for more leftist parties in the electoral competition (in the presence of relevant parties of such kind) or for other perceived radical alternatives. In this way, moderate parties lost votes from both ends of the spectrum, resulting in one of the highest combined losses in terms of vote percentage in the history of recent elections, particularly so in France.

There are a number of assumptions made here that would deserve to be treated in a different paper. First, it is assumed that immigration is now a more relevant issue than what it used to be decades ago. That is not to say that immigration was not relevant, but there are several intervening factors signaling this unprecedented relevance: the first one is that the number of illegal immigrants and refugees is higher than what it used to be.² The combined effect of the Syrian civil war and the war in Libya led in the first case to massive flows of refugees fleeing the country, and in the second case it led to a situation of a completely failed state where because smugglers are in full control of the territory, illegal immigration flows through Africa can depart Libya and reach the Italian coasts to enter Europe.³

This is the first time that there are three potential passages all open at the same time to reach Europe from the MENA region: the first one is the fortified border enclave of Ceuta and Melilla in Spain bordering Morocco, the second one is the Libyan coast from where migrants can reach Italy and the third one is the Turkish border with Greece, one of the main points of passage for Syrian refugees towards Europe before the deal between Erdogan and the E.U. which substantially closed the border from the Turkish side in exchange for money (Gkliati, 2017). All these routes highlight the unprecedented level of the issue of immigration for Europe and European Union, at a moment where the trust in the European

² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>; "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts" in *BBC News*, bbc.com (4 March 2016).

³ <http://www.unhcr.org/cy/2018/07/03/refugee-migrant-flows-libya-rise-report/>, UNCHR Report, "Refugee and migrant flows through Libya on the rise" in unhcr.org (3 July 2018).

institution it is not at its highest (as the U.K. BREXIT situation shows) and where populist anti-European forces are gaining traction and even making government.

Although immigration plays an important role, elections are obviously multidimensional, as voters do not decide on who they vote based on only one element and although this might be true for some voters, the public might prioritize different issues. Although in the literature some authors argue the opposite, it is clear that elections are a complicated mechanism that cannot be entirely explained by preferences (for an opposing view see Berinsky, 2009). Caverley (2014) argues that what explains electoral results is the willingness of the public to support military expenditure in the presence of threats, in order to avoid being deployed or drafted for the war and because in that way the median voters shift the burden of the war towards the rich because they favored a capitalized military. In other words, median voters “replace military labor with capital” (Caverley, 2014, p.34).

Downs (1957) argues instead that the “median voter” is generally a centrist moderate and that because the distribution of voters along the spectrum is a normal distribution, the two main opposing parties should compete for the voters in the middle (because there are more voters at the center of the distribution). All these theories, however, mainly apply to a two-party competition, and they do not generally consider neither proportional representation nor the presence of third parties. Tsakas and Xefteris (2018) try to do so, showing that under the normal distribution of Downs (1957), third parties enter in the middle because there are more voters. As a result, the two main opposing parties will actually become more polarized because they must retain the end of the spectrum.

All these authors consider the electoral voters as a normal distribution. In fact, it would seem that due to an increased polarization in politics in general, the distribution of the electoral body is actually bimodal, and that the two distribution only partially overlaps at the center. If that is the case, under high polarization the challengers will not be able to break through the middle (because there are now actually less voters). Third parties will have a better chance entering from the very end of both spectrums, or maybe a non-ideological single party could try to take both ends of the spectrum (arguably the case of the Five-Stars Movement in Italy). The result of this shift is a convergence between the two main opposing parties, because now they lost the ends of the political spectrum they previously controlled, and they both have to compete for the middle of the distribution where there are now less voters. This scheme explains the recurring patterns of the last national European elections in a better way (and it also explains the recent increase in the numbers of “Great Coalitions” between moderate parties) and because the challengers’ rhetoric is about immigration, this element clearly played a more relevant role than other factors.

4 Case-Studies Selection

The cases selected in the study are all countries which were deeply affected by the immigration crisis. As four case-studies, France, United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany and Italy are either in the front-line of the European borders or they host large communities of immigrants and are often the destination that immigrants want to reach. The main parties considered in this analysis are the moderate progressive parties in these countries. For Italy, this party is the Democratic Party (*Partito Democratico*, or P.D.). For France this political tradition is represented by the Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste Français*, or P.S.F.). The analysis will consider also the Labour Party in the U.K. and the Social-Democratic Party (*Sozial-Demokratische Partei*, or SPD) of Germany. France and Italy represent two interesting cases as these parties were in power when the refugee crisis (2015-2016) began, and they both now play an extremely less relevant role. The analysis includes the Labor Party of the U.K. because of its upward trend. The U.K. is also the only country with a purely majoritarian system of first-past-the-post. Germany uses a purely proportional system with some corrections (entry-level threshold of 5% of national vote share), the French (Presidential system) elections are based on the overall national popular vote, Italy uses a mixed system

for the Parliament where 61% of Congress is elected using a national proportional systems and 37% is elected using a first-past-the-post system (the remaining 2% is elected in the abroad districts).

In the literature, it is generally highlighted (Bale et al. 2010, Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2011) as one of the strategies for electoral competition for more moderate parties is to drain support from more radical parties to reduce third-party support. This was indeed a strategy generally followed by most of the parties in the study. In that sense, the declaration of the moderate Austrian government saying in an official statement in the midst of the immigration crisis that Austria would send military tanks to patrol the Brennero border (Alps) with Italy is an example of this mechanism.⁴ Although this strategy seems to be constantly followed, it does not necessarily work. Marco Minniti (P.D.), former-Minister of Internal Affairs for Italy, was generally highlighted as the most hard-liner minister of the former government led by the Democratic Party (P.D.). Among other things, the law he proposed (and approved by Parliament) substantially reduced legal rights for immigrants and refugees (it abolishes the possibility of appeals for denials of refugee status and creates sanctions for NGO boats rescuing immigrants if they do not respect a set of standards) and it increases significantly the number of identification centers and it also extended the networks for repatriations.⁵ It is doubtful that this strategy helped the Democratic Party in the electoral competition. Then the question become why this kind of policies was decided in the first place.

Traditionally, during the 1960s and 1970s leftist movements were not generally in favor of workers coming to their countries because of the effect on the job market and on the social welfare (Freeman, 1986), the main two cases are represented by the Turkish in Germany and the Italians in Belgium in the guest worker system. In the last decades, however, hospitality, integration and tolerance were values generally associated with progressive movements. The salience of the immigration issues in Western Europe is causing a different shift where there is a stronger opposition to immigration all together, even if possibly based on different reasons. Recent surveys, for instance, show how the relative majority of the voters of the Democratic Party favors the hardline stance of the new Italian government towards immigrants. This kind of policy was mainly decided in order to reduce the support for the far-right.⁶ The general growing hostility of the public opinion towards immigration produced these shifts within the Democratic Party, but only between people who voted for the party and not counting people who abstained because of these shifts.

Research Design and Hypotheses

This study will use a qualitative comparative case study approach, identifying the effect of the change in policies, political platforms and narrative towards immigration within the social-democratic parties (independent variable) on the electoral performance of these parties (dependent variable) in terms of change in the vote share between the most recent elections. As there were elections in both 2017 and 2018, and because the last five years (which is generally the electoral cycle) saw the outburst of the migration crisis in Western Europe, it is clear that this issue played a role. The measurement of the IV will be realized through a process-tracing approach, looking at the political platforms of the party, the laws passed if they were in government and what leaders said during the electoral campaign regarding immigration. The measurement of the DV is straightforward, the change in the vote share percentage and number of votes of the social-democratic parties. Equifinality can clearly become a problem in this sense,

⁴ <http://www.lastampa.it/2017/07/04/italia/laustria-pronta-a-schierare-lesercito-al-brennero-per-bloccare-i-migranti-provenienti-dallitalia-gMZ5afdIlf2iwjNYoiPrNN/pagina.html> , in Zanotti, Raphael, "Austria ready to deploy the army at the Brennero border to block immigrants coming from Italy", *lastampa.it* (17/4/2017).

⁵ <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2017/04/12/decreto-minniti-orlando-legge> , in Camilli, Annalisa, "The Orlando-Minniti decree on immigration is now law" in *internazionale.it* (12 April 2017).

⁶ https://www.termometropolitico.it/1308088_sondaggi-politici-ixe-immigrazione-salvini.html , Vena, Emanuele, "Ixe political polls. Immigration: 7 Italians out of 10 agree with Salvini" in *termometropolitico.it* (19/6/2018).

and that is why the case studies will also address possible alternative explanations, and mainly: the role of the economic crisis which might have punished the government in charge for economic reasons, the role of terrorism which could have fostered the vote share of the far right based on anti-Islamic discourse, and lastly ideological reasons. This study anticipates that because the downward pattern followed by these parties is general and not country specific, and because the demise of these parties happened in the same time-frame, hypothesis looking only at the specific situation of countries are not compelling explanations. An overarching phenomenon most likely requires an overarching explanation.

Specifically, the operationalization of the dependent variable is realized through a textual analysis of the political *manifestos* of the moderate parties before the election, to see whether they favored a more open or more closed approach to immigration and refugees. However, as electors do not only look at platforms but also at performance during government periods, it is obvious that this element mattered too. In fact, the British case shows that is not necessarily true, as in the days after BREXIT the Labour Party was considered as its lowest point in history, without having been in government for a while. At the same time, openly contradictory policies and platforms undermine the credibility of the party, as in the case of Germany, where the line of the party shifted only a couple of months before the national elections. However, also the SPD program is not exactly open towards immigration. Although these additional effects might play a role, the variation in the political manifestos before the elections is the best indicator to gauge the position of the party and, more importantly, how the party presented itself to voters. Analyzing the DV in this way also allows for a more compelling comparisons as it holds things constant.

The hypothesis is that, in a comparison of countries, the hardline stance of the Social-Democratic moderate parties towards immigration in Western Europe results in electoral loss of votes. This hardline stance caused at the same time:

- 1) people already opposed to immigration to vote for conservative or far-right parties,
- 2) people favoring immigration to vote for more leftist parties. This second effect is unlikely to take place in majoritarian system because of lack of competition from outside the political spectrum. In this second case, if there is a shift to the left this will happen within the party, towards a more general open policy towards immigration.

The implication, in other words, is that if the traditionally moderate party takes a conservative stance towards immigrants to reduce support for far-right parties, this is actually more likely to yield the opposite effect in the long run, as voters worried about immigration will vote for the latter. At the same time, the more progressive voters might leave the party and either abstain or vote for more progressive party. This is true not only for immigration, the economy is another aspect that could potentially yield the same logic: when expansive reforms operating in debt (as the last one proposed by the Italian government) are defended by the moderate parties with straightforward neo-liberal narrative defending the Central European Bank, the difference between moderate left and moderate right becomes extremely clouded (this argument is deeply analyzed in Garrett & Lange, 1991).

Van Spanje (2010) argued that the existence of successful anti-immigrant opposition parties has the power to directly affect governments in a more restrictive oriented fashion because of the fear of competition. This and other similar analysis sometimes overlook the exact mechanism causing the disruption of moderate progressive parties. Although the existence of anti-immigrant parties plays a role, the issue is that these parties became more relevant because the problems linked to immigration became more salient, with strong effects also on the public opinion supporting Social-Democratic parties.

Four Case-Studies

Different mechanisms can possibly explain the demise of the largest social-democratic parties. In France, the terrorist attacks at the newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* and Bataclan club, plus the handling of the

aftermath by the Presidency, might have been costly for Hollande and the P.S.,⁷ Italy is at the geographical frontlines of massive immigration sailing from North Africa, the CDU-SPD coalition in Germany proved effective in ruling the country in terms of the economy.⁸ The common factor in all these countries can in fact be found in the approach of these parties towards immigration. It is worth noting how alternative hypothesis linked to terrorist attacks and economic crisis are also linked with immigration, both because of the alleged link between immigration and Islamic extremism, at least in the narrative of the far-right party,⁹ or because of the fear of competition with immigrants in the job market in a situation of economic crises which reduces welfare state benefits for local citizens (Freeman, 1986). In addition, natives might fear a higher level of competition of similarly low-skilled immigrants, whereas there might be a different perception for high-skilled immigration (Haimueller & Hiscox, 2010), and in fact the traditional electoral base of far-right parties is made of low-skilled workers (according the post-vote IPSOS report on the Italian elections, the relative majority of low-skilled workers voted the League, p.11). This study now looks at five case-studies to test its theory (France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy):

1. France

The *Parti Socialiste Français* (Socialist Party of France) led by François Hollande was in power in 2012-17. Even if France was not too deeply affected from the 2008-2009 crisis, we can see that this alternative hypothesis does not explain how Hollande came in power in 2012 with over 10 million votes in the first-round and over 18 million votes in the second-round against conservative candidate Sarkozy.¹⁰ Five years later, French Socialist Presidential candidate Benoit Hammon gained slightly over 2 million votes, scoring a disappointing (if not catastrophic) 6.36%, the worst result of the Socialist Party in France. What caused this result? France suffered a relevant wave of ISIS terrorist attacks in 2015, which left a long-lasting mark in the country. With almost 250 victims and many more wounded, the Islamist attacks on the satirical paper Charlie Hebdo and on 15 November in Paris, French Intelligence and government were accused of not doing all that was possible to prevent the attacks. It could be the case that the outrage of the French population towards the attacks and the inability of the government to do anything about it resulted in the massive electoral loss.

At the same time, if that was the case we should have seen a higher increase in the post-Fascist National Front (now National Rally) vote share, which explicitly stated that its goal was to win the Second Round (Marine Le-Pen's party arrived second in the First Round with 21.30% and it gained 33.90% in the second round with more than 10 million and a half vote, an unprecedented result but still far from the hopes of the party regarding the possibility of making government).¹¹ In fact, the far-left formation of ex-Trotskyist Jean-Luc-Melenchon ("Unbowed France") was almost able to compete to enter the second round, as it gained more than 7 million votes and 20% vote share. The votes from the former mainstream left went mainly in that direction, and they also went towards the pro-European party of "*En Marche*" led by Emmanuel Macron. Looking at the debate regarding the Presidential elections in France it is clear that terrorism was the main topic. At the same time, this debate was not necessarily linked to security aspects,

⁷ <https://www.thelocal.fr/20160202/french-lose-faith-in-hollande-to-lead-fight-on-terror> , "No wonder French losing faith in Hollande's war on terror" in *The Local*, thelocal.fr (2/2/2016).

⁸ <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/germany-economy-growing-voters-against-politicians-why-angela-merkel-sdp-a8210691.html>, McRae, Hamish, "Germany's economy is growing. So why are voters turning against politicians who brought them this success?" in *The Independent*, independent.co.uk (14/2/2018).

⁹ In fact, most of the attacks related to Islamic extremism in Western Europe were carried out by European citizens.

¹⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/06/francois-hollande-wins-french-election> , Chrisafis, Angelique, "François Hollande wins French Presidential Elections" in *The Guardian*, theguardian.com (6 May 2012).

¹¹ <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/paris-attack-could-help-marine-le-pen.html> , Chandran, Nyshka, CNBC, "Paris attack could strengthen Le Pen heading into Sunday vote" in *The Guardian*, theguardian.com (21 April 2017).

but also to immigration. The National Front built a narrative of Muslim immigrants increasing the risk of terrorist attacks in France and declaring a crusade against “Islamic fundamentalism”.¹²

On the other hand, Hollande and the French government responded with crackdowns on immigration and extensive police operations targeting immigrants.¹³ There was also a serious debate regarding the possibility of revoking French citizenship for citizens convicted of terrorism.¹⁴ Although the project was ultimately canceled, it is a clear example of the stance of the Socialist Party on the subject. It is evident that French public opinion after the terrorist attacks was the main cause of these shifts. In this situation, former voters of the Socialist Party concerned with immigration and terrorism either voted Macron or the Conservatives, but an often-overlooked aspect is that the progressive electorate opposed to hardline policies shifted towards the more leftist (or centrist European) side. In fact, anecdotal and media evidence suggest that one of the reasons French voters did not vote the Socialist Party is because of this hardline stance, which stands in stark contrast with the alleged underlying value of the party.¹⁵ In general, social-democratic parties have been accused of realizing right wing policies all over Europe, and some experts noticed how the European left has substantially “turned right on immigration”.¹⁶

This strategy however overlooks that there are already political parties opposed to immigrants, which would be preferred by hard-liners because they have always been coherently anti-immigrant. Hollande declared towards the end of his term that “there is too much immigration in France”.¹⁷ This kind of policies is likely to yield catastrophic electoral results because it disperses votes in all possible directions. Obviously, elections are decided by more than one factor: they are decided by the economy, the general performance of the country, safety issues. Yet, it seems that immigration had a prominent role in the electoral campaign and that the Socialist reaction to that was substantially harmful as it consisted in a strong shift towards the right of the party. Additionally, the main issue that likely played a role in shaping the results of the French elections (namely, Islamic terrorism) was often linked by political actors to the issue of immigration.

Despite these elements, the percentage loss of the French Socialist Party is much higher than in the other countries, and it almost caused the complete dissolution of the party itself. That could mean that there were several additional reasons other than perspectives regarding immigrations. Although this could be the case, it is worth to note that the *extent* to which the French Socialists engaged in anti-immigration rhetoric and in crackdown policy is also much higher than in other countries. In fact, the *Parti Socialiste Français* was the only one who openly completely crossed the line of the pro/anti-immigrant front, positioning itself in a clear way with a strongly conservative attitude. The ratio of this strategy was to drain votes for the far-right in a context where it was generally thought that the anti-immigrant narrative could have played a stronger role after the terrorist attacks.¹⁸ The result was the opposite: the

¹² <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-speech-campaign-launch-islamic-fundamentalism-french-elections-a7564051.html> , Farand, Chloe, “Marine Le Pen launches presidential campaign with hardline speech” in “*The Independent*”, theindependent.co.uk (5 February 2017).

¹³ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/699848/Migrants-refugees-asylum-seekers-paris-france-camps-police-jungle-francois-hollande> , Osborne, Simon, “France launches crackdown against migrants with thousands cleared from streets of Paris” in *The Express*, express.co.uk (15 August 2016).

¹⁴ <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/france-drops-terrorism-citizenship-bill-1.3511865> “François Hollande drops bill to revoke French citizenship of convicted terrorists” in *Reuters*, cbc.ca (30 March 2016).

¹⁵ https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/marie-c/cher-parti-socialiste-pourquoi-je-ne-voterai-plus-pour-toi_b_12023894.html , in French. Marie C., “Dear Socialist Party, here’s why I will not vote for you anymore” in “*The Huffington Post*”, huffingtonpost.fr (5 October 2016).

¹⁶ <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/europes-left-turns-right-immigration/> , Bröning, Michael, “Europe’s left turns right on immigration” in “*New Europe*”, neweurope.eu (25 June 2018).

¹⁷ https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/pour-hollande-il-y-a-trop-d-immigration-qui-ne-devrait-pas-etre-la-12-10-2016-2075244_20.php , AFP, “For Holland there is too much immigration which ‘should not be there’” in lepoint.fr (12 October 2016).

¹⁸ <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/04/french-terror-attack-could-benefit-marine-le-pen> , Bush, Stephen., “The French Terror Attack could benefit Marine Le Pen” in *New Statesman* (21 April 2017).

more the PSF went in that direction, the more it was likely to lose votes from its electoral base. Skeptics might highlight how this could be linked to other factors (scandals, the economy) but it is worth to note that former-Socialist voters voted either for Melançon or Macron, who both expressed quite different views in terms of immigration compared to the French Socialist's manifesto. Far from being an exceptional case resulting in an extremely odd of percentage loss, the French case actually explains the theoretical implications of the theory presented here with the greatest clarity: the more the moderate parties will adopt anti-immigrant stances, the more votes they will lose in the next election.

This can be clearly seen through the analysis of the political *manifesto* of French Socialist Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon for the 2017 elections. In the political program there is no proposed laws of reforms regarding immigration or refugees. Instead, great emphasis is dedicated to "security". More specifically, Hamon proposed a relevant increase of police forces and controls (Hamon political program: "My project to make the heart of France beat" p.22) and a "law regarding security" (*ibid.*). In the same program there is also a proposed crackdown on radical mosques, a proposed increase of the maximum sentences for terrorism and a plan to introduce new categories of crimes related to terrorism, in addition to increased controls regarding public transportation (*ibid.*). It is therefore clear that Hamon's program was openly following a hardline approach towards immigration. Refugees and immigrants are also not mentioned at all in the *manifesto*.

2. United Kingdom

On 9 May 2016, Sadiq Khan, a British citizen of Pakistani heritage, member of the Labor Party, was elected Mayor of London. This is the first time that a Muslim representative became mayor in a capital city in Europe,¹⁹ also because of the direct appeal towards the Muslim community in London, often left out of the picture in France because its role is hotly debated and this kind of narrative is generally thought to result in the loss of the moderate votes. However, the London example shows that retaining moderate voters not in favor of immigration and integration is not the best way to win elections. Despite the rhetoric identifying the end of leftist ideology as electorally attractive, some of the most unexpected results in Western European elections come from more far-left parties: *Syriza*, *Podemos*, "Unbowed" France to name the main ones.

The Labour Party in the U.K. was able to increase its vote share in the last election, despite not winning the majority of parliamentary seats. The Conservative Party of Theresa May, who called the elections to increase the vote share of the party according to polls,²⁰ ended up losing the absolute majority and had to strike a deal with the Northern Irish Unionist.²¹ The Labour Party in the United Kingdom is the only party, which was not in government in this study, so an alternative theory is that it might have gained from being an opposition party. This theory overlooks two main elements: the first one is the BREXIT referendum. Although it led an ambivalent campaign, the U.K. Labour Party's standing on BREXIT was in favor of the "remain".²² If the party was advantaged because it was not in government, then the "remain" option should have prevailed. In fact, the result of the Brexit vote left the Labour Party in "turmoil"²³ and

¹⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/europe/britain-election-results.html> , Castle, Stephen, "Sadiq Khan elected in London, becoming its first Muslim mayor," in "New York Times", nytimes.com (6 May 2016).

²⁰ <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/year-in-politics-theresa-may-conservatives-jeremy-corbyn-labour-boris-johnson-a8094426.html> , Grice, Andrew, "Theresa May's ultimate U-turn in calling a snap election paved the way for a turbulent year of political surprises" in *The Independent*, independent.co.uk (24 December 2017).

²¹ <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40245514> , Hunt, Alex, "Theresa May and the DUP deal: What you need to know" in *BBC*, bbc.com (26 June 2017).

²² <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36496288> "E.U. Referendum: Labour urges its voters not to back Brexit", *BBC*, bbc.com (10 June 2016).

²³ <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/26/europe/uk-brexit-labour-corbyn/index.html> , Hume, Tim, "Britain's Labour Party in turmoil over Brexit vote results", *CNN*, cnn.com (27 June 2016).

posed several issues for the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, elected Secretary of the party few months before Brexit. Immigration was at the center of the debate regarding the referendum (Hobolt, 2016) as people tended to blame the E.U. for the increased level of the number of immigrants in the country.

The second aspect is that one of the reasons the snap election was called by the government also because the Conservative party it had an unprecedented 20 points lead according to the polls, as the Labour Party was deeply divided after the Brexit issue.²⁴ If anything, it would seem that up until the snap elections were called, the Labour Party was losing terrain and it was supposed to lose several seats in the House of Commons. These two facts clearly show that the opposition party did not have an advantage just because it was at the opposition, and that the government was not performing poorly in the polls.

After the referendum vote, some factions within the Labour Party tried to pass a motion asking for the resignation of Jeremy Corbyn from the role of Secretary of the Labour Party. That motion was approved, but Corbyn refused to resign.²⁵ Meanwhile, after BREXIT Corbyn repeatedly took position against the anti-immigrant rhetoric and he stressed the concerns regarding the consequences of BREXIT for skilled European workers,²⁶ which represent almost 3 million people in the U.K. (mainly from Poland and Ireland, but also Romania, Portugal, Italy and France).²⁷

Immigration became a central issue regarding British politics, because it was also one of the main elements that made people vote for BREXIT. It is generally thought (Hobolt, 2016) that the young multicultural European generation voted strongly in favor of the “remain” option, whereas older people tended to be more euro-skeptical. If that is true, it would mean that the new European generation perceives being part of the E.U. as a fundamental value. This analysis, however, does not consider that the youth turn-out in the BREXIT vote was not high to say the least. Although the data are quite different according to different medias and research institutes, the estimated turn-out of the youth vote for the 18-to-24 years old varies between 36% and 64%. Even taking the best-case scenario for the youth turnout, this figure is still significantly below the 90% turn-out of voters in the age range 65 and over.²⁸

At the same time, the argument that the Brexit defeat was the fault of youth turnout (when young people overwhelmingly voted “remain”) might have played an important role in the British national elections, where the Labour Party almost reached the Tories, gained 40% vote share and increased its vote base by 3,5 million. Fearing that a low turnout between young people might have favored more anti-European forces for the second time in a few months, the youth vote went in bloc to the Labour Party, as youngsters identified in Jeremy Corbyn the political representative of a different idea regarding Europe and multi-culturalism in general. The anger towards the results of the Brexit referendum might have fostered the youth turn-out in the general election to give a message against the élites who were perceived as traitors of the younger generations, as pointed out by political analysts, also because young people in Great Britain have close interpersonal links with young people in other E.U. countries: they have relatives, friends, significant others and possibly families with people who came to the U.K. from other countries.²⁹

²⁴ <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/935018/UK-next-general-election-Labour-party-Jeremy-Corbyn-Conservatives-polls> , Scotto di Santolo, Alessandra, “Britain’s top polling guru reveals why Labour are in BIG TROUBLE at next general election” in “The Express”, [express.co.uk](https://www.express.co.uk) (22 March 2018).

²⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36647458> , “Labour MPs pass no-confidence motion in Jeremy Corbyn” in *BBC News* (28 June 2016).

²⁶ E.U. citizens do not need passports or visa to move in another E.U. country, it is unclear what will happen in the U.K. regarding this aspect after Brexit, also considering that the U.K. is one of the main countries of emigration from other E.U. states.

²⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-uk-leaves-the-eu-36745584> , “Reality Check: How many E.U. Nationals live in the U.K.?” in *BBC News*, [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com) (8 July 2016).

²⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/09/young-people-referendum-turnout-brexit-twice-as-high>; Helm, Toby, “E.U. Referendum: Youth turnout almost twice as first thought” in “The Guardian”, [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com) (10 July 2016).

²⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/europe/britain-elections-youth-vote.html> , Yeginsu, Ceilan, “What turned the British elections? Maybe the youth vote” in “New York Times”, [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com) (9 June 2017).

The BREXIT vote threatened all this, as E.U. citizens living in Great Britain risked (and still actually risk) to become illegal immigrants overnight. Not only this threatens the values of multi-culturalism promoted by the progressive left appealing to the youth vote, it threatens to a great extent also the interpersonal relations of young British citizens.³⁰

Although immigration regarding other E.U. countries played a huge role in the national political elections because of BREXIT, it is worth to note how the discourse and narrative of the Labour Party in the U.K. was valid also regarding immigration and refugees more in general, as it can be clearly seen by the political *manifesto* for the 2017 elections. In the political platform presented in the Labour manifesto there is an entire section dedicated to the protection of immigrants. Although the emphasis is obviously on the E.U. citizens living in the U.K., there are some passages highlighting how Corbyn's platform was open more in general. For instance, Labour is the only moderate parties in this study to clearly express concepts such as "Labour values the economic and social contributions of immigrants" (Labour political platform "For the many not the few", p.28) and statements clearly criticizing the policies of the Tories regarding refugees ("Unlike the Tories, we will uphold the proud British tradition of honoring the spirit of the International law and our moral obligations by taking a fair share of refugees", *ibid.* p.28-29).

Overall, immigration played an important role in moving the youth vote from abstentionism towards the Labour party after Brexit, an effect that might have been taking place also in other age groups. The main engine for this shift was the position on immigration and Brexit of the Labour Party, despite Corbyn's ambivalent campaign during the referendum. His personal leadership and appeal to youth vote are unusual for a main moderate progressive party in Western Europe and also one of the main factors of the electoral success.

The British electoral system also favored these shifts, as it prevented the challenges coming from third parties because of the first-past-the-post system. In fact, despite being a leader of a moderate party, Corbyn is often associated with the rise of the new alternative left outside the mainstream parties (*Syriza*, *Podemos*, "Unbowed France", or Bernie Sanders).³¹ The economic positions of Corbyn also appealed to the youth vote, but without the BREXIT effect and its link with immigration it is at least doubtful that the Labour Party could have bounced back in this fashion.

This begs the question: was Corbyn's success the result of a good political strategy or a result mainly caused by the majoritarian system and not replicable across Europe? The electoral system is part of the story as it eliminates the possibility of strong challengers (unless they have a strong regional base, like the Scottish National Party). At the same time, without the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn the Labour would not have achieved the same result. The main question however remains: can a "Corbyn effect" happen also in other places in Europe with a proportional representation system and in the presence of many challengers? To make such a comparison, one would need to assess a case where the moderate party ran with a more open platform regarding immigration and performed well. However, there is no such case because none of the major parties decided to run with this kind of approach (at least in major countries in Europe in terms of population), so there is no way to test what would have happened, although the Italian case (where 1/3 of the seats is first past the post) shows that challengers can win these seats too (most of these districts went to the Center-Right or the Five-Stars Movement, which is clearly the "challenger" in the Italian political scenario).

The fact that in all major European countries with Proportional Representation systems progressive voters shifted to more radical parties also signals that this effect is existing, and that the strategy used until now by moderate parties is unlikely to win elections. In Italy, because of the absence

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/07/how-jeremy-corbyn-and-european-left-are-reclaiming-populism> , Eaton, George. "New Statesman, How Jeremy Corbyn and the European Left are reclaiming populism", *newstatesman.com* (11 July 2018).

of credible leftist alternatives, many voters left the Democratic Party and ended up in the abstentionist pool. The common knowledge suggests to party leaderships in Europe that if they take a more open approach towards immigration, they will end up losing votes (because of the general anti-immigrant sentiment) and that is why a Corbyn case never happened in other countries. As this strategy did not seem to work, however, some parties might want to try a different approach even under a Proportional Representation system, so that they can get more votes at the left end of the spectrum, differently from what Downs argues. Although this might seem a speculative reasoning, the success of Corbyn and leftist parties in Western Europe would seem to suggest that this is precisely the mechanism in action.

3. Germany

Grand Coalitions have been generally used in Western Europe to prevent the rise of far-left and far-right radical parties. The logic behind this strategy is to preserve the key foundational elements supposedly representing the common values shared by the citizens. This strategy generally tended to work: the two main blocks were able to reach a level of electoral support that cannot be easily challenged by third parties. However, as highlighted by some authors (Jacoby, 2017) this strategy is also risky. It works as long as the general consensus towards the mainstream parties is relevant, yet the very formation of the Grand Coalition with former political opponents (possibly the ones criticized during the electoral campaign) is likely to upset voters of both sides of that Coalition and push them towards radical political challengers. In that case, the strategy of Great Coalitions leads in the long-run to relevant electoral upsets.

In Germany, the country ran on Great Coalitions in the periods 2005-2009 and 2013-2017, both governments were led by the Christian-Democrats (CDU/*Christian-Demokratische Union*) leader Angela Merkel. The *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* (German Social-Democratic Party) participated in both governments, finding itself associated with the center-right for a time-frame of 8 years. If the differences between main competitors fade-up to a point where there is no clear difference between parties, it is unclear why a moderate progressive voter should keep voting for the SPD if the most likely result is a government coalition between the CDU and SPD, after months of electoral campaign where the parties were up against each other despite having governed for 8 years together. The SPD, incidentally, did not just lose votes in the last election, it is constantly losing millions of votes in the last decades (it had 20 million votes in 1998 with a 40% vote share, it lost exactly half in 20 years), it is basically in a free fall trajectory arguably also because of Great Coalitions.³²

Because Socialist leaders can hardly criticize and confront the government in which the SPD participated (and they cannot make many remarks on government success, which is equated with Merkel),³³ the consequence is the loss of votes in all possible directions. Moreover, the governmental policies of the center-right became also identified with the center-left policies, because policies in Great Coalitions are decided jointly. Immigration posed a puzzle to the entire German political system. In 2015, the government opened the doors (for a short period of time) to Syrian refugees.³⁴ The same Angela Merkel, now three years later just signed a deal that increases the numbers of control and transitions center, making it more difficult for immigrants to enter the country.³⁵

³² <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-fall-and-fall-of-german-social-democracy-german-regional-elections-spd-malu-dreyer-sigmar-gabriel/>, Delcker, Janosh, "The Fall and Fall of German Social Democracy" in *Politico*, politico.eu (4 January 2016).

³³ <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/28/the-crisis-of-the-spd-where-now-for-germanys-social-democrats/> Bremer, Björn, "The crisis of the SPD: Where now for Germany's social democrats?" London School of Economics, blogs.lse.ac.uk.

³⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/20/angela-merkel-exit-german-refugee-policy-syrian-migrants> , Schnee, Christian, "Is Angela Merkel's exit strategy shaping refugee policy?" in *The Guardian*, theguardian.com (20-10-2015).

³⁵ <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/07/02/europe/merkel-seehofer-government-intl/index.html> , Schmidt, Nadine & Judith Vonberg, "Germany's Merkel makes deal with interior minister on migration dispute" in *CNN*, cnn.com (2 July 2018).

The 2015 approach of the Merkel government did not last long anyway, as it was followed by a deal between the E.U. and Turkey strongly wanted by the German government, where in exchange for money Turkey should patrol the border to prevent the entry of immigrants and refugees try to enter Europe through the so-called Balkan route. This agreement, heavily criticized by NGOs and humanitarian organizations,³⁶ was signed by the Great Coalition government with the participation of the Socialist Party. The SPD expressed some “concerns”,³⁷ but the former Socialist Foreign Minister Steinmeier was reported saying: “we need to cooperate [with Turkey] to some extent, if we want to avoid the circumstances we had last year” (the circumstances being the massive flow of refugees).³⁸

The SPD is therefore responsible for the deal too, and this happened to be a crucial deal basically closing one of the main roads of access for immigrants and refugees. The youth vote, generally more open and multi-cultural, was not receptive to this message, if it is true that the majority of 18-to-24 years old did not vote for the SPD. Despite the somewhat paradoxical claim of the SPD’s youth press officer Benjamin Koester that because of the strong German economy “the situation is just too good to start a revolution”,³⁹ the main problem is that it is unclear why voters should vote for the SPD instead of Merkel if the two did the same things in the last decade.

Although the political party of the “Left” (“Die Linke”), the modern evolution of the former Communist Party, did not gain much in the last 2017 elections, it was able to slightly increase its vote share and score a relevant 9.2% (4,297,270 votes). The Greens have also similar numbers, meaning that the two parties combined have roughly the same share of the SPD. At the same time, the more moderate attitude in the initial phases of the refugee crisis might have convinced some moderate SPD voters to vote CDU⁴⁰ and others to not vote at all. It also had the effect to bolster the far-right party of *Alternative Fur Deutschland* (AFD), now identified as the strongest anti-immigrant party. It is also a relevant one, since it was able to obtain a vote share of 12.6% with almost 6 million votes (and an improvement of 7.9%).⁴¹

Because of the Great Coalition effect, the SPD was identified as a party not opposing one of the more debated deals on immigration in the recent history of Europe. Meanwhile, the open policy aspects in the initial phases was identified with the name and the party of Angela Merkel. Although the good economy can explain why voters rewarded Merkel’s leadership, it is worth noting that the CDU lost 8.6% of its vote share, and it is constantly losing votes towards more radical section of the electoral base, despite these good economic indicators, so voters did not actually reward economic performance. Whereas the votes lost by the SPD ended up in multiple directions (left, abstentionism, CDU), it is clear that the main reason this shift happened is because of immigration and it is probably not a coincidence that Merkel decided for a quick U-turn on the issue once the public was increasingly becoming hostile to the open-door policy. The substantial irrelevance and ambiguity of the SPD in this matter was probably of no help for the party.⁴²

³⁶ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/> , Gogou, Kondylia, “The E.U.-Turkey deal: Europe’s year of shame” in “Amnesty International”, amnesty.org (20 March 2017).

³⁷ <https://www.newsweek.com/merkel-accused-opening-germany-turkish-blackmail-460127> , Reuters, “Merkel accused of opening Germany to Turkish ‘blackmail’” in *Reuters/Newsweek.com* (15 May 2016).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/how-germanys-social-democratic-party-lost-the-youth-vote/article36374803/> , Reguly, Eric, “How Germany’s Social Democratic Party lost the youth vote,” in “*The Globe and Mail*”, theglobeandmail.com (22 September 2017).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-merkel-bundestag-afd> , Clark, Sean, “German elections 2017: Full results” in “*The Guardian*” theguardian.com (25 September 2017).

⁴² <http://openmigration.org/en/op-ed/germanys-conflicted-middle-in-order-to-reach-them-we-must-understand-them/> (Open Migration shows that 17% of Germans is strongly opposed to immigration, 18% moderate opponents, 23% “Humanitarian Skeptics”).

The electoral program of the SPD reflects the change of leadership that took place few months before the 2017 elections, when Martin Schultz took the leadership of the party with a slightly more open platform. The political *manifesto* of the SPD is a bit more open towards refugees than the other ones, and it calls for “European solidarity” and the right of asylum (SPD Political *Manifesto*, “Time for more Justice”, p.74). At the same time, it remains vague on general issues regarding immigration that, according to the *manifesto*, must be reordered. The program also calls for harder measures to contrast illegal immigration and for the rejection and deportation of people whose asylum application was denied.

4. Italy

Hard line immigration policy from the former leftist P.D. government, hostility of public opinion, lack of real leftist alternatives and rise of populist movements shaped the characteristic of Italian politics in recent years. This is also the only case where populist and far-right parties were able to gain power, and mainly so because their key issue was hostility towards immigration, as in the case of the League (*Lega*, former “Northern League”) led by Secretary of the Party, Minister of Internal Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini. This shows how the strategy of imitating far-right parties to reduce their support actually produces the opposite outcome.

The Italian case also falsifies the hypothesis that terrorism alone can explain the demise of the Social-Democratic parties, as Italy did not suffer any Islamist-related terrorist attack. Regarding the situation of Social-Democratic parties, in the last national Italian elections of 2018 the Democratic Party reached its historical minimum with 18.76% vote share and slightly more than 6 million votes. The moderate right also lost support. The gaining parties were the 5-Stars Movement/*Cinque Stelle* (with an unprecedented 32.68% and more than 10 million votes) and the far-right League of Matteo Salvini (17.35%, record for the party, 5.7 million votes).

These two forces were able to form a government together, which prioritizes the hard-stance towards the European Union, hardline on immigration and more intervention of the state in support of the economy. What explains the loss of almost 6 million votes in 10 years of the Democratic Party? In terms of the specifics of the Italian situation many elements have been indicated: the continuing effects of the economic crisis, the unusually high number of scandals, arrests and convictions for corruption and similar within the Democratic Party,⁴³ a close alignment with the liberal political economy of the European Union and the European Central Bank (led by Italian economist Mario Draghi).⁴⁴ It is doubtful that a general European demise of Social-Democracy can be linked to specific domestic factors, although these elements did not help. Immigration was the main puzzle during the last years for the Democratic Party. Italy is on the frontlines of immigration flows coming from the failed state of Libya, where after the Revolution smugglers in control of the territory organize human trafficking, with the result of increasing to unprecedented levels the numbers of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers in Italy,⁴⁵ despite a

⁴³ <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2017/03/18/mafia-capitale-i-versamenti-le-iscrizioni-al-pd-e-quei-100mila-euro-che-non-versammo-perche-fummo-arrestati/3458196/> Palladino, Andrea, “Capital Mafia. The money transfers, the sign ups to the Democratic Party and those 100k euros we did not pay because we were arrested” in “*Il Fatto Quotidiano*”, [ilfattoquotidiano.it](https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it) (18 March 2017). The main scandal was the involvement of the Roman section of the Democratic Party with local criminal groups, in the so-called “Capital Mafia” scandal and having the main consequence of causing the Five-Stars Movements to win the local elections for Mayor in Rome in 2016 with a landslide victory (67.15% in the second round) with controversial Mayor Virginia Raggi (also the first woman to serve in this position in Rome).

⁴⁴ There are some paradoxes in this sense: for instance, the expansive political economy of the government has been challenged on the bases that Brussels and Frankfurt do not like the reform, which is an argument traditionally made by conservative parties.

⁴⁵ https://www.corriere.it/cronache/18_marzo_20/migranti-richieste-asilo-ue-dimezzate-un-anno-ma-non-italia-36e2ff40-2c2c-11e8-aa71-9a5a346d5f9b.shtml, Del Frate, Claudio, “Migrants. Asylum requests halved in the E.U. in the last year (but with a 4% increase in Italy)” in “*Corriere della Sera*”, [Corriere.it](https://www.corriere.it) (20/3/2018).

reduction in the numbers after the Italian government, thanks to the requests of the League, decided to close the seaports to immigrants arriving by boat.

Immigration in Italy became salient in the years following the Arab uprisings and the complete state failure of Libya, which became a hotspot for human trafficking and smuggling from all of North and West Africa towards the south of Italy. This salience probably caused a shift in the public opinion in a more restrictive sense, and it did not help that the European Union did not want to be involved too much on the issue. Looking at surveys by Italian firms during the period in which the PD was ruling the country, this effect can be seen clearly, with an overwhelming majority being opposed to immigration and the progressive voters at the very least divided on the topic (for instance, 41% PD voters disagreed with then Prime Minister Renzi's statement that "the last meeting in Europe regarding immigration was a giant success").⁴⁶

Additionally, only 16% of Italian Public opinion was in favor of welcoming refugees (the phrasing was about refugees, not "immigrants").⁴⁷ This particular finding might seem to suggest that the strategy pursued by the Italian Democratic Party is rational, as it is a reaction to a perceived shift of the public opinion and in this view having a more restrictive attitude towards immigration might help in retaining votes. This would also confirm the findings of Lahav (2011), who shows how liberals can become opposed to immigration when it is framed as a national security threat rather than a threat to national identity. Yet, because 22% of the people who voted P.D. in 2013 abstained in 2018, this claim does not hold water, as it does not address whether or not the shift of the party regarding immigration issue was one of the main factors causing people to abstain in the first place. In the absence of credible and relevant alternatives to the left, and with all the other parties expressing a hardline towards immigration (with an arguably softer approach for the Five-Stars Movement), people who were against the hardline policies of the government probably decided to abstain (and most of the overall increase in the abstentionism comes exactly from the abstention of ex-P.D. voters).

This fact also signals that, contrary to Berinsky's argument, preferences are not given, and that electors *will* leave the party if they do not feel represented (at least in proportional representation systems). Therefore, the data in the poll might actually signal that the Democratic Party was mainly able to retain people already opposing to immigration and refugees, rather than signaling an overall shift in the moderate leftist public opinion. In other words, it is not that the voters of the Democratic Party became more opposed to immigration, what happened instead is that the Democratic Party was able to retain only the votes of people already more opposed to immigration, which is different.

The government, and mainly former Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Order Marco Minniti (member of the Democratic Party) tried to react to this perceived shift in the public opinion with hardline measures and restrictive laws in the last government led by the Democratic Party, increasing rejections of asylum seekers, number of detention centers and repatriations. The law was heavily criticized leftist parties and by members of the Party itself (Italian PD has an extremely high number of factions) and also by NGOs operating on the matter (particularly those involved in the rescue of immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea). In the 2018 political program of the Democratic Party, immigration is mentioned to state that there is a humanitarian problem but that "Europe must deal with the migration phenomenon..." (P.D. political program "Stronger. Fairer. Italy", 2018, p.26), implying that Italy should not be in charge of the matter. This is the only explicit mention regarding immigration issues in the program, other than the proposed rejection of the Dublin Treaty (which states that immigrants and refugees coming to Europe must remain in the first country they enter). That is because the leadership of the Democratic Party was

⁴⁶ https://www.scribd.com/document/264238234/Sbarchi-migranti-sondaggio-Panorama-aprile-2015#fullscreen&from_embed

⁴⁷ <http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/media/Immigrazione-sondaggio-solo-16-per-cento-degli-italiani-favorevole-ad-accogliere-rifugiati-75aa1df9-5d47-48dc-9f7b-66f5cc099ac9.html#foto-3>

afraid of the electoral trap regarding immigration: a progressive party cannot reject its underlying ideological values completely, but it must also accommodate perceived shifts in the public opinion. Conversely, the League's main point was contrast to immigration.

The Five-Stars Movement always tried to stay completely out of the issue (and even now that is in government it leaves the matter to the Northern League alone) because of its characterization as a "take-all" party, aiming to drain votes from both sides of the political spectrum (successfully). Yet, most of its members and supporters are against immigration, and they are not required to be coherent with some ideological standards because of their characterization as an "anti-ideological" movement.⁴⁸ The existence of a radical (but non-ideological) challenger party made it possible for some former voters of the Democratic Party opposed to immigration to vote another party without crossing the ideological divide with the right of far-right.⁴⁹ Even if scandals also tended to favor this flow of votes, as the Movement presents itself as the champion of "honesty", immigration also plays a relevant role. An analysis of electoral flows shows that 14% of people who voted P.D. in 2013 voted the Movement in 2018 (22% abstained), meanwhile the Five-Stars Movement retained 76% of the votes it gained in 2013. This same effect of perceived lack of hardline approach can also explain the same shift in the center-right coalition (41% of people voting for Silvio Berlusconi in 2013 voted for the League in 2018) (*Ipsos' post-vote analysis, 2018*).

These dynamics can be traced back to the role of immigration in the political scenario and the electoral campaign. The inability to successfully solve the puzzle played an important and relevant role (although it was not the only element) in explaining the complete demise of the Italian Democratic Party and the increased relevance of anti-system and anti-immigration forces.

Renouncing Core Values

This paper argues that the main reason causing the demise of social-democratic parties is (somewhat counter-intuitively) that these parties pursued a wrong electoral strategy starkly in contrast with the supposed core values and ideology they were supposed to represent with regards to immigration issues. More specifically, universalism, multiculturalism and opposition to nationalist rhetoric have always been considered a core value of progressive leftist parties, at least since the 1990s. Proposing hardline measures on immigration caused relevant chunks of the electoral base (and young voters in particular) to leave the party, a fact that contrasts with the theories asserting that preferences of electors are given, although this could arguably be the case in the United States. Voters left the party because they did not identify themselves with the party they once supported, as progressive political parties in Western Europe tended to enact conservative policies. The immigration debate lies at the center of this particular mechanism.

However, it should be noted that this mechanism potentially applies to all the situations where parties deny some key aspects of their ideology and platforms, whether they are motivated by political constraints or by the pursuit of electoral strategy. This author disproved the alternative theory that the role of economy is relevant in explaining the demise of Social-Democratic parties in Western Europe: for instance, the case of the SPD in Germany shows how a party can be in a challenging electoral situation even if it helped the country to achieve an outstanding economic status.

At the same time, economy possibly played a role in cases, like Greece and Spain, not because the economic situation was bad in itself, but because progressive parties reacted to the 2008 economic crisis through the implementation of conservative and neo-liberal measures, as they were constrained to do so by the European Union. Therefore, parties like the Greek *Pasok* (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) had to

⁴⁸ <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/italys-populist-youth/554408/>, Schulteis, Emily, "How Italy's Five-Stars Movement is winning the youth vote" in *The Atlantic*, theatlantic.com (2 March 2018).

⁴⁹ The opposite is also true, in the sense that moderate voters of the right can do the reverse. In fact, the two-rounds electoral law of cities and municipalities always tend to favor the Five-Stars Movement, because the opponents will entirely and massively converge on the 5-Stars candidate to weaken their direct political opponents.

enact policies like firing public employees, raising the age of retirement, selling public assets. In general, the measures implemented by the Papandreou government after the negotiation with the IMF and European Commission were considered “Draconian” (Lyrintzis, 2011, p.12).

In any case, it should be noted that what caused the collapse of PASOK in the following elections it is not attributable (or at least, not only) to the economic downfall by itself, but to the fact that the party implemented hardline conservative measures in clear opposition with its ideological goals and commitments to solve the issue. As a result, the electoral base left and massively voted for the more radical leftist party of *Syriza*, led by Alexis Tsipras. This case also highlights that if a party renounces to its foundational values, the most likely result is a complete *débâcle* in the electoral competition. This same mechanism is now highlighted by the reactions of almost all social-democratic parties to immigration issues.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The current status of social democratic parties in Europe is one of total demise except for a few cases, mainly Great Britain (and arguably the Scandinavian countries). The theory presented in this paper argued that the stance of these parties on immigration plays a bigger role than what is generally thought, and that trying to implement more conservative policies on immigration is not likely to reduce support for conservative or far-right parties, as sometimes thought in the literature. Instead, the opposite tends to be true. These shifts reduce credibility for the party: more progressive voters in favor of tolerance will vote for other parties, whereas voters worried about immigration will vote for the already available anti-immigrant parties.

The structure of the electoral system can sometimes prevent the rise of challengers from more radical sides of the political spectrum. In these cases, the movement to the left will be realized (if at all) within the progressive party, if this shift does not happen, it will favor conservatives and abstentionism. Whereas this same logic is valid for many aspects of the political platforms (mainly the economic ones), this study argues that the stance on immigration played an important role in shaping the electoral performances of traditional moderate progressive parties.

It is clear that the best electoral strategy for these parties is not to follow what conservative and far-right parties say to halt the rise of these challengers. The best strategy is doing the opposite and gain the vote from abstentionists and youngsters on the basis of a more traditional progressive approach. Austerity and closed-border policies are a prerogative of conservative parties, electors in favor of these policies will vote for the conservative parties in any case, so there are no votes to gain from that pool. Corbyn’s case shows that it is instead possible to mobilize generally overlooked portion of the electoral base, provided that the party is perceived as coherent and theoretically and practically opposed to its main adversaries. As immigration is the main relevant issue in the last years in Europe, this aspect deeply influences elections.

The general demise of Social-Democratic parties is not due to the end of the ideological left or country-level factors, it is mainly due to the wrongful conviction that a political strategy aiming towards more conservative policies is able to drain votes from the conservatives’ electoral base, especially for highly debated issues such as immigration and the economy. A U-turn in this electoral strategy is likely to yield more successful electoral results, contrary to what most of the literature regarding elections argue.

	Vote Share Second-to-Last Election	Vote Share Last Election	Difference	Electoral System	Votes gone towards (or gained from the U.K.)	Stance on Immigration	Grand Coalitions	Economic conditions between last elections	Unemployment
ITALY <i>(Partito Democratico)</i>	2013: 25.53% (8,646,034)	2018: 18.76% (6,161,896)	-6.77% (-2,484,138)	Mixed (mainly proportional 1/3 first past the post)	Mainly 5-Stars Movement & Abstentionism	Ambivalent but generally against	Yes	At risk (credit rating average: BBB)	2013: 11.8 2018: 9.6
FRANCE <i>(Parti Socialiste Française)</i>	2012: 28.63% (10,272,705)	2017: 6.19% (2,291,288)	-22.44% (-7,981,417)	Popular vote (1 st round Presidential)	Mainly Melenchon vs. Macron	Hard stance after the terrorist attacks	No*	Good (Credit Rating Average: AAA)	2012: 9.4 2017: 9.7
GERMANY <i>(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland)</i>	2013: 25.7% (11,252,215)	2017: 20.5% (9,539,381)	-5.2 (-1,712,834)	Pure proportional with entry levels	Left, Greens, CDU	Generally followed Merkel (open initially, then closed)	Yes	Strong (Credit Rating Average: AAA)	2013: 5.2 2017: 3.7
UNITED KINGDOM <i>(Labour Party)</i>	2015: 30.4% (9,347,273)	2017: 40.0% (12,878,460)	+9.6% (+3,531,187)	Pure Majoritarian (First Past the Post)	Youth votes, abstentionism first vote	Open with minor criticisms	No	Good (Credit Rating Average: AAA)	2015: 5.8 2017: 4.8

*Presence of the electoral coalition of the “Republican Front” at the second round of French Presidential elections against Le Pen. Economic data from tradingeconomics.com

ELECTORAL PLATFORMS OF CENTER-LEFT PARTIES & POLICIES WHEN IN GOVERNMENT (WHERE APPLICABLE)

POLITICAL PARTY	ELECTORAL PLATFORM REGARDING IMMIGRATIONS ISSUES FOR LAST NATIONAL ELECTIONS	POLICIES WHEN IN GOVERNMENT
<i>Democratic Party (PD, Italy)</i>	Mainly a European problem: the E.U. must help Italy, proposed sanctions for E.U. members not willing to do so. Proposed rejection of the Dublin Treaty.	Hardline against irregular immigration.
<i>Labour Party (U.K.)</i>	Emphasis on Brexit: protection of immigrants “already working here, whatever their ethnicity”. The U.K. must also uphold the “moral obligation” of taking a “fair share of refugees”. Generally open approach.	N/A
<i>Socialist Party (PSF, France)*</i>	No policies mentioned in the reduced version of the program, which also focuses on increasing security, closing mosques and increasing controls, increased presence and power of police officers.	Strong crackdown on immigration after the terrorist attacks.
<i>Social-Democratic Party (SPD, Germany)</i>	Vague policies based on “solidarity” (including Germany too), easier procedures for refugees but harder measures against illegal immigration. Call for more European solidarity.	Followed Merkel’s policy, first open then closed. Supported deal with Erdogan.

Analysis realized looking at the political *manifestos* and program before the last national elections.

* Analysis of the electoral program of 2017 Socialist Presidential candidate Benoit Hammon.

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- France: Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party): Benoit Hamon: "Mon Projet pour faire battre le Cœur de la France" ("My project to make the heart of France beat"), *manifesto* for the 2017 French Presidential elections.
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Rethinking Leadership: Women Commanders, Rebel-Groups and Sexual Violence against Civilians—Cases of Colombia and Sierra Leone

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ABSTRACT: The figure of women in wartime is often associated to a passive actor that as a vulnerable group, is in need of special protection. If it is true that during conflicts gender-based violence is used as a strategy of war, it is also true that women are active combatants within rebel groups. I conduct a case study comparison between the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) in Colombia and *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) in Sierra Leone to investigate the variation in the episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians when, within rebel groups, women hold positions of command and when they are enlisted as mere soldiers, camp-followers, if not even sexual slaves. In Colombia, the episodes of sexual violence against civilians have been almost always absent in the last years of the civil war and even if women were not enlisted in the Secretariat—the FARC’s highest body—they held positions of leadership and command. Instead, in Sierra Leone, sexual violence against civilians has occurred very often and women were only enlisted as soldiers, camp-followers or sexual slaves. By implying a qualitative methodology, this essay uses academic articles and cross-national datasets figures to analyze the variation in the level of sexual violence against civilians perpetrated by the FARC and RUF. The intent of this study is to overcome the misconception about the role of women in wartime to promote an effective inclusion of women in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs.

Introduction & Research Question

The issue of sexual violence in wartime has been extensively discussed in the literature due to the implications under the international humanitarian law, within the human rights framework and in regard to the protection of vulnerable categories.¹ Usually, when thinking about sexual violence, men are considered as perpetrators, while women are victims. If it is a matter of fact that violence against women is widely spread in wartime, the one against men does not need to be overlooked.² Men are usually considered more violent than women and so, more prone to perpetrating acts of sexual violence when in reality, women can also be the perpetrator of those acts.³ Women have been conceived as passive actors in wartime, victims of physical, sexual, and mental violence, and so as a vulnerable category that deserves special protection.⁴ The misconception of women during wartime has led to a series of consequences that

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² Carpenter C. R., *Recognizing gender-based violence against civilian men and boys in conflict situations*, 2006; Sivakumaran S., *Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict*, 2007; Lewis D. A., *Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence against Men in Conflict Settings under International Law*, 2010.

³ Leggat-Smith Y., *Rwanda: Not so innocent – When women become killers*, 1995; Sharlack L., *Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of genocide*, 1999; Alison M., *Women as agents of political violence: gendering security*, 2004; McKelvey T., *One of the guys: Women as aggressors and torturers*, 2007; Bloom M., *Bombshell: The many faces of women terrorists*, 2011.

⁴ Chickin C., *Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law*, 1994; Copelon R., *Surface Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law*, 1994.

exacerbated the condition of women after civil wars: by failing to recognize women as soldiers and commanders, women have been put continuously aside from programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).⁵ In addition to that, it has led in overlooking dynamics that are related to gender issues such as the variation in the level of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians when women hold leadership positions within rebel-groups.⁶

The intent of this study is contributing to the literature address to re-thinking the role of women in wartime and investigating whether the presence of women commanders within rebel-groups reduces or not the episodes of sexual violence against civilians.⁷ By focusing on women commanders, the study wants to attempt answering the question: does the presence of women in positions of command within rebel-groups reduce the level of sexual violence against civilians? Answering this question will also mean to take into consideration that: women are not only “housekeepers”, “wives” and “mothers”, but they are also “politicians”, “soldiers” or “commanders”; and women can be both active and passive actors in wartime.⁸ There are systematic differences on how rebel groups are internally organized this, depending on socio-cultural factors; violence and in particular sexual violence, knows different kinds and levels, depending on the composition, structure and traits of rebel-groups.⁹ Mostly, having women in a position of command redefines gender roles and resize the emphasis make on masculinity.¹⁰ By implying a qualitative methodology, this research will first present the literature’s tendencies that addressed the topic of sexual violence and gender issues within rebel groups, then it will present the selection of case-studies (Colombia and Sierra Leone) for then focusing on the presentation of key and alternative hypotheses that will be tested via a case study comparison to check for the presence of women commanders within the *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) in Sierra Leone and *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) in Colombia. An examination of articles, reports and survey results will then measure the level of sexual violence perpetrated by the RUF and FARC rebel-groups.¹¹

Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

The debate about violence as inherent in men's nature has overshadowed the attention on the propensity of women to commit acts of violence.¹² Women are often perceived as less bellicose than men, as passive actors that during conflict suffer for physical, sexual and mental abuses.¹³ The implications of not considering women as a perpetrator of violence when serving as soldiers or commanders pose a double

⁵ MacKenzie M., *Securitization and desecuritization: Female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone*, 2009; Mendez A., *Militarized gender performativity: women and demobilization in Colombia’s FARC and AUC*, 2012.

⁶ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁷ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Women, Peace, and Security. Understanding the Implications, Fulfilling the Obligations*, 2000.

⁹ Goldstein J. S., *War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice versa*, 2001; Macartan H., et al., *What the fighters say: A survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, June-August 2003*, 2004; Rosenau W., et al., *Why they join, why they fight, and why they leave: Learning from Colombia’s database of demobilized militants*, 2013.

¹⁰ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

¹¹ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

¹² Leggat-Smith Y., *Rwanda: Not so innocent – When women become killers*, 1995; Sharlack L., *Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of genocide*, 1999; Alison M., *Women as agents of political violence: gendering security*, 2004; McKelvey T., *One of the guys: Women as aggressors and torturers*, 2007; Bloom M., *Bombshell: The many faces of women terrorists*, 2011.

¹³ Chickin C., *Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law*, 1994; Copelon R., *Surface Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law*, 1994; Card C., *Rape as a weapon of war*, 1996; Baaz M., *Why do soldiers rape? Masculinity, violence, and sexuality in the armed forces in the Congo (DRC)*, 2009.

threat: not only women are not adequately supported after the end of the conflict, but the society will face a situation of partial securitization and reintegration of ex-combatants since women are excluded.¹⁴

In certain societies, as for example in Rwanda after the genocide, women have been considered as mere victims of the genocide and consequently treated as such after 1994: forced to support extended families, women have been forced to live in a situation of poverty close by other women that in some way contributed—or committed—murder of loved ones.¹⁵ It is true that in the case of Rwanda, sexual violence and mass killings have been perpetrated by both men and women and that there has been a lack in terms of starting judicial procedures against everyone who was involved in the perpetration of crimes, however, women have been almost always considered as mere victims and so, never prosecuted and left in potential close contact with who was the real victim.¹⁶ The Rwandan genocide can be considered an example of ethnic rivalries that through mass atrocities and killings, intended to eliminate an entire ethnic group.¹⁷ Follows from this that sexual violence in Rwanda was used as a strategy of war, no matter if only men, women, or both were involved in the perpetration of violence.¹⁸

However, examples such as the one of Rwanda demonstrates that women are not necessarily victims, but they can be bellicose as much as men.¹⁹ The literature that has extensively focused on how to rehabilitate women after being victims of violence, has prevailed over the one addressed in demonstrating why and how the rehabilitation of women needs to be pursued when they have committed crimes.²⁰ A step forward in this sense has been made by that literature strand addressed to reverse the misconception of women as mere victims, this by sustaining that who joins rebel groups tend to be more bellicose, regardless the gender. In this regard, Annan article about the reintegration of former combatants in Uganda, stresses that the variety of positions held by women during the civil war posed a challenge during the securitization process so that the gender issue has been finally addressed by including women in the rehabilitation process as much as men.²¹ On the other hand, According to MacKenzie, in Sierra Leone, the attention was given to women as victims of violence rather than the latter and those who participated as combatants in the ranks of RUF; this translated in the systematic exclusion of women from the DDR program.²²

The main argument addressed by the literature is that the presence of women in rebel groups—mostly in a subordinate position—reduces the level of sexual violence against civilians, due to a mechanism of replacement.²³ The consequence of having women enlisted in subordinate positions within rebel groups may lead to think that men combatants—in the same or higher level—satisfy their sexual needs with women colleagues and consequently they tend to perpetrate less sexual violence against civilians.²⁴ In response to this strand of the literature, Cohen' study focused on Sierra Leone, demonstrated that the number of acts of sexual violence did not diminish because of the presence of women: instead, women

¹⁴ MacKenzie M., *Securitization and desecuritization: Female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone*, 2009.

¹⁵ Leggat-Smith Y., *Rwanda: Not so innocent – When women become killers*, 1995; Askin K. D., *Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status*, 1999; Sharlack L., *Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of genocide*, 1999.

¹⁶ Askin K. D., *Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status*, 1999.

¹⁷ Leggat-Smith Y., *Rwanda: Not so innocent—When women become killers*, 1995; Sharlack L., *Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of genocide*, 1999.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ MacKenzie M., *Securitization and desecuritization: Female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone*, 2009.

²¹ Annan J. et al., *Civil war, reintegration, and gender in Northern Uganda*, 2011.

²² MacKenzie M., *Securitization and desecuritization: Female soldiers and the reconstruction of women in post-conflict Sierra Leone*, 2009.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

were actively involved in perpetrating this type of violence either within or outside the rebel group.²⁵ This issue also addressed an additional topic usually overlooked: the violence against men.²⁶ If women victims of sexual violence tend to be stigmatized from their societies and families of origins, men tend to be stigmatized and mocked enough to try to hide if they have been abused.²⁷

As Cohen stressed in her article, women not only assisted to the perpetration of sexual violence, but also incited it and “suggested” to their men colleagues *whose girl was more beautiful*.²⁸ Cohen’s study demonstrates that the level of sexual violence does not diminish with the presence of women soldiers, but it is maintained at the same levels.²⁹ This, also because sexual violence is wrongly considered in the mere conception of satisfaction of rebels’ needs: instead, sexual violence is often used as a strategy of war.³⁰ Again, the case of Rwanda can be taken as an example in which rapes have been perpetrated with the intent to racially “contaminate” the rival ethnic group, as a deterrent, and as terrorist mental violence when rapes were perpetrated in front of the victim’s family.³¹

Interesting is the work of Eriksson who has investigated whether the level of sexual violence against civilians in areas occupied or under the control of rebel groups with women in positions of command is lower than in those where women are only in a subordinate position.³² By taking as an example the FARC, Eriksson shows that when women are in positions of command, sexual violence tends to be perpetrated less than when they are not.³³ Since in Colombia the civil war cannot be reconnected to an ethnic civil war, it follows from this that the argument of sexual violence as a strategy of war addressed to abuse and contaminate the rival group does not apply: however, the case of Sierra Leone is also a case in which ethnic rivalries do not play a crucial role, instead, as in the case of Colombia, the RUF wanted to challenge the government. Therefore, why in the case of Sierra Leone sexual violence has been extensively perpetrated against civilians, while in Colombia it did not?³⁴

This study’s argument is that women when holding positions of command tend to see sexual violence not as a strategy of war and consequently, rape and other acts of sexual violence, not as a tactic of war. This can be explained by three main reasons: first, women have usually been considered victims of sexual violence whose suffered the most from the consequences (i.e. when they are disowned by the family and/or they have no medical or psychological support after having undergone the violence) therefore, they may be “traditionally” less prone in perpetrating sexual violence against civilians. Second, women commanders do not consider the perpetration of acts of sexual violence as moments of “team-building”

²⁵ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013.

²⁶ Carpenter C. R., *Recognizing gender-based violence against civilian men and boys in conflict situations*, 2006; Sivakumaran S., *Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict*, 2007; Lewis D. A., *Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence against Men in Conflict Settings under International Law*, 2010.

²⁷ Carpenter C. R., *Recognizing gender-based violence against civilian men and boys in conflict situations*, 2006; Sivakumaran S., *Sexual Violence against Men in Armed Conflict*, 2007; Lewis D. A., *Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence against Men in Conflict Settings under International Law*, 2010.

²⁸ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Sellers P. V., *Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of Rape*, 2002; Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013.

³¹ Leggat-Smith Y., *Rwanda: Not so innocent – When women become killers*, 1995; Askin K. D., *Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status*, 1999; Sharlack L., *Gender and genocide in Rwanda: Women as agents and objects of genocide*, 1999.

³² Herrera N., *‘Like going to a fiesta’ – The role of female fighters in Colombia’s FARC-EP*, 2009; Mendez A., *Militarized gender performativity: women and demobilization in Colombia’s FARC and AUC*, 2012; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

³³ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

³⁴ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

to let members of the group getting closer. Last but not least, women commanders tend to punish perpetrators of sexual violence more effectively, therefore, there is also an indirect effect on the number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians, due to the reluctance of member in engaging in such acts of violence for the fear of subsequent retaliation.

CASE-STUDIES SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

2 Case-Studies: Colombia vs. Sierra Leone

The case of Sierra Leone, where sexual violence has been perpetrated both within and outside the rebel group, opposes the one of Colombia where sexual violence, after 1985, was almost never reported.³⁵ A series of considerations about the nature, scopes and traits of the two rebel-groups, in addition to the contexts in which they emerged, are presented as follows in order to better explain the case study selection and discussing similarities and differences among RUF and FARC.

Both the RUF and FARC emerged in a patriarchal society where the gender inequality indexes are – respectively—0.64 and 0.46.³⁶ Similarly, the RUF and FARC were aimed at opposing the government and denouncing corruption, economic inequality, and exploiting of resources.³⁷ If in Colombia the FARC stressed their left-wing closeness and inspiration to Marxism, in Sierra Leone the RUF has never proclaimed its political affiliation, exception made when it constituted as a nationalist political party.³⁸ The length of the two civil wars also is quite different: the Colombian civil conflict is dated to 1964 and is considered ended—at least in respect of the FARC, in 2016 where the Peace Agreement has been signed.³⁹ Conversely, the civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002.⁴⁰ Even considering the FARC's dynamics from 1985 ahead, there is still 6 years of difference between the two onsets and 14 years of difference between the two endings.

The objective of the paper has required to perform a multiple-case studies selection with the intent to both describe and explain the causality behind the phenomenon of the variation in the number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians when, on one hand, women were enlisted in high-rank positions and on the other hand, in low-rank positions. A random selection would have not served the purpose of this study, due to some limitations in the number of rebel-groups for which data are available and women holding positions of command. Despite this may reflect in a selection effect issue, the paradigm of this study will set the basis for future analysis that via a cross-case or longitudinal analyses, would examine additional cases.

Research Design: Unit of Analysis & Variables

Via a deductive and causal investigation, this study takes as a unit of analysis rebel-groups. Since the goal of this research is to investigate the variation in the number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians by rebel groups, the dependent variable is the number of such acts perpetrated—respectively—by the RUF and FARC in certain time-frames. The measurement will be performed via an analysis of academic articles and figures contained in the SVAC Dataset and Democracy

³⁵ Cohen D., Nordås R., *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset 1989-2009*, 2016.

³⁶ Norris P., *Democracy Cross-National Data*, 2015; The UNDP gender inequality index is up-to-date to 2014 and ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is complete equality, and 1 is complete inequality.

³⁷ Abdullah I. *Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone*, 1998; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁴⁰ Bellows J., *War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone*, 2009; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

Cross-National Database.⁴¹ Due to the data constraints concerning sexual violence perpetrated against men, in this research there is no direct specification of the gender of victims of sexual violence. However, based on the coding of the reports collected by both the United Nations and Amnesty International, when referring to sexual violence, the majority of victims are women.

The independent variables are respectively the presence within rebel groups of women holding positions of command and so enlisted in high-rank positions. Consequently, an additional independent variable is the presence, instead of women holding low-rank positions within rebel-groups. For measuring both these independent variables, the study uses a qualitative approach that will be analyzing academic articles.⁴²

Among the control variables, the study will look at the nature of the society (patriarchal/non-patriarchal) to control for gender dynamics specific of the society in which the rebel-group aroused that may impede or limit the enlistment of women and the enlistment in certain ranks. The research will also include the nature of the conflict. As the Rwanda case teaches, ethnic conflict may tend to register higher levels of sexual violence, due to the use of rape as tactics of war. The ideology expressed as a political ideology may help in identifying the common or different pattern for groups that have a strong political ideology and those that have not. In the case of Colombia and Sierra Leone, the ideology plays a different role within the rebel-groups, however, in the light of future research, analyzing additional cases would help better define the pattern of ideology as a determinant—or not—towards the level of sexual violence perpetrated by rebels against civilians. The length of the conflict is an additional aspect that differs between Colombia and Sierra Leone that however may be take into consideration for future studies to see whether if after a certain number of years – here, it would be possible to check via a time frame breakdown of five years—the acts of sexual violence increase or decrease; for instance, after a certain amount of time, the episodes of sexual violence may decrease due to a stronger establishment of the rebel group in a specific region. Last, but not least, the study will also look at the gender inequality index as coded by the UNDP in order to check if at different levels of the index correspond different levels of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians.

Hypotheses

The intent of this paper is to investigate whether the enlistment of women in high-rank positions within rebel-groups affect or not the number of acts of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians. As previously discussed, this study expects to find a lower number of such acts when women are enlisted in high-rank positions instead of low-rank ones. The first hypothesis is the one that follows:

H1: *In a comparison of rebel groups, those having women enlisted in high-rank positions are more likely to register a lower number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians than those enlisting women in low-rank positions.*

Also, the enlistment of women may depend on several factors including the widespread level of gender inequality. If the consequent mechanism may lead to believe that this phenomenon limits women in joining rebel-groups, instead, the literature has demonstrated that women are often more likely to join a rebel group when the society they come from is instead characterized by high levels of inequality, therefore, women seek in the rebel-group's enlistment a way to leverage their social status.⁴³ However, despite the fact that women can be more prone to join rebel groups, does not automatically translate in

⁴¹ Norris P., *Democracy Cross-National Data*, 2015; Cohen D., Nordås R., *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset 1989-2009*, 2016.

⁴² Herrera N., *'Like going to a fiesta' – The role of female fighters in Colombia's FARC-EP*, 2009; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁴³ Tezcür, G. M., *A Path Out of Patriarchy? Political Agency and Social Identity in Women Fighters*, forthcoming.

them holding high-rank positions. This particularly happens in patriarchal groups where gender equality is not part of the group ideology. The second hypothesis is:

H2: *In a comparison of rebel groups, those whose group ideology does not include gender equality, are more likely to register a high number of acts of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians than those whose ideology affirms gender equality.*

When thinking about sexual violence against civilians in wartime, a recurring explanation for this to happen resides in the use of rebel groups of sexual violence as a strategy of war. This phenomenon is generally observed in ethnic conflicts that make use of rape as a tactic of war.⁴⁴ Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is:

AH1: *In a comparison of rebel groups, those motivated by ethnic hatred are more likely to register a high number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians than those motivated by other motifs including government opposition.*

However, there might be additional explanations for a rebel group using sexual violence against civilians, including strengthening groups' relationship by sharing moments of *collective violence*, a phenomenon usually happened in patriarchal societies.⁴⁵ If it is true that the literature has extensively discussed how women commanders tend to avoid using sexual violence within and outside the rebel group and punishing who engages in sexual violence, there may be an exception when the masculinity is strongly instilled in men members that may also not fear punishment. Consequently, the second alternative hypothesis is:

AH2: *In a comparison of rebel groups, those emerging in patriarchal societies are more likely to register a high number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians than those not emerging in patriarchal societies.*

As previously discussed, the length of the conflict may also influence the level of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians, due to the close relationships that the rebel-group may establish with the local population if settled in a certain territory. The third alternative hypothesis is:

AH3: *In a comparison of rebel groups, those operating in a long-standing conflict will be likely to register a lower number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians than those operating in relatively recent conflicts.*

In the following section of the paper, the main finding resulting from the analysis will be discussed in relation to the hypotheses. This, in order to provide an overview of both the aspects that were expected to be analyzed and the ones resulting from the archival research.

MAIN FINDINGS

Diamonds, Grievances and Poverty: Civil War in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the civil war began in 1991 when the RUF started opposing President Joseph Said Momoh.⁴⁶ If the diamonds' market was known for being corrupted, providing little or no benefits to the

⁴⁴ Card C., *Rape as a weapon of war*, 1996.

⁴⁵ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013.

⁴⁶ Abdullah I. *Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone*, 1998.

population, and being the reason for illicit traffic, it was also one of the causes for the civil war onset.⁴⁷ The RUF complained against the incapacity of Momoh to let state's provisions against corruption to be respected and when not, enforced by law.⁴⁸ However, after the break out of the war, the RUF used the market of diamonds as a form of sustenance.⁴⁹ However, in addition to the diamonds-cause, the RUF denounced forms of slavery such as the so-called cash crop that used to use forced labor in the agricultural sector.⁵⁰ More in general, corruption, oppression and poverty were at the basis of the civil war onset.⁵¹

A first peace accord—the Abidjan Peace Accord, attempted to be signed and put in place in 1997; however, it collapsed after a few weeks, due to the escalation of violence that followed the prosecution of Foday Sankoh, one of the RUF's leaders.⁵² A second attempt, the Lomé Peace Agreement, was put in place in 1999 when Sankoh was elected as Vice President of the diamonds oversee the commission.⁵³ The election of Sankoh was not welcomed from the international community that, despite the United Nations peacekeeping presence, found the episode as a wrong example of post-conflict restoration. During the same year, the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatant, a process that aimed several critiques immediately after and still nowadays due to the lack in including former women soldiers and former child soldiers.⁵⁴ It was only with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah that the war was officially considered as ended in 2002.⁵⁵

Campesinos, Poverty and Gender Inequality: Civil War in Colombia

The civil war in Colombia has been one of the longest civil war in recent history. Officially started in 1964 when the FARC created in response to the attack of the National Front in Marquetalia in the region of Caldas in the north-west of the country.⁵⁶ However, the reasons at the basis of the civil war onset were a combination of economic instability, political grievances, and poverty in which the *campesinos* were forced to live.⁵⁷ If the FARC emerged to promote *campesinos'* rights, lately the episodes of violence against them aroused, and the territories controlled by the FARC started to suffer a condition of deprivation and exploitation.⁵⁸ It was 1985 when the FARC—in response to a decade of low-profile and emergence of other movements including the M-19 and the *Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional* (ELN), decided to reinvigorate their ranks: by proclaiming the gender equality, the FARC started a recruitment campaign among women, taking advantage of the social status in which women were constrained.⁵⁹ In a society so-called *machista*, the high level of gender inequality was leaving women at home while being forced in living with abusing

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Fanthorpe R., *On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs & Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone*, 2005.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Restrepo J. A., *The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set*, 2003.

⁵⁷ *Campesinos* is the Spanish term for farmers and I use this term due to the extensive use that has been done of it by the literature to specifically refer to the issues between farmers and members of the FARC; Restrepo J. A., *The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set*, 2003.

⁵⁸ Elhawary S., *Between War and Peace: Land and Humanitarian Action in Colombia*, 2007; Restrepo J. A., *The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set*, 2003.

⁵⁹ Restrepo J. A., *The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set*, 2003.

husbands.⁶⁰ It was only in 2016 that the efforts of President Juan Manuel Santos allowed the sign of the peace agreement that was approved by both the Senate and House of Representatives after five days.⁶¹

For the purpose of this study, 2016 is considered as the year in which the Colombian civil conflict has ended, also considering that the next year the FARC participated in the national elections. However, several scholars and Colombians do not consider the country as fully pacified, due to the emergence of paramilitary groups that are replacing—in occupation and violence—the FARC’s old role.⁶²

Different Ranks, Different Outcomes

In Colombia and Sierra Leone, the ranks were significantly different in regard to the gender ratio: in Sierra Leone, women have always held subordinate position instead, after 1985 in Colombia they have been recruited and assigned to the command of battalions.⁶³ Is there a linkage between women positions within the rebel group’s ranks and the level of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians? According to the case studies analysis, the answer is yes.

In Sierra Leone, women were enlisted in the RUF ranks because of two main reasons: the need for combatants and group’s sustenance.⁶⁴ Women served in low-rank positions and as camp followers and sex slaves.⁶⁵ During the eleven years of conflict, women soldiers participated in acts of violence, including sexual abuse.⁶⁶ By “suggesting” beautiful girls to their male colleagues, assisting to the violence, and perpetrating abuses against other civilian women, RUF women did not play any role in reducing the level of sexual violence against civilians; instead, they were an active contributor of the abuses.⁶⁷ In fact, by analyzing the figures in the SVAC Dataset, the level of sexual violence perpetrated by the RUF in Sierra Leone has almost always accounted for *some level of violence*—as reported in Table 3.⁶⁸

Sierra Leone											
1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
0	0	0	2	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	0

Table 3 | Level of sexual violence perpetrated by RUF, 1991-2002, source: SVAC Database
 0 = no episodes, 1 = some episodes, 2 = many episodes, 3 = massive number of episodes

In the FARC, the enlistment of women in both subordinate, but also high-ranks, had an effect on the number of episodes of sexual violence perpetrated by civilians, in fact as shown by the SVAC Dataset (Table 4),

⁶⁰ The term *machista* – with means sexist, is often used to refer to the Colombian society and more in general, to Hispanic/Latin American society where the role of women is conceived as one of wives, mothers, and housekeepers; Restrepo J. A., *The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set*, 2003; Sajjad T., *Women guerrillas: Marching toward true freedom?*, 2011.

⁶¹ Long T., *Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence and the Making of Contemporary Colombia*, 2017.

⁶² Gutierrez Sanin F., *Telling the difference: Guerrillas and paramilitaries in the Colombian war*, 2008.

⁶³ Cohen D., *Female combatants and the perpetration of violence: Wartime rape in the Sierra Leone civil war*, 2013; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Cohen D., Nordås R., *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset 1989-2009*, 2016; Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

exception made for some episodes of sexual violence occurred in 2001, there are no episodes of sexual violence registered between 1989 and 2005.⁶⁹ Note that the SVAC Dataset does not provide data from the period 1985-1989 and 2009-2016 when FARC was active and was enlisting women in all rank's positions.⁷⁰

Colombia											
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009			
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			

Table 4 | Level of sexual violence perpetrated by FARC, 1989-2009, source: SVAC Database
 0 = no episodes, 1 = some episodes, 2 = many episodes, 3 = massive number of episodes

Women have enlisted in the rebel groups of the RUF and FARC for similar yet different reasons. In the case of the RUF, the need of combatants and the need of camp-followers that would've supported the survival of the group that was not settled in one specific territory for a long time, characterized the reasons at the basis of the RUF's decision to allow women joining the group if not even promoting such recruitment. On the other hand, if the need of combatants also characterized the enlistment strategy of the FARC, women became particularly motivated in joining the rebel-group after 1985 when the FARC proclaimed gender equality, a condition that women when demanding the government of Colombia from a long time.⁷¹ Therefore, despite the level of gender inequality was similar in both countries (0.64 in Sierra Leone and 0.46 in Colombia where 1 is inequality and 0 perfect equality), the enlistment of women was motivated by direct and indirect consequence of either their social status, rebel group's needs, and initiatives of the rebel group such as the one of the FARC in 1985.⁷²

As the analysis has shown, in Sierra Leone the gender inequality has represented a constraint in the opportunity for women to hold high-rank positions. The outside-of-the-rebel-group condition of women exploited and abused have been reproduced inside of it with women forced to labor and sexual slavery. In Colombia, if the widespread gender inequality has motivated women in joining the FARC, after 1985, the crucial declaration of gender equality within the rebel-group has made possible for women to start holding positions of command. It is worth to mention that 1985 has represented a turning point in the ideology of the FARC; it is particularly clear if we compare the internal dynamics of the FARC pre- and post-1985. Before 1985, as within the RUF's ranks, Colombian women could enlist in the FARC, but with subordinate positions; for instance, women could refuse to have sex with their men colleagues; however, they would have been forced to labor activities as a sort of punishment.⁷³ Second, the FARC's strategies were to take advantage of the condition of deprivation to which women were forced to live: if in Sierra Leone the entire population was living a condition of poverty and so joining the RUF could have been considered a way to at least access shelters and food by both men and women, this cannot be said for the FARC that despite recruited soldiers from poor areas of Colombia, the *machista* society—in the reality, used to pose women in a condition not only of gender inequality but continuous abuses.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

⁷² Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016; Norris P., *Democracy Cross-National Data*, 2015.

⁷³ Eriksson J., *Women in leadership and sexual violence. A case study of the role of women in FARC*, 2016.

The lower episodes of sexual violence perpetrated by FARC than RUF, in relation to the issues of women positioning and gender inequality, confirm both main hypotheses. The analysis has also shown that within the FARC the traits of the society, prone to be patriarchal and masculine-oriented, were reversed when it comes to perpetration of sexual violence against civilians. If it is true that several other issues remained, as for instance the issue related to forced abortion for women *guerrillas*, the influence of women in high-ranks reversed the masculinity orientation that used to characterize the Colombian society—at least, within the rebel-group. That also confirms the second alternative hypothesis since in Sierra Leone, the patriarchal society orientation was maintained in the RUF, impeding women positioning in high-ranks and the registration of abuses and sexual violence both inside and outside rebel-group.

The ethnic hatred issue cannot be taken into consideration in the cases of the FARC and RUF for two reasons: both civil wars did not emerge as ethnic-oriented ones and, secondarily, within both the FARC and RUF, the soldiers belonged to different ethnic and indigenous groups. If in cases such as Rwanda the level of sexual violence can be contextualized as a strategy of war implemented with the tactic of rape and sexual slavery, in the case of Sierra Leone where the level of sexual violence between the 1997 and 1999 has touched the higher levels—this, in concomitance with the escalation of violence occurred after the Momoh persecution and before the Lomé Peace Agreement—there is no issue related to ethnic hatred, therefore, exception made for cases in which sexual violence has been detected as strategy of war, it is not possible to generalize that where conflicts aroused for different reasons than ethnic hatred, the level of sexual violence would be lower.⁷⁴ Therefore, it is not possible to confirm the first alternative hypothesis since ethnic hatred did not play a key role in either case studies.

The length of the conflict seems to play an important role in episodes of sexual violence against civilians. More specifically, the length of the conflict contributes to motivating rebel-groups in establishing a stronger relationship with local populations that—at a certain extent—become essential for the survival of the rebel group itself. As it has happened for the FARC, in remote rural areas, the support of the local population became essential to obtain food, households, and other types of commodities. Also, since the FARC expropriated lands from *campesinos* and/or tried to find monetary or mutual benefits when occupying their lands, avoid using sexual violence against civilians, helped the FARC in achieving their strategic goals.⁷⁵ Instead, the RUF did not really occupy territories for a long time and consequently, that led the rebel-group in breaching local populations' villages by using violence, knowing that their permanence would be short. This also confirms the third alternative hypothesis.

Conclusions and Further Research

The goal of this paper has been to demonstrate the variation in the episodes of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians by rebel-groups, when women are enlisted in high-rank positions and when they are not. The multiple case studies analysis of Colombia and Sierra Leone has evidenced how the presence of women commander within the FARC has strongly reduced the number of acts of sexual violence perpetrated by the rebel-group. Women tend to avoid using sexual violence as a strategy of war, this mainly because of the categorization of them as the victims of sexual violence. Reversing this idea is part of the motivations that bring women leaders in both avoid using sexual violence as much as punishing any member of the group found to perpetrate sexual abuses either inside or outside of the rebel-group. In the case of the FARC, this mechanism has discouraged men in engaging in such kind of acts, consequently reversing the patriarchal orientation of the society, at least, within the FARC.

However, if it is true that the presence of women commanders reduces the episodes of sexual violence against civilians, it is also true that in the case of Colombia, women were enlisted in high-rank

⁷⁴ Abdullah I. *Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone*, 1998.

⁷⁵ Elhawary S., *Between War and Peace: Land and Humanitarian Action in Colombia*, 2007.

positions because, in 1985, the FARC proclaimed gender equality within the rebel-group in opposition to the government that instead, was not proactively working for the main inclusion of women in the society. It is clear that in this strategy, the ideology and nature of the FARC can be recalled, namely, the will of the group of opposing the government. The reasons behind the formation of the group, also played an important role in the past when looking at the sexual abuses perpetrated against civilians. If in the case-study analysis here it is not possible to confirm that ethnic hatreds play a role in the decreasing or increasing the number of acts of sexual violence against civilians, the literature suggests that in other cases, such as Rwanda, rape has been used as a tactic of war to destroy other ethnic group's identity. This suggests one of the future steps of this research.

Among the main dissimilarities between the cases of Colombia and Sierra Leone, there was the length of the conflict. The analysis has demonstrated that longer conflicts make rebel-groups less prone to perpetrating violence against civilians and the local population for either the necessity of territories and sustenance. This relevant aspect led the study in confirming one of the hypothesis and also, has stimulated the interest about the topic of rebel-groups and population relationships and how it affects either the survival of the group itself or the kind of treatment received by the population from the members of the rebel groups beyond the perpetration of violence.

As future developments for this study in addition to the ones above, the author intends to focus on:

- Finding data about the perpetration of sexual violence against civilians in Colombia between 1964 and 1985 with the intent to measure the phenomenon in a period in which the FARC had the same structural organization of the RUF; then, searching for data from 1985 and 1989 and from 2009 and 2016 so, for periods not covered by the SVAC Dataset: this, in the view of performing a within-case analysis of FARC;⁷⁶
- Further, investigate the reasons at the basis of the FARC declaration of gender equality and impact on FARC—Colombian government relationship;
- Considering a quantitative analysis by using data from the SVAC Dataset and ABA/Benetech SLWCD database addressed to investigate the issue of sexual violence against civilians perpetrated by rebel-groups that enlist women in high-rank positions and comparing those results with the ones of rebel-groups not-enlisting women in leadership positions;
- Further investigate traits and characteristics of rebel groups as potential contributor/alternative explanation of the phenomenon, including the role of political ideology and how it affects the decision of enlisting women and allowing them to hold positions of command;
- Overcome the selection bias by performing quantitative analysis and/or expanding the case studies comparison.

In conclusion, this study sets the basis for the investigation of a topic that has been continually overlooked by the literature and that would contribute in demonstrating that women are able to commit violence and play an active role within civil wars, a dynamic that if apparently may seem to oppose the key norm in International Law and Laws of War to protect women as a vulnerable category—which is not the intent of this study—would otherwise stress the importance to include women in the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding by involving them in the programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs.

⁷⁶ Cohen D., Nordås R., *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset 1989-2009*, 2016.

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Differences in Vote Margin of Candidates in the Florida Legislature

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Abstract: What explains differences in the margin of victory in Florida legislative races? Data is collected for all 160 legislative races from 2016 (120 House contests and 40 Senate elections) and two sets of analyses are conducted: all races and just competitive races. When looking at all races, five variables are statistically significant in the multivariate model. District party registration difference has a positive effect on margin of victory and the greatest relative impact. Races involving two major party candidates have a much smaller margin of victory, a contest with a major party versus a minor party (or No Party Affiliation candidate) has a somewhat smaller margin of victory, and a race involving only a write-in candidate as an opponent has a wider margin of victory. House races had somewhat smaller margins of victory compared to senate races. When examining just competitive races (contests that had at least two candidate names listed for an office) only two variables were statistically significant in the multivariate model. District party registration difference had a positive relationship with margin of victory and races involving a minor party candidate as the main challenger had higher margins than contests between two major party candidates.

INTRODUCTION

What explains the difference in vote margin of candidates in the Florida Legislature? This is an important question because without competitive elections Florida voters would have little meaningful choice in picking legislators and directing public policy. Florida has been called a microcosm of the United States due to its diverse population almost matching the racial and ethnic percentages of the country as a whole. This diversity has led to Florida being a powerful swing state. In recent years Florida has been under the control of the Republican Party, but each election there is a chance of a shift in that balance of power. The way the constituents vote for members of the Florida House and Florida Senate has an effect on how the state has an impact on a national scale.

People speak about many factors that they think have an influence on why some candidates win and why some candidates do not. Common ones are differences in party registration in a district or if there is an incumbent present on the ballot. Redistricting has been a hot topic in recent years and the Florida Senate went through a redistricting in 2016 before the election cycle that is being studied. The characteristics of the constituents, the contest, and of the candidate are also going to come into play. The following theories and literature review will give important background knowledge on redistricting, the state legislature and other information on variables that can affect the margin of victory in an election.

¹ This paper is an up-dated revision of the author's Honors Thesis completed at the University of Central Florida, Orlando, under Thesis Chair Dr. Aubrey Jewett.

LITERATURE REVIEW

To fully understand the differences in vote margin of candidates in the Florida Legislature it is essential to know background knowledge on the subject and aspects that may influence state politics in Florida. Florida has been the largest swing state since the 1990s and this is attributed to the state being a microcosm of America (MacManus, Dye, Jewett & Bonanza 2015, p.147). It is made up of people from all ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. For years, the Florida Legislature was dominated by Democrats and it was not till the 1960s when Republicans started gaining seats in each house. The Republicans took their first majority in both the Senate and House in 1996 and this was no surprise due to the Republicans slowly catching up to the Democrats each election cycle (MacManus, Dye, Jewett & Bonanza 2015, p.146).

As of now the Republicans still hold the majority in both houses. Going in to the 2018 elections there are 76 members of the Republican Party and 41 members of the Democratic Party in the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives). There are 23 members of the Republican Party and 15 of the Democratic Party in the Florida State Senate (Florida Senate). In 2016 there were 24 competitive state Senate elections and 78 competitive State House of Representative elections (Florida Department of State). What is meant by competitive is that there is more than one person running for the seat. "It is only in competitive races where the normal campaign related activities, money, message, mechanics, make a difference and where variations in these resources can affect the outcome (Crew & Bayliss 2013, p.145)."

Legislative reapportionment or otherwise known as redistricting is an important factor when it comes to the state legislature. "Every ten years, the United States Census Bureau is charged with tracking changes in the nation's population, as required by article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (Lewis 2015)." The changes in population result in a change of the number of U.S. Representatives and state legislators. In 2012 the population of Florida has grown to almost 19 million people, with heavy growth in the Central and Southwest Florida areas (Jewett & McKee 2015, p.41). There is a one-person one-vote standard that the states are supposed to take into consideration when adjusting the districts after the census (Engstrom 2015). The redrawing of district lines are drawn by the legislatures themselves in most states (Levitt 2010). The responsibility of election administration is primarily on the states due to the U.S. Constitution (Engstrom 2015).

Most research done on redistricting and its affects, focus on electoral outcomes and how those outcomes affect the partisan make-up of the state (Hayes & McKee 2012). Redistricting in this way has created uncompetitive elections and partisanship (Lewis 2015). Some critics have even said that gerrymandering can erode away electoral competitiveness to the point of violating equal protections standards in the Constitution (Forgette, Garner & Winkle 2009). To fix the consequences of the malapportionment there were radical redrawing's taking place in the 1960s to the congressional and state legislative districts (Engstrom 2015). As years have passed the percent of uncontested seats has increased from 20% in 1968 to 39% in 2002. This has resulted in a decline in the competitiveness of state legislative elections because a high percent of candidates do not have competition to begin with. There was a slight increase in margin of victory in the 1990s, but the absolute value of the margin of victory has remained high with candidates winning by almost 25% points (Forgette, Garner & Winkle 2009, p.156).

The Fair Districts Amendment was made to require legislators to draw districts that make geographic sense and not districts that would help them politically. It prohibited the drawing of new district lines with the intent of favoring political parties or incumbents with the intent or result of diminishing minority presentation and require districts to be compact and follow existing geographic and political boundaries where possible (Jewett 2015, p.42). The Amendment was put on the ballot in 2010 and passed with nearly 63% of the vote (Lewis 2015). With the implementation of the Fair Districts

Amendment and the population changes in the census of 2010 those running in 2012 were campaigning in districts that were different than they would have been in 2010. This change resulted in several incumbents retiring and others having new competition in their party primaries or general elections (Crew & Anderson 2016). The Republican Party had the supermajority in the House and Senate after the 2012 elections in Florida, so they controlled the redistricting process for the next cycle (Jewett 2015, p.53). The new districts that were made in 2012 were approved by the Justice Department and the Florida Courts, but the Florida Supreme Court required some changes to the original senate map (Jewett 2015, p.43).

Redistricting can be a factor in who wins an election, but it is not the only reason a candidate wins. Even in the 2012 elections for the state legislature the new districts were affecting all of the candidates and there were other factors that determined the outcomes of that election cycles. The factors were the elements of legislative behavior, like incumbency success, competitiveness and party control (Crew & Anderson 2016). Redistricting can also change the relationship between representatives and individual campaign contributors. The effect that this change has on the campaign contributions varies. It has been shown that as a district moves geographically the members of that district receives larger shares from donors outside of their new area. When it comes to individual donors who are no longer a part of their past district are less likely to support their previous representative, but contributors who are now in a district because of the geographical changes are more likely to donate (Crespin & Edwards 2016, p.220). It has been observed that geography is the most important factor influencing contribution decisions, with the three types of contributors being investors, ideologs, and intimates (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell & Wilcox 2003).

For redistricting to have an effect on a candidate they have to become a candidate first. It is said that there are formal and informal elements to this recruitment process. The formal being the Constitution and state and federal laws governing nominations and elections. The informal being ambitions, skills, resources and then the popular mood and attitudes at the time (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.41). There is a recruiting season where the leaders and campaign staff of the Republican and Democrat parties reach out across the country in search of political talent (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.57). An amateur would have a lack of political experience and professionals are career politicians, people whose career is in politics (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.57-58). Professionals have more to weigh when thinking about running and amateurs are more likely to run for a long shot than are professionals. Many amateurs run for Congress, but the most successful congressional candidates are professionals before they run. "Candidate quality and campaign strength are critical factors in many battles for congressional seats (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.59)."

Focusing more on campaign finance law because studies have shown that the task of fund-raising is a deterrent when it comes to running for office (Hamm & Hogan 2008, p.458). When an incumbent is running one view suggests that a challenger is less likely to run if the states contribution limits are low. Campaign finance laws vary state to state. Some may have greater limits on sources of funding than others and some may even prohibit direct contributions from corporations (Hamm & Hogan 2008, p.459). A study of races involving an incumbent in contested primary and general elections from 1994 to 1998 was done of the lower house elections for 25 states. It showed that of the 303 elections examined in Florida during that time only 25 incumbents faced a challenger in their primary election and 39 faced a challenger in their general election. When it came to an independent or minority party challenging an incumbent that happened in 1% of elections during the time period specified (Hamm & Hogan 2008, p.462).

The strength of a campaign can come down to stamina. Races that do not have an incumbent running are more likely to be competitive and to shift party control (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.60). Closed primaries aid party loyalty and discourage outsider candidates from running (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.62). Florida has a closed primary, meaning that one can only

vote in the primary for the party that they are registered to have an affiliation with. When there is an incumbent in the primary the incumbent has only been defeated 1% of the time since the postwar period (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee & Schickler 2014, p.62). Open-seat races result in competitive primaries.

There are many candidate characteristics that can influence voters. These characteristics can include campaign skills, name recognition, integrity, competence and dedication to public service (Adams, Merrill, Simas & Stone 2011). Voters rely heavily on these candidate traits when deciding who to cast their vote for and this is even when there is a control for ideology and issue preference (Fridkin & Kenney 2011). The way that a candidate interacts with the media and citizens drives the election and determines the outcome (Box-Steffensmeier, Darmofal & Farrell 2009). A candidate can come out on top in some cases due to partisans who defect from their usual voting patterns and vote for the opposing party (Herrnson & Curry 2011). Research has shown that partisan attachment is the basis for vote choice and because there is low-visibility in many state level elections the long-term forces are what most believe have the strongest pull on the outcomes (Herrnson & Curry 2011). Studies have shown that members of Congress hold more extreme views than their constituents which supports the idea that there are differences that the voter puts to the side (Bafumi & Herron 2010, p.519). People sticking to their party nominee further supports the idea that party affiliation is the best predictor of vote choice (Nelson and Mellow 2018, p.89).

THEORIES EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF CANDIDATES IN FLORIDA'S LEGISLATURE

Political Districting:

This theory suggests that the partisan breakdown of a district has an effect on the vote margin between the winning candidate and the runner up. Specifically, the percent of a district affiliated with the Republican, Democrat and other parties will have an impact on whether a legislative race is close or a blowout. Districts with high percentage of voters identifying with one major party are more likely to elect a candidate from their preferred party by a wide margin. Districts with an even number of voters from each major party are more likely to have competitive elections.

Constituent Characteristics:

This theory suggests that the characteristics of the constituents that make-up a district have an effect on the vote margin. These characteristics can include the percent of each race and sex that are in a district. The median household income and level of education in a district can also have an effect. Variations on the percentages can have an impact on why one candidate beats another and by how much.

Candidate Centered Characteristics:

This theory suggests that characteristics of the candidates who are running will have an effect on the vote margin of the election. These characteristics can include race and sex of the candidates. This will test the effect that a female or minority candidate can have on an election.

Contest Characteristics:

This theory suggests that there are certain contest specific characteristics that effect the vote margin of the election. The money raised, and the money spent by the candidates have shown to have an impact on elections. In addition, whether there is minor party or major party competition can have an effect: elections that include one major party candidate against only a minor party candidate are likely to have wide margins of victory. Finally, whether the race is for a House or Senate seat may also make a difference in the margin of victory. House districts are geographically smaller and have fewer constituents

and may be more homogenous and thus less contested, while senate districts are larger, have more constituents and tend to be more heterogeneous and thus more competitive.

HYPOTHESES

Political Districting Variables

H1 – There is a positive relation between party registration differences and vote margin.

Constituent Characteristics

H2 – There is a positive relationship between racial homogenization and the vote margin.

H3 – The closer the percent of each sex the lower the vote margin.

H4 – There is a positive relationship between the average age of a district and the vote margin.

Candidate Centered Characteristics

H5 – If both candidates are from the majority race of the district, then the vote margin will be lower than if one candidate was not from the majority race.

H6 – If both of the candidates are of the same sex, then the vote margin will be lower than if the candidates running were of different sexes.

H7 – If there is an incumbent running, then the vote margin will be higher than if it was an open seat election.

Contest Characteristics

H8 – There is a positive relationship between the difference in amount of money spent and vote margin.

H9 – If both candidates are from one of the major parties, then the vote margin will be lower than other types of races (for instance if a minority party, NPA, or write in faces a Republican or Democrat).

H10 – If one candidate is from one of the two major parties and the other candidate is from a minor party or non-party affiliated, then the vote margin will be higher than if two major party candidates were present but lower than if there was no named competition on the ballot (a write in or an uncontested race).

H11 – If there is a write-in candidate as the only opponent, then the vote margin will be higher than if there was another named opposition candidate on the ballot.

H12 – If only one person files for a legislative seat, then the vote margin will be higher than for any other type of race.

H13 – If it is a House race, then the vote margin will be higher than if it is a Senate race.

METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT

To conduct this analysis, the author did a regression analysis to show the relationship between different variables and the effect that they have on the vote margin of candidates in the 2016 races for the Florida Legislature – both the Florida House and Senate. The author collected information on the races

from the Florida Division of Elections. The unit of analysis is the election. Two sets of analyses will be run: one for all races and one for competitive races where more than one person has filed for a seat. This means that the analysis for all races will include 160 races since there are 120 House seats and 40 Senate seats. Normally, Senate races are staggered so that only 20 would be up for grabs in any election cycle. However, a court mandated Senate redistricting for 2016 resulted in elections for all 40 seats. This will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of which variables effect vote margin and to what extent.

Variables

The dependent variable is the difference in vote margin of candidates running for the same seat in the Florida Legislature. Vote Margin is determined by taking the absolute value of the difference between the first-place candidate and the runner up candidate. The value will not take into consideration the other candidates who may have ran and received votes. My analysis will use information from the Florida Division of Elections for the 2016 State Legislature cycle. There will be an inverse relationship between the vote margin value and the competitiveness of the race, meaning that the lower the value the more competitive the race and the higher the value the less competitive the race. Independent variables are divided into four categories; political districting, constituent characteristics, candidate centered characteristics and contest characteristics.

Political Districting:

Party Registration Difference – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of registered Republicans and Democrats in the district. Florida Division of Elections Book Closing Reports from the 2016 General Elections.

Constituent Characteristics:

Racial Homogenization – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of the largest racial/ethnic group and the 2nd largest racial/ethnic group in the district. Thus, it will be the absolute value of the difference between white and black, white and Hispanic, or black and Hispanic. Florida Division of Elections 2016 Book-closing Reports.

Sex – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of males and females in the district. United States Census Bureau, Florida House and Senate Redistricting Statistics.

Age – the percent of people over the age of 65. Florida House and Senate Redistricting Statistics.

Candidate Centered Characteristics:

Race/Ethnicity – a dummy variable recorded as 0 if both candidates are the same race or ethnic group or 1 if candidates are of different races. Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate, Florida Division of Elections.

Sex – a dummy variable where if both the candidates running are of the same sex, then it will be recorded as 0 and if they are not the same sex then it will be recorded as 1. Florida Division of Elections.

Incumbency – a dummy variable where if there is an incumbent it will be recorded as 1 and if there is not an incumbent it will be recorded as 0. Florida Division of Elections.

Contest Characteristics:

- Money Spent Difference – the absolute value of money spent by candidate R minus money spent by candidate D. Florida Division of Elections Campaign Finance Database.
- Major Party Competition – a race between a Republican and a Democrat would constitute a race between majority parties. Any other type of race (for instance a Libertarian running against a

Democrat) that would constitute a different type of contest. Races between the majority parties will be coded as 1 and any other type of race as 1. Florida Division of Elections.

- Minor Party Competition – if there is a race between a candidate from one of the two major parties and a candidate from a minor party or non-party affiliated then that would be considered minor party competition. Races with a minor party present will be coded as 1 and races without a minor party will be coded as 0. Florida Division of Elections.
- Write-In Competition – if there is an official write-in candidate registered for a contest then that would constitute a race with write-in competition. If there is a write-in candidate, then that will be recorded as 1 and if there is not a write-in candidate that will be recorded as 0. Florida Division of Elections.
- No Competition – if there is only one name on the ballot, then that would be considered a race with no competition. Races that have a write-in candidate are considered no competition since there is still only one name on the ballot. Races with no competitor will be coded as 1 and races with more than one name in the ballot will be coded as 0.
- House or Senate – a dummy variable where a House race will be recorded as 1 and a Senate race will be recorded as 0. Florida Division of Elections.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF CANDIDATES IN FLORIDA LEGISLATURE – ALL RACES

UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Table 6: Explaining Vote Margin in All Races - Univariate Analysis

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Margin Difference	58.405	41.044	160
Registration Difference	16.901	14.970	160
Race/Ethnicity Difference District	47.760	22.518	160
Sex Difference District	3.079	1.785	160
% 65 and Older	17.336	7.039	160
Money Spent Difference	233408.226	229130.346	160
Major Party	N/A	N/A	75
Minor Party	N/A	N/A	14
Write-In	N/A	N/A	14
Race/Ethnicity Difference Candidate	N/A	N/A	29
Sex Difference Candidate	N/A	N/A	38
Incumbent	N/A	N/A	72
House	N/A	N/A	120

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables examined in all 120 State House districts and 40 Senate districts, meaning that it includes the 76 uncontested races, so the races where there was only one candidate filed and won the race. Out of the 160 districts there were 75 that contained races between a Republican and a Democrat. There were only 14 races that included a candidate from a minor party and then another 14 that contained a write-in candidate. There were 29 races where the candidates were of different races or ethnicities and 38 races where the candidates identified as different sexes.

There were 72 incumbents running for reelection during the election cycle being studied. The mean for margin of victory was 58.4, meaning that the average difference between the first and second place candidate was 58.4%. The standard deviation is large being 41, so there is a lot of spread in the difference in margin of victory. The difference between registered republicans and registered democrats averages out to 16.9, with the standard deviation being 14.97. For the race or ethnicity differences of the constituents the mean was 47.76 and the standard deviation was 22.5, so most districts had a race that made up almost half the population. The sex difference between constituents was small with the average being only 3% and the standard deviation was 1.78, meaning that most districts had small differences between the amount of male and female constituents. The difference between the 65% of older population was 17.33, with a standard deviation of 7. The money spent differences between candidates as expected resulted in a large mean of 233408.22 and a standard deviation of 229130.34. There was a large amount of variance when it came to the amount spent by candidates, since minor party candidates would spend significantly less money than their major party counterparts. Even between two major party candidates the spent difference was often high depending on the partisan breakdown of the district.

BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Table 7: Explaining Vote Margins in All Races - Bivariate Regression Results

Independent Variable	B	Standard Error	Beta	Significance	Constant B
Registration Difference	1.478	.184	.539	.000***	33.422
Write-In	45.278	10.942	.313	.000***	54.443
Minor Party	-23.011	11.373	-.159	.045**	60.418
Major Party	-75.868	2.473	-.925	.000***	93.968
No Competition	79.131	1.690	.966	.000***	20.818
Race/Ethnicity Difference District	-.279	.143	-.153	.053*	71.721
Race/Ethnicity Difference Candidate	-31.484	8.070	-.296	.000***	64.111
Sex Difference Candidate	-29.591	7.278	-.308	.000***	65.433
Money Spent Difference	-2.761E-5	.000	-.154	.052*	64.850
65 or older	.267	.463	.046	.565	53.777
Sex Difference District	1.308	1.825	.057	.475	54.377
Incumbent	-1.077	6.542	-.013	.869	58.890
House Race	-4.560	7.509	-.048	.545	61.825

Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

All constants were significant at the .000 level

Table 2 shows bivariate regression results for all independent variables hypothesized to have an impact on vote margins in all 160 state legislative races. The results showed that these variables were significant; registration difference, write-in candidate, minor party candidate, major party candidate, no competition, racial difference in districts, race difference of candidates, sex difference of candidates, and money spent difference.

When there is no difference in party registration in a district the vote margin is 33.4%. For each 1% increase in difference in party registration there was a 1.48% increase in the margin of victory. Party registration difference alone explains 29% of the variance in vote margin. This supports our initial hypothesis that there would be a positive relationship between party registration and vote margin.

When there was a race that included a write-in candidate as the only opposition, the margin of victory increased by 45.3% and when there was no write-in candidate the vote margin was 54.4%. This variable only explains 10% of the difference in margin. This is in line with our initial hypothesis that the margin of victory would increase when there was only a write-in candidate present.

Races that have a minority party or no party affiliated candidate on the ballot showed a 23% decrease in the margin of victory. When no minor party or no party affiliated candidate was on the ballot the margin was 60.4%. A minor party candidate only explained 2.5% of the change in vote margin. This is on par with the initial hypothesis since the decrease in vote margin when a minor party is present is smaller than the decrease when two major party candidates are present.

If a race contained a candidate from both major parties, as in there was a candidate from the Republican Party and a candidate from the Democrat Party then the margin of victory decreases by 75.9%. When the race does not include a candidate from both major parties then the vote margin is 94%. Major party candidate explains 86% of the difference. This supports our initial hypothesis about two major party candidates causing a lower margin of victory.

When only one candidate's name appears on the ballot (or when a candidate won by default because there were no challengers at all) the margin of victory increases by 79%. When there is more than one name on the ballot the margin is 21%. The no competition variable explains 93% of the variance in the margin of victory. This supports the initial hypothesis, since having no competition caused the margin of victory to increase and to increase a significant percentage. One would expect this result since when there is no competition at all the winner theoretically takes 100% of the vote and if there is only one name on the ballot for the voters to choose from then it is likely only a miniscule number of voters actually even know the name of the person who has registered as a write-in candidate.

For each 1% increase in racial and ethnic difference among constituents there is a .28% decrease in the margin. The larger the racial and ethnic difference is of the constituents in a district the smaller the margin of victory becomes. When there is not a difference the vote margin is 72%. This variable alone only explains 2.3% of the change in margin. This is the opposite of what our initial hypothesis since the increase in racial differences led to a decrease in margin, instead of an increase in margin.

When the candidates are of different races or ethnicities the margin decreased by 31.5%. When the candidates were of the same race or ethnicity the margin was 64%. The race or ethnicity of the candidates explain 9% of the variance in vote margin. Again, this is the opposite of our initial hypotheses. The initial thought was that the vote margin would be higher if the candidates were of different races not lower.

When the candidates are of different sexes then there was a 29.6 decrease in the margin. When the candidates were of the same sex then the margin of victory was 65%. The sex of the candidates explained 10% of the difference in vote margin. Our initial hypothesis thought that candidates of the same sex would result in a decrease in vote margin, not the other way around.

The larger the Dollar difference between the candidates spending the smaller the margin of victory. When there is no difference in amount spent the margin is 65%. Money spent only explains 2.4% of the variance. Initially the thought was that money spent difference was going to result in a positive relationship, meaning that the larger the difference in spending the larger the vote margin.

The data surprisingly showed otherwise since it seems that a larger dollar difference resulted in a smaller vote margin. There were a few races where one candidate spent more by a half-million Dollars and then the vote margin was only a couple points. These instances of extreme out spending in a few close races might help account for the result. A series of bivariate regressions showed that these variables were not significant; 65% or older, sex difference, incumbent and House race. The percent of each district that was 65 years old or older did not have a statistically significant effect on vote margin. Districts that had larger percentages of 65 and older did not have significantly different vote margins than districts with smaller 65 and older populations. This does not support our initial hypothesis; the positive relation is not at the strength that was expected.

The percent difference between males and females in a district did not have an effect on the margin of victory. A larger percent of males or females did not cause a significant change in the margin. This also did not support our initial hypothesis, due to the difference in sex of a district not having an impact on the margin of victory.

The presence or absence of an incumbent candidate did not have a statistically significant effect on the vote margin. When there was no an incumbent on the ballot the vote margin was 59%. This surprisingly did not support our initial hypothesis. The redistricting of the Senate in 2016 might explain this result since there were a number of previous Senators running, but they were running in different districts than their prior election. There was no difference in competitiveness between House races and Senate Races. The difference between the two types of races was not statistically significant enough to have an effect on the margin. This did not support our initial hypothesis since the Senate districts are larger the thought was that they would be more competitive than the House races.

FULL MODEL – MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION

Table 8: Explaining Vote Margin in All Races -- Multivariate Regression Results

Model	B	Standard	Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	90.794	4.346		20.891	.000***
Registration Difference	.261	.073	.095	3.564	.000***
Major Party	-71.511	2.278	-.872	-31.388	.000***
Minor Party	-36.273	3.087	-.251	-11.751	.000***
Write-In	9.771	3.263	.067	2.995	.003***
House Race	-5.196	2.552	-.055	-2.036	.044**
Race Difference Candidate	-2.167	2.351	-.020	-.922	.358
Sex Difference Candidate	-3.030	2.127	-.032	-1.424	.156
Race Difference District	-.017	.051	-.009	-.329	.742
Sex Difference District	.153	.483	.007	.317	.752
% 65 and Older	.191	.150	.033	1.274	.205
Money Spent Difference	1.816E-6	.000	.010	.402	.688
Incumbent	1.412	1.987	.017	.711	.479

Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

R Square = .939

F Change = 189.261

Durbin-Watson = 1.944

There were five variables that were statistically significant; registration difference, major party, minor party, write in and house race. Each one percent increase in the difference between registered Republicans and Democrats leads to a 2.61 increase in margin of victory. When there was major party competition margin of victory was 71.5% smaller. When there was only minor party (or NPA) competition on the ballot the margin of victory was also smaller, but only by 36 percentage points, about half of what it was for major party. Conversely, when there was only a write in candidate the margin of candidate was larger by almost 9.7%. House races have a 5.19% lower margin of victory than Senate races, so the House races are on average somewhat more competitive than Senate races.

These five variables had roughly the same impact in the bivariate regression and they were statistically significant and had the same direction in both bivariate and multivariate regression. According to the standardized coefficient the statistically significant variable with the largest impact was major party whose beta was -.873. Minor party had the second largest impact at -.250. Presence of a write in candidate had an impact of .067 and house race had the smallest beta of -.055. Party registration difference as expected supported our initial hypothesis. Major and minor party both also as expected supported our initial hypothesis about how each would decrease the vote margin. The presence of a write-in also supported our initial thoughts since the vote margin ended up being larger when a write-in candidate was present. House races being slightly more competitive did not support our initial hypothesis. Since the Senate districts are larger the initial thought was that they would be more competitive than House races.

There were seven variables that were not statistically significant; race or ethnicity difference among candidates, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference between candidates, sex difference in the district, percent of the district 65 or older, money spent difference and if there was an incumbent. In a bivariate analysis four of these variables were statistically significant; race or ethnicity difference among candidates, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference between candidates, and money spent difference.

Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables examined in the competitive races, meaning the races that had at least two candidate names on the ballot. This set of analyses excludes districts where only one candidate filed to run for an office or where the only competitive for a major party candidate was an official write-in candidate (because under Florida law write-in names do not appear on the ballot). Out of the 160 districts originally studied 84 of them were considered competitive. Minor party candidates were present in 14 of the races, which is the same number as in the analysis with all races. Candidates were of different races or ethnicities in 24 of the races and they identified as different sexes in 31 of the races. There were 39 incumbents present in this model and that is 33 less than in the All Races model. A decrease in that category is expected since incumbents are more likely to run without competition than those running for the first time. Of the 84 competitive races 65 of those were races for seats in the House of Representatives. That is surprising since one would think that Senate races would have more competition because Senate districts are much larger than House districts.

The average difference in vote margin was 20.8%, with a standard deviation of 14.7. This is a lower average and tighter standard deviation than in the all races model. The registration difference had a mean of 10.26 and a standard deviation of 9.85, which again is lower than it was when all races were included.

The mean for racial and ethnic differences of constituents was 50.7 and the standard deviation was 21.42. The sex difference of constituents was a lot smaller with the mean being 2.99 and the standard deviation being 1.63. This difference between sex and race is expected since more races are collected than sexes. The average percentage of population as 65 or older was 17.1 and the standard deviation was 5.73.

The difference in money spent between candidates had mean of 261442.14 and a standard deviation of 182539.30. This mean is higher than it was in the all races model, but the standard deviation is lower than it was in that model.

EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF CANDIDATES IN THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE – COMPETITIVE RACES

UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Table 9: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races - Univariate Analysis

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Margin Difference	20.817	14.731	84
Registration Difference	10.260	9.855	84
Race/Ethnicity Difference District	50.716	21.429	84
Sex Difference District	2.990	1.633	84
% 65 and Older	17.103	5.737	84
Money Spent Difference	261442.142	182539.308	84
Minor Party	N/A	N/A	14
Race/Ethnicity Difference Candidate	N/A	N/A	24
Sex Difference Candidate	N/A	N/A	31
Incumbent	N/A	N/A	39
House	N/A	N/A	65

BIVARIATE REGRESSION

Table 10: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races -- Bivariate Regression Results

Independent Variable	B	Standard Error	Beta	Significance	Constant B
Registration Difference	1.056	.177	.706	.000***	9.987
Minor Party	32.081	3.519	.709	.000***	16.999
Money Spent Difference	-1.582E-2	.000	-.196	.074*	24.953
Race/Ethnicity Difference Candidate	-3.064	3.564	-.095	.392	21.693
Sex Difference Candidate	.933	3.350	.031	.781	20.474
Incumbent	2.470	3.231	.084	.447	19.671
Race/Ethnicity Difference District	-.073	.075	-.107	.333	24.545
Sex Difference District	.314	.996	.035	.753	19.879
% 65 and Older	.200	.283	.078	.480	17.389
House Race	1.424	3.862	.041	.713	19.716

Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

All constants were significant at the .000 level, except % 65 or older was at the .001 level.

Table 5 shows the bivariate regression results for all independent variables hypothesized to have an impact on the vote margin in all 84 of the competitive state legislative races. The results showed that these variables were significant: registration difference, minor party and money spent difference.

When there was no difference in party registration the vote margin was about 10%. For every percent increase in party registration difference there was a 1% increase in vote margin. This variable alone explains 49.9% of the variance in margin of victory.

When there is not a minor party candidate on the ballot the vote margin is about 17%. When there is a minor party candidate the margin of victory increases by 32%. This explains 50.3% of the change in vote margin.

When there was no difference in amount of money spent between the candidates the vote margin was 24.9%. The vote margin decreases slightly for each dollar increase in difference spent. Money spent difference only explains 3.8% of the difference in margin of victory. This result is opposite what was hypothesized since the expectation was that as the difference in money spent between the candidates increases so would the margin of victory.

A series of bivariate regressions showed that these variables were not significant; race or ethnicity difference of the candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and older, and house race.

The difference in race or ethnicity of the candidates did not have a statistically significant effect on the vote margin. If both candidates were of the same race or if the candidates were different races did not have a significant impact on the margin of victory.

The sex difference of candidates did not have a statistically significant effect on the margin of victory. There was not a real difference between races that had two candidates who identified as the same sex or two candidates who identified as different sexes.

The presence or absence of an incumbent in a race did not have a significant effect on the vote margin. The margin of victory was not affected by having an incumbent in the race or not having an incumbent in the race. Since this analysis is from competitive races only that could have had an effect on the significance of an incumbent. Incumbents tend to run uncontested more than other candidates, so many incumbents might not be accounted for in this dataset.

The difference in races or ethnicities of the constituents in a district did not have an effect on the margin of victory. Districts with large differences between races and districts with small differences between races had similar vote margins.

The difference in sex of constituents did not have a statistically significant effect on the margin of victory. Having a larger margin between men and women in a district does not cause a larger or smaller vote margin.

The percent of the constituents that are 65 or older did not have a significant impact on the margin. Districts that had larger percentages of 65 and older did not have significantly different vote margins than districts with smaller 65 and older populations.

The type of race did not have a statistically significant effect on the margin of victory. House and Senate races did not have differences in competitiveness. More of the competitive races were House races but looked at all together there was not a trend of House races having smaller margins of victories than Senate races.

Table 6 contains the results for the multivariate regression analysis seeking to explain the variance in vote margin in all 84 competitive contests. When regression is run on the full model, the model explains 74% of the variance. The F Change statistic is 20.87, so the model is statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson was 2.308, meaning that serial correlation was not a problem for the model. All of the variance inflation factors were less than two, indicating that multi-collinearity was also not a problem in this model.

The constant for this model indicates that the margin of victory for a race where all other variables are set to 0 is 76.6%.

FULL MODEL – MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION

Table 11: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races -- Multivariate Regression Results

Model	B	Standard	Beta	t	Sig.
Constant	.766	4.935		.155	.877
Registration Difference	.854	.112	.571	7.655	.000***
Minor Party	22.361	3.092	.495	7.232	.000***
Race Difference Candidate	.059	2.036	.002	.029	.977
Sex Difference Candidate	-1.059	1.894	-.035	-.559	.578
Incumbent	2.355	2.066	.080	1.140	.258
Race Difference District	.041	.057	.059	.709	.481
Sex Difference District	.118	.569	.013	.208	.836
% 65 and Older	.099	.200	.039	.497	.620
Money Spent Difference	7.747E-6	.000	0.96	1.261	.211
House Race	2.279	2.818	.065	.809	.421

Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

R Square = .741

F Change = 20.877

Durbin-Watson = 2.308

There were two variables that were statistically significant; party registration difference and minor party. For each 1% increase in the difference between registered Republicans and registered Democrats there is an 8.54% increase in vote margin. When there was a minor party candidate the margin of victory increased by 22.3%. These two variables were also statistically significant and had a similar impact, and direction in the bivariate regression as they did in the multivariate regression. According to the standardized coefficient party registration difference had a larger impact at .571 to the .495 of minor party. The results in both these instances are consistent with the hypothesized relationship.

There were eight variables that were not statistically significant; race difference of the candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and older, money spent difference, and house race. In a bivariate analysis one of these eight variables were statistically significant; money spent difference. The other seven variables were also not statistically significant in the bivariate analysis.

CONCLUSION

The aim of my research was to explain the differences in vote margin of candidates in the Florida Legislature. Information was collected on all 120 house districts and all 40 senate districts from the 2016 general election. This research intended to see which variables had a significant impact on the vote margin and which did not have a significant impact. Political districting, constituent characteristics, candidate centered characteristics and contest characteristics were collected, and then inputted into a spreadsheet.

Two spreadsheets were then developed: one containing all 160 districts and the other containing those districts that were considered to have competitive races. A competitive race was an election that had at least two names on the ballot. There were 84 competitive races by that definition. Using IBM SPSS software, a univariate analysis, a bivariate regression, and multivariate regression was done on both models, resulting in six sets of analysis total.

The all races model showed that nine of the variables were statistically significant in the bivariate regression; registration difference, write in candidate, minor party candidate, major party candidate, no competition, racial difference in the district, race difference of candidates, sex difference of candidates, and money spent difference. Five of the variables were statistically significant in the multivariate regression; registration difference, major party, minor party, write in and house race.

The competitive races model showed that three of the variables were statistically significant in the bivariate regression; registration difference, minor party, and money spent difference. There were only two variables that were statistically significant in the multivariate regression; party registration difference and minor party.

The all races model resulted in more statistically significant variables in both regressions than the competitive races model. This was expected since there were 76 less races being analyzed in the competitive model. Party registration difference and minor party were the two variables that were statistically significant in all four regressions. This was not surprising, but what was surprising was that there were only two variables that were significant in each regression. It was thought that money spent difference and the presence or absence of an incumbent was going to explain more of the variance in vote margin.

The all races model showed that four variables were not statistically significant in the bivariate regression; percent 65 or older, sex difference in the district, incumbent, and house race. Seven of the variables were not statistically significant in the multivariate regression; race or ethnicity difference among candidates, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference between candidates, sex difference in the district, the percentage of the district with 65 or older voters, the money spent difference, and if there was an incumbent.

The competitive races model showed that seven of the variables were not statistically significant in the bivariate regression; race or ethnicity difference of the candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and older, and house race. Eight variables were not statistically significant in the multivariate regression; race difference of the candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and older, money spent difference and house race.

All together these results show that party registration difference has the biggest impact on the margin of victory. The difference in registered Republicans and registered Democrats in a district largely determines how competitive the race is going to end up. The most competitive races were between districts that were evenly divided between the two major parties. The candidate characteristics and the constituent characteristics did not matter. The presence or absence of an incumbent ended up not mattering. Differences in money spent only had an effect in the bivariate regressions and type of race only mattered in the all races multivariate model. One reason that money spent difference results did not turn out as initially hypothesized might be that the amount of money spent by the challengers is the most important variable, rather than the gross difference between the candidates. Some research has shown that because incumbents have an advantage in name recognition and campaign contributions, challengers have to raise and spend a lot of money in order to raise awareness among voters. Successful challengers may still be out-spent, but will have raised and spent a sufficient amount of money to get their name and message out to the public. It may also be that money and incumbency are factors that help decide who wins a race, but have little or no direct effect on the closeness of the race.

This research does cover all 160 districts in Florida, but that is also a shortcoming, due to the data only covering the 2016 election cycle and only in the state of Florida. Additional research on more than one election year and more than one state could prove helpful in understanding what explains the differences in vote margin of candidates in state legislatures overall, not just in Florida. Since there was an unorthodox midyear redistricting in the Senate in 2016 that caused all of the seats to be up for elections instead of the usual half. The new districts also caused many incumbents to technically run in a different district than they had run in previously, which might explain the lower than expected impact of the presence or absence of an incumbent. This election cycle was also during a presidential election year, so it might be interesting to analyze data from a non-presidential election year and see if that has an impact on the results. In addition, given that Donald Trump was a maverick candidate who ran an unconventional campaign in 2016, it might be useful to analyze other presidential election years as well. Further research on competitiveness might also be conducted on the decision by major parties to contest a particular race with the dependent variable measures as a dummy variable: "1" for races with two major party candidates and "0" for contests with only one major party candidate.

In the future, this research could be expanded to look at multiple election years in Florida and then look at multiple election years in other states as well. Starting with neighboring states such as Georgia and Alabama might open the door for seeing if there are regional differences in which variables have an effect on the margin of victory. Seeing how Florida compares to other preeminent swing states like Ohio could also prove to be an interesting analysis. Another possible factor that could be added in the future is replacing the current money spent difference variables with one that looks at the amount spent by the challenger. The thought there is to see if that measure would show different results than the current measure of the absolute value of the money spent differences between the candidates. Adding a third model that only contains the competitive races that include a Republican and a Democrat candidate could be interesting to see if some of the other variables become statistically significant in those types of races. Candidate centered, and contest characteristics did not have a direct impact on the vote margin according to the current models, so controlling for just races that contain the two major parties might help bring out those variables.

The takeaway from this research is that despite initial thoughts about the potential impact of candidate and constituent characteristics on vote margin, party registration differences and the presence or absence of major or minor party competition largely explain the differences in margin of victory of candidates in the Florida Legislature. Party registration differences are directly affected by redistricting and the presence or absence of major or minor party competition is indirectly impacted by redistricting decisions. This showcases the stakes of the upcoming redistricting after the 2020 census and highlights the importance of following the guidelines set out in the Florida Fair District constitutional amendments to ensure that new districts are not drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party.

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Does the U.S. Support Unfair Labor Practices Through Trade Negotiations?

by Jamie Dietrich, B.A., 2019 Best Runner-up for Undergraduate Paper Award,
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ABSTRACT: The United States promotes itself as a democratic country that has interests in human rights domestically and internationally. With the growing trade market particularly in Asia, there continues to be reports of unsafe labor conditions such as sweatshop labor in the manufacturing industry and forced labor of children. These reports come from many of the countries that the U.S. has strong trade deals with such as Laos, China and Vietnam. This research seeks to answer the question: “Is the U.S. supporting unfair labor practices through trading with these countries?” This work looks at the effect that the number of trade agreements, trade openness and multilateral versus bilateral agreements had on number of labor standards and laws in Laos, China and Vietnam. This essay used the U.S. State Department’s *Report on Human Rights* to measure the number of laws and violations each country had. Through this research the author determined that the number and types of trade that a country engages in effects how their country creates laws and how likely they are to report and do something about violations.

Introduction

Are unfair labor practices being supported by the United States, a country that boasts freedom and democracy as core values, through their trade agreements? The United States (U.S.), as well as many other countries in the Western developed world fought against slavery and for workers’ rights for centuries. Throughout the industrial revolution and for years after, people were subject to horrible working conditions with long hours, no standardization on age requirement, unsafe and unhealthy conditions, as well as impractical standards of production. Despite all of the years of hard work to end these horrific conditions, are developed nations whose legislation’s ban these practices, supporting economies that thrive on this type of labor? What would these countries economies’ look like if democratic nations were to put trade blocs on these countries in petition of unfair labor laws? Would these nations find solutions to the problem or would their citizens suffer further without work?

This research focuses on how the number of trade agreements, trade openness, and the types of trade agreements influence the presence of labor laws and labor standard violations around the world. Concentrating on a countries policies’ and practices on foreign trade will help to reflect how easily and how often developed nations trade with developing nations. Further, this will show how developed nations are supporting the unfair labor practices prevalent in developing nations.

In comparison, the labor practices and labor standards in the countries where these goods are being imported from will be looked at as dependent on a countries’ willingness to trade and the type of trade. The first question that must be answered is how labor laws in the countries who are producing and exporting cheap goods do compare to those of the import country, like the United States (U.S.)? Are the laws put in place by each country being followed? What are the ways in which they are being regulated and implemented, if at all? If the labor laws are being followed in their own nation but they do not match-up with countries whose democratic values reflect that labor practices should be fair, is that a breach in their morals? It is important to look at the comparison between labor laws in the developed nations versus those in developing nations in terms of hours permitted to be worked, working conditions, safety and health regulations.

This research sets out to test the relationship between trade and labor laws and violations which translates into how democratic nations are supporting unfair labor. This essay predicts that the results will clearly show strong correlations between trade openness' effect on how lenient labor laws are. The author hypothesize that the results will show that countries like the United States are supporting unfair labor and therefore breaking their democratic morality.

This section introduces the main topic: is the U.S. supporting unfair labor practices through trade negotiations? The author outlined why this issue matters to readers and how to solve this problem, while touching upon what the results would be like, that number of trade agreements, trade openness, and types of trade agreements will correlate to a country's labor standards and labor standard violations. The next section explores existing literature on the linkage between U.S. trade and labor standards, looking at the International Labor Organization (ILO) and World Trade Organization (WTO) to see how they handle exchanges of trade and what revisions are there for labor used to produce these goods. Finally, this essay looks at the literature on trade and how labor provisions impact trade. This literature will help to support the author's theory on the relationship between labor standards, violations and trade.

LITERATURE REVIEW

I. Labor Standards

It is essential for the context of this argument that the term labor standards is elaborated upon and defined. The research defines labor standards on their own terms and uses a combination of scholars' definitions to outline labor standards in an international setting to back up this essay's claim that such standards are being abused. Morally speaking, it is wrong to overwork people and give them an unsafe working environment (Marshall, 1990). From an economics standpoint, if we treat workers better: they are more productive. So why do countries still abuse workers' rights? The main focuses of international labor rights groups is to make sure that no country is unduly advantaged by illegally exploiting laborers (Marshall, 1990).

"The general area of labor rights involves a variety of issues, including both the capacity of workers to act collectively—to associate freely, bargain collectively, and strike—as well as the individual conditions they experience—hours of work, protection of health and safety, non-discrimination in hiring and compensation" (Mosley & Tello, 2015, p.56). Labor standards have evolved and expanded in the developed world over time. Rights originally dealt with women and children's safety provisions but have come to encompass many things, such as hours worked in a week (Brown, 2001). As defined by many scholars, as well as outlined by the ILO there are eight collective standards that are upheld in the world of global trade (Burtless, 2001):

- 1) freedom of association,
- 2) right to organize and bargain collectively,
- 3) prohibition on forced labor,
- 4) abolition of forced labor,
- 5) prohibition of employment discrimination,
- 6) equal pay for men and women,
- 7) minimum age of work, and
- 8) prompt elimination of the worst forms of child labor (Burtless, 2001).

These principles, defined by the ILO provide an outline for countries to adopt however, these guidelines are not binding (Sarkin, Koenig, 2011). This brings up the topic of enforcement. How do international trade organizations have in making sure that countries follow labor standards?

Labor standards are already widely accepted by the international community and, as long as they are practical and enforceable, there is no reason to reject them (Marshall, 1990). It is also accepted that

as long as they meet the conditions of being practical and enforceable, labor standards promote free trade systems. So why do countries have such a hard time accepting international labor standards? There are a few key points on how labor standards can be implemented:

1. that the defining of labor standards needs to be as simple as possible,
2. there needs to be a clear way of telling when someone is in violation of a labor regulation,
3. there needs to be a system in place for countries to report on violations. In order to bring these countries back up to standard, there needs to be a process for correcting these situations (Marshall, 1990).

There are many issues that arise with the question of labor standards. The examples highlighted here include the “race to the bottom” argument, countries with higher standards actually losing out from regulations, and developed markets regimenting underdeveloped countries as a way to persuade them into following labor laws.

The “race to the bottom” argument proposes that if we increase imports from low standard countries it will actually harm our own workers, according to Dehejia (2008), who also suggests that there is a concern for this should countries develop more open trade policies. According to Lloyd (1992) there is a strong positive correlation between trade and labor standards. When developed countries lower tariffs on underdeveloped nations that have advantages in industries such as textiles and produce, there is a higher chance of them improving their labor standards (Burtless, 2001).

One argument is if we increase imports from low standard countries, it will actually harm our own workers (Dehejia, 2008). The European Union (E.U.) has always drawn attention to working standards since its creation and they have an established set of standards that all member states must abide by. In the E.U. countries must follow the basic platform but are welcome to amend their own labor laws to allow nations to remain sovereign. This may work in the E.U., however, the E.U. and developing countries are very different. Developing countries often are reluctant to follow international trade laws, fearing that they only benefit developed countries. What we know from evidence is that the E.U. demonstrates that there is not a strong correlation between low labor standards and improvement in exports (Dehejia, 2008).

The final argument involves regulation of underdeveloped countries trade. If regulations are implemented and followed, they will be rewarded with an invitation into the U.S.-European markets. Arguments against this method include that any refusal to trade until these countries improve their labor laws, could hurt our own consumer market (Burtless, 2001). Also, will refusing to trade with these countries really improve their working conditions or will the poor just stay poor?

One way to control the labor market is through private sanctions: individual's right to not consume goods produced in a labor market that is abusing human rights. But it cannot be expected that Third World countries comply with the global standards of Western countries because it takes time for them to develop their markets, while by imposing high tariffs on these countries only hurts them more by cutting them off from a huge international market (Burtless, 2001).

II. WTO's & ILO's Roles in Labor Standards

Should labor standards make their way into the WTO or remain solely in the ILO? Currently, the WTO does not govern any labor conditions (Burtless, 2001). Brown (2001) claims that there is unanimous support for protecting workers rights, the issue lies in how to actually solve them. The WTO's existing regulations are not up to par with labor standards and are thus unwittingly enabling countries to abuse laborer's rights (Brown, 2001).

The ILO is in charge of laying the groundwork for labor standards which are adopted and enforced by the country. Many countries model their labor laws around the standards the ILO has provided (Mosley

& Tello, 2015). The ILO created the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998 which includes: the Forced Labor Convention, Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, the Equal Remuneration Convention, the Discrimination (Employment & Occupation) Convention, the Minimum Age Convention and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (Mosley & Tello, 2015). The U.S. formally recognizes two of the eight rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (U.N.) is aimed to fill the gaps where the ILO fell short, however it is too broad to hold any country to any real standard (Mosley & Tello, 2015).

In 1966 the UDHR, combine with two new covenants, became the International Bill of Rights (IBR). The rights outlined in the IBR included "the right to work, just and favourable conditions of work, trade union rights, including the right to strike and the right to social security, including social insurance" (Mosley & Tello, 2015, p.250-251). It also included rights of the family, and an adequate standard of living, health and culture. The basis for linking trade and labor standards is appropriate when we link the terms labor standards and human rights. Since core labor standards are human rights, the WTO has an obligation to incorporate and protect labor standards (Mosley & Tello, 2015).

There are articles in the WTO's forerunner, the General Accord on Tariffs & Trade (GATT), that indirectly reference labor standards that are accepted in international law. These GATT articles justify the need for labor principals to be outlined by the WTO. The WTO is the most appropriate platform to decide international law protecting workers because it is the broadest trade agreement that incorporates standards for labor. If the international community wants to be serious about fair free trade they need to push for the incorporation of standards in the WTO (Kagan, 2011).

The U.S. has shown they are serious about labor agreements by holding their trade partners accountable for violations of the agreements, unfortunately we cannot say the same about the WTO (Kagan, 2011). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce prefers free trade agreements, but the fear is that many countries will not comply to the strict labor standards if the international community shifts towards this type of trade (Burtless, 2001).

The ILO does lack some rights that would allow strict regulation and standardization (Kagan, 2011). They can investigate cases involving violations of labor standards they put in place and make conclusions based on their findings. They cannot; however, enforce punishment or force a country to comply with standards (Kagan, 2011). The variability of adoption of standards ensures that countries still feel a sense of sovereignty over their own labor laws (Dehejia, 2008). The hope is that condemning these countries will cause other countries to not want to trade with them (Kagan, 2011).

So how can we implement labor standards into the WTO? There are three key points:

1. the defining of labor standards needs to be as simple as possible (Marshall, 1990);
2. there needs to be a clear way of telling when someone is in violation of a labor regulation;
3. there needs to be a system in place for countries to report violations. Thus, to bring these countries back-up to standards there needs to be a process to correct these situations (Marshall, 1990).

The most important improvement is that we see increased rates of productivity which leads to an increase in economic activity (Mattioli & Sapovadia, 2004). Labor is not only the sole proprietor of production but also the way in which the producers benefit and contribute economically. If working conditions are healthy this fosters a better life for workers which increases the productivity of labor. The more a country can produce, the more foreign direct investment will be funneled into that country (Mattioli & Sapovadia, 2004).

III. Trade

The author notes that it would be optimal for the ILO and WTO to coordinate on labor and trade however, the WTO is not legally obligated to do so. Improving labor standards improves workers productivity and therefore benefits the economy (Granger & Siroen, 2006).

It is important to include labor provisions in both the export and trade sectors of the WTO. Granger and Siroen (2006) conclude with a quote by Kimberly Ann Elliott "Globalization is not leading to a worldwide race to the bottom for workers, but greater respect for the core labour standards could help spread its benefits more broadly."

Economists agree unanimously that free trade is more advantageous than protectionist trade (Rodrik, 2018). Additionally, in regions where there is a free trade agreement, the enforcement of labor practices amongst countries can be executed more optimally (Burtless, 2001). These scholars also see trade agreements as enhancing the efficiency of production due to specialization of products in certain countries. Current trade agreements can include regulations on border control, health and safety, investment and finances, intellectual property, environment, and most importantly for the case of this research, is labor (Rodrik, 2018). These trade agreements are designed to cross borders.

Rodrik poses the question of why trade agreements are even necessary if we are trying to move the world toward more free-trade. He argues that policy makers do not often think about the boundaries of trade and will do whatever it takes to gain economic opportunities for their country.

The agreements are more in place to keep the policymakers in check with morals and values when they are figuring out trade schemes (Rodrik, 2018). It is known that more traditional trade barriers included regulation on tariffs, the main goal of trade negotiations was to negotiate tariffs. In 1995 there was a shift away from tariffs and towards negotiations on other topic areas. These regulations can be used to serve the interest of the population in that country, such as creating barriers for trade in large production areas, and to meet social and developmental goals the country has (Rodrik, 2018).

The GATT has helped reduce tariffs world-wide, however multilateral trade still suffers from the consequences of non-tariff trade barriers. Bilateral agreements, while expediting trade regulation reform, also have negative consequences such as the potential to become exclusionary and actually diverting trade. Irwin (1993) acknowledges that there is a shift from multilateral to bilateral agreements and focuses on the debate over if bilateral or multilateral agreements are more effective in promoting trade? During times of great macroeconomic stability, liberal trade policies are typically the go-to. For free trade to occur, it is pertinent to have a solid international economy in place however, things such as price shocks seemed to throw an economic wrench in open trade policies. The evidence throughout history suggests that multilateralism does not support or harm liberalization of trade. The same goes for bilateralism, there is no support or harm through these types of negotiations. The historical perspective of these types of agreements remains inconclusive in terms of their effect on liberalization of trade (Irwin, 1993).

Postuma and Ebert (2010), discovered that incorporating labor provisions in free trade agreements could act as a form of protectionism in disguise. They also suggest that labor standards could shrink the growth of developing countries through increasing tax rates. The ILO should not be the sole body responsible for labor provisions. Instead they should use their knowledge to guide the WTO towards a more humane workforce. The ILO should receive all violations of labor standards and should appropriately help countries fix their issues and get up to speed with the standards that exist. The authors claim that at this point with the lack of compliance being so prevalent, it is better to work with the standards that are already in place and bring countries up to speed, rather than try to implement new standards (Postuma & Ebert, 2010).

There is one solution to improve the amount of trade between underdeveloped and developed nations which could actually harm individuals in underdeveloped countries. Tightening labor standards in

developed countries, for example, making the minimum age to work one year older could possibly help. This would put that age group out of work and therefore less people to do that low skilled job, so it will require the developed country to import more goods which will increase labor in underdeveloped countries (Brown, 2001).

IV. Conclusion

We can conclude from studying this research that sovereignty plays a major role in the integration of human rights internationally. Many states feel that collaboration on international law goes too far when a state's actions are punishable. The WTO does not currently hold any standards of labor that can hold countries accountable for abusing their citizen's rights. This is an organization that holds a lot of power in international trade and in order for any nation to take them seriously in regard to labor standards, countries need to be held accountable.

The U.S. as a major promoter of its democratic values, has a stake in inviting other countries to take a stand and be held accountable for abusing their citizens. The U.S. should be acting as a role model to move the world toward more fair labor practices while upholding a positive international economy.

This section looks into the literature regarding trade agreements, labor standards and their interconnection. Trade agreements such as the WTO, according to the literature, is not sufficient enough to prevent against unfair labor standards in the developing world. There are also many cases where the U.S. could play a role in the implementation of international laws by raising tariffs on countries who do not follow labor standards or even refusing to trade with these countries. Many scholars argue, however, that this would cause more harm than good in both the U.S. and developing countries. The theory section seeks to hypothesize about the relationship between number of trade agreements, trade openness, bilateral vs. multilateral agreements, and the number of labor standards and labor standard violations.

THEORY

Gary Burtless (2001) explains his resolution to the labor malpractice epidemic in his works. He discusses how the European and U.S. markets could be used as a persuasive tactic to entice developing countries out of poor labor standards by opening them up to the U.S. and European Union (E.U.) markets. He also explains all the negative impacts of implementing strict labor standards into the international trading system. Another strong argument by Burtless (2001) is the argument surrounding child labor laws. It is obvious that in developed countries we send children to school to get an education so that one day they can get a well-paying job, however, in underdeveloped countries this is not always plausible. This exemplifies how labor standards in developed countries cannot translate into developed countries.

This lays the framework for what makes a country more likely to have labor standards and be reported for violations of those standards. How does the number of trade agreements a country is involved in effect the number of labor violations and labor standards? How do bilateral and multilateral agreements affect the number of labor laws and labor standards? If a country holds more bilateral laws does that mean that there are less eyes on them so they do not need as many laws and will have fewer reports? Or do bilateral agreements mean that the other country they are trading with is less distracted and can see whether they are violating labor standards?

Hypotheses

This section seeks to develop hypotheses based on the theoretical framework laid out above by using the literature and research to distinguish whether the U.S. is reporting labor violations and what factors make a country adopt more labor standards. The author will look at the number of trade agreements each country holds and at the types of agreements to distinguish if bilateral or multilateral

agreements are more likely to have more labor standards and violations. This research also looks at trade openness as a factor to see if it has any effect on the number of trade standards and violations in a country.

Hypothesis 1.1: *Countries with a higher number of trade agreements will have more labor standards than countries with fewer trade agreements.*

Hypothesis 1.2: *Countries with a higher number of trade agreements will have more labor standard violations than countries with fewer trade agreements.*

Hypothesis 2.1: *A country that is more open to trade will have fewer labor standards than a country that is less open to trade.*

Hypothesis 2.2: *A country that is more open to trade will have fewer labor standard violations than a country that is less open to trade.*

Hypothesis 3.1: *Countries with more bilateral trade agreements than multilateral trade agreements will have less labor standards.*

Hypothesis 3.2: *Countries with more bilateral trade agreements than multilateral trade agreements will have less labor standard violations.*

This work's theory suggests that the United States is benefiting from bilateral trade agreements with countries who practice unfair labor laws but invest in the U.S. to keep them from reporting. The broad question here is this: how is the U.S. getting away with not enforcing fair labor standards across the world with their use of their powerful labor market as a tool or a weapon? Will this actually just hurt these countries or would we be helping the quality of life by improving their labor standards?

This section presents several hypotheses and the scholarly evidence that help support them. The research is rooted in how the United States is encouraging unfair labor practices through trade agreements. Thus, this study tests the effects of several different variables on the number of labor standards and violations a country has. In doing so, it is hoped to show how labor standards have an impact on the way in which a country establishes and maintains trade agreements.

METHODOLOGY

Control Variables

An important step in conducting my research will be to seek out and define any outlying variables which could have extraneous effects on the relationship between independent and dependent variables. When choosing pertinent case-studies it is important to control for these variables so not to skew the data in their favor.

The first control variable is whether or not a country is democratic. Since democracies tend to trade with each other and maintain peaceful relations it is important to select either all democracies or non-democracies. Democracies also tend to have a higher standard for human rights and protecting those rights. This means that democracies are less likely to infringe upon the rights of their citizens and are more likely to provide healthy and safe working conditions. For the purpose of this research my case studies will all be non-democratic countries. Studying countries who have trade agreements with the U.S. who do not share our same democratic values will give the most contrast between the U.S. and a country and show how the U.S. deals with this contrast.

Another control variable is a country's status as developed or developing. Developing countries sometimes need to bend the rules more than developed countries in order to get their economy on the right track. Labor standards are no exception. In some less-developed countries it may be crucial that

children work in order for their families to be able to afford to live and survive in that country and removing these children from the workplace could actually hurt citizens rather than help. In the case of developed countries, it is nearly unheard of for children to work and there are many laws preventing this. It is the norm for children to be expected to get an education so they can get a better job. For the purpose of this paper I will focus on developing countries.

The final variable which is important to control for is national culture. Culture can impact our thoughts, opinions, feelings and viewpoints. Sometimes what is the norm in one country can be very strange or foreign to another. This can apply to labor laws in that not all countries see labor laws or standards as an issue. What we view as unsafe or inhumane in the United States may be the norm in some other countries. In order to control for culture, this study will select countries from the same region of the world who have similar cultures.

The countries that chosen as case-studies that fit these control variables were Laos, China and Vietnam. All three are communist countries. This means that they do not practice democracy which typically means a lower standard of human rights. All three nations are also developing nations, unlike the United States. According to the *Oxford Dictionary* a developing country is “a poor agricultural country that is seeking to become more advanced economically and socially” (*Oxford Online*, 2018). It is often the case that developing countries need to lower their standards in order to gain equality amongst other nations. Laos, China and Vietnam are also all East Asian countries. This means that they share similar languages, geography and culture. This should help to control for any attitude or though differences which could be seen between these countries and countries in the Western world.

Dependent Variables

My dependent variables include labor standards and labor standard violations. The author believes in order to see the full effect of this research it is important to see both which laws are set in place and which laws are being violated. In the case of violations it is true that there will be instances where a country is violating a law and it has not been reported. This could be due to it having an adverse effect on the country who reports it. In terms of labor standards this study looks at the trade agreements the U.S. has with each of the countries in the case-studies section and analyze how many standards are actually outlined in those trade agreements. Both labor standards and labor standard violations are quantifiable and will be measured in terms of how many of each exist between the two countries.

Independent Variables

In order to receive results that help contribute to the question: ‘Is the U.S. encouraging unfair labor practices through trade agreements?’ there are several independent variables that affects the number of labor standards and the number of labor standard violations between the U.S. and its trading partners. This study breaks them down into three sections and each will be tested for its effect on the number of labor standards and the number of labor standard violations.

The first independent variable is the number of trade agreements. This is a quantifiable test of how many trade agreements a country is involved in. It is important to test for this because it is possible that the more trade agreements a country has the more intertwined their economies are. If this is true, reporting a country you are tied to economically could have major negative effects on your own economy. Likewise, it is possible that the U.S. is benefitting from the abuse of labor standards in another country. The cost of cheap labor helps to keep prices on goods low which means cheaper goods for the U.S.. It is important to account for the number of trade agreements the U.S. has with another country in order to see how it affects their implementation and reporting style of labor standards and violations.

The next independent variable chosen is trade openness: how open a country is to trading with other countries. If a country is less willing to trade with another country it could affect how that country is monitoring and being monitored for labor standard violations. On the other hand, if a country is open to trade with all others they could overlook violations of labor standards in order to gain access to a better market or better production of goods. Trade openness is measured by exports plus imports divided by GDP.

The final independent variable that will be tested for its effects on labor violations and labor standards is the existence of multilateral versus bilateral trade agreements. If more countries are involved in a trade agreement does that mean there are more eyes to keep watch of how labor standards are being violated or does it give countries an opportunity to fly under the radar. In contrast if a country has a bilateral trade agreement does that mean that it is more visible when one of the two countries abuses labor standards? Or, on the contrary, does it allow countries to have a closer relationship so that when one reported the other it would have implications on how the reporting country is perceived or cause harm to their own economy because it hurt their trading partner to report those violations.

It is important that labor standards and labor standard violations are tested in multiple ways to see which factors are affecting how laws are implemented and what effects whether or not a country will report another country. The next section puts these variables into play with the selection of my case studies which will be controlled by the control variables and tested using my independent variables to see the effects each one has on the dependent variables.

This section defines variables and lays the groundwork for how to test the hypotheses. The next section looks to three case-studies (Laos, China and Vietnam) and outline as much information as possible on their trade and labor standards. Sources used are the World Bank and U.S. Department of State Reports to gather all this information to apply it to this model in the case-study analysis section below.

3 CASE-STUDIES:

Laos

Laos holds around 40 trade agreements total (Exports, 2018). These include World Trade Organization (WTO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Laos grants Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to these countries: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey (Exports, 2018). The following countries provide Least Developed Country aid to Lao goods: Chile, China, Taiwan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Thailand (Exports, 2018). Laos has agreements with all 9 ASEAN nations, they also have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement of 2016 with the United States. Laos holds bilateral agreements with the following countries: Vietnam, China, Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, North Korea, Mongolia, Malaysia, Russia, India, Belarus', Argentina, Kuwait and Turkey (Exports, 2018).

The top three partners for trade with Laos include China, Vietnam and Thailand. The major industries in Laos are Mining (Copper, Tin, Gold, Gypsum); Timber; Electric Power; Agricultural Processing which produces their top three exported goods: Ores, Copper and Electrical Machinery (*Global Edge*, 2018). The industry that employs the most people in Laos is agriculture, though employment in agriculture is on a steady decline while the service and industry employment rates are on a steady incline. Unemployment rate is extremely low at 0.67% (*Global Edge*, 2018). Exports in Laos amounted to 5.831 billion, imports were at 7.351 billion and Lao GDP was 16.853 billion.

Using this information their trade openness score was .78 trade openness (World Bank, 2017). The top three export goods are ores, copper, electrical machinery and the top three import goods include electrical machinery, motor vehicles and parts, plus oil and mineral fuels (*Global Edge*, 2018). For business transactions it is common to use the U.S. Dollar, the Thai Bhat, or the Chinese Yuan for transactions involving the import of goods (Exports, 2018).

Laos has no current independent standards organization for the regulation of trade (Exports, 2018). The Department of Standards and Metrology heads any conformity assessments and product certifications. Laos is currently experiencing a shortage of labor. In order to attempt to change this the Lao government put into place new rights for workers and is working on increasing workers skills. The law gives authorization to workers groups to bargain collectively and associations, such as the Lao Federation of Trade Unions, as the primary representative, is helping to protect and represent Lao workers' rights. Under the 2014 law, child labor is prohibited except for in very specific scenarios and even then it is made a priority that the child's work does not interfere with their education or wellbeing. The law also bans discrimination of employment and sets a standard for number of hours an employee can work (Exports). There are health and safety standards that are outlined under the law and in 2015-2016 the International Labor Organization trained labor standard workers to be able to notice and cite violations of health and safety. There is, however, no connotation as to how often inspections must occur. Although Laos does not have a history of strikes, the new law allows for them. Under the new law, labor contracts are mandatory while in practice, contracts are rarely ever used (Exports 2018).

It is difficult to analyze employment, productivity, and wages in Laos because this information is only made public every 5 years and there are very few people who earn a wage in Laos (World Bank, 2018). This study looks at several different reliable data sources and how they compare to each other. The most reliable of these sources are the Lao Consumption and Expenditure surveys from 2002-2003, 2008-2009 and 2012-2013. These studies show that over time the labor force participation rate in Laos has decreased by 4% over the course of ten years. Additionally, the Lao unemployment rate more than doubled over this time period (World Bank, 2018).

Where does Laos labor market fall? Most of their citizens are employed in the agriculture sector followed by construction and services. Another major issue with the labor market in Laos is the increase in labor costs despite the lack of increase in productivity of workers (World Bank, 2018).

The rise in wages for Lao workers did not increase their productivity and in return caused firm's profitability to shrink (World Bank, 2018). It is hard to determine the cause of rising labor costs and the effects they are having on productivity because of the lack of research and information made available. Because of the lack of information, Laos is stuck in a vicious cycle of employers rushing to raise wages because of the national average of wages increasing which, studies have shown, does not mean that employees will be more productive at higher wages and in return profitability of the companies shrink. Due to the lowered profitability, firms do not want to make long term investments which, in the long run, would improve productivity which would justify the increased wages (World Bank, 2018). Since it is less attractive for countries to invest in Laos while they hold a similar low wage to other countries, investors are more likely to invest in those other countries.

There are two misconceptions about Lao labor that need to be disputed.

1. that there is a huge influx of migrant workers who are making up for the lack of Lao people who are not working. This is simply not true especially in unskilled jobs (World Bank, 2018). A report by Enterprise Survey states that only 2% of unskilled labor consists of foreign workers (World Bank, 2018).

2. that Lao workers are not fit for factory work. This is not just a myth in Laos but across many countries where factory labor is high. Scholars blame cultural and historical aspects that have affected the Lao people. The author highlights that when people are armed with the appropriate skills-set they will choose to take the better job for a chance at a better future. In this study they recognize obstacles that Lao workers face and their suggestion for improving the situation is just to make more options and opportunities available (World Bank, 2018).

Laos has joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) since 1964 and has ratified 8 of the ILO standards, including five out of 8 of the core ILO standards (compare this to two out of 8 ratified by the

U.S.) (ILO, 2018). Laos is working hard to improve standards and hopes to be off the "least developed countries" list by 2020. Their efforts toward a more developed country include "making changes in employment creation; stimulating the investment environment; strengthening social dialogue; improving social security and expand social protection; promoting safety and health, including HIV/AIDS workplace policy, safe labour migration and lifting Laos off the list of least-developed countries by 2020" (ILO, 2018).

It is stated in the U.S. Department of State report on Human Rights in Laos that the most significant violations of human rights standards include "lack of due process, including arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment by the government; government infringements on the right to privacy and on freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association; the denial to citizens of the ability to choose their government; trafficking in persons; and restrictions on workers' rights, including the inability to form independent labor unions not associated with the government" (USDS, 2018). This states that the infringement of workers' rights and in particular the right to form independent labor unions is one of the more serious violations of human and labor rights in Laos (USDS, 2018).

Section 7 of this document outlines worker's rights violations in Laos in the year 2017 (USDS, 2018). There are five subsections of section seven which define the violations in the areas of: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; prohibition of forced or compulsory labor; prohibition of child labor and minimum age for employment; discrimination with respect to employment and occupation, and acceptable conditions of work (USDS, 2018). In the area of Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining it is stated that the law in Laos allows for the formation of workers unions and organizations (USDS, 2018).

The law does fall short in its actions that are not inclusive to certain populations including foreigners, police and armed forces (USDS, 2018). Lao laws explicitly state that one cannot be discriminated at work for reasons unrelated to their job performance and, the law lacks a revision that outlines what happens to workers who are fired for their participation in the union. The Lao government provided no information on what they are actually doing to enforce freedom of association provisions however the penalties for if you are caught infringing on these rights include fines, jail time and the revoking of business licenses (USDS, 2018).

Many Lao trade unions operate within the Lao Federation of Trade Unions which the law does not acknowledge as either allowed or not (USDS, 2018). In Laos there were infrequent labor disputes and many times the law was not enforced however there was evidence of employees and workers groups attempting to settle the disputes. The government did not provide any information on the effectiveness of employee intervention. Strike rates are extremely low against labor rights because of the government's disapproval describing striking as leading to social turmoil and social instability (USDS, 2018).

Forced labor is illegal in Laos and is enforced using fines, suspension from employment, revoking business licenses, and prosecution (USDS, 2018). The penalty for trafficking humans include imprisonment, fines and assets confiscation. These were strict penalties to deter forced labor from occurring in Laos however because of a lack of resources there was a gap in the efficiency of enforcement (USDS, 2018).

There was also a displacement of a large number of agricultural workers in Laos (USDS, 2018): 60% of trafficked girls were between the ages of 12-to-18 and worked under forced conditions. This increased their likelihood of being trafficked because of their lack of income. Some of these agricultural workers found day labor jobs (USDS, 2018).

Child labor in Laos prohibits work performed by children under the age of 14 (USDS, 2018), with 14-to-18 years-old are only permitted to work 8 hours a day at the most, and it must be in a healthy and safe environment. Children 12 and older are permitted to work more lax jobs. The law does not apply to informal labor. The lack of inspectors led to a decreased surveillance and punishment for those who

abused child labor laws (USDS, 2018). Punishment for child labor includes fines and imprisonment however it is not enough to deter this type of labor (USDS, 2018). The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is the body responsible for seeing that child labor is not abused in Laos. They did things such as holding awareness campaigns, held workshops and collected data on child labor (USDS, 2018).

Although the law does provide the prohibition of discrimination against biases there is no law that prohibits discrimination based on race, disabilities, language, gender, age, HIV status, or sexual orientation (USDS, 2018). The law does require that equal work be paid equally and outlines that it is illegal to discriminate against a woman based on marital status or pregnancy status however studies have shown that it is more difficult for women to find jobs in Laos. Lao laws set the minimum wage and poverty level for industries in Laos (USDS, 2018). The workweek is restricted to 48 hours and you may not work overtime more than 45 hours in one month. There is a law requiring that workers who work in unsafe conditions get paid more however the law does not help in the case of someone wanting to leave a job for safety purposes. There are provisions for workman's compensation for those who are injured or die on the job and in these instances employers are required to report accidents that occur at work. In the case of pregnant women working in hazardous situations they are guaranteed a transfer to a safer job with the same pay rate (USDS, 2018).

The Department of Labor Management is responsible for inspecting workplaces for safety and health code violations (USDS, 2018). There were many occasions where health and safety codes were not enforced because of a lack of inspectors. These infringements include the government not paying workers on time, workers earning less than minimum wage, and lack of enforcement for overtime wage (USDS, 2018). Immigrant workers were more likely to be exploited for their work. They mostly worked in the fields of construction, plantation farming, logging, casinos and service industries, all of which are more likely to see violations of labor laws). The ILO reported a lack of competency from the garment workers on their rights at work and they were oblivious to the fact that their working conditions were unsafe and unhealthy (USDS, 2018).

China

China has bilateral agreements with more than 100 countries (Exports, 2018). China's bilateral agreements cover everything from expropriation and arbitration to how they treat most-favored-nations and the return of investment proceeds to their own country (Exports, 2018). China has 14 Fair Trade Agreements (FTAs) with ASEAN, Singapore, Pakistan, New Zealand, Chile, Perú, Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, South Korea and Australia. China has an additional 8 countries which they are seeking to create FTAs with (Exports, 2018). Because of China's very large export market it is vital for them to have free trade agreements with other countries in order to export all of the goods that they produce (Exports, 2018).

China's top three trading partners include the United States, Hong Kong and Japan. Top industries are Mining and Ore processing (Iron, Steel, Aluminium, other metals, coal); machine building; armaments; textiles and apparel; petroleum; cement; chemicals (Exports, 2018). The top three exported goods include Electrical Machinery, Industrial Machinery and Furniture. The industry with the highest employment rate is Services and compared to Agriculture and Industry it is the only labor field that has increased employment over the last five years. The unemployment rate is on the rise and currently sits at 4.675% (Exports, 2018).

China is the world's number one exporter of goods and the number two importer of goods after the United States (Exports, 2018). China imported 2.504 trillion U.S. Dollars-worth of goods, exported 2.68 trillion and their GDP was 12.238 trillion (World Bank, 2017). This means their trade openness score was 0.42. The top three exported goods from China include Electrical and Industrial machinery, and furniture

(Exports, 2018). The top three goods imported include electrical machinery, oil and mineral fuels, and industrial machinery. The leading industry in China is manufacturing. They supply a majority of manufactured goods sold in the U.S. (Exports, 2018).

Starting in the mid-1950s China shifted its aid from solely communist countries to underdeveloped countries (*Britannica*, 2018). Large investments were made in Asia, as well as in Africa. China's balance of trade has been positive, which means more exports—since 1990 (*Britannica*, 2018).

The unions in China are based on industry and only those who rely on wages from employment qualify, which disqualifies agricultural employees. There is great pressure to join a union for the social benefits (*Britannica*, 2018). These unions never engage in collective bargaining and instead focus on social reforms including "provided services such as clinics, rest and holiday homes, hostels, libraries, and clubs; and administered old-age pensions, workers' insurance, disability benefits and other welfare schemes" (*Britannica*, 2018).

Over the past five years the U.S. has definitely increased the amount of goods they import from China. In the year 2013 the total trade balance for the year was -318,683.8 million U.S. Dollars. At the end of 2017 the trade balance was -375,576.4 million U.S. Dollars (*Census*, 2018). It is too soon to tell where 2018 will fall on this spectrum however we are on track to surpass the trade balance from 2017. This will mean that even more goods will potentially be imported from China in the year 2018.

China became a member of the WTO at the end of 2011 (WTO, 2018). The single most prevalent industry is manufacturing. 93.7% of Chinese exports are manufactured goods. They do import a slightly larger variety of items however manufacturing takes up 64.9% of their imports with fuels and mining taking up the next biggest portion at 20.5% (WTO, 2018).

According to the WTO report China began its expedition on open trade in 1978 (WTO, 2018). Their current goal is to further this development and open their trade to many countries. They outline four steps including easing market access, improving their investment environment, exchanging information in regards to new technology and expanding imports (WTO, 2018).

Trade standards in China are governed by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) (Exports, 2018). The China National Certification and Accreditation Administration (CNCA) also plays a large role in trade standards by standardizing the certification and testing system in China. Both the SAC and the CNCA fall under the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ) (Exports, 2018).

China holds four categories of standards for trade: national standards, industry standards, local or regional standards and enterprise standards (Exports, 2018). There is a mandatory certification mark for safety on some types of products that is required before import or export. Many industries also require their own regulations and certifications before a product can be imported or exported (Exports, 2018).

Only recently have Chinese workers been given the right to form alliances (Exports, 2018). Other bodies who have a role in dictating trade standards include the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (Exports, 2018). Currently, the SAC is undergoing reforms in China to allow their system to have less mandatory standards and adopt a system similar to the E.U.'s top-down system. Their main goal in doing these reforms is to become a big player in international standards.

Beijing relies on the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) as a mark on whether a product follows the safety standards (Exports, 2018). Products may not be imported or sold unless they contain the CCC mark (Exports, 2018). The CCC is China's most widely respected standard label however industries are permitted to set their own standards and many require their own unique product certification processes (Exports, 2018).

According to reports from *China Daily*, the labor force is shrinking in China which is causing wages to increase. The labor market shrinkage is due to increased education levels in China (*China Daily*, 2018). In the past there have been strict limits on who was allowed to work in factories based on age and productivity which caused people to get a higher education. There has been a shift from uneducated workers towards those with college degrees working in factories. Although China now has a more educated population, there is a gap between the employees and the market for more advanced jobs. The job market is becoming increasingly geared towards high skilled workers. One possible solution to this issue would be to invest more in job training and skill enhancement for workers (*China Daily*, 2018).

There are many deterrents for foreigners to settle and work in China the main concern being increasing air pollution (Exports, 2018). China is also not up to date in regard to labor standards. Their laws do not protect Chinese workers from freedom of association and the right to strike and they have not ratified the ILO's ramifications on freedom of association and collective bargaining (Exports, 2018).

They have however adopted provisions on child labor laws and employee discrimination (Exports, 2018). Companies attempting to trade with China often find difficulty in the ever-changing laws on labor. The epidemic of not obtaining an employment contract is very prominent in China (Exports, 2018). Labor contracts are required by law however they are not often implemented domestically and can lead to the abuse of power by the employer without the employee to be able to prove they are employed which leads to decreased workers' rights (Exports, 2018).

Collective bargaining in China is only allowed in terms of wage negotiation and even then, it is not popular amongst workers. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions plays a role in implementing the communist regime in Chinese trade unions (Exports, 2018).

China became a member of the ILO in 1919 (ILO, 2018). In 2016 the MOHRSS and the ILO signed an updated agreement that aims to bring labor standards up to speed in the rapidly changing environment that is present in China (ILO, 2018). The Memorandum of Understanding (M.U.) describes the relationship between the ILO and the MOHRSS which according to the ILO "realize(s) the common objectives of promoting social justice, decent work and fair globalization in a world marked by deepening economic integration, rapid economic and social transformation, and a pressing need for quality job creation and global policy coherence" (ILO, 2018).

China has a 1995 Labor law and a 2008 Labor Contract Law that provide the outline for labor law in China (CLB, 2018). Some of these laws include: A written contract between employer and employee, 40 hours work weeks (conditions apply) and severance is required upon termination of a contract. Since the 2008 contract however, the government and employers are not very strict about implementation and it is up to the workers and unions to ensure that these laws are upheld (CLB, 2018).

The measurement of unemployment was difficult throughout China because of the economic disparity throughout the country (CLB, 2018). In the early 2000's there was a number that represented unemployment amongst registered urban house holders. This was a very small sector of China's very large population (CLB, 2018). The current average unemployment in China weighs in around 6.6% (CLB, 2018).

The biggest issue Chinese workers face is the lack of payment by the employer (CLB, 2018). The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) is making steps towards improving the issue and even proposed an eradication of late payment by 2020. Because of the widespread disparity, wage is based on cost of living, and the supply and demand for labor (CLB, 2018).

Section 7 of the U.S. Department of State report on human rights abuses in China is geared toward highlighting the breeches in workers' rights (USDS, 2018). This is divided into five sections: Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining, Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor, Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment, Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation, and Acceptable Conditions of Work (USDS, 2018).

Workers do not have the right of freedom of association or to choose unions to join (USDS, 2018). The unions are all government sponsored, there are no independent unions and workers are more or less required to be a part of these unions (USDS, 2018). The government sponsored unions are allowed to fight for better wages and the government collects feedback and information from these unions. Legally, there is no obligation from employers to bargain fairly against workers and often, they do not (USDS, 2018).

The process for settling labor disputes is trifold and includes mediation between two parties, arbitration and litigation (USDS, 2018). Work stoppage is not outlined precisely and it is not necessarily thought of as illegal. Striking is legal and the most accepted strikes included those against delayed pay (USDS, 2018). The enforcement officers lack resources to implement corrections where violations are made. The enforcement tactics are outlined however, they were long and unclear leading to delayed or lack of enforcement. There is proof of government interference in response to strikes in terms of changing provisions (USDS, 2018).

Forced labor is against the law however there were reports of this illegal action against adults and children (USDS, 2018). According to the government the law was enforced through imprisonment, detention and fines. There were two cases of police freeing more than 30 disabled people who were participating in forced labor in Heilongjiang Province. In 2013 the re-education through labor system was terminated. It was not possible to verify the effect this had on forced labor (USDS, 2018).

Chinese law prohibits children under 16 from working (USDS, 2018). Between the ages of 16 and 18 there are requirements for what this age group can and cannot do. This law was not effectively enforced and the penalty for violating such hiring conditions includes imprisonment. There was also an abuse of the student worker system wherein schools were being the middleman between employers and underage workers (USDS, 2018).

Discrimination in the workplace is illegal in regards to ethnicity, race, gender, religious belief, disability, age and infectious or occupational diseases (USDS, 2018). The MOHRSS and local bureaus are in charge of monitoring labor laws in terms of discrimination and enforcement was not effective. The courts did not often accept these types of cases and so in return there were very few examples of these violations (USDS, 2018). There were some employers who made their retirement age for women 50 years and there was evidence of employers favoring male workers in hiring. Despite the child-bearing limit there was still discrimination based on maternity leave. This is a backwards move by the Chinese government who lightened its policy on birth control—a clear discrimination towards women. In January of 2016 the limit was raised to two children (USDS, 2018).

In 2016 migrants were required to register and acknowledge themselves as residents (USDS, 2018). This registration system allows for the discrimination of migrant workers by employers. The country at large does not have a minimum wage however locally, there are minimum wages set. Overtime work results in extra pay and is limited to three hours a day or 36 hours in a month (USDS, 2018).

The law requires employers to provide employees working in hazardous situations to free health checks. Workers also have the right to report violations and leave the workplace if situations are unsafe (USDS, 2018).

The bureaus of labor and social security at the county level or above are responsible for enforcing labor laws (USDS, 2018). Those in violation of labor laws face business suspension and loss of license. The government was not properly enforcing the law. It was apparent that penalties against those in violation were not strong enough to deter them from performing unlawful acts. There were not enough people working in inspection so there was no way for all of the violations to be caught. The safety conditions did improve however there were still a sizeable amount of work related injuries (USDS, 2018). The non-payment issue was still extremely prevalent. Companies were defiant in paying their share and often relocated their company in order to avoid debts (USDS, 2018).

In terms of violations of health, a mere 10% of employers provided health services to their employees and there was a lack of proper safety equipment to prevent injury (USDS, 2018). There were many studies done on the prevalence of occupational disease which showed how in more than 30 industries there were many cases of such diseases. From January to November the number of work-related injuries decreased by 26.9% in comparison to the same time period from last year and fatalities dropped by 20.6%. One industry that stood out as unsafe was coal mining in May, 18 miners were killed in a mining accident and in August, 11 miners were killed in an accident that was denied by the employer. In June a fire burned down a paper factory, no deaths were reported and in August an accident at a petrochemical company killed 10 (USDS, 2018).

Vietnam

Vietnam holds 11 trade agreements with the World Trade Organization (WTO), Bilateral agreement with the U.S., Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (Exports, 2018). Vietnam has trade pacts with China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand, India, Chile and Japan. Vietnam has signed and complied with all bilateral agreements in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) however, it has not yet been ratified. Vietnam negotiated a deal with the E.U., but must wait for a decision from the Council of Ministers. Vietnam is also negotiating a deal with the EFTA countries (Exports, 2018).

Vietnam's exported 227.961 billion in goods, imported 230.237 billion and their GDP was 223.78 billion (World Bank, 2017). This gave them a trade openness score of 2.05. Their top three exported goods are electrical machinery, footwear and apparel. The top three imported goods into Vietnam are electrical and industrial machinery, and plastics (Global Edge, 2018).

The U.S.' trade balance in 2008 with Vietnam was -10,111.6 million U.S. Dollars whereas so far in 2018 (excluding October, November and December) the trade balance between these countries is -9,267.6 million U.S. Dollars (Census, 2018). Although imports from Vietnam grew, they are just a small fraction of those imported from China. This increase in Vietnamese imports into the U.S. is not stopping anytime soon and according to the data the U.S. is on track to surpass imports from 2017 (Census, 2018).

Vietnam's top three trading partners are China, US and South Korea (Exports, 2018). The top industries in Vietnam are food processing, garments, shoes and machine-building. The labor force has been on a steady rise in the past 5 years with a current unemployment rate of 2.053%. Agriculture employs the largest percentage of the population in Vietnam with 40.8% of workers being in the agriculture industry. Employment in services follows agriculture, weighing in at 34% of the labor force and industry employs 25% of workers. Imports and exports have been on a gradual rise in Vietnam and additionally, Foreign direct investment has also increased a significant amount (Exports, 2018).

Vietnam has an extensive list for international trade standards and 9,500 national standards exist in Vietnam regarding trade agreements (Exports, 2018). Trade regulations in Vietnam are applied at the national and organizational level and can include both voluntary standards and mandatory technical regulations. After joining the WTO the Directorate for Standards, Metrology and Quality management (STAMEQ) took precedence as promoting values of the WTO in Vietnam. Vietnam has a transparent national standards system and nearly half of their standards are up to par regionally and globally (Exports, 2018).

The Vietnam Standards and Quality Institute (VSQI) develops and issues what the standards are in Vietnam (Exports, 2018). VSQI is the link between national agencies and their international standards organization. The regulations laid out by the National Technical Committee (TCVN) are typically voluntary. They span things such as export and import standards, product quality and supplier standards. Although these regulations are voluntary companies are encouraged to adopt these actions and their approval is based on consensus vote (Exports, 2018).

Product certification falls into four categories. QUACERT, being most significant, certifies organizations and people who comply with international standards (Exports, 2018). The Bureau of Accreditation is responsible for laboratories that perform testing, calibration, medicinal testing, certification and inspection (Exports, 2018).

After the Two Vietnam Wars (1946-54 and 1964-75) the country was reunited in 1975 under communism (Exports, 2018). In the 1980s the economic reforms that took place in Vietnam were called the *Doi Moi* and they helped to capture macroeconomic stability and strong economic growth. Since the creation of *Doi Moi* imports and exports in Vietnam have grown exponentially and this has caused better living conditions for the Vietnamese (Exports, 2018). Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, going through a long process of reducing tariffs to be accepted into the agreement (Exports, 2018).

In 1995 Vietnam joined ASEAN and AFTA (Asian Free Trade Area) (Exports, 2018). To join AFTA a country needs to comply by the tariff scheme to reduce tariffs with trade partners to allow for free trade. Vietnam also has a bilateral agreement with the U.S.—a step in the right direction towards joining the WTO since many of the principals that the U.S. laid out—open market access, U.S. investment in many Vietnam sectors, protection on U.S. property rights, transparent rules for investors and open service market—are very similar to the requirements of the WTO. Joining the WTO has increased Vietnam's imports by 280% and exports by 214% between 2007-2015 (Exports, 2018).

The World Bank gives credit to education in Vietnam for increasing labor force participation however they suggest that there now needs to be a shift toward increasing productivity (World Bank, 2018). Due to the increasing demand of goods from Vietnam, employers are seeking employees who demonstrate better behavior, cognitive and technical skills (World Bank, 2018). Now that the majority of the population shows a basic level of education there is a shift in standards toward applicants with good critical thinking and those with technical skills (World Bank, 2018). The school systems in Vietnam has come up with a three-steps process including: early development to work towards school readiness, building a better foundation based on cognition and behavioral tactics and building those technical skills that lead to employment (World Bank, 2018).

The goals of the ILO in Vietnam are to promote workers' rights, allow for better opportunities for work, enhance social protection and get people talking about work related problems (ILO, 2018). The ILO has helped the Vietnamese government by advising on policy, capacity building, as well as opening-up opportunities for people to have increased access to jobs and have an opinion on work conditions. The ILO highlights some key areas that they are helping to improve in Vietnam as: "green jobs, skills development, labor statistics, industrial relations development, occupational safety and health and social security". The ILO is hoping to find enhanced success by implementing yet another Decent Work Country Programme which will tackle work issues that face Vietnam (ILO, 2018). The top three goals of the Decent Work Country Programme include the promotion of decent employment and opening of a healthy environment that fosters entrepreneurship; reduction of poverty levels through expanding social aid programs and building a labor market governance that oversees the fundamental rights of workers (ILO, 2018).

Over the past 30 years Vietnam has felt a major shift in its economy and which has caused the labor market to swing from agriculture, household and state-owned enterprises and towards manufacturing, regulated business, private owned firms (ILO, 2018). Compared to other countries whose economies have made substantial changes, Vietnam has been very meticulous and successful in keeping its people employed and keeping wage disparity low. There are always downfalls however, one of the most substantial being that the regulations by Vietnam have prevented companies from doing business in Vietnam and take their business elsewhere. Vietnam has a differentiated minimum wage based on location and sector. This is efficient for a country like Vietnam where living conditions can be vastly different between the countryside and large cities. The minimum wage also differs amongst domestic and

foreign owned enterprises however according to the WTO, overtime it is a goal to make the gap between these two increasingly smaller (ILO, 2018).

Section 7 of the U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights outlines the breeches in workers' rights in Vietnam in 2017 (USDS, 2018). There are five subsections including Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining, Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor, Prohibition of Child Labor, Discrimination in Respect to Employment, and Acceptable Work Conditions. Labor laws permit citizens to collective bargaining and demonstrating however there are limits on how they can perform these acts (USDS, 2018).

All unions in Vietnam must be under the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) (USDS, 2018). The VGCL carries out the law on unions and their relationship with the government means that unions are not shielded from government influence (USDS, 2018). It is mandatory under the law that if there is no local union, workers be represented under the upper level unions. If these workers without a local union wish to strike they must consult the upper level trade union. The labor law forbids workers to strike on the basis of rights (USDS, 2018). Workers who are employed by the government do not have the right to strike and the prime minister has the right to suspend a strike. There is a very long process for gaining permission to strike. Although you may not receive retribution for striking, workers are not required to be paid so long as they are not at work. More than 80% of the strikes in 2017 were deemed illegal because they did not follow the conciliation and arbitration process (USDS, 2018).

The government sometimes had heavy fines on the employers (USDS, 2018). On the local level, NGOs help to raise awareness among workers on their rights in the workplace, as well as help migrant workers (USDS, 2018). The only consequence non VGCL workers who wished to form their own unions faced was government discrimination. In one case a woman was forbidden to leave the country. The constitution makes forced or compulsory labor illegal however there are some places where the law is not very clear (USDS, 2018). The provisions that are not exclusively outlined include debt bondage and the explicit definition of forced labor that is punishable. The law also does not determine a punishment for breaking the law of forced labor. Employment recruitment facilitators charged migrants higher payment for their services and sometimes found themselves in debt bondage situations (USDS, 2018).

In Vietnam the legal working age is 18, the law also discloses that children under the age of 18 may not work in hazardous or unsafe conditions (USDS, 2018). Children ages 15-18 can work up to 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week. Children ages 13-15 may work in light labor settings. Children may register for vocational training schools at age 14 without a parents' consent. Children under 13 may work only under very specific rules (USDS, 2018). The Ministry of Labor is in charge of enforcement of child labor laws. The government is permitted to fine and put violators on trial for breaking the law in terms of underage employment. The government also has a plan called the 2016-20 National Plan of Action for Children and National Program for Child Protection in which they aim to reduce hazardous work conditions in more rural areas of Vietnam (USDS, 2018).

As reported by NGOs in Vietnam there were children ages 10-to-18 working in garment factories forcibly (USDS, 2018). There were also privately-owned garment factories employing children ages 12 and up to work for free and threatening physical violence if they did not work. In March an NGO aimed at helping end child labor reportedly rescued six children from forced labor NGOs across China said their partnerships with the local government was helping to implement the national law on child labor (USDS, 2018).

The law outlines the illegality of discrimination based on gender, race, disability, color, social class, marital status, belief, religion, HIV status and for membership in a trade union or participation in trade union activities, but not for political opinion, age, language, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Employers are allowed to ask about marital status and family in an interview. The enforcement of law based on discrimination in the workplace was not properly implemented by the employers (USDS, 2018).

The government allows for subsidies for companies that employ 51% disabled people (USDS, 2018). The expected retirement age of women in some sectors was 55, while for men it was 60, making moving up in the company less likely for women. Many women were terminated from their position by 35 and many found it difficult to find a job at age 35. There was very little action by the government to aid this issue. The government did try to alleviate some discrimination based on disability (USDS, 2018).

Overtime hours worked are typically limited to 50% of normal working hours per day, 30 hours per month and 200 hours per year, but there were certain circumstances where this number was higher (USDS, 2018). In 2016 the government laid out a law that protects victims of work-related injuries or unsafe conditions and allow workers to remove themselves from an unsafe situation without losing their job (USDS, 2018).

The Ministry of Labor is the primary body responsible for enforcement of labor violations (USDS, 2018). The Labor Inspections Department is in charge of doing health and safety inspections in the workplace. Violations may result in sanctions, fines, withdrawal of operating licenses or registrations, closures of enterprises, and mandatory training. The Ministry of Labor acknowledges a shortage of inspectors as a main cause of poor labor practices (USDS, 2018). The enforcement of violations based on wages, hours, and benefits were not consistent and were ineffective in preventing these abuses to occur. The most abused population included ethnic minorities and migrant workers who faced low income, long and unsafe work conditions, and often resulted in work related injuries (USDS, 2018). "In 2016 the government reported 7,981 occupational accidents with 8,251 victims, including 799 fatal incidents with 862 deaths" (USDS, 2018).

This section lays the groundwork for all the research on the three case-studies in order to test the hypotheses. Specifically, the author found information on the number of labor laws and labor standard violations for Laos, China and Vietnam, and also defined what trade looked like in each country. It was pertinent that the author researched and found all of this information to be able to apply this research's theories to the three case-studies. The next section will use the information from the case-studies in order to test my hypotheses and test my research question: is the U.S. supporting unfair labor practices through trade negotiations?

This section laid out all the material necessary to test my hypotheses on three case-studies: Laos, China and Vietnam. The next section uses the variables defined in the methodology to test the hypotheses and determine the relationship between the variables.

CASE-STUDIES ANALYSIS

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis one looked at the number of trade agreement's effect on the number of labor standards and labor standard violations. This study predicts that the larger the number of trade agreements a country was involved in the more labor laws they will have and the more labor standard violations they will have. This is because with a greater network of partners there comes more standardization across the board of how you can treat your employees. The more countries involved also relates to the number of violations because there are more people who are able to scrutinize you and make sure you are complying with international and domestic law.

According to my analysis, the greater number of trade agreements a country has no direct correlation to the number of laws a country has. According to the US state department report of Human Rights, China, the country with the largest number of trade agreements, 114, has the least number of laws, 6. Laos has the next greatest number of trade agreements, 40, with the highest number of laws and regulations outlined in the report at 12. Vietnam, with only 11 trade agreements has the median amount of labor laws, 8. In terms of labor standard violations, there seemed to be no real correlation there either.

China, having greater than 114 trade agreements had only nine violations according to the U.S. State Department. Laos had 40 trade agreements, but had the most violations at 16. Vietnam had 11 trade agreements and they also had the least number of violations which was seven. Vietnam does prove the theory to be right, however with the other two countries having the opposite results than what should be expected it seems that this claim cannot be validated.

Hypothesis 2

This hypothesis looked at the relationship between trade openness and labor standards and violations. As a measure for trade openness this study adds imports plus exports and divided by GDP to show how open a country was to trading with other countries. According to the results there was no consistent correlation among all three countries. Laos had the median trade openness at 0.78 while holding 12 labor laws. China's trade openness was the smallest at 0.42 holding six laws, and finally Vietnam was the most open country to trade with a 2.05 score and holding 8 labor laws. Laos and Vietnam both somewhat validated my hypothesis while China did not validate.

The effect trade openness had on labor standard violations does have a correlation. Laos had the median trade openness score at 0.78 and they had the highest number of labor standard violations at 16. China was the least open to trade with a score of 0.42 and having nine violations according to the U.S. State Department report. Vietnam, the most open country to trade with a score of 2.05 had the fewest number of violations, only having seven. Laos and China both somewhat validated the theory to be correct that the higher your trade openness means the less labor violations your country has.

Hypothesis 3

This hypothesis tested whether multilateral or bilateral trade agreements were more likely to result in more labor standards and violations. This proved to be the most difficult section to measure results from. By using the U.S. State Department's references for labor standards and violations this study consistently used the same number of labor standards and violations for each country throughout the research. This meant that there was no variation in the results for a particular country. Instead this research looks at whether the country had more multilateral or bilateral and compare how many standards and violations they had compared to the other countries.

In the case of Laos there were more bilateral trade agreements than multilateral with 14 of their agreements being bilateral and only 3 being multilateral. They had 12 labor laws in their country. China had more than 100 bilateral trade agreements and only participated in 14 multilateral agreements. They had six labor laws. Vietnam had more multilateral than bilateral trade agreements holding only one bilateral agreement with the U.S. and nine multilateral ones. They had eight labor laws. Laos and China both had more bilateral agreements than multilateral ones and they had both the most and the least number of labor laws. Vietnam had a majority of multilateral trade agreements and had the median amount of labor laws. This information shows us that there is no real correlation between the type of trade agreements you hold and the number of labor laws.

Once again the author looked at the number of multilateral versus bilateral agreements that these three countries held and related them to the number of labor standard violations. In the case of Laos and China we know that we had more bilateral agreements and their number of labor violations were 16 and nine respectively. Vietnam on the other hand had more multilateral agreements and they had 7 violations of their labor law. This validates the hypothesis that a country with more bilateral agreements will have more violations than a country with more multilateral agreements because bilateral agreements make it more easy to see who is in the wrong when there are only two actors.

The hypothesis that increased trade openness would lead to lower labor standards and violations was validated. However, going forward it would be better to develop a more inclusive measure of labor standards and violations a country has because the State Department report, although consistent across countries, did not cite the total number of labor standards and violations that each country had.

Conclusion

In these case-studies there was an ample amount of research that demonstrated that workers in Laos, China and Vietnam are being taken advantage of at the hands United States. Through conducting this research it has been clear that there are many human rights violations in the workplace in these countries and if the U.S. really does have an interest in promoting their democratic values, it is pertinent that they step in and help these countries reevaluate their approach to labor safety.

Through this research the author was unable to determine whether the number of trade agreements, trade openness or multilateral and bilateral trade agreements had any impact on labor standards or labor standard violations. The only hypothesis that was proven through this research was lower trade openness results in a higher number of labor standards.

In the future, it is essential to reevaluate how to measure labor standards and labor standard violations. For the purpose of time, the U.S. State Department report on human rights was central because it provides a consistent standard of measure for all three case-studies. However, this ended-up being a poor standard of measure, due to the report not listing every standard and violation a country has, but rather making generalizations. Another improvement the author would like to make in the future is to refine the research and assure that the literature selected for use is more concentrated and focused on the actual problem at hand.

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
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BOOK REVIEW

Amin Saikal, *Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019, pages 344, ISBN 978-0-691175478)

**by Houman Sadri, Ph.D., Deputy-Director Information & Policy Analysis Center,
University of Central Florida, Orlando**



Iran Rising: Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic, is a fine book in many respects. Generally speaking, Professor Amin Saikal has done a great job in researching and including both secondary and some primary sources. The book contains also a bibliography which is 32 pages-long. Each book chapter is well-documented with extensive notes and citations.

This book provides a great discussion of the political development of the Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.I.) in the last 40 years in terms of both its domestic politics and foreign relations. This work is not a major test of a particular theoretical or methodological topic. However, the author concentrates on a couple of important themes throughout his discussion of how Revolutionary Iran has evolved in the last four decades, despite a number of significant domestic and international challenges.

The author presents a number of significant questions which he comprehensively addressed in different chapters. Some of the main questions include: what is the nature and structure of Revolutionary Iran's theocratic order? Why has this Islamic régime led to so much regional and global oppositions? What factors have allowed Tehran to survive the brutal regional and global environment? How has Iran developed its capabilities despite sanctions since its revolution? How has Tehran pursued its major policy objectives against both regional and global powers? Will Iran be able to survive the mounting pressure of the conservative Donald Trump Administration?

The strength of this work is founded on the following elements. First of all, the author is not a newcomer to the study of Iran, due to his earlier book, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah* (Princeton University Press) earning great reviews in 1980. Secondly, the book clearly identifies and limits the causes of Iranian domestic and foreign policy challenges to two main variables: the revolutionary rhetoric of the Islamic Republic and the behavior of outside forces (U.S.A. and others) towards Islamic Iran since its revolution. Next, Professor Saikal correctly concentrates on the interplay between domestic and foreign policies of Tehran to present a more accurate and complete picture of the Iranian Islamist policies and major decisions. Then, he narrows the analysis even further to the impact of revolutionary Iranian leadership as the key factor in national policy-making, while examining interactions between the "combative" (*Jihadi*) and "reformist" (*Ijtihadi*) leaders who have advocated a variety of diverse and opposing policies since the establishment of this theocracy in 1979.

Finally, the author clearly shows how the global and regional power have influenced both the domestic and foreign policies of Tehran since the early days of the Supreme Leader Grand-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In this regard, the author demonstrates how the poor understanding of Iranian politics by certain foreign leaders have led them to make even poorer policies towards Islamic Iran.

Unfortunately, there has been no learning curve for such foreign leaders in this regard, despite the fact that after four decades of attempting to isolate Iran by sanctions and the American coercive diplomacy have not made any major changes in national or international politics of Islamic Iran.


The book *Iran Rising*, however, is not clear and/or expressive about a couple of points. For example, why Tehran has failed to export its revolution elsewhere beyond establishing a few proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere. Why other Shi'a majority states have not followed the Iranian Islamic Republic structure? In particular, it would have been interesting to see the author's explanation for why Iraq (the second most populous Shi'a majority state), once liberated from the oppressive dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, it did not copy the Iranian Islamic System after the U.S. forces left the country? Also, the author does not address the negative image of Tehran, despite the fact that Islamic Iran was sympathetic and instrumental in secretly helping Washington against the Islamic Talibani government of Afghanistan after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks. Moreover, Iran declared neutrality in 2003 just before the U.S.A. invasion of Iraq. At the time, the U.S. was seriously concerned about the role that Iran could play, as many Iraqi Shi'a citizens would die during the heavy American bombardment of the country before U.S. ground forces could enter Basrah, Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities. More recently, the *Islamic Republic* was also an unofficial strategic ally of the U.S.A. in fighting against the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq & Levant/Syria (ISIL/S) forces in Iraq and liberating Iraqi cities and people. In explaining such fine issues, the book is rather silent and underestimates the psycho-political dimension of the Washington-Tehran relationship since the U.S.A. lost the Shah's pro-Western dictatorial régime to the anti-Western Islamic Revolution in 1978.

Despite these couple of minor shortcomings, the *Iran Rising* is a very well researched and written book, authored by a respected scholar of Iranian politics. This work is highly recommended for a variety of audience from the students to scholars, as well as policy-makers and even ordinary people who are curious about why Islamic Iran acts the way it does.

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