



[http://media.npr.org/assets/img/2012/12/05/florida\\_slide-298a8e81153f6b4e2558c3e4d2e47728b8e29c.jpg](http://media.npr.org/assets/img/2012/12/05/florida_slide-298a8e81153f6b4e2558c3e4d2e47728b8e29c.jpg)

# ***Florida Political Chronicle***

**Regional Scholarly Journal**  
**Florida Political Science Association**

**VOLUME 27, N.2 (2020)**

**Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.**



**ISSN: 1549-1323**

**Fall 2020**

**Journal of Florida Political Science Association**

**- Table of Contents -**

Illustrated Florida Cover	1
Table of Contents	2
Editorial Board— <i>Florida Political Chronicle</i>	3
FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION—Membership ( <a href="http://www.fpsanet.org">www.fpsanet.org</a> )	3
Officers & Executive Council—Florida Political Science Association 2020-2021	4
Call for Papers: Florida Political Sciences Conference, Virtual Sessions, 27 March 2021	5
FPSA Publications: <i>Florida Political Chronicle</i> & <i>Political Scientist Newsletter</i>	6
<i>Florida Political Chronicle</i> —Submission Guidelines	7
* President’s Message by FPSA President Kelly McHugh, Ph.D. (Florida Southern University, Lakeland)	8
* Editor’s Introduction: New Essays in International and Domestic Politics by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair E.U. College of Europe-Bruges)	10
* Responding to COVID-19 and Hurricane Dorian: Building Key Skills for a 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Technical and Vocational Workforce in the Bahamas by President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D. & Dean Alexander Darville, M.A. (Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute, Nassau)	14
* Chinese Think-Tanks’ Foreign Policy Influence: A Case-Study on the Influential Role of CIIS and SIIS on “Belt & Road Initiative” Policy-Making by XIN Hua, Ph.D. (Executive Director, Center on European Union Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, China)	22
* E.R.A.: Post-Suffrage Fight for Equal Rights for Women by Kathryn DePalo-Gould, Ph.D. (Florida International University, Miami)	43
* Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: Border Fortification and Transnational Insurgents’ Violence Against Civilians by Jeffrey Coltman-Cormier, ABD (Rutgers University, New Jersey) & B.A. Honors (Florida Atlantic University in Boca-Raton)	65

## Announcements:

- ❖ **Book Review: James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, by Manuel De Leon, Ph.D., Editor of *The Political Scientist Newsletter* (FPSA & Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona) 110**
- ❖ **Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: IPAC-University of Central Florida-Orlando 116**

## —EDITORIAL BOARD—

### *Florida Political Chronicle:*

**A Peer-Reviewed Regional Scholarly Journal for Faculty, Students and Public of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA)**

- Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., U.S./International Security, NATO & Europe (Saint Leo University)
- Sean Foreman, Ph.D., U.S. Politics/Elections, Latin America & International Affairs (Chair, Barry University, Miami)
- Aubrey Jewett, Ph.D., U.S./Florida Politics & Elections (University of Central Florida, Orlando)
- Kelly McHugh, Ph.D., U.S./International Security & United Nations (Chair, Florida Southern College, Lakeland)
- Jack McTague, Ph.D., Middle East, Russia & Third World Politics (ex-Chair, Saint Leo University)
- Manuel De Leon, Ph.D., International Relations, Security Studies and International Political Economy (Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona) & Editor of *Political Scientist*, FPSA Newsletter
- Frank Orlando, U.S./Florida Politics/Elections & Director of Polling Institute (Saint Leo University)

## —FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION—

**JOIN FPSA: Membership see: [www.fpsanet.org](http://www.fpsanet.org)**

The Florida Political Science Association is committed to promoting political science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our Board of Officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. From the University of West Florida in Pensacola to Florida International University and the University of Miami, our FPSA association spans the state bringing together political scientists at public and private institutions to network, to collaborate on research and to discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

**Join/Renew Membership in FPSA (Includes 2021 Conference Registration): [CLICK HERE](#)**

- Faculty: \$20 (includes membership fee)
- Student: \$10 (includes membership fee)



# FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

## CHARTER OFFICERS 2019-2021

**Kelly A. McHugh, President FPSA**

Florida Southern College, Lakeland, [kmchugh@flsouthern.edu](mailto:kmchugh@flsouthern.edu)

**Leah Blumenfeld, 1<sup>st</sup> Vice-President**

Barry University, [lblumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:lblumenfeld@barry.edu)

**Giselle Jamison, 2<sup>nd</sup> Vice-President**

St. Thomas University, Miami, [gjamison@stu.edu](mailto:gjamison@stu.edu)

**Sean Foreman, Secretary**

Barry University, Miami, [sforeman@barry.edu](mailto:sforeman@barry.edu)

**Aubrey Jewett, Treasurer**

University of Central Florida, Orlando, [aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu](mailto:aubrey.jewett@ucf.edu)

### EX-OFFICIO

**Marco Rimanelli, Editor, *Florida Political Chronicle*, peer-review scholarly journal FPSA**

Saint Leo University, near-Tampa, [Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu)

**Manuel De Leon, Editor, *The Political Scientist Newsletter* FPSA**

Bethune-Cookman University, [deleonm@cookman.edu](mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu)

**Mark Logas, Past-President FPSA**

Valencia College, Orlando

### EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (staggered 3-years terms)

- Gary Boulware (2017-2020), Santa Fe College, [gary.boulware@sfcollge.edu](mailto:gary.boulware@sfcollge.edu)
- Manuel De Leon (2017-2020), Bethune-Cookman University, [deleonm@cookman.edu](mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu)
- Brian Kupfer (2017-2020), Tallahassee Community College, [kupferb@tcc.fl.edu](mailto:kupferb@tcc.fl.edu)
- Richard Murgo (2018-2021), Tallahassee Community College, [murgor@tcc.fl.edu](mailto:murgor@tcc.fl.edu)
- Kathryn VanderMolen (2018-2021), University of Tampa, [kvandermolen@ut.edu](mailto:kvandermolen@ut.edu)
- Kevin Wagner (2018-2021), Florida Atlantic University, [kwagne15@fau.edu](mailto:kwagne15@fau.edu)
- Leah Blumenfeld (2019-2022), Barry University, [lblumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:lblumenfeld@barry.edu)
- David Hill (2019-2022), Stetson University, [dhill@stetson.edu](mailto:dhill@stetson.edu)
- Frank Orlando (2019-2022), Saint Leo University, [francis.orlando@saintleo.edu](mailto:francis.orlando@saintleo.edu)
- Houman Sadri (2019-2022), IPAC-University of Central Florida, [sadrihouman@hotmail.com](mailto:sadrihouman@hotmail.com)



# Call for Papers

## Florida Political Science Association Annual Conference

### Saturday, 27 March 2021

### Virtual Conference held on-line via Zoom

**Program Chair: Dr. Leah Blumenfeld**  
 Barry University  
 Phone: (305) 899-3386  
 E-mail: [l Blumenfeld@barry.edu](mailto:l Blumenfeld@barry.edu)

**Arrangements Chair: Mr. Doug Ryan**  
 Doug Ryan Consulting  
 Phone: (850) 567-3212  
 E-mail: [doug@dougyanconsulting.com](mailto:doug@dougyanconsulting.com)

The 2021 FPSA Annual Conference will be held virtually through the FPSA on-line platform. Information on registration, technical requirements and the 2021 Program will be sent to participants in **February 2021**. **Please send paper proposals and requests to participate to Panels or Roundtables to the listed Section Chairs by Friday 5 February 2021. Accepted papers will be notified by 15 February 2021.**

All paper Presenters, Panel Chairs and Discussants are asked to pre-register. Registration for this on-line virtual conference is **\$20** for faculty and **\$10** for students. Registration supports the association website and scholarly journal: *Florida Political Chronicle*. **For pre-registration and updated information, please go to: [www.fpsanet.org](http://www.fpsanet.org)**

Faculty, talented graduates and undergraduate students are encouraged to submit papers for publication. A **\$250 award** is given to the **FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award** and a **\$200 award** to the **FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award**, from student papers presented at the annual conferences.

All proposals must include: name, institution, rank (faculty, graduate student, undergraduate student), contact information, paper title and an abstract around 100-to-250 words.

Sections/Panels	Section Chairs	Contact Information
American National Politics	Gary Boulware Santa Fe College	<a href="mailto:gary.boulware@sfcollege.edu">gary.boulware@sfcollege.edu</a> (352) 395-5040
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	<a href="mailto:kupferb@tcc.fl.edu">kupferb@tcc.fl.edu</a> (850) 201-9951
Public Policy & Public Administration	Jonathan West University of Miami	<a href="mailto:jwest@miami.edu">jwest@miami.edu</a> (305) 284-2500
States & Local Governments	Sean Foreman Barry University	<a href="mailto:sforeman@barry.edu">sforeman@barry.edu</a> (305) 899-4098
Comparative Politics	Manuel De Leon Bethune-Cookman College	<a href="mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu">deleonm@cookman.edu</a> (386) 481-2842
International Relations	Leah Blumenfeld Barry University	<a href="mailto:l Blumenfeld@barry.edu">l Blumenfeld@barry.edu</a> (305) 899-3386
Regional Security (from World War I to Today)	Marco Rimanelli Saint Leo University	<a href="mailto:marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu">marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu</a> (813) 598-3012 (text message)
Roundtable: Teaching Political Science	Kelly A. McHugh Florida Southern College	<a href="mailto:mchugh.kellyann@gmail.com">mchugh.kellyann@gmail.com</a> (722) 593-4442

Conference Papers, Best Student Award Papers and runners-up are welcome for publication in the *Florida Political Chronicle* (FPSA scholarly journal). Please contact Editor Marco Rimanelli at [Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) for more information. See FPSA website for Submission Guidelines: <http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.htm>

**PUBLICATIONS:**  
**FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**

***Florida Political Chronicle***

<http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html>

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the bi-annual peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, which encourages submissions from all discipline sub-fields. Submission Guidelines here on p.7. Please contact the journal's **Editor, Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.** of Saint Leo University at [marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu) for Submissions.

***The Political Scientist:***  
***Newsletter of the Florida Political Science Association***

<http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html>

*The Political Scientists* newsletter is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Science Association. Please contact for information and Submission Guidelines to **Newsletter Editor Manuel De Leon, Ph.D.** of *The Political Scientist* at Bethune-Cookman College at [deleonm@cookman.edu](mailto:deleonm@cookman.edu) for Submissions.

See FPSA website: [www.fpsanet.org](http://www.fpsanet.org)





# Florida Political Chronicle

## – SUBMISSION PUBLICATION GUIDELINES –

### ESSAYS & BOOK REVIEWS SUBMISSIONS:

Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.  
Professor of Politics & International Studies  
SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY  
Social Sciences Department  
MC-2127, P.O.-Box 6665  
Saint Leo, Florida, 33574-6665, U.S.A.  
E-mail: [Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu)

### FPSA MEMBERSHIP & CONFERENCES:

please go to the FPSA website:  
<http://www.fpsanet.org/>  
then click on:  
[Join FPSA/Conference Registration](#)

E-mail FPSA Treasurer:  
[Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu](mailto:Aubrey.Jewett@ucf.edu)

Current (since 2020) and past (2010-2019) issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, as well as the on-line Archive of older issues (1989-2009) are **FREE** for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Sciences Association's Website either: <http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html> or <http://www.fpsanet.org/archive>

The *Florida Political Chronicle* is the peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA), published twice-a-year, on-line, in colour. It is free for access on the FPSA website to serve the academic disciplines of Political Sciences and International Relations, practitioners, students and the community of readers in a balanced, non-political and analytical way. The *Florida Political Chronicle* journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Sciences disciplinary subfields: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Relations, International Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and International Organizations.

**SUBMISSIONS:** e-mail as **WORD** (NOT PDF) **attachments all Submissions (Essays or Book Reviews)** to the journal's Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. of Saint Leo University at [Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu](mailto:Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu) for consideration:

1. **Essays & Book Reviews in Word** (12 Font, single-spaced, Calibri style or Times Roman), not PDF.
  - o **Essay length:** single-spaced from 5/6 pages minimum to maximum length of 50 pages with 1-inch margins, inclusive of Abstract, Bibliography & 1-paragraph Author's Bio.
  - o **Book Review length:** single-spaced from 2-to-10+ pages-long in **Word** with 1-inch margins, with Bibliography & 1-paragraph Author's Bio. Book Reviews of either one book or compare several related books.
2. **Footnotes** preferred style (at end of each page in Calibri style or Times Roman) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has already a finished work for review.
3. **Abstract** (a long-paragraph; no library reference codes).
4. **Maps/Graphs/Tables/photos** in the text or as appendixes (use 11 or 12 Font to make it fit) must fit the same vertical format with around 1-inch margin--**No landscape-size Tables! Must fit in a standard paper page portrait-size!** Photos can be sent separately for inclusion. I will reformat all work, but it helps if it fits initially.
5. **Bibliography** (10 Font, single-spaced); preferred use Manual of Chicago Style, but other styles accepted.
6. **Author's Biography** at end paper (a long-paragraph, with Ph.D. and M.A. Degrees, position, publications).
7. **Do not use the First Person ("I");** instead please use as neutral: "This study" or "This work" or "The author".
8. **Do not use colloquial contractions**, like: don't, it's, can't, won't, etc.
9. **"2 Blind Peer Reviews"** scholarly process (yes, I have 2 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
10. **Best Graduate Student Paper Award & Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award** reviewed by related committee. Both Award Winners and any Alternate Best Papers will be published in the journal.

**DISCLAIMER:** All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

## President's Message

### The "New Normal": Reflecting on Political Science in Turbulent Times

by FPSA President Kelly McHugh, Ph.D. (Florida Southern University, Lakeland)

It is a pleasure to welcome you again, as President, to the Florida Political Science Association. The FPSA is committed to advancing the understanding of the importance of government and international politics in both academia and among the community. We are pleased that colleagues from throughout the United States, as well as abroad, now attend our Annual Conferences.

Few people will look back with fondness on the year 2020, as its 365 days contained myriad challenges to our economic, social and civic life. Although personally, we may want to move past the tumult of this year, as Political Scientists, we must seek to understand both the causes of the events of 2020, as well as their long-term effects on our world. For scholars of International Relations, the pandemic's spread provided an object lesson in the nature of multiple and unexpected transnational challenges. It also starkly illustrated the need for policy-makers to reconsider what indeed constitutes the biggest threats to state security in the contemporary world. For scholars of Comparative Politics, understanding states' divergent responses to the spiraling pandemic will be essential. While most advanced democracies -- including countries like Japan, Italy, South Korea, Spain, France, Germany, Great Britain and Canada -- acted quickly to contain the spread of the viruses by limiting the movement of their citizens, the United States proved to be a distinct outlier.

Instead, in the United States, debates over closing businesses, limiting non-essential travel, and mask-wearing became politically-charged. There was also a clash of rival partisan operational responses, with then-President Donald Trump and Republicans privileging a federal delegation of aid for the COVID-19 health emergency to the 50 states. Conversely, then-candidate Joe Biden and Democrats called for a New Deal-style whole-of-government response. As a result, the U.S. has lacked a national consensus regarding the best way to contain the virus, to disastrous consequences. Furthermore, in recent months the dramatic unraveling of previously successful national virus-containment strategies in most European states starkly demonstrates the extreme difficulty of quickly handling -- both domestically and through international cooperation -- such a fast-spreading, mutating, and genuinely global pandemic. Understanding the role of political culture and partisan policies in this debate within the U.S.A. and comparatively among similarly-affected countries will be essential as we consider managing such health threats in the future and promoting effective global cooperation in research, vaccinations, and coordinated responses.

Those who study American politics also have much to consider going forward. Following Mr. George Floyd's death in May of 2020 at the hands of local police, the country at-large saw an unprecedented surge of activism, with citizens of all races calling for a renewed focus on racial justice. If we hope to address systematic racism and create "a more perfect union," we must understand both the



dynamics of the Black Lives Matter Movement and related protests, as well as the likelihood that policy-makers will be able to enact the much-needed changes for which it advocates.

The year 2020 also signaled the likely end of the brief "Trump Era" in American Politics. First, in November 2020, we witnessed the rarity of an incumbent President losing his quest for reelection. Far more shocking was President Trump's insistence that the election was illegitimate and that he should rightfully remain in office. This ultimately resulted in an unprecedented crisis for our democracy, when on 6 January 2021, hundreds of angry supporters of the President stormed the Capitol building (where both the House of Representatives and Senate were in session) in an attempt to overturn the 2020 elections. To ensure the health of our democracy, we must discover the confluence of factors that caused this profoundly troubling series of events. Connected to this, we must also analyze how partisan divisions have ossified in Congress, largely resulting in gridlock. This was much in evidence during the unprecedented dual Impeachment attempts against President Trump (in 2020 and 2021), with the votes to impeach and convict breaking largely along partisan lines. Congressional Democrats have argued that a conviction of the now ex-President will send a powerful signal about the robustness of American democracy; the upcoming trial, however, is likely to end much as the previous one did, as supporters of conviction are unlikely to garner the needed numerous Republican votes in the Senate to sanction Donald Trump.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted virtually all aspects of our lives, and academic conferences are no exception. Last year, we reluctantly elected to cancel the 2020 Annual Conference over concerns about the virus's exponential spread. This year, FPSA's Executive Board decided to hold our 2021 Annual Conference virtually on Saturday, 27 March 2021. While the format is different, the aims will be the same. As an organization, we seek to offer faculty, graduate students, and undergraduate students an opportunity to share their work on local, state, national, and international politics. Since the conference will be remote, we have significantly reduced the registration/membership rates for this specific event (\$20 for faculty and \$10 for students and attendees). We hope you will join our virtual 2021 Annual Conference and continue the urgent task of investigating critical political issues that shape our world today.

In the meantime, I hope that you will get to know our organization through our publications, offered free to the public: the *Florida Political Chronicle*, our scholarly Journal, and *The Political Scientist*, our professional newsletter.

Please contact me if you have any questions about the FPSA or are interested in becoming involved in the work we do.

Sincerely,

*Kelly McHugh,*

**Associate-Professor Kelly McHugh, Ph.D.  
President Florida Political Science Association  
Florida Southern College, Lakeland**

## **Editor's Introduction: New Essays in International and Domestic Politics**

**by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges)**

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and "Fellow-Travelers",

welcome to a new edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, regional peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) published twice-a-year on-line and in colour. All current, recent (2009-2020) and archived issues (1989-2009) are free for access on the FPSA website (<http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html>) as a community resource for members, scholars, students and public interested in domestic and international affairs, as well as the work of the FPSA. Equal pride comes from having since 2018 the EBSCO Library collection of sources include also the *Florida Political Chronicle* and all its past issues as current references in all library and university searches.

This current *Florida Political Chronicle* issue at 116 pages (vol.27, n.2, Fall 2020) welcomes our readers with an introductory "President's Message" (p.8-9) from our renewed President of the Florida Political Science Association, Associate-Professor Kelly McHugh, Ph.D., of Florida Southern College in Lakeland, on current FPSA issues related to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic (including the cancellation of the 2020 FPSA Annual Conference and resigning of our previous President Mark Logas, M.A., of Valencia College in Orlando). This issue displays four lengthy essays (two of which international from very distinguished colleagues) and a Book Review. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic the 2020 FPSA Annual Conference was cancelled and will be replaced by the 2021 (Virtual) FPSA Annual Conference (see Call for Papers at p.5), but unfortunately no meritorious student could be selected as winner for either the 2020 FPSA Best Graduate Paper Award, or the 2020 FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award. Both these awards competitions will be reissued in conjunction with the 27 March 2021 (Virtual) FPSA Annual Conference.

This issue's first essay is international in scope and authorship, "Responding to COVID-19 and Hurricane Dorian: Building Key Skills for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Technical and Vocational Workforce in the Bahamas" (p.14-21), as a joint-research by President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D. & Dean Alexander Darville, M.A., both from the Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute in Nassau. The authors address the unprecedented, dramatic impacts on the tourism-dependent Bahamas of the dual devastating hit of massive Hurricane Dorian on Abacos and Grand Bahama in Fall 2019, followed few months later by the global COVID-19 pandemic on the country's economy, health, education and society. This paper describes the Bahamas' efforts to enhance vital workforce-ready skills to meet the considerable demands of companies rebuilding the hurricane-ravaged northern islands and simultaneously competing in a nationwide post-COVID-19 environment. As case-study, this paper focused on the community college system by showing how the Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute (BTVI), spearheaded educational training in workforce skills both on-campus and during the pandemic by quickly developing on-line programs.

The second essay is also international in both scope and authorship, "Chinese Think-Tanks' Foreign Policy Influence: A Case-Study on the Influential Role of CIIS and SIIS on the 'Belt & Road Initiative' Policy-Making" (p.22-42), by Professor XIN Hua, Ph.D., Executive Director at the Center for European Union Studies at the Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), and Director of Research of the Shanghai Institute for European Studies in China, as well as Director of Academic Research of the Shanghai Institute for European Studies (SIES), plus Non-Resident Research-Professor at the Center for National Strategic Studies of Shanghai Jiaotong University. He was also a 2013-2014 Visiting-Scholar at the E.U. graduate College of Europe-Bruges in Flanders/Belgium where I also was serving as Fulbright-Schuman Chair.

Professor Xin Hua analyzes Chinese policy-making activities on the “Belt and Road Initiative” through the country’s rival foreign policy think tanks influence on national decision-making: the Central-Level” China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) vs. the “Provincial-Level” Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). To analyzing the impact of their rival influences on shaping China’s BRI policy-making, this case-study focuses on CIIS and SIIS relevant meetings to evaluate their connections with the four “sub-fields” (politics, business, academia and media) of China’s “field of power”, particularly their relations with national political leadership and policy-makers through the analytical framework of the “policy-making pendulum between horizontal and vertical fragmentation”. This paper explains how the CIIS enjoys more advantages and is more closely connected to some key parts of the national central-level policy-makers than SIIS, but the links between SIIS with central ministries are still more intimate than its contacts with provincial policy-makers. This case-study also reveals that China’s political power and resources committed to “Belt and Road”-related policy-making are largely concentrated within the central and top leadership, especially since the latest round of reorganization within China’s Communist Party central leadership and state institutions in March 2018. Further, both CIIS and SIIS have links with business, academia and media as related to the national “Belt and Road Initiative”.

The third essay is a superb homage to both the Centennial of Women’s Rights and the ERA, “E.R.A.: Post-Suffrage Fight for Equal Rights for Women” (p.43-64), by Kathryn DePalo-Gould, Ph.D., Teaching-Professor in American Politics and Director of Pre-Law Advising & Training at Florida International University in Miami. Dr. DePalo-Gould surprises her readers by highlighting how the fight for the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) has gone on longer than even the push for women’s suffrage. The paper focuses mostly on two key figures in the battle on opposite ideological sides of the spectrum: on one hand, the militant suffragette-feminist, Alice Paul, who authored the ERA when it was first introduced in Congress in 1923 and succeeded in building a bi-partisan political support for its legislation by the 1970s vs. on the other, Phyllis Schlafly, the conservative anti-feminist firebrand whose StopERA campaign in the 1970s-1980s derailed ERA ratification despite an already-extended deadline from 1979 to 1982. Recent events in state legislatures in 2016-2020, now teeming with women lawmakers and the unwavering ideological support of the Democratic Party has revived an ill-fated 2020 political push to bypass the constitutional process by voting *post-facto* for a belated ERA’s ratification. But by late-2020 this political push stalled once feminist Justice Bader-Ginsburg stressed that ERA required a brand new constitutional amendment resubmitted for renewed approval by Congress and  $\frac{3}{4}$  of states, while political hostility by the Republican-led Senate has coalesced with a conservative-led “originalist” U.S. Supreme Court culminating with new Justice Amy Coney Barrett replacing in person and ideologically the suddenly-deceased Justice Bader-Ginsburg.

The fourth essay is an international *tour-de-force* Honors research paper, “Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: Border Fortification and Transnational Insurgents’ Violence Against Civilians” (p.65-109), by Jeffrey Coltman-Cormier, Doctoral student at Rutgers University in New Jersey and 2019 B.A. in Political Sciences at Florida Atlantic University in Boca-Raton, whose Honors Thesis (under Faculty Adviser Dr. Angela Nichols) was presented to the 2019 FPSA Annual Conference. This interesting and thoroughly-researched Honors Thesis analyzes world-wide insurgents’ patterns of victimization of the local civilian populations from the viewpoint (rarely considered in the literature) of the transnational character of insurgency. This study’s theoretical argument is that border fortifications causes transnational insurgent groups to perpetrate more violence against civilians. Insurgents who are transnational strategically and materially benefit from operating in target states’ contiguous neighbors and participating in illegal cross-border commerce networks of illicit commodities, while various states have responded by erecting border walls and fences. The author contends that these border barriers deprive impacted transnational fighters of resources, prompting them to extract more support from

civilians who are less likely to provide it. Thus, insurgents impose more violence against civilians as a means of coercive resource extraction through short-term surges because successive expansions of border fortifications generate new, even greater bursts of insurgency violence against both states and local civilian populations. As case-study the author tests his analysis through qualitative methods of process-tracing mostly on the India-Bangladesh border fortifications against the United Liberation Front of Assam. The preliminary evidence in this pilot-study indicates that the global trend of fortifying borders to counter transnational insurgency instead increase harm to civilians who are so protect.

This issue's Book Review is an homage to Professor James D. Barber of Duke University enduring scholarly work, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (p.110-115), by Manuel De Leon, Ph.D., Editor of *The Political Scientist Newsletter* of the Florida Political Sciences Association and Assistant-Professor in Political Sciences & International Studies at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona, Florida. Dr. De Leon reviews how Barber's old work (1972) is still used today (fully revised 5<sup>th</sup> edition 2020) as an introduction to the fascinating and complex world of the presidential character and how it shapes U.S. Presidential performance. Dr. Barber's book is still relevant today for these two key reasons:

- 1) it proposes that the U.S. Presidency is shaped not only by the check and balances that the Constitution imposes on it, but also by the character of the Presidents;
- 2) give American voters a means to predict how any new U.S. President will exercise presidential duties and prerogatives, behave in front and away from the public, and lead the administration and nation. Barber studies presidential character in terms of the psychology of adaptation on how social experiences can shape a person's self-image, ideology and political attitudes, as well as how personality affects behaviour and character (no longer in terms of personal ethics, but in terms of the leader's overall personality).

Barber seeks to predict the character of future Presidencies based on *inductive component* (using past presidential experiences to interpret how Presidents respond to certain political situations) and four new presidential typologies: *active-positive* (flexible, comfortable with leadership and daily work-routine), *active-negative* (compulsive, dominant, bullying and 'tragedy prone'), *passive-positive* (love-seekers, but after each failure, opt for self-reclusiveness to heal, while neglecting their duties) and *passive-negative* (low self-esteem and self-withdrawal by neither leading nor acting during a crisis, instead, they opt for a wait and see attitude, falling into denial). Thus:

1. *active-positive* U.S. Presidents were: Thomas Jefferson (Democrat-Republican), Franklin D. Roosevelt (D), Harry Truman (D), John F. Kennedy (D) and Gerald Ford (R);
2. *active-negative* U.S. Presidents were: John Adams (Federalist), Woodrow Wilson (D), Hebert Hoover (R), Lyndon B. Johnson (D) and Richard Nixon (R);
3. *passive-positive* U.S. Presidents Barber were: James Madison (Democrat-Republican), William H. Taft (R), Warren G. Harding (R), Ronald Reagan (R) and Bill Clinton (D);
4. *passive-negative* U.S. Presidents were: George Washington (Federalist), Calvin Coolidge (R) and Dwight Eisenhower (R).

In the end, Barber's work was preceded and followed by other authors who have further expanded on Presidential personality, power, politics and crises.

Finally, the Back-Cover (p.116) of this *Florida Political Chronicle* issue traditionally highlights the institutional profile of current FPSA University Members and sponsors. Deputy-Director Houman Sadri, Ph.D. of the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida in Orlando (he was also ex-FPSA President in 2012-2013) generously funds the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to meritorious candidates in 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Dr. Sadri has confirmed that IPAC will continue to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards.

**Our Mission:** since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the peer-reviewed, regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Sciences and International Relations in a balanced, non-political, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association's and U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is registered on EBSCO and encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; and International Law & Organizations. Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from current and past FPSA members, as well as domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference or support our organization's mission. The *Florida Political Chronicle Submission Publication Guidelines* are at p.7.

Thank you for your enduring trust in *Florida Political Chronicle* and best wishes to all for our future **2021 FPSA (Virtual) Annual Conference on Saturday 27 March 2021 (see Call-for-Papers and registration link to Panels at p.5** for this event-specific rates of \$20 for faculty and \$10 for students and attendees)!

Most sincerely,

*Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.*

Editor of *Florida Political Chronicle*, FPSA's regional scholarly peer-reviewed journal, <http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html>  
Full-Professor of Politics & International Studies at Saint Leo University-Florida, U.S.A., <https://www.saintleo.edu/faculty-bios/marco-rimanelli-ph-d>  
1993-Now: Member Committee on Foreign Relations-Tampa Bay, Florida, USA.  
2013-2014: Fulbright-Schuman Chair at E.U. graduate College of Europe-Bruges, Flanders/Belgium.  
2004-2005: U.S. Fellow on European Security at France's War College-IHEDN/École Militaire, Paris.  
1999-2001 & 1990-1992: Senior Scholar-in-Residence (twice) on NATO & European Security at U.S. State Department & InterAgency.  
1994: Fellow on U.S. Military History & Strategy at West Point U.S. Military Academy, N.Y.

## Responding to COVID-19 and Hurricane Dorian: Building Key Skills for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Technical and Vocational Workforce in the Bahamas

by President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D. & Dean Alexander Darville, M.A.  
(Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute in Nassau)

**ABSTRACT:** Globally, countries are addressing the unprecedented and dramatic 2020-2021 impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on their economy, health, education and society itself. In the Bahamas, an added challenge relates to managing the recovery efforts from the major Hurricane Dorian that devastated the Abacos and Grand Bahama in Fall 2019. This paper describes the efforts of the Bahamas to enhance the workforce-ready skills necessary to address the considerable demands of companies rebuilding the hurricane-ravaged northern islands and simultaneously competing in a post-COVID-19 environment. Specifically, this paper uses as an example at the community college system, the Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute (BTVI), to illustrate advancing workforce skills both on-campus and now through on-line education due to COVID-19.

Globally, governments are struggling to address the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic which has impacted social, political, economic and educational interests. High unemployment, a significantly reduced GDP and stresses on the healthcare, tourism and education systems are only a few of these impacts. For example, the global COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically changed the face of education across the world from classroom and face-to-face instruction; to home and on-line—a revolution in how we will learn and train forever. Most research suggests that there will be a sustained period of higher unemployment and an increased need for a more highly skilled workforce. Governments globally are struggling to manage the short- and long-term impacts of this pandemic. The International Labour Organization’s 2020 Report states that “the world of work is being profoundly affected by the global virus pandemic. In addition to the threat to public health, the economic and social disruption threatens the long-term livelihoods and well-being of millions.”<sup>1</sup>

Another important impact is related to education. The Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD) notes that the COVID-19 crisis has forced school closures in 188 countries, heavily disrupting the learning process of more than 1.7 billion children, youth and their families.<sup>2</sup> Further, the World Economic Forum (2020) highlights that:

- COVID-19 has resulted in schools shut all across the world. Globally, over 1.2 billion children are out of the classroom.
- As a result, education has changed dramatically, with the distinctive rise of e-learning, whereby teaching is undertaken remotely and on digital platforms.
- Research suggests that on-line learning has been shown to increase retention of information, and take less time, meaning the changes coronavirus have caused might be here to stay.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> International Labour Organization (2020), “COVID-19 and the World of Work”, <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/lang-en/index.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (2020).

<sup>3</sup> World Economic Forum (2020), “The COVID-19 pandemic has changed education forever”, Retrieved from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-education-global-covid19-online-digital-learning/>



The pivot to on-line education to address the COVID-19 pandemic has not been easy in many instances. There are always questions and concerns about the equity of access to basic tools (computers, Internet and printers). In fact, shortly before the pandemic outbreak a survey noted that “6 in 10 on-line learning administrators say their campuses require professors to train before teaching on-line – but 70% say students are not formally prepared to study virtually creating concerns about learning quality.”<sup>4</sup>

In another recent survey conducted by CHLOE confirmed that about 70% of respondents noted that students looking to study on-line do not have to take any orientation related to that mode of study.<sup>5</sup>

Legon and Garrett (2020) state that “given the known difficulties of students adjusting to on-line study and the higher drop-out rates, we considered the figures for required on-line student orientation ... as surprisingly low.” This CHLOE survey suggests that most professors are moving their on-ground content on-line with limited support which may reduce the potential positive impact of on-line courses; indeed, the survey authors note that “...the brand of virtual education most of them (students) are seeing right now isn't the sort of high-quality on-line education that is possible when it is designed thoughtfully with help from professionals and well-trained professors”.<sup>6</sup>

Overall, the data from the CHLOE “collectively show that most institutions are not prepared to flip a switch and move all their learning into truly online settings” according to Legon. Indeed, crises, like the COVID-19 pandemic, often can afford challenges and opportunities for innovation and new opportunities for the education sector.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to COVID-19 impacts, the Bahamas has a compounding challenge. Specifically, the Government of the Bahamas is dealing with the results of a major Category Five hurricane. The Hurricane Dorian disaster (1-3 September 2019) had an estimated impact of \$ 3.4 billion or approximately 25% of the GDP of the country. By comparison, in the United States this loss would be equal to losing the economic contribution of Florida, Texas and California. Damage just to the housing sector included approximately 3,000 homes with an impact estimated at \$ 1.48 billion. In particular, the hurricane has generated an increased urgency of addressing the skills gap – from traditional on-the-job training to accelerated, blended and certificate-based skills development and *SME creation*.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, the combined impact of the pandemic and the hurricane represents an unprecedented political, social and economic challenge to the Bahamas. A key policy response advanced by the Government of the Bahamas has focused on the need to develop more capacity within the labour force, notably in the areas of technical and vocational education, such as the trades and information technology.

“On-line and blended education are here to stay. There will now be more use of, and appreciation of, simulations and technical options ... in the use of technology to deliver content ... lectures ... assignments and quizzes, whether synchronous or asynchronous.

...[T]he workforce has also shifted towards on-line platforms. There is now a reliance on short, specific, job-ready, professionally-certified courses and training. Technology skills and competencies are the new job security during the post-COVID-19.”<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> McKenzie, L. (2020), “COVID-19 and Online Education Decisions”, *Higher Education*, Retrieved from <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/30/survey-data-reveal-impact-covid-19-perceptions-online-education>

<sup>5</sup> Legon, R. & R. Garrett (2020), “CHLOE 5: the Pivot to Remote Teaching in Spring 2020 and its Impact”, *Quality Matters and Eduventures*. See: <https://encoura.org/project/chloe-5-the-pivot-to-remote-teaching-in-spring-2020-and-its-impact/>

<sup>6</sup> Legon & Garrett, 2020.

<sup>7</sup> Legon & Garrett, 2020.

<sup>8</sup> Inter-American Development Bank (2019), “Damages and other impacts on the Bahamas by Hurricane Dorian estimated at \$3.4 billion”, from: <https://www.iadb.org/en/damages-and-other-impacts-bahamas-hurricane-dorian-estimated-34-billion-report>

<sup>9</sup> Quotes from BTVI President Robert W. Robertson’s speech at the Rotary Clubs of Nassau West in “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” in *The Tribune* (7 October 2020): p.19.

**Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute**

The Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) is the national, public, tertiary community college which has been fully engaged in responding to these critical and urgent national priorities. In fact, the Government directed an increase in public scholarships to support skills related training to address pressing work force skills gaps related directly to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. These scholarships are aimed at supporting more than 1,200 students per year.<sup>10</sup> In part, these scholarships were designed to bridge the national skills gap in the Bahamas. Indeed, a recent survey suggests that approximately 65% of businesses state that the quality of employees in the country is not satisfactory.<sup>11</sup>

BTVI offers Certificates, Diplomas and Associate Degrees, as well as customized training. The key areas of enrollment are in information technology (IT), office and business, cosmetology and trades. BTVI is a recognized Cisco Academy, a City & Guilds centre and it has received CompTIA awards of excellence for regional leadership in IT. In addition, BTVI has been pursuing registration with the National Center for Construction Education and Research (NCCER). A NCCER certification facilitates offering accelerated and certified trade courses.<sup>12</sup>

Until the 2020 Spring term, BTVI has served around 2,200 traditional on-ground, face-to-face students in Nassau, Freeport, Abaco and Andros, delivering over 450 classes primarily using a face-to-face model. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, BTVI has undertaken radical changes in all operational areas.

**On-line Education**

A key direction that BTVI has advanced in the past few years has been to develop the capacity to offer on-line education and on-line training. In that regard, many faculty members have been trained to develop and offer on-line courses. There is more to do in this area, but BTVI has made tremendous steps in advancing on-line education. At the onset (March 2020) of the pandemic approximately 40 mostly IT courses were being delivered in a blended mode and this afforded a template for moving all courses on-line.

The technology infrastructure at BTVI had been improved over the past few years including the addition of computer labs and smart classrooms. These improvements made the transition to on-line more effective. Although there remains more work to be completed to support a smart campus concept the improvements are being made incrementally as budgets dictate.

Globally, the transition to on-line education has accelerated dramatically with the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, BTVI moved almost all the 450 classes offered during the Spring 2020 term to an on-line format using the Moodle learning management system. These courses included case-studies, simulations, videos and Zoom classes. Although some classes in the trades are particularly difficult to accommodate, more than 95% of classes across the system continued on-line. In addition, for the trade related courses, alternatives to ensure student success for all students were made using “boot camps” of small, face to face, hands on practical sessions. The intention has been to use a blended format of the “theory” component on-line and the “practical” component on-ground.

As a certified Cisco Academy and CompTIA award winning institution for leadership in the Caribbean and Latin America, BTVI is uniquely qualified to be an on-line centre of excellence. In that regard, a Centre for On-line and Distance Education was established at BTVI in Spring 2020.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Lloyd, J. (2020), “2020-2021 Budget Contribution, Honourable J. Lloyd, Minister of Education, House of Assembly, Nassau, Bahamas”. [https://www.bahamaslocal.com/newsitem/244871/20202021\\_Budget\\_Contribution\\_by\\_The\\_Hon\\_Jeffrey\\_L\\_Lloyd\\_Minister\\_of\\_Education\\_House\\_of\\_Assembly\\_June\\_16th\\_2020.html](https://www.bahamaslocal.com/newsitem/244871/20202021_Budget_Contribution_by_The_Hon_Jeffrey_L_Lloyd_Minister_of_Education_House_of_Assembly_June_16th_2020.html)

<sup>11</sup> *The Tribune* (2019).

<sup>12</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19”, idem; BTVI Website: [https://www.bahamaslocal.com/showlisting/1246/Bahamas\\_Technical\\_and\\_Vocational\\_Institute\\_BTVI.html](https://www.bahamaslocal.com/showlisting/1246/Bahamas_Technical_and_Vocational_Institute_BTVI.html)

<sup>13</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19”, idem.

As a general observation, it is unfortunate that, many efforts to pivot to on-line education in response to this global pandemic were less than successful: “the brand of virtual instruction that most professors and students are doing on the fly right now could damage perceptions of on-line education”. Indeed, Legon and Garret argue that for those with limited backgrounds in on-line education the pandemic will just confirm existing stereotypes of on-line learning.<sup>14</sup> At BTVI a systematic approach to the pivot to on-line was used including a number of key initiatives as follows below.

### **Intensive On-line Faculty Training**

A key to a successful on-line programme is the importance of faculty training. In that regard, additional training related to online education was initiated, in part, through a grant from the Commonwealth of Learning (COL). The Commonwealth of Learning is an “inter-governmental organization created by the Commonwealth Heads of Government to promote the development and sharing of open learning and distance education knowledge, resources and technologies”.<sup>15</sup> Around 22 faculty completed this training and the Ministry of Education had a participant in the training. Additionally, five faculty were identified to complete certification as Lead On-Line Instructor. An important outcome of this COL project is the creation of five blended courses (Information Technology, Numeracy, Literacy, Entrepreneurship and Student Success) that will be rolled out primarily for dual-enrollment purposes.

### **Faculty and Staff Professional Development—On-line**

During the initial lock-down period (March-July 2020), BTVI faculty and staff remained actively engaged in upgrading their professional credentials. Over 90 completed Occupational Safety & Health (OSHA) certification as a safe workplace is a key in all sectors. Many jurisdictions are developing COVID-19 construction guidelines including OSHA. Ten staff members completed training on financial and registration systems (Empower) to ensure that a fully on-line registration process be available for students. Also, a number of other short, on-line courses (emergency preparedness, management and leadership) were completed. In addition, a series of courses (including “Introduction to Computers and On-line Education”) were developed to train all faculty members. These short courses can be packaged as “nano degrees”. This program uses Open Education resources and includes a number of industry recognized certifications and badges to assist instructors in becoming more effective in digital classrooms.

In total more than 11,000 hours of training were completed by faculty and staff between March 2020 and August 2020. In general, there is a need to build better competency among the teaching faculty and support staff. As a part of this initiative to focus on training, faculty members have been encouraged to develop individual training plans. It is anticipated that some of this training could be made available at low cost to family island high school technology and vocational teachers to build capacity at that level as well.<sup>16</sup>

### **Accelerated Technical Training Program**

BTVI has developed an accelerated technology training program in partnership with Valencia College in Orlando, Florida. This accelerated program is aimed at quickly developing a trained workforce to address national skills gaps and provide 10-weeks training focused on the trades: courses in carpentry, plumbing, electrical and masonry. This program is based on certification in the trades available with the National Center for Construction Education & Research (NCCER). Such key program includes professional certifications to ensure that the graduates meet industry standards, including safety standards that will be of increasing importance post-COVID. The NCCER mandate is to “share the common goal of developing a safe and productive workforce via a standardized training and credentialing program”.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Quote from Legon & Garret, 2020, *idem*.

<sup>15</sup> Commonwealth of Learning, n.d., *idem*.

<sup>16</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19”, *idem*; BTVI Website.

<sup>17</sup> National Center for Construction Education and Research (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.nccer.org/>

Indeed, the safety response to COVID-19 is vitally needed by the construction industry. BTVI supports and elevates the applicable training to ensure workplace safety. Also, the Commonwealth of Learning has produced a “best practices” document that has assisted in delivering technical projects on-line.<sup>18</sup> In the delivery of accelerated trades training, the intent is to work in cooperation with the Bahamas Contractors Association to initially and immediately assist in the rebuilding efforts required in the Hurricane Dorian impacted areas of Abaco and Grand Bahama.

This key NCCER program includes professional certifications to ensure that the graduates meet industry standards including safety standards that will be of increasing importance. The first step in advancing this initiative was to hold a “train the trainer” seminar which certified approximately 100 craftsmen and women to NCCER standards. The second step of training students, particularly on those islands impacted by Hurricane Dorian, is underway.

Overall, the development of the skills within the key trade areas will assist in reducing unemployment and having more Bahamians certified and therefore in a position to participate in the economy in a tangible way as rebuilding efforts take place in the country.<sup>19</sup>

### **Student Satisfaction**

BTVI conducts regular student satisfaction surveys. The most recent survey was conducted during the lock-down phase (March-June 2020) with responses from over 200 students: 85% of students stated that their experiences with respect to on-line courses at BTVI were “good”. This survey is repeated regularly and results provide empirical data to form the basis of improvement strategies. Key findings include:

1. Percentage of first-time On-line, or Blended Learning students: the number of students identified as “first-time enrollees” on the on-line learning platform represented 70%. The remaining 30% already had on-line, or blended learning exposure.
2. Adequacy and Quality of the On-line Instruction: average scores of satisfaction for Instructional services ranked at 90%. Students were satisfied that classes met learning-objectives, courses were easy to navigate, and they provided adequate auditory and visibility to accommodate all learning styles.
3. Final Examinations: 80% of student responders took a final exam on the Virtual Learning Platform.
4. Faculty Engagement: the satisfaction scores for teacher engagement ranged from 81%-85%. The questions included levels of engagement, as well as faculty guidance.
5. Challenges Faced: students ranked the challenges faced as follows, the most challenging factor, Internet, least challenging issue, lack of computer equipment.
6. Overall Satisfaction: the score for overall satisfaction included students’ likelihood to take another on-line course. The responses indicated 70% would like to take another on-line session, and overall satisfaction score for the COVID-19 On-line Learning experience came in at 85%.<sup>20</sup>

In summary, the results indicated that students were mostly satisfied with the BTVI’s response to the COVID closures, and the instructional methodology was satisfactory. The area showing some concern related to technical and internet challenges. Teacher engagement from the point of faculty guidance showed some average ratings. Overall the results were positive. It is anticipated that the results will be assessed in additional detail and used to improve the online experience. For example, based on these concerns computer labs are now opened by appointment and students use these facilities using social distancing protocols. In addition, an introductory on-line course has been finalized that provides students with an understanding of how the online systems work. Finally, ongoing teacher training is underway to improve both course development and delivery.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Commonwealth of Learning (2020), “Strategies for Blended TVET: Response to COVID-19” (Burnaby, B.C.: Commonwealth of Learning).

<sup>19</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” idem; BTVI Website.

<sup>20</sup> BTVI Website.

<sup>21</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” idem; BTVI Website.

### Community Support

BTVI has consistently attracted the support of key corporate and community stakeholders. One recent example is the Race for the Kids and the support of the Royal Bank. The funds generated by the RBC were specifically designed to assist the hurricane-impacted areas of the country and provide a software system to enhance student retention. In addition, the Rotary Clubs of the Bahamas contributed free laptops for hurricane-impacted areas. Another example is a partnership between the Commonwealth of Learning (COL) and BTVI in which the COL has sponsored on-line education training for BTVI faculty members.

Overall, these types of partnerships are critical and it is anticipated that this support can be enhanced to build the brand particularly in up-skilling the workforce in these challenging post-COVID-19 times. Firms and organizations, both domestic and global, are looking to partner to assist community development efforts.<sup>22</sup>

### Post-COVID-19 Workplace Skills

A key consideration for any academic institution in today's environment is the need to assess the critical skills that will be in demand post-COVID-19. The European Commission (2020) suggest that the critical post-COVID-19 skills will include: leadership, particularly related to teams and working remotely; emotional intelligence to work with ourselves and others in uncertain and challenging times; technology skills will be increasingly "indispensable"; digital and coding skills to manage processes and data; adaptability and the ability to understand change and the ability to embrace change; creativity and innovation to continuously improve; data literacy to effectively gather and manage "big data"; and critical thinking to evaluate data and make informed decisions.<sup>23</sup>

Of course, ensuring an effective educational system to achieve these objectives will not be an easy task. Indeed, a key challenge for educators is the budgetary constraints made more pressing by the global COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the OECD suggested that "governments should not solely focus on the short-term effects of the months of disrupted learning, which may fade out by the time students complete their school education. The policy focus should be set on keeping students engaged in learning to limit negative long-term impact on students' outcomes, which also potentially aggravates inequalities in education."<sup>24</sup>

### Summary

Several key initiatives have been started by BTVI with positive results. In particular, it is critical that skills be developed to address the dual national impacts of Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic. Projections indicate that there will likely be continued high unemployment as the pandemic is resolved. Strategic investment in skills development is timely and can pay significant dividends in the recovery phase rebuilding the national economy. The specific outcomes that BTVI is aiming to achieve include:

- Quality—it is critical that quality and national accreditation be advanced illustrating the vital focus on providing a global standard of excellence in all programs. This will strengthen relations with international institutions as BTVI partners with academic institutions and firms in other countries to facilitate acceptance of BTVI credits and programs.
- Certifications—increase the percentage of graduates completing courses with industry recognized certifications. This will increase employment opportunities as foreign direct investment and major developments take place throughout the country notably in the hurricane-impacted areas. Entrepreneurship will also be promoted and increased.

<sup>22</sup> BTVI Website.

<sup>23</sup> European Commission (2020), "Eight Essential Skills to Succeed in a Post COVID-19 World", Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/news-articles/-/asset\\_publisher/L2ZVYxNxK11W/content/8-essential-skills-to-succeed-in-a-post-covid-19-world](https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/news-articles/-/asset_publisher/L2ZVYxNxK11W/content/8-essential-skills-to-succeed-in-a-post-covid-19-world)

<sup>24</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (2020), "Education and COVID-19: focusing on the long-term impact of school closures", <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/education-and-covid-19-focusing-on-the-long-term-impact-of-school-closures-2cea926e/>



- Accelerated Trade Courses—the model will move to shorter more focused courses and programs that will enhance retention, graduation and output while maintaining quality. These courses will be employment focused on building employment skills including specific training in starting and operating a business. Entrepreneurship represents a key skill that will be advanced.
- On-line—use more technology to deliver online and or blended content to a broader range of Bahamians country-wide. Improving online course quality is a key goal.
- Training Faculty—ensure that the faculty are properly trained to meet the demands of the new reality using primarily short, industry recognized certifications.
- Dual Enrollment—as a method to introduce younger Bahamians to the trades, develop stronger relationships with students and provide specific, mostly trade courses and programs for high school students.
- On-line Centre of Excellence—an on-line centre has been formally established. This Centre is designed to promote, support and deliver on-line education. The Centre will solicit partnership support from other academic institutions, industry, NGOs and the Government of the Bahamas.
- Physical Infrastructure—the infrastructure to deliver high quality programs must be enhanced as BTVI has for many years required facility improvements. This is also a requirement of some of the international certification and accreditation institutions. For example, the Freeport campus remains only partially operational as a result of Hurricane Dorian damage. Major repairs are urgently required to make the facility useable as classes are being held at the local high school. In that respect, the capital budget is designed to repair the damaged buildings in Freeport and bring Nassau facilities up to standards required to offer industry approved certificates and accredited courses.<sup>25</sup>

In conclusion, BTVI made the pivot to on-line very quickly and efficiently. For example, moving courses to the learning management system was completed within 72 hours. Also, developing and implementing a series of training initiatives that includes more than 11,000 hours of professional development work by faculty and staff shows a strong commitment to continuous improvement during difficult times. Going forward, training priorities for the next year are being identified and these include customer service, conflict-resolution and leadership. Student survey data from the initial lock-down are quite positive; however, ongoing surveys are important to develop a culture of continuous improvement. Finally, a focus on short, industry certified courses in the trades using the NCCER model is imperative in addressing the skilled worker shortage in the Bahamas particularly driven by Hurricane Dorian. It will take a united effort over time to close the skills gap and rebuild the country.<sup>26</sup>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

BTVI Website: [https://www.bahamaslocal.com/showlisting/1246/Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute BTVI.html](https://www.bahamaslocal.com/showlisting/1246/Bahamas_Technical_and_Vocational_Institute_BTVI.html)

“BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” in *The Tribune* (7 October 2020): p.19.

Commonwealth of Learning (n.d.), “About the Commonwealth of Learning” from <https://www.col.org/about/what-commonwealth-learning>

Commonwealth of Learning (2020), “Strategies for Blended TVET: Response to COVID-19” (Burnaby, B.C.: Commonwealth of Learning).

European Commission (2020), “Eight Essential Skills to Succeed in a Post COVID-19 World”, Retrieved from [https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/news-articles/-/asset\\_publisher/L2ZVYxNxK11W/content/8-essential-skills-to-succeed-in-a-post-covid-19-world](https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/news-articles/-/asset_publisher/L2ZVYxNxK11W/content/8-essential-skills-to-succeed-in-a-post-covid-19-world)

Inter-American Development Bank (2019), “Damages and other impacts on the Bahamas by Hurricane Dorian estimated at \$3.4 billion”, Retrieved from <https://www.iadb.org/en/damages-and-other-impacts-bahamas-hurricane-dorian-estimated-34-billion-report>

International Labour Organization (2020), “COVID-19 and the World of Work”, Retrieved from <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/lang--en/index.htm>

<sup>25</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” idem; BTVI Website.

<sup>26</sup> “BTVI Radically Changes to Cope with COVID-19” idem; BTVI Website.



- Lederman, D. (2020), "Survey gauges the state of the online education landscape pre-coronavirus" (25 March 2020), *Inside Higher Education*, from <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/25/survey-gauges-state-online-education-landscape-pre-coronavirus>
- Legon, R. & R. Garrett (2020), "CHLOE 5: the Pivotto Remote Teaching in Spring 2020 and its Impact", Quality Matters and Eduventures. See: <https://encoura.org/project/chloe-5-the-pivot-to-remote-teaching-in-spring-2020-and-its-impact/>
- Lloyd, J. (2020), "2020-2021 Budget Contribution, Honourable J. Lloyd, Minister of Education, House of Assembly, Nassau, Bahamas". <https://www.bahamaslocal.com/newsitem/244871/20202021-Budget-Contribution-by-The-Hon-Jeffrey-L-Lloyd-Minister-of-Education-House-of-Assembly-June-16th-2020.html>
- McKinsey & Company (2020), "Thriving After COVID-19: What Skills do Employees Need?" Retrieved from <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-accelerate/our-insights/accelerate-blog/thriving-after-covid-19-what-skills-do-employees-need>
- McKenzie, L. (2020), "COVID-19 and On-line Education Decisions", *Higher Education*, Retrieved from <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/30/survey-data-reveal-impact-covid-19-perceptions-online-education>
- National Center for Construction Education and Research (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.nccer.org/>
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2020), "Education and COVID-19: focusing on the long-term impact of school closures", from <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/education-and-covid-19-focusing-on-the-long-term-impact-of-school-closures-2cea926e/>
- Small, M. (2020) "Survey: Most college students unsatisfied with on-line learning", *WTOP News* (25 June 2020), Retrieved from <https://wtop.com/education/2020/06/survey-most-college-students-unsatisfied-with-online-learning/>
- World Economic Forum (2020), "The COVID-19 pandemic has changed education forever", Retrieved from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-education-global-covid19-online-digital-learning/>

## AUTHORS

**Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D.**, is President of Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute in Nassau, and a Visiting Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Previously, he served as Director of Academic Affairs at the University of Phoenix-Central Florida and Senior Research Fellow at its Center for Workforce Development Studies; and was Vice-President for Academic Affairs at Argosy University-Central Florida. He has served as a city manager and as a senior education administrator. Dr. Robertson holds 9 degrees: Doctor of Philosophy (2000) in Management & Organization from Stirling University in Scotland, Great Britain; Graduate Diploma in International Development from the London School of Economics (2020); Post-Doctoral Professional Certificate (2015) in Global Business & Leadership from Argosy University-Graduate School of Business & Management; Post-Graduate Diploma (2013) from the University of London-School of Oriental & African Studies, Great Britain; Executive Certificate (2011) in Strategy & Innovation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Sloan School of Management; Master of Studies in Law, *Cum Laude* (1985) in Public Policy/Administrative Law from Vermont Law School; Master of Public Administration (1984) in Public Policy Evaluation/Management from Dalhousie University, Canada; Master of Arts (1978) in Planning/Community Development from Eastern Kentucky University; and Bachelor of Science (1974) in Social Sciences from East Tennessee State University. He is a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners and a Fulbright Scholar.

**Alexander Darville, M.A.**, is Dean of Construction and Workforce Development at the Bahamas Technical & Vocational Institute in Nassau, where he oversees all construction and mechanical trades, as well as workforce development. He also served on the BTVI/Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) project, as Skills Development Specialist between the IDB and Bahamas Ministry of Labour, and as former lecturer at the University (formerly College) of the Bahamas. He holds a Master's in Adult and Continuing Education with the University of the West Indies, a Bachelor's Degree in Construction Management with a Minor in Security Management from Richmond University, and numerous technical and vocational certifications. He is a member of the International Association of Electrical Inspectors (IAEI).

## Chinese Think Tanks' Foreign Policy Influence: A Case-Study on the Influential Role of CIIS and SIIS on "Belt & Road Initiative" Policy-Making

by XIN Hua, Ph.D. (Executive Director, Center on European Union Studies at Shanghai International Studies University, China)

**ABSTRACT:** As China is enhancing its policy-making activities through the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), also the contribution of its foreign policy think tanks' has become more prominent and their policy influence deserves a meticulous scrutiny. Starting out from a theoretic paradigm of "field of power" and an analytical framework of the "policy-making pendulum between horizontal and vertical fragmentation", this paper is a case-study of comparing the "Central-Level" China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) with the "Provincial-Level" Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) by analyzing the impact of their influences on shaping China's BRI policy-making. Thus, this case-study focuses on CIIS and SIIS relevant meetings to evaluate their connections with the four "sub-fields" (politics, business, academia and media) of China's "field of power", particularly their relations with national political leadership and policy-makers. This paper reveals that, while CIIS enjoys more advantages and is more closely connected to some key parts of the central-level policy-makers than SIIS, the links between SIIS with central ministries are still more intimate than its contacts with provincial policy-makers. This case-study also reveals that China's political power and resources committed to BRI-related policy-making are largely concentrated within the central and top leadership, which might be further strengthened by the latest round of reorganization within China's Communist Party central leadership and state institutions in March 2018. Further, the links between CIIS and SIIS with business, academia and media are varied, and all this deserves more detailed scholarly attention and future analysis of the key policy influence mechanism of Chinese foreign policy think tanks.

### Introduction

The world around China is becoming ever more complex and fluid. On the one hand, the U.S. and Europe have become increasingly defensive in trade and more negative towards the current system of globalization and global governance, taking tough protectionist measures to reduce imports of China's products and investments; on the other hand, areas at the periphery of China are becoming ever more destabilized, continuously disrupted by unpredictable contingencies ranging from North Korea issues to maritime skirmishes for territorial claims. Overwhelmed by these unprecedented challenges, Chinese policy-makers and political élites increasingly depend on foreign policy think tanks for more information and advice. This helps explain the "fever" to "construct new types of think tanks with Chinese characteristics" that has been emerging since early-2015.

China's foreign policy think tanks form a community of various types of foreign policy research institutions belonging to different components of China's overall political régime and policy-making system. Among them, two of the most élite ones deserve the particular attention and intensive research. Both of them belong to China's "foreign affairs system", the government section within China's executive system specialized in handling foreign policy-related issues, but they are also affiliated to central and provincial-level governments respectively. One is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a direct subsidiary of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF), while the other one is the Shanghai Institute for International Affairs (SIIS), a think tank fully financed by the Shanghai Municipal Government, which is one of the most important provincial governments in China. Thus, these two top think tanks provide a relatively complete picture of China's élite foreign policy think tanks influence within China's foreign policy-making system.

From late-2014 to March 2015, the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) was formally established by China’s central government as a long-term strategic framework to guide Chinese foreign relations and global governance over the next decade. Naturally, both the CIIS and SIIS played an active and important role in the process of formulating this initiative. Their interactions over BRI with the national political leadership and other components of China’s foreign policy-making system offer an interesting window to observe some of the most revealing features of think tanks influence in national foreign policy-making. Thus, this paper provides a case-study on the CIIS and SIIS, analyzing the mechanism in which they interact with and influence China’s political system and policy-making régime over BRI issues, while clarifying some of its characteristics. The goal of this paper is to apply theoretic depth and empirical precision to offer a more detailed picture of the key role of China’s foreign policy think tanks in national decision-making.

## **I. A Review of Literature on Chinese Think Tanks and National Policy-Making**

### **I-1. The Literature on Chinese Think Tank Studies**

#### ***The Chinese-Western Differentiation on Chinese Think Tank Studies***

The current literature on Chinese think tanks reveals several differences between Chinese domestic scholars and Western scholars (including overseas Chinese scholars):

**1) A Differentiation of Research Fields and Domains.** Domestic scholars aim at displaying a panoramic picture of various types of Chinese think tanks embedded in China’s complex public administration system, whereas Western scholars mainly concentrate on Chinese foreign policy think-tanks, hoping to precisely define their relevance in the country’s foreign policy-making.

**2) A Divergence of Paradigms and Perspectives.** Domestic scholars analyze Chinese think tanks’ inherent characteristics, interpreting their social nature as government advisory boards or public advocates. In other words, they are more focused on ontological issues. On the other hand, Western scholars approach this field through an epistemological lens on Chinese foreign policy. They focus on Chinese foreign policy think-tanks’ interactions with the national top leadership, painstakingly tracing their imprints in top-level politics, with a particular interest on their channels and means to exert policy influence.

**3) A Disparity of Methodology.** Domestic scholars use more quantitative-oriented methodologies based on sociology and public administration to carry out their analyses, while most Western scholars prefer to employ qualitative-oriented skills of foreign policy analysis and political sciences.

#### ***Domestic Scholars’ Research on Chinese Think Tanks***

Domestic scholars’ research of Chinese think tanks has several characteristics.

1. First, they often take the paradigms of élites and technocracy theories as their starting point for describing think tanks’ social status in China, emphasizing their special social status and explaining the significance of their development in China’s strive for scientific transformation of its policymaking (Zhu, 2006, 2008, 2013; Xue, 2007).
2. Second, sociological and philosophical paradigms and perspectives (such as “social capital”, “social space” and “public sphere”), are frequently employed to explain the advantages that Chinese think tanks enjoy when they are participating in China’s policy process and bringing their policy influence to the national level (Zhu, 2006; Xu, 2012; Xin, 2016).
3. Third, well-structured and rigorous surveys are constantly employed as a means to collect vast quantities of data and establish statistical models. Based on these models, their picture of Chinese think tanks becomes more distinctive (Zhu, 2006, 2008 & 2010; Xu, 2012; Chen 2015).

**Western and Overseas Chinese Scholars' Research on Chinese Think Tanks**

The observations by Western and overseas Chinese scholars on Chinese think tanks form a 3-stage process in pace with China's social and political transition.

- In 1980s, when China began to push forward domestic reforms and its opening to the world, Western scholars started to notice the role of Chinese think tanks, particularly foreign policy think tanks (Oksenberg, 1982; Shambaugh, 1987; Halpern, 1988; Weaver, 1989).
- During the 1990s and 2000s, as China became increasingly integrated into globalization through its dramatic acceleration of domestic market-oriented reforms since 1992 and its 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), think tanks began to emerge as a unique force shaping China's policy-making process. Western scholars intensified their research in this field substantially. Their enormous interests and efforts were exemplified by the No. 171 issue of the *China Quarterly* in 2002, which was fully dedicated to Western scholars' articles on Chinese think tank studies (Glaser; Lampton; Li; Naughton; Shambaugh; Tanner).
- Since the 2008 world financial crisis, as China's external environment became unprecedentedly complex and fluid, the Chinese political leadership inevitably increased their urgent demand for high-quality policy advice. Therefore, with Chinese think tanks' role becoming even more crucial, Western scholars, especially experts from elite think tanks, become fully absorbed in this field (Jakobson, 2010; Paltiel, 2010; Li, 2017; Menegazzi, 2017).

While Chinese scholars are more skillful at technical analysis, Western scholars mostly embed their research into macro-level analytical frameworks on China's political régime. Based on this distinctiveness, Western scholars proposed several acute and enlightening perspectives, although these are rarely mentioned by Chinese scholars:

- They emphasized the outstanding significance of a "small leading group" in China's foreign policy-making and took an attempt to clarify its connections with think tanks (Shambaugh, 2002; Glaser, 2002 & 2012; Jeremy, 2010).
- They regard "stove-piping"<sup>1</sup> as a permanent feature of Chinese policy-making system and use this concept to sketch the contours of the mechanism within which think tanks may bring influence (Glaser, 2002 & 2012; Shambaugh, 2002; Tanner, 2002).
- They give high credit to personal connections (*guanxi*) in assessments of Chinese think tanks' foreign policy relevance. Some scholars analyzed think tanks' channels of patronage from Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1980s and Zhu Rongji in 1990s (Halpern, 1988; Naughton, 2002). Some of them summarized these connections into five major types: family links, common school ties, teacher-student relations, common geographic origins, and working relations (Glaser, 2002 & 2012; Zhao, 2012).
- Also, some of them conduct their analyses within more general frameworks of elite and informal politics (Dittmer, 1995; Paltiel, 2010; Jakobson, 2010).
- There were also some descriptions of a Chinese style "revolving door" mechanism (Li, 2002).

---

<sup>1</sup> "Stove-Piping" is a special term referring to the strong vertical control in China's executive system. Usually China's ministries in the State Council possess enormous resources. They take direct control and have assertive commands over provincial-level ministries of the same field, while the provincial ministries can directly command city-level functional government institutions in the same field. This kind of vertical top-to-bottom command-chain is an outstanding feature of Chinese policy-making system, just like the pipes of stove that extend from top to bottom in vertical lines. U.S. experts in Chinese studies already noticed this feature since late-1960s and early-1970s. They adopted the term "stove-piping" from the discipline of intelligence analysis. The earliest description of this vertical control can be found in Barnett, A. Doak, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.72.

## I-2. The Literature on China's Policy-Making and Related Political Régime

It should be pointed out that research on Chinese think tanks can never be separated from more macroscopic research on China's overall policy-making system within its political régime, otherwise it may be very difficult to clarify the mechanism, as well as the effectiveness of their policy influence. Already there is a large body of literature, mostly written by Western and overseas Chinese scholars, on China's overall policy-making system and political régime. This literature can be divided into four categories through the lens of their analytical frameworks:

**1) The Power Centralization vs. Decentralization Dichotomy.** On one hand, some scholars approach their topics through the perspective of theories of authoritarianism, underlining the elements of power centralization in China's Communist régime. The most influential idea proposed by them may be the concept of "fragmented authoritarianism", which elaborates the complexity of internal bargaining and deals that make the overall system appear to be authoritarian, but fragmented (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Mertha, 2009). In addition, some of them raised the ideas of "consultative authoritarianism" (Harding, 1986), or "consultative Leninism" (Tsang, 2009). On the other hand, other scholars deal with their issues from the perspective of theories of federalism, more assertively stressing the collaborative aspects of China's political régime. They coined the terms of "*de facto* federalism" (Zheng, 2007), "informal federalism" (Segal, 1994), or "Federalism, Chinese style" (Montinola et al, 1995).

**2) The Central-Local Gaming in China's National Policy Process.** The central-local relationship is particularly complex and fluid in such a huge polity as China. It is embedded in a vertical-horizontal gridlock of command and control chains over below-central level government institutions, with the command chains originating from central ministerial leadership termed as "vertical line" and the directives flowing from below-central level party committee or government leadership to specific institutions of the same level defined as "horizontal line". Particularly, there is a "dual leadership" over Chinese governmental institutions, including most foreign policy think tanks.<sup>2</sup> This feature attracts both Chinese and Western scholars. Since late-1960s, U.S. experts of Chinese studies already noticed the vertical-horizontal crossing of executive chains-of-command and interpreted this feature as "dual rule" (Schurman, 1968 & 1973), or "honeycomb model" (Shue, 1988).

**3) The Élitist vs. Pluralist Participation in Policy Process.** As China's reforms and opening is pushing forward step-by-step, a variety of social groups and interests are entering the arena of China's overall policy-making process to promote their requests and interests. Think tanks are one within this diversity of emerging voices. This pluralizing trend is captured by scholars in their works, especially Shue (1988), Mertha (2005 & 2009) and Glaser (2010).

---

<sup>2</sup> "Dual Leadership" refers to the crossing of both "vertical" and "horizontal" commanding lines on "Below-Central-Level" governmental institutions (including government-affiliated think tanks) in policy-making and executive operations. For a "Provincial-Level" government institution (including provincial government-affiliated think tank), "vertical commanding" lines extend from the "Central-Level" ministries of the State Council or Central Party apparatus to this institution, transmitting "Central-Level" guidance on how to operate its professional work, while "horizontal" commanding lines extend from Provincial Party Committee and government leadership to that institution and mostly transfer administrative directives on funding, personnel affairs and some part of professional work. For example, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) is under both a direct control from the Shanghai Municipal Government and a strong guidance from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF). The Shanghai Municipality is a "Provincial-Level" unit and it appropriates funds to SIIS annually, determines its personnel appointment affairs, and occasionally gives directives on specific issues related to its research work (termed as "horizontal leadership" in Chinese bureaucratic jargon), while the MOF issues most of the guidance on its research work (termed as "vertical leadership" in Chinese bureaucratic jargon). In the bureaucratic organizational chart, the SIIS is both a subsidiary of the Shanghai Municipal Government with an administrative bureaucratic rank of "bureau" and a knot on a line extending from the top-level pivotal juncture of the MOF in Beijing.



**4) The Impact of China's *Nomenklatura* System on Policy-Making.** China may not have yet a mature "revolving door" mechanism as institutionalized as that in the United States, but there does exist a system of human resource exchanges that plays a role in shaping China's policy-making. That is the Chinese-style "*nomenklatura*" system. Scholars' analyses of this system reveal some structural features of bureaucratic ways of information gathering and resource exchanges in China's policy-making system (Harding, 1982; Huang, 1996; Lu, 1997; Glaser, 2010).

## II. Guiding Theoretical Paradigm and Analytical Framework

### II-1. The Guiding Theoretical Paradigm

The conceptual frameworks of current literature on think tanks are largely based on the idea of "social space" and "field of power" proposed by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. He argued that highly interactive social actors of a political system create a kind of "social space", within which these actors exchange social capital with each other and form many networks. These networks will gradually become integrated and generate a "field of power". This "field" covers the whole society and shapes the behavioural models of social actors (Bourdieu, 1992). On the basis of this viewpoint, U.S. sociologist Medvetz defined think tanks as a "central space of the field of power" consisting of four major sub-fields: politics and bureaucracy, economy, cultural production and media. Think tanks just form a "central space" between all these sub-fields. He argued that the boundary of this "central space" is always fluid through synchronization with the changes of the overall "field of power" (Medvetz, 2012).

This paper reinterprets Medvetz's points and establishes a synthesized theoretic paradigm that may work as a guiding paradigm to frame the whole analysis of this paper. Figure 1 gives a panoramic view of this paradigm. As Figure 1 reveals (next page), the whole political régime of China can be interpreted as a three-layered "field of power":

a) The outer layer is composed of four "sub-fields": politics, business, academia and media.

b) The middle layer is made of interactive forces between think tanks and the four sub-fields of the outer layer, which continuously push the exchanges of information and resources between them. This is a dynamic layer largely driven by China's "knowledge régime".<sup>3</sup>

c) The inner layer is the entire system of Chinese think tanks, which has developed into a complex structure containing a variety of institutions,<sup>4</sup> forms a "central space" in the center of the "field of power".

<sup>3</sup> The author of this paper defines the "knowledge régime" as an institutionalized mechanism that continuously generates multiple streams of processed policy-related information and data that heavily influences the perceptions and cognitions of members of policy community. John L. Campbell made a detailed comparative research on the "knowledge régime" in his work and regarded it as a parallel system to the "production régime" and "policy-making régime". Details can be found in: Campbell, John L. & Oce K. Pedersen, *The National Origins of Policy Ideas: Knowledge Regimes in the United States, France, Germany and Denmark* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

<sup>4</sup> There are already many categorizations on the typologies of Chinese think tanks. The author of this paper argues that Chinese think tanks can be divided into five major systems that cover three executive levels. The five major systems are:


- 1) In-house research organs of the Communist Party and government;
- 2) Specialized foreign policy think tanks;
- 3) Communist Party school system;
- 4) Academy of Social Sciences system;
- 5) Research institutes affiliated to universities.

Each of these five think tank systems is distributed across three levels: central, provincial and below-provincial levels. The details of this categorization can be found in: Xin Hua, "Chinese Think-Tanks' Influence on Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of the Role of CIIS and SIIIS in the Making of China's Europe Policy", p.217-245, in Abelson, D.E., Stephen Brooks & Xin Hua eds., *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics: Pathways to Influence* (London: Routledge, 2017).



Furthermore, Figure 1 below shows that, within China’s régime, think tanks’ connections with the two “sub-fields” of politics and academia are much closer and tighter than their links to business and media. Thus, to build a more accurate perceptual framework to analyze CIIS and SIIS’s policy relevance, it is necessary to take a more focused anatomy on China’s foreign policy-making system.

**Figure 1:**  
**Chinese Think-Tanks within China’s Field of Power and Multiple Policy Streams**




**II-2. China’s Foreign Policy-Making System within the “Political Sub-Field”: Régime-defining Roles for CIIS and SIIS**

Figure 2 (next page) shows China’s overall policy-making system on foreign policy-related issues. There are three levels within the nation’s whole chain-of-command policy-making system:

- the “Supreme Level” chain-of-command is the central core of national decision-making comprising both as “Top Level” the General-Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and as “Near-Top Level” the “Central Foreign Affairs Commission”<sup>5</sup> and the CCP’s “Central Political Bureau”;
- the “Central Level” consists of several structures operating in parallel to manage specific areas. It is at this level, that the country’s executive structure deals with the bulk of foreign policy-related issues, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF) in charge of current foreign policy and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) overseeing foreign economic issues;
- the “Provincial Level” comprises all Provincial governments that rely on their own specialized institutions to play a subsidiary function similar to those of the MOF and MOC, named as “Provincial Foreign Affairs Office” and “Provincial Commission of Commerce”.
- All institutions under the Provincial level are largely irrelevant to China’s foreign policy-making.

<sup>5</sup> Before March 2018, the “Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs” had been operating as the “Top-Level” institution of decision-making for China’s foreign policy, which had been controlled by the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Central Politburo and jointly operated by top leaders of the Communist party and state. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Meeting of the CCP’s 19<sup>th</sup> Central Committee issued a “Plan for Deepening the Reform on the Institutions of the Party and the State” on 26-28 February 2018, mandating that the “Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs” be reorganized and expanded as a new “Central Foreign Affairs Commission”, which remains largely controlled by the CCP’s Central Politburo. This reorganization plan was approved by the 1<sup>st</sup> Plenary Meeting of China’s 13<sup>th</sup> National People’s Congress (NPC) on 17 March 2018, and implemented thereafter.

**Figure 2:  
China’s Overall Foreign Policy-Making Structure**



To a large degree, Chinese foreign policy think tanks are tightly embedded in this highly centralized and hierarchic system. Thus, the CIIS is a “Central-Level” think tank directly affiliated to the MOF and acts as an analyzing hub that disseminates processed information and new policy ideas to MOF leaders, whereas the SIIS is a “Provincial-Level” think tank affiliated to the Shanghai Municipal Government and under nominal leadership of its foreign affairs office. Their performance in academic research and policy advice are deeply shaped by the entrenched “reversed pyramid” pattern of information and resource distribution. To be specific, the lower the level that a foreign policy think tank is structured on and the more junior the executive status it is granted, the less academic resources and policy-making information it is able to obtain from this system, and the less able it can conduct cutting-edge research on international studies or offer high-quality policy advice that may meet policy-makers’ demands. At the same time, unlike some non-official think tanks specialized in economic and social policy research, Chinese foreign policy think tanks usually find it very difficult to get substantial non-official support from an underdeveloped and immature civil society, because foreign policy issues are perceived to belong exclusively to “high politics” that are rarely of concern to non-governmental actors. Thus, the CIIS as a “Central-Level” think tank occupies a more advantageous position than the SIIS as a “Provincial-Level” think tank.

**II-3. “Policy-Making Pendulum between Horizontal and Vertical Fragmentations”: Analytical Framework explaining the Dynamic driving CIIS’ and SIIS’s Interactions with Policy-Makers**

China’s system is never a monolithic one, because its vast territory is affected by diverse geographical conditions and imbalances in economic development levels among different provinces, as well as sectors. The norm “fragmented authoritarianism” invented by Lieberthal captures this diversity and imbalances (Lieberthal, 1988). However insightful this is, it may not fully reveal the operational dynamic of the system.

Indeed, this paper argues that, inside China’s political system and policy-making, there is also a “policy-making pendulum” permanently swaying between the structures and momentums of vertical and horizontal fragmentations. China’s foreign policy think-tanks, such as CIIS and SIIS, are embedded in this fluctuating system with their operational activities largely shaped by somewhat cyclical shifts of top leadership’s perceptions, preferences and practices between “horizontal” and “vertical fragmentations”. This dynamic process drives both the “dual leadership” and “stove-piping”, which are two key mechanisms outlining CIIS’ and SIIS’ interactions with the national political power and their relevant policy influence.

As shown in Table 1 (below) and Figure 3 (next page), China’s foreign policy-related executive structure includes three Competence Modules and three hierarchical Territorial Executive Levels.

The three Competence Modules are the:

- 1) foreign affairs system, 2) foreign economic affairs system, and 3) state security system.

The three hierarchical Territorial Executive Levels are the:

- 1) Central Level, 2) Provincial Level, and 3) Below-Provincial Level.

This criss-crossing between all Competence Modules and Territorial Executive Levels creates a network of information- and resource-flows that shapes national foreign policy-making and implementation. In this paper, the gathering of information, resources and power along Competence Modules is defined as “vertical fragmentation”, which derives from the Chinese bureaucratic jargon of “*tiaotiao*”, while the convergence along the Territorial Executive Levels is defined as “horizontal fragmentation”, which derives from Chinese bureaucratic jargon of “*kuaikuai*”.

**Table 1:  
The Executive Network of China’s Foreign Policy-Making**


Functional Divisions Executive Hierarchy	Foreign Affairs System (System 1)	Foreign Economic Affairs System (System 2)	State Security System (System 3)
“Central-Level” (Level A)	A1	A2	A3
“Provincial-Level” (Level B)	B1	B2	B3
“Below-Provincial-Level” (Level C)	C1	C2	C3

Past records show this dynamic: whenever the top political leadership felt overly pressed by excessively chaotic and complex internal and external situations that developed beyond its capacity to maintain an efficient control to extract resources from below, it delegated decision-making power, including the power to delegate decisions on specific foreign policy-related issues of a technical nature to the “Provincial-Level” and even “Below-Provincial-Level”. Then “horizontal fragmentation” became more prominent along these Executive Levels, as the black-lined boxes indicated in Figure 3. In this way, “stove-piping” mechanism would be substantially weakened. More information, resources and power would flow downward to provincial actors, and the leadership of both the provincial structure of the Communist Party and government’s apparatus over their provincial think tanks would be strengthened. Under such circumstances, provincial think tanks might obtain more resources and information horizontally from provincial leadership and consequently their policy influence would be strengthened in comparison to “Central-Level” think tanks.

On the other hand, whenever top leaders felt confident enough to establish strong controls, or feared a potential unravelling of their control over provinces, then these previously delegated powers shift back to re-centralization, building-up a momentum for “vertical fragmentation”, as shown in the dotted-lined boxes in Figure 3. Under such circumstances, “stove-piping” would be strengthened, and the differentiated positions of central and provincial think tanks would get more and more pronounced.

In general, both “vertical” and “horizontal fragmentation” coexist at any specific time spot and form a criss-crossed complex “labyrinth” of policy-making and policy influence. The dynamic of “vertical fragmentation” shapes “stove-piping” because it drives the division of power and resources along the functional competences of the ministerial system. Meanwhile the dynamic of “horizontal fragmentation” checks the inherent balance of “dual leadership” because it helps concentrate more power and resources along the “Provincial-Level” and “Below-Provincial-Level” of China’s governing apparatus. Moreover, for most of the time, “Central-Level” ministries and institutions are not directly connected to the “horizontal fragmentation” structure because they perch on the highest level of territorial executive administration and are directly controlled by the Communist Party’s top-level apparatus. Thus, CIIS’ and SIIS’ interactions with policy-makers are largely structured by this oscillating dynamic, and their respective positions and policy influences evolve forward in pace with this cyclic sway. This criss-crossed pattern largely builds the macro “field of power” within which the CIIS and SIIS operate.

**Figure 3:**  
**The Horizontal and Vertical Fragmentation of China’s Policy-Making**



**III. Influence of the CIIS and SIIS on BRI Policy-Making: Empirical Study Focused on Their Meetings**

The “Belt and Road” (BRI) initiative originated from President Xi Jinping’s speech in Kazakhstan in September 2013. During late-2013 and throughout 2014, this idea of constructing a China-led multilateral cooperative economic network connecting East Asia’s littoral with Europe was constantly amplified and sharpened, with China’s top leadership coming to view it as a grand blueprint that may guide China’s global foreign economic relations in the future. On 28 March 2015, the MOF, MOC and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) unveiled a joint-document named, “*Vision and Actions on Jointly Building a Silk Road Economic Belt and 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Maritime Silk Road*”, as the first comprehensive national policy plan on the BRI. During most of 2015 and throughout 2016, the Chinese government actively negotiated with foreign countries to establish feasible frameworks for bilateral BRI cooperation (like the “16+1” mechanism for infrastructure-building collaborations between China and Central-Eastern Europe) and creating new institutions to finance BRI (like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank-AIIB). The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in May 2017 signals a peak in Chinese authority’s policy-making activities on BRI issues.

Because of the BRI’s special significance, the influence of CIIS and SIIS on national BRI decision-making can offer a good case-study showing the structural features of China’s policy-making system and foreign policy think tanks’ role. Nevertheless, due to the difficulty of gathering accurate data, it is not quite possible to draw a truly panoramic picture to portray all the means and channels used by CIIS and SIIS to influence BRI policy-makers, nor to precisely calculate their respective policy influence. This paper analyzes a single mechanism regularly used by CIIS and SIIS to interact and impact China’s policy-making system: think tank meetings. Indeed, because every Chinese think tank tends to keep a record of its meetings for certification of its research capacity and influence, so data for meetings is more easy to be measured.

### III-1. The Significance of CIIS and SIIS Meetings in Their Policy Influence

Among many ways and means employed by CIIS and SIIS to push their policy influences, meeting may be the most special one because it can reveal the structural characteristics and operating dynamic of China's "field of power" in a most concise way through its three major functions:

1) Platforms for Exchanges of Policy-Related Information and Resources. As Figure 1 indicates, Chinese think tanks, including CIIS and SIIS, form a "central space" between four sub-fields of China's "field of power". The participants in CIIS and SIIS meetings are considered as élites of China's foreign policy community within these four sub-fields, and particularly for politics and academia. So CIIS and SIIS meetings can act as a regular and concentrated platform facilitating and propelling the direct or indirect exchanges of resources and information between these actors.

2) Channels for Transmitting Concerns and Requests of Domestic Social Groups to Policy-makers. As China is now deeply integrated into the world, the vital interests of various domestic social groups are increasingly impacted, even shaped and concerned by foreign policy issues. So far China has not established an open and institutionalized system of political lobbying and interest group politics, but think tank meetings on some important occasions may offer channels for some social groups to let their voices be heard by high-level policy-makers, with these groups' interests, requests and concerns communicated directly to political leaders. As Table 3, 4 and 5 show, Chinese business interests have become increasingly and actively involved in CIIS and SIIS meetings, seeking to use their direct communication links to high-level officials or even top leaders to air such concerns and requests.

3) Hub of Networking. Many meetings of CIIS and SIIS have become institutionalized as a kind of mechanism to regularly connect different sectors of China's foreign policy community. Large-scaled annual forums and workshop programs operate as networks and platforms to connect actors of the whole foreign policy community, particularly those from important business interests, academic institutions and even non-governmental advocacy groups, while small-scaled lecture meetings and bilateral meetings may help to drive the more exclusive networks between CIIS, SIIS and government leaderships.


Therefore, through observation and calculation of the frequencies of various forms of meetings, and the composition of their participants, not only is it allows to distinguish the closeness of CIIS' and SIIS' connections to each sub-field in China's "field of power", and so clarify their differentiated positions within the national foreign policy-making system, but also it helps assess the degree of influence of these two think tanks on specific issues.

Of course, there are some limitations when meetings are analyzed for describing think tank's policy influence. Some meetings, particularly some large-scaled forums or seminars funded by the state, are functioning as platform for "Track 2" or "Track 1.5" diplomacy. They are organized partly for the purpose of publicizing official policy or public relations. CIIS and SIIS may use these meetings to send out policy messages in line with official instructions to certain groups of audiences.

However, meetings offer an incomparable convenience of making face-to-face contact with policy-makers. No other form of think tank activities can offer occasions or chances of interpersonal communication that are as direct and immediate as meetings. As long as policy-makers appear at the meetings, they will inevitably get in touch with experts of think tanks and representatives of social groups, hear these people's voices and become more or less influenced by their fresh information, ideas or opinions. Since it is difficult to definitely or precisely pinpoint or calculate a think tank's policy influence, meetings can be regarded as a convenient and vivid mirror from which a think tank's influence may be analyzed more meticulously.



**Figure 4:**  
**Quarterly Changes of Numbers of CIIS and SIIS Meetings and Numbers of Central-Level Government**



**Documents Declaring BRI Policy**

**III-2. The Pace and Rhythm of CIIS and SIIS Meetings and Their Relevance on BRI Policy-making**

It might be difficult to directly calculate the influence of CIIS and SIIS meetings over BRI policy. However, as time goes by, CIIS and SIIS are sponsoring and organizing an uninterrupted stream of monthly and quarterly meetings on BRI issues. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities, particularly its executive institutions, are also producing a stream of policy documents announcing and explaining BRI policies, in accordance with new ideas, perceptions and changes among China’s top leadership. Therefore, the type of influence these two think tanks wield can be verified by analyzing the quarterly change in numbers of CIIS and SIIS meetings, and the quarterly fluctuations of numbers of documents issued by China’s central policy-making institutions (Communist Party and top state institutions) that declared new BRI policy directives during the same period. Figure 4 is comprised from this idea.

As indicated in Figure 4, the number of CIIS and SIIS meetings exactly follow the same direction of rises and falls, revealing their largely synchronized pace and rhythm of research or associated communication activities. Quarterly numbers of “Central-Level” documents announcing BRI policy did not fluctuate with the same exact pace and rhythm as those from CIIS and SIIS meetings, but there is an interlock between them. From a broader perspective, quarterly numerical changes in both BRI policy documents and meetings at CIIS and SIIS are shaped by and inter-connected to the evolution of perceptions and ideas among China’s top leadership.



In March-June 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a set of refined principles on BRI on various international occasions, such as the Boao Forum for Asia, the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference, and the signatory ceremony for the AIIB Agreement, indicating that his original BRI ideas had already developed into a coherent scheme. Urged in pace with President Xi Jinping's ideas, the BRI policy-making activities of the central ministries were dramatically accelerated and the number of policy documents peaked for the first time in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2015, while CIIS and SIIS meetings reached their own first peak on the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2015, due to the time-lag necessary for research prior to organizing meetings to offer their own policy advice.

From January to June of 2016, President Xi Jinping took intensive visits to the Middle East and Central-Eastern Europe, promoting BRI blueprints and signing documents of intent for joint BRI projects. Against this background, both the number of "Central-Level" BRI policy documents and number of CIIS and SIIS meetings reached their second peak in 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2016. In the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2017, China's top leadership built-up expectations for the first "Belt and Road Summit" held on 14 May 2017, therefore the numbers of policy documents and CIIS and SIIS meetings simultaneously reached a new peak in 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2017.

In brief, the above review of the approximate 3-year of numerical fluctuations displays a general relevance and consistency between the overall long-term trend of these two think tanks' meetings and the trend of central-level policy documents. Furthermore, the records of the past 3 years also indicate that top leaders' perceptions and ideas largely shape the pace, rhythm and frequency of these fluctuations. Actually the "policy-making pendulum" is driven by the mentality of China's top leaders.

### **III-3. Detailed Analysis on CIIS and SIIS Meetings' BRI Policy Influence within China's "Field of Power"**

Since the emerging of BRI policy in early-2014, CIIS and SIIS have organized numerous meetings to discuss BRI policy issues with élites from the four sub-fields of China's overall "field of power". Acting as exchange platforms and network hubs, these meetings disclose the closeness and frequency of CIIS' and SIIS' connections with different sub-fields, and particularly with the core of political power. To some extent, they also reveal the exact position of the long-term pendulum between "vertical" and "horizontal fragmentation" in the fields related to BRI policy-making. Thus, a detailed analysis of their meetings is meaningful.

#### ***A General Picture of Differentiated Positions of CIIS and SIIS within the System of BRI Policy-Making***

After a calculation of the institutional backgrounds of participants who took part in CIIS' and SIIS' BRI meetings and who were from the "political sub-field" of China's "field of power", a general picture of these two think tanks' differentiated positions within China's BRI-related foreign policy-making system is established. Table 2 clearly shows this differentiation driven by the mechanisms of "dual leadership" and "stove-piping".

As shown in Table 2, CIIS contacts to "Central-Level" foreign policy-making authorities mainly depend on its official channels to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF), but has much fewer contact channels to the central executive institutions of foreign economic policy-making, such as the MOC, the Ministry of Treasury (MOT, or at times also called "Ministry of Finance"), or the National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC). This is a typical sign of "stove-piping": MOF, MOC, MOT and NDRC are separate "stove-pipes" with differentiated competences, so it is not easy for MOF-affiliated CIIS to cross inter-ministry boundary and contact MOC, MOT, or NDRC.

On the other hand, Table 2 also demonstrates that SIIS has to maintain substantial relations with both the "Central-Level" Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the "Provincial-Level" Shanghai leadership concurrently, a distinct sign of inextricable "dual leadership".

**Table 2:**  
**General Structural Characteristics of CIIS- and SIIS-Sponsored Meetings on BRI Issues**  
**(3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2014 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2017)<sup>6</sup>**

Names of Think Tanks		CIIS		SIIS	
		No.	% of Total	No.	% of Total
<b>Meetings sponsored by CIIS or SIIS and Joined by “Central-Level” and “Provincial-Level” Policy-Makers as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>From Departments of CCP’s Central Committee</b>	3	3.4%	4	2.8%
	<b>From MOF System</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>45.3%</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12.5%</b>
	<b>From MOC, or MOT, or NDRC or Other Central Executive Institutions handling Foreign Economic Policy</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11.6%</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7.6%</b>
	<b>From Other Central Executive Institutions</b>	6	7%	5	3.8%
	<b>From China’s Non-Executive “Central-Level” Policy-Making Institutions (like NPC, or CPPCC)</b>	3	3.5%	2	1.4%
<b>Meetings Sponsored by CIIS or SIIS and joined by “Provincial-Level” Policy-Makers as Keynote Speakers</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13.9%</b>
<b>Meetings Sponsored by CIIS or SIIS and Joined by Foreign Officials as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>From Foreign Embassies and Consulates stationed in China</b>	25	29.1%	26	18%
	<b>From Foreign Policy-Making Institutions visiting China</b>	30	34.9%	25	17.4%
<b>Total Number of Meeting on BRI Issues</b>		86		144	

Table 2 highlights another interesting feature: the very weak ties of CIIS with provincial policy-making institutions. As a subsidiary of a central ministry, CIIS is not allowed to contact provincial policy-makers directly and intensively, due to the vertical hierarchic compartmentalization of China’s bureaucratic structure. This may restrain CIIS’s interactions with “Provincial-Level” institutions to some degree. On the other hand, this low frequency also means that “Provincial-Level” policy-makers are far less crucial or relevant than central ministries and institutions of the Communist Party’s Central Committee in the field of foreign policy. More precisely, resources, information and power on foreign policy-making are largely concentrated within the “Central-Level” policy-making institutions, particularly the political core of the party. In March 2018, the CCP’s Central Committee issued a “Plan for Deepening the Reform on the Institutions of the Party and the State” with a design for a “Central Foreign Affairs Commission” that aims at foreign policy-decision making competences further centralized into CCP’s Central Party apparatus. As this plan took into effect on 17 March 2018, the previous “Central-Level” concentration of foreign policy-related information, power and resources may be further strengthened.

<sup>6</sup> Every meeting might have many participants from each category of those social and political groups identified on the left column of this table, so it is inevitable to make repeated or overlapped calculation on the numbers of meetings on different lines. Therefore, it is of no meaning to vertically or horizontally sum-up any numbers in this table.

Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that the CIIS enjoys a relatively more advantageous position than SIIS in terms of its connections with the core of political power and the direct sources of foreign information. Particularly, it has more frequent contacts with foreign diplomats and policy-makers than SIIS has, a crucial advantage for a foreign policy think tank. In general, CIIS may possess more plentiful resources, information, links and thus influence in China's "field of power" than SIIS during the BRI policy-making.

Nevertheless, SIIS has its own unique resources and links, and particularly unique personal connections. Mr. Yang Jiemian, former Head of SIIS, is the younger brother of Mr. Yang Jiechi, who is now member of CCP's Central Politburo and director of the office of "Central Foreign Affairs Commission", the inner core of China's foreign policy decision-making. This personal link surely helps SIIS to maintain an elevated position among China's foreign policy think tanks.

Additionally, SIIS's close personnel connections to the government of Shanghai,<sup>7</sup> the financial and trade center of mainland China, may facilitate SIIS to obtain more financial support and actual economic information below the "Central-Level" whenever there is some momentum in "horizontal fragmentation".

### ***A More Nuanced Picture of CIIS' and SIIS' Connections with Four Sub-Fields of China's "Field of Power"***

Table 2 outlines a general picture of CIIS' and SIIS' positions within the political régime for BRI policy-making and sketches their connections with the political sub-field of China's "field of power". To better explain the mechanism of their influence towards BRI policy through all the direct and indirect channels, it is necessary to draw a more nuanced picture of their connections and interactions with all four sub-fields of the overall "field of power".

Nevertheless, as CIIS and SIIS organize a huge variety of meetings every month, a more specific classification should be made on the types of their meetings before a clear-cut analysis is feasible (see Table 3). All CIIS and SIIS meetings are split in 6 types.

Table 3 gives a detailed comparison of 6 major types of meetings that CIIS and SIIS frequently hold. From left to right, a roughly descending sequence can be found in the degree of formality, the extensiveness of representation and the scale of these 6 types. As for the directness and effectiveness of these meetings' policy influence, it is difficult to generalize. The High-level forum is the most formal and most extensively represented form of meeting. Usually its participants are élites from all the four sub-fields of "field of power". However, it usually does not concentrate on a specific and narrow issue, so it may be less direct and effective to transmit crucial and professional information to top-level leadership.

On the other hand, when a political dignitary with a very high status take part in a High-level forum as a keynote speaker, he may hear some idea from an expert and agree with it. In this way, policy influence is immediately achieved. Sometimes, important political dignitaries may leave a high-level forum or other form of meeting after they present keynote speeches, because they are very busy, but afterwards they may spend some time to read the briefings or records of that meeting, particularly those records of policy discussions. So, case-studies are needed for analyzing specific circumstances on specific policy issues.

---

<sup>7</sup> There is a "revolving door" mechanism between SIIS and Shanghai Municipal Government: SIIS researchers and executives have opportunities to take posts in foreign affairs-related institutions in the Shanghai Municipal Government for 1-to-2 years.

**Table 3:**  
**Characteristics of 6 Major Types of Meetings held by CIIS and SIIS**

<b>Types of Meetings</b> <b>Characteristics</b> <b>of Meetings</b>	<b>I. High-level Forum</b>	<b>II. Workshop Programs</b>	<b>III. Regular Dialogues</b>	<b>IV. Symposium on Specific Issues</b>	<b>V. Lecture Meetings</b>	<b>VI. Bilateral Meetings</b>
<b>Total Number of Participants</b>	Large (50-200)	Middle (20-50)	Uncertain	Middle-Small (10-50)	Small (10-30)	Small (10-30)
<b>Degree of Formalness</b>	Highly Formal	Very Formal	Very Formal	Formal	Less Formal	Less Formal
<b>Level of Institutionalization</b>	Uncertain	High	Very High	Uncertain	Low	Uncertain
<b>Extensiveness of Representation</b>	High	High-to-Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
<b>Concentration of Issues</b>	Low	Medium	High	High	Very High	Uncertain
<b>Time Span</b>	1-2 days	3-10 days	1-2 days	1-2 days	0.5-1 days	0.5-1 days

After a clarification of all these types, it is practicable to make a more detailed calculation on the participatory rates of various groups of political actors in each type of CIIS and SIIS meetings. Table 4 and 5 list the results of this calculation on CIIS and SIIS respectively.

Table 4 shows the details of the CIIS connections with the four “sub-fields” of politics, academia (including other think tanks), business and media within China’s “field of power” through BRI meetings. It displays the varied closeness of CIIS links with each of these four sub-fields and indicates the different importance of each sub-field as a channel for CIIS to exert its BRI policy influence.

Moreover, this table tells the frequencies of each type of meeting held by CIIS, depicting the significance of each type of CIIS efforts through meetings and studies to influence national BRI policies.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Every meeting may have many participants from each category of those social and political groups identified on the left column of this table. Besides, some meetings may indicate features of both the type of regular dialogue and some other type outlined in Table 3, so they may be categorized into two types concurrently. This means that it is inevitable to make overlapped calculation on the numbers of meetings along different lines of this table. Therefore, it makes no sense to vertically or horizontally total the numbers in this table.

**Table 4:**  
**Structural Characteristics of CIIS-sponsored Meetings on “BRI” Issues (the Number of Each Type of Meetings joined by Each Type of Political Actor Groups) and Participatory Rate (this Number’s Percentage to the Total of this Type of Meetings) (3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2014 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2017)**

Statistical Categories		CIIS-Meeting Types		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
		Number	Participatory Rate						
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by “Central-Level” Policy-Makers as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>Departments of CCP’s Central Committee</b>	Number	1			2	2	1	
		Participatory Rate	8.3%			14.3%	11.1%	9%	
	<b>From MOF System</b>	Number	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	
		Participatory Rate	<b>91.7%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>73.3%</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	<b>72.7%</b>	<b>7.3%</b>	
	<b>From MOC, or MOT, or NDRC, or Other Central Executive Agencies handling Foreign Economic Policy</b>	Number	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>		
		Participatory Rate	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>22.2%</b>	<b>9%</b>		
	<b>From other Central Executive Institutions</b>	Number	3		3	2	1		
		Participatory Rate	25%		20%	11.1%	9%		
	<b>From “Central-Level” Legislative Institutions (NPC, or CPPCC)<sup>9</sup></b>	Number				1	2		
		Participatory Rate				5.6%	18.2%		
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by “Provincial-Level” Policy-Makers as Keynote Speakers</b>		Number	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>			
		Participatory Rate	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>7.1%</b>	<b>5.6%</b>			
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings with Business Interests (Industries, Commerce, Finance &amp; Banking) as Keynote Speakers</b>		Number	5	2	4	1	1		
		Participatory Rate	41.7%	50%	26.7%	5.6%	9%		
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings with Scholars from Chinese Think Tanks and Universities as Keynote Speakers</b>		Number	12	2	12	14	5		
		Participatory Rate	100%	50%	80%	77.8%	45.5%		
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by Media and Press as Discussants</b>		Number	7	1	6	3	1	3	
		Participatory Rate	58.3%	25%	40%	16.7%	9%	7.3%	
<b>CIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by Foreigners as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>Foreign Embassies and Consulates in China</b>	Number	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	
		Participatory Rate	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>45.5%</b>	<b>17.1%</b>	
	<b>Foreign Policy-Making Institutions Visiting China</b>	Number	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	
		Participatory Rate	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>22.2%</b>	<b>18.2%</b>	<b>48.8%</b>	
	<b>Foreign Think Tanks and Universities</b>	Number	8		10	9		16	
		Participatory Rate	66.7%		66.7%	50%		39%	
<b>Total</b>	Total Number of Each Type		12	4	15	18	11	41	
	% of This Type to the Total 86 CIIS Meetings on BRI Issues		14%	4.7%	17.4%	<b>20.9%</b>	12.8%	<b>47.7%</b>	

<sup>9</sup> NPC: China’s National People’s Congress. CPPCC: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.



**Table 5:**  
**Structural Characteristics of SIIS-sponsored Meetings on “BRI” Issues (the Number of Each Type of Meetings joined by Each Type of Political Actor Groups) and Participatory Rate (this Number’s Percentage to the Total of this Type of Meetings) (3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2014 to 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2017)<sup>10</sup>**

SIIS-Meeting Types			I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Statistical Categories									
<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by “Central-Level” Policy-makers as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>Departments of CCP’s Central Committee</b>	Number	1	1		3		1	
		Participatory Rate	8.3%	33.3%		10.3%		1.1%	
	<b>From MOF System</b>	Number	8		5	7	4	2	
		Participatory Rate	66.7%		100%	24.1%	36.4%	2.2%	
	<b>From MOC or MOT or NDRC or Other Central Executive Agencies handling Foreign Economic Policy</b>	Number	7	2		2	3		
		Participatory Rate	58.3%	66.7%		6.9%	27.3%		
	<b>From other Central Executive Institutions</b>	Number	3			2		1	
		Participatory Rate	25%			6.9%		1.1%	
	<b>From Central Legislative Institutions (NPC, or CPPCC)</b>	Number				1		1	
		Participatory Rate				3.4%		1.1%	
	<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings joined by Shanghai-Level Policy-makers as Keynote Speakers</b>	<b>From Shanghai Municipal Governor’s Executive Institutions handling Foreign-related Affairs</b>	Number	7		1	4		5
			Participatory Rate	58.3%		20%	13.8%		5.6%
<b>From Shanghai-level Non-Executive Policy-making Institutions (Such as Shanghai-level NPC and CPPCC)</b>		Number	3			2		2	
		Participatory Rate	25%			6.9%		2.2%	
<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings with Business Interests (Industries, Commerce, Finance &amp; Banking) as Keynote Speakers</b>	Number	9		2	3		1		
	Participatory Rate	75%		40%	10.3%		1.1%		
<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings with Scholars from other Chinese Think Tanks and Universities as Keynote Speakers</b>	Number	12	2	4	20	2	3		
	Participatory Rate	100%	66.7%	80%	69%	18.2%	3.3%		
<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings with Media and Press (Chinese or Foreign) as Discussants</b>	Number	4			1				
	Participatory Rate	2.7%			3.4%				
<b>SIIS-sponsored Meetings</b>	<b>Foreign Embassies and Consulates in China</b>	Number	4	2	1	3	2	17	
		Participatory Rate	33.3%	66.7%	20%	10.3%	18.2%	18.9%	

<sup>10</sup> Every meeting may have many participants from each category of the social and political groups identified on the left column of this table. Some meetings may indicate features of both the type of regular dialogue and other types outlined in Table 3, so it may be categorized into two types concurrently. Therefore, it is inevitable to make overlapped calculation on the numbers of meetings along different lines of this table, and it makes no sense to vertically or horizontally total the numbers in this table.

joined by Foreigners as Keynote Speakers	Foreign Policy-making Institutions visiting China	Number	7	2	1	4	1	13
		Participatory Rate	58.3%	66.7%	20%	13.8%	9.1%	14.4%
	Foreign Think Tanks and Universities	Number	7		5	8	1	45
		Participatory Rate	58.3%		100%	27.6%	9.1%	50%
Total	Total Number of Each Type		12	3	5	29	11	90
	% of This Type to the Total 144 SIIS Meetings on BRI Issues		8.3%	2%	3.47%	20.1%	7.6%	62.5%

The more nuanced data of Tables 4 and 5 confirms the basic pattern already sketched by Table 3, which may be clarified and elaborated into the following three points:

**First**, both CIIS and SIIS are closely linked to “Central-Level” policy-makers, but CIIS is far less connected to provincial policy-makers than SIIS. The participatory rates of provincial officials in CIIS meetings are much lower than the participatory rates of Shanghai policy-makers in SIIS meetings generally,<sup>11</sup> but the overall participatory rates of central ministerial officials in both CIIS and SIIS meetings are on similarly high levels. CIIS appears to be relatively closer to MOF than SIIS, which is natural because CIIS is directly affiliated to MOF, but it is no closer than SIIS to the central ministries of foreign economic policy-making, such as MOC, MOT and NDRC, a sign of “stove-piping”. Furthermore, SIIS’ connections with MOF system and central foreign economic policy-making ministries are also similarly close. More specifically, SIIS’ intimate links to MOC, MOT and NDRC are completely concentrated on BRI-related meetings of type I (High-Level Forum), type II (Workshop Programs) and type V (Lecture Meetings). All in all, CIIS is very intensively connected to the MOF system, less closely linked to foreign economic policy-related central ministries and very distant from “Provincial-Level” institutions, while SIIS has to divide its resources to concurrently maintain substantial connections with both “Central-Level” policy-making institutions and Shanghai municipal authority, at least on BRI issues.

**Second**, SIIS itself is much closer to “Central-Level” policy-makers than to Shanghai policy-makers.<sup>12</sup> Of all the six types of meetings held by SIIS, Shanghai municipal officials were almost completely absent from three types of these meetings: type II (Workshop Programs), type III (regular Dialogues with stakeholders of BRI-related policy areas) and type V (Lecture Meetings), while “Central-Level” policy-makers from both MOF and central foreign economic policy-making ministries actively participated in these three types of meeting. As a matter of fact, BRI-related meetings of type II, III and V act as important platforms for face-to-face contacts of the relatively exclusive inner circles of inter-personal networks, on which crucial information for policy-making is transferred to relevant policy-makers, or requests of certain social interest groups are heard by key officials. Shanghai officials’ absence on these platforms implies that they are largely outside the inner circle that has real power of BRI policy-making. In other word, crucial resources, information and personal links related to BRI policy issues are concentrated in “Central-Level” government institutions, so SIIS is compelled to hold closer ties with the central authorities.

<sup>11</sup> In China’s territorial executive administration system, Shanghai Municipality is one the four “Provincial-Level” municipalities under direct control of China’s central government. Thus, Shanghai municipal leaders are usually “Provincial-Level” officials.

<sup>12</sup> Several SIIS experts interviewed by the author of this paper denied that SIIS is a “Provincial-Level” think tank. They argued that although it is located in Shanghai, not Beijing, “SIIS still represents top level research capacity of the whole nation and possesses ‘very direct channels’ of interactions with top leadership in Beijing”. They thought that the term of “Provincial-Level” think tank downgrades the outstanding position of SIIS and underestimates its policy influence. Later they admitted that SIIS is financially dependent on the Shanghai Municipal Government, not the central government, as a “Fully-Appropriated Non-Profit Institution”. Their dislike of the term of “Provincial-Level” reveals the special importance of maintaining close links to central policy-makers and the relative peripheral position of provincial policy-makers in foreign policy decision-making.

Actually, this centralization pattern may be further strengthened in future because of the situational changes highlighted by two signs:

- a) Since the CCP's 18<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2012, domestic and foreign analysts have already observed more traces of re-centralization in the national economy and government's executive administrations, along the lines of "vertical fragmentation";
- b) On 17 March 2018 the decision to expand and upgrade the "Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs" into "Central Foreign Affairs Commission" took into effect as the "Plan for Deepening the Reform on the Institutions of the Party and State" was passed by China's National People's Congress. Four previous "Central Small Leading Groups" were upgraded and expanded into special "Central Commissions" controlled by the CCP's Central Politburo and jointly operated by top leaders of the Communist Party and state. Also, several new central ministries will be established, which will absorb and gather competences of some existing ministries, a situation similar to the time of reform for the "big ministry system" in 2007. This latest round of adjustments on "Central-Level" party and state institutions may amass and concentrate more resources and power upward into the Communist Party's central apparatus and a few central ministries, therefore intensifying "vertical fragmentation" to some degree.

**Third**, CIIS indeed enjoys more advantages than SIIS. The highly distinctive percentage of each type of meeting to the total numbers of meetings disclose the differentiated positions of CIIS and SIIS in BRI policy-making. The percentages of the meetings of type IV (Symposium on specific issues) and type VI (Bilateral Meetings) to the total numbers of BRI-related meetings organized by CIIS and SIIS are not vastly different, showing the significance of these two types as key channels and platforms for CIIS and SIIS to push forward their influences on BRI policy. However, there is a vast difference between CIIS and SIIS in the percentages of meetings of type I (High-Level Forum), type III (regular Dialogues) and type V (Lecture Meetings) to the total numbers of meetings. The weights of these three types to the total number of meetings held by CIIS are much larger than those of SIIS. As a matter of fact, the meetings of type I (High-Level Forum) consumes tremendous quantity of resources, including funds and expertise. And it is not probable to organize the meetings of type III (regular Dialogues) and type V (Lecture Meetings) without intensive long-term and stable personal links to the top-level policy-makers and political power.

Therefore, much larger weights of these three types in CIIS meetings certify its large advantages compared to SIIS in terms of resources and privileged personal connections. The obviously higher participatory rates of foreign diplomats and officials in CIIS meetings in comparison to SIIS meetings also reveal the relatively more advantageous position enjoyed by CIIS.

These two tables also unveil other interesting points:

**First**, these two think tanks' connections with other three "sub-fields" of China's "field of power" in the form of meeting are varied. Through meetings, their relations with the academia are similarly close, but CIIS obviously maintains much tighter relations with the media than SIIS. On the other hand, SIIS operates much closer formal links or institutionalized ties with business interests than CIIS through formal or professional meetings of type I (High-Level Forum), type III (regular Dialogue) and type IV (Symposium on specific issue), while CIIS may have more intimate inter-personal ties with business people through more exclusive meetings of type II (Workshop Programs) and type V (Lecture Meetings). The weaker institutionalized contacts of CIIS with China's business community may be attributed to the heavier restrictions it has to undergo as MOF's in-house research institution. Leaders and executives of CIIS are usually from MOF with experiences of working as high-ranking officials in the past. As former-"Central-Level" high-ranking officials, they are inevitably restricted by more disciplines. Generally-speaking, Chinese business interests become increasingly actively involved in think tank events on the BRI topic.

**Second**, it might be concluded that the central executive institutions in charge of foreign economic policy take an increasingly outstanding role in China's overall foreign policy-making régime and become a part of important targets of think tanks' policy influence, at least on the BRI issues. Tables 3 and 4 shows that both CIIS and SIIS invited these foreign economic policy-makers to take part in a large number of their meetings and undertook a substantial expense to contact and host them. These two points will add new complexity to Chinese think tanks' role in national policy-making.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

Generally speaking, there is a scarcity of literature on China's foreign policy-making, which constrains the analytical depth of existing literature of China's foreign policy think tanks. Lieberthal's concept of "fragmented authoritarianism" and Mertha's idea of "fragmented authoritarianism 2.0" may capture some dynamic characteristics within China's political and policy-making structure, but they derive these two terms from observations in the domains of economic and social policy-making, without much specification on the structural pattern of the relations between different actors and the channels of exchange and influence. On the other side, Western and overseas Chinese scholars have paid much more attention to China's foreign policy think tanks than native Chinese scholars, but they seldom conduct individualized case-studies on specific policy issues, perhaps because of the lack of detailed information, which may lead to some degree of insufficiency and imprecision. As China's foreign policy-making is far less open and regularized and its relevant power, resources and information are much more centralized than the economic and social policy-making, more caution is required for the analysis of think tanks' role within this complex "black box".

CIIS and SIIS are two of the most élite foreign policy think tanks in China. This case-study on their influences in the BRI policy-making has revealed some structural characteristics of the positions and roles of think tanks in China's foreign policy-making structure. This paper establishes a synchronized theoretic paradigm that interprets think tanks as a "central space" in a "three-layered field of power" and builds an analytical framework of policy-making pendulum between "horizontal" and "vertical fragmentation", so as to elaborate the roles and influences of CIIS and SIIS on BRI policy issues. Based on this guiding theoretic paradigm and analytical framework, this paper focuses on the meetings held by CIIS and SIIS for BRI policy discussions. To be specific, this paper calculates the participatory rates of different social and political groups of the four "sub-fields" (politics, business, academia and media) of China's "field of power", and then analyzes the exact structural characteristics of CIIS and SIIS's connections with these "sub-fields", particularly with policy-makers in the national political circle.

The analysis of this paper reveals that both CIIS and SIIS are closely connected to central ministerial systems through BRI meetings. Especially, the links of SIIS as a "Provincial-Level" think tank to central policy-makers are still more intimate than its relations with Shanghai Municipal Government. Also, the connections of CIIS through meetings with central ministries outside the MOF, such as foreign economic policy-related MOC, MOT and NDRC, are substantially weaker than its links with MOF. On the other hand, CIIS as a central ministry-affiliated think tank is very distant from provincial policy-makers, due to the limitations brought by China's vertical executive compartmentalization. These facts reveal the typical features of "stove-piping" driven by the structure and momentum of "vertical fragmentation".

On the other hand, SIIS has to maintain intimate relations with central policy-makers and top leadership, and at the same time keep substantial ties with Shanghai government, demonstrating the mechanism of "dual leadership" shaped by "horizontal fragmentation" structure. In general, the behaviors and influence of CIIS as a central ministry's subsidiary are only subject to "vertical fragmentation", whereas SIIS as a think tank financially dependent on a "Provincial-Level" government has to maneuver between "vertical" and "horizontal fragmentation". It is also revealed that there are discrepancies in CIIS' and SIIS' connections with and influence on academia, business and media over BRI policy issues.

In brief, faced with an increasingly unpredictable external world plagued by surging tides of populism and de-globalization, China has to manage new challenges that may disrupt or even damage the established structures of world economy and global governance. It is under this fluid situation that China has developed the grand plan of the “Belt and Road” Initiative, and its policy-making activities to substantialize this grand plan are by no means an easy task. Consequently, it is inevitable that Chinese foreign policy think tanks will play a stronger role as professional policy advisers in China’s foreign policy-making system. Nevertheless, the exact mechanisms and effectiveness of their influences on foreign policy remain insufficiently researched and deserve greater attention of both domestic and Western scholars.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, Mahmood & Raees A. Mughal, “The Foreign Policy Think Tanks in China: Input, Access and Opportunity”, *Asian Affairs: an American Review*, Vol. 38 (2011): p.143-155.
- Abb, Pascal, “China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Changing Roles and Structural Conditions”, *German Institute of Global & Area Studies*, Working Papers N. 213 (January 2013).
- Abb, Pascal, “China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and Changing Roles”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, Issue 93 (May 2015): p. 531-553.
- Barnett, A. Doak, *Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
- Bachman, David, “The Limits on Leadership in China”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, N. 11 (November 1992): p.1046-1062.
- Bourdieu, Pierre & Loic J. D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
- Chung, Jae Ho, *Central Control and Local Discretion in China: Leadership and Implementation during Post-Mao De-collectivization* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Cheng Li, *The Power of Ideas: the Rising Influence of Think Tankers and Think Tanks in China* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2017).
- Cao, Zhenghan, “Vertically Decentralized Authoritarianism and Mechanisms of Political Stability in China”, *Sociological Studies*, Vol. 25 (January 2011): p. 1-39.
- Dittmer, Lowell, “Chinese Informal Politics” in *China Journal*, N. 34 (July 1995): p. 1-34.
- Duckett, Jane, “Bureaucratic Interests and Institutions in the Making of China’s Social Policy”, *Public Administration Quarterly* (Summer 2003): p. 210-237.
- Eckhardt, Jappe, *Business Lobbying and Trade Governance: the Case of E.U.-China Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
- Montinola, Gabriella, et al, “Federalism, Chinese Style: the Political Basis for Economic Success in China”, *World Politics*, Vol. 48 (October 1995): p. 50-81.
- Ma, Jun & Muhua Lin, “Policy-Making in China: A Review of Chinese Scholarship”, *China Review*, Vol.12, N.1 (Spring 2012): p. 95-122.
- Medvetz, Thomas, *Think Tanks in America* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
- Naughton, Barry, “China’s Economic Think Tanks: their Changing Role in the 1990s”, *China Quarterly*, N.171 (September 2002): p.624-635.
- Fewsmith, Joseph, “Institutions, Informal Politics & Political Transition in China”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.36, N.3 (March 1996): p.230-245.
- Faulkner, Margaret S., “Regulating Intellectual Life in China: the Case of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences”, *China Quarterly*, N.189 (March 2007): p.83-99.
- Gill, Bates & J. Mulvenon, 2002, “Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions”, *China Quarterly*, N.171 (September 2002): p. 617-624.
- Glaser, Bonnie S. & P. C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence”, *China Quarterly*, N.171 (September 2002): p. 597-616.
- Glaser, Bonnie, “Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and the Practice of Influence”, p. 88-124, in Gilbert Rozman, ed., *China’s Foreign Policy: Who Makes It and How Is It Made?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Goodman, David S. G., *Groups and Politics in the People’s Republic of China* (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1984).



- Gore, Lance, L. P., *Market Communism: the Institutional Foundation of China's Post-Mao Hyper-Growth* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- Harding, Harry, *Organizing China: the Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949-1976* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981).
- Harding, Harry, "Political Development in Post-Mao China", p. 13-38, in Barnett, Doak & Ralph N. Clough eds., *Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
- He Li, "Reforming the Chinese State: the Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 49, N. 2 (March-April 2002): p. 33-43.
- Heilmann, Sebastian, "Policy Implementation in China's Economic Rise", *Studies of Comparative International Development*, Vol. 43 (2008): p. 1-26.
- Huang, Yasheng, "Information, Bureaucracy and Economic Reforms in China and the Soviet Union", *World Politics*, Vol. 47, N.1 (October 1994): p. 102-134.
- Huang, Yasheng, *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: the Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- Huang, Yasheng, "Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: an Institutional Economics Perspective", *Political Studies*, Vol.50 (2002): p.61-79.
- Jackobson, Linda & Dean Knox, "New Foreign Policy Actors in China", *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, SIPRI Policy Paper N. 26 (September 2010).
- Kennedy, Scott, *The Business of Lobbying in China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
- Lampton, David M., "China's Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?", p.1-36, in David M. Lampton ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- Lampton, David M., "China Policy: Interests and Process", *World Affairs*, Vol. 149, N. 3 (Winter 1986-1987): p. 139-142.
- Lampton, David M., *The Politics of Medicine in China: the Policy Process, 1949-1977* (Kent, U.K.: William Dawson & Sons, 1977).
- Li, Jinshan, *Bureaucratic Restructure in Reforming China: A Redistribution of Political Power* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1998).
- Lieberthal, Kenneth & Michael Oksenberg, *Policy-Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
- Landry, Pierre F., *Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party's Control of Local Élites in the Post-Mao Era* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- Liao, Xuanli, *Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks and China's Policy towards Japan* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2006).
- Luo, Zhaohong, "Globalization Challenge and the Role of Think Tanks in China", p.75-77, in John W. Langford & K. Lorne Brownsey eds., *Think-Tanks and Governance in the Asia-Pacific* (Halifax, Canada: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991).
- Mertha, Andrew, "'Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0': Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process", *China Quarterly*, N.200 (December 2009): p. 995-1012.
- Morrison, Michael, "China's Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Influence on Decision-Making and the 5<sup>th</sup> Generation Communist Party Leadership", *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (September 2012).
- Menegazzi, Silvia, *Rethinking Think-Tanks in Contemporary China* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
- Nathan, Andrew J., "China's Changing of Guard: Authoritarian Resilience", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, N.1 (January 2003), p.6-17.
- Paltiel, Jeremy, "Structure and Process in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Canada", N. 8, China Papers Series, *Canadian International Council* (March 2010).
- Pye, Lucian W., *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A Model and Some Propositions* (RAND Corp., 1980).
- Shambaugh, David, 1987, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy", *China Quarterly*, N.110 (June 1987): p.276-304.
- Shambaugh, David, 2001, "The Dynamics of Élite Politics during the Jiang Era", *China Journal*, N.45 (January 2001): p.101-111.
- Shambaugh, David, 2002, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process", *China Quarterly*, N.171 (September 2002): p. 575-596.
- Schurmann, Franz, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973).
- Shi, Tianjian, *Political Participation in Beijing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
- Shue, Vivienne, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
- Thomas Bondiguel & Thierry Kellner, "The Impact of China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks", Working Paper of Asia Paper Series, *Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies* (July 2009).
- Tanner, Murray S., "Changing Windows on a Changing China: the Evolving 'Think-Tank' System and the Case of the Public Security Sector", *China Quarterly*, N.171 (September 2002): p. 559-574.


- Tsang, Steve, "Consultative Leninism: China's New Political Framework", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 18 (62) (November 2009): p.865-880.
- Wang, Shaoguang, "Learning Mechanism and Adaptive Capacity: Enlightenments from the Changes of China's Rural Cooperative Health Care System", *Chinese Social Sciences*, Issue 6 (2008): p. 111-133.
- Wang, Xixin & Zhang Y., "Experts, the Public and Use of Knowledge: an Analytical Framework for Administrative Rule-Making" (in Chinese) in *Chinese Social Sciences*, Issue 3 (2003): p. 113-127.
- Xin Hua, "Chinese Think Tanks' Influence on Foreign Policy-Making: A Case-Study of the Role of CIIS and SIIS in the Making of China's Europe Policy", in Abelson, D.E., Stephen Brooks & Xin Hua eds., *Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics: Pathways to Influence* (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 217-245.
- Zhao, Quansheng, "Moving between 'Inner Circle' and 'Outer Circle': Limited Impact of Think Tanks on Policy-Making in China" in Gilbert Rozman, ed., *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes It and How Is It Made?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Zhu, Xufeng & Xue Lan, "Think Tanks in Transitional China", *Public Administration & Development*, Vol. 27 (2007): p.452-464.
- Zhu, Xufeng, "Government Advisors or Public Advocates? Roles of Think Tanks in China from the Perspective of Regional Variations", *China Quarterly*, Vol. 207 (September 2011): p. 668-685.
- Zhu, Xufeng, "Policy Change and Expert Involvement in China", *Public Administration*, Vol. 91, N. 2 (2013): p. 281-302.
- Zhu, Xufeng, *The Rise of Think-Tanks in China* (London: Routledge, 2013).
- Zheng, Yongnian, *De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms & Dynamics of Central-Local Relations* (Singapore: World Scientific Publ., 2007).

## AUTHOR

**XIN Hua, Ph.D.**, is Executive Director and Professor at the Center for European Union Studies at the Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), and Non-Resident Research-Professor at the Center for National Strategic Studies of Shanghai Jiaotong University. He was also a 2013-2014 Visiting-Scholar at the E.U. College of Europe-Bruges in Flanders/Belgium. He has won several academic prizes by the Shanghai Federation of Academic Institutions of Social Sciences and has a Ph.D. in International Relations from Fudan University. His research focuses on: Comparative studies on domestic sources of Chinese and European diplomacy, E.U.-China-U.S. economic relations, and comparative studies on E.U. and East Asian regional economic integrations.

## E.R.A.: Post-Suffrage Fight for Equal Rights for Women

by Kathryn DePalo-Gould, Ph.D. (Florida International University, Miami)



Lucretia Mott, co-organizer of the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention first calling for women's equality. Library of Congress



Alice Paul, architect of the Equal Rights Amendment, toasting the suffrage flag, September 1920. Library of Congress



Rep. Martha Griffiths (D-MI), "mother" of the Equal Rights Amendment. Library of Congress

**ABSTRACT:** The fight for the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) has gone on longer than the historical push for women's suffrage. Two key figures in the battle on opposite sides of the spectrum included the militant suffragette, Alice Paul, who authored the ERA when it was first introduced in Congress in 1923 vs. Phyllis Schlafly, the conservative firebrand whose StopERA campaign in the 1970s-1980s prevented ratification of the ERA by its already extended 1982 deadline. Recently in 2017-2020 events in state legislatures, now teeming with women lawmakers and the unwavering ideological support of the Democratic Party, revived an ill-fated new political push to bypass the constitutional process by voting *post-facto* for a belated post-1982 ERA's ratification, but this too stalled by late-2020 due to the political hostility of the Republican-led Senate and a conservative-led Supreme Court.

It has been 100 years since the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment was ratified granting women the right to vote and nearly 100 years since the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) was first introduced. When those pioneering ladies (and gents) met at the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848, their mission was, in actuality, much broader than women's suffrage. In fact, Lucretia Mott exclaimed to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Why, Lizzie, thee will make us ridiculous!" when suffrage rights were included among the Resolutions and Resolves.<sup>1</sup> In the end, the women's suffrage plank was the only Resolve lacking a unanimous vote. Instead, Mott and others focused on women's equality under the law. However, it was the "outrageous" suffrage rights that were extended to women by Constitutional amendment in 1920, while the Equal Rights Amendment has languished ever since.

<sup>1</sup> McMillen, Sally, *Seneca Falls and Origins of the Women's Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.93.

The first few years after suffrage became a period of reorganization. With their common goal of women's suffrage achieved, the two rival suffrage camps, the NAWSA (National American Woman Suffrage Association) under the leadership of Carrie Chapman Catt, Susan B. Anthony's protégée and the NWP (National Woman's Party) created under the more militant Alice Paul, needed to reevaluate their organizations' goals and mission. NAWSA became the League of Women Voters (LWV), more interested in voter education and giving women access to jury service, as part of a focus on expanding citizenship duties for women.<sup>2</sup> The NWP believed suffrage was just the beginning and created a new organization, keeping the same name, but with a new mission: equal rights for women under the law.<sup>3</sup>

### Origins of the "Lucretia Mott" Equal Rights Amendment

"Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and in every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."  
Original ERA language introduced to Congress, 1923.

Almost immediately, the NWP introduced the ERA at their convention in February 1921. Alice Paul, in an editorial in *The Suffragist* given to attendees at the convention, called for continued pursuance of goals first espoused at the Seneca Falls Convention, namely, legal and social equality: "It is for the Woman's Party to decide whether there is any way in which it can serve in the struggle which lies ahead to remove the remaining forms of women's subordination."<sup>4</sup>

All major women's groups were represented at the NWP convention except the League of Women Voters (LWV). Maud Wood Park, as first president of the LWV was particularly "suspicious" of NWP and its goals.<sup>5</sup> In 1920, the LWV created the Women's Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC) led by Park that included the National Women's Trade Union League, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Women's Christian Temperance Union, and National Consumer League.<sup>6</sup> The WJCC successfully lobbied congress for the Sheppard-Towner Maternity-and Infancy-Protection Act, a federal initiative that focused on improved hygiene practices for mothers and babies through education and access to nurses in the home and in consultation centers. The bill was first introduced by Jeannette Rankin, Republican of Montana and the first woman elected to the House of Representatives. The goal was to combat the high infant and maternal mortality rates in the country.<sup>7</sup> This legislation was the first tangible success of women's suffrage.

Prior to Sheppard-Towner, protective legislation measures such as guaranteed minimum wages and limited working hours for women (but not men) were done piecemeal, state-by-state. These were hard fought victories of social reformers in the two decades before passage of the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment.<sup>8</sup> However, Paul rejected laws that protected women as discriminatory and in effect, legalized inequality. NWP "denounced" the Sheppard-Towner Act because it labeled women as a class needing special

<sup>2</sup> Chafe, William H., *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Roles, 1920-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.118-120.

<sup>3</sup> Lunardini, Christine A., *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p.161; Becker, Susan D., *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism Between the Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), p.16.

<sup>4</sup> Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.158-159.

<sup>5</sup> Cott, Nancy F., *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p.122.

<sup>6</sup> Riley, Glenda, *Inventing the American Woman: An Inclusive History*, Vol. 2 *Since 1877*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1995), p.229-230.

<sup>7</sup> Lemons, J. Stanley, *The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in 1920s* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p.159; Tobias, Sheila, *Faces of Feminism: An Activist's Reflections on the Women's Movement* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p.90 & 152.

<sup>8</sup> Rothman, Sheila M., *Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals & Practices, 1870 to Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p.156; Slosson, Preston William, *The Great Crusade & After: 1914-1928* (New York: MacMillan, 1930), p.133-134.

protections defined as mothers, not persons.<sup>9</sup> Among the seasoned women leaders in attendance at the NWP convention, Florence Kelly, general secretary of the National Consumers' League was the only speaker to voice concerns that women needed protective legislation.<sup>10</sup>

When the Executive Committee of the NWP drafted a federal blanket ERA, obliterating all existing protective legislation, tensions rose and opened old wounds created during the suffrage campaign. The schism between NWP and the NAWSA, now the LWV, was vast. Alice Paul had a habit of alienating others from her time in the suffrage movement with her NWP seen as fanatical and extreme. Born in 1885 to a wealthy Quaker family in New Jersey, Paul's family believed in gender equality and embraced the idea of education for both men and women. She was highly educated herself, earning a Bachelor's Degree in Biology from Swarthmore College, a Master's Degree in Sociology from what is now Columbia University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania. Before completing her Doctoral program, Paul studied in Great Britain at the London School of Economics, where her suffrage work began with Emmeline Pankhurst and the WSPU (Women's Social and Political Union).<sup>11</sup>

Paul's strategy of pursuing federal action began when she headed NAWSA's Congressional Union, a committee established to lobby congress for a constitutional women's suffrage amendment. However, Paul alienated NAWSA president Anna Howard Shaw when she decided to keep funds she had raised specifically for the Congressional Union under her control instead of giving the money to National. Further, Paul's agitation work soon became branded "militant" and partisan as they went after the Democratic majority that existed in congress and the White House leading some Democratic incumbents to defeat in the 1914 Mid-term election. But it was Catherine Chapman Catt's open criticism of Paul and ultimately Shaw that caused the Congressional Union to break off and become its own entity and eventually form the National Woman's Party. Paul's history with the militant Pankhurst suffrage campaign in England was well-known and members of the NWP, including Paul herself, emulated her experiences in England, willing to go to jail and conduct hunger strikes and treacherous force feedings. The NWP also burned Pres. Woodrow Wilson in effigy attacking the war effort and battled to take credit for passage of the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment.<sup>12</sup> It is no surprise that the animosity continued post-suffrage.

The LWV quickly voted against a blanket ERA amendment policy in April 1921 and other groups like the American Association of University Women (AAUW) followed suit in 1922. There was an opportunity for compromise. Wisconsin passed equal rights legislation which included a provision to keep special protection measures. However, the NWP, unequivocally, would not support any legislation unless it was applied equally believing special protections benefitted men by making women weaker in the bargaining process.<sup>13</sup> The two groups, NWP and LWV were now working in direct opposition to one another: the NWP for total female equality and the LWV for social reform.

Informed by the suffrage battle, Paul and the NWP thought a federal amendment would be the fastest way to achieve equality under the law, proving "that women have at last thrown off the shackles of serfdom and lifted their faces from the dust."<sup>14</sup> The Equal Rights Amendment, dubbed the "Lucretia Mott Amendment," was officially adopted at the 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Seneca Falls Convention in New York in July 1923. Drafted by Alice Paul and Crystal Eastman, who worked alongside Paul in the NWP, the official language read, "Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." The ERA was introduced into both

<sup>9</sup> Rothman, *Woman's Proper Place*, p.157.

<sup>10</sup> Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.159-160.

<sup>11</sup> Zahniser, J.D. & Amelia R. Fry, *Alice Paul: Claiming Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.11, 36, 56 & 65.

<sup>12</sup> Zahniser & Fry, *Alice Paul*, p.233; Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.162.

<sup>13</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.187-190.

<sup>14</sup> Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, p.19-20.



Houses of Congress on 10 December 1923, by Senator Charles Curtis and Representative Daniel Anthony (Susan B. Anthony's nephew).<sup>15</sup> This decision would split social feminists away from the radical feminists who remained in the NWP when equality came to mean abolishing protective legislation.

Most women's groups were now firmly in opposition to the ERA. The WJCC, now with 21 affiliate group members, formed a subcommittee tasked with opposition to the ERA. Those in opposition included the LWV, National Consumers' League, General Federation of Women's Clubs, National Women's Trade Union League, WCTU, National Mother and Parent Teacher's Association, and National Council of Jewish Women.<sup>16</sup> The Women's Trade Union League was multiracial, with black working-class women more concerned with uplifting the race.<sup>17</sup> All of the major professional women's groups vowed opposition, except for the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, choosing neutrality.<sup>18</sup> The ERA was viewed as middle-class legislation pursued at the expense of working-class women who benefitted from protective legislation. As proof, NWP was allied with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, along with Republicans and Democrats opposed to labor rights.<sup>19</sup>

The ideological differences between these women's groups was insurmountable. ERA adherents, so-called radical feminists, believed that men and women should be considered fully equal under the law, while social feminists saw men and women differently with the biological destinies of motherhood in need of protection. ERA supporters firmly believed that women should work outside the home and be economically independent. Further, they believed the ERA would benefit all workers and redound to men as well with the passage of the ERA. They felt protective legislation forced women into low-paying jobs and hindered their ability to successfully compete in the workplace.<sup>20</sup>

Social feminists believed that physical and psychological differences prevented women from ever competing equally with men and thus needed the advantages that protective legislation provided. Their role as mothers and caregivers was paramount over other work.<sup>21</sup> Opponents claimed sexual division of labor necessitated protective legislation. Florence Kelly stated, "So long as men cannot be mothers, so long as legislation adequate for them can never be adequate for wage-earning women; and the cry Equality, Equality, where Nature has created Inequality, is as stupid and as deadly as the cry Peace, Peace, where there is no Peace."<sup>22</sup> Social feminists worked too hard to win protective legislation to throw it away on the ERA.

These differing ideologies divided the women's movement and denied any meaningful progress through the 1920s. But even among like-minded feminists, there was continued skepticism that with passage of a federal amendment, the government could not legislate equality effectively. Some of this discontent fell on Alice Paul, who by this time was not directing U.S. activities, but had continued her work internationally.<sup>23</sup> It was left to Crystal Eastman and others in the NWP to pursue the ERA for the next two decades.

---

<sup>15</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.191; Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, p.122.

<sup>16</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.191; Fry, Amelia R., "Alice Paul and the ERA", p.8-24, in Joan Hoff-Wilson, ed., *Rights of Passage: the Past and Future of the ERA* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), p.12; Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.11; Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.159-160.

<sup>17</sup> Orleck, Annelise, *Rethinking American Women's Activism* (New York: Routledge, 2015), p.33; Terborg-Penn, Rosalyn, "Discontented Black Feminists", p.261-278, in Lois Scharf & Joan M. Jensen, eds., *Decades of Discontent: the Women's Movement, 1920-1940* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), p.267.

<sup>18</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.190.

<sup>19</sup> Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.5; Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.12.

<sup>20</sup> Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, p. 49 & 235; Rothman, *Woman's Proper Place*, p.159.

<sup>21</sup> Chafe, *The American Woman*, p.129.

<sup>22</sup> Cott, *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*, p.138.

<sup>23</sup> Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.162; Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.10.

The year 1925 is widely viewed as a turning point in the women's movement. There was no more suffrage coalition, factions among feminist groups around the ERA had created an impasse, and no women's voting bloc materialized to push for more reforms.<sup>24</sup> In 1925, the House Judiciary Committee quickly realized the NWP was the only women's group pushing for ERA ratification and refused to send the bill to the floor of the House when it realized the extent of the opposition from major women's groups. The Senate Judiciary Committee took-up the ERA in 1929, but failed, as the House had done four years earlier, to submit the bill to the floor.<sup>25</sup>

Other clashes occurred among women's groups at the 1926 Women's Industrial Conference when proceedings broke down as speakers were continually interrupted by members of the NWP. Mary Anderson, the head of the Labor Department's Women's Bureau and delegate to the convention, called ERA supporters a "diabolical group of women" who voted down the possibility of neutrality on protective legislation. The most important thing to come out of the convention was the vote approving an investigation into the effects of protective legislation for women. Even then, there was extreme disagreement over how to proceed. ERA proponents, mostly members of the NWP on the advisory committee, wanted to conduct public hearings, while most other appointees preferred a quiet study. This increased tension led to the resignation of NWP members from the committee. The final report, submitted November 1928, after an extensive private review, concluded that protective legislation not only benefitted women in the workplace, but raised the working conditions of men as well.<sup>26</sup>

The ERA movement in the 1928 Presidential Campaign took a decidedly political turn when the NWP endorsed Republican Herbert Hoover and his Vice-Presidential pick, Senator Charles Curtis, a Kansas Republican who originally sponsored the ERA bill in the Senate, over New York Governor Al Smith who openly favored protective legislation. Both political parties were heavily lobbied that year to include a plank supporting the ERA, but each declined.<sup>27</sup>

By the 1930s, women who participated in organized labor movements worked to continue pursuing their own rights, still firmly in opposition to the ERA. In 1937, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Groups, originally started by teachers and clerical workers, began to differentiate themselves from the working-class women in factories and endorsed the ERA. The National Federation of Colored Women and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom also now actively supported the ERA.<sup>28</sup>

### **Political Party Support and the "Alice Paul Amendment"**

"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of sex." ERA language introduced to Congress, 1943.

Entering the 1940s, the ERA continued to be supported by pro-business Republicans and anti-labor conservative Democrats. During the 1940 convention, the Republican Party codified its support for the ERA in its party platform and Democrats followed suit in 1944. But liberal social reformers of that era,

<sup>24</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.80; Showalter, Elaine, "Introduction", p.3-30, in Elaine Showalter, ed., *These Modern Women: Autobiographical Essays from the Twenties* (New York: Feminist Press at City University of New York, 1989), p.9.

<sup>25</sup> Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.165; Coben, Stanley, *Rebellion Against Victorianism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.109.

<sup>26</sup> Chafe, *American Woman*, p.119-120; Lunardini, *Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.165-168; Lemons, *Woman Citizen*, p.195.

<sup>27</sup> Becker, *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment*, p.93; Slosson, Preston William, *The Great Crusade and After: 1914-28* (New York: MacMillan, 1930), p.134.

<sup>28</sup> Lemons, *The Woman Citizen*, p.199; Fry, "Alice Paul and the ERA," p.18.

such as Eleanor Roosevelt, still insisted upon keeping protective legislation on the books. They tried to get the NWP to support equal pay, but NWP members were focused exclusively on passage of the ERA.<sup>29</sup>

Alice Paul returned to the U.S. in the early-1940s to pursue the ERA again and convinced most major women's organizations to support the ERA. The National Association of Women Lawyers and the National Education Association were now on board. Black women's groups continued to be split on the ERA with the National Association of Colored Women in support, while the National Council of Negro Women wanted protective legislation. The WJCC, now in support of the ERA, created an umbrella organization of women's groups to push for ratification, but Paul and the NWP were still fully in charge. The Women's Bureau remained in staunch opposition and was still run by Mary Anderson until her retirement in 1944. That same year, the National Committee to Defeat the Unequal Rights Amendment was formed and included groups under the Women's Bureau and the ACLU.

Congress twice considered approving the ERA, before and after World War II, to thank women for their wartime service. In May 1943, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted favorably new language that Paul, herself, had written, now referred to as the "Alice Paul Amendment" which still stands today: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of sex."<sup>30</sup>

In July 1945, the House Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the ERA for the first time and six months later in January 1946, the Senate Judiciary Committee followed suit. The amendment came to the floor of the Senate July 1946 for a majority vote (38-to-35), but failed to acquire the necessary 2/3 vote.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, the tide was turning. In a post-World War II America, there was a concerted effort from all facets of the social, economic, and political sectors to get women back in the home. In 1947, the Women's Status bill was introduced in congress to compete with the ERA. The bill, supported by social justice feminists, advocated for incremental changes to dismantling discrimination retaining laws that benefitted women, including job protections for those on maternity leave.<sup>32</sup> The bill was supported by former U.S. Women's Bureau Director Mary Anderson, civil rights groups, labor organizations and various women's groups. But the bill went nowhere by 1948.

By 1950, Congressional support for some protective legislation along with the ERA, akin to the compromise Wisconsin law in the 1920s, gained traction. The bill came attached with the Hayden rider stating the Amendment "shall not be construed to impair any right, benefits, or exemptions now or hereinafter conferred by law upon persons of the female sex."<sup>33</sup> It passed in the Senate with a vote of 65-to-19 and again in 1953 with a vote of 73-to-11.<sup>34</sup> The NWP worked hard to successfully defeat the ERA bill with the attached Hayden Amendment in the House. By the Senate's second vote in 1953, women's groups on both sides actively disliked it.<sup>35</sup> In a major turn of events at the end of the decade, the LWV officially changed their stance and supported the passage of the ERA.<sup>36</sup> Those who remained opposed to the ERA and in support of protective legislation turned their attention to the 1960 Presidential Election and found an ally with the election of Democrat John F. Kennedy (JFK) to the Presidency.

The Women's Bureau had been lobbying for a commission on the status of women since 1946, in an effort to kill the ERA. President Kennedy, a supporter of protective legislation who found an ally in the

<sup>29</sup> Harrison, Cynthia, *On Account of Sex: Politics of Women's Issues, 1945-68* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), p.20; Chafe, *The American Woman*, p.187-188; Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.39.

<sup>30</sup> Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights*, p.169; Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.10-20.

<sup>31</sup> Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.21-22.

<sup>32</sup> Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.40.

<sup>33</sup> Mansbridge, Jane J., *Why We Lost the ERA* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.9.

<sup>34</sup> Fry, "Alice Paul and the ERA," p.15.

<sup>35</sup> Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.32 & 38.

<sup>36</sup> Coben, *Rebellion Against Victorianism*, p.111.

Women's Bureau during the election, established the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women in December 1961. Esther Peterson, whom JFK appointed to head the Women's Bureau, used the commission to prevent the ERA from advancing in Congress, but skillfully did not outright oppose the measure. Alice Paul sounded the alarm bells on the commission's true intention, however. Only one outright ERA supporter was nominated to the 26-member appointed panel (15 women and 11 men).<sup>37</sup>

The commission's report released in April 1963 sought an alternative to the ERA calling for test cases for the courts to reinterpret the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment's equal protection clause to include sex, something courts had never done since the Amendment's ratification in 1868. This would render the ERA unnecessary, according to their recommendations. This compromise was proposed by attorney Pauli Murray, a Black feminist and racial activist, who would not come on board with the ERA until the early-1970s. The report left room for future support of the ERA if the judicial strategy never came to fruition. This was a big step forward after 40 years of deep divisions within the women's movement.

However, Paul, true to her reputation of being a totally single-minded advocate, advised the NWP to ignore the report and continue fighting for a new federal constitutional amendment.<sup>38</sup> In fact, it would take eight more years for the Supreme Court to interpret the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment as prohibiting discrimination based on sex in *Reed v. Reed* (1971).

During this time, 1963 and 1964 were also monumental years for the passage of major congressional legislation. The Equal Pay Act was signed by President Kennedy on 10 June 1963. However, Representative Katherine St. George, a Republican who opposed the Women's Status Bill in 1947, amended the Equal Pay Act from "work of comparable character" to "equal work" which watered down the effectiveness by limiting its scope. Further, the 1964 Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination based on sex which Paul called a "sideshow" to the ERA.<sup>39</sup> Title VII of the Civil Rights Act banned sex discrimination in employment and created the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). The commission, however, angered many feminists when it declared that sex-based advertising did not violate the Civil Rights Act. Union opposition to the ERA dissipated once Title VI of the Civil Rights Act which extended protective benefits to men was enacted.<sup>40</sup>

A new, powerful organization would soon revive the ERA: NOW (National Organization for Women) was created in 1966 by Betty Friedan and Pauli Murray. Friedan was the author of *The Feminine Mystique* published in 1963 that sparked a new women's revolution by discussing women's dissatisfaction with their limited role as mother and housewife, the "problem that has no name."<sup>41</sup> NOW's Statement of Purpose declared the pursuit of "the unfinished revolution toward true equality now."<sup>42</sup> NOW combined both labor and professional women, something that eluded other women's groups since the 1920s and included women who had come out of the Civil Rights Movement. NOW immediately endorsed the ERA in 1967, listing it at number one on the Bill of Rights for Women. Public opinion and political support were now firmly on the side of the ERA. The three major candidates in the 1968 Presidential Election, Democratic Hubert Humphrey, Republican Richard Nixon and third-party segregationist George Wallace all publicly supported approval of the ERA.<sup>43</sup>

By the early-1970s, the 50-years rift that divided major feminist women's groups over the ERA was largely over. NOW had managed to gain support of most feminists in favor of the ERA, including many

<sup>37</sup> Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.113, 116 & 120-123; Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.73.

<sup>38</sup> Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.126-136.

<sup>39</sup> Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.54-56.

<sup>40</sup> Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.10.

<sup>41</sup> Friedan, Betty, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).

<sup>42</sup> Cobble, "More Than Sex Equality," p.61.

<sup>43</sup> Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.206.

social justice feminists. Groups in support of the revived Equal Rights Amendment included the ERA Action Committee, NWP, Common Cause, League of Women Voters, and Business and Professional Women's Cubs.<sup>44</sup> NOW was ultimately reformist and very adept at generating publicity, but a younger, more radical generation of feminist women would soon compete for attention. The New York Radical Women protested against the 1968 Miss America pageant, which came to be defined as the "burning bras" moment and although there never was any fire, the image stuck.<sup>45</sup> These so-called women's "Libbers" were much younger, pro-civil rights and anti-Viet-Nam War. They were agitators, militant and against the patriarchy, whose own personal dislike of any hierarchy made political organizing difficult.<sup>46</sup>

Unlike the strategy pursued in earlier decades by Alice Paul, NOW also focused on a variety of women's issues, including repealing anti-abortion laws. However, dissension was in the ranks and two former members of NOW founded the Women's Equity League (WEAL) in a break over the abortion issue. Further, Paul herself, a member of NOW and a keen political strategist, disagreed with NOW's mission, that taking on these controversial issues would ultimately doom the ERA.<sup>47</sup> For now, the ERA remained publicly popular and the time seemed ripe to push hard politically for its passage.

### ERA Passes Congress with Aid from the "Mother" of the ERA

1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the U.S. or by any State on account of sex.
2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

ERA language proposal passed by Congress, 1972

By 1970, women were winning election to congress in increasing numbers and making congressional passage of the ERA a legislative priority. Democratic Representative Martha Griffiths from Michigan tactically revived the ERA in congress becoming known as the "mother" of the Equal Rights Amendment. Long-time opponents of the ERA, Senator Carl Hayden, Democrat from Arizona, author of the Hayden Rider in the 1950s, and Representative Emanuel Celler, Democrat from New York who was supported by labor, continued their staunch opposition in Congress. Representative Celler had single-handedly blocked hearings on the ERA in the House Judiciary Committee for 23 years. Representative Griffiths successfully used a discharge petition in August 1970 to get the bill out of Celler's committee and onto the floor of the House. For the first time in 47 years, the full House considered the ERA, passing the amendment proposal with the requisite 2/3 majority (352-to-15) after just an hour-long debate.<sup>48</sup>

The decades-long fight over protective legislation reared up again in the Senate. Democratic Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr. from North Carolina became the most fervent anti-ERA legislator and chief opponent in Congress in 1970. He fought against "rational" differences between men and women wiped out under the law claiming the legal language, "physiological and functional differences."<sup>49</sup> Senator Ervin and others attached several riders to the bill, including draft exemptions and prayer in public schools making it almost impossible for the Senate to take-up the bill on the floor.

<sup>44</sup> Berry, Mary Frances, *Why ERA Failed: Politics, Women's Rights and the Amending Process of the Constitution* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), p.66.

<sup>45</sup> Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.86.

<sup>46</sup> Gordon, Linda, "The Women's Liberation Movement", p.69-145, in Dorothy Sue Cobble, Linda Gordon & Astrid Henry, eds., *Feminism Unfinished: A Short, Surprising History of American Women's Movements* (New York: Liveright Publ., 2014), p.69-71.

<sup>47</sup> Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.10; Harrison, *On Account of Sex*, p.205; Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.84-85.

<sup>48</sup> Suk, Julie C., *We the Women: the Unstoppable Mothers of the Equal Rights Amendment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

<sup>49</sup> Mathews, Donald G. & Jane Sherron De Hart, *Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA: A State and Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.28 & 36.



Representative Griffiths reintroduced the ERA in 1971. The House Judiciary Committee included a rider to the ERA providing exemptions from the draft and other situations that promoted health and safety.<sup>50</sup> Proponents of the ERA still insisted on zero exemptions, effectively killing protective legislation. While both the full House and Senate would ultimately strip the bill of any exemptions, two other seemingly innocuous parts of the bill would help doom passage of the ERA. A 7-years deadline was included at the insistence of Senator Ervin and Representative Griffiths and supporters agreed, which proved a grave mistake. Ratification deadlines began with the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment prohibiting alcohol in a bid to (unsuccessfully) kill the amendment. The 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment, which granted women suffrage, did not include a deadline because Catherine Chapman Catt, president of NAWSA, testified it was a terrible idea and ultimately unnecessary. Every proposed amendment since, however, has stipulated a deadline in order to reflect the times and not leave it open indefinitely. Alice Paul was very vocal against the 7-years time-limit for the ERA believing a deadline would kill the amendment. In the end, the deadline did not placate Senator Ervin and Representative Celler who voted against the ERA anyway.<sup>51</sup>

The other major contention concerned which level of government was given the power for its enforcement. Section 1, containing Alice Paul's original 1943 language remained: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." Section 2, however, gave Congress the sole power of enforcement and did not additionally include the "several states." Senator Ervin claimed this provision "would virtually reduce the states of this union to meaningless zeros on the nation's map."<sup>52</sup> Alice Paul not only lobbied Congress to remove the ratification deadline, she was even more adamant that states should be included in the enabling portion in Section 2. Adding state enforcement would appease the Southern states needed for ratification and appease growing conservative fears over the increasing power of the federal government. When members of NOW visited Paul to alleviate her fears, she tried to convince them to revert back to her original wording, but the wheels were already in motion.<sup>53</sup>

The 92<sup>nd</sup> Congress successfully passed the ERA with significant lobbying from NOW. With the rules of a 7-years deadline and no exemptions, the ERA passed the House with the requisite 2/3 majority (354-to-24) on 12 October 1971 and the Senate (84-to-8) on 22 March 1972. The ERA was now sent to state legislatures for their approval.<sup>54</sup> The 7-years deadline first appeared to be no cause for concern. Hawaii ratified the ERA only 22 minutes after Congressional passage. Delaware and New Hampshire ratified the following day, and Idaho and Iowa on the third day, all unanimous votes. Within the first week, 7 states ratified the ERA. By the end of 1972, already 22 states had approved the ERA.<sup>55</sup>

Within two years, 33 states had ratified the ERA, with only 5 states remaining. Its passage seemed unstoppable. But proponents lost control of the ratification process by late-1973. The ERA Ratification Council created to see the ERA become the 27<sup>th</sup> Amendment had no resources and only a committee to determine strategy.<sup>56</sup> Proponents did not effectively organize for ratification in the individual states under

---

<sup>50</sup> Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.63.

<sup>51</sup> Spruill, Marjorie J., *Divided We Stand: the Battle over Women's Rights and Family Values that Polarized American Politics* (New York: Bloomsbury Publ., 2017), p.32; Zahniser & Fry, *Alice Paul*, p.299; Suk, *We the Women* (2020).

<sup>52</sup> Felsenthal, Carol, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority: the Biography of Phyllis Schlafly* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), p.235.

<sup>53</sup> Fry, "Alice Paul and the ERA," p.8 & 21.

<sup>54</sup> Rothman, *Woman's Proper Place*, p.259; Fry, "Alice Paul and the ERA," p.16.

<sup>55</sup> Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.136; Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.12; Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.65.

<sup>56</sup> Pleck, Pleck, Elizabeth, "Failed Strategies: Renewed Hope", p.106-120, in Hoff-Wilson, Joan, ed., *Rights of Passage: the Past and Future of the ERA* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), p.108-109.

the assumption that the ERA was already overwhelmingly popular. What backers of the ERA did not foresee was the birth of the religious political right, and more importantly the influence of Phyllis Schlafly.

### The Rise of Phyllis Schlafly and StopERA

While labor was on board supporting the ERA by the 1970s, opposition now came from the right. The right believed the ERA would bring family destruction with husbands abandoning wives and children, subject women to the military draft, and promote abortion and homosexual rights. While there were opponents such as NCCW (National Council of Catholic Women), John Birch Society, HOW (Happiness of Womanhood) and Right to Be a Woman, the most formidable was Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and StopERA.<sup>57</sup>



Activist Phyllis Schlafly with a "Stop ERA" badge, flanked by anti-ERA women demonstrators at the White House Washington, D.C., February 1977, Library of Congress



Equal Rights Amendment demonstrators at Virginia's State Capitol in Richmond, 8 January 2020 (Steve Helber/AP Photo in *Bostonia*,<sup>58</sup> Boston University Alumni Magazine): <http://www.bu.edu/articles/2020/era-activist-carol-jenkins/>

Schlafly was a late convert against the ERA, however. Shirley Spellerberg who headed Florida's StopERA had been working to convince Schlafly to join the movement. Schlafly remained indifferent as late as December 1971, when a friend was still unable to persuade her to debate a pro-ERA woman in Connecticut.<sup>59</sup> Up to this point, Schlafly had built a career focused on international issues, especially the fight against Communism, a focal point of her two unsuccessful campaigns for Congress.

Schlafly first ran for Congress as a Republican in 1952, one of very few women at that time running for congressional office but lost in a heavily Democratic district to a popular incumbent. Her upbringing in a conservative Catholic Republican home heavily influenced her politics. Phyllis MacAlpin Stewart was born on 15 August 1924, in St. Louis, Missouri. Schlafly earned her B.A. from Washington University in Missouri and an M.A. in Political Sciences from Radcliffe. She then met and married Fred Schlafly in 1949 while she was working for both the First National Bank and St. Louis Union Trust Company as a librarian, speech-writer and producer of newsletters, all skills that would later aid in her fight against the ERA.<sup>60</sup>

Schlafly and her husband were highly connected to Republican political circles in their new home together in Alton, Illinois. She became an ardent supporter of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential Campaign and with his election loss, she remained on the conservative fringes of the Republican Party.

<sup>57</sup> Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.67.

<sup>58</sup> Kertscher, Tom, "Fighting for Political Rights" in *Bostonia* (Boston University Alumni Magazine) (18 February 2020): <http://www.bu.edu/articles/2020/era-activist-carol-jenkins/>

<sup>59</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.240.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p.79-83 & 153.

This became evident when she ran unsuccessfully for the Presidency of the National Federation of Republican Women claiming other forces (more moderate) kept her out of leadership.<sup>61</sup> These continued fractures within the Republican Party would portend to the major ideological split soon to come.

In 1970, a bad year to be a Republican candidate in Illinois, she again ran for Congress unsuccessfully. Her favorite campaign stump speech began with, “My opponent says a woman’s place is in the home. But my husband replies that a woman’s place is in the House—the U.S. House of Representatives,” which was also a famous slogan used by Bella Abzug, a feminist Democratic Congresswoman from New York in her own 1970 electoral campaign.<sup>62</sup>

Even as she ran for Congress in 1970, she had no intention of debating feminist issues. Something changed when the Senate was getting ready to pass the ERA in early-1972, however. Opponents, including George Wallace, who was an ardent supporter only a few years earlier, began to denounce the ERA as a Socialist plot.<sup>63</sup> This argument is likely what drew Schlafly into the debate, at least at first. By February 1972, only a month before the Senate voted to send the amendment for ratification to the states, Schlafly puts herself on record against the ERA. In her *Phyllis Schlafly Report*, she lays out a point-by-point critique of the ideology behind those who support the ERA as an attack on the nuclear family and women homemakers, in particular. In it, she calls American women “privileged” decrying: “Suddenly, everywhere we are afflicted with aggressive females on television talk-shows yapping about how mistreated American women are, suggesting that marriage has put us in some kind of ‘slavery,’ that housework is menial and degrading, and—perish the thought—that women are discriminated against!”

Schlafly believed biology determined that women and men should never be considered the same because women have babies and men do not: “If you don’t like this fundamental difference, you will have to take up your complaint with God because He created us this way.”<sup>64</sup> Schlafly argued the ERA did not mean equal pay or even an equal playing field for women: “all this is only a sweet syrup which covers the deadly poison masquerading as ‘women’s Lib.’... The women’s libbers don’t understand that most women want to be wife, mother and homemaker—and are happy in that role.” Lest anyone thought Schlafly, a highly-educated woman herself, believed women only belonged in the home, she also said: “The wonderful advantage that American women have is that we can have all the rewards of that number-one career and still moonlight with a second one to suit our intellectual, cultural or financial tastes or needs.”<sup>65</sup>

On 7 July 1972, Schlafly held a meeting of her Federation supporters at O’Hare in Chicago. Those who understood their contract as housewives felt threatened by the idea they would be forced to work outside the home. They feared the loss of protective legislation and access to alimony and Social Security, especially with a rise in divorce rates. And as conservatives, they particularly disliked that the ERA gave all enforcement power to the federal government, stripping states of their control over the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.<sup>66</sup>

The result of this meeting was the creation of StopERA (Stop Taking Our Privileges) and the slogan, “You can’t fool Mother Nature.” The first national StopERA conference was held on 26 September 1972. Some argued for extending the group’s influence to other issues, including the fight against communism, but Schlafly refused. Much like Alice Paul, she believed that keeping the message on a single issue would garner the largest support and coalition needed to defeat the ERA. In contrast, NOW’s expansive Liberal

<sup>61</sup> Critchlow, Donald T., *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.146-150.

<sup>62</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.204.

<sup>63</sup> Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.142.

<sup>64</sup> Schlafly, Phyllis, “What’s Wrong with ‘Equal Rights’ for Women?” in *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, 5, n.7 (February 1972), p.1-2.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3-4.

<sup>66</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.74 & 236; Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.143-144.

agenda lent itself to division even among its own ranks (especially on the gay rights issue), but also gave credibility to Schlafly and others' claims that "women's Libbers" wanted radical change in all aspects of life. This allowed Schlafly to link the ERA to a more radical agenda, including women being drafted in the Military, legalization of same-sex marriage and government-funded abortions.<sup>67</sup>

For conservatives, the *Roe v. Wade* decision by the Supreme Court in January 1973, solidified the urgent need to defeat the ERA. Schlafly capitalized on developments in Hawaii and Massachusetts, which had state ERA laws on the books and feminists who successfully sued for taxpayer funding for abortions. Abortion opposition thus became ERA opposition.<sup>68</sup> Schlafly was able to bring religious conservatives, including Orthodox Jews, Mormons, and Christian Evangelicals together to fight the ERA. Growing secularism and threats to "true womanhood" united these once hostile groups and created the beginnings of a powerful new Religious Right. Other national groups like Women Who Want to be Women, the Family Preservation League, and the National Council of Catholic Women were working in tandem with StopERA. Young evangelical women were also now joining the ranks.<sup>69</sup>

StopERA had active members in 26 states by February 1973.<sup>70</sup> Schlafly had no paid staff and a decentralized organization of volunteers. She developed grassroots, state-by-state strategies and heavily fundraised. Success came quickly. Nebraska, a state that ratified the ERA within the first week, was the first state to rescind after a meeting with Schlafly in March 1973. Schlafly was the national spokesperson and seemingly the only one media went to for the anti-ERA message: "If you like the ERA, you'd better like congressmen and Washington bureaucrats and federal judges relieving you of what little power you have left over your own life." She was also famous for her opening line in stump speeches: "I want to thank my husband, Fred, for letting me come here. I like to say that because I know it irritates the 'women's Libbers' more than anything else."<sup>71</sup> By 1974, 17 states had formally rejected the ERA. New York and New Jersey, which as states had already ratified the ERA, now shifted the increasingly controversial issue to the ballot in 1975, which voters then resoundingly rejected in both states.

A fractured pro-ERA movement developed between NOW and ERAmerica formed in 1976 to combat StopERA. NOW refused to join forces and often had conflicting strategies. ERAmerica used a state-by-state strategy while NOW preferred marches and rallies which often did not get positive press. Pro-ERA groups were plentiful, including many women's associations, the AFL-CIO which changed its opposition into support by 1975, a long list of celebrities, and coordinated efforts by women's magazines and many female journalists who were pro-ERA. Presidents Ford and Carter even actively supported the ERA.<sup>72</sup>

Schlafly and the grassroots supporters of the StopERA movement favored their status as underdogs in the fight. The Fairness Doctrine allowed Schlafly to debate pro-ERA spokespersons on heavy rotation. Schlafly labeled ERA supporters as militant, lesbian, bitter, radicals and quickly got under their skin. In a debate with Betty Friedan in Bloomington, Illinois in 1973, Friedan lost her cool shouting: "I'd like to burn you at the stake, as far as that's concerned!" Schlafly responded, "I'm glad you said that, because that just shows that the intemperate, agitating proponents of ERA are so intolerant of the views of other people that they want to burn us at the stake." Friedan replied: "I consider you a traitor to your sex! I consider you an Aunt Tom!"<sup>73</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.238.

<sup>68</sup> Pleck, "Failed Strategies," p.110; Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.225.

<sup>69</sup> Pleck, "Failed Strategies," p.110-111; Spruill, *Divided We Stand*, p.92; Mayo & Frye, "ERA: Post-mortem," p.86; Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.220.

<sup>70</sup> Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.66.

<sup>71</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.113, 254, 26-263 & 281.

<sup>72</sup> Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly & Grassroots Conservatism*, p.227-233.

<sup>73</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.301.



People tried to viciously tie Schlafly to the K.K.K. and others even called for outright violence against her. In August 1974, Florynce Kennedy, on a Miami radio station said, "I just don't see why some people don't hit Phyllis Schlafly in the mouth." While at the Women's National Republican Club at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City in 1980, Schlafly had an apple pie smashed in her face by a hired demonstrator and was forced to wear contacts because her eye was painfully scratched.<sup>74</sup>

Schlafly was not without her own personal ambition. After debating many women lawyers on the pro-ERA side, she thought it would be helpful to the cause to get a Law Degree. She enrolled in Law School at Washington University in St. Louis at the age of 51. Schlafly graduated in December 1978, ranked 27 out of 186 students and successfully passed the Illinois Bar.<sup>75</sup>

Schlafly credited the turning point in her battle against the ERA to the 1977 International Women's Year Conference in Houston where the delegates adopted a strong stance in favor of gay rights. The United Nations declared 1975-1985 the Decade for Women and announced a second International Women's Year Conference in Houston in 1977 (the first was in Mexico City in 1975). The U.S. Congress "mandated and funded" state and national conferences with bipartisan support. Schlafly despised the fact that Congress and Republican President Ford (as later Democrat Jimmy Carter) fully supported and funded the U.N. initiative while only appointing liberal feminists. The IWY Conference support for federal funding for abortion united anti-ERA and pro-life movements and those opposed to gay rights under the leadership of Anita Bryant.<sup>76</sup>

During that summer, the two state IWY conferences, the Eagle Forum, created by Schlafly in 1975, and Women Who Want to be Women, founded by Lottie Beth Hobbs of Texas, were able to get state delegates opposed to the ERA selected to the convention, but with only 25% of the delegation, their minority viewpoint would not have much influence. Instead, they organized a counter-rally of pro-life, pro-family forces with 20,000 women in attendance, twice the amount of IWY Conference attendees.<sup>77</sup>

Back at the IWY Conference, Friedan urged ratification of the ERA by the original 1979 deadline, especially with the possibility of a deadline extension uncertain. She worried federal money for the Houston conference was a consolation prize for not ratifying the ERA. Friedan famously endorsed gay rights at the Houston conference, but she would later blame the focus on gay rights and the growing conservative movement for the ERA's ultimate defeat.<sup>78</sup> While the Houston conference was meant to rally diverse women around many issues, it really was the ERA that they believed had momentum. Despite the perceived success of those in the women's movement in Houston that year, Indiana was the last state to ratify the ERA in 1977. Alice Paul died that same year with the belief that the ERA was doomed to fail.<sup>79</sup>

Illinois became the top priority of proponents—Schlafly's home state—and heavy lobbying from President Carter who personally visited the state in May 1978. Schlafly decried presidential threats of retaliation and withdrawal of federal funding, essentially blackmail from the federal government, unless Illinois ratified. President Carter led a concerted effort by ERA proponents to have women register for the draft. If women were to be fully equal citizens, they must be drafted along with men. However, this proved extremely unpopular among the public. Young women denounced the idea and with it the ERA.<sup>80</sup> Schlafly and StopERA later picketed the White House protesting the involvement of President Carter and First Lady Rosalyn Carter who actively lobbied for the ERA's ratification.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.253.

<sup>75</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.114-116; Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly & Grassroots Conservatism*, p.239.

<sup>76</sup> Spruill, *Divided We Stand*, p.2-10.

<sup>77</sup> Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.245-246; Spruill, *Divided We Stand*, p.236.

<sup>78</sup> Spruill, *Divided We Stand*, p.223-224.

<sup>79</sup> Spruill, *Divided We Stand*, p.229; Fry "Alice Paul and the ERA," p.22.

<sup>80</sup> Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.67-68; Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.74.

<sup>81</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.245-249 & 316-317.



In April 1978, Schlafly and her StopERA volunteers held a counter-rally to the League of Women Voters in Springfield, Illinois which brought attention to the legislature that women—and a lot of them, opposed the ERA. In most states that formally rejected the ERA, opposition came from rural conservative men.<sup>82</sup> Momentum was shifting decidedly in favor of the anti-ERA movement. Illinois, the first state to ratify the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment, was the lone northern industrial state to ultimately reject ERA ratification.

### Congress Extends Original 1979 Deadline

While passage of the ERA seemed inevitable in 1972, forward momentum soon stalled with only 13 states ratifying the ERA between 1973 and 1978. The ratification deadline of 7 years for consideration was set to expire on 22 March 1979. No other amendment that included a deadline had failed to this point. In a controversial turn of events, Congress granted an extension of an additional three years by only a simple majority vote in both Chambers. Opponents vociferously argued this was changing the rules in the middle of the game and that the original deadline was a “contract” with the states.<sup>83</sup> By 1979, already five states rescinded their earlier approval of ratification: Nebraska, Idaho, Tennessee, Kentucky and South Dakota. Proponents of the ERA dismissed these reversals as unconstitutional and doubled down on a strategy to find only three more states necessary for ratification.

In a stunning move, NOW orchestrated boycotts in non-ratification states that included the large cities of Atlanta, Chicago, Miami, Las Vegas and New Orleans. This was yet another political miscalculation by the pro-ERA contingent. Legislators from these cities supported the ERA, while opposition was concentrated in the rural areas of these states.<sup>84</sup> In January 1981, the Nevada Senate rejected the ERA just 30 seconds after it’s introduction. In February 1982, a Virginia House committee killed the bill and it outright failed in a Senate vote.<sup>85</sup> The ERA also failed to ratify in North Carolina where as many women strongly opposed the ERA, just as many strongly supported it, providing all legislators with good political cover.<sup>86</sup>

In Florida, both Schlafly and Anita Bryant, who worked to defeat the gay rights ordinance in Miami in 1977, campaigned in the state during the ERA fight. The Senate would continue to thwart pro-ERA efforts in the House throughout the decade. An ERA ballot amendment was defeated by Florida voters in November 1978.<sup>87</sup> With the congressional deadline looming, Florida Governor Bob Graham (D) called the legislature in for a special session to vote on the ERA as a last-ditch effort to secure its passage. On 21 June 1982, both Chambers by voice vote cast their final votes for the ERA. As expected, it passed the House, but for the fifth time in a decade it failed in the Senate 22-to-16 with the largest vote-margin in defeat of the ERA. After the Florida defeat, Schlafly said, “I think the ERA will take its place with the child-labor amendment and the prohibition amendment as an idea that seemed to have a lot of backing’ but not enough support to become a permanent part of the Constitution.”<sup>88</sup>

By the 30 June 1982 extended deadline, proponents complained that 35 states had voted in favor of ratification and lacked only three necessary for constitutional passage, while opponents jeered that five of these original states had rescinded their earlier ratification and 21 more had also formally rejected the ERA. Schlafly held that night a celebratory dinner in D.C. dubbed, “The Rainbow Dinner” with her loyal supporters in attendance.<sup>89</sup> Her army of housewives had been finally victorious: the ERA was dead!

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p.243-244; Pleck, “Failed Strategies: Renewed Hope,” p.112.

<sup>83</sup> Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.70; Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.255.

<sup>84</sup> Mathews & DeHart, *Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA*, p.92-93.

<sup>85</sup> Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.75 & 80.

<sup>86</sup> Mathews & DeHart, *Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA*, p.62-63 & 211.

<sup>87</sup> Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority*, p.288.

<sup>88</sup> Riordan, Patrick, “Florida Senate Dashes Hopes for Adding ERA to Constitution” in *Miami Herald* (22 June 1982): p.1A.

<sup>89</sup> Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.281.

## Why the ERA Failed

The 1980 election of President Ronald Reagan (R) signaled the death knell for the ERA. This began a decade of the pro-family movement of moral conservatives, the culture wars and the rise to power of the Religious Right. What propelled the well-organized anti-feminist movement in the 1970s was a triple combination of *Roe v. Wade*, ERA and the “homosexual agenda” which rallied conservative Christians to defeat the ERA.<sup>90</sup> Thirty years of bipartisan Presidential support of the ERA from Eisenhower (R) through Carter (D) ended abruptly after Reagan’s arch-conservative victory.

The ERA had already become a partisan issue by the late-1970s. With the contested Republican Presidential Primary in 1976, many who attended the RNC that year wanted outright removal of support for the ERA. Republicans successfully eliminated support for the ERA from their own party platform since 1980 and replaced it with calls for a constitutional amendment to end abortion. In contrast, the DNC doubled-down on its official support for the ERA in 1980 and denied party support to all its candidates who did not openly support the ERA.<sup>91</sup>

But the biggest political miscalculation of its proponents was believing that ratification of the ERA was inevitable. The opposition had the easier task of convincing 21 states to reject the ERA, rather than the proponents who had to convince 38 states to accept it. Public opinion polls were misleading, at best. The ERA was popular in terms of the concept of granting new rights, but not in changing the actual role of women. Opponents did not want to be held to the same standards as men or be treated like men, if that is what “equality” meant. The idea that the “state” was already replacing parenting in the schools for moral learning, forcing mothers out into the workforce through passage of the ERA was one step too many.<sup>92</sup> There was also serious concern about Supreme Court overreach in social issues. Both sides embraced the notion that with the constitutional amendment in place, the Supreme Court would alter male/female relations. On the one hand, the ERA was popular, but on the other, most did not want fundamental changes in gender roles.

Gallup polling found declining support for the ERA from 74% to 62% between 1974 and 1982. Those who had not formed an opinion on the ERA by the early-1980s now were decidedly against.<sup>93</sup> Support for the ERA declined over the decade because Schlafly and ERA opponents successfully linked the ERA as part of a more radical liberal agenda on abortion, gay rights and the draft. The refusal of ERA proponents to compromise on any of these issues, much like the NWP refused to compromise at the very inception of the ERA, ultimately brought about its downfall.

In January 1983, attempts to reintroduce the ERA in the U.S. House of Representatives failed. A schism in the women’s movement also developed between those who believed male supremacy was to blame and others, particularly minority women who believed race and class were more important to challenge. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment to apply it to sex discrimination already changed the legal landscape. The passion to push harder for the ERA was gone.<sup>94</sup>

## ERA Ratification Revived, 2016-2020

Then came the election of President Donald Trump (R) in 2016 and the *#MeToo* movement against male harassments and assaults, along with greater numbers of women elected to state legislatures. The so-called three-states strategy developed years earlier was now gaining new momentum.<sup>95</sup> In an amazing twist, 34 years after the expiration of Congress’ extended deadline for ERA ratification by  $\frac{3}{4}$  of states, the

<sup>90</sup> Orleck, *Rethinking American Women’s Activism*, p.200.

<sup>91</sup> Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism*, p.242 & 264; Berry, *Why ERA Failed*, p.74.

<sup>92</sup> Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.20; Mathews & DeHart, *Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA*, p.152-156.

<sup>93</sup> Pleck, “Failed Strategies: Renewed Hope,” p.114; Mansbridge, *Why We Lost the ERA*, p.18.

<sup>94</sup> Tobias, *Faces of Feminism*, p.90 & 152.

<sup>95</sup> Neuwirth, Jessica, *Equal Means Equal: Why the Time for an Equal Rights Amendment is Now* (New York: New Press, 2015), p.100-102.

Nevada state legislature brought the ERA issue back into the national spotlight when it ratified the ERA in March 2017. One year later, in May 2018, Illinois became the 37<sup>th</sup> state to ratify the ERA in the midst of the #MeToo movement. Then the improbable happened: Virginia, with almost 30% of its legislature now composed of women, became the symbolical 38<sup>th</sup> state necessary to ratify the ERA in January 2020.<sup>96</sup>

However, before Virginia could officially certify its vote in favor of the ERA, the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion to the National Archives that the already extended deadline to 1982 was binding and final; thus the votes by the last three states backing the ERA (Nevada, Illinois and Virginia) were deemed constitutionally invalid.<sup>97</sup> These three states then filed a joint-suit in federal court against the U.S. Archivist to force acceptance of their ratification votes, arguing that the 1982 deadline was not constitutionally-binding. Against this suit, Republican Attorneys-General from those five states that had rescinded since the late-1970s their own votes before the Congressional 1982 extended deadline (Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Nebraska and South Dakota) openly worked to legally block any such future belated ERA ratification.<sup>98</sup>

In February 2020, on a mostly party-line vote, the Democratic-led House of Representatives voted to repeal the old extended 1982 ERA deadline. In turn, the Republican-led Senate refused to take-up the measure because even after almost 40 years, the ERA still remains closely associated with abortion in the eyes of most Republicans.<sup>99</sup> At the same time, any hope by the Democratic Party to force this political controversy all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, also quickly evaporated since late-February 2020 once progressist Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg, arguably the biggest ERA ally on that Court, openly stated that while she personally would like to see the ERA ratified, the entire ratification process would have to start all over again due to the "late-comers" controversy (on one hand the three states who recently ratified it many decades after the deadline vs. those five states who had much earlier in the late-1970s rescinded their initial vote), thus making this matter constitutionally problematic for any belated ratification after nearly 40 years. Then, the sudden death in September 2020 of Justice Bader-Ginsburg who was replaced in October by conservative Justice Amy Coney-Barrett, has led the Supreme Court to turn decisively conservative capping President Trump's single-term in office successful push to confirm to it three new conservative "originalist" Justices. This dashed any hopes that even if the Democratic Party might eventually attain a future sizeable electoral majority in both House and Senate it could still not resume its stalled 2020 political push to bypass the constitutional process by voting *post-facto* for a 40-years delayed ERA ratification. Justice Bader-Ginsburg's parting legal view reconfirms that in an ideologically divided country the only way left for the ERA is a politically hazardous, uncertain and time-consuming future full resubmission for ratification of a new ERA constitutional amendment to both Houses and ¾ of states.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> Colin Dwyer & Carrie Kaufman, "Nevada Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment... 35 Years after the Deadline" in *NPR* (21 March 2017): <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/21/520962541/nevada-on-cusp-of-ratifying-equal-rights-amendment-35-years-after-deadline>; A.J. Willingham, "Only One More State Needs to Pass the Equal Rights Amendment to Finally Get it Ratified" in *CNN* (31 May 2018): <https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/31/us/equal-rights-amendment-illinois-states-trnd/index.html>; Gregory S. Schneider & Laura Vozzella, "Virginia Finalizes Passage of Equal Rights Amendment, Setting Stage for Legal Fight" in *Washington Post* (27 January 2020).

<sup>97</sup> Stephen Dinan, "Justice Department says Equal Rights Amendment is dead; Virginia Ratification can't Revive It" in *Washington Times* (8 January 2020).

<sup>98</sup> Associated Press, "GOP Attorneys General Seek to Block Equal Rights Amendment" in *ABC News* (21 February 2020), <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/gop-led-states-seek-block-equal-rights-amendment-69121903>

<sup>99</sup> Eleanor Mueller & Alice Miranda Ollstein, "House Passes Bill to Revive Equal Rights Amendment" in *Politico* (13 February 2020), <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/13/house-passes-bill-to-revive-equal-rights-amendment-114865>

<sup>100</sup> Joseph Guzman, "Did Ruth Bader-Ginsburg Just Kill the Equal Rights Amendment?" in *The Hill* (12 February 2020).

In the end, the story of the Equal Rights Amendment, almost 100 years in the making, is paradoxically a story of women against women: are women considered individuals seeking complete equality with men under the law or are there fundamental differences between men and women that require differential legislation to benefit women? Since the ERA has been so closely linked with abortion, an issue that still splits the political parties today in a hyper-partisan environment, and with even the most-staunch and illustrious former supporter of the ERA on the U.S. Supreme Court openly doubtful about its constitutional prospects, the ERA political effort seems condemned to the background until yet another future generation might try to retackle it.

**ERA Timeline:**

- 1923 – 10 December, ERA first introduced by Alice Paul.
- 1936 – 30 May, first favorable House Judiciary Committee report.
- 1940 – Republican Party adds ERA support to party platform.
- 1942 – 11 May, first favorable Senate Judiciary Committee report.
- 1944 – Democratic Party adds ERA support to party platform.
- 1946 – 19 July, first positive Senate floor vote (38-to-35) shy of the necessary two-thirds vote.
- 1950 – 25 January, Senate votes in support of ERA with Hayden Rider (65-to-19).
- 1953 – 16 July, Senate votes again for ERA with Hayden Rider (73-to-11).
- 1966 – NOW (National Organization for Women) founded with support for ERA as a major issue.
- 1970 – 20 July, successful discharge petition forces ERA out of House Judiciary Committee.
- 1970 – 10 August, House votes in favor of ERA (352-to-15) with a 7-years ratification clause and Congressional and state enforcement.
- 1971 – 12 October, House passes Alice Paul's original ERA language, but with a 7-years time-limit and only Congressional enforcement (354-to-24).
- 1972 – 22 March, Senate passes ERA (84-to-8).
- 1972 – Phyllis Schlafly creates StopERA (Stop Taking Our Privileges).
- 1972-1977 – 35 states ratify ERA (short of the 38 required limit).
- 1975-1979 – 5 states rescind their initial ERA ratification, cutting the ratifying list down to 30.
- 1977 – 9 July, Alice Paul dies.

- 1979 – U.S. Congress extends ratification deadline an additional three years to 30 June 1982.
- 1980 – Republican Party removes ERA support from its party platform, while Democratic Party reaffirms ERA as mandatory in its party platform.
- 1982 – 30 June, deadline expires without the requisite  $\frac{3}{4}$  of states approval for ERA ratification, while 21 states formally rejected ERA.
- 2016 – 5 September, Phyllis Schlafly dies.
- 2017 – 21 March, Nevada belatedly ratifies ERA.
- 2018 – 30 May, Illinois belatedly ratifies ERA.
- 2020 – 27 January, Virginia belatedly ratifies ERA.
- 2020 – February, Democratic-led U.S. House votes on basically party-lines to reverse ERA's 1982 extended deadline and supports now its delayed ratification 38 years later.
- 2020 – Conservative-led U.S. Senate and Supreme Court both quietly oppose any delayed ERA ratification, reconfirming its 1982 extended ERA deadline as final.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Associated Press, "GOP Attorneys General Seek to Block Equal Rights Amendment" in *ABC News* (21 February 2020): <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/gop-led-states-seek-block-equal-rights-amendment-69121903>
- Becker, Susan D., *The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism Between the Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981).
- Berry, Mary Frances, *Why ERA Failed: Politics, Women's Rights and the Amending Process of the Constitution* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986).
- Chafe, William H., *The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic and Political Roles, 1920-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- Cobble, Dorothy Sue, "More Than Sex Equality: Feminism after Suffrage", p.1-67, in Dorothy Sue Cobble, Linda Gordon & Astrid Henry, eds., *Feminism Unfinished: A Short, Surprising History of American Women's Movements* (New York: Liveright Publ., 2014).
- Cobble, Dorothy Sue, Linda Gordon & Astrid Henry, eds., *Feminism Unfinished: A Short, Surprising History of American Women's Movements* (New York: Liveright Publ., 2014).
- Coben, Stanley, *Rebellion Against Victorianism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
- Cott, Nancy F., *The Grounding of Modern Feminism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p.122.
- Critchlow, Donald T., *Phyllis Schlafly & Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman's Crusade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).
- Dinan, Stephen, "Justice Department says Equal Rights Amendment is Dead; Virginia Ratification can't Revive It" in *Washington Times* (8 January 2020).



- Dwyer, Colin & Carrie Kaufman, "Nevada Ratifies Equal Rights Amendment... 35 Years after the Deadline" in *NPR* (21 March 2017): <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/21/520962541/nevada-on-cusp-of-ratifying-equal-rights-amendment-35-years-after-deadline>
- Felsenthal, Carol, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority: the Biography of Phyllis Schlafly* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981).
- Friedan, Betty, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963).
- Fry, Amelia R., "Alice Paul and the ERA", p.8-24, in Joan Hoff-Wilson, ed., *Rights of Passage: the Past and Future of the ERA* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
- Gordon, Linda, "The Women's Liberation Movement", 69-145, in *Feminism Unfinished: A Short, Surprising History of American Women's Movements*, in Dorothy Sue Cobble, Linda Gordon & Astrid Henry, eds. (New York: Liveright Publ., 2014).
- Guzman, Joseph, "Did Ruth Bader-Ginsburg Just Kill the Equal Rights Amendment?" in *The Hill* (12 February 2020).
- Harrison, Cynthia, *On Account of Sex: the Politics of Women's Issues, 1945-1968* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
- Hoff-Wilson, Joan, ed., *Rights of Passage: the Past and Future of the ERA* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).
- Kertscher, Tom, "Fighting for Political Rights" in *Bostonia* (Boston University Alumni Magazine) (18 February 2020): <http://www.bu.edu/articles/2020/era-activist-carol-jenkins/>
- Lemons, J. Stanley, *The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973).
- Lunardini, Christine A., *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1910-1928* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), p.161.
- Mansbridge, Jane J., *Why We Lost the ERA* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
- Mathews, Donald G. & Jane Sherron De Hart, *Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA: A State and Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- Mayo, Edith & Jerry K. Frye, "ERA: Post-mortem of a Failure in Political Communication", p.76-89, in Joan Hoff-Wilson, ed., *Rights of Passage: The Past and Future of the ERA* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
- McMillen, Sally, *Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women's Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Mueller, Eleanor & Alice Miranda Ollstein, "House Passes Bill to Revive Equal Rights Amendment" in *Politico* (13 February 2020), <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/13/house-passes-bill-to-revive-equal-rights-amendment-114865>
- Neuwirth, Jessica, *Equal Means Equal: Why the Time for an Equal Rights Amendment is Now* (New York: New Press, 2015).
- Orleck, Annelise, *Rethinking American Women's Activism* (New York: Routledge, 2015).
- Pleck, Elizabeth, "Failed Strategies: Renewed Hope", p.106-120, in Hoff-Wilson, Joan, ed., *Rights of Passage: the Past and Future of the ERA* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).
- Riley, Glenda, *Inventing the American Woman: An Inclusive History, Vol. 2, Since 1877*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1995).
- Riordan, Patrick, "Florida Senate Dashes Hopes for Adding ERA to Constitution" in *Miami Herald* (22 June 1982): p.1A.
- Rothman, Sheila M., *Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).
- Scharf, Lois & Joan M. Jensen, eds., *Decades of Discontent: the Women's Movement, 1920-1940* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983).
- Schlafly, Phyllis, "What's Wrong with 'Equal Rights' for Women?" in *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, 5, n.7 (February 1972), p.1-2.
- Schneider, Gregory S. & Laura Vozzella, "Virginia Finalizes Passage of Equal Rights Amendment, Setting Stage for Legal Fight" in *Washington Post* (27 January 2020).
- Showalter, Elaine, "Introduction", p.3-30, in Elaine Showalter, ed., *These Modern Women: Autobiographical Essays from the Twenties* (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1989).
- Slosson, Preston William, *The Great Crusade and After: 1914-1928* (New York: MacMillan, 1930).
- Spruill, Marjorie J., *Divided We Stand: the Battle over Women's Rights and Family Values that Polarized American Politics* (New York: Bloomsbury Publ., 2017).
- Suk, Julie C., *We the Women: the Unstoppable Mothers of the Equal Rights Amendment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).
- Terborg-Penn, Rosalyn, "Discontented Black Feminists", p.261-278, in Lois Scharf & Joan M. Jensen, eds., *Decades of Discontent: the Women's Movement, 1920-1940* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983).
- Tobias, Sheila, *Faces of Feminism: An Activist's Reflections on the Women's Movement* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
- Willingham, A.J., "Only One More State Needs to Pass the Equal Rights Amendment to Finally Get it Ratified" in *CNN* (31 May 2018): <https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/31/us/equal-rights-amendment-illinois-states-trnd/index.html>
- Zahniser, J.D. & Amelia R. Fry, *Alice Paul: Claiming Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

## AUTHOR

**Kathryn DePalo-Gould, Ph.D.**, is Teaching-Professor in American Politics and Director of PLATO (Pre-Law Advising & Training Office) at the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University in Miami since 2006. She received her Ph.D. in Political Sciences from Florida International University in 2006 and her Dissertation on the effects of term-limits on Florida's State legislature is now a book-manuscript, *Eight is Enough: the Case of Term Limits in Florida*. She also holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Sciences from Florida Atlantic University and a B.A. in Communications from the University of Connecticut. Dr. DePalo-Gould has extensive experience in State and local government processes and elections both in Connecticut and Florida. She has managed several political campaigns, including a successful county-wide judicial campaign in Broward County, Florida. Her teaching and primary research are on American Politics, Florida politics, State and local government, judicial process, and gender and politics.

## Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: Border Fortification and Transnational Insurgents' Violence Against Civilians

by Jeffrey Coltman-Cormier, ABD (Rutgers University, New Jersey) & B.A. (Florida Atlantic University)

**ABSTRACT:** Many factors contribute to insurgents' patterns of civilian victimization. Yet, the literature has rarely considered this behavior in terms of the typically transnational character of insurgency. This study's theoretical argument is that border fortifications causes transnational insurgent groups to perpetrate more violence against civilians. Insurgents who are transnational strategically and materially benefit from operating in target states' contiguous neighbors and participating in cross-border commercial networks of illicit commodities. As political geographers and some political scientists have described, various states have responded to this and other forms of illicit movement by erecting border walls or fences. The author contends that these border barriers deprive impacted transnational fighters of resources, prompting them to demand more voluntary support from civilians who are less likely to provide it. The expectation is that insurgents in this situation consequently commit more violence against civilians as a means of coercive resource extraction. This behavior transpires in the form of short-term surges because impacted insurgents can adapt to their new material contexts, but successive fortification generates new, even greater bursts of violence. Using the qualitative method of process tracing and new data on India-Bangladesh border fortifications gathered for this project, the author tests his argument with a case-study of the United Liberation Front of Assam. The preliminary evidence in this pilot-study indicates that the global trend of fortifying borders to counter transnational insurgency may in fact be harming the civilians who walls and fences are purported to protect.

"Neither infiltrators nor smugglers nor terrorists will penetrate our borders in the future," said Major General Hamid Abdullah Ibrahim in 2018 of the Iraqi border fence along the Iraq-Syria border. This barrier is intended to inhibit fighters of the so-called Islamic State from conducting attacks within Iraq from the group's remaining territory in Syria. The counter-insurgent sentiment behind such a fence is not limited to Iraq; it is, in fact, proliferating across the world.<sup>1</sup> States throughout multiple continents are increasingly erecting walls, fences and other physical barriers along their international borders to attempt protecting societies from the alleged threats that accompany undocumented movement, including insurgency.<sup>2</sup> Well understood to entail significant violence, civil wars are dangerous for all who are involved, and for civilians in particular. What is less established is how civilians' well-being changes in response to states' use of physical border barriers to obstruct the movement and capacities of armed non-state actors. It is imperative, then, to ask, *how does the state practice of border fortifications during civil conflicts shape transnational insurgents' violence against civilians?*

Two general emphases have characterized studies of insurgent violence against civilians. The author calls the first the interactions approach, which assigns great importance to the ever-changing relationships and dynamics that characterize intra-state conflict, including battlefield events, strategy,

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d3900379-9d35-4d14-9f7b-acafb76b0b4d>.

<sup>2</sup> See <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/24/border-walls-berlin-wall-donald-trump-wall/553250002/> and <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2019/01/separation-barriers/580480/>.

competition, and control over civilian populations and territory (Hultman 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Lilja 2009; Stewart & Liou 2017; Wood 2014a; Wood & Kathman 2015). The approach that undergirds other works in this literature is the internal emphasis, which highlights insurgent groups' internal attributes such as ideology and political education, geographical focus, sources of support, initial resource endowments, and recruitment tactics (Cohen 2013; Green 2016; Hovil & Werker 2005; Mkandawire 2002; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014; Stanton 2013; Thaler 2012; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2014b). The theoretical use of either emphasis has produced explanatory insights regarding insurgent victimization of civilians but works in this literature generally abstain from considering how civil conflict often circumvents the deceptively static lines on maps that represent international borders.

In this study, the author addresses the above issue by drawing from scholars who have evaluated insurgency as a transnational phenomenon. Transnational conflict environments expand the context in which insurgents organize, fight, and interact with civilians. The author also takes from both political geography and political science to consider how border fortification as a form of border diversity impacts transnational civil conflicts. However, this study does not center states' self-interested terms of defeating perceived enemies; instead, the author considers the broader ramifications of border fortification directly for under-considered civilian populations. In taking this approach, this study uncovers preliminary evidence for the argument that incapacitating transnational insurgents with border barriers sparks periods of greater violence by them against civilians. Scholars and policy-makers must acknowledge the unintended consequences of border fortification in order to effectively navigate conflicts without exposing civilians to greater harm.

In order to test his claim, the author conducts a case-study of the United Liberation Front of Assam,<sup>3</sup> a transnational insurgent organization from northeast India.<sup>4</sup> The Indian state has responded to the cluster of transnational insurgencies based in this region with various strategies, including by fortifying its border with Bangladesh. Therefore, this area serves as a useful context from which to evaluate how border fortification impacts transnational insurgents' behavior. The author draws from Indian government documents to create a new dataset regarding Indian fortification along the India-Bangladesh border and then, utilizing the qualitative method of process tracing, he tracks how this border fortification has or has not impacted the case-study's patterns of civilian victimization.

In the following literature review section, the author explores the burgeoning body of research on insurgent violence against civilians, outlining the strengths and overall weakness of the two theoretical emphases. Then, the theory section contains the argument concerning the relationships between border fortification, transnational insurgents' resources, and insurgents' violence against civilians. In doing so, the author articulates two hypotheses. In the subsequent research design and data section, the author justifies the use of qualitative methods and describes this case-study's selection, variable operationalizations, and methodology. From there, the author conducts the case study. The conclusion of this pilot study expounds upon the relevance of its findings to research on border fortifications, insurgency, and civilian victimization, as well as to policymaking in today's increasingly fortified world.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Civilian Victimization**

Studies of insurgency and violence against civilians have considered both externally derived and group-specific factors that shape how insurgents interact with non-combatant populations. These contributions are important for outlining the range of factors that influence insurgents' behavior.

<sup>3</sup> Some refer to the group as the United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam].

<sup>4</sup> Authors spell the designation of "Northeast" in a plethora of ways, but I select this one.

However, scholars have rarely addressed how insurgent organizations often spread across borders, even less how border diversity itself affects them. Integrating consideration of the transnational dimensions of insurgency and the role of border barriers into research on insurgents' violence against civilians improves the literature's consideration of the practice and the study of civil conflict more generally.

Wood outlines what he sees as the two broad focuses that scholars have used to explain insurgent violence against civilians. His first category is "instrumental or strategic" violence (Wood 2016, p.6) that insurgents employ based on their perceptions of its situational utility, variation in their access to information, the desire to compel civilian loyalty, shifts in conflict environments' distributions of power, and external intervention. The second approach that he describes scholars adopting is "institutional or organizational" (Wood 2016, p.6), which considers domestic political institutions in target states, insurgent groups' internal organization, ideology, and changes to insurgent groups' capacities. The author draws from but modifies these two categories so as to explicitly account for the origin of factors like those described above.

The works that are evaluated in this literature review consider different forms of violence, spanning from killings to non-fatal sexual violence. In describing the literature, the author notes that a single scholar can utilize either of the discerned theoretical emphases in different studies. Importantly, the author largely addresses the central arguments of these works on their own, but their authors typically do not discount the potential influence of other variables. This is the reason that the author categorizes the literature as comprising two emphases, rather than "ism"-like camps or schools of thought that would falsely appear to vehemently oppose or contradict one another (see Lake 2011).

The first emphasis in the literature on insurgent violence against civilians is what the author terms as the interactions emphasis. These works study insurgents' interactions with externally based actors and situations in the conflict environment that shape a group's use of violence at different times and to varying extremities. Within this body of research, some have emphasized battlefield dynamics. Hultman (2007) argues that battle losses compel insurgent groups to kill more civilians as an alternative, unconventional means of pressuring target governments to settle. Similarly, Wood (2014a) contends that insurgents are more likely to kill civilians after experiencing losses because doing so can quickly provide them with the resources that they direly need after being harmed by state forces. Another interactions argument asserts that insurgents' killing of civilians rises in response to competition in complex, multi-actor environments, which intensifies immediately following either the entrance of new organizations or direct conflict between rival groups (Wood & Kathman 2015). The claim that states strategically kill civilians to weaken insurgents' bases of support (Azam & Hoeffler 2002; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004) can also apply to insurgent groups that are fighting against state militaries that rely on civilians.

The aforementioned works with an interactions emphasis often view civilian populations as strategic targets or as crucial sources of support to insurgent groups and states as they compete for power. Civilians' importance is why Kalyvas (2006) in his seminal work primarily considers violence against noncombatants to connect directly both to actors' desire to augment their territorial control and to civilians' active use of fighters to perpetrate violence against personal enemies. In areas where one warring group mostly dominates, it is safe enough for an allied civilian to denounce and direct insurgent violence against other civilians without risking reprisal from yet other civilians and their own aligned insurgents. Comparably, Lilja (2009) describes how the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE) in Sri Lanka/Ceylon selectively employed violence to compel civilian support and deter defection, adding that territorial control enabled the group to force civilians' support regardless of their actual preferences.

These studies with an interactions emphasis highlight that conflicts are dynamic. Each event that transpires in conflict situations forces actors like insurgent groups to make new decisions about their behavior. However, some interactions-oriented works collapse insurgent groups as singular entities



whose members respond to external interactions in a uniformly coordinated fashion. This assumption oversimplifies insurgent organizations in ignoring that individuals' behavior is not guaranteed to follow that of their leaders or even fellow group members (Green 2016; Kalyvas 2006). Analyzing conflict interactions with reference to insurgent groups' different segments — leaders, individual fighters, and others — can potentially uncover other explanations for why insurgents do or do not harm civilians.

The second, internal emphasis that the author discerns in the literature on insurgent violence against civilians prioritizes assessing insurgent groups' internal characteristics as consequential factors for their conduct. The most well-known representative of this approach is Weinstein (2007; see also Humphreys & Weinstein 2006), who argues that insurgent violence against civilians essentially stems from variation in leaders' early resources. Possessing economic endowments from either natural resources or external sponsors leads groups to recruit opportunistic fighters through short-term material incentives (see also Naylor 2002, p.57), resulting in less internal discipline and significant indiscriminate violence as such groups govern and extract resources from civilians; the same personal motive of material self-interest, it is worth noting, can also drive insurgent leaders to stoke anti-civilian violence (Azam 2006). On the other hand, leaders' use of social endowments such as identity and ideology for recruitment in the place of material incentives attracts committed activist members, creating more disciplined and coherent organizations that use violence selectively and are more willing to peacefully bargain with civilians for resources. This explicitly path-dependent argument does not dispute the role of other factors such as leaders' decisions in affecting insurgent behavior, but does contend that differing resource endowments themselves affect these other characteristics of insurgent groups.

Following suit, other works with an internal emphasis scrutinize insurgents' externally provided resources. Wood (2014b) argues that stronger insurgent groups that are increasingly capable of killing civilians decide to do so based on where their strength and resources derive from. Reliance on local civilian populations deters insurgents from killing their own supporters, but if external sponsors supply insurgents' capacity, increasing potency results in higher civilian killings because there is less of a disincentive plus a greater capability to kill. For state-group relationships, it is important to consider the principal-agent dynamic in which the behavior of one actor influences that of the other. External support's effect of enabling insurgent anti-civilian violence partially lessens when a group has a single state sponsor, especially one that is democratic and checked by domestic human rights groups (Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014). An insurgent group may also carry out violence against civilians even when doing so is not part of leaders' preferred strategy simply because external sponsors demand it or because insurgent commanders are attempting to sustain support by visibly demonstrating commitment and credibility (Hovil & Werker 2005).

There are other internal emphasis-leaning works that look outside of economic incentives and consider insurgents' political objectives. In examination of post-colonial insurgencies throughout Africa, Mkandawire (2002) argues that insurgent groups are more likely to victimize civilians in rural areas when their struggle focuses on urban issues and when states do not target rural civilians, who then have less of an incentive to supply rebellion. Somewhat relatedly, Thaler (2012) maintains that group leaders' ideology can shape insurgent violence against civilians, claiming that the "people's war" orientation of the early Mozambique Liberation Front and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola disallowed and, consequently, largely eliminated indiscriminate violence by fighters against civilians (see also Cherry 2012). Green (2016) notes the potential relevance of ideology but adopts a more institutional perspective in articulating the concept of the "commander's dilemma:" insurgent leaders seek to establish effectively lethal forces, yet also attempt to instill obedience that prevents fighters from uncontrollably committing violence outside of leaders' preferences. The socialization of fighters with political education can lessen unordered sexual violence against civilians; leaders who implement political education that specifically

mandates restraint develop rank-and-file members who are less likely to commit any type of violence against civilians. Similarly, insurgent groups without socialization mechanisms, as when organizations abduct rather than recruit fighters, contain units that are more likely to foster cohesive organizations by committing group rape (Cohen 2013).

Most acutely exemplified by Green (2016), the internal emphasis rightly acknowledges that insurgent groups are comprised of individuals with different levels of power as it relates to decision-making and status. At the top of group hierarchies, leaders can mold the behavior of their fighters. At the same time, rank-and-file insurgents are capable of acting on their own accord. Theoretically fusing this internal complexity of insurgent groups with the interactions emphasis that considers conflicts' evolving nature best contends with why insurgents behave the way that they do. For example, Stanton (2013; see also Ottmann 2017) simultaneously examines internal attributes and external interactions as causal factors for insurgents' violence. She first maintains, in an interactions approach, that insurgent groups are likelier to violently target civilians when they are fighting democratic states that are more conducive than authoritarian ones to concede in response to civilian deaths. At the same time, she argues — with consideration of groups' internal dynamics — that insurgents who pursue exclusive identity-based objectives do not depend on support from broad constituencies; therefore, these insurgents commit more overall violence against civilian populations because the costs do not outweigh the perceived benefits. Clearly, this argument directly considers both the strategic battlefield and insurgent groups' particular objectives. This enables it to effectively contend with the messy, yet unavoidable, reality of conflict as one in which a multitude of factors and dynamics rooted in different sources collectively affect insurgents to varying degrees in different contexts. Theories that adopt such a fused interactions-internal, or aggregate, emphasis best grapple with this nature of civil war and, as such, can uncover additional factors that shape insurgents' violence against civilians.

### Transnational Insurgency

However, regardless of whether its works emphasize interactions, internal elements, or a combination of the two, the literature on insurgent violence against civilians tends to approach insurgency as a purely domestic phenomenon. This problem can trace to definitions of civil war, such “as armed combat *within the boundaries* of a recognized sovereign entity between rival parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006, 5; emphasis added). It is more accurate to consider what, in an appropriation of Gleditsch's (2007) phrasing, are the transnational dimensions of insurgency. Over half of insurgent groups since 1945 have carried out operations in territories outside of their target states'. As Salehyan (2009) explains, this is significant because international borders normatively restrict states' jurisdiction, and therefore their military and policing activities, to within their sovereign boundaries. Insurgents can exploit this limitation to states' power by crossing borders to neighboring countries. Groups most often do so after initially failing domestically to hold down territory and beat government forces (Staniland 2005). This insurgent border-crossing expands the geographic scope of so-called intra-state conflicts (Buhaug & Gates 2002), such as by motivating some states' forces to target insurgents in external territories with<sup>5</sup> or without<sup>6</sup> neighboring states' consent (Salehyan 2009).

Insurgents can greatly benefit from traversing international borders. Those who relocate can more safely mobilize, train, and gather supplies, especially if their host states and/or ethnic kin actively provide support (Gleditsch 2007; Gurses 2014; Martínez 2017; Salehyan 2009; Staniland 2005; Stewart & Liou

<sup>5</sup> See the Iraqi government's bombing of the so-called Islamic State in Syrian territory: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iraq/iraq-bombs-meeting-of-islamic-state-leaders-in-syria-military-idUSKBN1JJ0FD>.

<sup>6</sup> See the Indian government's bombing of an insurgent group within Pakistani territory: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/pakistan-india-jets-breached-ceasefire-line-kashmir-bomb?CMP>.

2017). Insurgents in external territory also wield more control and time over how they respond to target states' domestic moves (Staniland 2005). It makes sense, then, that scholars have found that conflicts in which insurgent groups possess external, rather than only domestic, territory last longer (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009; Salehyan, 2009), and that insurgent groups that access external sanctuary from allied ethnic kin are more likely to reach settlements with their target states (Gurses 2014). Another benefit for insurgent groups of operating in external territory is that local civilian populations may voluntarily support and even join them. For instance, after the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) had relocated from Uganda to the Democratic of the Congo, the group developed beneficial economic relationships with local communities and recruited civilians on the basis of shared religious and ethnic identities (Titeca & Vlassenroot 2012).

While scholars are quick to point to the usefulness of crossing borders to transnational insurgents, they also note that the strategy is not without its limitations and potential costs. Insurgents in external territory may experience the problems of disconnection from their constituents and day-to-day events, unwelcoming local civilian communities, and, as described earlier, the constraints of state sponsors' demands (Hovil & Werker 2005; Salehyan 2009; Stewart & Liou 2017). Even the strategic benefit of external territory is difficult to exploit effectively if insurgents' targets are too far (Salehyan 2009). Utilizing bases in Venezuela enabled the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to carry out more attacks against Colombian targets, but these were limited to municipalities that were contiguous to the Venezuela-Colombia border because infiltrating further would have made successfully returning to Venezuelan sanctuary increasingly arduous (Martínez 2017). In spite of these potential shortcomings, access to external territory as a whole is primarily beneficial for enabling insurgent groups to compensate for the typically asymmetric distribution of strength between them and states (Salehyan 2009).

Stewart and Liou (2017) are unique in the literature on insurgents' violence against civilians in evaluating the effects of external territorial control on their behavior. The authors contend that insurgent groups with foreign territory kill more civilians than those that control domestic or no territory. Insurgents in external countries have no incentive to invest in governing and providing for local civilian populations who, the authors assume, probably belong to a different political community and would not offer willing support; so, killing these civilians for needed material gain poses only minimal costs to fighters. This study and works that otherwise investigate transnational insurgency address civil conflict as it most often occurs: in a cross-border context. However, any investigation of transnational insurgency should account for the heterogeneity of the boundaries that cross-border insurgents encounter. Doing so recognizes that insurgent border-crossing and states' responses to it vary.

### **Border Barriers**

States' international borders, political geographers chronicle, are incredibly diverse in terms of their location, how states and societies view them, their roles in and effects on political phenomena, and the forms that they take (Diener & Hagen 2012; Jones 2016; Rosière & Jones 2012). The most visible type of border diversity is whether or not they are fortified with a physical barrier. Border fortifications as a practice has grown rapidly in the past few decades; while 12 border barriers existed in 1991, states built 14 new ones over the following 10 years (Vallet 2014). Between the longer period of 1989 to 2017, states began to construct a total of 48 barriers (Avdan & Gelpi 2017). These physical fortifications stand along a few international borders throughout Africa and the Americas, much of the external boundary of Europe, and various parts of Asia and the Middle East (Saddiki 2017, p.4-5).<sup>7</sup>

The small body of Political Science research that evaluates border barriers attempts either to understand why states erect them (Carter & Poast 2017; Hassner & Wittenberg 2015) or how effectively

<sup>7</sup> See also: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/01/07/more-neighbours-make-more-fences>.

they hinder the mobility of undocumented non-state actors. Doubtful of their effectiveness, Cannon (2016) contends that border fortification is not inherently successful because barriers' ability to halt movement is contingent on a number of factors: corruption among border guards, the legal statuses and identities of insurgents, alternative routes and methods, and the long-term financial costs of barriers that governments may neglect. Similarly, political geographer Dear (2013) claims based off of his examination of the United States-Mexico border that people can circumvent barriers by moving around them, building tunnels underneath them, creatively hopping over them, and sneaking through official crossings. On the other hand, the argument that most political scientists make about fortified borders' efficacy is that they at least partially inhibit people from covertly entering states' territories (Avdan & Gelpi 2017; Hassner & Wittenberg 2015; Jellissen & Gottheil 2013; Staniland 2005; Khory 2018). As Hassner and Wittenberg (2015, p.187) succinctly put it, "clandestine transnational actors cannot walk through walls." It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that one study finds that states with fortified borders experience fewer incidents of transnational terrorist attacks (Avdan & Gelpi 2017; see also Jellissen & Gottheil 2013).

Although it is theoretically useful to know that fortified borders potentially obstruct illicit movement, the research that has reached this conclusion is limited in being state-centric. These works investigate border barriers strictly from the perspective of the states that construct them and, consequently, ask only if border barriers can impede the entrance of perceived threats. Framing the question of border barriers' effects in this way confines analysts to considering only what states want. This precludes the assessment of fortified borders' broader consequences for those who are more vulnerable. As just one example that contrasts this neglect, Jones (2016) exemplifies the field of political geography by directly addressing how border barriers impact civilians. He argues that they, along with the formation of borders in general, are inherently violent assertions of state power that contain desperate migrants into zones of poverty, environmental degradation, and other harmful and even fatal settings.<sup>8</sup> To the best of the author's knowledge, no works of political science have similarly examined fortified borders, including how they impact the insurgent-civilian relationship.

Overall, the literature on insurgent violence against civilians has constructively considered a plethora of factors that drive or constrain the behavior. These factors include what the author has categorized as either conflict interactions or groups' internal dynamics. Yet, this area of study predominantly does not scrutinize insurgents' victimization of civilians with regard to the transnational aspects of many insurgencies and the related global proliferation of border fortifications. Incorporating findings from studies of these two phenomena updates the reviewed literature to the present-day realities of civil conflict. Noting the staggering rate at which states continue to erect border barriers ostensibly to protect civilians from actors like insurgents, it is imperative to study border fortification critically. Doing so can inform internationally and people-oriented policymaking. In this study, the author develops such a theoretical understanding of transnational insurgency, border fortification, and civilian victimization.

The argument in the following theory section is that border fortification during conflict actuates transnational insurgents to carry out comparatively higher levels of violence against civilians. Border barriers decrease the benefits of waging a transnational insurgency by limiting access both to cross-border commercial networks and strategically beneficial sanctuary, inflaming competition between insurgent groups and strengthening states' control over civilian populations in border regions. These outcomes diminish impacted transnational insurgents' access to resources. Consequently, these insurgents pressure civilians for more support; these populations, however, are less likely to willingly fulfill these demands. In order to meet their needs and survive in this situation, transnational insurgents become more likely to use violence against civilians as a means of extracting resources. This tactic swells temporarily after an

---

<sup>8</sup> See Urrea (2004) for a journalistic account of this phenomenon as it pertains to the United States-Mexico border.

increase in border fortifications, but successive periods of border barrier-building generate increasingly greater eruptions of violence over time.

### **How Border Fortifications Make Insurgents Desperate and More Violent**

Insurgencies are difficult to win. States tend to command militaries that are larger and better equipped than non-state groups. This asymmetry forces insurgents to develop alternative means of sustaining themselves. Therefore, the author assumes, insurgent groups seek to improve their capacity in order to organizationally succeed and so that individual members personally survive. The logic of success and survival leads insurgents, especially those without state sponsorship, to pursue support from civilians (Wood 2010; Wood 2014b). Insurgents themselves have historically recognized civilians' utility. For instance, a 1928 manual for communist insurrection from the Soviet Union explicitly urged tacticians to recognize that civilian support "is one essential precondition for victory. Decisive elements of the proletariat must be prepared to wage an implacable armed struggle to overthrow the political power of the ruling classes" (Neuberg et al. 1970, 25). Importantly, though, civilian support for insurgents does not have to entail participation in actual combat; it can also include the supply or transportation of information, money, weapons, food, medicine, and shelter (Stewart and Liou 2017). In light of these benefits that insurgents can acquire from sympathetic civilians, leaders dictate strategy to engender adequate civilian support. Beyond commanders' goals, rank-and-file fighters attempt to maintain basic means of survival during strenuous conflict. This can involve relying on civilians' resources. So, on both the organizational and individual dimensions, insurgents' need for resources fundamentally shapes how they interact with civilians.

As Wood (2014a) explains, if civilians voluntarily support insurgents, the latter are not incentivized to utilize coercive resource extraction. If, on the other hand, insurgents have low supplies and high demands that voluntary support from civilians does not sufficiently meet, said insurgents become more likely to resort to violence against them. This study frames this argument with an aggregate emphasis that mixes insights from both the interactions and internal emphases that the literature review section described. Resource desperation can affect insurgents in different levels within their organizations. Rank-and-file desperation can compel individual insurgents, either alone or in small groups, to independently and opportunistically harm civilians for resources. Collectively, insurgent groups can strategically — at the command of leadership in response to external circumstances — target civilians in order to forcibly extract resources. These two forms of resource desperation can occur in conjunction with each other, and so the decision to theoretically conjoin them best captures the broad range of this behavior's manifestations.<sup>9</sup>

There are various situations in which resource depletions can prompt insurgents to victimize civilians. The first is battle losses, which intensify insurgents' needs, lessen civilian support for what are demonstrably less victory-assured insurgents, and weaken insurgents' control over populations within their territories, which further results in less civilian confidence (Wood 2014a). It is difficult for seemingly incapable insurgents to convince even previously supportive civilians to continue providing assistance. Insurgents in this situation become more likely to resort to the short-term solution of violence to compensate for their loss in support (Wood 2014a). For example, one of the few instances in which the ADF embarked on a surge of anti-civilian violence was so that it could acquire resources to recuperate from government attacks (Titeca & Vlassenroot 2012). Even though the group had previously formed positive relationships with civilian populations, it turned against them when conditions became severe enough.

Other non-battle related resource losses that result from insurgents' groups internal dynamics can also fuel civilian victimization. For instance, a portion of the LTTE that had controlled territory in eastern Sri Lanka lost access in 1999 to the national organization's financial resources. Immediately afterward, the

<sup>9</sup> In a future book, it would be more possible to tailor specific theories to different types of insurgent resource desperation.



LTTE in that region ramped up localized violence against civilians (Lilja 2009). The simple loss of material capacity drove these fighters to coercively draw resources. What this example also indicates is that different segments of groups can perpetrate distinctive levels of violence. At least partially, fighters respond to their local, rather than strictly organizational, conditions. In this sense, events that impact some, but not all, members of an insurgent group can still influence its overall violent behavior.

A third situation of material desperation that can compel insurgents to victimize more civilians than they had previously transpires on a wholly individualized level. Some soldiers of the post-independence Mozambique Liberation Front who lost supplies because of a severely weakening economy resorted to robbing civilians and murdering witnesses to the acts (Thaler 2012). This illustration of unordered, non-strategic violence shows that individual deprivation can prompt insurgents to attack civilians. But, fighters do not inevitably harm civilians because of poor circumstances; for instance, anti-*Apartheid Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) fighters in externally located camps abstained from doing so even though they lived in squalid conditions. This restraint, however, made sense for two reasons. First, their anti-colonial, black nationalist ideology explicitly condemned violence against supportive black African peoples (Cherry 2012). Second, harming local civilians would have counterproductively undermined the voluntary support of governments hosting MK. Insurgents who are not bound to such state-granted sanctuary are not restricted in the same way. Nevertheless, resource desperation can provoke even these types of insurgents to commit against civilians located outside of host states.

The effects on insurgents of the three types of resource losses that the author has discussed reflect more generally that desperate times induce desperate measures. Insurgents' violent behavior can function as a response to threats against organizational success and individual survival. This dynamic can compel even groups who originally abstained from civilian victimization to engage in the practice.

The author maintains that the relationship between insurgents' resources and their treatment of civilians applies to groups that are transnational. The author partially defines transnational insurgents "as armed opposition groups whose operations are not confined to the geographical territory of the nation-state(s) that they challenge" (Salehyan 2009, p.15). Again, physically operating in neighboring territories of target states can greatly benefit insurgent groups. These insurgents possess unique opportunities to cross borders and attack state forces, to utilize safer territories in which to organize, and to access new and potentially more types of resources (Gleditsch 2007; Gurses 2014; Martínez 2017; Salehyan 2009; Staniland 2005; Stewart & Liou 2017).

This study's definition of transnational insurgents also incorporates their participation in cross-border commercial networks. Particularly as they expand in size, insurgent groups require extensive financial and material resources to provide for fighters and civilians within their territory and to successfully combat states. History is replete with instances of insurgents acting on these imperatives by participating in black markets as both purchasers and sellers of weapons, drugs, minerals and other illicit commodities (Naylor 2002).<sup>10</sup> These illegal markets have expanded across state borders in the era of globalization to comprise international economies (Palma 2015; see also Stohl 2005). For instance, many actors in the Golden Triangle region in southeast Asia participate in producing and selling drugs for international consumption (Chin 2009), enabling regional insurgents to afford more weapons (Behera 2016; see also Jonsson & Brennan 2014). Even strongly ideological organizations have participated in these economies because it assists the pursuit of their political goals (Naylor 2002).

Adding insurgent integration in commercial cross-border networks to a definition of transnational insurgency enables one to account for the broader sense in which the phenomenon transcends the boundaries of a single state. Based on this discussion, the author's overall definition of transnational

---

<sup>10</sup> Even some states have opted to participate in illicit economies for its financial rewards and benefits to state-building (see Meehan 2011; Meehan 2015).

insurgent groups is as armed non-state organizations whose members are physically present in at least one neighboring territory of a target state<sup>11</sup> and who somehow benefit from illicit commercial cross-border networks. The author contends that when the transnationality of insurgents is challenged — as when a state fortifies its border(s) — they become more desperate and, consequently, violent against civilians.

The author defines border fortifications as when a state or a private entity financed by a state erects, or supplements pre-existing, walls, fences, or other physical barriers<sup>12</sup> anywhere along such state international borders.<sup>13</sup> In line with other scholars (Avdan & Gelpi 2017; Hassner & Wittenberg 2015; Jellissen & Gottheil 2013; Staniland 2005), the author assumes that border barriers at least partly limit the movement of non-state actors. It is important to note that border barriers do not materialize overnight. A state may decide to fortify part or all of any of its borders, but the act of doing so takes time depending on available financial resources (see Cannon 2016), political will, and borders' lengths. Years may pass before a state fully completes fortifying just one border.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, a single international border can contain paralleling or partial barriers — such as along only particular provinces — to fit states' varying goals. The Israeli state, for instance, has designed its barrier along the West Bank to funnel would-be attackers to open areas that state forces can more easily access (Avdan & Gelpi 2017). In this sense, border fortifications does not inherently aim to stop all human movement across an entire international boundary; rather, the fundamental goal is to force movement to pass through official or more surveillable zones, all the while making unofficial movement more difficult and costly to crossers. Bearing in mind the above complexity, the author argues below that border fortifications causes transnational insurgents to experience resource desperation in five ways and, consequently, to perpetrate more violence against civilians.

The first effect of border fortification on transnational insurgents regards cross-border commercial networks. The author assumes that border barriers at least partially hamper international illicit networks that insurgents may rely on for purchasing and selling commodities (see Carter & Poast 2017; Hassner & Wittenberg 2015). Bribable guards notwithstanding, it is more difficult to transport contraband and illegal goods, especially weapons, through monitored border crossings (Avdan & Gelpi 2017). The resulting loss of profits and resources leads insurgents who are involved in clandestine economies to increase their resource demands on civilians; this, all the while the same insurgents are less equipped to grant material incentives to potential allies in exchange for support. Transnational insurgents facing this situation of fewer resources and less enthusiastic supporters turn to more anti-civilian violence.

Second, border fortifications diminish transnational insurgents' resources by interfering with their combat operations. Border barriers at least partially block transnational insurgents from crossing international borders. When transnational insurgents cannot navigate between state sovereignties, they become less able to attack and successfully retreat (Staniland 2005). Simultaneously, border barriers impede domestically located fighters from as easily retreating to external territory in response to battle losses or for other needs; moreover, states that monitor their fortified borders are more likely to deter secretive insurgents from exiting to neighbors. Transnational insurgents within domestic territories, then, are also more vulnerable and less capable of successfully fighting state forces after border fortification. The threat

---

<sup>11</sup> It is possible for insurgents to relocate to an external territory that is not contiguous to a target state. However, many groups do not engage solely in this type of border-crossing; it does not grant them the opportunity to perpetrate cross-border attacks and it would entail more-costly, longer-distance travel.

<sup>12</sup> The huge sand berm between Morocco and the contested Western Sahara is a unique example of a border barrier that is neither a fence or a wall (Saddiki 2017, p.97-120).

<sup>13</sup> There are other non-barrier-related means through which states attempt to bolster security at their borders. But, for the purposes of this study, the author primarily limits the scope of border fortification to border barriers.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, the United States unfinished anti-illegal immigration border wall with Mexico, whose construction started in 2006: <https://www.usatoday.com/border-wall/us-mexico-interactive-border-map/> and <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/5/walls-world-keep-foreigners-out.html>.

of this situation to insurgents is exacerbated by the fact that civilians in conflict zones are likely to furnish their support to the most dominant local actor (Kalyvas 2006). By lessening the likelihood of military success, border fortification makes it more difficult for transnational insurgents to demonstrate viability to civilians and garner their voluntary support (see Wood 2014a). Insurgents who lose civilian support for this reason still have resource needs, and so they become more likely to coerce civilians for resources.

The loss of the combat advantage associated with external sanctuary may also compel impacted transnational insurgents to commit more strategic violence against civilians to pressure target states to concede (see Hultman 2007 & Stanton 2013). The resource losses that accompany border fortification weaken insurgents' combat capabilities, making it less likely that they will succeed in battles with state forces, even with sanctuary across a nearby border. This incentivizes insurgents to intensify their violence against less-armed civilians who would be easier to attack successfully and escape from (see Wood 2014a). In other words, a group may harm more civilians after border fortification because they become more viable targets, particularly in a democracy where insurgents know that public pressure on states can force them to the negotiating table (see Stanton 2013).

Fourth, the presence in a conflict environment of competing insurgent groups compounds the consequences of border barriers. As Wood and Kathman (2015) assert, civil conflicts tend to involve more entities than one state and one opposing group; these actors themselves often comprise different factions. In such a composite environment, insurgent groups are competing with each other for control of resources, territory and civilians. Competition itself fluctuates in intensity, but sudden spikes in competition compel insurgents to kill more civilians as a means of dissuading defection and asserting control. Micro-level resource competition undergirds much inter-group conflict because resources are finite, a fact that particularly inflames violence when insurgent organizations are in close proximity to one another. An example of this overall dynamic is the National Patriotic Front of Liberia in the early-1990s. The group intensified its killing of civilians as a way to compensate for the group's declines in military strength and resources that followed the defection of at least 3000 fighters to a recently formed group (Wood & Kathman 2015). The author adds to this theory that border fortification itself intensifies rivalry between insurgent groups. As argued above, the erection of barriers along borders weakens transnational insurgents economically and militarily. These outcomes put groups into greater competition with one another for dwindling zero-sum reservoirs of resources and civilian supporters, thereby sparking more violence against civilians.

In addition to border barriers' direct ramifications for transnational insurgents, the author argues that they also escalate fighters' victimization of civilians by changing state-civilian relations. The fortification of borders augments states' control over the people and spaces within border regions, especially when soldiers deploy to patrol these borders (see Cannon 2016) and to use surveillance technologies. States that strengthen their monopoly on territorial control in this fashion extend their reach over civilian populations. These states are better able to monitor said civilians in border regions, where ethnic groups are more likely to rebel anyway (see Salehyan 2009). States in this context become more capable of targeting civilians who are suspected of aiding insurgents. The author holds that this state concern sharpens when border fortification provokes resentment among locals in border regions due to how it often disrupts their previously unregulated movement, environments and livelihoods.<sup>15</sup> The threat of punishment by the state dissuades at least some civilians from continuing to provide support to insurgents, further draining them of resources and making it less likely that they are able to assemble voluntary support. These affected insurgents, therefore, become more likely to use coercive violence against civilians in order to sustain themselves and survive.

---

<sup>15</sup> For examples, see <https://www.texasobserver.org/border-residents-protest-trumps-wall-in-hidalgo-county/> and <http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/BNi2004-10-15b.htm>.

A possible counterargument to the author's contentions is that, in the aftermath of material losses, insurgents may prioritize cultivating non-coercive, nonviolent relationships with civilians that would foster substantial support over time. This may appear to be especially rational for insurgents with access to political communities that they intend to govern in the future (see Stewart & Liou 2017). However, immediate needs with short time horizons can prevail over the long-term and resource-intensive project of assembling supportive constituencies (Wood 2014a); the privation that border barriers impose is no different. Even if groups can reach civilian members of their own political communities, insurgents are not immune from wielding violence against these civilian populations as a mechanism of control, deterrence, and resource extraction (Cherry 2012; Kalyvas 2006; Lilja 2009; Ottmann 2017).

The author additionally maintains that border fortification can affect groups with either type of initial resource endowments — economic or social — that Weinstein (2007) typologize. Border fortification's negative effects on individuals' well-being could fuel violence by opportunistic fighters who had been driven to fight by the enticement of material incentives in the first place. Even activist insurgents without such an impetus face the bottom line of survival. When they are threatened and desperate, they too may wield unprecedented anti-civilian violence to acquire resources and survive. Resource-deprived leaders who command activist insurgencies might even seek to satisfy their fighters' basic material needs by tolerating or ordering violence against civilians in order to forestall rank-and-file resentment about resource losses. In all, the author contends that resource desperation-driven violence by insurgents has the potential to significantly alter previously established group-civilians relationships characterized by minimal or no violence.

In the five ways described above — the weakening of illegal commercial networks, the loss of the military advantage affecting both civilian support and combat performance, the heightening of inter-insurgent group competition, and the extension of state control over potentially supportive civilians — border fortification damages transnational insurgents' capacity to garner resources. This increases their demands for support that, less likely to be met willingly by civilians, actuates transnational insurgents to carry out more violence against them. This behavior is a tool for insurgents to compensate for resource losses, which threaten organizational success and personal survival. Put another way, states that undertake border fortifications confine transnational insurgents to more desperate conditions that push them to engage in more desperate, violent behavior.

The author notes, though, that the effects of border fortification on insurgents are likely short-term. Environmental phenomena and intentional damage by state or non-state actors<sup>16</sup> may cause physical barriers to deteriorate over time, lessening their impact. More immediately, insurgent groups themselves are adaptable actors who can react to new circumstances in the conflict environment. They are likely to respond to border fortification by redesigning cross-border commercial networks, reorganizing or seeking out alternative external bases and otherwise reorienting their activities to account for an environment with less porous borders. As such, the violent outcomes of border fortification are temporary; that is, until a state reinforces or further fortifies a border, re-instigating a spike in impacted insurgents' violence. These subsequent, consecutive spikes of violence grow over time because an increasingly fortified border will impose progressively greater constraints on transnational insurgents. The above argument's hypothesis is as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** *Increases in border fortifications cause impacted transnational insurgent groups to perpetrate surges of anti-civilian violence that consecutively enlarge over time.*

<sup>16</sup> See <https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-border-concertina-wire-theft-20190318-story.html> and <https://www.telegraphindia.com/states/west-bengal/border-fence-stolen/cid/866311?ref=search-page>

The author formulates a corollary hypothesis based on the assumption that not all types of insurgent violence against civilians are equally conducive to extracting resources. While it is impossible to conclusively deduce conscious intent from the forms of violence that insurgents engage in, some types more likely aim to coercively extract resources. Kidnapping hostages falls under this category because it oftentimes enables insurgents to extract ransoms (see Naylor 2002). This act has proliferated among insurgents in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, heavily contributing to groups' financial reservoirs.<sup>17</sup> The global spread of cheap smartphones has enabled insurgents in poorer countries to more safely kidnap people and broadcast demands.<sup>18</sup> Based on the economic logic of kidnapping, the author creates a second hypothesis regarding border fortifications and transnational insurgents' violence against civilians:

**Hypothesis 1a:** *Increases in border fortifications cause impacted transnational insurgents to perpetrate surges of civilian kidnappings that consecutively enlarge over time.*

In this theory section, the author has outlined his two expectations regarding how border fortification affects transnational insurgents' violence against civilians. The primary expectation (H1) is that increases in border fortifications temporarily intensify general anti-civilian violence by insurgents. The building of border barriers diminishes insurgents' resource bases by limiting illicit cross-border markets, preventing insurgents from utilizing the military advantage of sanctuary, intensifying competition between insurgent groups over civilians and resources, and bolstering the ability of states to suppress civilian support. The consequential resource desperation prompts insurgents to demand more support from civilians who are less likely to give it, compelling the former to resort to coercive violence. This violence spikes temporarily after an increase in border fortification, but heightens over time with consecutive increases. Similarly, H1a predicts that increases in border fortification temporarily cause insurgents to specifically commit more kidnappings of civilians. In order to test the hypotheses, the author uses the method of process-tracing to evaluate an insurgent group from the Indian sub-Continent, where the Indian state has resorted to border fortifications as a counter-insurgency strategy.

### Research Design and Data

The unit of analysis of this study is *Transnational Insurgent Group-Year*. The case that the author evaluates is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), which has primarily been fighting in the northeast region of India (see Figure 1). This study analyzes the ULFA's violent behavior between 1988, when the group formally began to employ violence as an insurgent organization, and 2012 when the organization officially splintered. The ULFA meets the definition of transnational insurgents that the author provided earlier: armed non-state organizations whose members are physically present in at least one neighboring territory of a target state and who somehow benefit from illicit commercial cross-border networks. The author limits the sample of the hypothesis tests to one case due to time and resource constraints. He chooses the ULFA as the case because it is a usefully conservative one. The fact that its transnationality enveloped multiple external territories means that the author must meet a higher threshold of evidence in order to successfully demonstrate that fortifications solely along one of India's border sufficiently impacted the ULFA.

The case in this study is holistic — the unit of analysis composes one level — and longitudinal — the author evaluates the dependent variable at multiple periods of time both before and after variations in the independent variable (see Yin 2017). Although this project's sample is limited to one relatively small area of


<sup>17</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/amhtml/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/04/the-u-s-believes-that-kidnapped-journalist-austin-tice-is-still-alive-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-global-kidnapping/?noredirect=on>.

<sup>18</sup> <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/decade-iphone-changed-global-kidnapping/>.



the world, it comprises diverse regions on which to test this study's claims because of northeast India's unique combination of border fortification and transnational insurgencies. This case-study can be considered as a pilot project for investigating the nexus between border fortifications and transnational insurgency.

Figure 1



### Dependent Variable

Adequately operationalizing insurgent violence is challenging because the phenomenon manifests in an array of forms. It is essential that definitions and measurements of the concept reflect what theories of violence are specifically claiming. The author addresses this problem by measuring insurgent violence against civilians differently for the two hypotheses. The outlines for these operationalizations are below.

One common measurement in the literature on insurgent violence against civilians is one-sided violence, or fatal acts against “civilians that are deliberately and directly targeted by governments or non-state groups” (Eck & Hultman 2007, p.235; see also Eck, Sollenberg & Wallenstein 2003). Since this definition includes the intentional killing of civilians, insurgents potentially would use it to forcibly acquire resources, in line with this study's theory. As such, the author draws from the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program's* (UCDP) One-Sided Violence Dataset — using its best estimates — to first operationalize insurgent violence as one-sided for testing H1 (Eck & Hultman 2007).

Similarly, the author takes from the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) to operationalize anti-civilian violence in H1, by including all attack types against businesses, educational institutions, journalists and media, non-governmental organizations, private citizens and property, religious figures/institutions and tourists. These targets encompass either individual civilians or groups, all of which are relevant non-combatant targets of insurgent resource extraction. Targets labelled as institutions — businesses, educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations — are defined in the GTD as including individual victims located at or associated with the entities (*Global Terrorism Database*). The author does not require that GTD incidents meet the three criteria of terrorism, opts to “Exclude ambiguous cases” and decides to “Include unsuccessful attacks” (*Global Terrorism Database*).

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/IN-map.gif>.

<sup>20</sup> <http://mdoner.gov.in/infrastructure/road-map-only-nh->

Additionally, the author defines casualty type as “Fatalities Only,” aligning this operationalization with the first one of one-sided violence (*Global Terrorism Database*). Finally, the author chooses to include incidents in which the ULFA acted alongside other insurgent groups. In order to organize the GTD data into annual amounts, the author manually adds the total number of fatalities from incidents throughout a year into a single measurement of killings per year. The two clear operationalizations of violence for H1 enhances this study’s construct validity in avoiding the issue of ambiguously defined and measured concepts that some critics associate with the case study method (Yin 2017; see also Geddes 2010).

The form of violence referenced in H1a is a complex concept to define.<sup>21</sup> Definitions of kidnapping can vary based on whether or not the act includes killings, takes a minimum amount of time, or is accompanied by specific demands. In light of logistical restraints, the author chooses to simply operationalize civilian kidnappings as annual amounts of incidents in which a kidnapping of some number of civilians took place. The author takes from the GTD again to measure “hostage taking (kidnapping)” of businesses, educational institutions, journalists and media, non-governmental organizations, private citizens and property, religious figures/institutions, and tourists (*Global Terrorism Database*). These targets comprise overtly civilian, non-combatant individuals or groups. As when testing H1 with GTD data, the author does not mark the GTD incidents as needing to meet the three criteria of terrorism, decides to “Exclude ambiguous cases,” chooses to “Include unsuccessful attacks,” opts to include incidents in which the ULFA acted alongside other insurgent groups, and, again, manually adds GTD information into annual amounts (*Global Terrorism Database*). Casualty type for this operationalization is “Both Injuries and Fatalities” since the kidnappings that the author measures do not have to specifically result in civilian deaths.

This operationalization of kidnapping is limited because it does not measure the amount of civilians targeted in an incident; a low number of incidents may include a high number of actual civilian victims, and the inverse can also be true. It is difficult, however, to determine from GTD data if all victims in an incident were actually civilians. So, the author avoids counting the number of kidnapped people to avoid overestimating the amounts of civilian victims of kidnapping.

It is also important to consider that current datasets on insurgent kidnappings of civilians do not adequately record their scale. Some groups intentionally keep their kidnappings secret and laws in some countries deter civilians from reporting kidnapping incidents in which the perpetrators demand ransom.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, GTD data on kidnappers’ motives and demands, which are difficult to know in the first place, is incomplete. Until the uncovering of more accurate and comprehensive data, the GTD dataset is the only usable source for using insurgents’ kidnapping of civilians as a variable.

The author acknowledges that datasets’ practices and the extent of media attention on insurgents’ activities shape the usefulness of measuring violence by amounts. In regard to this study specifically, border fortifications as a strategy of counterinsurgency may draw more reporting on violence in relevant areas than had occurred previously. Therefore, any relationships that the author finds between insurgents’ violence and border fortification are subject to this limitation.

### Independent Variable and Qualitative Controls

A handful of scholars have created datasets measuring border barriers (Avdan & Gelpi 2017; Carter & Poast 2017; Hassner & Wittenberg 2015; Jellissen & Gottheil 2013). These datasets all provide information on which international borders contain walls, fences, or other physical barriers, which contiguous states have built as barriers, and when the barriers erected. Two of them (Avdan & Gelpi 2017;

<sup>21</sup> The author thanks Danielle Gilbert, PhD candidate at the George Washington University, for her words of wisdom regarding issues in defining, recording and measuring insurgent kidnappings of civilians.

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/amhtml/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/04/the-u-s-believes-that-kidnapped-journalist-austin-tice-is-still-alive-here-are-5-things-to-know-about-global-kidnapping/?noredirect=on>

Carter & Poast 2017) indicate specifically when, if at all, states tore down their border barriers. The other two datasets (Hassner & Wittenberg 2015; Jellissen & Gottheil 2013) include what specific cross-border phenomena the constructed barriers were intended to obstruct, as well as the barriers' length.

Despite their utility, these datasets as a whole inadequately measure border fortification. First, they operationalize it as a nominal variable, categorically indicating only whether any type of barrier is present along any part of a state's borders. This does not account for barriers' temporal and spatial variation. In reality, and as the author noted earlier, border fortification tends to be a long-term project over time. Neglecting this fact in data can lead to significant misrepresentations of a border barriers' characteristics. For example, Jellissen and Gottheil (2013, p.271) code India as having an estimated 1,020-miles fence along its border with Myanmar/Burma. However, a more recent government report (Ministry of Home Affairs 2016, p.41) states that the Indian government did fence 10 kilometers of the border, but that further progress "has been stopped due to local protests from [the local government] and local populace." Clearly, then, data must measure border fortifications as an interval, rather than nominal, variable in order to measure its variation over time.

The second reason that existing datasets on border fortifications are insufficient is that they do not disaggregate the variable below the national level. Fortification of one portion of an international border does not necessarily impact all phenomena crossing all segments of border in the same fashion. For instance, there would be a clear difference between fencing part of the shortest international land borders in the world — 85 meters dividing Morocco and Spain's Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera— and the 5525 miles splitting the United States and Canada. Consequently, inferring causal relationships regarding border fortification from macro-level data potentially misattributes dependent variable outcomes to the effects of fortified borders rather than other variables. Therefore, more rigorous hypothesis testing requires border fortification data that is disaggregated to at least the province-equivalent level.

Due to the above data issues, the author resorts to constructing a unique dataset on the Indian state's fortification of its 4096.7 Kilometers (Km.) borders with Bangladesh, which has occurred in three stages. This dataset records the annual progress of Indian fencing in Km. on the entire India-Bangladesh border from 1991 to 2018, and from 2004 to 2016 on the individual borders of five Indian states: Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal. The dataset also includes information detailing other aspects of annual Indian border security along the India-Bangladesh border, including the lengths of border roads and floodlighting. The dataset likewise provides the annual lengths of fencing, roads, and floodlighting that the Indian state has officially approved but not yet constructed.


The India-Bangladesh Border Fortification Dataset compensates for previous datasets' weaknesses by accounting for temporal and spatial variation and disaggregating fortification to subnational political units. Measuring border fortification with time-series data like this better equips scholars to study the role of the phenomenon in causal relationships. See Figure 2 for the entire historical progress of Indian fencing along the India-Bangladesh borders, in addition to roads and floodlighting. This graph reiterates the dramatic temporal variation of border fortification that must be measured in datasets; fencing came to cover about three quarters of the India-Bangladesh border — around 3,000 Km. — in the span of three decades.

The sources for the dataset include transcripts of official debates in the Rajya Sabha, India's upper parliament, and Annual Reports from the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is essential in this process that the sources used to construct these data points are equally informative and provide a uniform level of detail. Appendix I outlines in greater detail how the author created the India-Bangladesh Border Fortification Dataset.

As explained in greater detail below, the author utilizes the within-case method of process tracing for the case-study. This method necessitates testing hypotheses by directly contending with rival explanations to the independent variable. In this case, the alternative explanations are factors other than border fortification that may also impact the case's patterns of violence against civilians. As such, the

author completes a review of the internal history and the social, political, economic and historical environments of the ULFA. These case-specific factors include, but are not limited to, ideology, the prevalence and roles of female members (see Henshaw 2016, Nivat 2005, Speckhard 2008, Thomas & Bond 2015, and Wood & Thomas 2017), battle dynamics, the number of international borders that it could access and the amounts of fighters who surrendered, were arrested and/or were killed at various times. The author also draws from the literature review to contend with two particular alternative explanations for patterns of insurgent violence, or control variables.

Figure 2



First, territorial control also might alter insurgents’ behavior. Holding territory is a powerful military, human and economic resource (Naylor 2002; Stewart & Liou 2017) that possibly insulates groups from the material diminutions that follow battle losses (Wood 2014a). In this sense, border fortifications may not harm transnational insurgent groups that control territory to the extent that it would notably alter their treatment of civilians. Whether or not they control territory, though, insurgent leaders and fighters seek to compensate for situations in which they perceive and experience their resource levels as exceedingly low. The author asserted earlier that border barriers drain transnational insurgents’ resources from cross-border commercial networks and weaken insurgents’ military capabilities; these losses could cause for affected insurgents to lose at least portions of their territory within the jurisdictions of target states or involved neighbors. This outcome could render previously held territory that may have effected abstention from violence less relevant, while intensifying insurgents’ resource demands on civilians anyway. As such, the author evaluates the ULFA’s control of territory over time and its potential role in shaping how it interacted with civilians. It is also important to consider territorial control because the location of transnational insurgents’ territory would dictate which sites dominated by border fortifications actually impact them.

The second and final control variable that the author directly addresses is state-sponsorship. A sufficiently supportive state may furnish additional resources to insurgent groups that experience situations



of greater need, thereby eliminating the post-fortification motive to victimize more civilians. On the other hand, continued support is not guaranteed. States may rescind their sponsorship of groups that are experiencing notable resource and performance problems after border fortifications. Additionally, if insurgents need to visibly demonstrate reliability to their state sponsors in order to maintain support (see Hovil & Werker 2005), then the challenges that border fortifications exacerbate transnational groups might compel leaders to impel greater violence against civilians. This may even occur alongside their violent efforts to independently compensate for resource losses caused by border barriers. The complex nature of state sponsorship is why the author considers whether or not the ULFA received it from different states and, if so, how it might have conditioned the group's access to resources and use of violence against civilians.

Clearly, there exist potential rival explanations for insurgents' behavior toward civilians in addition to or other than border fortification. The author directly contends with these by utilizing the method of process tracing, strengthening this study's internal validity (Collier 2011; see also Yin 2017 and Ricks & Liu 2018). The author elaborates on process-tracing and this study's broader methodology below.

### Methodology

In this study, the author takes a qualitative approach. As explained earlier, quantitatively studying border barriers with previously existing data poses problems for causal inference. The dataset that the author outlined above compensates for these issues, but its N size is limited for containing information on only one international border. For this reason, as well as for its unique utility, the author resorts to a case-study.

In conducting this case-study, the author specifically adopts the method of process-tracing. This case-method entails "uncovering traces of a hypothesized causal mechanism within the context of a historical case or cases" (Bennett & Elman 2006, p.459). Process-tracing is geared toward considering variation across time, as it "gives close attention to sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables" (Collier 2011, p.823). Rather than rely on mere intuition for causal inferences, process tracing explicitly examines both causes and outcomes in order to directly link the two (Bennett & Elman 2006, p.461).

This rigorous method entails explicitly testing rival explanations against theorized independent variables (Ricks & Liu 2018). Users of process-tracing do this through the heavy use of description that "[takes] good snapshots at a series of specific moments... which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence" (Collier 2011, p.824). It is important to note, though, that process-tracing does not exclude the use of non-descriptive information. This study obviously incorporates quantitative data measuring both insurgent groups' violence against civilians and border fortifications.

Process-tracing in this specific case-study involves analyzing the temporal progress of fortifications along the India-Bangladesh border in relation to the annual rates of violence that the ULFA perpetrates. The author begins by referring to secondary sources by journalists, researchers, scholars<sup>23</sup> and former/current Indian military officials<sup>24</sup> to create a timeline that details significant events in the ULFA's history (see Ricks & Liu 2018). He then develops line graphs displaying and comparing annual progress in border fortifications and the ULFA's annual exhibitions of violence, the specific operationalizations of which were explained above. Subsequently, the author evaluates whether or not correlations exist between increases in border fortification and insurgents' subsequent violence against civilians. He then draws from both primary and secondary sources to attempt explaining causally the ULFA's patterns of violence.

---

<sup>23</sup> The author intentionally draws extensively from Indian authors to attempt ensuring that information on the case is grounded in locally produced knowledge.

<sup>24</sup> Researchers with experience in the Indian military, who likely participated in counterinsurgency activities, may exhibit bias against insurgent groups. At the same time, these authors potentially have access to exclusive information. As such, the author uses these types of sources but does so cautiously.



Primary documents include newspaper articles and government documents and secondary sources again include books and articles written by journalists, researchers, scholars and military officials. Relying on these types of sources enables me to explore counterfactual outcomes and rival explanations for patterns of violence in order to attempt ruling them out and to determine how likely it is that border fortifications explains the causality of the correlations that the author observes (see Ricks & Liu 2018). It is impossible for me to examine the personal experiences of all ULFA fighters and leaders throughout the group's history in terms of border fortifications and access to resources. This is why the author focuses on ruling out rival explanations to border fortification in this case study.

The following section begins with a summary of the ULFA's origins and turn to insurgency. Then, after conducting preliminary tests of H1 and H1a, the author initiates more in-depth process-tracing of the ULFA's transnationality and patterns of violence against civilians throughout its history. Once the case-study concludes, the author reviews the extent to which the results support the arguments, in addition to exploring the findings' implications for research and policy-makers.

## CASE-STUDY

### Historical Background

The northeast region of India and the rest of the country share a fraught relationship. The diverse array of societies within the northeast historically maintained distinct social identities and political systems. This pattern continued during the middle-to-latter periods of British imperial colonization of India between the mid-XIX<sup>th</sup> to mid-XX<sup>th</sup> Centuries, during which the imperial state both dominated and further isolated the northeast region (Singh 2004). India attained independence in 1947, but numerous nationalist movements subsequently emerged in the northeast with demands for increased autonomy or independence. Some of these movements developed into full-fledged insurgencies (P.K. Das 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). A collection of factors relating to Indian independence contributed to this collective discontent: historical seclusion from India, economic neglect of the region, relative deprivation, high unemployment, corruption and fear of identity loss (Gogoi 2007; Purkayastha 2013; Singh 2004; Thapliyal 2013). Northeastern antagonisms with the national state continued even after the formation of seven individual states out of Assam, which had originally comprised the entire jurisdiction of northeast India (Bhaumik 2009; Singh 2004; Staniland 2018).

Specifically, Assamese discontent also formed in reaction to the above perceived injustices (Butt 2017; Centre for Development & Peace Studies; H. N. Das 2011; P. K. Das 2007; Das 2012; Gogoi 2007; Gohain 2007; Purkayastha 2013). But what is uniformly considered the most salient reason for the emergence of Assamese consternation that later transformed into insurgency — in the form of the ULFA, as well as other groups — was the influx of Muslim Bengali people into Assam from East Pakistan, which become Bangladesh in the early-1970s (Barman 2010; Bhatt 2004; Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013; Bhaumik 2009; Butt 2017; Chadha 2005; P. K. Das 2007; Das 2012; Das 2016; Datta 2000; Gogoi 2007; Gohain 2007; Khori 2018; Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Nepram 2002; Purkayastha 2013; Ray 2013; Saikia 2004; Sengupta & Singh 2004; Singh & Kumar 2004; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*; *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*).

Many Assamese people believed that this class-diverse migration — which had been occurring since the era of the British Empire (Butt 2017; Nepram 2002; Sinha 2007) — created millions of Bengali workers and illegal voters in Assam who would politically, economically, and culturally overpower and uproot traditional society. The actual number of Bengali immigrants who illegally joined voter rolls over the years was less than 50,000 people (Khori 2018). Nevertheless, in 1979 Assamese organized what is

called the Assam Movement or the Assam Agitation that demanded, among other things, the mass deportation of Muslim Bengalis. The movement's various organization and participants employed both nonviolent and violent tactics, ranging from protests and election boycotts to pogroms such as the 1983 Nellie Massacre, where Assamese killed between 2000 and 5000 Bengali people (Bhaumik 2009; Das 2012; Khori 2018; Mahanta 2013; Thapliyal 2013). These activities destabilized Assam to the point that the Indian Army deployed to the state (*South Asia Terrorism Portal*).

These disturbances lessened somewhat in 1985 with the signing of the Assam Accord between the national Indian government and representatives of the Assam Movement.<sup>25</sup> The deal — which the government has yet to comprehensively implement (Mahanta 2013; Ray 2013; Sengupta & Singh 2004)<sup>26</sup> — had multiple stipulations. Two important ones were: that undocumented immigrants who had arrived in India after 25 March 1971 would be deported and that those who came between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1975 would be disallowed from voting (Chadha 2005). The Asom Gana Parishad (ASP), which had formed out of the All Assam Students' Union within the Assam Movement, received massive electoral support after the accord and became the majority in Assam's government (Centre for Development & Peace Studies; Chadha 2005; *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*).

In line with the widespread Assamese dissatisfaction, a handful of male intellectuals formed the ULFA in 1979. Beyond expelling those deemed foreign to Assam, the ULFA sought to have the state become an independent, socialist country. The group justified this goal by claiming that Assam had never been a legitimate part of India because it was the British Empire that had originally acquired and integrated the region into its Indian imperial colony through a treaty with the King of Ava, which is now Myanmar/Burma (Chadha 2005; Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Saikia 2010, p.1).<sup>27</sup> That kingdom had previously taken Assam from the Ahom Kings — not Indian rulers — who had governed the region for around 600 years (Barman 2010; Sinha 2007). Independent India retained control over Assam, after which, the ULFA insisted, the national state both extracted the financial profits of Assam's massive tea industry and enabled mass Bengali immigration as a colonial tool to diminish the status of the indigenous Assamese (Barman 2010; Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013; Bhaumik 2009; *Journeyman Pictures* 2016; Mahanta 2013; Nepram 2002; *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*).

After having participated in the Assam Movement, the ULFA was unsatisfied with the 1985 Assam Accord because it did not fulfill the group's demand for independence. Despite its connections to the party, the ULFA was also dissatisfied with the ASP government's dysfunction and its perceived inability to rightfully transform Assam. So, the organization persisted in its mission by officially adopting the more radical strategy of armed struggle against the Indian state in 1988 (Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013; Bhaumik 2009; Chadha 2005; Lintner 2015; Verghese 1997). Members considered this necessary because, in the words of one contemporary ULFA document:

"If Assam would have been an independent country then we could have brought (about) progressive change by means of agitation or elections. But in the present context, if we agitate or participate in parliamentary politics then the government formed by us (will) have to work as per the Constitution of India and guidelines fixed by the government... This system is prone to exploitation and corruption... Therefore, to create an exploitation-free society, our next step (must) be a national war of liberation."                      Quote: Verghese 1997, p.57

<sup>25</sup> See "Assam Accord (Memorandum of Settlement)" in Saiki (2010).

<sup>26</sup> See <https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/portlets/assam-accord-and-its-clauses>.

<sup>27</sup> See "Treaty of Yandaboo" in Saiki (2010).

### Preliminary Hypothesis Tests

In its violent pursuit of Assamese independence, the ULFA became a deeply transnational insurgent organization by physically operating in multiple external territories and participating in cross-border commercial networks of illicit goods. Appendix II contains a general timeline that the author created of the ULFA's history and transnationality. Bangladesh featured the most prominently in these transnational activities throughout most of the ULFA's existence. As such, the author assumes that fortification of the India-Bangladesh border would have impacted the ULFA.

Governments at different levels of the Indian state have historically expressed concern over unofficial movement across the India-Bangladesh border. Politicians in the Assam government had first proposed border fencing in the 1960s to halt illegal immigration, but the issue did not acquire national attention until the 1980s after the violence of the Assam Movement and the Assam Accord (P. Das 2016; Khory 2018; Schendel 2004). More recently in the 2000s and 2010s, Annual Reports from the Ministry of Home Affairs have consistently justified border fortification in the form of fencing, as well as roads and floodlighting, based on its view that "The [India-Bangladesh/Indo-Bangladesh] border is marked by a high degree of porosity" (Ministry of Home Affairs 2005, p.73; 2006, p.36; 2007, p.36; 2008, p.29; 2009, p.26; 2010, p.28; 2011, p.39; 2012, p.46; 2013, p.29; 2014, p.42; 2015, p.32; 2016, p.37; 2017, p.37; 2018, p.32).

The majority of these documents also proclaimed that "The main problem" necessitating border fencing "is of illegal migration from Bangladesh into India" (Ministry of Home Affairs 2005, p.73; 2006, p.36; 2007, p.36; 2008, p.29; 2009, p.26; 2010, p.28; 2011, p.39; 2012, p.46; 2013, p.29). Transnational activities by Indian insurgents, like the ULFA across the India-Bangladesh border have also inspired border fencing. Numerous politicians, bureaucrats, and security personnel have variously explained in different contexts that at least one purpose of fencing the India-Bangladesh border has been to curtail insurgents' cross-border attacks and smuggling (*Agence France Presse* 2001; Azmi 2005; Bhattacharjee 2001, 2002 & 2003; Chairman et al. 1991; Das 2009 & 2010; Hariprasad 2016; Khandelwal 2008; Mishra 2005; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017; Ramaswamy 2005; Razi 1997).

In light of the above concerns, the Indian state began in 1989 to fortify parts of its border with Bangladesh with fencing, as well as roads, after formally approving the Indo-Bangladesh Border Roads & Fence Project in 1986-1987 (Das 2008; Ministry of Home Affairs 2003; Schendel 2005).<sup>28</sup> This project comprised Phase I, for which the government had sanctioned 857 total KM of fencing for sections of the borders of Assam, Meghalaya and West Bengal. By 2000, the government had erected 854 KM of this fencing and concluded Phase I (Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017). Around that same year, the government decided to attempt fencing much more of the 4096.7 Km. India-Bangladesh border in Phase II (Khory 2018; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017).

Fortification anywhere along the massive border potentially affected the ULFA — even though its members did not regularly cross all sections of it — because the illicit smuggling of weapons and drugs that benefitted the group also could have occurred through any segments of the border. This is why, as a tentative test of H1, the author compares annual progress of total completed Indian fencing along the entire India-Bangladesh border to the ULFA's annual amounts of civilian killings. The author creates two line graphs in order to separately measure ULFA violence with UCDP and GTD data (see Figures 3 & 4).

The graphs provide evidence for a correlation in general support of H1. Both depict the same pattern between India-Bangladesh border fortification and ULFA killings of civilians: increases in

---

<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, time-series information on other forms of Indian border security is minimal, making it difficult to adequately their temporal variation. Suffice it to say here that the entire India-Bangladesh border has been guarded by the Border Security Forces (G. Das 2016; Pande 2004; Staniland 2018), which practices a shoot-to-kill policy that applies to any person seen illegally crossing the border: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/23/indias-shoot-kill-policy-bangladesh-border>. The Indian state has also constructed border outposts and used surveillance equipment to monitor various parts of the India-Bangladesh border (Das 2008; G. Das 2016; P. Das 2016; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017).

completed fencing in the early-to-late-1990s, the early-to-mid 2000s, and even more in the mid-to-late-2000s each preceded spikes in anti-civilian violence by the ULFA.<sup>29</sup> Although the second surge in violence in 2004 was smaller than the one in 2000, the final 2007 spike in violence was the largest in the ULFA's history of fatal civilian victimization. This set of correlations largely aligns with H1.

It is also useful to disaggregate the location of India-Bangladesh border fortification to the individual Indian states' borders that the ULFA specifically used. Doing so is a more precise way to determine which areas of border fortification would have likely impacted the ULFA. The clandestine nature of both insurgent border-crossing and black markets makes it impossible to know the exact time periods that insurgents' transnationality traversed specific borders.

Overall, though, ULFA members were known to have used the borders that Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura share with Bangladesh for both various cross-border operations (Centre for Development & Peace Studies; Das 2008; Rammohan 2007; Verghese 1997) and weapons smuggling (Bhaumik 2009; Das 2008; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). So, the author creates graphs comparing fencing along these states' borders and ULFA killings of civilians (see Figures 5 & 6 for Meghalaya, 7 & 8 for Mizoram, plus 9 & 10 for Tripura). Again, each set contains two graphs to separately measure violence with UCDP and GTD data.

These state-level graphs also provide evidence of a correlation for H1. However, as further explained later in the case-study, not all of India's northeast states built their fencing in both Phases I and II. Additionally, available information on Indian fortification of these state-level borders encompass a shorter span of time than on fortifications along the entire India-Bangladesh borders. Therefore, this evidence for correlation applies only to the ULFA's third surge of civilian killings in 2007, which was the largest annual amount in the group's history. For Meghalaya, that third spike in violence followed the fencing increase beginning in 2005-2006. Fencing on Mizoram's border began in 2005-2006 in direct tandem with the ULFA's third surge in violence. Fencing along the Tripura border from 2004-2006 also preceded the 2007 increase in ULFA violence. Put together, the three line graphs whose fencing data is disaggregated to the state-level provide partial support for H1. In conjunction with the first test depicting national-level fortification, it is clear that a positive correlation exists between increases in Indian fortification of the India-Bangladesh border and subsequent surges of fatal ULFA violence against civilians.


However, it is important to emphasize that Meghalaya was the only state border of the above three particularly used by the ULFA that had substantial fencing prior to the third spike in violence in 2007. Almost half of the state's border had been fenced by 2004, while the borders of Mizoram and Tripura contain minimal fencing in comparison to their total lengths. Therefore, India-Bangladesh border fortifications likely did not affect the ULFA in a substantial way until the time period just before its third spike in violence. In other words, the independent variable may have only demonstrably impacted the ULFA around 2005, possibly rendering fortification-violence correlations in earlier years as null. The author dedicates further attention to this issue later in the case-study.

The author also compares data on India-Bangladesh border fortification and ULFA violence in regard to H1a, which expects that border fortification causes transnational insurgents to perpetrate more kidnappings of civilians. The ULFA did use that form of violence, particularly against tea company executives from whom the group extracted large ransoms (Barman 2010; Bhaumik 2009; Butt 2017; H. N. Das 2007; Das 2012; Gogoi 2007). However, GTD data indicates that this practice was limited; only 19 incidents of ULFA kidnappings of civilian targets took place between 1988 and 2017 (see Figure 11). Moreover, the majority of these kidnappings occurred in a single year — 1991 — while none took place between a 14-years gap from 1993 to 2007. Thus, according to GTD, ULFA did not significantly engage in civilian kidnappings.

---


<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that the killings of civilians that Figure 3 with UCDP data depicts reach a greater 2007 peak than in Figure 4 with GTD data. Nevertheless, the two graphs present the same general correlation.

Figures 3 and 4







Figures 5 and 6



Figures 7 and 8




Figures 9 and 10



It is possible, however, that the GTD data is incomplete. As the dataset’s website explains, GTD coders used different practices of data collection over time, generating inconsistencies “before and after January 1, 1998, before and after April 1, 2008, and before and after January 1, 2012.”<sup>30</sup> Figure 11 does depict a stark shift in ULFA kidnappings between before and after 2008. So, it is possible that a data discrepancy explains the lack of measured ULFA kidnappings of civilians from 1993 to 2007. For the purpose of this study, then, the author makes no claims of positive or negative correlation or causation between ULFA kidnappings and India-Bangladesh border fortification. The author does not substantively address the ULFA’s kidnappings of civilians throughout the rest of this study.

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/>.

Figure 11



Overall, the above collection of line graphs comparing India-Bangladesh border fortifications and ULFA violence against civilians provides preliminary support of a correlation for H1 and is incapable of supporting or invalidating H1a. Beyond these tests, the author seeks to rigorously analyze whether or not these correlations actually reflect a causal relationship between border fortification and the ULFA’s patterns of violence. As elaborated upon earlier in this case-study, this is why the author employs the method of process tracing. Throughout the rest of this case study, the author evaluates the historical development of India-Bangladesh border fortification and the ULFA’s killings of civilians with particular reference to variation in its transnational activities in order to attempt explaining the organization’s three annual surges in violence in 2000, 2004 and 2007.

**Process-Tracing**

The first country where the ULFA began to operate transnationally was Myanmar/Burma. Between 1985 and 1986, group leaders began to make contact with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-IM, another transnational northeast Indian insurgent group and Myanmar/Burmese insurgents such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The ULFA acquired training in insurgency from by the KIA by paying in weapons, money and combat participation (Barman 2010; Bhattacharyya & Puri 2015; Bhaumik 2009; Das 2012; Dasgupta 2001; Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Roye 2013; Saksena 2018; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*; Verghese 1997). The ULFA, KIA, and other Indian and Myanmar/Burma insurgent groups formalized their links with the founding of the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front in 1989 (P. K. Das 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). In Myanmar/Burma, the ULFA also became involved in the regional trade of illicit drugs like heroin and narcotics in order to acquire more materiel (Datta 2000; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). The organization began in the late-1980s to launch attacks into India from Myanmar/Burma (Lintner 2015). Indian politicians in parliamentary sessions routinely raised concern over these cross-border activities



by the ULFA, as well as other insurgent groups (Bhattacharya 1983; Chairman et al. 1991; Verma & Masodkar 1991). ULFA activities in Myanmar largely ended by 1995, however, after successful joint operations by the Indian and Myanmar/Burmese militaries against insurgent camps in the India-Myanmar border region (Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Minorities at Risk; Roye 2013; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*; Verghese 1997).

During its time in Myanmar/Burma, the ULFA began to recruit also female members. The logic behind this decision was that female inclusion would sanitize the ULFA's public image as less violent (Deka 2018) and would provide strategic utility. As a former-leader explained to one researcher, women could transport matériel and messages more successfully than men without being as quickly suspected by security forces since women were culturally viewed as less threatening (Moral 2013). Women and girls primarily from rural areas began to voluntarily join the ULFA in 1989, coming to comprise at most 15% of ULFA members at any point in its history (Moral 2013; *The Hans India* 2017). Teenage girls and women joined in order to escape economic deprivation, to flee gender-based violence against women within traditional society, and to avenge the army's violent abuse of suspected ULFA members and their families in Assam (Deka 2018). In terms of women's status within the ULFA, they and men operated under the same rules and regulations, acquired identical combat training, and practiced consensual marriage and sex; leadership even reportedly punished male sexual abusers with methods including execution (Moral 2013). At the same time, military leaders never officially sent women militants on combat missions (Deka 2018; Moral 2013).<sup>31</sup> Women instead largely played support roles in the areas of political education, training and amassing public support for the ULFA (Deka 2018). Women did take some mid-level leadership roles (Journeyman Pictures 2016), but only Pranati Deka held a high-level position, which itself was the feminized one of Cultural Secretary (Saksena 2018). Nevertheless, women militants within the ULFA came to play an important role.

Back in Assam during the early 1990s, the ULFA — comprised of at least 3000 members (*South Asia Terrorism Portal*) but probably more — encountered substantial challenges after it established a proto-state in rural Assam (Butt 2017). The state experienced severe turmoil due to both ULFA violence and military activities. The Indian government banned and designated the group as a terrorist organization in 1990 (*Journeyman Pictures* 2016; Saksena 2018). The Indian army then conducted Operation Bajrang between November 1990 and April 1991 in response to the ULFA's intensifying violence against tea plantation owners (Gohain 2007; *Journeyman Pictures* 2016; Mahanta 2013; Sinha 2007; Verghese 1997). The operation included the sending of thousands of soldiers and the imposition of national state rule in Assam, and resulted in the dissolution of ULFA camps, the arrests of over 200 members, and the recovery of some weapons and cash (Barman 2010; Dasgupta 2001; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). The effectiveness of Operation Bajrang was somewhat lessened though because the ULFA had advanced awareness of it from high-level bureaucrats in Assam's AGP government (Bhatt 2004; Gogoi 2007; Gohain 2007; Sinha 2007). The ULFA continued to fight after the June 1991 Assamese elections in which the sympathetic AGP lost its majority (Bhaumik 2009; Verghese 1997).

Subsequently, the army conducted Operation Rhino from September 1991 to early-to-mid 1992. This second anti-ULFA operation was more effective, as indicated by the fact that the army arrested between 2,500 and 4,300 members, eliminated 15-16 camps, captured munitions and cash, and captured or killed some of the group's leaders (Bhatt 2004; Bhaumik 2009; Gogoi 2007; Mahanta 2013; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*; Verghese 1997). Once the government halted military activity, about 4000 ULFA members surrendered in exchange for amnesty, comprising the first former members of the group that came to be referred to as the Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam/SULFA (Bhatt 2004; Dasgupta 2001; Pande 2004; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). Some SULFA went on to join Indian security forces in anti-ULFA activities such as spying and to commit personal *vendettas* against their old comrades (Barman 2010; Choudhury

<sup>31</sup> However, women did participate in combat during situations such as government attacks on ULFA camps.



2016; Gohain 2007; Verghese 1997). The government attracted surrender by members of the ULFA and other insurgent groups by establishing a rehabilitation program beginning in the 1990s. Essentially, the government provided a range of benefits encompassing financial support and personal security guards, preferential treatment in business contracts and permits for selling items like liquor, and the permitting of weapons possession (Verghese 1997). 5000 ULFA members surrendered to the government by March 1997 through this scheme (Mahanta 2013). In all, Operation Rhino and the government's surrender and rehabilitation program greatly incapacitated the ULFA. The organization split between pro and anti-negotiations factions following Operation Rhino, but the latter continued fighting (Sinha 2007).

It is noteworthy that the ULFA minimally victimized civilians during or immediately after these military operations that severely harmed the group. In line with the author's theoretical assumptions, it is likely that the ULFA did not engage in significant violence against civilians because it still held widespread public support amidst the resource losses (Gogoi 2007; Gohain 2007; *Journeyman Pictures* 2016; Moral 2013; Saksena 2018; *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*; Verghese 1997). The insurgent ULFA ensured this since it had originated with social endowments (see Weinstein 2007) and built a following among an Assamese population greatly discontented with the national state (Mahanta 2013). In fact, multiple authors describe the early ULFA as having a "Robinhood" (Barman 2010, p.3 & 101) or "Robin Hood"-style reputation amongst Assamese (H.N. Das 2007, p.158; Gogoi 2007, p.117; Mahanta 2013, p.180; Moral 2013, p.15; Sinha 2007, p.167; Verghese 1997, p.57). Many rural Assamese claimed that the Indian army violently brutalized them, including raping women, during Operations Bajrang & Rhino, contributing to a groundswell of support for the ULFA (Barman 2010; *Journeyman Pictures* 2016; Mahanta 2013). Moreover, the ULFA elicited support by conducting public campaigns that included service provision like the construction of roads and engaging in vigilante activity against corrupt bureaucrats, alcohol consumption, sexual abuse of women and rhino poaching (Barman 2010; Bhaumik 2009; Mahanta 2013; Verghese 1997). Therefore, the group was able to maintain sufficient civilian support during this period of severe counter-insurgency operations, and did not victimize civilians in the aftermath.

In this context, the anti-negotiations segment of the ULFA managed to endure. Female members contributed to the group's survival after the military operations since they transported crucial information and weapons throughout militarized northeast India (Ghosh 2017; Moral 2013; Saksena 2018; *The Hans India* 2017). The ULFA also persevered after the damage it incurred from Operations Bajrang and Rhino and the operations in Myanmar/Burma by significantly relocating many of its fighters and bases to both Bangladesh and Bhutan (Bhaumik 2009; Butt 2017; Centre for Development & Peace Studies; Das 2008; Das 2012; Ministry of Women & Child Development; Mahanta 2013; Moral 2013; Nepram 2002; *The Telegraph* 2003).

Before proceeding, it is important to briefly address the topic of India-Bangladesh relations.<sup>32</sup> The Indian and Bangladeshi states began to rival each other in the mid-1970s over political conflict after the former had originally assisted insurgents fighting for Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan. Each side subsequently sponsored insurgents who fought the other (Bhaumik 2009; Nepram 2002; Rana 2018). Islamist state and non-state actors in Bangladesh, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have particularly sought since this era to challenge the Hindu-majority country of India by sponsoring northeast Indian insurgents (Gopal 2004; Mahanta 2013). The Awami League, on the other hand, has generally not supported northeast Indian insurgents. The BNP and others accuse the secular Awami League of being pro-India for a variety of reasons, including that it had previously acquired Indian support as Bangladesh's leading independence organization (Gopal 2004; Jindal 2004). The BNP came to power in a 1991 election that reinstated formal democracy in Bangladesh. The make-up of Bangladeshi governments from this point onward — largely between either the BNP or the Awami League (Gopal 2004) — had significant repercussions for the ULFA's transnationality, a point that the author will return to throughout the case-study.

<sup>32</sup> This subject contains its own complex history that in this study, it is only explored as it pertains to the ULFA.

The ULFA had begun to maintain 12-14 camps in Bangladesh since 1989 for sanctuary and training after first establishing safe houses in 1985 (S.K. Das 2011; Nepram 2002; Rana 2018; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). Despite Indian politicians' diplomatic exclamations about this (Chairman et al 1991; Verma & Masodkar 1991), the BNP government at that time and later repeatedly denied the presence of any insurgents, including the ULFA, in its territory (Das 2008; Pande 2004). The BNP, nevertheless, likely permitted the group's operations (S.K. Das 2011). In addition to these camps, the ULFA's former-Foreign Secretary who had been arrested and then released on bail, Sashadhar Choudhury, claimed in a 2012 interview that the organization began at this time to involve itself in the smuggling of weapons into India from across its border with Bangladesh (Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013).<sup>33</sup> These arms, originally supplied by other insurgent groups or sellers in Asia (S.K. Das 2011), often travelled through Cox's Bazaar on the southern coast of Bangladesh, a massive site of weapons smuggling for South Asia (Chanda & Gupta 2004; P. K. Das 2007; Das 2008; Nepram 2002).

Another important aspect of the ULFA's early history in Bangladesh was the assistance that it acquired — through the Bangladeshi government (S.K. Das 2011) — from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the intelligence agency of the Pakistani state, which sought revenge against India for supporting Bangladeshi independence (Das 2012). Secondary sources somewhat diverge on the exact nature of ISI's sponsorship, but they widely agree that it did operate Bangladeshi camps for northeast Indian insurgents (Bhatt 2004; Chanda & Gupta 2004; P.K. Das 2007; Pande 2004). It provided weapons and intelligence training, funded, armed and transported ULFA leaders and members throughout Bangladesh, as well as Pakistan, Bhutan, and Afghanistan (Barman 2010; Bhatt 2004; Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013; Bhaumik 2009; Centre for Development & Peace Studies; Chanda & Gupta 2004; S.K. Das 2011; Gogoi 2007; Mahanta 2013; Pande 2004; Saikia 2002; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*; Verghese 1997).<sup>34</sup>

In consideration of the ULFA's multi-layered activities in Bangladesh, it is clear that access to the country contributed substantially to the group's capacity in the 1990s. What that also did was upend the ULFA's ideology. As explained earlier, the ULFA initially opposed the so-called invasion of Muslim Bengali immigrants into Assam. In 1992, however, the organization released a pamphlet that publicly reversed this position. The document stated, "We consider the immigrants from East Bengal to be a major part of the national life of the people of Assam. Our freedom struggle can never be successful without these people" for stated reasons such as that their labor contributed to much of Assam's agricultural output (quoted in Mahanta 2013, p.68). Later, ULFA violence against Bengali immigrants declined (Sinha 2007). Authors agree that this attitudinal change resulted from either or both the ULFA's growing reliance on support from the Bangladeshi and Pakistani states and the group's desire to expand its support base in light of immigrants' large presence in Assam (Barman 2010; Mahanta 2013; Nepram 2002; Sinha 2007; Verghese 1997).

This shift is indicative of the substantial importance that transnational activities involving Bangladesh had for the ULFA. Otherwise, the group would have had no incentive to completely reevaluate a perceived problem that partially drove the ULFA to insurgency in the first place. This transformation also indicates that post-1992 border fortification that might have hindered illegal Bangladeshi immigration into Assam would not have diminished the ULFA's motivation to operate and, therefore, its levels of violence against civilians. However, as important as the ULFA's connections in Bangladesh were, Bhutan initially played an even more significant role after the Indian military operations of the early-1990s in Assam. The group's members and leadership even further relocated to Bhutan once a new, anti-ULFA Bangladeshi

---

<sup>33</sup> Interviewees such as this former ULFA leader may have ulterior motives for making claims like these, but such sources are nonetheless useful to at least consider in constructing a history of the ULFA.

<sup>34</sup> Currently available information on the ULFA-ISI relationship is less detailed than that about the ULFA's activities interactions with the Bangladeshi state. In this study, the author does not comprehensively examine the role of ISI. For the same reason, he does not address the vaguely described allegations by secondary sources regarding ULFA's connections to the Chinese state.

government under the Awami League in 1996 took power and initiated army attacks (Das 2012; Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Schendel 2005; Sinha 2007).

Access to Bhutan was crucial to the ULFA beginning in the early-to-mid 1990s. The group erected at least 13 camps for training and sanctuary in the southern forests of the country, as did other northeast Indian insurgents (Barman 2010; Bhaumik 2009; Centre for Development & Peace Studies; Chanda & Gupta 2004; P. K. Das 2007; Das 2012; Mahanta 2013; Nepram 2002; Purkayastha 2013; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). Sources estimate that between 1500 (Purkayastha 2013) and 2000 (Barman 2010; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*) ULFA members resided in these sites, while former-Foreign Secretary Choudhury reported a massive total of 5000 members (Bhattacharyya & Puri 2015). Regardless of its size, the group strategically conducted attacks in India from its Bhutanese bases, which bordered Assamese districts containing many pro-ULFA civilians (Bhaumik 2009; Journeyman Pictures 2016; Purkayastha 2013; Sinha 2007; Verghese 1997).


The ULFA also developed gainful construction businesses in Bhutan (Lintner 2015). Secretary Choudhury in his recent interview refuted the claim that the ULFA acquired state sponsorship in Bhutan, saying that “We did not receive any support from Bhutanese authorities. Officials came to our camp but failed to do anything for us” (quoted in Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013, p.86). This contrasts, however, with another interview (Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013, p.94) of “a former-ULFA staff officer.” A number of authors likewise claim that the Bhutanese state, or at least some associated individuals tacitly permitted the ULFA’s presence (Bhaumik 2009; Das 2012; Sinha 2007) and even provided rations and financial aid (Das 2012; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*) or even materiel (Kharat 2004). So, it is likely that the ULFA did indeed acquire support from at least individuals working in the Bhutanese government. Overall, the ULFA’s access to Bhutanese territory in the 1990s clearly bolstered members’ ability to train, fight and acquire resources.

Thus far, this research has outlined the early ULFA’s transnationality in both Bhutan and Bangladesh. It is now possible to analyze whether or not India-Bangladesh border fortifications caused the group’s first two surges of civilian killings in 2000 and 2004.<sup>35</sup> As explained earlier, the ULFA only utilized particular segments of the India-Bangladesh border for physical operations and weapons smuggling: Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura (MMT). Notably, completed Indian fencing of those individual states’ borders was insubstantial between the late-1990s and 2004. While half of Meghalaya’s 443 Km. border was fenced by 2004 (see Figures 5 & 6), Mizoram had no fencing along its 318 Km. border until 2006 (see Figures 7 & 8) and only 16% of Tripura’s 856 Km. border was fenced by 2004 (see Figures 9 & 10). To better demonstrate the significance of this information, the author created a graph depicting annual combined fencing along the MMT borders — totaling 1.617 Km. — and ULFA killings of civilians per year (see Figures 12 & 13).

As the below graphs (Figures 12 & 13) reflect, it is impossible at this stage of data collection to measure the pre-2004 temporal progress of Indian fencing along the MMT borders. What Figures 12 & 13 do show, however, is that the Indian state did not markedly fortify the Bangladesh-contiguous borders of MMT prior to the 2000 and 2004 spikes in ULFA killings of civilians. By 2004, less than a quarter of MMT’s combined border length of 1,617 Km. — 365 Km. — had been fenced. This was because Phase I of the border fencing projects included Meghalaya but not Mizoram and Tripura (Das 2008; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017). Phase II included all three state-level borders, as well as Assam and West Bengal, but this stage of fencing began only in 2000 with slow progress (Das 2008). Therefore, it would be unreasonable for me to argue that increases in border fortifications directly caused the 2000 and 2004 surges in ULFA civilian victimization. It is possible that the negligible fencing partially contributed to them, but not as a principal factor. Regardless, there are non-border fortification explanations for the two spikes in violence.

<sup>35</sup> The Indian state has never fortified the India-Bhutan border.

Figures 12 and 13



The ULFA committed its surge of civilian killings in 2000 mostly against non-Assamese, Hindi-speaking labourers. Mahanta (2013) contends that the ULFA’s growing reliance on Islamist Bangladeshi supporters in and out of the government, including the BNP, explains this first spike in anti-civilian violence (see also Bhaumik 2009; Chanda & Gupta 2004). The ULFA’s dependence on external support, the author claims, enabled the anti-Hindu sponsors to compel the group to commit violence against this particular demographic of people. If accurate, this explanation lends support to those who argue that state



sponsorship increases sponsored insurgents' victimization of civilians because sponsors demand it or the insurgents perform violent commitment in order to maintain funding (see Hovil & Werker 2005). In this sense, the function of the ULFA's violence in 2000 arguably did not relate to coercive resource extraction, especially not as a response to border fortification.

It is also possible, though, that even relatively minimal Indian fencing along the India-Bangladesh border had indeed lessened the success and profitability of the ULFA's cross-border activities — anti-Indian military combat and smuggling, respectively — thereby pushing it to rely even more on Bangladeshi state sponsorship despite its influence. This potential outcome of border fortification, in turn, would have indirectly contributed to the 2000 surge in civilian killings. Possessing greater knowledge of the exact contact and communications between ULFA leader and Bangladeshi sponsors would help to more clearly explain this dynamic. In the meantime, though, the author argues that the 2000 spike in ULFA violence against civilians was likely caused by the Bangladeshi state's sway on the organization, rather than any prior expansion of fortifications on the India-Bangladesh borders.

The probable explanation for the ULFA's 2004 surge in civilian killings also does not entail an increase in border fortification. Rather, two incidents of severe resource losses in 2003 and 2004, respectively, likely drove the group to perpetrate that violence. First, the ULFA lost its presence in Bhutan. Even though it had originally acquired at least some forms of support from the state or individuals within it, the ULFA overstayed its welcome. The Bhutanese government eventually wanted the ULFA to leave because of Indian government pressure, fear that the ULFA would align with a disgruntled ethnic group in southern Bhutan, and the ULFA itself was causing localized violence and disrupting the economy in southern Bhutan (P.K. Das 2007; Das 2012; Mahanta 2013; Sinha 2007). Bhutanese officials spent a few years requesting the ULFA to vacate its bases because of these issues. After the group refused to comprehensively do so (Bhaumik 2009; Kharat 2004), the Bhutanese military coordinated with the Indian military to initiate Operation All Clear in December 2003 that completely eliminated the ULFA's camps and its headquarters in southern Bhutan (Barman 2010; Bhaumik 2009; Centre for Development & Peace Studies; P. K. Das 2007; Das 2012; Lintner 2015; Mahanta 2013; Purkayastha 2013; Sinha 2007; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). The offensive also resulted in between 300 and 650 total deaths, arrests, and surrenders of ULFA members, as well as in the extraditions, arrests and deaths of a handful of some leaders (P. K. Das 2007; Mahanta 2013; Purkayastha 2013; Sinha 2007). Overall, this operation greatly damaged the ULFA by depriving the group of the external territory from which it chiefly operated transnationally.

The second event that the author argues contributed to the ULFA's high level of civilian victimization in 2004 was the infamous Chittagong Arms Haul. After being ousted from Bhutan, the ULFA sought to replenish its supplies and materiel by making a massive purchase of weapons in the black market that the group dominated at the time (Lintner 2015). Bangladeshi Police — ignoring the demands of pro-ULFA elements within the government (*The Economic Times* 2014) — then intercepted this procurement at the southern port of Chittagong in April 2004. The largest arms haul in the history of South Asia, this one included 10 truck-loads of somewhere over 1 million weapons and pieces of ammunition for 5000 weapon types, almost 6400 magazines, over 27,000 grenades and 2000 launchers, and 840 rocket launchers with 300 accompanying accessories. The purchasing cost of this failed shipment to the ULFA had been between 4.5 and 7 million U.S. Dollars (S. K. Das 2011; Mahanta 2013). Had it successfully acquired the stash of materiel, the ULFA would have both re-armed itself and made an enormous sum of money by selling many of the weapons to other insurgents throughout South Asia (Bhaumik 2009). This incident, then, essentially caused the ULFA to waste a vast sum of money, worsening the desperate conditions that the ULFA had been in since the 2003 Bhutan operation. Although the ULFA had contemporaneously maintained its presence in Bangladesh, these activities likely would not have been beneficial enough to immediately supplement the damage from the previous years' events.



The incidents of 2003 and 2004 clearly caused severe damage to the ULFA; it lost important external bases and experienced a severe diminution in resources. The organization subsequently embarked on a spree of unprecedented violence against civilians.<sup>36</sup> Many of the affiliated acts took the form of devastating bombings in public places (P.K. Das 2007). One author contends that the ULFA strategically turned to bombings of civilians because losing Bhutanese territory had made the group so weak that it could not target state forces in combat or with assassinations, like it had previously (Purkayastha 2013). This argument supports the foundational assumption of this study's theory regarding insurgents' violence and resources: resource losses make insurgents more desperate and, therefore, more likely to victimize civilians as either a battlefield strategy or for extracting resources. But, as with the 2000 surge in violence, the author does not claim that border fortifications directly caused this one in 2004. As noted earlier, Indian fortification of the ULFA-relevant MMT borders did not progress significantly until after 2004.

Hitherto, this study has explored the ULFA's high levels of civilian victimization in both 2000 and 2004. He attributed the first to the influence of Bangladeshi state sponsorship, noting that border fortification possibly amplified this entanglement. This study then explained the 2004 surge in civilian killings by pointing to the severe resource challenges that the ULFA experienced between 2003 and 2004. The author added here that the two likely causes of the violence aligned with this study's broader theoretical argument about resources and insurgents' desperate violence. In contrast to these explanations, the author contends that the ULFA's 2007 surge in violence likely happened in significant part due to a preceding increase in Indian fortification of the MMT borders. This fortification emerged in a context of the ULFA's unprecedented use of Bangladeshi territory and diminishing civilian support for the group.

Bangladesh had grown more vital to the ULFA by the mid-2000s in comparison to earlier years. The ULFA had first reorganized a number of its camps in the country following the 2001 re-election of the friendly BNP (Gopal 2004). The BNP became the ruling party of Bangladesh that year by making a coalition with other Islamist parties. This grouping facilitated comparatively greater support for the ULFA and other northeast Indian insurgents until the next set of elections at the end of 2008 (Chanda & Gupta 2004; Pande 2004; Singh & Kumar 2004). The ULFA even funded Islamist political parties and candidates who would ensure that the group keep receiving Bangladeshi governmental support (Mahanta 2013). Therefore, 2001-2008 is the time period during which the ULFA garnered the most sponsorship from the Bangladeshi state that it ever had.

The ULFA also began to utilize Bangladesh as the foremost territory from which it operated because of the Bhutan episode (Barman 2010; Gopal 2004; Sinha 2007; see also Appendix II). The BNP government continued denying the existence of ULFA camps to the Indian government (Pande 2004), but these certainly flourished. The ULFA also developed in Bangladesh a large number of lucrative businesses spanning from vehicular driving instruction, clothing shops, and chicken farming to a hospital and hotels (Barman 2010; Das 2012; Gopal 2004; Rana 2018). Presumably, the group continued to participate in the regional arms-trade after the Chittagong incident (Bhaumik 2009). In all, the ULFA enormously relied on its ability to traverse the India-Bangladesh border from 2004 onward.

Another striking characteristic of the ULFA at this time was its declining popularity. The ULFA's 2000-onward turn to new indiscriminate violence had alienated many of its backers (H. N. Das 2011). One brutal 2004 attack at an Indian Independence Day celebration in Dhemaji, Assam that had killed 22 people, including children, particularly fostered anger against the organization (Barman 2010; Misra 2009; Purkayastha 2013; *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*). Beyond the moral outrage, the violence also conveyed to the Assamese population that not even ULFA supporters were necessarily safe from the group's violence. Thus, ULFA members' overall public image changed, according to one author, "into terrorists

---

<sup>36</sup> GTD data confirms that the ULFA's incidents of violence in 2004 transpired in the latter half of 2004, which was after the Chittagong arms haul in April and obviously after the military operation in Bhutan. UCDP data for 2004 does not include dates for most attacks.

from revolutionaries” (Purkayastha 2013, p.50). Anti-ULFA dissent in a handful of areas even reached the dramatic point that some civilians murdered individual members of the group in response to localized incidents of ULFA violence (Barman 2010).

Further illustrating the ULFA’s change in reputation, Mahanta (2013) conducted fieldwork interviews in 2001 with a sample of Assamese civilians. Most of them perceived the contemporary ULFA as engaging in destructive violence on behalf of the Bangladeshi state, colluding with other external supporters like ISI, and advocating for Bangladeshi immigrants. The vast majority of those interviewed did not support the ULFA because of these views. Barman (2010) similarly conducted interviews with civil society activists in Assam in the mid-2000s and reached the same conclusion. Most interviewees expressed the belief that the ULFA had lost its previously established mass support base because of its growing victimization of civilians and connections to the Bangladeshi state. External sponsorship, then, undermined the ULFA’s local support in Assam, the region that it claimed to fight for (H. N. Das 2011).

Clearly, greater levels of external sponsorship and of indiscriminate violence by the ULFA had lessened its support from the Assamese populace, particularly in the mid-to-late-2000s. This does not, however, fully clarify why the ULFA resorted to that behavior in the first place. The author maintained earlier that Bangladeshi influence and massive resource losses most significantly caused the 2000 and 2004 surges in violence, respectively. In regard to 2007, the author argues that MMT border fortification likely played a critical role in triggering greater victimization of civilians.

The MMT borders underwent pronounced fortification in the mid-2000s. Between 2004 and 2006, total completed fencing tripled from 365 Km. to 1097 Km. out of the total 1,617 Km. (see Figures 12 & 13).<sup>37</sup> This rapid progress was perhaps surprising. The topography along the India-Bangladesh border as a whole is heterogeneous and somewhat uncondusive to fencing since it includes rivers, hills, plains, forests and jungles (Das 2008; P. Das 2016; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017; Verghese 1997). Meghalaya and Tripura are notably hilly (G. Das 2016). Indian communities in Meghalaya and other places located near the international border have also sometimes physically and legally protested fencing because it would disrupt their lives (Das 2008; G. Das 2016; Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017). Nevertheless, the Indian state managed to significantly fence the MMT borders from 2004 to 2006.

In light of the ULFA’s tremendous presence in Bangladesh after 2004, this period of MMT border fortification likely directly affected the ULFA’s cross-border strategic capabilities and access to resources and, therefore, its high level of violence against civilians in 2007. First, that specific increase in border fortification possibly caused the ULFA to increasingly resort to violence against civilians as a strategy when it could not as easily move across the India-Bangladesh border to attack state targets. Second, and similarly to what the author described in regard to the 2000 surge in violence, 2004-2006 border fortification likely drove the ULFA to rely even more heavily on Bangladeshi and even Pakistani support whose reinforced influence could have compelled more civilian victimization. This is potentially evidenced by the fact that, according to government officials, the ULFA again directed much of its fatal violence in 2007 against Hindi-speaking laborers: 61 in January, 10 in May, and 28 in August (Akhtar & Chaturvedi 2008; Dhoot et al. 2007). Finally, the 2004-2006 MMT border fortification possibly made acquiring and selling weapons more difficult and less profitable for the ULFA. These likely outcomes of pre-2007 MMT border fortification all arguably inflamed the group’s resource desperation that fueled its 2007 surge of targeting civilian victims; no other notable events at this time drained the ULFA of resources. The 2007 violence, in turn, likely further perpetuated a cycle of diminishing civilian support and reliance on external

---

<sup>37</sup> The 2007-2008 Annual Report published by the Ministry of Home Affairs describes how “adverse climatic conditions” and “repeated submergence” under water tarnished Phase I fencing to the point that the government decided to entirely reinstall the fencing under Phase III (Ministry of Home Affairs 2008, p.30). By the end of 2007, Phase III had commenced on the borders of Assam and West Bengal but not on Meghalaya’s. So, this fencing did not affect the ULFA prior to the 2007 surge in violence.

sponsorship. In this sense, the author argues, an increase in border fortification conglomerated with other factors to cause the ULFA's high level of civilian killings in 2007. This conclusion lends support to H1.

After its third massive exhibition of violence, the ULFA experienced a steep decline (see Appendix II). In June 2008, the most powerful and trained battalion of the organization singularly initiated a ceasefire to negotiate with the government in support of increasing Assam's autonomy, rather than wholesale independence (Centre for Development and Peace Studies). The faction pursued this attempt, which failed, because it had lost faith in ULFA leadership (Mahanta 2013), particularly over the group's relatively new embrace of civilian victimization (Purkayastha 2013). Then, the Awami League became the Bangladeshi government again after elections at the end of 2008. Shortly thereafter, the Bangladeshi state conducted seminal military operations against the ULFA. Over the course of 2009-2010, many group members began to surrender and security forces arrested and extradited multiple high-level leaders of the group, including its chairman, to India (Bhattacharyya & Puri 2013; Bhaumik 2009; H. N. Das 2011; S. K. Das 2011; Das 2012; Lintner 2015; Purkayastha 2013; Rana 2018; Saksena 2018; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*).

The ULFA split into pro-talks and anti-talks factions between 2011-2012 after most of the remaining leadership and 297 group members agreed to unconditional peace negotiations with the Indian government. These talks have not yet concluded. Former members receive some financial support from the Indian government, but women involved with the ULFA face stigma that prevents them from equitably accessing these benefits and jobs (Ahmed 2013; Deka 2018; Moral 2013). The ULFA-Independent of only about 200 members, on the other hand, has continued to operate since this bifurcation by sustaining ties to other insurgents, ISI, and a few camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma (Centre for Development & Peace Studies; *South Asia Terrorism Portal*). Overall, the of the ULFA from the late-2000s through to the present day markedly diverges from its powerful position in the 1990s.

## Conclusion

This study has investigated how states' fortification of their borders as a tactic of counterinsurgency impacts transnational insurgents' patterns of violence against civilians. The building of border walls and fences is a burgeoning phenomenon on a global scale, yet empirical evidence does not yet exist for their utility in the context of insurgencies that traverse international borders. This study has sought to fill that knowledge gap by conducting a preliminary case study of the ULFA in northeast India, a region that experiences the nexus between border fortification, transnational insurgency, and violence against civilians in civil war. The author has utilized the method of process tracing and incorporated a new dataset on Indian fortification of the India-Bangladesh border. Studying this neglected topic is important because it concerns, not just the academic study of conflict and border barriers, but political decision-making in the real world and the consequences of counterinsurgency for noncombatants.

In that pursuit, the author has established preliminary evidence for his argument that border fortification causes transnational insurgents to experience resource desperation that makes them more likely to perpetrate temporary surges of violence against civilians. The author contends that the construction of border barriers interferes with insurgent groups' transnational activities: physical operations in external territories and participation in cross-border commercial networks of illicit goods. Impacted organizations consequently demand more support from civilian populations who are less willing to provide it to increasingly incapacitated insurgents. The resulting incongruence drives the transnational insurgents to commit more violence against civilians as a means of both coercive resource extraction and strategy.

As the author found in the case-study, the ULFA killed the most civilians in its history in 2007 likely because of a significant preceding increase in fortification of segments of the India-Bangladesh border that the ULFA had historically relied on for its transnational activities. This occurred in a context of substantial state sponsorship from Bangladesh and declining civilian support for the ULFA. Bangladeshi state support,

and resource losses in Bhutan and the Chittagong arms haul, likely contributed to the group's two earlier annual surges of violence in 2000 and 2004. On the other hand, the group did not intensify its violence against civilians in the aftermath of destructive Indian military operations in the early-1990s or losing of losing its bases in Myanmar; this was likely because the ULFA established new external bases and because it still held widespread support among civilian Assamese who could at least partially offset the organization's resource desperation. Clearly, the ULFA's access to resources and level of public support interacted with factors like counter-insurgency operations and border fortification to shape the group's patterns of violence against civilians. These findings pertain only to the ULFA's fatal violence because the N-size of the group's measured kidnappings is too small to make any claims of causation or correlation.

These novel findings present a number of theoretical implications. First, insurgencies should be studied in what are their often transnational contexts. The ULFA's extensive external operations and black market connections to actors, states, and territories across South Asia were prevalent elements of the group's history. If such cross-border activities are overlooked in scholarship, researchers would miss out on their crucial ramifications for transnational insurgent organizations. Relatedly, this study's preliminary results highlight the problematic state of literature on border fortifications. It is clearly possible that border walls and fences play a consequential role in transnational civil conflicts than scholarship has previously considered. As states throughout the world increasingly decide to wield border fortification for counter-insurgency, this dynamic should be considered in research on civil conflict.

This study's findings also provide other theoretical implications outside of the realm of the author's central argument. A multitude of factors impact insurgents' behavior, including their violence against civilians. But resource losses — whether caused by border fortifications, battle losses, losing external bases, or otherwise — appear to impact insurgent organizations' general violence. If they do not hold potent civilian support in these contexts, the groups become more likely to resort to civilian victimization for resources or strategy. In this sense, this study aligns with the interactions emphasis of the civilian victimization literature that considers how external factors shape insurgents' treatment of non-combatant populations (Hultman 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Lilja 2009; Stewart & Liou 2017; Wood 2014a; Wood & Kathman 2015). Finally, the history of the ULFA also demonstrates that insurgent groups do not necessarily maintain coherent goals, resource bases, or strategies throughout the duration of their existence. State sponsorship can significantly shape groups' behavior even to the extent of changing their ideological objectives; this applies even to groups that had originally formed with social endowments (see Weinstein 2007). Overall, this study's findings and their theoretical implications contribute to the bodies of literature on insurgent behavior, violence in civil wars and border fortifications.

A number of limitations characterize this study. The first is the author's attempt to determine causality. It is difficult to precisely ascertain insurgents' resource levels since their activities are, by definition, clandestine. For qualitative studies like this study, it would be beneficial to conduct interviews with former insurgent leaders and fighters in order to more granularly trace the locations and size of smuggling networks, temporal variation in cross-border activities, the localized effects of border fortification, and other related subjects. But, as the author has repeatedly stated, he only claims that this study provides preliminary evidence; more work certainly would need to be done in order to verify claims of causality between border fortification and transnational insurgents' violence against civilians.

Second, the author's dataset is limited in its measurement of border fortifications along the frontiers of all India's northeast states. As far as he could find, currently available Indian government documents do not provide enough information to account for subnational border fortification prior to 2004. Communicating with Indian government officials and viewing official archives might provide this type of needed data.

Other concerns about this study regard the connection between its theory and case selection. It is possible that benefiting from illicit cross-border commercial networks would make transnational insurgent groups less dependent on civilians, irrespective of their other activities and characteristics. If true, this would interfere with the author's theorized relationship that border fortifications make such groups more likely to victimize civilians for resources specifically. It would be theoretically useful, then, to analyze the effects of border fortification on a case that physically crossed international borders but did not participate in black markets. Similarly, as the author said at the outset of this study, the ULFA is a conservative case. It accessed multiple international borders in a complex region where it interacted with multiple states, numerous insurgent organizations, and varying civilian populations. A study that might better isolate the effects of border fortifications on transnational insurgents' resources would be of a case that maintained access to fewer international borders and did not acquire state sponsorship.

Fifth, the author did not substantially discuss forms of border fortification other than fencing. It is possible that different types of border fortification impact cross-border phenomena like insurgency in unique ways. It would be useful, then, to specifically investigate roads, floodlighting, security patrols, surveillance, and other types of border fortifications with the same level of theoretical attention that the author gave to fencing. However, this study's conceptualization and operationalization of border fortification as walls and fences is still pertinent because they arguably play the greatest role in physically obstructing the movement of insurgents and illicit goods across international borders.

Sixth, this case-study did not disaggregate "civilians" to the complex array of groups within Assam and northeast India. The author distinguished between Hindi victims of ULFA violence and Assamese people, but did not otherwise account for variation within the general civilian population. Further studies of insurgent violence against civilians would do well to account for societal diversity.

Seventh, this study did not address the location of transnational insurgents' violence in relation to border fortifications. Perpetrating violence against civilians in a capital city far from a group's external base may result from different causes — resource-related or not — than violence in isolated rural regions. This might be an important dynamic of insurgents' behavior in relation to border fortification that future research should consider.

Finally, this study primarily operationalized insurgents' violence against civilians as fatal. Forms of insurgent violence, however, fall along a broader spectrum. This was the logic for this study's second hypothesis regarding civilian kidnappings that the author could not evaluate because of a dearth of data on the ULFA case. The author still did not consider other non-fatal forms of violence, and so further research on this topic should consider these in addition to killings. Altogether, this study has some limitations, but it makes a useful contribution to scholarship by investigating an ignored topic with new data and a strong methodological approach.

This case-study serves as a starting point for other inquiries relating to border fortifications and transnational insurgency. These questions can revolve around neighboring states' relations, insurgencies' recruitment strategies, civilians' roles in conflict, and how states perceive their fortified borders over time. Investigating these subjects would complement this study's investigation into the relationship between border fortification and transnational insurgents' violence against civilians.

The preliminary findings of this study have bearings on policy-making in today's world. States are increasingly pursuing border fortification for its utility in hindering the activities of transnational insurgents. However, policy-makers need to consider the possibility that doing so may ultimately put civilians in greater harm's way. Engaging in tactics like border fortifications that possibly endanger civilians undermines the goals of counter-insurgency to preserve stability, maintain security, and reinforce the state's authority. More broadly, this study implies, border barriers do not shield societies from the violent phenomenon of transnational insurgency; walls and fences function as one factor among many in conflict environments that,



according to this study, might exacerbate insurgents' desperation and consequent treatment of civilians. A more successful, if long-term and difficult, solution to transnational insurgency would be to resolve the political, social and economic conditions that spawn the motivations for rebellion in the first place.

### **Appendix I — India-Bangladesh Border Fortifications Dataset**

This appendix provides a basic outline of how the author created the India-Bangladesh Border Fortification Dataset. He drew the information for this dataset from Annual Reports released by the Ministry of Home Affairs<sup>38</sup> and official debates in the Rajya Sabha, India's upper parliament.<sup>39</sup> Data on India-Bangladesh border fortification spans from 1991-2018 while data on border fortification of the five individual Indian states — Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal — spans from 2004-2016. The data encompasses Phases I and II fencing and roads, Phase III fencing, and floodlighting; this is broken down into completed and sanctioned amounts when that information is available. All data is reported in kilometers (Km.) based on the official international measurements used in these documents.

The author originally organized the fortification dataset to account for month variation. However, doing so made it impossible in Stata to plot fortification progress with as many yearly entries as possible; doing so also made the data incompatible with annual GTD and UCDP data. Therefore, the author changed his fortifications data to annual by collapsing any sets of multiple entries that the author had for a given year, keeping the highest recorded amount of fortification from as late in such year as possible. The author adds a note to each entry in the "Year" column to explain which documents that year's information came from. The author has kept the pre-annual dataset for comparison to the annual dataset.

The government documents do not collectively provide a uniform level of detail on dates. Some Annual Reports and official debates include the specific date by which fencing, roads, or floodlighting had been completed specifically delineated by Phase. If this is the case for an Annual Report, the author codes each annual entry by the year of these specific dates. If an Annual Report provides a particular year of publication, the author lists that even without the month. For Official Debates, the author specifies annual amounts of fencing, etc. by year if the documents specifically indicate the year of progress. Otherwise, the author standardizes how he codes based on when a document was published. For Annual Reports without specific dates, the author codes the progress of fencing, for instance, by the first year of the two years in the document title (eg. 2008 for a 2008-2009 report). He sometimes can derive from the document's language which year out of the two in its title the report was published in. If the author employs this tactic, he explains specifically how in a note of that yearly entry's cell. Relatedly, there are situations in which the author has a 2012 document and a 2012-specific month document, but does not know which one to use for a single yearly entry. In these situations, the author decides to employ his judgement; he compares the data in the month-less document to the previous and subsequent ones. If an official debate does not provide a year for the discussed progress, the author codes the year based on the "Date of Debate" for each document. The author includes a note for cells in which he uses this method for either Annual Reports or Official Debates. Some documents give a specific date only for one type of progress — for example, fencing — but not for another — road progress, for instance. In these cases, the author assumes that the given date for one phenomenon also applies to others in the same document.

In addition to organizing data on Phases I and II separately, the author created a section that combines the two in order to account for the full progress of something like fencing in a given year. Sometimes, the documents directly provide these amounts. For other years, the author manually adds Phase I and Phase II amounts. The documents that provide total amounts sometimes round these numbers

<sup>38</sup> <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.

<sup>39</sup> <http://rsdebate.nic.in/>.

even if the individual amounts in Phase I and Phase II contained decimals; this explains very minor deviations between the listed total amounts and the totals that result from manually adding combined progress the two phases.

The author also accounts for the above issue by created “Rounded Down” columns for every entry of fencing, roads, or floodlighting progress; this eliminates the decimals inconsistency. The author rounds down, rather than up, to make the data marginally conservative so as not to overestimate progress of fencing, roads, or floodlighting. In the rounded down columns in the section combining Phases I and II, the author rounds down from the manually added amounts.


After employing the above methods to organize yearly data, some cell entries still remained empty. The author devises two ways to manually code progress in these gaps. Phase I was officially completed by 1999, so after filling out the entire dataset, the author fills in Phase I amounts for empty cells that are between other cells that contain identical amounts (ex. if 2003 and 2005 are both coded as 50KM, then the author codes 2004 also as 50KM). To continue with that example, if the 2003 and 2005 amounts are 50.111KM and 50.11, respectively, the author fills the gap with the two-decimal point number. There are instances when the documents do not give full data of border fencing or roads for a given year, such as not including the completed amount of fencing or roads from both phases. When this occurs, the author adds the two for combined Phase I and Phase II entries, making a note when doing so. These are the two possible notes that the author makes in the cells where he manually filled in gaps: “Manually filled in because previous and subsequent year-month amounts are identical” and “Manually filled in by adding phases I and II’s respective amounts.” After filling in gaps in a column measuring completed progress, the author then fills in the gaps in the related rounded down column; he also includes a note in the cells of such entries.

Subsequent to the columns regarding border fortification, the author includes two others that code for annual violence by the ULFA. “Best” estimates data from the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s* measurement of one-sided violence are coded annually. The other column includes fatal killings of civilians by the ULFA whose operationalization the author explains in the Research Design and Data section of the study. The author notes here, though, that he manually added the yearly number of killings by combining the number of killed victims in all incidents in a given year.

### Appendix II – Timeline

## United Liberation Front of Assam

History and Transnationality



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akhtar, Kamal & Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi. 2008. "Violence by ULFA" <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/106884>
- Avdan, Nazli & Christopher F. Gelpi. 2017. "Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence." *International Studies Quarterly*, 61: p.14-27. <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/isq/sqw042>
- Azam, Jean-Paul. 2006. "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians." *Economics of Governance*, 7 (1): p.53-73. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-004-0090-x>
- Azam, Jean-Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (4): p.461-485. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004006>
- Azmi, Abu Asim. 2005. "Foreign Help to Extremists against India." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/65070>
- Barman, P. 2010. *Changing Perception of Freedom: Civil Society and Its Response to United Liberation Front of Asam*. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House.
- Behera, Anshuman. 2017. "Insurgency, Drugs and Small Arms in Myanmar." *Strategic Analysis*, 41 (1): p.34-48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249176>
- Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. 2006. "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9 (1): p.455-76. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104918>
- Bhatt, Anil. 2004. "ISI's Eastward Operations— Old Links in North-East India and New Ones in South-East Asia." In *Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.233-252.
- Bhattacharjee, Karnendu. 2001. "Problem of Insurgency in North-East." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/24941>
- . 2002. "Infiltration of Terrorists from Nepal and Bangladesh." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/89362>
- . 2003. "Fencing of Indo-Bangladesh Border." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/100206>
- Bhattacharya, G. C. 1983. "Curbing Guerrilla Infiltration from Bangladesh and Burma." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/361754>
- Bhattacharyya, Rajeev & Nikhil Raymond Puri. 2013. "An Annotated Interview with Sashadhar Choudhury, Foreign Secretary, United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam]." *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 7 (2): p.82-94. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26296926>
- Bhaumik, Subir. 2009. *Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India's North East*. Los Angeles: SAGE. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fau/detail.action?docID=488131>
- Buhaug, Halvard, Scott Gates & Päivi Lujala. 2009. "Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of Civil Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53 (4): p.544-569. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336457>
- Buhaug, Halvard & Scott Gates. 2002. "The Geography of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (4): p.417-433. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039004003>
- Butt, Ahsan I., ed. 2017. "India's Strategies against Separatism in Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir, 1984-1994" in *Secession and Security, Explaining State Strategy against Separatists*, Cornell University Press, p.83-124. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1w0d9w9.8>
- Cannon, Brendon John. 2016. "Terrorists, Geopolitics and Kenya's Proposed Border Wall with Somalia." *Journal of Terrorism Research*, 7 (2): p.23-37. <https://cvir.st-andrews.ac.uk/article/10.15664/jtr.1235/>
- Carter, David B. & Paul Poast. 2017. "Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability." *Journal of Conflict-Resolution*, 61 (2): p.239-270. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715596776>
- Centre for Development & Peace Studies. "Militant Groups Profile." *Centre for Development and Peace Studies*. [http://cdpsindia.org/assam\\_mgp.asp](http://cdpsindia.org/assam_mgp.asp)
- Chadha, Vivek. 2005. *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis*. SAGE Publications India.
- Chairman et al. 1991. "Training of Insurgents in Burma and Bangladesh." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/239849>
- Chanda, Saswati & Alok Kumar Gupta. 2004. "Pakistan-Bangladesh Nexus in Abetting Insurgency in India's North-East." In *Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.253-273.
- Cherry, Janet. 2012. *Spear of the Nation: Umkhonto WeSizwe*. Ohio University Press.
- Chin, Ko-Lin. 2009. *The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade*. Cornell University Press.
- Choudhury, Sanghamitra. 2016. *Women and Conflict in India*. New York: Routledge.
- Cohen, Dara Kay. 2013. "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)." *American Political Science Review*, 107 (3): p.461-477. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/explaining-rape-during-civil-war-crossnational-evidence-19802009/30FC323D6DA7E923547156CC0E947213>
- Collier, David. 2011. "Understanding Process Tracing." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44 (4): p.823-830. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/understanding-process-tracing/183A057AD6A36783E678CB37440346D1>

- Das, Gautam. 2017. *Securing India's Borders: Challenges and Policy Options*. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies.
- Das, Gurudas. 2012. *Security and Development in India's Northeast*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Das, Harendra Nath. 2011. *Beyond North-East: Insurgency ~ History ~ Development*. New Delhi: Manas Publications.  
[http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product\\_info.php?products\\_id=961](http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=961)
- Das, Harendra Nath. 2007. "Brigands of Fortune: The Economics of North East Militancy." In *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*, Viking, p.155–169.
- Das, Kumar Deepak. 2009. "Steps to Curb Cross-Border Terrorism along Indo-Bangla Border." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/225378>
- . 2010. "Status of Indo-Bangladesh Border Fencing." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/349717>
- Das, P. K. 2007. *Cross-Border Terrorism in South Asia*. New Delhi: Sumit Enterprises.  
[http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product\\_info.php?products\\_id=463](http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=463).
- Das, Pushpita. 2008. "India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government's Response." *Strategic Analysis*, 32 (3): p.367–388. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802063228>
- . 2016. *Illegal Migration from Bangladesh: Deportation, Border Fences and Work Permits*. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
- Das, Samir Kumar. 2011. "ULFA Indo-Bangladesh Relations and Beyond." In *Conflicts in the Northeast: Internal and External Effects*, Vij Books India, p.25–46.
- Datta, Sreeradha. 2000. "Security of India's Northeast: External Linkages." *Strategic Analysis*, 24 (8): p.1495–1516.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455301>
- Dear, Michael. 2013. *Why Walls Won't Work: Repairing the US-Mexico Divide*. Oxford University Press.
- Deka, Dixita. 2018. "Reframing Female Agency in Insurgency: Women's Voices from Assam." *South Asia @ LSE*.  
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/03/07/reframing-female-agency-in-insurgency-womens-voices-from-assam/>
- Desai, Rami. 2018. "Impact of Insurgency on Women: A Study within the Context of Northeast India." <http://www.indiafoundation.in/impact-of-insurgency-on-women-a-study-within-the-context-of-northeast-india/>
- Dhoot, Rajkumar, S. S. Ahluwalia & Jaya Bachchan. 2007. "Civilians Killed by ULFA." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/31727>
- Diener, Alexander C. & Joshua Hagen. 2012. *Borders: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman. 2007. "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data." *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (2): p.233–246. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075124>
- Eck, Kristine, Margareta Sollenberg & Peter Wallensteen. 2003. "One-Sided Violence and Non-State Conflict." *States in Armed Conflict*: p.1-9.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2010. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2007. "Transnational Dimensions of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (3): p.293–309.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307076637>
- Gogoi, Dilip. 2007. "Resurrection of a Sunset Dream: ULFA and the Role of the State." In *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*, Viking, p.116–133.
- Gohain, Hiren. 2007. "Chronicles of Violence and Terror: Rise of United Liberation Front of Asom [Assam]." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42 (12): p.1012–1018. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4419382>
- Gopal, Krishan. 2004. "Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh and Its Role in North-East Insurgency." In *Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.171–198.
- Green, Amelia Hoover. 2016. "The Commander's Dilemma: Creating and Controlling Armed Group Violence." *Journal of Peace Research*, 53 (5): p.619–632. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316653645>
- Gurses, Mehmet. 2015. "Transnational Ethnic Kin and Civil War Outcomes." *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 (1): p.142–153.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914554042>
- Hariprasad, B. K. 2016. "Plan for Insurgency and Border Issues in NER." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/663804>
- Hassner, Ron E. & Jason Wittenberg. 2015. "Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?" *International Security*, 40 (1): p.157–190. [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00206](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/ISEC_a_00206)
- Henshaw, Alexis Leanna. 2016. "Where Women Rebel." *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 18 (1): p.39–60.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1007729>
- Hovil, Lucy & Eric Werker. 2005. "Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An Account of Rational, Sub-Optimal Violence in Western Uganda." *Rationality and Society*, 17 (1): p.5–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463105051775>
- Hultman, Lisa. 2007. "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19 (2): p.205–222. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550701246866>
- Humphreys, Macartan & Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2006. "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War." *American Political Science Review*, 100 (3): p.429–447. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/handling-and-manhandling-civilians-in-civil-war/4981647EDFE411635EB2086C4A851BFA>



- Jellissen, Susan M. & Fred M. Gottheil. 2013. "On the Utility of Security Fences along International Borders." *Defense & Security Analysis*, 29 (4): p.266–279. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2013.842707>
- Jindal, Nirmal. 2004. "Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh: Implications on India's Security." In *Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.199–214.
- Jones, Reece. 2016. *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move*. London: Verso Books.
- Jonsson, Michael & Elliot Brennan. 2014. "Drugs, Guns and Rebellion: A Comparative Analysis of the Arms Procurement of Insurgent Groups in Colombia and Myanmar." *European Journal on Criminal Policy & Research*, 20 (3): p.307–321. <http://ezproxy.fau.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=sih&AN=97383609&site=eds-live&scope=site>
- Journeyman Pictures. 2016. *The Nationalist Movement in Assam (1997)*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4nZ0nYkqT0>
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Khandelwal, Pyarelal. 2008. "Terrorism in North-Eastern State Encouraged by Bangladesh" <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/108859>
- Kharat, Rajesh S. 2004. "Coping with ULFA." *Economic & Political Weekly*, 39 (17): p.1661–1663. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4414923>
- Khory, Kavita R., ed. 2018. "Regional Migration and Indian Security." In *The Oxford Handbook of India's National Security*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.323–340.
- Lake, David A. 2011. "Why 'Isms' Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress." *International Studies Quarterly*, 55 (2): p.465–480. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23019696>
- Lintner, Bertil. 2015. *Great Game East: India, China & the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mahanta, Nani Gopal. 2013. *Confronting the State: ULFA's Quest for Sovereignty*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fau/detail.action?docID=1187494>
- Martínez, Luis. 2017. "Transnational Insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the Border with Chávez's Venezuela." *Journal of Development Economics*, 126: p.138–153. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387817300081>
- Meehan, Patrick. 2015. "Fortifying or Fragmenting the State? The Political Economy of the Opium/Heroin Trade in Shan State, Myanmar, 1988–2013." *Critical Asian Studies*, 47 (2): p.253–282. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2015.1041280>
- Meehan, Patrick. 2011. "Drugs, Insurgency and State-Building in Burma: Why the Drugs Trade Is Central to Burma's Changing Political Order." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 42 (3): p.376–404. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-southeast-asian-studies/article/drugs-insurgency-and-statebuilding-in-burma-why-the-drugs-trade-is-central-to-burmas-changing-political-order/2F7555450EA820334A0B7B2C8D816FFC>
- Ministry of Home Affairs. 2017. *Annual Report: 2016-2017*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2016. *Annual Report: 2015-2016*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2015. *Annual Report: 2014-2015*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2014. *Annual Report: 2013-2014*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2013. *Annual Report: 2012-2013*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2012. *Annual Report: 2011-2012*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2011. *Annual Report: 2010-2011*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2010. *Annual Report: 2009-2010*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2009. *Annual Report: 2008-2009*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2008. *Annual Report: 2007-2008*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2007. *Annual Report: 2006-2007*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2006. *Annual Report: 2005-2006*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2005. *Annual Report: 2004-2005*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- . 2004. *Annual Report: 2003-2004*. <https://mha.gov.in/documents/annual-reports>.
- Ministry of Women and Child Development. *Insurgency in Assam*. <https://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/Women%20Headed%20Household-Assam-%20Final%20Report.pdf>
- Minorities at Risk. "Chronology for Assamese in India." <http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=75015>
- Mishra, Kalraj. 2005. "Use of Nepal and Bangladesh Borders by Terrorists/Insurgents." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/60141>
- Misra, Udayon. 2009. "ULFA: Beginning of the End." *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44 (52): p.13–16. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25663932>
- Mkandawire, Thandika. 2002. "The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial 'Rebel Movements' in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence against the Peasantry." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40 (2): p.181–215. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/terrible-toll-of-postcolonial-rebel-movements-in-africa-towards-an-explanation-of-the-violence-against-the-peasantry/8B06D1254FDBFD9271164A55FC08931C>
- Moral, Rakhee Kalita. 2013. *Living and Partly Living: The Politics of Freedom and the Women of United Liberation Front of Assam*. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum & Library.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2018. *Global Terrorism Database*. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
- Naylor, R. T. 2004. *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld Economy*. Cornell University Press.



- Nepam, Binalakshmi. 2002. *South Asia's Fractured Frontier: Armed Conflict, Narcotics and Small Arms Proliferation in India's North East*. Mittal.
- Nivat, Anne. 2005. "The Black Widows: Chechen Women Join the Fight for Independence—and Allah." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28 (5): p.413–419. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100500180394>
- Neuberg, A. et al. 1970. *Armed Insurrection*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. New Left Books.
- Ottmann, Martin. 2017. "Rebel Constituencies and Rebel Violence against Civilians in Civil Conflicts." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 34 (1): p.27–51. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570428>
- Palma, Oscar. 2015. "Transnational Networks of Insurgency and Crime: Explaining the Spread of Commercial Insurgencies beyond State Borders." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 26 (3): p.476–496. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.982885>
- Pande, Savita. 2004. "Pakistan's ISI Activities in Bangladesh and India's North-East" in *Insurgency in North-East India: the Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.253–273.
- Purkayastha, Samir Kar. 2013. "Impact on Assam, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Tripura." In *Consequences of Long-term Conflicts in Northeast India*, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, p.44–58.
- Rajya Sabha Secretariat. 2017. "Two Hundred Third Report — Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions." <http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Home%20Affairs/203.pdf>.
- Ramaswamy, M. A. M. 2005. "Terrorists Hiding in Bangladesh and Myanmar." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/44983>
- Rammohan, Edavelth Nalaamveetil. 2007. "Lebensraum in the East: Illegal Migration from Bangladesh." In *Frontier in Flames: North-East India in Turmoil*, Viking, p.14–33.
- Rana, Md Sohel. 2018. "Transformation of Indo-Bangladesh Relations: From Insecurity to Cooperation in Northeast India." *Strategic Analysis*, 42 (6): p.559–577. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1559976> (February 22, 2019).
- Ray, Jayanta Kumar. 2013. "Conflict in Assam and Its Consequences." In *Consequences of Long-term Conflicts in Northeast India*, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, p.59–65.
- Razi, Syed Sibtey. 1997. "Escalation in Cost of Indo-Bangladesh Border Fencing Project." <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/136588>
- Ricks, Jacob I. & Amy H. Liu. 2018. "Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 54 (4): p.842.
- Rosière, Stéphane & Reece Jones. 2012. "Teichopolitics: Re-Considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences." *Geopolitics*, 17 (1): p.217–234. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2011.574653>
- Roye, Arun (Major-General). 2013. "Transborder Insurgency and Effects." In *Consequences of Long-term Conflicts in Northeast India*, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, p.66–78.
- Saddiki, Said. 2018. *World of Walls: The Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of Separation Barriers*. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers. <http://books.openedition.org/obp/4561>
- Saikia, Jaideep. 2010. *Documents on North East India*. Delhi: Shipra Publications. <https://idsa.in/book/DocumentsonNorthEastIndia>
- . 2002. "The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 25 (3): p.185–197. <http://ezproxy.fau.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=sih&AN=6615052&site=eds-live&scope=site>
- Saikia, Pahi. 2004. "Beyond the Roots: Undocumented Bangladeshi Migrants in Assam and the Question of Ethnic Assamese Identity." In *Insurgency in North-East India: the Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.58–102.
- Salehyan, Idean. 2009. *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky & Reed M. Wood. 2014. "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities." *International Organization*, 68 (3): p.633–661. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/external-rebel-sponsorship-and-civilian-abuse-a-principalagent-analysis-of-wartime-atrocities/7B8C7423A615E804A829E95AEE9E4A39>
- Schendel, Willem van. 2004. *The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia*. London: Anthem Press.
- Sengupta, Dipankar & Sudhir Kumar Singh. 2004. "Introduction." In *Insurgency in North-East India: Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.233–252.
- Singh, Chandrika. 2004. *North-East India: Politics & Insurgency*. Manas Publications. [http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product\\_info.php?products\\_id=410](http://www.lancerpublishers.com/catalog/product_info.php?products_id=410).
- Singh, Sudhir Kumar, and Amit Kumar. 2004. "Revival of Islamist Forces in Bangladesh and Its Impact on North-East Insurgency." In *Insurgency in North-East India: The Role of Bangladesh*, Authorspress, p.215–230.
- Sinha, S. P. 2007. *Lost Opportunities: 50 Years of Insurgency in the North-East and India's Response*. Lancer Publishers.
- Speckhard, Anne. 2008. "The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31 (11): p.995–1023. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802408121>
- South Asia Terrorism Portal*. "United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - Terrorist Group of Assam." [https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist\\_outfits/ulfa.htm](https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/ulfa.htm)
- Staniland, Paul. 2018. "Counter-insurgency in India" in *The Oxford Handbook of India's National Security*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.229–246.


- . 2005. “Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense Is a Good Fence.” *The Washington Quarterly*, 29 (1): p.21–40. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016366005774859698>
- Stanton, Jessica A. 2013. “Terrorism in the Context of Civil War.” *The Journal of Politics*, 75 (4): p.1009–1022. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381613000984> (September 3, 2018).
- Stewart, Megan A. & Yu-Ming Liou. 2016. “Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties.” *The Journal of Politics*, 79 (1): p.284–301. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688699>
- Stohl, Rachel J. 2005. “Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms.” *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 25 (1): p.59–68. <https://muse.ihu.edu/article/181953>
- Thaler, Kai M. 2012. “Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola.” *Civil Wars*, 14 (4): p.546–567. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.740203>
- Thapliyal, Sheru (Major-General). 2013. “Insurgency in the Northeast-Can This Night without End Ever End?” In *Consequences of Long-term Conflicts in Northeast India*, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, p.84–101.
- The Economic Times*. 2014. “2004 Chittagong Arms Haul Case Exposes Many Terror Links.” *The Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/et-commentary/2004-chittagong-arms-haul-case-exposes-many-terror-links/articleshow/29918978.cms>
- The Hans India* 2017.
- The Telegraph*. 2003. “Ulfa Flush-out Mission.” *The Telegraph*. <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/ulfa-flush-out-mission/cid/816178>
- Thomas, Jakana L. & Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. “Women’s Participation in Violent Political Organizations.” *American Political Science Review*, 109 (3): p.488–506. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/womens-participation-in-violent-political-organizations/FD35CCB2555B2B3AA023D2A77F894370>
- Titeca, Kristof & Koen Vlassenroot. 2012. “Rebels without Borders in the Rwenzori Borderland? A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 6 (1): p.154–176. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2012.664708>
- Urrea, Luis Alberto. 2004. *The Devil’s Highway: A True Story*. New York: Back Bay Books.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program*.
- Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth & Dylan Balch-Lindsay. 2004. “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare.” *International Organization*, 58 (2): p.375–407. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/draining-the-sea-mass-killing-and-guerrilla-warfare/A4DD186DD876B363754AD358B8148014>
- Vallet, Élisabeth. 2014. “Introduction.” In *Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?* Ashgate Publishing.
- Verghese, B. G. 1997. *India’s Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development*. New Delhi: Konark.
- Verma, Kapil & Bhaskar Annaji Masodkar. 1991. “Infiltration of Insurgents into North-Eastern States from Across the Borders of Bangladesh and Myanmar.” <http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/233516> (February 5, 2019).
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, Reed M. 2016. “Intrastate Conflict and Civilian Victimization.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-29>
- . 2014a. “From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence.” *International Organization*, 68 (4): p.979–999. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/from-loss-to-looting-battlefield-costs-and-rebel-incentives-for-violence/A368245D4FABF684A7F7524566F7F32F>
- . 2014b. “Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support and Civilian Victimization in Civil War.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31 (5): p.461–480. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213510122>
- . 2010. “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 47 (5): p.601–614. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310376473>
- Wood, Reed M. & Jacob D. Kathman. 2015. “Competing for the Crown: Inter-Rebel Competition and Civilian Targeting in Civil War.” *Political Research Quarterly*, 68 (1): p.167–179, see: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912914563546>
- Wood, Reed M. & Jakana L Thomas. 2017. “Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology and Women’s Participation in Violent Rebellion.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 54 (1): p.31–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316675025>
- Yin, Robert K. 2017. *Case-Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods*. SAGE Publications.

## AUTHOR

**Jeffrey Coltman-Cormier, ABD**, is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in Political Sciences at Rutgers University in New Jersey. He graduated with a 2019 B.A. Honors Thesis (under Faculty Adviser Dr. Angela Nichols) in Political Sciences at Florida Atlantic University in Boca-Raton with dual-Majors in Political Sciences and History, and a Minor in Arabic, plus Certificates in Asian Studies, and Peace, Justice & Human Rights. His research agenda focuses on the relation between states and borderlands, and states’ attempts to control movements and set regional presence at borders.

## – BOOK REVIEW –

**James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (original: Prentice Hall, 1972 & revised 5<sup>th</sup> Edition: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2020, pages 522, ISBN 978-0367366773)  
by Manuel De Leon, Ph.D., Editor of *The Political Scientist Newsletter*  
(FPSA & Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona)**







Every American Presidential Election reminds me of Professor James D. Barber of Duke University's classic 1972 Political Sciences book, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, that I still recommend to my students as an introduction to the fascinating and complex world of the presidential character and how it shapes U.S. presidential performance. Thus, I take here this opportunity to recommend it again. Dr. Barber's book is old, but in its fully revised 5<sup>th</sup> edition (2020) is still relevant for two key reasons:

- First, it proposes a relatively novel idea: that the U.S. Presidency is shaped not only by the check and balances that the Constitution imposes on it, but also by the character of the Presidents.
- Second, Americans surely want to know or at least get a hint about how a new President will behave and lead, and the main objective of Barber's book is precisely that: give American voters a means to predict how a new president will exercise his/her presidential duties and prerogatives, behave in front and away from the flashy cameras, and lead the administration and nation.

For starters, it is worth noting that Barber's *The Presidential Character* is not the first book of its type. We can cite several other important precedents. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and Modern Presidents: the Politics of Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1960; 7<sup>th</sup> Edition 1991), focused mostly on decision-making within the limits of constitutional powers of the U.S. Presidency and how it all affects the presidential character. Neustadt's book earned great attention and still remains a seminal work on the topic.

We can also cite Erwin C. Hargrove, *Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), where he compared two opposing typologies of presidential leaderships: President of Action versus President of Restraint. For his comparison, Hargrove utilized personality traits such as personal drives, skills, styles and the values that each President bring to the Oval Office.



In addition, Harold Laswell, "A Note on Types of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-relational, Developmental" in *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXIV (July 1968), where he explained how to use power-seeking personalities to study political behavior in political leaders and activists. Laswell defines power in terms of persuasion, as the ability of powerful leaders to reason and persuade instead of bullying and coercing.

Coincidentally, also in July 1968 Alexander L. George, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders" in *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXIV (1968), first responded to Laswell's work. George is also one of the most productive and resourceful researchers on U.S. Presidential character and personalities.

And just a year earlier, Fred I. Greenstein published, "Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization" in *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. XI (1967) where he explored two main related themes:

- first, how personal variability among different actors affect political behavior;
- second, how ego-defensive needs tend to manifest in an actor's political behavior.

Like most books of its type, Barber's *The Presidential Character* draws and builds on the vast research in cognitive and behavioral psychology of the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Bruce Mazlish's published in the *New York Times* in 1972 a critique to Barber, *The Presidential Character*, pointing-out that Barber's typology "reminds one forcibly of Pavlovian psychology" in a clear reference to psychologist Ivan Pavlov. Indeed, Barber studies presidential character in terms of the psychology of adaptation, meaning how social experiences can shape a person's self-image, ideology and political attitudes. In addition, central to Barber's book is the concept of personality and how it affects character and behavior.

Note that, at the dawn of the XX Century, the word character basically referred to a person's moral and ethical fiber and a person's trustworthiness. In other words, if a man had character, then we would say that we could trust him. And *vice-versa*, if a man had no character, then we would certainly not trust him. That simple it used to be. But time went by and with it many words changed meanings, so today character basically refers to a person's overall personality. Character is at the core of personality.

Barber applies that new meaning to the context of the U.S. politics and, specifically, to the character of the U.S. Presidents and presidencies. Barber states that "the president's personality is what sets in motion the dynamic of his presidency" (Barber, 1972, p.21). Due to the tremendous powers, responsibilities and public standing U.S. Presidents carry, it is the U.S. Presidents' character what really shapes their presidency and the nation's political tone.

Thus, in order to grasp the true nature and character of a particular presidency, it is crucial to understand the President as a *persona*, meaning the President's psychological mix along with his/her leadership attributes. Barber defines personality as "the way the President orients himself toward life -not for the moment but enduringly" (Barber, p.8). And later he adds: "character provides the main thrust and broad direction but it does not determine in any fixed sense, world view and style" (Barber, p.11). A person's character develops during childhood and in most cases it stays stable afterward. It is during adolescence that character shapes a person's ideology with long lasting impact and consequences for that person's life. Of course, we now know that factors such gender, age, education, social strata, access to wealth and some others can shape a person's worldview, but it would be fair to state that even those factors have greater impact during adolescence than in any other stage of a person's life.

And like most theories about personality, Barber builds his on a two dimensions analysis, which he actually had used in his previous work, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). His two dimensions are *positive* and *negative*, which he outlines according to how much time and energy a person—an American President for that matter—puts into daily work and how that person appreciates or enjoys it. To those two dimensions Barber adds another two, the *active-passive*, which coincidentally was also employed by Edrita Fried, *Active/Passive: the Crucial Psychological Dimension* (New York: Harper, 1970). Let us remember that Barber first published his *The Presidential Character* later in 1972. Still, Barber combines and reshuffles the two pairs to create four new typologies: *active-positive*, *active-negative*, *passive-positive* and *passive-negative*. The result is a parsimonious, straightforward and easy to understand chart.



Barber then adds what he calls the *inductive component*, which consists in utilizing past presidential experiences and accounts to make interpretations about how Presidents respond to, for example, certain political situations, behave under normalcy and stress, and construe their relations with the media, members of his/her cabinets and people in general. Indeed, some say that history repeats itself while others argue that past experiences do not necessarily resemble new ones and they certainly do not lead to the same outcomes. Barber seems to not care about any of those assumptions and believes he can predict the character of future Presidencies based on his *inductive component* and four presidential typologies.

Barber defines the *active-positive* Presidential character as adaptive. U.S. Presidents with such typology seem to feel comfortable with their job and daily work. They definitely enjoy power, which they use to create political situations and opportunities favorable to them. *Active-positive* Presidents tend to be flexible, optimistic and amicable. They have high self-esteem, which allows them to create positive work environment and, thus, have productive relations with aids and subordinates. In this context, Barber defined as *active-positive* U.S. Presidents: Thomas Jefferson (Democrat-Republican), Franklin D. Roosevelt (D), Harry Truman (D), John F. Kennedy (D) and Gerald Ford (R).

For its part, the *active-negative* Presidential character is compulsive and 'tragedy prone'. They are invasive, overwhelming and dominant. Yes, they bully and humiliate, and they would insist on carrying on failing policies and then blame others of their failure. In addition, these kind of Presidents usually face serious political 'tragedies' as result of a too rigid character and approach to policy. They often debate between two dimensions: emotional reward versus physical and mental effort, meaning that they tend to experience low emotional reward for all the effort they put into their work and duties. They are aggressive, ambitious and power-seeking, but they would often ask: "Why bother?", "Why do I work so hard?", "No one appreciates my efforts!" Thus, Barber defined as *active-negative* U.S. Presidents: John Adams (Federalist), Woodrow Wilson (D), Hebert Hoover (R), Lyndon B. Johnson (D) and Richard Nixon (R).

As a whole, Barber concludes that there are basically two types of presidential activists: Presidents who generally engage the presidency with a positive and uplifting attitude, as opposed to Presidents who for the most part take a negative, uninspiring, self-defeating attitude towards the presidency.

Then, there is the *passive-positive* Presidential character. This one is compliant with some proclivity to self-withdrawal. They feel a strong need for love and care, on the one hand, and an urging need to show love and care, on the other hand. They are always trying to indulge themselves. And after each failure, they opt for a reclusive attitude, taking time for healing while neglecting their duties along the way. In reality, and according to Barber's description, these Presidents are not really leaders: they are followers. They even delegate many of their responsibilities to others. As *passive-positive* U.S. Presidents he identified: James Madison (Democrat-Republican), William H. Taft (R), Warren G. Harding (R), Ronald Reagan (R) and Bill Clinton (D).

And lastly there is the *passive-negative* Presidential character, where self-withdrawal is its most notable feature. *Passive-negative* Presidents neither lead nor take action when facing a crisis. Instead, they opt for a wait and see attitude, eventually ignoring the crisis and falling into denial. These Presidents usually have low self-esteem and a strong sense of uselessness. At times, they even see themselves as incompetent and worthless, which is why they often need to be reminded that they are the President for a reason. They constantly need reaffirmation and recognition of their skills and talents. Thus, Barber defined as *passive-negative* U.S. Presidents: George Washington (Federalist), Calvin Coolidge (R) and Dwight Eisenhower (R).



**Barber's *The Presidential Character*: Shortcomings**

Barber's *The Presidential Character* has had mixed reviews over the years. It definitely enjoys some popularity, considering that it is intended mainly for an academic audience, more specifically for scholars specialized on the U.S. Presidency. But of course, popularity and sales are not always the best criteria for measuring the quality of an academic book, of any book for that matter.

Among the most common critiques to Barber's approach is his reduction of personality to four somehow mutually exclusive typologies. In fact, Barber warns us against it in his own previous work, *The Lawmakers*, when stating that "at a certain stage in the development of a typology, one experiences a peculiar intellectual seduction. The world begins to arrange itself in fourfold tables. The lines separating the categories get blacker and thicker, the objects near the margins move quietly toward the centers of the cells or fade into invisibility..." (Barber, *Lawmakers*, p.261).

But perhaps the strongest and more in depth critique comes from Alexander L. George in "Assessing Presidential Character" in *World Politics*, Vol. 26 (January 1974). In it, George states that "Barber is not too clear in indicating how he arrived at the composite of characteristics he imputes to each type...", and the word-type there refers to the four Presidential types he creates for his study: *active-positive*, *active-negative*, *passive-positive* and *passive negative*. George also notes that Barber dedicates most of his analysis to President Nixon, while reserving very little or not enough discussion to other Presidents, some of them as relevant as Richard Nixon. Yes, there are limits on the number of pages a book can have, but as case-studies Presidents Woodrow Wilson and F.D. Roosevelt, for example, both presided during times of World Wars and severe political crises. Just the ways they faced and responded to those crises are worth a hundred pages each. Barber could have also made a good case-study on President L.J. Johnson, for he had a very interesting, controversial personality which, in turn and by most accounts, had very negative consequences for his presidency and U.S. foreign policy in general. The Johnson Presidency ended just a few years before Barber published *The Presidential Character*, and by then there was enough documentation about Johnson's own controversial presidential character. In fact, Johnson 'inner circle' and 'Tuesday Lunch Group' eventually became central themes for later research and books on personality, presidential character and presidential performance.

In addition, we agree with Barber in that personality shapes presidential character, but we also agree with Fred I. Greenstein when arguing that non-personality attributes such as professional skills, for example, affect presidential performance as explained in his essay, "The Qualities of Effective Presidents: An Overview from FDR to Bill Clinton" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30 (2000). Greenstein precisely argues that: communication skills, political skills, vision and purpose, organizational capacity, cognitive style and emotional intelligence might not be enough to a successful presidency but they do play tremendous roles in the shaping of a presidential leadership and, therefore, the presidency as a whole. We think Barber should have touched on that at least briefly.

Still another problem with Barber's approach is that he relies way too much on biographies, which can be both objective and faithful to historic facts, but also subjective. History lends itself to personal interpretation of events, and people forget situational and/or details and circumstances, not to mention that time can erode meanings and historical facts. However, to be fair, that is a common problem in most of research about politics, power and presidential character. Since we were not there, we can only rely on protagonists, first-hand witnesses and what historians and biographers tell us. On the other hand, let us remember that Professor James D. Barber was neither a historian nor a psychologist. He was a political scientist who endeavored in-depth research of human personality and behavior, and how both affect the U.S. Presidents' performance. For that, we could always argue that he had limited skills for the kind of research he did, and Barber himself publicly acknowledged his limitations.

Eventually interest in Barber's *The Presidential Character* faded away. Only a few scholars and Political Sciences Departments kept referring to it, especially in times of presidential elections. Still, we must credit Barber for having sparked more long-term interest in the topic, which in turn unleashed — it is fair to say — a great research effort for years to come. We could safely say Barber's *The Presidential Character* inaugurates a new sub-field within the realm of Political Sciences.

For example, James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky, "Incentives for Political Participation" in *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV (July 1972), sort of transformed Barber's typologies into what they called "incentive types" to encompass political activists and leaders. Payne and Woshinsky basically focused on motivation, or the several and different incentives which drive political activists and leaders in their political endeavors.

Also around the same time came, Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), a study of how personality can create group-thinking and, consequently, affect the decision-making process, a phenomenon that actually affected the Presidency of L.B. Johnson. For Janis, the U.S. fiasco in Viet-Nam was to a large extent the result of group-thinking in what was called Johnson's 'inner circle' and 'Tuesday lunch meetings'. Janis's research continued over the years, creating a considerable amount of work on the same theme.

The already cited Alexander L. George, remains an important contributor to the study of how a President's personality shapes decision-making and the presidency in general. To his essay, "Assessing Presidential Character" in *World Politics*, Vol. 26 (January 1974), which was an early critique of Barber's *Presidential Character*, George added *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: the Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). Here George discussed the role of individual personalities, meaning president and advisers, when selecting, classifying and discussing information relevant to decision-making, because information is not enough: the quality of the information is more important.

Finally, the case of Fred I. Greenstein is interesting since he comes before Barber, meaning that, as argued earlier, he researches, writes and publishes about personality, power and politics before Barber published in 1972 *Presidential Character*. But then Greenstein draws on Barber's work to write "The Qualities of Effective Presidents: An Overview from FDR to Bill Clinton" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2000).

In conclusion, Barber's *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* is a fascinating introduction to the complex world of American Presidents and presidencies. I for sure get back to it with every Presidential Election, and invite my students to read it on the assumption that they would like to learn or at least get an idea about how any new President will exercise presidential duties and prerogatives, behave in front and away from flashy cameras, and lead the nation in general and in crises.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Barber, James David" in: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James\\_David\\_Barber](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_David_Barber)

Barber, James D., *The Lawmakers: Recruitment & Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1965).

Barber, James D., *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Prentice Hall, 1972; fully revised 5<sup>th</sup> Edition at New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2020).

"Democratic Party" in *History.com* (2020) in <https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/democratic-party>

"Federalist Party" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2020) in <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Federalist-Party>

Fried, Edrita, *Active/Passive: the Crucial Psychological Dimension* (New York: Harper, 1970).

George, Alexander L., "Assessing Presidential Character" in *World Politics*, Vol. 26 (January 1974).

- George, Alexander L., "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders" in *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. XXIV (1968).
- George, Alexander L., *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: Effective Use of Information & Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980).
- Greenstein, Fred I., "Personality & Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference & Conceptualization" in *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. XI (1967).
- Greenstein, Fred I., "The Qualities of Effective Presidents: Overview from FDR to Bill Clinton" in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol.30 (2000).
- Hargrove, Erwin C., *Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
- Janis, Irving L., *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions & Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
- Laswell, Harold, "A Note on Types of Political Personality: Nuclear, Co-relational, Developmental" in *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV (July 1968).
- Mazlish, Bruce, "Barber's *The Presidential Character*" in *New York Times* (1972).
- Neustadt, Richard E., *Presidential Power & Modern Presidents: Politics of Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1960; 7<sup>th</sup> Ed. 1991).
- Payne, James L. & Oliver H. Woshinsky, "Incentives for Political Participation" in *World Politics*, XXIV (July 1972).
- "What Political Party Did George Washington Belong To?" in *Reference.com* (2020) in <https://www.reference.com/history/political-party-did-george-washington-belong-8ccb00033e7194af>


## *Manuel De Leon, Ph.D.*

Editor of *The Political Scientist Newsletter*, FPSA  
Assistant-Professor in Political Sciences & International Studies  
Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona, Florida

### **AUTHOR**

**Manuel De Leon, Ph.D.**, is Assistant-Professor in Political Sciences & International Studies at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona, Florida, and is Editor of *The Political Scientist Newsletter* of the Florida Political Science Association. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sciences from Florida International University. His field of research is International Relations, Security Studies and International Political Economy.

## Back-Cover FPSA University Member Profile: IPAC at University of Central Florida-Orlando



Information & Policy  
Analysis Center, Inc.

3206 South Hopkins Avenue, Suite 400  
Titusville, Florida, 32780  
Phone: (407) 439-4722 [contact@ipacnet.org](mailto:contact@ipacnet.org)

Our Motto: *“Making positive differences in education and communication leading to opportunities for a more peaceful world.”*



Left-Right: IPAC Deputy-Director Dr. Sadri, IPAC PR Director Ms. Malisci and Mr. Stewart, International Business Manager of Enterprise Florida

### ***About Us***

The Information and Policy Analysis Center, Inc. (IPAC) has built a foundation of broad and deep knowledge to impact and make a difference in the most important and pertinent areas of opportunity in today’s world. Our interdisciplinary expertise in policy, communication, education, socio-economic development, defense, energy, homeland security and environmental protection combines theory with real-world experience.

### ***Mission Statement***

IPAC is dedicated to producing exacting research and unbiased analysis through quality education. Our mission is to stimulate and support relevant social science research that addresses major domestic and international issues and to disseminate those findings widely to professionals, scholars, policy-makers and the public at large.

### ***Education***

As a non-partisan, non-profit educational foundation, IPAC seeks to promote constructive dialogues among diverse cultures and civilizations. While our educational efforts extend to the general public, we acknowledge that today’s students need to develop an understanding of communication, international relations and cultures to compete in the global environment. Whether pursuing careers in business, public service, education, or non-governmental organizations, IPAC promotes such goals by providing funding for student awards to organizations such as the Florida Political Science Association.

### ***Quality Research Standards***

IPAC provides high caliber and realistic research on significant national and international issues. At IPAC, we are proud of the ways by which we ensure that our training sessions, research products and consulting services reflect our core values of dedication to excellence and objectivity in a complex world.