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Florida Political Chronicle

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Florida Political Sciences Association

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Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.

FPSA

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Journal Florida Political Sciences Association

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Peer-Reviewed Regional Scholarly Journal for Faculty, Students and Community of the Florida Political Sciences Association (FPSA)

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The Florida Political Sciences Association is committed to promoting political science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our Board of Officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. From the University of West Florida in Pensacola to Florida International University and the University of Miami, our FPSA association spans the state bringing together political scientists at public and private institutions to network, to collaborate on research and to discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

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Call for Papers

Florida Political Science Association Annual Conference
Saturday, 26 March 2022
Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona Beach, Florida

Program Chair: Giselle Jamison
St. Thomas University
Phone: 305-628-6579
gjamison@stu.edu

Arrangements Chair: Manuel Deleon
Bethune-Cookman University
Phone: 386-481-2842
deleonm@cookman.edu

The 2022 FPSA Annual Meeting will be held at Bethune-Cookman University in **Daytona Beach, Florida.** **DEADLINE for PROPOSALS 26 January 2022.** Information on directions, parking and hotels posted end-January.

Pre-registration before the conference day is **$75** for faculty and **$35** for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs, and discussants are asked to preregister. **Registration at the meeting** is **$85** for faculty and **$40** for students. Registration includes lunch, refreshments and a subscription to the *Florida Political Chronicle.*
For pre-registration, please go to www.fpsanet.org

Faculty, talented undergraduates, and graduate students are encouraged to submit papers. **A $250 award is given to the best Graduate Student Paper presented at the conference, and a $200 award will be given to the best Undergraduate Student Paper**. **All proposals must include: name, institution, rank (faculty, graduate student, undergraduate student), contact information, paper title and an abstract around 100-to-250 words.**
Please send paper proposals to the following Section Chairs by January 2022. Accepted papers will be notified.

Sections:	Sections Chairs:	Contact Information:
American National Politics	Austin Trantham Jacksonville University	austin.trantham@gmail.com 940-390-2506
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	brian.kupfer@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-9951
Public Policy & Public Administration	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
States & Local Governments	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations	Leah Blumenfeld Barry University	lblumenfeld@barry.edu 305-899-3386
Comparative Politics	Manuel DeLeon Bethune-Cookman University	deleonm@cookman.edu 386-481-2842
Roundtable: Teaching Political Science	Kelly McHugh Florida Southern College	kmchugh@flsouthern.edu 863-680-4111
Regional Security from World War I to Today	Marco Rimanelli Saint Leo University	marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu 352-588-8277

SUBMISSIONS to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal: Conference Papers, Best Student Award Papers and runners-up, plus scholarly essays from past FPSA conferences and other related unpublished papers are all welcome for publication. Please contact the Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu for more information and see the Submission Guidelines on: http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.htm

PUBLICATIONS:
FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Florida Political Chronicle

http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html

The ***Florida Political Chronicle*** is the bi-annual peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Sciences Association, which encourages submissions from all discipline sub-fields. Submission Guidelines on: ***http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.htm*** Please contact the FPSA journal's **Editor, Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.** of Saint Leo University at ***marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu*** for Submissions and questions.

The Political Scientist:
Newsletter of the Florida Political Sciences Association

http://www.fpsanet.org/political-scientist.html

The Political Scientists newsletter is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Sciences Association. Please contact for information and Submission Guidelines to **Newsletter Editor, Manuel De Leon, Ph.D.** of ***The Political Scientist*** at Bethune-Cookman College at ***deleonm@cookman.edu*** for Submissions.

See FPSA website: ***www.fpsanet.org***

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Florida Political Chronicle

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Current (since 2020) and past (2010-2019) issues of the *Florida Political Chronicle,* as well as the on-line Archive of older issues (1989-2009) are ***FREE*** for readers by clicking on the Florida Political Sciences Association's Website either: **http://www.fpsanet.org/chronicle.html** or **http://www.fpsanet.org/archive**

The ***Florida Political Chronicle*** is the peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Sciences Association (FPSA), published twice-a-year, on-line, in colour. It is free for access on the FPSA website to serve the academic disciplines of Political Sciences and International Relations, practitioners, students and the community of readers in a balanced, non-political and analytical way. The ***Florida Political Chronicle*** journal encourages scholarly submissions from all Political Sciences disciplinary subfields: American Politics, Theories, Comparative Politics, International Relations, International Security, Diplomatic History, International Political Economy, Public Administration, International Law and International Organizations.

SUBMISSIONS: e-mail as WORD (NOT PDF) **attachments all Submissions (Essays or Book Reviews)** to the journal's **Editor Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.** of Saint Leo University at ***Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu*** for consideration:

1. **Essays & Book Reviews** in **Word** (12 Font, single-spaced, Calibri style or Times Roman), not PDF.
   - **Essay length:** single-spaced from 5/6 pages minimum to maximum length of 50 pages with 1-inch margins, inclusive of Abstract, Bibliography & 1-paragraph Author's Bio.
   - **Book Review length:** single-spaced from 2-to-10+ pages-long in **Word** with 1-inch margins, with Bibliography & 1-paragraph Author's Bio. Book Reviews of either one book or compare several related books.
2. **Footnotes** preferred style (at end of each page in Calibri style or Times Roman) is the Chicago Manual of Style, but accepted are also APA, APSA or others if the author has already a finished work for review.
3. **Abstract** (a long-paragraph; no library reference codes).
4. **Maps/Graphs/Tables/photos** in the text or as appendixes (use 11 or 12 Font to make it fit) must fit the same vertical format with around 1-inch margin--**No landscape-size Tables! Must fit in a standard paper page portrait-size**! Photos can be sent for inclusion. I will reformat all work, but it helps if it fits initially.
5. **Bibliography** (10 Font, single-spaced); preferred use Manual of Chicago Style, but other styles accepted.
6. **Author's Biography** at end paper (a long-paragraph, with Ph.D. and M.A. Degrees, position, publications).
7. **Do not use the First Person ("I");** instead please use as neutral: "This study" or "This work" or "The author".
8. **Do not use colloquial contractions**, like: don't, it's, can't, won't, etc.
9. **"2 Blind Peer Reviews"** scholarly process (yes, I have 2 blind mice!) and those accepted for publication will incorporate editorial modification and suggested changes by Reviewers.
10. **Best Graduate Student Paper Award & Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award** reviewed by related committee. Both Award Winners and any Alternate Best Papers will be published in the journal.

DISCLAIMER: All interpretations, opinions or conclusions printed in the *Florida Political Chronicle* are solely those of the author/s and should not be attributed to or considered to be reflective of an institutional position by either the Florida Political Sciences Association (FPSA) and its Officers, or by Saint Leo University, its Board of Trustees, officers and staff, or any organization and individuals supporting either the FPSA or Saint Leo University as institutions.

FPSA President's Message

by FPSA President Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D. (Chair Barry University, Miami)

Greetings FPSA members and all interested readers!

Welcome to the latest edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle,* vol.28, n.2 (Fall 2021) at 127 pages, once again presented under the leadership and direction of our esteemed Editor, Professor Marco Rimanelli of Saint Leo University. This edition includes articles featuring both the 2021 Best Graduate Paper and Best Undergraduate paper from our annual conference. What a great way to showcase the strength of Political Science scholarship in Florida as we begin another academic year. The FPSA is committed to advancing the understanding of the importance of government and international politics in both academia and among the community throughout the United States, as well as abroad.

It is my distinct privilege to serve a second-term as President of the FPSA and I hope to continue the tradition of great leadership of my predecessors. We held a successful FPSA Annual Conference in March 2021 – the first virtual conference for the organization! This could not have been achieved without the diligence and hard work of our Arrangements Chair Doug Ryan, all Section Chairs, panelists and presenters who adapted well to the changes and platform.

We live interesting times, to say the least. Since March 2020 we have repeatedly heard the word "unprecedented" in the discussion of world events and political actions. It seems there has been no crisis, issue, movement, or challenge of the past two years that has not affected or included Florida in some way. As scholars of politics in Florida, our work is both local and global. Responses to the pandemic, questions of state authority, and debates about racial and economic justice, will continue to encompass our research and indeed our lives, for years to come. Our members are sure to present numerous and nuanced approaches to these challenges from a variety of perspectives at our next conference, which we are diligently preparing.

The 2022 FPSA Annual Conference will take place at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona Beach, FL on 26 March. The Midterm and Gubernatorial campaign season is already underway and Florida continues to catch the headlines as our communities and elected officials grapple with the ongoing challenges of a global pandemic. We will watch them in the coming months and during the elections. Meanwhile, the Florida legislature is also gearing up for another session, which is sure to address many of the same pressing issues as the previous year and those we see playing out across the country when it comes to voting, privacy and first amendment rights. I expect the 2022 Annual Conference will highlight both a high level of discussion and an even broader range of topics in contemporary politics. I am looking forward to seeing everyone there and finally in person!

I also hope that you will get to know our organization through our publications, offered free to the public: both the *Florida Political Chronicle,* our scholarly peer-reviewed regional Journal, and *The Political Scientist,* our professional newsletter. Please contact me if you have any questions on the FPSA or wish to become involved in our work.

Sincerely,

Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D.

Chair & Associate-Professor Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D.
President Florida Political Science Association
Barry University, Miami

Editor's Introduction: New Essays Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges)

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and "Fellow-Travelers",

welcome to this new 125-pages Issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle,* vol.28, n.2 (Fall 2021), regional peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Sciences Association (FPSA) published on-line and in colour. All our *Current Issues, Recent Issues* (2009-2020) and *Archived Issues* (1989-2009) are free for access on the FPSA website (**http://www.fpsanet.org/florida-political-chronicle.html**) as a community resource for members, scholars, students and public interested in domestic and international affairs, as well as the work of the FPSA, including a new section *Books-Special Issues,* that showcases our first book, Marco Rimanelli, ed., *World War I and League of Nations Centennial, 1914-2019,* Special Issue, vol.28, n.1 (Summer 2021) at 350-pages, and other occasional future lengthy volumes. Since 2018, EBSCO Library collection of sources include also the *Florida Political Chronicle* and all its past issues as current references in library and university searches.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic the 2020 FPSA Annual Conference was cancelled and followed by the 27 March 2021 Virtual FPSA Annual Conference, but business will return to normal for our 2022 hybrid FPSA annual conference at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona Beach on Saturday 26 March 2022. This new *Florida Political Chronicle* regular issue, vol.28, n.2 (Fall 2021) at 1xx pages, welcomes readers to an introductory "President's Message" (p.9-10) of the new President of the Florida Political Sciences Association, Associate-Professor Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D., of Barry University in Miami, expanding on the state of affairs in the discipline and future 2022 FPSA Annual Conference. This is followed by my own "Editor's Introduction" (p.11-14) summarizing key contributions to this issue from 9 authors in eight essays.

This issue also is unveiling the three new FPSA Best Student Awards for 2021:

1) Craig Wilding, M.A. from the University of Central Florida-Orlando, is the 2021 Winner of the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award with essay, "Florida Campaign Contributions: Does Campaign Money Represent Constituents?" (p.89-102);
2) Özgür Kayaalp, M.A. & ABD from the University of Central Florida, is the 2021 Alternate Winner of the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award with essay, "Bilateral Environmental Agreements and Environmental Cooperation (in the Mediterranean with Social Network Analysis" (p.103-115);
3) Alyson E. Johnson, B.A. from the University of Central Florida-Orlando, is the 2021 Winner FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award with essay, "Explaining Income Inequality in Florida, 2000-2016" (p.116-134). Each of these 2021 new FPSA Best Awards is discussed separately further below.

The first essay in this issue, "North Africa to Italy: NGOs' Role in the Rescue and Assimilation of Migrants" (p.15-24) by Janna Merrick, Ph.D., Full-Professor of Political Sciences at the University of South Florida-Tampa, analyzes the impact of thousands of illegal migrants moving all over the world either in search for better economic conditions or fleeing violence in their countries of origin. This essay focuses illegal migrants departing by sea from North Africa bound for the ports of Italy through a long and dangerous journey in rickety rammed boats where for thousands who land unwelcomed in Italy, other thousands regularly perish at sea, drowned and ignored. Many migrants are rescued at sea by non-government organizations (NGOs) who operate rescue ships in the Mediterranean and have saved thousands of migrant lives even when European government authorities have tried to prevent those rescues, and then other NGOs also assist the rescued migrants on land in relocation centers by providing food, lodging and other services in cooperation with Italian government agencies. Inevitably, the constant surge in Italy of thousands of illegal migrant mostly from Africa and the Middle East have provoked major backlash in Italy's political climate and elected governments, with dramatic reactions also on rescue policies both at sea and on land, given the rise of anti-immigrant political parties and uncertain commitments by successive Italian governments.

The second essay, "The Future of Political Sciences: Growth, Atrophy or Demise as Success" (p.25-38) by Ufot B. Inamete, Full-Professor of Political Sciences at Florida A&M University, examines possible futures for the academic discipline of Political Sciences by comparing what is happening in Social Sciences and other academic disciplines through their natural progression and trajectory. A possible future this study focuses on is that of the academic discipline of Political Sciences either becomes very successful to grows, or atrophies and ceases to exit. This study develops a classification system for all academic disciplines (all basic Social Sciences, applied Social Sciences, basic Biological Sciences, applied Biological Sciences, basic Physical Sciences, applied Physical Sciences, basic Humanities and applied Humanities).

The third essay, "Will Florida's Growing Puerto Rican Population Influence Election Outcomes? Analyzing U.S. Presidential and Mid-Term Election Turnout among Florida Puerto Ricans using New Data, 2012-2018" (p.39-56) by Vanessa M. Perez, Ph.D., Assistant-Professor at the Queens College, City University New York, is of particular importance for Florida as it studies the evolving U.S. and Puerto Rican electorates in the racially- and ethnically-diverse battleground State of Florida. Puerto Ricans count as 10% of the Hispanic population in the U.S.A., but 27% in Florida after massive population inflows from Puerto Rico in 2005-2021 (exceeding their parallel combined inflows to New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Massachusetts) and now rivaling Florida's dominant 29% Cuban-American vote. Since 2016, most Puerto Ricans settled in Central Florida (70%), with 25% in Orange County and Orlando, and more than doubled in 20 years (2000-21) from 482,000 to around 1,800,000, rapidly expanding after the island's 2015 economic crises and devastating 2017 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico (the latter leading to 135,000 new arrivals to the U.S. of which 42% or 56,000 to Central Florida).

Many observers and political operators argue that this strong Puerto Rican population change can potentially alter both State and Presidential election outcomes in the decisive "Sunshine State". But not much is known about the voting behavior of Puerto Ricans because existing research is often based on dated survey data that do not adequately sample Puerto Ricans in Florida. This essay presents a data-driven analysis of the expanding Puerto Rican electorate in Florida and its potential influence on election outcomes from 2012 to 2018 using voter file data. Findings show that turnout among this group is relatively low at 64%, is focused on registered voters and is rising over time. Voting rates rose slightly in the 2016 Presidential election from the 2012 levels and rose strongly from 2014 to 2020. Dr. Perez's research shows that the pattern of increased political participation among Puerto Ricans in Florida until likely 2020, has the higher voting rates among older, female, registered partisans and higher income earners than other Puerto Ricans in the "Sunshine State", while lack of knowledge of local Florida politics and elected officers remains a key factor in consolidating large voter absenteeism among first-time voters in new U.S. and Florida relocation locales for immigrant Puerto Ricans, most voting information in the U.S. is printed in both English and Spanish (especially in Florida). Dr. Perez's research also shows differences in the turnout patterns of Democrats and Republicans. Democrats are more likely to vote by mail. Republicans are more likely to vote in Mid-Term elections. The results presented here inform expectations on the voting behavior of this cohort also in the 2020 Presidential election, and future Federal and State levels in the "Sunshine State". However, the extremely fragmented domestic political scene and Florida's strong lean-Republican trend will become important in the running to the 2022 Mid-Term elections and might dramatically reverse all these previous trends.

On one hand, for Political Scientists living in Florida it became clear since Hillary Clinton's doomed 2016 second Presidential campaign that many in the Democratic Party openly speculated that the current inflow of Puerto Rican voters could hopefully tilt election outcomes in the Democratic Party's favor in both State and Presidential elections (a hope in Democratic Party backed by a common knowledge that many new voters were being recruited and registered by the Florida DNC at airports just as they stepped out of planes from Puerto Rico). But such hope was just as quickly deftly countered publicly by direct and continuous offers of Florida State aid and support to Puerto Ricans "refugees"

from both Republican Governors Rick Scott in 2011-2019 and Ron DeSantis since 2019 who were equally able to attract lots of grateful new voters to the Republican Party. Equally damaging for the DNC in general and its Florida operatives in the 2016, 2018 and 2022 elections was their locally criticized mistaken ideological strategy to consider all Hispanics/Latinos as an homogeneous ethnic group that would overwhelmingly commit to the Democratic Party as a specific political side (while instead profound regional-nationalist differences politically divide in Florida the dominant Cuban-Americans vs. Colombians, Venezuelans, Puerto Ricans and especially the smaller Mexican-Americans who are dominant instead in Texas-to-California). On the other, Dr. Perez's study show that the direction of partisanship (i.e., Democrat or Republican) although not associated with increased turnout in Presidential contests, still demonstrates that in the 2016 and 2018 elections, Puerto Ricans identified as Democrats were more likely to cast a ballot by mail and that pattern might have continued in 2020 with Democrats possibly having an edge with Puerto Ricans until the upcoming 2022 Mid-Terms. One reason for this is that 2020 elections, due to the unusual impact of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic waves having "more than 4.85 million Florida voters cast vote by-mail (VBM) ballots in the 2020 general election, roughly 43.6% of the 11.1 million total ballots cast".

However, due to the unusual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic that influenced many to switch to voting by mail instead of in-person, and the strong impact of DNC operatives encouraging registered-Democrats to vote by mail in 2020, future research by the author and other Political Scientists are exploring if the existing patterns of 2012-2018 did fully hold in 2020 and more importantly if they could possibly change dramatically in the upcoming 2022 Mid-Term and 2024 Presidential elections. Indeed, looking ahead, Republicans are already openly striving to consolidate an emerging wide advantage in political turnout nationally and in Florida, on four accounts: 1) findings here show that the direction of partisanship mattered for voter turnout during Mid-Terms, which usually favours the opposition party; 2) since Fall 2021 Republicans are even more emboldened to participate in the 2022 Mid-Term elections given the historical unpopularity of the sitting Joe Biden Presidency and Democratic Party policies over domestic, immigration, inflation and foreign policies; 3) since the controversial 2020 Presidential elections all Republican-controlled State Legislatures have passed new electoral laws restricting voting by-mail, which had been massively widened in scope in 2020 by Democratic State legislatures and Democratic Election Officers (regardless of opposition by Republicans) using as key political pretext the COVID-19 pandemic and this strategy had been a dominant factor for Biden's 2020 Presidential victory (the Democratic Party quietly politicized the traditional voting by-mail process, turning it into a new way to both encourage higher turnout by registered Democrats and immediately count casted votes before Election Day by checking the mail-in ballots' name of registered voters, which is immediately available publicly at turnout time vs. the actual secrecy of official ballots results, which depend on the completion of each states' counting process and in-turn was complicated on-purpose in 2020 by allowing unprecedented very late registrations of new voters and acceptance of late mailed ballots ever a week after elections); 4) finally, the historical generalized trend of rising income-levels prompting a degree of party-switches among registered and unregistered voters even among Minorities is now in-play with Puerto Ricans as well, as is the appeal of Republican conservative values on large segments of the more conservative Puerto Ricans society. Thus, the significant Gallup polls of 17 December 2020 confirmed the long-trend of 31% of Americans identifying as Democrats, 25% as Republicans and 41% as Independents, but just one year later by 17 November 2021 the parties' percentages had dramatically reversed with 31% now identifying as Republicans and 27% as Democrats, although Independents remain around 41%.

The fourth essay, "The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946" (p.57-66) by Sina Azodi, ABD at the University of South Florida-Tampa, discusses how the end of World War II and tensions over the Soviet satellization of Eastern Europe erupted in a first, major crisis between the former war-time allies (United States and Soviet Union) over far-away Iran. Just like in Eastern Europe, this crisis began as the result of continuing Soviet

interference in Iranian affairs as a part of greater Russo-Soviet strategy to exploit Iranian resources and weaken the country's independence, but while Soviet politico-military control of the new satellites could not be challenged, Iran still remained in a "gray zone". In 1946, the USSR refused to leave Iranian territory after World War II, and Moscow promoted the separatist movement in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, with the goal to finally annex it to Soviet North Azerbaijan. This historical analysis examines Soviet conduct in the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis and the critical role of Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam (*Qavam Al-Saltaneh*) in persuading Stalin to finally withdraw Soviet forces from Iran.

The fifth essay, "Florida Campaign Contributions: Does Campaign Money Represent Constituents?" (p.67-80) by Craig Wilding, M.A. of the University of Central Florida-Orlando, is the 2021 Winner of the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award. This study looks at campaign donations to Legislators on two dimensions. First, does campaign money come from inside or outside the candidate's electoral district? Second, is this money coming from individuals or interest groups? This gives a measure of how closely a representative's campaign money represents the constituents. Donations to Florida Legislative candidates from the 2020 elections were used to determine from whom local candidates receive their contributions from. The analysis shows there is a Kickstarter Effect, where new candidates running as a challenger or for an open seat get more start-up money from individuals in their electoral district. But once established as an incumbent, candidates rely more on interest group money from out of their district. The result is that the longer a candidate represents an electoral district, the less representative the campaign money is of their district's grass-roots constituents.

The sixth essay, "Bilateral Environmental Agreements and Environmental Cooperation (in the Mediterranean with Social Network Analysis" (p.81-93) by Özgür Kayaalp, M.A. & ABD at the University of Central Florida, is the 2021 Alternate Winner of the FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award. It discusses why some Mediterranean states ratify more Bilateral Environmental Agreements (BEA) than others through the networks of BEAs to cope with regional environmental challenges. This paper empirically analyzes these BEA agreements signed by 21 Mediterranean states through social network analysis. As measurements, the reciprocity and transitivity parameters are applied to understand how mutual interaction affects BEA preference of the state-members and whether BEA preferences of the state spill over to other states via clustering. The results suggest that while geographical proximity between Mediterranean dyads makes normative convergence a plausible motive for environmental cooperation, bilateral regimes do not promote clustering effects for other states. Furthermore, states' motivation for BEA ratification may be only focusing on a particular environmental problem that they share within a certain area. Other distant states may abstain from a BEA since that environmental problem does not affect that state to the same degree, while many states sign a BEA without any presupposition, regardless of whether they have not any shared commonality or not.

The seventh essay, "Explaining Income Inequality in Florida, 2000-2016" (p.94-112) by Alyson E. Johnson, B.A. at the University of Central Florida-Orlando, is the 2021 Winner FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award. This essay compares income inequality in Florida as higher than in many states and worsening over time, while seeing to explain variance in Florida counties' income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient for the years 2000-2016. Three variables achieve statistical significance in all three multivariate models: 1) poverty rate and population density have a positive effect as also does education; 2) income per capita has a statistically positive relationship with inequality in the 2000 model and in the change model; 3) unemployment rate is statistically significant in the 2016 model and in the change model but has a positive association with the GINI index in the former and a negative association in the latter. Several variables were statistically significant in just one model: cost-burdened housing with a positive relationship to inequality, percentage of minorities with a negative relationship in 2016, and county tax rate with a positive association with inequality in the change model. Conclusions focus on policy to implement to mitigate worsening inequality in the "Sunshine State".

The eighth essay is the "Book Report: *Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen* by Drs. Diane Zorri, Houman Sadri and David Ellis" (p.113-124) by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Full-Professor of Political Sciences & International Security at Saint Leo University near Tampa. This complex book for the U.S. Central Command analyzes all facets of U.S. Strategy and Foreign Policy in the Middle East vs. the continuing and growing security challenges posed by Islamic Iran to U.S.-backed regional stability via the military activities of Iranian-backed militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, plus Teheran's support of Houthis insurgency in Yemen against the U.S. ally Saudi Arabia.

Finally, this issue displays both the Florida Political Science Association's "Statement of Support of Academic Freedom" (p.125) and two Back-Covers for the *Florida Political Chronicle*, traditionally highlighting the institutional profile of current FPSA University Members: Back-Cover I (p.126) promotes Saint Leo University in Florida & Global, while Back-Cover II (p.127) spotlights the Information and Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida in Orlando, which is an FPSA sponsor, and under IPAC's Deputy-Director Houman Sadri, Ph.D. who is also Associate-Professor at the University of Central Florida in Orlando (and former FPSA President in 2012-2013) has generously funded the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to meritorious candidates in 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2021. Dr. Sadri has reconfirmed that IPAC continues to sponsor future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards.

Our Mission: since 1989, the *Florida Political Chronicle* is the peer-reviewed, regional, scholarly journal of the Florida Political Sciences Association, serving the academic disciplines and professors of Political Sciences and International Relations in a balanced, non-political, analytical, intellectual and non-discriminatory way that fully embodies both our regional association's and U.S. Department of Education's requirements for public policy in universities. The *Florida Political Chronicle* is registered on EBSCO and encourages submissions of scholarly academic essays and Book-Reviews from all Political Sciences-related Disciplines: American Government & Politics; Political Theory & Philosophy; Comparative Politics; International Affairs & Security; Diplomatic History; International Political Economy; Public Administration; International Law & Organizations. Our FPSA regional scholarly journal supports submissions from current and past FPSA members, as well as domestic and foreign scholars who have either presented their work at any FPSA Annual Conference or support our organization's mission.

Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle* (***Submission Guidelines*** on p.8).

Most sincerely,

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North Africa to Italy: NGOs' Role in the Rescue and Assimilation of Migrants

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ABSTRACT: Thousands of migrants are on the move all over the world. Some are searching for a better economic life; others are fleeing violence in their countries of origin. Despite globalization, migrants face a nation-state system where borders divide the world. This article examines one small slice of the world's migration picture, focusing on migrants who depart by sea from North Africa bound for the ports of Italy. The journey is long and dangerous; thousands arrive in Italy, but in some years, thousands also perish at sea. Migrants do not make this journey alone. This article focuses on those migrants who are rescued at sea by non-government organizations (NGOs) and are assisted on land, also by NGOs. There is no doubt that NGOs operating rescue ships in the Mediterranean have saved thousands of migrant lives even when government authorities have tried to prevent those rescues. There is also no doubt that NGOs are the major providers of food, lodging, and other services once migrants are on Italian soil. This article will examine the specifics of how NGO sea rescues are organized, how NGO services are currently offered on land in cooperation with government agencies, and how changes in the political climate and in the elected leadership of the Italian government have dramatically impacted policies both at sea and on land. This will be followed with an analysis of how rising anti-immigrant political parties have impacted Italian policies towards both NGO sea rescues and their services on land.[1]

Introduction

Scholars and the news media alike have characterized the migration of hundreds of thousands of people out the Middle East and Africa and into Europe as a humanitarian crisis of immense proportion. These migrants are fleeing their countries of origin for multiple reasons including war, civil strife, political instability, violence, and poverty. As Mavroudi and Nagel so clearly articulate, migration is the result of complex factors.

> Migration, in sum, is not a discrete, isolated process, but one that is intimately bound up with a multitude of societal processes operating within and across territorial boundaries. Migration relies on and produces connections between people and places, working through and altering the inequalities and disparities that exist between them. Migration is both an outcome of social, political, and economic transformations and a driver of new transformations that may spur further migrations or may cause flows to diminish or cease (2016, p. 20).

But migrants do not make the journey alone. Ambrosini (2017) argues that migrants make their way to their destination countries with the help of intermediaries, some illegal such as smugglers and others legal such as non-government organizations (NGOs). The current article focuses on only one slice of this mass migration, those who arrive in Italy by sea from North Africa and are assisted by NGOs both

[1] The author wishes to thank for his contributions Dr. Maurizio Ambrosini, Professor of Migration Sociology at the State University of Milan in Italy and Editor of *Mondi Migranti*.

at sea and on land. For most, the journey is long, extremely dangerous, and expensive. And yet, they continue to come, uncertain if they will ever reach European soil or even if they will survive the journey. We will begin with an analysis of terminology as it applies to migrants arriving in Italy, followed by an analysis of NGO rescue efforts at sea and their services on land. We will then conclude with an analysis of the impact that anti-immigrant political parties have had on changing immigration policies in Italy.

Defining "Migrants"

It is important to clarify terms used to describe migrants. While the news media, including the Italian news media, uses many terms interchangeably – migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and so forth—we will be more precise in this article. The following categories of people live legally in Italy. First, of course, are Italian citizens, followed by citizens of other European Union (E.U.) countries and citizens of non-E.U. countries possessing Italian long-stay visas. Additionally, those granted official "refugee" status by the Italian government live legally in Italy. But migrants arriving from North Africa usually do not fall into any these "legal" categories, and as Crawley and Skleparis write: "categories have consequences. They entitle some to protection, rights and resources, whilst simultaneously disentitling others (2017, p.12)."

As background to this discussion, there are two general categories of migrants who arrive in Italy by sea from North Africa, economic migrants seeking better jobs and political migrants seeking asylum. The former are "pulled" to Europe in search of a better economic life, while the latter are "pushed" out of their countries of origin due to fears for their safety.[1] This dichotomy between economic and political admittedly simplifies what is a very complex situation for migrants, many of whom leave their countries of origin for multiple reasons including both economic and political, but only those claiming fear of violence and persecution in their countries of origin have the right to claim asylum in Italy. Article 10 of the Italian Constitution affirms this right. "A foreigner who, in his home country, is denied the actual exercise of the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian constitution shall be entitled to the right of asylum under the conditions established by law (Constitution of the Italian Republic, 1948). According to Mavroudi and Nagel, the:

> modern notion of a refugee is based on an understanding of the world as divided into clearly defined nation-states. Those displaced by state violence and forced to live outside the boundaries of their own country are fundamentally out-of-place in the nation-state system. They become a problem to be solved by states and international agencies, preferably by returning them to where they 'belong' (2016, p. 144).

In the aftermath of World War II and the subsequent Cold War, the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* sought to define a refugee (ie asylum-seeker) more specifically as an individual:

> owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1951).

As Crawley and Skleparis argue, it is this UN definition that officially distinguishes between migrants seeking a better economic life and asylum-seekers fleeing persecution (2017, p. 4).

[1] For a detailed analysis of the "push/pull" theory of immigration, see Lee (1966).

Modern asylum policy within the EU was established under the Dublin Agreement.[1] Under the Agreement, European Union Member States are to ensure that no one is sent back to persecution. In terms of its impact on Italy, the most important provision is Article 13 specifying that the Member State where the asylum-seeker first initiated paperwork for international protection is the country responsible for that asylum-seeker, therefore, Italy is responsible for asylum-seekers who arrive at its ports from North Africa and elsewhere (E.U., 2013). In July 2017, the European Court of Justice affirmed the Dublin Agreement, ruling that Member States of first entry were indeed responsible and that if an asylum-seeker passed from the first Member State of entry to another Member State, the second Member State could deport the asylum-seeker back to the first Member State. In other words, if an asylum-seeker arrives in Italy and then crosses the border into France, France has the right to deport the asylum-seeker back to Italy, and Italy must accept the deported asylum-seeker. This puts an especially difficult burden on Italy since, according to the *Asylum Information Database* (AIDA), Italy is not the intended destination for most asylum-seekers arriving at Italian ports (AIDA, 2017). Most hope to "get over the Alps" to other European countries where employment opportunities are better,[2] yet Italy is responsible for them. In 2019, Italy accepted nearly 6,000 asylum-seekers who had landed in Italy, relocated elsewhere in Europe, but were returned to Italy under the Dublin Agreement (AIDA, 2019, p. 53).

NGO Rescues at Sea

While migrants are on the move throughout the world, the migration route across the Mediterranean Sea is often described as the most dangerous. Much news media coverage has focused on the massive number of migrants arriving on the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa just 80 miles from North Africa despite the true targets being the ports of Sicily and those along the southern mainland. For migrants heading to Italy, the journey typically begins in Sub-Saharan Africa months and sometimes years before they reach a departure port. Using intermediary smugglers (sometimes more benignly referred to as "brokers"), migrants are transported in trucks and buses for thousands of miles to reach Mediterranean ports, usually on the Libyan coast. There, they are held in squalid government-run detention camps, often at the mercy of violent jail-keepers, until they board smugglers' boats. Until 2013, the smugglers' boats were mostly decommissioned fishing boats, many not seaworthy, and most overloaded well beyond capacity. They were typically abandoned upon arrival at an Italian seaport.

While thousands of migrants made it to Italy, thousands also perished at sea. In October 2013, in response well-publicized deaths, the Italian navy implemented Operation Mare Nostrum to rescue migrants in peril on the sea and/or to guide seaworthy migrant boats into Italian ports. But approximately one year later, the Italian navy discontinued this policy after Italy unsuccessfully requested funding assistance from other EU countries. In April 2015, there were two major accidents at sea with a combined migrant death toll of more than 1,000; vivid photos and heartbreaking news reports were seen around the world. These two accidents were followed by more accidents and more drownings.

At this point, non-government organizations (NGOs) began chartering large ships to rescue migrants at sea. These included well-known charities such as Doctors without Borders, along with newly organized charities, such as SOS Mediterranean, created specifically for migrant sea rescues. Between May 2015 and July 2017, up to eight NGOs participated in rescues by patrolling just outside Libyan national waters and transferring thousands of migrants from small smugglers' boats to large rescue ships. While the goals of these NGOs were humanitarian—to save migrants from drowning—one of the externalities was to make it easier and less expensive for smugglers. Since the voyage in the smuggler's boat was now

[1] There have been three versions (1997, 2003 and 2013) of the Dublin Agreement, sometimes called the Dublin Convention or Dublin Regulation.

[2] In 2019, Italy had an overall unemployment rate of 10.6% (compared to Germany at 3.7% and France at 8.8%) and a youth unemployment rate of 32.7% (compared to Germany at 6.6% and France at 20.7%). (Migration Data Portal, 2019).

expected to be just a few miles from a Libyan port into international waters, smugglers began using inexpensive rubber dinghies with small outboard motors, thereby reducing their costs.

NGO rescue ships cooperated with one another in locating smugglers' boats and taking on board the migrants. The Italian Navy, the European coast guard (FRONTEX)[1] and commercial ships also worked to locate smugglers' small boats and to notify the NGO rescue ships of their locations. The NGO rescue ships would then dispatch small rescue boats and shuttle the migrants to the larger rescue ships. When a rescue ship was full, it would set sail to an Italian port. Determining the total number of migrants arriving in Italy is a challenge. As noted by the Migration Policy Institute, accurate data on unauthorized entry has been difficult to obtain (Fratzke & Salant, 2017, p. 3), but for purposes of this article, we will rely on data accumulated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Statista (see Table 1). These data show a huge increase between 2015 and 2016, when NGO rescue ships were patrolling in international waters with assistance from the Italian Navy, E.U. FRONTEX vessels and commercial ships.

Table 1:
Migrants from North Africa to Italy

	ARRIVALS BY SEA	DEATHS AT SEA
2015	153,842	3,777
2016	181,436	4,581
2017	119,310	2,832
2018*	23,126	1,306
2019*	11,097	743
2020	34,134	1,417

*Arrivals and deaths for marked years do not include the last two weeks of December.
Compiled from IOM reports for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Data for 2020 compiled from Statista.

Beginning in summer 2017, the Italian government sought to reduce the arrival of migrants at its seaports by restricting the activities of NGO rescue ships; we see a steep decline between 2016 (181,436 arrivals) and 2017 (119,310 arrivals), and then a huge drop in 2018 (23,126 arrivals). Reduction tactics used by the Italian government included attempts to prevent the transfer of migrants from small shuttle rescue boats onto the large NGO rescue ships, temporarily seizing some NGO rescue ships, levying extremely high fines (at times one million euros per rescue ship), closing migrant reception centers on land, and restricting the opportunities to apply for humanitarian protection. These were important factors in the reduction of migrant arrivals, but not the most important.

The most important factor was the effort of both the EU and the Italian government to gain cooperation from Libya. Mayroudi and Nagel write that the "E.U. …sought aggressively to move its 'asylum problem' offshore by securing poor countries' cooperation in intercepting and detaining potential asylum seekers (2016, p. 132)." The EU committed 46 million euros to Libya to finance its own rescue operation whereby migrants would be picked up by Libyan military ships in both territorial and international waters and returned to Libya (Romano, July 5, 2017). In 2017, it was reported that the Libyan coast guard returned 19,452 migrants to Libya (AIDA 2017, p.21), and in 2019 the figure was 8,406 (AIDA, 2019, p. 28).

Al Jazeera and other news outlets reported migrants being turned back at North African land borders by armed groups of men before they could reach the Mediterranean Sea, and rumors persisted that the Italian government was paying smugglers not to transport the migrants. Italy, of course, denied these claims (Al Jazerra, August 28, 2017; ANSA October 6, 2017; London Telegraph, October 9, 2017), and the Libyan government declared that Italy only provided funding for economic development (Squires, 2017). Funding for economic development, though, fits with additional arguments made by Mavroudi and

[1] FRONTEX was originally established 2004 to combat crime and irregular immigration. It also serves as the European Coast-guard.

Nagel. "By linking development aid to asylum policing, Europe (including Italy) effectively excludes asylum seekers without engaging in large-scale expulsions or 'directly violating liberal norms'" (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 132, citing Gibney 2004, p. 146). This allows wealthy countries "to control asylum seekers by preventing them from entering national territory in the first place" (Mavroudi & Nagel, 2016, p. 130).

NGO Services on Land

Migrants need more than help at sea; they need help on land as well. The migrant reception system in Italy is complex and ever changing. Migrants arriving by sea are received initially at processing centers located at the ports of Lampedusa, Pozzallo (Sicily), Messina (Sicily), and Taranto (on the mainland in the region of Apulia). These processing centers (called hotspots) have been required by the EU since 2015 (Ambrosini, 2019, p. 149). In 2019, hotspots were jointly staffed by FRONTEX, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and UNHCR. The NGO, Save the Children, had previously provided hotspot staff, but they were no longer present in 2019 (AIDA, 2019, p.32). At hotspots, migrants are registered and identified as either economic migrants or asylum-seekers. In theory, migrants are informed about their rights to seek asylum in Italy, although there are documented cases of migrants being misinformed, misled, or interviewed in Italian even though they did not speak or understand Italian (AIDA, 2019, p. 34). Once registered at the hotspot, the migrant officially becomes the responsibility of Italy under the Dublin Agreement. Migrants not making claims for asylum are labeled "irregular immigrants" and are subject to deportation and return to their countries of origin (EU. The Hotspot…). Bello writes that while waiting for deportation, they are assigned to "expulsion centers" to live under prison-like conditions (2020, p. 4).

Migrants identified as asylum-seekers are sent to residential reception centers, but for a variety of reasons, some migrants remain at the hotspot centers. (See Table 2.) The Italian asylum-seeker residential reception system was originally established in 2001 after the National Association of Italian Municipalities, the United Nations Refugee Agency, and the Italian Ministry of the Interior reached an agreement to feed and lodge asylum-seekers (Sistema Accoglienza Integrazione). Local government authorities were authorized to establish reception centers through a variety of models. There were changes over the years, and in 2020, the residential reception system was revised into two parallel systems: the System of Accommodation and Integration (SAI)[1] administered by local governments and the system of Extraordinary Reception Centers (CAS) administered by the national government.

The first parallel system, SAI, has its roots in the asylum-seeker reception system established in 2001. It is organized by local governments who contract primarily with NGOs to feed and lodge asylum-seekers, primarily those who have obtained humanitarian protection. Each SAI center decides locally what categories to accept such as single males and/or families and/or unaccompanied minors. Each SAI center also decides if they will accept others in need including, for example, people who are victims of sex trafficking, of torture, and of natural disasters. Each local SAI is required to provide "compulsory services" that include food, lodging, social service activities, health assistance, and so on. Each SAI may choose to provide additional services such as Italian language lessons, adult education, legal guidance, and other services that help asylum-seekers navigate a new culture and unfamiliar political system. As the name implies, one of the goals of the SAI system is to integrate asylum-seekers into the community. As such, most SAI centers are located near town centers where asylum-seekers can attempt to integrate into the community.

But not all Italians welcome asylum-seekers; often residents and local government officials object to the creation of SAI centers in their communities. There are more than 8,000 local governments in Italy, yet in recent years, only about 1,800 have participated in the SAI system. As could be expected, the SAI system accommodates far fewer asylum-seekers than the CAS system (Ambrosini, 2019, p. 152; E.U., 2021) (see Table

[1] SAI was formerly called the *System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR).*

2). One of the early problems of the SAI system was its heavy concentration in the South, the poorest regions of Italy with the highest unemployment rates. Local government officials in these poor regions could see the economic benefits--such as job creation--associated with hosting an SAI reception center. Until 2014, 70% of asylum-seekers were hosted in Sicily, Puglia and Calabria (Ambrosini, 2019: p.152).

The second parallel system is the Extraordinary Reception Centers (CAS), run by the national government. It was originally established in 2011 as an "extraordinary" system to handle the overload of asylum-seekers who could not be accommodated in the SAI system. For the CAS, the national government contracts directly with providers, mostly NGOs, and determines where the centers will be located. The CAS centers usually do not provide the same level of services compared to the SAI centers. The reputation of the national CAS system has been tarnished by claims of inefficiency, lack of professionalism, corruption, and in some cases accusations of criminal infiltration (Ambrosini, 2019, p. 153). The quality of CAS centers varies depending on what organization has the contract to administer the center and what views those administrators hold toward asylum-seekers (Bello, 2020, p. 9). As Table 2 indicates, there are far more asylum-seekers housed at CAS centers than at SAI centers, but the CAS centers are more evenly distributed geographically than the SAI centers (see Table 3).

Table 2: Number of Asylum-Seekers in Reception Centers

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
Hotspot	9,592	7,394	15,514	10,438	9,443	
CAS	35,499	76,683	137,218	148,502	138,503	
SAI (formerly SPRAR)	20,975	19,715	23,822	24,741	25,657	
TOTAL:	66,066	103,792	176,554	183,681	173,603	

Source: Openpolis, 2018, p.10.

Table 3: Distribution of Asylum-Seekers Arriving in Italy Per Region in 2019--Excluding SAI Centers

	Number of Migrants	Percentage
Lombardy	10,576	15%
Lazio	5,766	8%
Campania	5,340	8%
Emilia-Romagna	7,066	10%
Sicily	3,316	5%
Piedmont	6,716	10%
Tuscany	4,840	7%
Veneto	5,400	8%
Puglia	2,092	3%
Calabria	2,092	3%
Liguria	2,998	4%
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	2,373	3%
Marche	1,522	2%
Trentino-Alto Adige	1,687	2%
Abruzzo	1,193	2%
Sardegna	1,194	2%
Umbria	1,166	2%
Molise	426	1%
Basilicata/Lucania	986	1%
Valle d'Aosta	120	0%

Source: AIDA, 2019, p. 102

The Rise of Anti-Immigrant Political Parties

The influx of migrants into Italy created political fodder for its conservative parties. Italians represent an interesting mix of feelings and beliefs, with heavy influence from the Catholic Church emphasizing kindness and aid for the needy. The "the vast majority … of Italians support the principle of

asylum" (Dixon, 2018, p. 8), but despite the support in principle, public opinion polls conducted in Italy during June and July 2017, show only ten percent of Italians surveyed felt that immigration had a positive impact. Two-thirds reported there were too many migrants in Italy, 63 percent believed the migrants were transforming Italy in ways the native Italians did not like, and 61 percent said migrants were placing too much pressure on public services. Two-thirds believed most foreigners were not political refugees fleeing violence and persecution in their countries of origin but wanted to enter Italy for economic reasons or to take advantage of welfare programs; more than half (55 percent) wanted to close the borders to refugees (IPSOS, 2017).

And then came the national parliamentary election on March 4, 2018, a virtual tsunami that swept out the coalition government led by the left-center Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) and swept in a populist coalition government. Italy has a multi-party system with a two-house parliament and a prime minister accountable to both houses. Almost always, the government is formed by a coalition of parties. Typically, during the campaign, parties form electoral alliances, and each alliance publishes a list of preferred candidates from parties within the alliance. There were three main electoral alliances in 2018. The center-left alliance was led by former prime minister Matteo Renzi's Democratic Party. The center-right was led by Berlusconi's Forza Italia Party in alliance with Matteo Salvini's anti-immigrant populist League (Lega)[1] Party and the anti-establishment populist Five-Star Party (Movimento 5 Stelle) created by Italian comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009 and led by the young, Luigi Di Maio in 2018 (Garzia, 2019). While there were multiple issues during the campaign, the most salient was immigration (Newell, 2018; Albertazzi, Giovannini & Seddone, 2018), and the most effective campaigner was Salvini who hammered constantly with the anti-immigration rhetoric of "Italians First" accompanied by a promise of deporting half million irregular immigrants (Cassidy, 2018).

On election night, the major winners were the populist Five-Star and League parties; the major losers were the asylum-seekers and their NGO supporters. After much negotiation, a coalition government was formed in June 2018, with the primary actor not being the newly appointed Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, but rather Salvini, who served simultaneously as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, the latter of which allowed him to transform his anti-immigrant campaign rhetoric into anti-immigrant public policy. Salvini closed Italian seaports to NGO rescue ships. In a much-publicized case in June 2018, Salvini announced the NGO rescue ship, Aquarius, carrying more than 600 migrants, including pregnant women, infants, and young children, would be denied docking at any port in Italy. Malta and France also denied docking, and so the ship floated in rough seas until being allowed to dock in Spain. In the following months, other NGO rescue ships were also denied docking.

Once the seaports were closed, Salvini moved to reduce the number of immigrants already living in Italy. In December 2018, parliament suspended residency applications for "dangerous" immigrants. It also abolished humanitarian residency permits for migrants not eligible for refugee status, but for various reasons could not be returned to their countries of origin[2]. The result was dramatic; in January 2018, more than two thousand immigrants were approved for humanitarian protections, but in January 2019, only 150 applicants were approved (Tondo & Giuffrida, 2018; Arnone & Sicomo, 2018). Salvini's anti-immigrant "success" was short-lived, however, because in September 2019, Salvini was forced out of the coalition government.

[1] The League Party was originally formed in 1989 as the Northern League Party. In order to attract national support for the 2018 election (as opposed to only Northern regional support), the name was changed to "The League." For a detailed analysis, see: Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone, 2018.

[2] Humanitarian protections allow migrants who do not qualify for asylum but who would face torture or inhumane treatment in their countries of origin to remain in Italy for two years.

A reorganized "left of center" coalition government took power, and in October 2020, reversed many of Salvini's policies. Fines levied against NGO rescue ships were reduced from a maximum of 1 million Euros per ship to a maximum of 50,000 euros. Funding for migrant reception centers was increased (ANSA October 6, 2020), and humanitarian protections were re-instated (Sunderland, 2020). The time allowed for the government to process applications for citizenship was reduced from 48 to 36 months. Salvini nicknamed the new policies as the "illegal immigrants decree," arguing, "w*e* are going back to the free-for-all of illegal immigration, permits gifted to anyone walking down the streets and thousand-strong migrant landings" (ANSA, October 6, 2020). Here the work of Ambrosini is again helpful. He argues no democratic society has effectively limited irregular immigration, for several reasons: not only prevailing liberal principles along with huge costs, conflicting and contradictory public policies, the lack of cooperation from the sending and transit countries, but also the action of several intermediaries and supporters (Ambrosini, 2017, p. 1815). Certainly, Italian citizens and migrants alike have experienced all of these, especially conflicting and contradictory policies.

Conclusion

Migrants are on the move all over the world. They are searching for many things including a better economic future and a violence-free society. Despite globalization, migrants are faced with a nation-state system where borders divide the world. This article analyzed only one small slice of the world's migration picture focusing on those who depart North African seaports bound for Italy and who are assisted by non-government organizations at sea and on land. The journey is long and dangerous through Africa and across the Mediterranean. Once in Italy, life is a challenging maze of government rules and reception systems. Some have arrived in Italy seeking jobs, many of whom want to get over the Alps to work in other European countries. Others are fleeing violence and fear in their countries of origin and seeking refuge in a safer location. Officially, only those seeking refuge can remain in Italy as asylum-seekers; economic migrants are subject to deportation.

Non-government organizations have played a major role in assisting migrants bound for Italy. Sometimes the work of NGOs has been in coordination with and sometimes in opposition to Italian government authorities. There is no doubt that NGOs operating rescue ships in the Mediterranean Sea saved thousands of migrant lives even when government authorities tried to prevent those rescues. There is also no doubt that NGOs are the major providers of food, lodging, and other services on land because they are the most common vendors administering the Italian residential reception centers known as SAI and CAS. Migrants do not make the perilous journey to Italy alone without assistance; for migrants, particularly asylum-seekers, non-government organizations are their primary supporters and benefactors.

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The Future of Political Sciences: Growth, Atrophy or Demise as Success

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ABSTRACT: This essay examines possible futures for the academic discipline of political science by gauging what is happening in other social sciences and other academic disciplines, and by analyzing the natural progression and trajectory of academic disciplines. A possible future this study focuses on is that of the academic discipline of Political Sciences being so very successful that it grows, atrophies, or simply ceases to exit. In order to achieve the goal of this study, this study creates and develops a classification system for all academic disciplines (all the basic Social Sciences academic disciplines, all the applied Social Sciences academic disciplines, all the basic Biological Science academic disciplines, all the applied Biological Science academic disciplines, all the basic Physical Science academic disciplines, all the applied Physical Science academic disciplines, all the basic Humanities academic disciplines, and all the applied Humanities academic disciplines).

1. Introduction:

The goal of this article is to examine whether the academic discipline of Political Sciences can be so very well successful that it ceases to exist, simply atrophies, or grows in the future, by examining the experiences, lessons, dynamics, changes, natural progression, and the trajectories in other social sciences (specifically geography and anthropology) and other academic disciplines, in order to search for one of the possibilities of what the future may hold for Political Sciences. The paths taken by Political Sciences, already, will also be used to examine the possible future paths this academic discipline may take in the future.

Studies about the future of Political Sciences often focus on the issues of policy relevance/irrelevance, research methodology, public engagement, and socio-political impacts, of the academic discipline of Political Sciences. This study, by not specifically focusing on the issues of policy relevance/irrelevance, research methodology, public engagement, and socio-political impacts, of the academic discipline of Political Sciences, is doing something new and different. Therefore, by studying the future of Political Sciences by examining the experiences, lessons, dynamics, changes, natural progression, and the trajectories, of other social science academic disciplines, and humanities and natural sciences academic disciplines, is examining the possible futures for the academic discipline of Political Sciences in a new and different way. Thus, the hope of this study is that this new and different way of analyzing the possible future of Political Sciences will lead to new and different results.

2. Literature Review:

For analytic ease and convenience, this study groups the literature that inform this study into eight categories of literature. These eight categories of literature are the literature that provide foundational knowledge about the academic discipline of Political Sciences, the literature that focus on the state of the academic of Political Sciences, the literature that focus on the behavioral era of Political Sciences, the literature that do not support Political Sciences being over-obsessive with rigorously scientific and highly quantitative research methodology, the literature that focus on the need for Political Sciences to be more policy relevant, the literature that focus on the factors that account for Political Sciences not being adequately policy relevant, the literature that focus on how the policy world view Political Sciences, and the literature that focus on how Political Sciences can be more policy relevant.

Foundational knowledge about the academic discipline of Political Sciences in the United States is elaborately provided by *The Development of American Political Sciences: From Burgess to Behavioralism* by Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus (1967). This book provides a comprehensive history of Political Sciences in the United States. More precisely, it provides the history of the academic discipline of Political Sciences from the time Professor Burgess established a Political Sciences program at Columbia University at about the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of 1960s. Interestingly, the book tended to have the view that the behavioral era of Political Sciences will in time become less 'scientistic', even though it thought Political Sciences will be more behavioral. That hope has not yet been realized. Today the academic discipline of Political Sciences is more 'scientistic' than Somit and Tanenhaus could have imagined.

There are also literature that focus on the state of the academic discipline of Political Sciences. One of the first of this sort of work was done in 1970s, and it was *Political Sciences - the Discipline and Its Dimension: An Introduction* by S. L. Wasby (1970). This book analyzed the state of the academic discipline of political as it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It provided information on the approaches to the study of Political Sciences, the state of research methodology in Political Sciences, and the state of some subfields and areas of Political Sciences, as they were in that era.

An article by Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson and Michael Tierney (2011) analyzes the current state of the subfield of International Relations. They gleaned their information from the analysis of International Relations articles published by some of the top academic journals in the field. Their study shows that International Relations allows and promotes International Relations scholars using many and different forms of theoretical frameworks. However, they find an opposite situation in terms of research methodology. Their study shows that, though three times as many International Relations scholars say that they use qualitative research methodology as their primary research methodology, more of the International Relations articles published by the top academic journals in the field use quantitative research methodology. In terms of epistemology, similar dynamics also exist. Their study shows that most International Relations scholars subscribe to positivism. Additionally, their study shows that very few numbers of International Relations articles in the top academic journals provide explicit policy advice for foreign policy makers.

The article by Gary King (1991) focuses on the state of the subfield of Political Methodology. King is generally of the view that the state of rigorous quantitative political methodology is good. According to him (1991, p.1), "the advantage of formal and quantitative approaches is that they are abstract representations of the political world and are, thus, much clearer". A text by Gabriel Almond (1990) examines the various schools and sects in the academic discipline of Political Sciences, that are fostered by intellectual effervescence, and that has roots in the behavioral and post-behavioural eras of Political Sciences. A book edited by King, Schlozman and Nie (2009) is a collection of works that examine the dynamics in the various areas of Political Sciences. Also, a book edited by Shapiro, Smith and Masoud (2004) is a collection of works that analyze approaches and the dynamics of research methodology in Political Sciences, and examine the state of some of the discipline's subfields.

There are also literature that focus on the behavioural era of Political Sciences. A book by Barry Karl (1974) provides knowledge about the role of Charles E. Merriam as the father of the Behaviouralism movement in Political Sciences, though Merriam had the older Political Sciences background that had roots in a fusion of history, law, and philosophy, and; also, he had a background that was not significantly quantitative, in terms of his research methodology. It is also important to note that the behavioural Political Sciences that Charles E. Merriam led in creating gave birth to the highly quantitative, statistical and mathematical Political Sciences that we have today. The fact that Merriam is also seen as the father of the Chicago School (through his central role in the Department of Political Sciences in the University of Chicago, during his era), which played an apex role in molding the modern American Political Sciences,

makes this book to be further illuminating. The book by D. M. Ricci (1984) is of the general view that the scientific research methodology in political science, that behaviouralism in Political Sciences fostered, has not allowed Political Sciences to study the key issues of justice, good life and other key values that underpin democracy. The book edited by Graham and Carey (1972) has collection of works that examine the post-behavioural era in Political Sciences.

There are also literature that are of the view that Political Scientists should not be overly obsessive with the scientific and quantitative research methodology. For an example, even as early as 1950s, Bernard L. Crick in one of his books, *The American Science of Politics: Its Origin and Condition*s (1960), was already wary of the trajectory of the scientific and quantitative research methodology of the academic discipline of Political Sciences in the United States (Crick had taught in universities in both the United Kingdom and United States). In his article, Michael Desch (2015) sees serious problem in research technique overriding the need for policy relevance in Political Sciences. In his article, Desch particularly aims at documenting how dominant focus on strict and rigorous scientific research methodology "trends in Political Sciences are marginalizing the sub-field of security studies, which has historically sought both scholarly rigor and real-world relevance" (Desch 2015, p.377). Also, an article by Roger Smith (2002) also focuses on the tension between scientific research methodology and policy relevance in Political Sciences. Generally, he is of the view that given the choice to decide between the use of rigorous scientific research methodology that can only study very unimportant and trivial political issues, and a less rigorous scientific research methodology that enables the study of policy relevant issues and "substantive political issues of general interests in accessible fashion", Political Scientists should give "priority to the latter" (Smith 2002, p.199). Smith bases his position on his view that "scientific inquiry is undertaken to serve human interests", and to not to "pursue science 'for its own sake' or knowledge 'for its own sake'" (Smith 2002, p.199).

There are also literature that primarily focus on the need and importance of policy relevance for Political Sciences. Joseph Lepgold (1998) is of the view that the gap between International Relations Theories and policy relevance should be bridged. An article by Lawrence Jacob and Theda Skocpol (2006) shows how Political Sciences can restore policy relevance by gearing itself to provide policy guides for some of the major social problems. The many works of Matthew Flinders (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013 and 2017), and Matthew Flinders and Peter John (2013), very elaborately demonstrate the need and importance of policy relevance and public engagement for the academic discipline of Political Sciences. Similarly, in 2003 Robert Putnam, as the President of the American Political Sciences Association, in addressing the association, emphasized the public role of political science. Additionally, John Gerring (2015), generally, is of the view that if Political Scientists, and other social scientists, are not able tell us something about our world they are of negligible use. Brian Head (2017) posits that, due the dynamics of public investments in universities, Political Sciences and other Social Sciences are now under pressure to be relevant, in order justify the public funds that they receive.

Some authors do focus on examining the factors that make Political Sciences to have inadequate policy relevance. Peter Campbell and Michael Desch (2013) posit that institutional and organizational dynamics in the academic world, specifically in terms of academic ranking of Political Sciences degree programs in universities, generate incentives and disincentives that very highly rewards very quantitative research outputs and very greatly discourages policy relevant research outputs, respectively. This situation has made some prominent professors of Political Sciences to voice their displeasures: for examples, Ian Shapiro of Yale University talks of a "flight from reality", Lawrence Mead of New York University decries the "new scholasticism", and Stephen Van Evera of MIT condemns a "cult of the irrelevant" (all quoted in Campbell & Desch 2013). Also, the article by Stephen Walt (2013) expounds on the work of Campbell and Desch.

Expectedly, the policy irrelevance of political science is glaringly noticed by policy makers. There

are also literature that primarily focus on how the policy world sees the academic discipline of political science. A study by Paul Avey and Michael Desch (2014) shows how, though some national security policy makers in the United States do follow academic research, they do not seem to gain any significant policy guidance from these works. Also, a study by Bruce Jentleson (2002) shows how after September 11 terrorist attacks, a foreign policy maker in Washington was frustrated by the fact that political science did not have a theory or model that could be used to take actions after these attacks. A study by Graham Wilson shows how political science, like other social science disciplines, is unable to predict future crisis. An article by Steven Hayward (2010) shows how annual conferences of American Political Science association are ignored by policy makers, even when they are held in Washington, DC. A study by John Trent (2011) shows that economists are more utilized in advisory roles, than political scientists, by Presidents of the United States. Also, an article by John Balz (2008) also shows how economists and psychologists play more public policy roles, than political scientists. Balz (2008) also notes how in the past prominent political scientists, like Harold Lasswell, David Truman and Gabriel Almond, played immense consulting roles for the Government of the United States. Similarly, a book by Bruce Kuklick (2006) also shows how other prominent political scientists, like Henry Kissinger, Richard Neustadt, Graham Allison, and George Kennan, in the past played very major policy roles in the Government of the United States.

There are also literature that primarily focus on possible ways that can make political science to be more policy relevant. For an example, an article by Matthew Woods (2014) posits that political scientists making their research to be more accessible to policy makers, and by also increasing interactions with policy makers, can make political science to be more policy relevant. Similarly, Colin Hay (2015) is of the view that political scientists having better engagements with public audiences, extending the range of audiences, and changing the forms and contents of some of their research outputs, can also make political science to be more relevant. A study by Gerry Stoker (2015) focuses on how to confront the factors that he sees as making political science not to be policy relevant. He sees three blockages to policy relevance. He sees first blockage as the dynamics of politics and power in decision making dynamics, the second blockage is seen as disincentives and organizational and institutional blockages, and the third blockages is seen as "generally whether political scientists can offer evidence-based solutions and advice rather than explanations of 'what is'" (Stoker 2015, 19). Stoker also posits that "the first obstacle is something that has to be worked around, the second has to be confronted and the third puzzled about and hopefully addressed by new cadres of work that build on some pioneering examples" (2015).

This literature review section clearly shows that the quantitative research methodology in political science has resulted in research outputs that are inadequately policy relevant. This is due to the fact that quantitative methodology can only handle trivial political issues that are drained of any value judgement (while in the policy world any significant policy decision involves value judgement). This reality is due to the fact that the quantitative research methodology cannot adequately measure value judgements. Additionally, the quantitative research methodology results in highly statistical and mathematical research articles that many policy makers cannot easily read, access, and comprehend. All these dynamics result in severe lack of policy relevance of political science research outputs.

3. The Incubator Tendencies of Academic Disciplines Concept:

As stated earlier, this study focuses on the experiences of other academic disciplines in order to understand the possible future of political science. Therefore, this study uses the term 'incubator discipline' to explain the natural tendencies of academic disciplines to function as incubators that hatches and launches new academic disciplines (through the sheer nature and functions of universities and other higher education institutions, in terms of their functioning as crucibles for the continuous robust creation, transfer, and application of knowledge in the various academic disciplines). In order to probe more into these dynamics in academic disciplines, this article will also present and examine the factors that foster

and promote 'incubation' processes in academic disciplines. Expectedly, this article also analyzes how these 'incubator' dynamics operate in the academic discipline of political science. As noted in the introduction section of this study, the goal of this study is to examine the possible future of the academic discipline of political science by examining the experiences, lessons, changes, dynamics, natural progression and the trajectories, in other academic disciplines, in order to search for one of the possibilities of what the future may hold for the academic discipline of political science.

4. The Experiences and Lessons of Geography and Anthropology:

This section of this study will examine the disciplines of geography and anthropology in terms of how they function as 'incubator disciplines.' The point of this exercise is to find out whether political science can glean any information or lessons from the experiences of geography and anthropology. Geography is a discipline that provides knowledge about our physical and social environments and the principles, laws, or theories that govern both these physical and social environments. The scope of geography is thus breathtakingly wide and expansive. Though geography is considered a social science discipline, as shown by its above scope, it really straddles both the social sciences and the natural sciences. The nearly exhaustive list of the numerous subfields of geography (de Blij & Muller 1997, p.A-9), and the major subfields of the discipline (de Blij & Muller 1997, p.38), glaringly show that geography abundantly and comfortably straddles both the social sciences and the natural sciences. This fact that geography has an extremely wide scope that extends to wide areas of the social sciences and natural sciences has made it to be very robust and active as an 'incubator discipline', since it contains very numerous disparate knowledge areas. These numerous disparate areas mean that it has so many areas which are eager to hatch and grow on their own. Since these various areas are very significantly disparate, they easily develop distinct identities that make them to move farther away from their fellow siblings and from their parent discipline.

Many of the subfields of geography have autonomously hatched into very strong distinct academic disciplines, or they have joined forces with knowledge in other disciplines to nourish, or develop, other academic disciplines. Thus the distinct academic discipline of meteorology is linked to the geography subfield of climatology, the discipline of oceanography is linked to the geography subfield of marine geography, the discipline of biology is linked to the geography subfield of biogeography, the disciplines in health sciences are linked to the geography subfield of medical geography, the disciplines of anthropology and sociology are linked to the geography subfield of cultural geography, the discipline of history is linked to the geography subfield of historical geography, the discipline of political science is linked to the geography subfield of political geography, the discipline of economics is linked to the geography subfield of economic geography, the discipline of urban studies is linked to the geography subfield of urban geography, the discipline of development studies is linked to geography of development, the discipline of demography is linked to the geography subfield of population geography, and the discipline of geology is linked to the geography subfield of geomorphology (de Blij 1997, p.38). Also, the discipline of urban and regional planning is linked to the geography subfields of geography of development, urban geography, and economic geography.

As shown above geography is a very robust and very active 'incubator discipline'. Since geography is a very successful 'incubator discipline', the disciplines that are linked to geography are so numerous, so strong, so autonomous, and so successful that they have lessened the need for many to choose geography as their academic discipline (though there are significant number of people who still recognize that geography does a very excellent work of weaving together the knowledge of the patterns, principles, processes and systems in both our physical and social environments, and, therefore, choose it as their academic discipline). For examples, many who want to study climate prefer to study meteorology (rather than study geography and specialize in its subfield of climatology), and similar dynamics also apply to the

other about twelve disciplines that are also linked to geography (and the respective subfields of geography that they each are linked to), as shown above. This reality has resulted in some smaller universities, and some smaller other higher education institutions, not offering degree programs in geography (though these universities do offer general education courses in geography, in order to provide its undergraduate students general education courses that provide them information and knowledge about peoples, places, and patterns and processes of our physical and social environments).

Like in other academic disciplines various areas of geography have been more emphasized at various periods. An earlier era emphasized physical geography, another era emphasized cultural geography (de Blij 1997, p.A-8). Expectedly, the dynamics of geography as an 'incubator discipline' reflected emphasis of each era. "In the meantime, geography's attraction for some students lay in technical areas: in cartography, in remote sensing, in computer-assisted spatial data analysis, and most recently, in geographic information systems" (de Blij 1997, p.A-8). Also, expectedly, new academic disciplines that will hatch from geography in the near-future, will reflect this new emphasis in the discipline.

In comparing political science to geography, it is important to note that political science does have a wide scope as a discipline (though not extremely wide in scope as does geography). Also, political science does also have subfields which are noticeably disparate (though not as strongly disparate as many of the subfields of geography). Additionally, though political science is firmly in social sciences, some areas of political research methodology, empirical political theory, and public policy (for examples health policy, water resources policy, space policy, science policy, energy policy, and transportation policy) do link political science to some aspects of basic biological sciences, applied biological sciences, basic physical sciences, and applied physical sciences; but, nevertheless, political science does not abundantly and comfortably straddle the social sciences and the natural sciences as does geography. Thus, though political science does share some features with geography, it does not share all features with the latter.

Like geography, anthropology does have a very ambitious scope. As the academic discipline that has the study humankind (in both the physical and cultural/social aspects) as its forte and mandate, anthropology does have a very ambitious scope indeed. The study of humankind, in both its physical and cultural aspects, has also made anthropology to abundantly and comfortably straddle the natural sciences and the social sciences (just like geography). This scope of anthropology glaringly determines its subfields. The main subfields of anthropology are physical anthropology and cultural anthropology.

"Physical anthropology is concerned primarily with humans as biological organisms, whereas cultural anthropology deals with humans as a culture-making species" (Haviland 2003, p.8). These features of the two subfields have made the discipline to have two very disparate orientations. Those who study physical anthropology are more like those in the natural sciences (especially the biological sciences), while those who study cultural anthropology are more like those in the social sciences. Therefore, unsurprisingly "Anthropology has been called a social or a behavioral science by some, a natural science by others" (Haviland 2003, p.19). One half anthropology being called a natural science, while the other half is called a social science clearly naturally create significant inadequate communication and distance between the two subfields of the discipline. This sort situation may or may not lead to physical anthropology and cultural anthropology emerging as two distinct and autonomous academic disciplines, in the future.

Though anthropology has not hatched many new academic disciplines (in comparison to geography), its participant-observer research methodology and its ideas (on subjects like culture, values, organizations, mores, norms, change processes, and leadership) has enriched (and has been utilized by) political science, and many other academic disciplines (for example, management, marketing, sociology, social work and others).

In comparing political science to anthropology, political science (unlike anthropology) is not starkly divided into two main branches, one of which is basically a biological science while the other branch is basically a social science. Though political science does have some disparateness among its many subfields

(though they are lesser disparateness in comparison to anthropology), the issues are not starkly framed in terms of some subfields of political science being purely natural sciences, while other subfields of political science are purely social sciences.

5. Political Science as an Another 'Incubator Academic Discipline?':

Political science is a relatively young social science discipline, in comparison to other social science disciplines like economics and psychology. The roots of political science (as an autonomous degree program in universities and as an autonomous academic discipline) were mostly laid in North America in the early years of the twentieth century. However, despite its relative youth, political science has risen as a vital, powerful, and dynamic social science academic discipline. Through the energetic, inspiring, visionary, and formidable contributions of political scientists like those at University of Chicago in the 1920s, through the influence of German (and other European countries) educational backgrounds of numerous early American political scientists, through the 1930s coming of sociologically oriented European scholars to the United States, through the roles political scientists and other social scientists played during World War Two and in the post World War Two years, through the scientific intellectual vigor and growth that the behavioral movement engendered, through the self-examinations and changes made due to post-behavioralism movement (Graham and Carey 1972; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Wasby 1970), and through the heightened scientific and theoretical rigor that rational choice theory (and other economic theoretical frameworks) have fostered, political science has positioned itself as an excellent social science academic discipline.

Like any large, active, and advancing academic community, political science community has had its shares of issues of methodology and theorization, in terms of how knowledge should be created, transferred, or applied in the discipline. These dynamics have led to various schools and sects within the discipline (Almond 1990). On the whole, these schools and sects have fostered regular positive intellectual effervescence, fermentations, vaporizations, distillations, condensations, crystallizations, and recrystallizations, that have regularly reinvigorated and re-energized the discipline. The intellectual energies, regularly liberated by these dynamics, have helped to make political science (like other great and growing disciplines) to be an 'incubator discipline'. It has already hatched, and released, public administration, international relations, public policy, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies, as distinct and autonomous academic disciplines (and as autonomous and distinct degree programs in universities). The continuous growth and progress in the discipline means that political science will possibly create other academic disciplines in the future.

6. Factors that Foster 'Incubation' Dynamics in Academic Disciplines:

In order to adequately understand the functioning of the 'incubator political science' and other 'incubator disciplines', this section will try to identify and gauge the factors that foster 'incubation' process in academic disciplines. The possibility is that one or more of these factors may trigger, sustain, and/or accelerate the 'incubation' process in a particular academic discipline. One of the factors that this study identifies as fostering the 'incubation' process, in academic disciplines, is the increasing generation and accumulation of knowledge in one discipline which reaches a point that this body of knowledge is too unwieldy, too bulky, and too cumbersome for one academic discipline alone to adequately, and effectively manage. The most sensible and effective option is for such academic disciplines to hatch and spin-off one or more new academic disciplines. This process thus allows the mother academic discipline and the new academic discipline(s) to have amounts of knowledge that they can effectively, and adequately, manage and handle. For an example, geography (which, as shown earlier, is the study of the patterns, processes, principles, laws, and theories that govern the physical and social environments [which is indeed a very extremely large scope of area for one academic discipline to cover]) over the years have accumulated very

large amounts of knowledge that are too unwieldy, and very unmanageable, for one academic discipline alone to adequately handle. Thus, as shown earlier, geography has helped to hatch disciplines like geology (from the geography subfield of geomorphology), and other academic disciplines (from other respective subfields of geography), as shown earlier.

It is also important to note that the 'incubation' process enables the mother academic disciplines and off-spring academic disciplines to be homeostatic (and thus excellently healthy, and therefore more able to effectively engage in the generation, transfer, and application of knowledge [which are the vital functions of academic disciplines]). Thus the 'incubation' process is very vital, essential, positive, and beneficial for academic disciplines.

Additionally, it is also important to note that, expectedly, the off-spring academic disciplines (which were given birth to by the mother academic disciplines, through the 'incubation' process) themselves also later become mother academic disciplines (since continuous generation and accumulation of knowledge also later make the off-spring academic disciplines to have knowledge stocks which are too unwieldy, too cumbersome, and too bulky for them, respectively, to adequately manage and handle by themselves alone; and, therefore, through the 'incubation' process, they hatch and spin-off new off-spring academic disciplines; and, later, the 'incubation' processes also repeat themselves, all over again, with the new off-spring academic disciplines). For an example, the academic discipline of agriculture later gave birth to the disciplines of animal science and agronomy. After sometime, agronomy gave birth to the academic disciplines of crop science and soil science. Interestingly, in some universities, horticulture is emerging as a new academic discipline from crop science. In the case of animal science, this discipline has given birth to the academic discipline of poultry science and the academic discipline of fisheries in some universities.

Interestingly, the 'incubation' processes in agriculture seem to be mirrored in its basic natural sciences counterpart academic discipline (biology). The basic natural science academic discipline of biology has agriculture as an applied natural science academic discipline counterpart (biology is a basic animal and plant science, while agriculture is an applied animal and plant science). Biology has given birth to the academic disciplines of zoology, botany, and microbiology. Also, currently, molecular biology and biotechnology are emerging as autonomous academic disciplines from microbiology in some universities. Maybe, in future, zoology may even give birth to autonomous academic disciplines of ornithology, herpetology, mammalogy and ichthyology.

A very important point to posit about this particular factor is that it is a very excellent gauge to use in measuring the success or failure of an academic discipline. Since the main functions of academic disciplines are the generation, transfer and application of knowledge, the quality and quantity of knowledge they continually generate are vital. The quality and quantity of knowledge transferred and applied, in a particular discipline, is dependent on the quality and quantity of knowledge generated by that particular discipline and other disciplines. Thus, the vital measure of success of an academic discipline is the high quality and the high quantity of knowledge it generates and accumulates for use in the transfer and application of knowledge in that particular academic discipline and in other academic disciplines. Thus, a very robust 'incubator discipline' is also a very successful academic discipline.

Another factor that fosters 'incubator disciplines' is the development of significantly disparate bodies of knowledge within one particular academic discipline (by the various subfields of that discipline) that eventually reaches a point that scholars within that discipline cannot easily communicate with each other (and thus cannot easily operate as one academic community). In this sort of situation, the logical option is for some of the subfields of the discipline to leave the discipline and emerge as distinct autonomous academic disciplines. For example, the knowledge stocks in the geography subfields of climatology and population geography are very significantly disparate as shown by the fact that meteorology, which emerged from climatology (though climatology still exists as a subfield in geography),

is a basic physical science and an applied physical science discipline, while demography; which emerged from population geography (though population geography still exists as a subfield in geography), is a basic social science and an applied social science discipline.

An additional factor that fosters 'incubator disciplines', and is also related to the above factor of disparate knowledge stocks within a particular discipline, is the existence of significantly disparate research methodologies within one particular discipline, which also causes and magnifies the problem of scholars within a particular discipline not being able to easily communicate with each other and share information (and thus also not able to easily operate as one academic community). Also, in this sort of situation the logical option is for some of the subfields to leave the discipline and emerge as distinct and autonomous academic disciplines. For example, the research methodology used in meteorology (which, as shown above, emerged from the geography subfield of climatology) is similar to the research methodologies in the basic physical science discipline of physics (for example, experimentation), while the research methodologies used in demography (which, as shown above, emerged from the geography subfield of population geography) is similar to the research methodologies in the basic social science discipline of sociology (for example, survey research).

Another factor that fosters 'incubator disciplines' is issues and problems in the physical or social environment strongly demanding a discipline to assemble, transform, appropriate, and apply some aspects of body of knowledge (in that discipline) to meet the demands and needs of such issues and/or to solve the problems that are demanding solutions. These sorts of dynamics often involve a basic academic discipline hatching and spinning-off an applied academic discipline, or an applied academic discipline spinning-off another applied academic discipline. For an example, the knowledge stocks in the sociology (a basic social science) subfields of sociology of family life, social change, social stratification, and other related subfields, combining to develop social work (an applied social science academic discipline), in order to help manage and solve social problems. Interestingly, the discipline of social work seems to be at the verge of hatching and spinning-off gerontology (an applied social science academic discipline that focuses on ageing, and the social needs, social services, and other social work activities for senior citizens) as an autonomous academic discipline in some universities.

As noted earlier, one or more of the above factors can trigger, sustain and/or accelerate the 'incubation' process in an academic discipline.

7. The Incubator Factors and Political Science:

This section of this study will examine how the above factors (which foster 'incubation' processes in academic disciplines) manifest themselves in the discipline of political science.

In terms of the factor of the generation and accumulation of knowledge (resulting in a discipline having too unwieldy, too bulking, and too cumbersome body of knowledge for that discipline to effectively and efficiently manage and handle by itself alone) leading to the hatching and spinning-off of new academic disciplines, political science has been a model academic discipline. The generation and accumulation of vast knowledge, by various generations of excellent political scientists, have meant political science (as shown earlier) hatching and spinning-off the academic disciplines of public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies; and will very likely hatch and spin-off more academic discipline in future. Since, as noted above, this factor is a vital measure of success or failure of an academic discipline (since the quality and quantity of knowledge generated by a discipline is the vital measure of its success or failure), political science is a very highly successful discipline, as also shown above.

In terms of the factors of the nature, level, and amount of disparate knowledge stocks, and disparate research methodologies, within one particular discipline, these factors have not played significant roles in the 'incubating' process in Political Sciences (since these factors are relatively mild in

the discipline). However, the factor of societal and public issues and problems demanding applied academic disciplines (that can solve, manage, and/or control these issues and problems) to emerge from existing academic disciplines, has played a strong role in the 'incubating' process in Political Sciences. The rising complexity of managing urban governments, in the United States, in the early years of the Twentieth Century; the highly complex nature of mobilizing and managing human and material resources for the war efforts, by the federal government in the United States, during the Two World Wars (especially World War II); and the accelerated complex tasks of managing the federal government of the United States after World War II (due to highly expanded defense and national security organizations [since the United States emerged from World War II as the world's superpower], and due to the highly expanded economic regulatory agencies and human services organizations [as the result of the New Deal programs that were created before and during World War II, due to the Great Depression]), led to the emergence (and expansion) of the academic discipline of public administration from political science in the United States. Also, the demands for policy relevance that was one of the important planks of the post-behavioral school in political science led to political science, in the United States, giving birth to public policy studies as an academic discipline.

Interestingly, when the academic discipline of political science was very severely challenged by the post-behavioral movement within political science to be more policy relevant, instead of political science becoming more policy relevant, political science hatched public policy (as an autonomous and distinct degree program and as an autonomous and distinct academic discipline) as the home for political scientists who want to chiefly focus on policy relevant knowledge generation, transfer and application. Wars (especially World War One) helped to focus the minds of political scientists in universities in the United States and the United Kingdom (for examples, at Aberystwyth University [in Wales], Georgetown University, Fletcher School at Tuft University, and the University of Southern California) on how to help countries manage their bilateral and multilateral relations in better ways; and this effort helped the academic discipline of international relations to emerge from Political Sciences. Additionally, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon Building near Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, made many political scientists to focus on excellent knowledge generation, transfer, and application that help to excellently and effectively combat the problem of international terrorism (and this dynamics resulted in political science incubating and hatching three new autonomous and distinct degree programs [and, thus, three new autonomous and distinct academic disciplines] in some universities in the United States [and these three academic disciplines are intelligence studies, national security studies and homeland security studies]).

8. Is 'Incubation' a Natural Progression for Academic Disciplines?:

The 'incubation' process in political science and other disciplines is a phenomenon that has occurred in all disciplines, at all eras, in formal higher education systems (be they the ancient academies in the West and East, or the modern universities of the current era). The single body of knowledge that existed in ancient time as philosophy later branched into two academic disciplines (moral philosophy and natural philosophy). Natural philosophy (which is, basically, what we call today the natural sciences), in turn, branched into basic physical sciences disciplines (like physics, mathematics, chemistry, and others), applied physical science disciplines (like civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, other engineering disciplines, and other disciplines), basic biological science disciplines (like biology, biochemistry and others) and applied biological sciences (like agriculture, medicine and others).

The moral philosophy (not to be confused with the current philosophy subfield of ethics) discipline branched into basic humanities disciplines (like fine arts, philosophy [note that this discipline which at the very beginning of formal higher education systems covered all areas of knowledge is now classified as part of the humanities], and others), applied humanities disciplines (like theatre arts, music, and others), basic

social science disciplines (like political science, economics, psychology, sociology, and others), and applied social science disciplines (like management, marketing, education, social work, public relations. journalism, public administration, and others). As shown above, the 'incubation' processes in political science and other disciplines are simply natural progression for all disciplines (as they continually generate and accumulate more and more knowledge).

9. 'Incubator Political Science' as an Awesome Success:

As shown in this study, Political Sciences functions as a discipline that continually generates and accumulates high quantity and high-quality knowledge, and, as a result, has given birth to many strong academic disciplines. Another way to gauge the success of political science is to look at the fact that it still maintains close links with its off-spring disciplines. Thus, it is common to find holders of PhD degrees in Political Science, specializing in the political science subfields of public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies, respectively, teaching in autonomous academic departments (or autonomous schools or colleges) of public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies, in many universities. Also, holders of PhD degrees in the autonomous academic disciplines of public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies and homeland security studies, often teach in political science departments.

These dynamics of close links of political science with its off-springs (the disciplines of public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies), thus make political science to be an active 'incubator discipline' and still continue to grow robustly (instead of ceasing to exist or atrophying). Another example of these close links is the fact that scholars who work in the autonomous departments of political science, public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies, do strongly feel like still belonging to the same academic community (even though each of these disciplines have many professional associations of their own). In fact, many in these seven disciplines belong to professional association(s) in their respective academic discipline and also to professional association(s) in one or more of the other six academic disciplines.

Compared to political science, geography does not have very strong links with its off-springs. For an example, it is not common (though it is not impossible) for holders of PhD degrees in geography, specializing in geomorphology, or climatology, respectively, to teach in a department of geology or a department of meteorology. Also, it is not common (though it is not impossible) for holders of PhD degrees in geology or PhD degrees in meteorology to teach in the department of geography. Obviously, this lack of close links, between geography and its off-spring academic disciplines, helps account for the very robust and very active 'incubator discipline' of geography atrophying.

10. Conclusions

This study will conclude by creating a classification system for the 'incubating' dynamics in all academic disciplines, and gauging which category political science belongs to, in the classification system. This study is of the view that the 'incubating' dynamics in all academic disciplines can be classified into four broad categories. This study terms the first category, in this classification system, 'Mild Incubator Disciplines'. These are the academic disciplines that, even though they greatly generate and accumulate a lot of knowledge, do not produce a lot of disparate knowledge stocks, or disparate research methodologies, within each of their particular disciplines. Another feature is that they appear to be older and more mature disciplines, which had produced a lot of off-springs in the past (and the disciplines are now left with core body of knowledge which are more homogeneous and are also more homeostatic). Examples of these are philosophy, psychology, and physics. They currently do not hatch and spin-off a lot

of new academic disciplines.

The second category is termed 'Active and Growth Incubator Disciplines'. The academic disciplines in this category are very active in producing new academic disciplines, while, at the same time, they maintain close links with their respective off-spring disciplines. Thus, the academic disciplines in this category produce a lot of off-spring disciplines, while also growing robustly. Political science is one example of this type of discipline. As shown earlier, it maintains close links with its off-spring disciplines (public administration, public policy, international relations, intelligence studies, national security studies, and homeland security studies). Biology is another example (it maintains close links with its off-spring disciplines of zoology, botany, biochemistry, and microbiology; and all these five academic disciplines mostly consider themselves as belonging to the same academic community).

The third category is termed 'Active and Atrophy Incubator Disciplines'. As the name applies, these disciplines hatch and spin-off a lot of academic disciplines, while at the same time atrophying (due to lack of strong links with their off-spring academic disciplines). An example is geography (as shown throughout most of this study). The fourth category is termed the 'Centrifugally Robust and Terminal Incubator Discipline'. The disciplines in this category are very robust in producing very high amounts of other academic disciplines.

Additionally, the disparateness of the knowledge stocks within this sort of discipline is so magnified, and so profound, that the centrifugal dynamics within the discipline completely overwhelms the centripetal dynamics (so that in the process of producing other academic disciplines, from its knowledge stocks, the discipline ends up forcing out all the knowledge stocks, it has, as autonomous academic disciplines; and, therefore, it [the mother academic discipline] ceases to exist). An example of this is natural philosophy.

As shown in an earlier section of this study, natural philosophy, which paved the way for all the basic biological science academic disciplines, all the applied biological science academic disciplines, all the basic physical science academic disciplines, and all the applied physical science academic disciplines, is no more in existence as a degree program in universities. This classification system also connotes that an academic discipline can move up or down the above four categories. The goal then is for an academic discipline to try to reach and/or stay at a category that best serves the collective interests of its members (scholars). Since this study seems to show that the 'Active and Growth Incubator Discipline' category seems to best serve the interests of political science professionals, the goal then may be for efforts to be in the direction of making political science to stay at that category.

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Will Florida's Growing Puerto Rican Population Influence Election Outcomes? Analyzing U.S. Presidential and Mid-Term Election Turnout among Florida Puerto Ricans using New Data, 2012-2018

by Vanessa M. Perez, Ph.D. (Queens College, City University of New York)

ABSTRACT: The U.S. electorate in the battleground State of Florida is becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. The Puerto Rican population rapidly expanded after the island's 2015 economic crises and Hurricane Maria forced people to relocate to the United States. Many argue that this population change can potentially alter election outcomes. But not much is known about the voting behavior of Puerto Ricans in the "Sunshine State". Existing research is often based on dated survey data that do not adequately sample Puerto Ricans in Florida and are also plagued by self-reported behavior. This study tackles these limitations, analyzing the turnout patterns of this population in Florida during Mid-Term and Presidential elections from 2012 to 2018 using voter file data with a total of 422,849 Puerto Ricans. Findings show that turnout among this group is relatively low, 64%, but rising over time. Turnout is higher among those that are older, female, habitual voters, partisan and have higher income. The results also showed differences in the turnout patterns of Democrats and Republicans. Democrats are more likely to vote by mail. Republicans are more likely to vote in Mid-Term elections. The findings of this study have future implications for election outcomes at Federal and State levels in the "Sunshine State".

Introduction

The composition of Florida's electorate is changing, becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. The "Sunshine State" Latino population is particularly expanding with most newcomers arriving from Puerto Rico and Central/South America (mostly out of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Colombia and Venezuela). In a state where elections are sometimes decided by a razor-thin voting majority, this demographic change has the potential to change election outcomes at the Federal, State and local levels. Until recently, the Hispanic electorate in Florida consisted primarily of Cuban-Americans—a largely Republican ethnic political group, whose traditional voting behavior exhibits predictable patterns. But now Puerto Ricans are over 27% of Florida's Latino electorate, rivaling the dominant 29% Cuban-American vote.[1] That makes Puerto Ricans approximately 6% of Florida's voting eligible population.[2] But despite the recent arrival of hundreds of thousands more Puerto Ricans to the "Sunshine State", especially after the devastating 2017 Hurricane Maria, the impact of Florida's Latino vote on State and Presidential election outcomes remains unclear. Media and both parties political pundits place great interest in this strong demographic shift, with many speculating that Puerto Rican voters could tilt election outcomes in the Democratic Party's favor.

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[1] Bustamante, Luis, Abby Budiman & Mark Hugo Lopez. 2020. "Where Latinos Have the Most Eligible Voters in the 2020 Election." Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/31/where-latinos-have-the-most-eligible-voters-in-the-2020-election/

[2] In 2018, Florida's voting eligible population (VEP) was 15,333,0367 and Puerto Ricans were a total of 859,000 VEP. The size of the Latino electorate in the state was, 3,143,000, nearly a third of which are Puerto Rican. Sources: Bustamante, Luis, Abby Budiman & Mark Hugo Lopez. 2020. "Where Latinos Have the Most Eligible Voters in the 2020 Election." Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/31/where-latinos-have-the-most-eligible-voters-in-the-2020-election/ McDonald, Michael. n.d. "United States Elections Project." *2018 November General Election Turnout Rates* (blog). http://www.electproject.org/2018g

This study empirically analyses the potential influence of Florida's growing Puerto Rican population on election outcomes through a focus on the voter turnout patterns of this group in Presidential and Mid-Term elections from 2012 to 2018. Using a large dataset from the Florida voter file, the author tests the hypotheses that Puerto Ricans that are older, partisan, female, have higher income, and are habitual voters are more likely to cast a ballot. Given the rise in voting by mail across the nation, this study further explores the likelihood of voting by mail among this population. This research makes several contributions to the literature on voting behavior. The paper improves upon existing research by using new data that adequately samples the Puerto Rican population in the "Sunshine State" at the individual level. Because Florida's Puerto Rican population expanded rapidly in just a few years after the island's economic crises circa 2014 and Hurricane Maria in 2017, this group is not sampled in much of the existing studies, which largely employ survey data from the previous decade. The dataset used here consists of voter file data from the firm, Catalist, LLC—a well-known data vendor widely used in academia and government. It includes a total of 422,849 Florida Puerto Ricans. Voter file data also presents additional advantages to survey data. It contains actual, not self-reported behavior, and the size of the data addresses issues with multi-collinearity (Barreto 2010).

Findings show that turnout among registered Puerto Ricans is relatively low but it is rising over time. Puerto Ricans that are older, female, have higher income, are habitual voters and belong to one of the two major parties have a greater chance of turning out than others. The 2014 election was an exception among women, who did not participate at the same rate as men. Interestingly, most Puerto Rican voters belong to one of the two major parties, which indicates potential for increased participation in the future. The results show that partisans were more likely to vote in all types of elections. When examining the voting behavior of only those Puerto Rican voters that affiliate with one of the two major parties, the results show that Republicans are more likely to participate in Mid-Term elections. The direction of party identification (i.e., Democrat or Republican) was not consequential in Presidential elections. In regards to the manner of voting, Puerto Ricans that affiliate with the Democratic Party are much more likely than Republicans to vote by mail. Overall, the findings of this study suggest that given a pattern of increasing turnout and voter characteristics, this segment of the Florida electorate is well suited to be influential in future state and national elections.

Florida's Expanding Puerto Rican Population 2000-present

Puerto Ricans make up about 10% of the Latino population in the U.S.A., but are about a third of the Latino electorate in Florida (Bustamante 2020). Their size potentially gives this group a great deal of leverage in this electorally competitive state, where outcomes are sometimes decided by a few votes. This rapid expansion of the Puerto Rican population in Florida started during the 21st Century. Wang and Rayer (2018) at *the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida* thoroughly document the growth of this population in the state since the year 2000, so this paper only summarizes their findings here. The researchers show that the Puerto Rican population in the "Sunshine State" has more than doubled since 2000. Whereas two decades ago only 482,027 Puerto Ricans lived in Florida, that increased to more than a million (i.e., 1,067,747) in 2016. The bulk of this population is located in Central Florida (approximately 70% by 2016), primarily in Orange County (25%), followed by Osceola County (12.4%) and Hillsborough County (9.8 %), and a sizeable number settled in South Florida (Miami-Dade). Research finds that most Puerto Ricans that relocated to the U.S. from the island between 2005 to 2016 did settle primarily in the State of Florida, predominantly in the Central Florida area.[1]

[1] The authors note that "Florida's share (29%) of the total inflow from Puerto Rico to the United States between 2005 and 2016 far exceeded that of any other state. In fact, Florida's share was almost as large as the combined inflows to New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Massachusetts."

After Hurricane Maria hit the island of Puerto Rico in September of 2017, the number of island-based Puerto Ricans moving to Florida continued to increase at a rapid rate. Estimates on the total number relocating to Florida after this devastating hurricane range from 53,000 to 56,000. The City University of New York's (CUNY) *Center for Puerto Rican Studies* estimates that within six months of the hurricane, 135,000 Puerto Ricans moved to the U.S.A. (42% of them settling in Central Florida).[1]

This demographic change has the potential of influencing election outcomes because unlike other Hispanic groups that relocate to the U.S.A., Puerto Ricans are American citizens and immediately eligible to vote upon moving to any state. This explains why in 2018 and 2020 both political parties heavily targeted this population, with the media often touting that Puerto Ricans could decide the election outcome. Such claims, however, are largely speculative and not necessarily based on systematic data analysis. To understand how Puerto Ricans may or may not have an effect on elections in the mainland we need to know the extent to which Puerto Ricans in Florida turn out to vote, who votes and the factors more likely to predict turnout among this group.

Overview of the Literature on Puerto Rican Turnout in the U.S.

It is well established in the literature that Puerto Ricans in the U.S vote at low rates, even less than other Hispanic groups (Falcon 1983; Nelson 1984; De la Garza et al., 1992; Arvizu & Garcia 1996; Vargas-Ramos 2003, 2016 & 2018; Highton & Burris 2002; Raychaudhuri & Proctor 2020). But it is not yet clear why that is the case. The usual socio-economic predictors of turnout (e.g., age, education, income) do not always explain participation among Latinos in the expected manner (De la Garza, 2004), nor are Latinos at all a homogeneous group. Analyzing the voting behavior of Puerto Ricans in the U.S.A., Nelson (1984) explored the role of generational assimilation in mainland American political culture, but found no support for the idea that Puerto Ricans that are more assimilated to U.S. political culture are more likely to participate. The author concluded that the electoral environment in the Empire State was possibly not conducive to participation among this group. Falcon (1983) had reached a similar conclusion earlier, observing that the uncompetitive nature of elections in New York—where, until recently, the bulk of this population lived, partly explained the lack of electoral participation there, especially when contrasting this to the excitement around political campaigns on the island in which mobilization was key to turnout. Others also find that mobilization mattered to Puerto Rican turnout in the U.S. and to Latino turnout in general (Shaw et al., 2000; Michelson 2003; Raychaudhuri & Proctor 2020).

When exploring the impact of age, gender, education, and income on Puerto Rican turnout in the U.S.A., research shows mixed findings. Across studies, age is consistently positively associated with higher turnout (Arvizu & Garcia 1996; DeSipio, 1996; Shaw et al., 2000, Highton & Burris 2002; Vargas-Ramos 2003). Arvizu and Garcia (1996) and Vargas-Ramos (2003) do not find an effect for education, while Highton and Burris (2002) find that low levels of education depress turnout. Studies on Latino voting behavior show that the effect of gender has changed over time; Latino men used to vote more than women (De la Garza, 2004). More recently, the trend resembles that of non-Latino females, who are more likely to vote than men (Monforti, 2017). However, among Puerto Ricans, Vargas-Ramos (2003) did not find an effect for gender. Findings on the effects of income were inconclusive: Arvizu and Garcia (1996) conclude that income has the expected positive effect, but matters less than age for turnout, while old surveys by Highton and Burris (2002) did not find as yet effects for income among Puerto Ricans, in contrast to other Latino groups prior to 2020.

Data limitations are one of the reasons that previous studies show mixed or inconclusive findings on this group's electoral participation in the U.S.A. As previous scholars noted, much of what is know about Latino voting behavior depends on the data available (Geron & Michelson, 2008; Hajnal & Lee,

[1] *Puerto Rico Post-Maria* (2018). Center for Puerto Rican Studies (CUNY-Hunter College).

2011). Because Latinos as a broad ethnic group consist of various national origin groups (e.g., Cuban-Americans, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Colombians, Venezuelans or Ecuadorians), research that lumps these groups together might mask the effects of explanatory variables. On the other hand, studies that focus on various national origin groups might suffer from inadequate sample sizes. One exception to this is the widely used, Latino National Survey (LNS) from 2006, which usually includes a sample of over 8,000 Latinos with sizeable samples for the various national origin groups. But that data excludes much of the Puerto Rican population in Florida. There are some more recent surveys that include Florida Puerto Ricans, but the sample sizes remain small or data are not clearly available.[1] This article builds on the existing research to explain the turnout patterns of the growing Puerto Rican population in Florida.

Data and Method

Survey data on the Puerto Rican population in the "Sunshine State" are largely lacking, and when available these are limited by small samples and self-reported behavior. To address these limitations, this article uses a 2019 snapshot of the Florida voter file data from Catalist, LLC. These type of data contain voter history and demographic information for millions of voters in the state at the individual level. The data include actual (not self-reported) voting behavior. This is important because survey data can suffer from social desirability bias—people respond in accordance to what they expect is acceptable. Catalist data further improve upon the publicly available Florida voter file data because that data does not break down race and ethnicity categories, making it difficult to determine which individuals in the dataset belong to a particular group. The firm uses proprietary algorithms that include multiple data sources and numerous characteristics to model race and ethnicity, such as "voters' names and Census block contextual data" (Ansolabehere & Hersh 2013) to produce a score on the likelihood that a person is of a particular ethnicity. For the data used in this paper, Catalist modeled ethnicity to predict who is Puerto Rican. Catalist and similar data vendors use these type of models to predict various races and ethnicities. Research shows that these predictive scores are remarkably accurate. Ansolabehere and Hersh (2013) noted that "in a study in which we tested the accuracy of Catalist's racial predictions, we found that 91% of the time Catalist's prediction of race matches a voter's self-reported race." The firm's ethnicity model additionally undergoes an extensive validation process. These predictive models are commonly used in academic research and political campaigns to determine race/ethnicity when that attribute is not directly specified in the data. Another advantage of the Catalist dataset used in this study is that it includes non-voters—making it possible to analyze the characteristics of potential Puerto Rican voters. That analysis is included in the Appendix.

The Catalist data used here contain a total of 422,849 Puerto Ricans in Florida. Of these, 357,961 are known registered voters and 64,573 are non-voters. The analysis will focus on the 357,961 known registrants. The data were selected from the places where most Puerto Ricans in Florida live. These are the Central Florida and South Florida counties of Broward (Fort Lauderdale), Hillsborough (Tampa), Miami-Dade, Orange (Orlando), Osceola, Polk and Seminole. Over 70% of the Puerto Rican population in the state resides in these counties. Figure 1 illustrates Puerto Rican registration rates by county from 2012 to 2018. The data show that the counties with the largest number of registered Puerto Ricans are Orange and Osceola. Table 1 displays the percentage of Puerto Rican registered voters by three registration period categories. It shows that most voters in the dataset are relatively new. The data include some demographic variables, voter history, and registration status for the 2012, 2014, 2016 and

[1] The Latino Decisions 2020 survey has a sample of 1,000 Puerto Ricans in the U.S., but only 200 of those are from Florida. Halpin, John, Stephen Nuno-Perez & Angela Gutierrez. "What Do Puerto Ricans Really Think Ahead of the 2020 Elections? Results from a National Survey of Mainland Puerto Ricans." Latino Decisions. https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/democracy/reports/2020/09/24/178839/puerto-ricans-really-think-ahead-2020-elections/ Another survey is the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, with a similar sample of 200 Florida Puerto Ricans.

2018 Federal elections. Voter records data do not usually include such measures as income, marital status, or education. To address this, the present study uses a geocoded subset of the dataset that includes median household income at the Census block level from the 2019 American Community Survey. The sub-set of the data that were geocoded did not include "Independents" in the party identification category, which reduced the sample size to 145,492.[1] This subset of the data is employed in part of the analysis to account for the effects of income on turnout.

Figure 1:
Puerto Rican Voter Registration Rates in Florida by County, 2012-2018



Table 1:
Total Number of Puerto Ricans by Registration Period

Registration Year	% Registered
>2005	33.62
2005-2014	48.81
2015-2018	17.57
N	357,961

The dependent variables of interest measure whether or not an individual voted in the elections of 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018. Four binary variables are used to measure this, coded 1 when a person voted and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are, age, gender, income, habitual, Independent, Democrat, Republican, and a multiplicative term between income and habitual. Age is a continuous variable. Gender is also coded 1 for females. Partisanship is measured with the variable "Independent" to differentiate between people registered with either of the U.S. two political parties (Democrats and Republicans) vs. those who are not, but currently account as the largest and ever-expanding portion of the electorate.[2] The variable Independent, is coded 1 when individuals checked the box "No Party Affiliation" (NPA). To measure partisanship trends (i.e., party affiliations by individuals) two dummy variables are used, Democrats and Republicans: with Democrats coded 1 for Democratic Party identifiers and coded 0 otherwise; Republicans are coded 1 for Republican Party identifiers and coded 0 otherwise.

[1] The geocoded dataset was prepared by the author for a different study that also uses these data. Resources permitting, geocoding the entire dataset is planned for future research.

[2] Gallup, "Party Affiliation, 2004-2021" (December 2021) in https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx

The small number of registrants that identified with third parties are not included in the analysis. Income is a continuous variable; it measures the annual household income in 2019 at the block level associated with an individual's residential address. Habitual captures whether or not voters in the 2018 voted in all previous elections that they were eligible to participate in. It is coded 1 when individuals voted in the 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 elections.

This article employs logit regression to analyze the impact of voter characteristics on Presidential and Mid-Term election turnout among Florida's Puerto Rican voters. The following hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 1: *Increasing age is associated with higher turnout.*

Hypothesis 2: *Women are more likely to vote than men.*

Hypothesis 3: *Partisans are more likely to vote than independents. In general, people that affiliate with a political party have a higher chance of voting.*[1]

Hypothesis 4: *Habitual voters were more likely to vote in the 2018 election.*

Hypothesis 5: *Increasing income is associated with a higher chance of turning out to vote.*

Turnout of Puerto Ricans in Florida, 2012-2018

This section presents an analysis of the voter turnout patterns of this population in Florida. Figure 2 shows turnout rates over time from 2012 to 2018.[2] As would be expected, participation in U.S. Presidential elections is much higher than in the Mid-Terms, averaging 64%. While that number might seem high at first glance, it is low when compared to voting among registered Whites (87%), Blacks (91%) and Latinos/Hispanics in general (81%) (Perez, 2015). Turnout plummeted in 2014 to 30%; this dip was in line with that of other groups that year. The 2014 Mid-Term elections exhibited some of the lowest participation rates in decades across the nation (Montanaro et al., 2014). Puerto Rican turnout in Presidential elections increased slightly in 2016 from 2012 and participation in the Mid-Terms rose significantly in 2018 by 16 points. Figure 3 shows the turnout and abstention rates by county for each election. While Orange County with the Orlando metropolis has the highest number of registered Puerto Rican voters, followed by Osceola County (south of Orlando) with all Disney Resorts, these do not have the highest turnout. Seminole County (north of Orlando) exhibits the highest participation rates in both Presidential and Mid-Term elections.

Figure 2: Turnout of Puerto Rican Registered Voters in Florida, 2012-2018



[1] There is an extensive literature on Latino partisanship. It is complex because it is not necessarily acquired through parental socialization. The author uses this Catalist data to analyze the partisanship of Puerto Ricans in Florida in a separate paper.

[2] Turnout is calculated as the total number of registered voters in a county that cast a ballot divided by the total number of the voting eligible Puerto Rican population in a county.

Figure 3:
Turnout of Puerto Rican Registered Voters in Florida by County, 2012-2018



Tables 2 and 3 display the characteristics of Presidential and Mid-Term election voters respectively. Consistent with the literature on voting behavior among the general population, Table 2 shows that older voters head to the polls at higher rates. Two-thirds of Presidential election voters were women in 2012 and 2016. Interestingly, as partisans make up the bulk of registered voters, three out of five Puerto Ricans belong to one of the two major parties and only 37.5% are Independent. This is somewhat unusual among Latino voters, if many in the data have not lived in the U.S. for a long time.[1] But even if that were the case, it is not entirely surprising given that Puerto Ricans on the island have an existing relationship or at the very least familiarity with these political institutions. Moreover, island politicians usually have affiliations with one of the two major U.S. parties.

Table 3 presents the characteristics of Mid-Term election voters. In line with the results for Presidential elections, older voters were more likely to turn out. Gender differences are less striking in the Mid-Terms. For the 2014 contest, men and women were just as likely to turn out, and during the heavily contested 2018 elections, the gap between men and women was only about 5 points, compared to a 9-points difference in Presidential elections. The majority of Independents failed to cast ballots in these races and Republicans were more likely than Democrats to vote in both 2014 and 2018.

[1] This study does not make any assumptions on the length of time the registered voters in the dataset have lived in the U.S.A. That is the subject of future research. Based on the existing research on this population (Wang & Rayer, 2018) most of the Puerto Ricans in some of these Florida counties arrived from the island.

Table 2:
Characteristics of Puerto Rican Presidential Election Voters, 2012-2018

Voted		Age %				Gender %		Party Id %		
2012 Election		**18-29**	**30-44**	**45-65**	**66+**	**Male**	**Female**	**Ind**	**Dem**	**Rep**
No	36.50	53.62	45.21	30.65	25.56	40.21	33.87	45.29	32.68	30.61
Yes	63.50	46.38	54.79	69.35	74.44	59.79	66.13	54.71	67.32	69.39
N=	252,473	28,661	73,640	100,204	49,968	104,605	147,868	83,502	122,508	45,625
2016 Election		**18-29**	**30-44**	**45-65**	**66+**	**Male**	**Female**	**Ind**	**Dem**	**Rep**
No	35.73	53.95	40.16	27.42	26.91	40.22	32.41	44.18	31.30	29.17
Yes	64.27	46.05	59.84	72.58	73.09	59.78	67.59	55.82	68.70	70.83
N=	344,553	60,196	101,775	124,031	58,551	146,468	198,085	127,302	161,564	54,595

Table 3:
Characteristics of Puerto Rican Mid-Term Election Voters, 2014-2018

Voted		Age %				Gender %		Party Id %		
2014 Election		**18-29**	**30-44**	**45-65**	**66+**	**Male**	**Female**	**Ind**	**Dem**	**Rep**
No	69.03	85.09	79.62	64.06	49.86	68.78	69.20	77.94	67.13	56.00
Yes	30.97	14.91	20.38	35.94	50.14	31.22	30.80	22.06	32.87	44.00
N=	290,775	41,565	85,494	110,164	53,552	122,261	168,514	101,983	138,569	49,269
2018 Election		**18-29**	**30-44**	**45-65**	**66+**	**Male**	**Female**	**Ind**	**Dem**	**Rep**
No	53.02	70.53	60.69	44.15	40.13	55.76	50.99	62.65	48.95	42.29
Yes	46.98	29.47	39.31	55.85	59.87	44.24	49.01	37.35	51.05	57.71
N=	356,921	62,529	106,273	128236	59,883	152,371	204,550	133,851	165,980	55,867

Multivariate Results:

This section focuses on the multivariate logit regression analysis results. Table 4 presents the results of four logit regression models, where the dependent variable is a binary measure that captures if a registered voter cast a ballot in the election. The explanatory variables are age, gender (female), Independents, measures of partisanship, and binary variables of the two major parties, Democrat and Republican. The latter is left out as the base category. Model 4 contains an additional independent variable, habitual, coded 1 when eligible individuals voted in all previous elections. In all four columns, age moved in the expected direction and the coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level. Increasing age is positively associated with turnout. Puerto Rican women were more likely to vote than men, except in the 2014 election. In 2014, being female was negatively associated with turnout.

In column 4, habitual, was positive and significant, indicating that consistent with expectations, voters that regularly head to the polls are more likely to vote. To ease interpretation, Figure 4 displays the marginal effects of, habitual, on the chance of voting in the 2018 elections holding other variables at their means. It shows that habitual voters had a probability of voting of approximately 83%, compared to less than 40% for non-habitual voters. When looking at the difference between Democrats and Republicans on the probability of voting, Democrats were less likely to participate than Republicans in both types of elections for all four election years.

The effect of Independents (partisanship) is consistent with expectations: Independents were less likely to vote in both types of elections from 2012 to 2018. Since logit coefficients do not lend themselves to straightforward interpretations, Figure 5 displays the marginal effects of partisanship vs. having no party affiliation (Independents) and age on the likelihood of turnout in Mid-Term and Presidential elections holding all other variables at their means. The graphs in the top row display the results for Presidential elections and the bottom row for the Mid-Terms. All four graphs illustrate that as age increases the chances of voting rise as well. Not surprisingly, Independents are less likely than partisans to participate in both types of elections regardless of age, though these have a greater chance of showing up for Presidential, rather than off-year contests.

To untangle these findings further, the author next turns to an analysis using a subset of the data that includes only voters that identify with the two major parties and data that has information on income for each voter. Table 5 displays the results of the same dependent and explanatory variables presented in Table 4, but now accounting for income in each model. Income is a continuous variable (Median Household Income, 2019). The model in column 4 additionally includes a multiplicative term between income and habitual to test the hypothesis that the effect of habitual might depend on income. When controlling for income there are some differences between Presidential and Mid-Term elections in the political participation of Puerto Rican voters.

For the 2012 and 2016 Presidential elections, age and gender are significant and in the positive direction. The most striking finding is that the direction of partisanship is significant for Mid-Terms, but not for Presidential elections. This means that Republicans are indeed more likely to vote, but this is only the case for Mid-Term elections once income is controlled for. This finding has important implications for future election outcomes. The results also show that for the 2014 Mid-Term elections, gender did not influence the chances of turning out to vote. The key variables for that election were age, partisanship and income. For the 2018 Mid-Term elections, all variables are significant, except for the interaction terms, income* habitual, indicating no association between habitual and income.

This paper next examined the manner of voting among this segment of the electorate focusing on which voters preferred to participate by mail instead of heading to the polls. Given the rise of voting by mail in recent years, the broad expansion since the pandemic and the expectations that this method of voting advantages one party (Democrats) over another (Cottrell, Herron & Smith 2021; Stewart III, 2021) it would be interesting to examine these patterns among Puerto Ricans in Florida.

Figure 6 graphs the results of two logit regression models on the likelihood of voting by mail in the 2016 and 2018 elections. For each graph, the Y axis shows the probability of voting by mail, and the X axis displays whether registrants are Republican (coded 0) or Democrats (coded 1). The take-away here is that in Presidential and Mid-Term elections Puerto Rican Democrats are more likely to participate by mail. In the 2016 election, Republicans had a probability of voting by mail of 24% compared to 27% for Democrats. In the 2018 Mid-Term elections, the chances of voting by mail for Republicans was 29% compared to 32% among Democrats. The full results of the logit regressions are in Table 4.A (Appendix).

Table 4:
Predictors on the Likelihood of Voting in Presidential and Mid-Term Elections among Florida Puerto Ricans, 2012-2018

Explanatory Variables	(1) Voted 2012 Dependent Variable	(2) Voted 2014 Dependent Variable	(3) Voted 2016 Dependent Variable	(4) Voted 2018 Dependent Variable
Age	0.023***	0.032***	0.021***	0.012***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female=1	0.266***	-0.042***	0.323***	0.194***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Independent=1	-0.480***	-0.809***	-0.502***	-0.446***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat=1	-0.054***	-0.416***	-0.063***	-0.086***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Habitual=1	—	—	—	2.285***
				(0.01)
Constant	-0.581	-1.972	-0.379	-1.026
	(0.01)	(0.017)	(0.01)	(0.0152)
Observations	252,473	290,775	344,553	356,921

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4:
Marginal Effects of Habitual on the Probability of Voting in the 2018 Mid-Term Elections



Figure 5:
Marginal Effects of Partisanship and Age on Participation in Mid-Term and Presidential Elections, 2012-2018



Table 5:
Predictors on the Likelihood of Voting in Presidential and Mid-Term Elections among Florida Puerto Ricans, 2012-2018

Explanatory Variables	(1) **Voted 2012** Dependent Variable	(2) **Voted 2014** Dependent Variable	(3) **Voted 2016** Dependent Variable	(4) **Voted 2018** Dependent Variable
Age	0.023***	0.032***	0.020***	0.009***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female=1	0.317***	0.012	0.345***	0.197***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat=1	-0.00	-0.365***	0.004	-0.034*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Habitual=1	—	—	—	2.287***
				(0.04)
Income*Habitual				-0.00
				(0.00)
Constant	-1.130	-2.446	-0.952	-1.452
	(0.0334)	(0.0298)	(0.0291)	(0.0280)
Observations	110,482	123,745	140,943	145,040

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 6:
Predictors on the Likelihood of Voting by Mail among Florida Puerto Ricans in the Two Major Parties during the 2016 and 2018 Presidential and Mid-Term Elections



Discussion and Conclusion

This essay presents a data-driven analysis of the expanding Puerto Rican electorate in Florida and its potential influence on election outcomes. The study showed that although turnout rates among this group are relatively low, especially considering that this analysis focuses on registered voters, there is an evident pattern of increasing turnout over time among the Puerto Rican electorate in the ”Sunshine State”. Voting rates rose slightly in the 2016 Presidential election from the 2012 levels. And in the Mid-Terms, the rate of increase from 2014 to 2018 was even higher. The results presented here inform expectations on the voting behavior of this cohort also in the 2020 Presidential election.

Unique in many ways, given that it took place in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 election was also characterized by high turnout among all Americans (66.2%); in Florida, participation was 6 points higher than in the previous Presidential race (DeSilver, 2021). Latino turnout similarly spiked nation-wide that year (Dominguez-Villegas et al., 2021). Within this context, the results of this study suggest that the pattern of increased participation among Puerto Ricans in Florida likely persisted in 2020. Those that are older, female, partisan and have higher incomes probably voted at higher rates than other Puerto Ricans in the “Sunshine State”. Though the results of this study show that the direction of partisanship (i.e., Democrat or Republican) was not associated with increased turnout in Presidential contests, Democrats might have had an edge with Puerto Ricans in 2020. One reason for this is that the 2020 election was largely (though not exclusively) conducted by mail due to the COVID-19 pandemic waves with “more than 4.85 million Florida voters cast vote by-mail (VBM) ballots in the 2020 general election, roughly 43.6% of the 11.1 million total ballots cast” (Smith, 2021). These findings demonstrate that in the 2016 and 2018 elections, Puerto Ricans that identify as Democrats were more likely to cast a ballot by mail and that pattern might have continued in 2020. This however, remains speculative, given the unusual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic that influenced many to switch to voting by mail instead of in-person. Future research could explore if the existing patterns from 2012-2018 held in 2020, or more likely might change dramatically in the upcoming 2022 Mid-Term elections: looking ahead, Republicans might have an advantage in political turnout, given that the findings here showed the direction of partisanship mattered for turnout during the Mid-Terms; but also because turnout usually favors the opposition party in off-year elections.

Turning to concluding thoughts, there exists the possibility that the pandemic negatively affected Puerto Rican turnout in 2020. Studies show that COVID-19 has disproportionately affected racial and ethnic minorities, not just in the sense of these communities having higher rates of infection (Wilder, 2021), but there is also a negative economic impact (Krogstad & Lopez, 2020). Given the correlation between income and turnout, individuals that lost employment due the pandemic might have been less likely to participate. This would mean that the positive effect of age on turnout might have also been suppressed, particularly for those with a strong preference for voting in person. It would be interesting for future studies to merge voter file data with COVID-19 data to test the impact of the pandemic on the voting behavior of this ethnic group.

Caution must be taken in speculating based on the results here given, because this study focused only on registered voters. In general, people that are registered are more likely to vote (Erikson, 1981). Yet, the analysis on the characteristics of a sample of unregistered Puerto Ricans in Florida (Tables 2.A & 3.A) suggests that non-voters share some characteristics with voters, namely most are older and female. This means there are thousands more Puerto Ricans that if properly mobilized and registered to vote could potentially become likely voters.

This study also found that consistent with expectations, participation rates were higher among those that are older, female, habitual voters, partisan and have higher income. Interestingly, this research showed that most registered Puerto Rican voters are partisans and this was positively associated with turnout. It is possible that Independents are not yet socialized into political parties—this study cannot answer that question, but it should be explored in future research. Another important finding was that the direction of partisanship mattered in Mid-Term, but not Presidential elections. Republicans were more likely than Democrats to participate in those contests.

The paper finally showed that when it comes to voting by-mail in Mid-Terms and Presidential races, Democrats are more likely to do so. With the increasing practice of voting by-mail (Smith, 2021), this could matter in the future. At the time of this writing, new voting laws in the Republican-controlled Florida legislature and government have restricted voting by-mail. This topic is another avenue open for interesting future studies. This paper set out with the question of whether the growing Puerto Rican population in the "Sunshine State" will be influential in future election outcomes. The findings presented suggest that given the turnout patterns and characteristics of these voters there is a strong possibility of such outcome.

APPENDIX

Table 1.A: Characteristics of Puerto Rican Habitual Voters

Age	**%**
18-29	4.63
30-44	18.39
45-65	45.81
66-114	31.17
N	76,248
Gender	
Male	41.72
Female	58.28
N	76,248
Party Identification	
Independent	23.87
Democrat	51.26
Republican	24.87
N	75,947

Table 1.A presents the characteristics of habitual Puerto Rican voters, defined as those that were eligible to vote and voted in every Federal election since 2012.[1] The overwhelming majority of habitual voters, 77%, are over the age of 45 and a third over 65 years of age. Most habitual voters are, not surprisingly, female and more than three-fourth are partisan. The results are in line with the general literature on voting behavior. What these findings suggest is that voting patterns among established Puerto Rican voters do not differ much from the patterns of non-Latino voters. In general, once people acquire the habit of voting they are more likely to vote in the future (Gerber & Green 2003; Coppock & Green 2015). As people age, they might have more income and stability that facilitate voting (Highton & Burris 2002). The finding that most habitual voters belong to the two major parties is also in line with traditional patterns, largely because partisans might be more invested in politics, but also because modern electoral campaigns use data analytics to target partisans through state voter file data. Since registered individuals are identifiable in such publicly-available datasets, it is easier for campaigns to mobilize them (Hersh, 2015).

Table 2.A: Demographic Characteristics of Puerto Rican Non-Voters in Florida

Age	**%**
18-29	6.40
30-44	24.53
45-65	49.10
66-114	19.98
N	38,262
Gender	
Male	42.88
Female	57.11
N	64,573

Table 3.A: Puerto Rican Voters vs. Non-voters by Key Florida Counties

County Name	**Voters %**	**Non-voters %**
Broward	12.03	13.74
Hillsborough	14.02	12.30
Miami-Dade	7.88	8.92
Orange	31.78	34.65
Osceola	20.21	17.02
Polk	7.01	4.65
Seminole	7.06	8.72
Total	357,961	64,573

[1] This means that only voters that are registered prior to Florida's registration deadline for any given election are included. In 2012 for instance, that deadly was October 9. For each subsequent election year, the author included only those voters that were registered to vote by the registration deadline that preceded the election. Of these, 76,248 registered Puerto Ricans were habitual voters.

Tables 2.A and 3.A display the characteristics of the Puerto Rican non-voters in the dataset. Given that these individuals are not registered to vote, there are no registration, party, or voting observations here. Table 2.A shows that most non-voters are female, and older, nearly half are in the age range of 45 to 65 years of age, and 20% are over the age of 65. This is somewhat puzzling because usually younger voters (18-to-29) are less likely to register and vote. This may be associated to the rapid relocation of large numbers of Puerto Ricans from the island to the U.S.A. The impact of the relocation, economic crises, hurricanes, and lack of English fluency for some might explain this.

The author expects to explore this in future research. Table 3.A displays the percent of voters and non-voters by county. Most non-voters are in the counties of Orange and Osceola, home to many of the new arrivals. What the data suggest is that since most non-voters are similar in age and gender to voters, this would indicate that once registered these individuals might be more likely to engage in electoral participation than if most were younger, or male.

Table 4.A
Predictors of Voting by Mail 2016 vs. 2018

Explanatory Variables	(1) **Vote by Mail 2016** Dependent Variable	(2) **Vote by Mail 2018** Dependent Variable
Age	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female=1	0.130***	0.099***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat=1	0.165***	0.139***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	-0.000	-0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Habitual=1		-0.005
		(0.042)
Income*habitual		-0.000
		(0.00)
Constant	-2.51	-2.16
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	97,420	76,678

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946

by Sina Azodi, ABD (University of South Florida-Tampa)

ABSTRACT: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 at the end of World War II emerged as one of the first crises between the two war-time allies, the United States and Soviet Union. The crisis began as the result of continuing Soviet interference in Iranian affairs as a part of greater Russian strategy to exploit Iranian resources and weaken the country's independence. In 1946 Soviet refusal to leave Iranian territory at the end of World War II, and their overt support for a separatist movement in the province of Azerbaijan, in north-western Iran. The purpose of this historical analysis is to examine the roots of Soviet conduct in the Azerbaijani crisis of 1946 and the critical role that then Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam (*Qavam Al-Saltaneh*) played in persuading Soviet leadership to withdraw their forces from Iran.

The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 at the end of World War II emerged as one of the first Cold War crises between the two main war-time Allies, the United States and Soviet Union (USSR). The crisis began as the result of Soviet refusal to leave Iranian territory at the end of World War II, and their overt support for a separatist movement in the province of Azerbaijan, in northwestern Iran with the covert goal to annex it to Soviet Azerbaijan in the north. The purpose of this historical analysis is to examine the roots of Soviet conduct in the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. This essay also pays special attention to the critical role that then Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam (*Qavam Al-Saltaneh*) played in persuading the Soviet leadership to withdraw their forces from Iran. However, Soviet interference in Iranian affairs was not an isolated incident, but rather part of greater Russian strategy to exploit Iranian resources and make such a weaken country dependent on the USSR.

Historical Background

The origins of the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 should be found in the political disarray and overall weakness of Iran (then Empire of Persia*)* in the 19th and early 20th centuries. While nominally an independent county, Persia became the target of the European countries' competition for power and influence. In this vein, Tsarist Russia, following Peter the Great's (1672-1725) dictum sought to push to the South. Accordingly, Peter the Great, in his political testament envisioned that "we[Russia] must hasten the downfall of Persia, push on to the Persian Gulf, if possible re-establish the ancient commercialities with the Levant through Syria, and force our way into the Indies, which are the storehouses of the world…"[1] Meanwhile, a weakened Iran under the Qajar Dynasty (1789-1925), was forced to grant numerous humiliating concessions to European powers because it simply lacked the means of defying the great powers' demands. For example, Persia after being defeated twice in the Russo-Persian Wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828, was forced to sign the two humiliating treaties of Gulistan and Turkemenchay, under which it ceded sovereignty of a large portion of its territory in Caucasus, including the "Khanates of Yerevan, Nakchivan, Talysh, Ordubad and Mughan… The Aras River was declared the new border between

[1] Lehovich, Dimitry V., "The Testament of Peter the Great" in *American Slavic and East European Review,* v.7, n. 2 (1948): p.111-124. doi:10.2307/2492188. Date Accessed: 11/8/19

Iran and Russia,"[1] and thus Persia/Iran was forced to give up her navigation rights throughout the Caspian Sea (except the southern-most area bordering northern Iran).

Over the course of this period, two important players namely the Tsarist Russia and Great Britain, acted in complete disregard for Iran's political independence, each trying to extract concessions from the weak Persian state. In response, Iranians unable to defy the European powers encroachments, employed a "positive equilibrium"[2] strategy of granting economic concessions and balancing off major powers against each other. While this strategy kept Iran as one of the very few remaining independent states in Asia, it left the once mighty Persian empire, humbled, plundered and barely standing on its feet. In one of the most consequential events in the history of Iranian politics in 1890, the Persian monarch Nasir Al-Din Shah, granted a humiliating concession to the British officer G.F. Talbot for a full monopoly on the growth, internal trade and the export of all Iranian tobacco, which constituted a significant part of the Iranian economy. The concession caused such a backlash that the Persian king under pressure from the Shi'a clergy and the people, was forced to nullify the concession, and pay reparations to the British company. This incident was indeed a transformational event, and the stage for Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, which turned Iran into a constitutional monarchy.

The Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, which effectively carved out Iran into spheres of influence between Great Britain and Russia was yet another affront to Iran's national independence. The two powers, facing with the emerging threat of Germany in Europe, decided to end their rivalry over influence in Persia. W. Morgan Shuster, the American financier and lawyer, who briefly served as the Treasurer General of Persia, in his memoirs *The Strangling of Persia* observes that:

> "…these two governments (Russia and U.K.) had signed a convention in 1907 in which they purported to define the geographical spheres of their respective interests, Russia in the North and England in the southeastern corner of the Persian Empire. Nominally at least, the Persian Constitutional government was that of a sovereign nation…and this sovereignty had been expressly recognized and proclaimed by the Russian and British…"[3]

Neither the government of Iran, nor the Shah were informed of this agreement. It bears noting that Shuster's mission short mission to Iran in 1912 witnessed yet another example of European powers' encroachment on Iran's political independence. Accordingly, while the Iranian parliament (*Majlis)* had hired Shuster to reform and restructure the Iranian economy, Russia and Great Britain, concerned with losing their privileges in Iran, issued an ultimatum demanding his dismissal. Such violations of Iran's territorial integrity and political independence would be repeated in the following years and decades.

Prelude: Iran and the two World Wars

At the onset of the first World War, Iran despite its official neutrality, once again became the target of the warring parties' occupation and disregard for its territorial integrity. As the prominent historian Abbas Amanat observes, in October 1914 and only a few months after the outbreak of war, "Iranian people witnessed repeated offensives from the Russians and Ottomans along the Eastern Front…Tehran could view this state of affairs only with a mix of horror and resignation as they warring armies moved

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan. "Treaty of Turkemenchay 1828." Permanent Link Available at: http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/810 (Date Accessed: 11/09/2019)

[2] Limbert, John, *Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling with the Ghosts of History* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press: District of Columbia, 2009), p. 42.

[3] Shuster, William Morgan, *The Strangling of Persia: A Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans: a Personal Narrative* (New York: Century Company, 1912), p.47.

closer to the capital."[1] Iran during this period was humbled, humiliated and unable to function as an independent government. It is believed that during the course of the Great War, as many as two million Iranians have died of famine and disease.[2]

Meanwhile, it is necessary to point out that in 1921, the Soviet Union, seeking to distance itself from Tsarist Russia, signed the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship wherein the Soviet Union pledged to embark on a "enlightened policy"[3] toward Iran and respect its territorial integrity. A word of mention regarding the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship seems necessary here. While according to the treaty both sides committed themselves not to interfere in the domestic affairs of each other, Article VI of the treaty, which was used by the Soviets as the pretext to continue the occupation of Iran, stipulated that Soviet Union had a right to send troops to Iran, should a "third party" use Iranian territory as a base of operations against the USSR or threaten Soviet frontiers or her allies. Unfortunately for Iran, the Soviets used this Article as the pretext to continue the occupation of Iran at the conclusion of World War II. The 1941 Allied invasion of Iran in the midst of World War II was the precursor to the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. Similar to the First World War, Iran on the onset of the second conflagration declared its official neutrality. However, as then Iranian Prime Minister Ali Mansur explained to an emergency meeting of Iranian parliament on 25 August 1941.

> "…Unfortunately, with all of the attempts that the government of Iran has made to preserve the national security & the well-being f the people…instead of amicable understanding & friendly settlement of this issue…the representatives of Britain & the Soviet Union each delivered a note [to the PM]…in these notes they stated their resolve to use military force…The Soviet air force has bombarded defenseless Azerbaijani cities and a substantial force is moving from Djulfa toward Tabriz."[4]

Noteworthy to mention here is the Allied countries' habitual complete disregard for Iran's territorial integrity and political independence. As historians Hooshang and Farhad Taleh observe, the allied forces demanded the Iranian government not only to surrender German nationals, but to also severe diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany, Hungary, Italy and Romania,[5] a direct affront to Iran's national sovereignty. Several factors including a large German presence in Iran, and concerns over the presence of a "German fifth column"[6] led the Allied governments to issue two ultimatums to the Iranian government in July 1941 demanding the deportation of all German nationals from Iran, and a declaration of war on Germany.[7] According to a U.S. State Department Cable, the British Chief of Staff had informed the US Minister in Iraq Paul Knabenshue that "[otherwise] British Army intends to move into Iran during first week of August and to occupy primarily Abadan and neighboring oil fields and perhaps bomb Tehran."[8] The Iranian government's desperate appeal to the United States for intervention on behalf of Iran, also fell on deaf ears,[9] as Washington was preparing the join the USSR and Great Britain in the fight against Nazi Germany.

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[1] Amanat, Abbas *Iran: a Modern History* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 395.

[2] Ward, Steven. *Immortal: A Military History of Iran* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), p. 123.

[3] Central Intelligence Agency, *USSR-Iran Boundary.* February 1951. Permanent Link Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00976A000200010003-4.pdf

[4] Prime Minister Ali Mansur speech before the emergency session of the Iranian Parliament, August 25, 1941. Quoted in: Tale, Hooshang & Taleh, Farhad. *Iran in the Claws of the Bear: the Failed Soviet Landgrab of 1946* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2007), p. 5.

[5] Taleh, Hooshang & Farhad, p. 8.

[6] *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers,* 1941 Volume 3, British Commonwealth; Near East and Africa, Document 359. Permanent Link Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v03/d359

[7] Ghazvinian, p. 124

[8] *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers,* 1941 Volume 3, British Commonwealth; Near East and Africa, Document 361. Permanent Link Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v03/d361

[9] Ghazvinian, John, *America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2021), p. 125.

Relatedly to the Allied concerns, was also the pro-German sentiments among Iranians, particularly Reza Shah's affinity[1] with Germany. As the historian John Ghazvinian observes, "Reza [Shah] was intoxicated by the discipline, efficiency and military precision of Germany…"[2] and viewed Berlin as a counterbalance to Moscow and London, both with a long history of colonial attitude toward Iran. In this vein, unlike other European powers, not only Germany lacked a history of colonial behavior in Iran, but had also sent a large number of businessmen, and technical advisors to Iran to help with the Reza Shah's aspirations to modernize the country. It is necessary to point out that while Iranians had a "soft spot" for Germany, claims that Reza Shah was a Nazi sympathizer are simply not true.[3] Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (hereafter, *the Shah)* who succeeded Reza Shah, after his force abdication in the midst of occupation of Iran, also rejects such claims by observing that his father "had little use for Hitler."[4] On 25 August 1941, Great Britain and Russia launched a full invasion of Iran from the south and the north, demanding Reza Shah's abdication.

Another critical factor in the Allied forces' decision was Iran's geostrategic position as a critical overland supply route to the Soviet Union, and substantial oil resources, especially after the Wehrmacht's invasion of the Soviet Union. As the Shah observed in his autobiography, "the need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Government… made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia."[5] After the occupation of Iran, the governments of United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) pledged in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942 to guarantee Iran's independence and territorial integrity and further promised to withdraw their forces from Iran within six months of the conclusion of the war.[6] In this regard, Ghazvinian has observed that the "lopsided arrangement"[7] allowed the powers to divide Iran into spheres of influence, the second time since the turn of the century. Ghazvinian notes that the word *Tripartite* itself was deceptive since under full military occupation, Iran had no choice but to sign the Allied agreement.[8]

Soviet Occupation of Iran and the Separation of Azerbaijan

Despite Allied countries' assurances to withdraw their forces, many in Iran including the Shah himself and his advisors[9] were already skeptical of Soviet and British intentions. On 3 September 1945, a day after Japan's surrender, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) officially declared its formation in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, with eyes toward joining the Soviet Azerbaijan. Jafar Pishevari, the leader of Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, in his letter to the Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan writes:

> "In order to protect the rights of Azeri people, we consider it necessary to establish an independent republic of Azerbaijan. Therefore…we ask you to render us assistance and create the conditions to realize the treasured dream of our people…"[10]

[1] Amanat, p. 495.
[2] Ghazvinian, p. 122.
[3] Ibid, p. 123.
[4] Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, *Mission for my Country* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p.67.
[5] Pahlavi, M.R., *Mission for My Country,* idem, p.71.
[6] A. H. Hamzavi, "Iran and the Tehran Conference" in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944),* v.20, n.2 (1944): p.192-203. doi:10.2307/3018096 (Date Accessed: 11/12/2019)
[7] Ghazvinian, p. 131.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ghazvinian, p. 131.
[10] Jafar Pishehvari letter to Mir Jafar Bagirof, Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan as quoted in: Leffler, Mevlyn & Painter, David, Ed., *Origins of the Cold War: an International History* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 105.

Contrary to its commitments, however, the Soviet army with an estimate of 90,000-100,000 troops[1] in the country, not only refused to withdraw, but also intensified the training of DPA forces,[2] even hampering Tehran's efforts to quell the separatists by preventing the Iranian forces to be deployed to Iranian Azerbaijan.[3]

The United States somehow found itself caught off-guard during the Azerbaijan crisis. While the Great Britain was simply too weak to counter the Soviet interference in Iran, America was alarmed by the developments in Iran. A Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Wallace Murray, further indicates that by November 1945 not only DPA had seized control of several cities in Azerbaijan,[4] a large group (of DPA) was "moving in direction of Tehran."[5]Accordingly, the threat of Soviet occupation of Tehran was so serious that the U.S. Ambassador had warned the Shah that "Soviets might occupy Tehran."[6] Nevertheless, Washington increasingly reluctant to publicly denounce its major wartime ally, chose to merely send a "strongly worded note"[7] to Moscow, reminding the Soviets of their treaty obligations. The Soviets, meanwhile, responded to Washington's note by replying that the people [of Azerbaijan] were simply "demanding their national ideals" and that they "opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts."[8] America's support was limited, and Iran was left on its own.

The exact motives of the Soviet refusal to leave Iran are subject to debate. However, it seems that the issue of oil has been the primary motive for USSR' nefarious actions. Interestingly, Milani observes that "under pressure from [Lavrentiy] Beria" to secure oil concessions from Iran, Stalin on July 6, 1945 ordered "organization of a separatist movement in Southern Azerbaijan and other provinces of Northern Iran."[9] Accordingly, the issue of Azerbaijan were to be used as "bargaining chips" for oil concessions.[10] Similarly, Taleh citing U.S. sources, argues that Soviets sought three main objectives. Firstly, to secure oil concessions for northern Iran; secondly, to secure air transport rights between USSR and Iran, and lastly, "unspecified privileges"[11] at the Iranian port of Bandar Pahlavi (today's Anzali) on the Caspian Sea.

Regarding Soviet intentions in Iran, the prominent American diplomat Ambassador John Limbert, who served in Iran as a diplomat has identified three main objectives for the USSR's refusal to leave Iran. He stipulates that the Soviets were seeking oil concessions in the north of the country, to balance off Great Britain's position in the south of Iran.[12] Another Soviet objective in Iran, according to Limbert was to advance the interests of the Tudeh communist party in "the Iranian central government."[13] The third objective, meanwhile, was that by supporting the separatist movement, Soviets sought to create a "friendly neighbor to the south." Nonetheless, the veteran American diplomat George Kennan, in a Telegram to the State Department argued that Soviet intentions in Iran are "apprehension of potential

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[1] British Joint Staff Mission, Memorandum, untitled re Iran, March 26, 1946, Top Secret, NARA. http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/us-intelligence-on-the-middle-east/british-joint-staff-mission-memorandum-untitled-re-iran-march-26-1946-top-secret-nara;umeoumeob01039

[2] Taleh, Hooshang & Farhad, p.19.

[3] *Iranian Foreign Ministry Communiqué to Soviet Embassy,* November 22, 1945. Cited in Taleh, p. 24.

[4] *FRUS Diplomatic Papers,* 1945, Volume VIII; Near East and Africa, p. 432. Permanent Link Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d400 (Date Accessed: 11/14/2019)

[5] Ibid.

[6] Quoted in Milani, Abbas, *The Shah,* idem, p. 121.

[7] Ghazvinian, p. 139.

[8] Quoted in Afkhami, Gholam Reza, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 93.

[9] Milani, Abbas, *The Myth of the Great Satan* (Hoover Institute Press: Stanford, 2010), p. 58.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Taleh, p. 22.

[12] Limber, p. 42.

[13] Ibid.

foreign penetration in that area, coupled with the concern for prestige...[1]" Overall, it seems that the USSR's actions during this period were largely the continuation of Russia's previous objectives to keep Iran politically weak and unstable.

This paper discussed previously that through the 19th and early-20th Centuries, Iran by employing a strategy of "positive equilibrium," balanced off major powers against each other. This time around however, Mohammad Moassadeq, the aristocratic lawmaker and the future prime minister who led Iran's oil nationalization movement in 1951, argued for the opposite approach. Accordingly, he suggested that "giving *less* to one of the two Great Powers as a way of reducing its influence, then giving less to the other to even the balance." [2] The so called "negative equilibrium" (*Mozaveneh-Manfi)* approach, Mossadeq argued, would allow the country to gain control of itself and its destiny. Mossadeq went as far as arguing that the positive equilibrium, would "resemble that of a person with one hand amputated who in pursuance of balance, would consent to have his right hand amputated."[3] In this vein, the Iranian parliament (*Majlis)* passed a law in late 1944 that essentially prohibited the government to discuss or sign petroleum concessions "with any foreign representative as long as foreign troops remained on Iranian territory."[4] The new law further "required approval by an Iranian parliament elected *after* (emphasis) the agreement was signed."[5] Meanwhile, Iranian law prohibited parliamentarian elections as long as foreign troops remained in Iran. In essence, any future concession was tied to the parliamentarian elections that could not be held as long as Soviet troops remained in Iran.

Enter Qavam

Ahmad Qavam, commonly known by his aristocratic title *Qavam Al-Saltaneh*, became Prime Minister of Iran in January 1946,[6] succeeding Mohsen Sadr who had failed to resolve the crisis. A pro-Russian statesman, Qavam had witnessed that Iran, because of Soviet interference, could not resolve the crisis through the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).[7] Hence, he immediately sought to directly engage the Soviet leadership. On 28 January 1946, he sent the following note to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin,

> "Now that the responsibility of for the affairs of Iran has been assigned to me, I find it necessary to convey the feelings of sincere friendship to His Excellency of the people and the government of Iran toward the government of USSR and the great people of neighboring and allied country. I also give my assurances that I am determined to do my utmost in sincere and friendly cooperation in accordance with good neighborly relations…."[8]

Qavam furthermore quickly led a delegation to Moscow to meet with Soviet leaders in February 1946, where he was welcomed by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.[9] Limbert, argues that Qavam had two "central and interlocking" objectives: "ensuring the withdrawal of forces and preventing the

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[1] FRUS*, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,* Volume V. November 7, 1944. Permanent Link Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v05/d506 (Date Accessed: 11/15/2019)
[2] Ghazvinian, p. 146.
[3] Milani, Abbas, *The Shah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 116.
[4] Limbert, p.38.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid, p.44.
[7] Afkhami, p.94.
[8] Ahmad Qavam, Telegram to Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin, January 28, 1946. Cited in Taleh & Taleh p.85.
[9] Agholi, Baqer. *Mirza Ahmad Khan Qavam Al-Saltaneh in Qajar and Pahlavi eras: A Biography.* (Javidan Publications: Tehran, 1996).

dissolution of Iran by the loss of important northwestern provinces."[1] Qavam's unique approach in negotiating with Stalin became critical in the eventual resolution of the bilateral conflict.

Conscious of Iran's weak position, Qavam during his three rounds of negotiations with Soviet officials called for a "good faith"[2] approach and even engaged in flattering Stalin by calling him the "symbol of major reforms" and the "supreme commander of brave Soviet army."[3] In the same vein, aware of the legalisms of the 1921 treaty of friendship between two countries,[4] Qavam approached the crisis as a matter of "equity."[5] Accordingly, Qavam told Stalin that:

> "I am not here to discuss legal matters or refer to certain treaties although they have their own place. I am here with honest and friendly intentions to ask you to act with a strong will in taking the initiative friendly relations and removing the problems between Iran and the Soviet Union, which is the immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran…"[6]

Despite Qavam's flattery, as the historian Gholam Reza Afkhami observes, Stalin rejected this proposal by accusing Iran of "stabbing Russia in the back at every opportunity.[7]" Meanwhile, when the Soviet leader brought up the issue of oil rights in the North, Qavam urged that because of the domestic Iranian laws-noted earlier- he is unable to negotiate any concessions, which led to a bitter end[8] to the first round of negotiations, leaving Qavam disappointed and ready to travel back to Iran.[9]

In the follow-up conversations with Iranians, Molotov too brought up the issue of oil after accusing Iranians of treating the Soviet Union unfavorably compared to the United Kingdom. "Iran would be wise to show evenhandedness by negotiating an oil agreement with the Soviet Union… which unlike the British was prepared to negotiate a *participatory* arrangement on discovery, extraction and marketing,"[10] Molotov urged Qavam. Meanwhile, on the issue of Azerbaijan, Molotov told the Prime Minister that the Soviets would withdraw their forces "only if they were assured of Iran's goodwill."[11] This situation trapped the prime minister between a defiant parliament and a much superior occupying power. Accordingly, he has been quoted as noting to one of the members of the Iranian delegation, "… If I comply with their [Soviet] demands, Mossadeq will surely take me to court for breaking the law. I will be tried and forced to spend the few years that remain to me in jail…no thank you!"[12] Here, it seems that the Iranian delegation in Moscow, in order to avoid breaking the law, seized the Soviet offer for *participatory* arrangement on oil.[13] Despite the Soviets' pressure however, Qavam did not relent and further announced that he would depart for Iran.

It is not clear whether Qavam' announcement was indeed a classic negotiation ploy to dupe the Soviet leaders, but prior to his announcement he also sent a confidential note to Stalin, reiterating that any improvement in bilateral relations is contingent upon Soviet withdrawal from Iran. Qavam wrote:

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[1] Limbert, p.45.
[2] Amanat, p. 515.
[3] Agholi, p. 377 (in Farsi).
[4] Libert, p.45.
[5] Libert, p.45.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Afkhami, p. 95.
[8] Agholi, p. 379.
[9] Afkhami, p.95.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Amidi-Nuri, Abdulhassan *Khateraat-e Safar-e Qavam be mosco* (Memoirs of Qavam Al-Saltaneh in Mosocow), *Sepid va Siah* N. 1007, 2002.
[13] Afkhami, p.95.

> "…the resolution of current issues in Iran is directly related to the issue of Soviet troops' evacuation from Iran because any reforms in political and economic relations must be approved by the parliament…Hence, if the Soviet Union is serious about cooperation with Iran and help in the resolution of issues… it must evacuate Iran to facilitate the parliamentarian elections in Iran…."[1]

Upon hearing the news that Qavam is departing Moscow in "dismay,"[2] Kremlin sent an urgent message to Qavam asking him to delay his departure since Stalin is hosting an official dinner in honor of the Iranian delegation, to which Iranian delegation conceded. This time around, however, the Soviet reception of Iranians were "exquisitely sumptuous and surprisingly friendly."[3] During the ceremony, Qavam once again urged Stalin to demonstrate "good faith"[4] to facilitate the improvement of Soviet-Iranian relations. Qavam left Moscow on 10 March 1946, with the Soviet commitment to resume negotiations in Tehran.

Despite failure to get any soviet commitment to withdraw, Qavam was successful in eventually resolving the crisis through a vague promise of oil concessions. Accordingly, on 4 April 1946 the two sides that agreed that the Soviets would withdraw from Iran by the mid-May 1946. In return, Iran agreed to submit to the next *Majlis* a proposal for the formation of a "joint Soviet-Iranian oil company,"[5] in addition to the commitment to a peaceful resolution of Azerbaijan. In this context, Limbert argues that cognizant of Russian intentions to extract an oil concession from Iran, Qavam used the oil as "bait or at least as the lever"[6] to soften Moscow's positions on troop withdrawal. Meanwhile, Qavam at a home front too, faced a serious uphill battle. Accordingly, despite attempts to pressure and "frighten the Shah into submission,"[7] the Prime Minister faced strong resistance from the fiercely anti-Communist Persian monarch who rejected any agreement with the Soviets,[8] and had become suspicious of Qavam's intentions.[9]

Qavam's 'Good faith,' Security Council and Departure of the Soviets

Iran also pursued a parallel track through the UNSC bringing about one of the first great power disputes before the newly established organization. Accordingly, Iran's then Ambassador to the UN and a Shah loyalist,[10] Hossein Ala presented Iran's case before the Council for "egregious violation of international law and Tripartite Treaty, and its blatant interference in Iran's internal affairs..."[11] Evidence suggests that during this crucial time, the Iranian leadership was divided over how to deal with the Soviet occupation. Accordingly, while Qavam following the talks with Soviets ordered Ala to withdraw Iran's case before the UNSC, the ambassador backed by the Shah[12] refused follow Qavam's orders. The Shah's deep suspicion of the Soviet Union was an important factor in his approach. Accordingly, the Shah in his autobiography, accuses Qavam of having a "soft policy"[13] toward the Russians. Prominent Iranian historian Ervand Abarahamian, however, soundly suggests that Qavam's diplomacy "permitted the

[1] Aqgholi, p. 382.
[2] Agholi, p.180.
[3] Afkhami, p. 97.
[4] Aqgholi, p. 382.
[5] Limbert, p.46.
[6] Limbert, p.46.
[7] Milani, p. 120.
[8] Milani, p. 120.
[9] Cottam, Richard, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), p.70.
[10] Limbert, p.48.
[11] Quoted in Afkhami, p.97.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Pahlavi, M.R., *Mission for My Country*, p. 116.

Russians to leave without losing face…."[1] Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council finally adopted 'Resolution 3' which noted the Iran's agreement with USSR;[2] deferring any action until May 1946, when the Soviets were scheduled to withdraw from Iran. The USSR announced on 25 March 1946, that they will withdraw their troops from Iran.

For his part, Qavam after much procrastination and under Soviet pressure,[3] did in fact take the bill for a joint Russian-Iranian oil company before the Iranian parliament, proclaiming that "signing the agreement concerning setting up the oil company was at that time in the best interest of the country… Any patriot seated in my position would inevitably felt obliged to agree with the proposal…"[4] While the details of the *Majlis* negotiations are not in the scope of this analysis, they are significant in a sense that not only the Iranian parliament rejected the bill, but also forbade any concessions to foreigners. Furthermore, these negotiations eventually led to the creation of a special committee in *Majlis,*[5] which in 1951 and under the leadership of future prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, moved to nationalize the Iranian oil. In this context, the *Majlis* mandated the Iranian government to begin negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which possessed almost full control over Iranian petroleum resources, in order to "regain Iran's national rights to all its own oil reserves."[6]In essence, the Azerbaijan crisis and the growing resentment of foreign interference in Iranian affairs, set the stage the stage for one of the most critical moments of contemporary Iranian history.

Conclusion

The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946, and the Soviet occupation of Iran should not be analyzed in isolation. Instead, as I demonstrated throughout this study, it should be studied in the context of systematic Russian machinations that began since the dictums of Peter the Great. Meanwhile, Iranian statesmen primarily relied on the traditional approach of playing major European powers to maintain Iran's nominal independence. Over the course of this crisis, Qavam cognizant of Iran's weak position, approached the issue on the basis of *good faith* diplomacy. It bears noting that Qavam's approach to avoid the legalism of treaty of friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union is continues to be prevalent among Iranian negotiators who hold a historical distrust of western legalisms and international treaties. Irrespective of Qavam's true intentions, he was forced to play an extremely weak diplomatic hand. Meanwhile, he was able to recognize Soviet interests in obtaining an oil concession, and successfully tied the issue of oil to the Soviet troop presence in country. After almost two centuries humiliation by European powers, the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 remains to be the first case that Iranian statesmen managed to reaffirm their authority in the country without any concessions.

[1] Ebrahamian, Arvand. *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 228.
[2] United Nations Digital Library. *Resolution 3 Adopted by the Security Council at its 30th meeting.* Permanent Link Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/111937?ln=en (Date Accessed: 11/25/2019)
[3] Afkhami, p.112.
[4] *Sourate-Mozakerat e Majlis* (Transcription of Malis Discussions), 10/21/1947. Quoted in Taleh & Taleh, p.148.
[5] Taleh & Taleh, p.148.
[6] Quoted in Afkhami, p. 115.

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Florida Campaign Contributions: Does Campaign Money Represent the Constituents?

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ABSTRACT: Legislators are supposed to be representative of the people. But is the campaign money that candidates receive equally representative of the people? This study looks at campaign donations on two dimensions. First, does campaign money come from inside or outside the candidate's district? Second, is the money coming from individuals or interest groups? This gives a measure of how closely a representative's campaign money represents the constituents. Donations to Florida Legislative candidates from the 2020 elections were used to determine whom candidates receive their contributions from. The analysis shows there is a Kickstarter Effect, where new candidates running as a challenger or for an open seat get more startup money from individuals in their district. Once established as an incumbent, candidates rely more on interest group money from out of their district. The result is that the longer a candidate represents a district, the less representative the campaign money is of their district.

Literature Review

While there is a judicial standard of one-person, one-vote set by *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964), there is no equivalent regulation on campaign money. There are a few restrictions on who cannot donate to a campaign, such as foreign nationals (FEC, n.d.), but whereas voters are restricted to which representatives they can vote for by district, there are no such restrictions on giving campaign donations outside of their district. This leads to the question of whether representatives adequately represent their constituents or if representation is skewed to the preferences of those donating to them.

Policy Preferences and Representation

There is existing research that finds differences in political preferences based on income (Gilens 2005, 2009) (Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013), gender gap (Caughell, 2016) (Griffin, Newman, & Wolbrecht, 2012) (Wilcox, Brown, & Powell, 1993) and along an urban/rural divide (Scala & Johnson, 2017) (Gelman, 2008) (Glenn & Hill, 1977). Research by Brown, Powell, and Wilcox (1995) and Baker (2016) further show that these preference differences also exist between representatives and their constituents, with a bias towards campaign donors over constituents. Baker (2016) finds that outside money pushes representatives towards the ideological extremes, and representatives become less responsive to their electoral districts.

Mansbridge (2003) presents a change in representation from the traditional *promissory representation*, where candidates make campaign promises to their local constituents, to a *surrogate representation* where constituents contribute to candidates outside their district in order to help someone that does represent them when their local representative doesn't. Baker (2016) and Mansbridge (2003) indicate a trend away from the constitutional location-based voting, both from the representatives' side and from the constituents' side. The question for this research, though, is does that trend hold for new candidates as well as incumbents? Is the candidate's local district a significant contributor to state-level political campaigns?

Geographical Location of Donors

Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski (2006) is the current standard for geographically mapping campaign donations. They tracked presidential campaign donations from 1992 to 2004 by zip code. They found that even though an area may be highly red or blue, both Republican and Democratic candidates use the same urban locations such as New York, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and Southern California for a large share of their contributions (Gimpel, Lee, & Kaminski, 2006). While this urban trend would be expected due to a concentration of population and wealth, Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski (2006), Cho and Gimpel (2007), and Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee (2011) find that the social networks among the wealthy elite spur people into becoming a political activist. People do not just give because they are wealthy, their peer network socializes them into giving. For local and state level candidates, though, their social network is more limited. New state level candidates are not likely to have the social donor networks of incumbents, and certainly not the same level as national candidates. This research looks at where donor networks for new and incumbent state level candidates come from.

The geographical research is limited to the national level for presidential campaigns. Mitchell et. al. (2015) does similar research as Gimpel, Lee and Kaminski (2006) but uses the county level instead of zip codes as the aggregate, but this gives a less clear picture and does not meaningly link the county to a constituent's district. This leaves a lack of similar research at the state and local levels. Research at the state level by Powell (2012) gives reasons why it is more difficult. Not all state legislatures work year-round. Governor races may be in off years from presidential races. Campaign contribution limits are different between states and the data must be usually be collected from each state separately rather than one central location. This makes it difficult to do a standardized comparison for all states. This research attempts to look at this lower level for the state of Florida to fill that gap, and to focus on the state house districts to link constituents to their representative.

Kickstarter Theory

There is a public perception that all candidates are given money either by their party to run a campaign, or that candidates get lucrative handouts from corporations or interest groups. While interest groups and party contributions are involved in elections, it is not the case that the money is so easily given, especially to new candidates Interest groups strongly prefer supporting incumbents as it is less of a risk (MacManus, Jewett, Bonanza, & Dye, 2019, p. 195). This leaves new candidates fending for themselves. This creates a Kickstarter effect where new candidates have to first raise money on their own to prove they are a viable candidate. They need to raise the initial startup funds from individuals willing to support them. Their Kickstarter efforts will either gain traction to gain more investors, or it will pan out. There is also a reverse effect. Once a Kickstarter is successful and the business is established, people stop giving to Kickstarter initiatives and expect the business to raise the needed money on its own. Likewise, once a candidate is established as an incumbent, the public expects them to be able to raise money on their own and no longer rely on individual donations. The Kickstarter effect should be visible by looking at where a candidate's campaign money comes from. New candidates relying on Kickstarter efforts should receive more money from individuals in their district, while incumbent candidates should receive more from interest groups outside of their district. This results in campaign money becoming less representative of the district as the legislator stays in office longer.

In-District vs. Out-of-District:

H1: Challengers are more likely to receive more campaign money from IN-District than incumbents.

H2: Incumbents are more likely to receive more campaign money from the State Capital than challengers.

New candidates need to create their startup funding to show they are viable. This will rely heavily on their personal network and initial self-funding. Incumbent representatives will have had much more contact with interest group representatives once in the state capital. Their network for startup campaign money is, therefore, more likely to consist of interest groups than their personal network. The hypotheses identify these expected differences. The first hypothesis, H1, identifies the expectations for challengers relying on local, personal networks which are more likely to be limited to within their district. The second hypothesis, H2, gets more specific for incumbents, in that not only will less money be from within their district, but more specifically it will come from the state capital.

Individuals vs. Interest Groups:

H3: Challengers are more likely to receive more campaign money from Individuals than incumbents.

H4: Incumbents are more likely to receive more campaign money from the Interest Groups than challengers.

Research on PACs (Cigler, Loomis, & Nownes, 2016) (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, & Schickler, 2016) confirms that incumbents receive a much larger percentage of their campaign funds from PACs. Again, having to rely on their own personal networks, new candidates should be more dependent on donations from individuals and have less available from interest groups. Incumbents, on the other hand, will have had more contact with interest groups once legislating in the state capital and will be able to rely on interest groups for their startup campaign money.

Open Seat Races

Open seat candidates exist when there is no incumbent in the race. Florida has an eight-year term limit on state legislators, so this provides a moderate number of open seat races each election. This presents a potential middle ground. Will an open seat candidate receive money from the interest groups that supported the previous incumbent, or will the candidates be left to fend for themselves? The Kickstarter theory suggests that they will need to generate their own startup money from individuals and their personal networks first. They must first prove that they are a strong and viable candidate before interest groups would be willing to invest. Fewer interest groups are likely to get involved in open seat races as they will place their money on safer incumbent races. This puts open seat candidates in the same category as challengers. Hypotheses H1 and H3 should hold for open seat candidates as well as challengers.

Data and Methods

The project collected information on campaign donations to all Florida House Representative candidates for the 2020 election. Each row in the dataset represents the candidate's total amount and percent of contributions per category. Campaign contribution data was retrieved from the Florida Division of Elections (FL DOE). The study includes candidates that both won or lost in order to see the differences between challengers and incumbents without limiting it to only candidates that won which would limit how much we see of the effect. Candidates that did not qualify, withdrew, were legally removed from the race, or were write-in candidates were removed from the study. In Florida, write-in candidates are mostly used as spoiler candidates or to close a ballot and force a primary-only election (Editorial Board, 2018). I did not consider them as viable candidates that raised campaign money for the study. In total, 314 candidates were included which covered 120 State House districts.

Follow the *Money.org*

The website *FollowTheMoney.org* (FTM) was also used to collect contribution information. This site includes information on whether the contributions were made by an individual or a non-individual. This additional information was used to indicate whether a candidate's contributions were coming from individuals versus interest groups. This study uses the non-individual label from *FollowTheMoney.org* to represent interest group donations. The term interest groups in this context is very broad. It includes any donation from a PAC, party, or even personal donations that used a business account. This broad definition is used in specific contrast to individual donations. It is more important whether it is an individual donation or not, so the relabeling of non-individual to specific interest groups is to make it more relatable.

Geocoding

In order to map which location category the donation fell into geocoding was used to convert the contributor's address into Longitude / Latitude coordinates. The coordinates were then imported into the ArcMap 10.8.1 program to clip and sort the locations into categories. A web scraper was used to pull the longitude and latitude from Google Maps. The original code to extract it is from Benjamin Smith (Smith, 2020). I updated the script to use the usaddress python library to parse the address according to US Postal Service standards before passing to Google Maps in order to get better results. Google Maps occasionally returned potential conflicts. In this case, the first location on the returned list was chosen. The most common scenario here is the street or city name is slightly misspelled. Google Maps returns the closest street name for similarly named cites in multiple states. In this case, the correct address within the state was normally first with ones from the wrong state after it. A similar problem occurred with PO Box addresses. Again, the first post office was chosen. For small districts, this may push a contribution from IN-District to Near-District, which is why the Near-District category was created. It allows for some leeway in the location being off. Addresses where multiple matches were found and one was chosen were identified in the coding to track the potential amount of matching error in the data.

In all, there were 241,946 contributions. Of these, 3.16% returned multiple addresses where the first address was chosen. Of these, 55.6% remained uncoded and the category that received the most was the state capital at 19.7%. With the state capital being a very small and specific location, it is most likely the correct coding. The high amount comes from interest groups using PO Boxes in Tallahassee. The remaining categories had 6% or less. After coding, only 0.49% remained in the unknown category and 0.18% were hidden.

Categorization of Location

To get a better sense of how closely the donation's location represented the candidate's district, I created categories to reflect the source location. This included IN-District, Near-District, State Capital, Out-of-State, and FL Other. Additional categories were created to handle donations that did not fall into any of these categories or were not identifiable. See Table 6. This categorization gives more specific detail on where the candidate relies on their money coming from.

The State Capital category provides a distinction between money raised mostly from interest groups that are based in the state capital. A map of the Tallahassee city limits was used to identify donations from the state capital. Two house districts, numbers 8 and 9, include Tallahassee in their district. In these cases, donations were identified as being in their district first over being coded as in the state capital. For the remaining districts, the boundary between their district and Tallahassee is not close enough to confuse which category it should be in.

The Near-District category provides a buffer area to allow a candidate some freedom in collecting contributions from areas nearby, if not directly in, their district. Near was defined as house districts that

border the district. This was used because a specific size buffer set in miles would not be equally meaningful in compact urban areas versus wider rural areas. By using bordering districts, it makes the term near be proportional to the size of the district.

Table 6
Location of Contribution Categories

LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
IN-DISTRICT	Contribution comes from within the candidate's district
OUT-OF-STATE	Contribution is from outside the state
STATE CAPITAL	Contribution is from within the city limits of the state capital (if not in the candidate's district)
NEAR-DISTRICT	Contribution is from a bordering district
UNKNOWN	Geocoding was not able to determine the Long/Lat location.
HIDDEN	Address was hidden in the contribution file.
FL OTHER	Contribution is from within FL but not in or near the candidate's district. Anything not in the other categories falls into this category.

Figure 7
Contributions by Location



Figure 7 shows the distribution of the contributions by category. While 61% of the contributions came from out of state, they accounted for only 14.7% of the total amount. There were two or three candidates that appeared to have used some type of 'keep the change' program that collected a large number of small donations of random value. Vice-versa, Figure 7 shows that a small 3.67% minority of the contributions from within the state capital account for a full quarter of the total dollar amount.
For each candidate, the total amount and percentage by category were calculated. For counts, each contribution by the same donor was counted as an additional contribution.

Categorizing by Individual vs. Interest Group

The contributions were matched to the FollowTheMoney.org dataset which had the individual and non-Individual categorization. Contributions were first matched to Individuals then to Non-Individuals in

order to give the Individual coding preference. Name + zip code matching was used. Because FollowTheMoney.org used the names from the FL DOE site this had a high match rate but needed to be adjusted for inconsistencies in using middle names, suffixes like JR or SR, or women's married names being reversed. The corrections left 6.68% of the contributions coded as unknown.

Figure 8
Contributions by Individual vs. Non-Individual



Figure 8 shows the distribution by count and amount. Again, while the majority of donations were by individuals, they still account for less than half of the total amount of contributions while only 10% of interest group donations account for over half of the total dollar amount.

Descriptive Information

In addition to the contribution data, the candidate's status as an incumbent, challenger, or open seat race was recorded. Whether the candidate ran in a primary or general election or both was recorded to measure how much competition there was for the seat. This also gives an indicator if having to go through more election cycles increases the amount raised by candidates.

The number of voters registered in each party (REP, DEM, NPA, OTH) was retrieved from the FL DOE book closing records for the 2020 general election. From this, a party advantage (or disadvantage) was calculated for each candidate. This gives a measure of how the closeness of the race impacts the contribution amounts.

Finally, census information was used for household median income, bachelor's degrees and old age ratio to account for standard income, education, and age effects. However, these variables were only meaningful when applied to individual contributions. Domestic variables do not appear relevant to interest groups and corporate donations.

Analysis and Results

After calculating the total amount of campaign contributions in each location category, it was evident from Figure 9 that incumbents have a much larger amount of campaign money in total. This indicates donations increase across the board for incumbents, but what the Kickstarter effect is looking for is a change in the dependency on In-District contributions for challengers to a dependency on State Capital contributions to incumbents. To inspect this more closely, the percentage in each location group was used instead of the total amount.

Figure 9
Contribution Amount by Location



Source: Florida Division of Elections

Figure 10
Map of Campaign Money by source Location



Source: FL Division of Elections

Specifically, the hypotheses are looking for the change between In-District and the State-Capital locations for challengers and incumbents as shown in Figure 10. The effect should also be seen between the individual and interest group differences as shown in Figure 11.

Regression Variables

For hypotheses H1 and H2, a regression was run on for the effect of incumbency status on the IN-District percent and State Capital percent of contributions. The regression also included a dummy variable for *Republican* candidates since Republicans have had the majority of Florida state house seats. *Competition* measures whether the candidate ran in a primary, general, or both and an *Advantage* variable calculated the candidate's party advantage (or disadvantage) within their district. The relation on party advantage to the amount of money was found to peak as the race was closer and trail off as the advantage or disadvantage grew larger. For this, $Advantage^2$ was added to the regression to capture the quadratic relationship. Interaction variables between Incumbency, Advantage, Competition and Republican were also tested to see what relationships provided the strongest results.

The interaction between Advantage and Competition was the only one that proved significantly strong. Advantage alone did not have a significant effect while Competition alone still held some significance. The independent variables used in the regression are from the combination that provided the highest F-statistic for the regression equation. Demographic control variables were collected for income, education, age, and size of the district were collected but they were only used in the models for Individual and Interest Group contributions. Since the demographic variables are measured in terms related to people, they were only meaningful when looking specifically at individual donations. Even then, when measured by percentage instead of amount, the demographic variables had no effect as shown in Table 8.

In-District vs. State Capital

While the chart in **Error! Reference source not found.**7 and the map of contributions by location indicate contributions moving from IN-District to the state capital for incumbents, the reliance on IN-District contributions for challengers, as hypothesis H1 predicts did not prove significant (

Table 7). The interaction between party advantage and competition is the significant indicator of the percent of IN-District contributions. The oppositely paired hypothesis, H2, was significant. As incumbency status changes from being a challenger to an incumbent, the percentage of contributions coming from the state capital increases by 10%.

Table 7
Regression of IN-District vs. State Capital contributions

	% IN-District		% State Capital	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Incumbency Challenger/Open/Incumbent	-2.324	.218	5.129	.000***
Competition	2.314	.235	2.212	.073*
Republican	-3.921	.196	14.043	.000***
Party Advantage * Competition	-1.700	.000***	.298	.212
Party Advantage^2 * Competition	.887	.000***	-.665	.000***
(Constant)	14.696		8.360	
N	246		246	
Adjusted R^2	.221		.447	
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 Source: FL Division of Elections 2020				

For the regression of individual and interest groups, the results show almost an equal and opposite reaction. As the candidate's status changes from challenger to incumbent, the percent of contributions from individuals drops by 15.8% while non-individuals increase by a corresponding 14.3% (Table 8). This confirms hypotheses H3 and H4. Republican candidates also show a significant swing between individual donations and interest groups of roughly 26%.

Table 8
Regression of Individual vs. Interest Group contributions

	% Individual		% Non-Individual	
	B	Sig.	B	Sig.
Incumbency Challenger/Open/Incumbent	-15.808	.000***	14.383	.000***
Competition	1.496	.460	-.087	.964
Republican	-26.482	.000***	26.927	.000***
Party Advantage * Competition	-1.322	.001***	1.178	.001***
Party Advantage^2 * Competition	.485	.012**	-.444	.016**
HH Median Inc	.000	.478	5.280E-5	.778
Bachelor's degree	-5.468E-5	.765	.000	.487
Old Age Ratio	-.027	.700	-.036	.596
Square Miles	-.001	.586	.000	.879
(Constant)	80.009		18.874	
N	246		246	
Adjusted R^2	.649		.649	
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 Source: FollowTheMoney.org 2020				

Representation Scorecard

To get a sense of how closely campaign money is representative of the constituents, a score was created for each candidate. For each candidate, the percentage of money in each of the combined categories of location and individual/non-individual status was calculated and weighted into the score. IN-District money and NEAR-District money were weighted the highest to reflect the most representation. Individual donations were also weighted more than non-individual contributions. For money from the State Capital, the square root of the value was used. In this way, the more a candidate relied on money from the State Capital, the less representative of their home district they were. Table 9 gives the weights used for each category. The score has a possible range of 0 to 100%. Some candidates did score a 100% while the minimum score was 9.71% and the mean was 51.5%.

Table 9
Weights used in Representation Score

Category	Individual	Non-Individual
% IN-District	1.0	0.9
% NEAR-District	0.75	0.6
% FL Other	0.5	0.4
%State Capital	Sq. root	Sq. root

Because the score is weighted to favor IN-District contributions, the regression shows similar results to the %IN-District regression. Moving from a challenger to an incumbent relates to a 6.4-point drop in the score which was significant at the *p*=0.05 level. The map in Figure 11 shows the scores for the candidates that won their FL State House of Representative seat in 2020. The mean score was 41.2% for winning candidates putting Florida on the low side of representation.

Figure 11
Representation Scores for winning 2020 FL State House candidates



Conclusion

There is evidence of the Kickstarter effect where new candidates rely on more money from individuals within their district while established incumbents can rely more heavily on contributions from interest groups in the state capital. The exception to the theory was that new candidates did not get a significant amount of their contributions from within their district. Since new candidates did still significantly rely on individual donations, the difference could indicate that new candidate's personal networks of support may expand beyond their district. This could be due to technology removing limits on the range of personal support networks. Figure 9 reveals that challengers have a balance between the locations they receive donations from, including the state capital. This indicates that challengers may still have access to interest groups, but that incumbents have significantly more access and support.

Also, since the average amount of IN-District money for incumbents was still larger than challengers, it could indicate that a candidate's initial supporters don't leave the candidate once they are the incumbent, much like supporters of a Kickstarter do not abandon the business after it has been started. What happens after the startup phase is that many more customers and other businesses start supporting it. Likewise, the Kickstarter effect shows that once a candidate becomes an established incumbent, other businesses come looking for them. This is what the darker side of the Kickstarter theory predicts. That once established, incumbents are expected by the public to be able to fund themselves through their job just like an established business is expected to. This illustrates the main point of the Kickstarter theory which is that our own personal expectations that incumbent candidates will be self-supportive allows and encourages this loss of representation to happen.

Further Research

To continue on the trail of IN-District money, contributions to interest groups should be further analyzed to see where their money comes from. If interest groups were limited to only giving money in the district it was raised from, would that make a difference in which candidates they give to? It's possible that interest groups get a majority of their money from districts whose representatives already support them. If so, limiting donations by district may not greatly affect them. The other path to go down is along the lines of supporting surrogate representatives. Giving to representatives outside one's district that better support their ideals. By looking at countries that have a multi-party system and uses proportional representation, tracking donation money could indicate if these systems come closer to adequately representing constituents.

APPENDIX

Name Match Algorithm

The following algorithm was used to match the contributor names from the FL DOE files to the FollowTheMoney.org files. For each candidate, the list of individual contributions from FollowTheMoney.org was stored in a corresponding FTM_IDV file and Non-Individual contributions were stored in an _FTM_NONIDV file. This creates a separate list of individual donations that were matched against first in order to give individual donations the benefit of the doubt.

1. The contributors from the _FTM_IDV file were read in and added to a list of IDV contributors.
    a. Zip codes – Name + Zip code was initially used to match on in case there were two contributors' by the same name. I.e. it had to match on LAST FIRST ZIP.
        i. In reviewing the data, this did not appear to be the case. Contributors in the candidates' file with the same name also had the same address and zip code. The match list was made

per candidate, so matching names between candidates was not a problem. Still, it was left in as a first pass to match on. Matching without the zip code was a second pass.

b. Contributor name in the _FTM_IDV file has the format: LAST, FIRST [M]
   i. The comma was removed for consistency
   ii. Some names had a nickname in parenthesis. I.e LAST, FIRST (NICKNAME). The candidate file used quotation marks (“) instead. Both the parenthesis and quotation marks (“) were removed for consistency

c. Middle names.
   i. Middle names in the candidate file often used a period to abbreviate. I.e. LAST, FIRST M. The IDV and NONIDV files had the periods removed. Periods (.) were removed from the contributor name from the candidate file for consistency.
   ii. The middle name or initial was removed from the IDV name and added to the match list in addition to the full name. A name from the candidate file could then match on either the full or partial name.
   iii. JR and SR were removed from matching. If either of these were used, it is still an individual rather than a company.

d. Women’s married names. Women with two last names or a split last name caused problems in the matching. The ordering of last names would be reversed between the candidate file and the IDV file or the first, middle, or last would be swapped.
   i. All combinations of last, first middle last1 last2 names from the IDV file were entered as potential matches.
   ii. Dropping one of the last names or middle names from the IDV file was also added to the match list.

2. The contributors from the FTM_NONIDV file were read in and added to a list of IDV contributors. These are company names so have a different set of matching problems than the IDV names.
   a. All commas and parenthesis were removed for consistency.
   b. One-word names for the contributor were assumed to be a company and marked as NONIDV.
   c. Names with an ampersand (&) in them that did not previously match an individual name were assumed to be a company name and marked as non-individual.
   d. A list of keywords was used to identify company or political action committee names. If the contributor name included any of these keywords, it was marked as non-individual (Table 10).

Table 10 Keywords used to identify Non-Individual contributions

CATEGORY	LIST
ABBREVIATIONS	' PC', ' PA', ' LLC', ' LC', ' LTD', ' INC', ' PAC', '-PAC', ' FSC', 'ASSOC', 'GOVT',
COMPANY OR PAC NAMES	'COMPANY', 'CORPORATION', 'COMMITTEE', 'AGENT', 'FUND', 'CONSULTANTS', 'UNION', 'POLICY', 'COUNTY', 'FLORIDA', 'GOVERNMENT', 'COUNCIL', 'POLITICAL', 'GROUP',
CONJUNCTIONS	' FOR ', ' AND ', 'THE ', Note: Conjunctions indicate a business or group. Personal names don’t include these words
OTHER BUSINESS NAMES	'INSURANCE', 'MEDIA', 'PENSACOLA', 'LIQUORS', 'RESEARCH', 'REALTY', 'REAL ESTATE', 'MATERIALS', 'TEAMSTER', 'DIAGNOSTICS', 'RUTHS LIST', 'CONTRACTORS'

The original matching method with just name + zip left approximately 8% uncoded. The additional corrections brought the matching down to 6.68% contributions NOT coded: 16157 of 241946.

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Bilateral Environmental Agreements and Environmental Cooperation in the Mediterranean with Social Network Analysis

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2021 Runner-up for FPSA Best Graduate Paper

ABSTRACT: Why do some Mediterranean states ratify more Bilateral Environmental Agreements (BEA) than others? As in the well-known triadic friend-enemy metaphor, can the friends of the two states that have signed the BEA also sign a BEA with each other? It is crucial to understand this tendency of states to cope with environmental challenges through the networks of BEAs since an implication of this is the possibility that the degree of the willingness or reluctance of states to cooperate with regional environmental problems. This paper empirically analyzes these agreements signed by 21 Mediterranean countries through social network analysis. As measurements, the reciprocity and transitivity parameters are applied to understand how mutual interaction affects BEA preference of the states and whether BEA preferences of the state spill over to other states by clustering. The results suggest that while geographical proximity between Mediterranean dyads makes normative convergence a plausible motive for environmental cooperation, bilateral regimes do not promote clustering effects for other states. Furthermore, states' motivation for BEA ratification may be only focusing on a particular environmental problem that they share within a certain area. Other distant states may abstain from a BEA since that environmental problem does not affect it to the same degree. Another implication is that states sign a BEA without any presupposition regardless of whether they have not shared commonality or not.

Introduction

The Mediterranean is one of the most environmentally affected regions due to both direct human activities and the effects of climate change (Jeppesen et al. 2015). The IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5), the most comprehensive climate change estimation analysis to date, identified that the Mediterranean is quite vulnerable to climate change, besides the region will experience various stresses and systemic failures (IPCC 2013; UNEP 2017; Cramer et al 2018). Since environmental problems such as air pollution, climate change and sea pollution are transboundary, regional, or global, countries may not achieve desired results by acting alone. One of the main obstacles facing countries today is collective action problems involving joint matters (Olson 1977; Underdal 2002). Therefore, if the cooperation level is not enough, challenges continue to increase because of the anthropocene and climate change effects (Young 2017).

Countries have developed a wide range of international environmental agreements (IEAs) to facilitate working together on global environmental issues (Mitchell et al. 2003). While examining these environmental agreements networks of the Mediterranean countries, I realized that there are variations among these countries. For example, Slovenia and Croatia have signed more BEAs than Croatia and Italy, although they spatially share the same environment. Should South Mediterranean-Arabic countries have convergence? What are the sources of this variation? This study explores whether the motive of signing a BEA has a structural factor in a diversified multicultural region? Understanding the tendency of the states to environmental challenges through these networks is important because this might give implications that the willingness of the cooperativeness of the states to regional environmental problems. If there is clustering in this IEAs network, this may stem from a specific circumstance, which may not be relevant to environmental issues.

This paper is the first study to investigate the Mediterranean environmental challenges through social network analysis. To date, scholarship has mostly pointed out the factors of economic interactions, regime type, and domestic policy concerning why states sign IEAs (Andanova & Mitchell 2010; Kalbhen 2011; Besedes 2016; Andanova 2017). However, little is known about BEAs, and the cooperative behavior of the states, and it is not apparent why states build environmental bridges through IEAs. The findings contribute to the literature on environmental cooperation from a network perspective and it may provide new insight into how exogenous factors affect the states' IEA preferences.

This essay empirically analyzes the Bilateral Environmental Agreements (BEAs) signed by 21 Mediterranean coastal countries through social network analysis. Social network analysis is an appropriate tool to discover the environmental collaborations because states and their agreements are social structures that connect them. As evaluation criteria, I apply standard network metrics; centrality, clustering coefficients, density, and modularity among states. In addition, reciprocity and transitivity measures are used in the analysis to grasp how mutual interaction effects BEA preference of the states and whether BEA preferences of the state spill over to other states by clustering. The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The following section gives a brief overview of the literature relates to IEAs. The third section explains the theoretical framework and hypothesis of the study. Two different networks are introduced in the research design section: bilateral and trade networks. Conclusions are drawn in the final section.

International Environmental Agreements and IEA Database

IEAs are legal regulations that call on states to collaborate to solve global environmental problems and impose certain restrictions on the environmental activities of states in line with the specified purposes (Mitchell 2003). Montreal Protocol, Kyoto, subsequently Paris agreements are the most known global IEAs. Besides constituting a functional agent in the field of environmental protection, international-regional and national developments revealed the distinctive feature of these agreements; to solve a common problem that is associated with all humans.

First, it is necessary to clarify what is constituted by International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). Although the "convention" term is also used, some texts also accept “treaty". I used the agreements as generic “IEAs” term throughout paper. It is generally assumed in the literature that the agreements refer to the environmental problems, either the elements of the environment such as biodiversity, atmosphere, endangered plant and animal species, oceans, seas, and marine creatures) or some activities or substances that will affect the environment such as hazardous wastes, radioactive wastes, toxic substances-especially their international transport (Andanova & Mitchell 2010). Mitchell defines IEAs with three respects "International, Environment and Agreement"; as is an "intergovernmental document intended as legally binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural resources" (Mitchell 2003, p.432). Throughout the paper, conceptually, I adopt this definition because states and their behavior in international arenas against environmental challenges can only be perceived when they sign an agreement binding for members. If the IEAs have no binding rules on signatory states, it would be difficult to measure their volunteer acts.

Having defined the IEAs, let us move on to Mitchell et al.'s IEA database, the most overarching and functional so far. The database allows researchers to systematically search with criteria such as type of agreement (Multilateral or Bilateral), texts, signature dates, subjects, lineage (2020). In this respect, considerable research variation can be generated through IEAs. There are over 1,300 MEAs, 2200 BEAs, 250 other environmental Agreements and include over 90,000 individual country memberships contingent upon these IEAs (Mitchell 2020; Solda 2020). The number of these agreements and membership of IEAs has been steadily increasing for two decades. The fact that the database is a frequently referenced resource in environmental regime studies reveal the importance of the database.

The Factors That Affect Environmental Cooperation

Several systematic reviews of IEAs have been undertaken to unravel why some countries cooperate more on environmental issues and others less. Besedes et al. (2016) empirically examine MEAs and question the economic factors determining countries' cooperation on multilateral environmental agreements. If so, liberal arguments that trade interdependence facilitates more cooperation between states is the case for environmental cooperation. Consistent with this assumption, economic and political interlinkages such as regional organizations, joint democracy facilitate trans-boundary environmental actions among states (Kalbhen 2011).

Some scholars highlight domestic political, economic and social factors associated with the state's environmental cooperation behaviors (Andanova 2017). Align with this inquiry, Brandi et al. found (2019) that states tend to adopt preferential trade agreements after IEA ratifications by enacting domestic environmental legislation. Overall, there seems to be some evidence to indicate that economic interests play an important role in the approval of BEAs.

Bilateral environmental cooperation is seen most on fisheries agreements since economic concerns, which stem from domestic pressures, push them to cooperate. Particularly, depletion of natural sources in a shared area can urge states to make rational decisions regardless of whether the partner is an enemy or a friend. Indeed, there is consensus among scholars that cooperation becomes meaningful and substantial when there is a set of conflicting and complementary interests regarding the solution of a problem (Keohane 1984; Stein 1982). Stein (1990) argues that even though states prefer unilaterally for optimal gains, they also need to cooperate to achieve outcomes protecting their interests besides avoiding unwanted outcomes, which is also known as dilemmas of common interest. Hønneland's (2010) finding is consistent with Stein's assumption. He investigates the enforcement cooperation within the fisheries sector between Norway and Russia. Although both are in a rival camp, they developed an effective fishing agreement after being confronted with extensive overfishing problems in the Barents Sea.

Another example can be observed in the Arctic Council organization in which the USA and Russia work together on the Arctic environment. Stadtfelt et al. (2017) examine the fisheries agreement derived by IEADB, showing that preliminary environmental governance starts with adjacent states that share a common geographic and economic area and then spreads to the all-region. Similarly using networks with global fisheries governance, Hollway and Koskinen (2016) argue how bilateral and multilateral relations are interrelated. Angeon and Bates (2015) use this method to grasp the sustainability of environmental governance of the states through vulnerability and resilience indexes. One implication from these studies is that IEA literature focuses on network analysis rather than statistical methods. One reason might be that network dynamics deeply affect cooperation relations (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009).

Such studies remain narrow in focus dealing only with particular problems. Mediterranean region, in this sense, is a more diversified region considering accommodation for many different cultures, blocs, and regimes. Besides, geospatial differences make bilateral cooperation infeasible. For instance, Spain and Egypt may not suffer the same environmental hazards. Then, it is plausible to expect that geographic proximity is a driving factor for BEAs.

Along these lines, scholars have developed theories that help explain why some states do not lean toward environmental cooperation. First, as systemic theories suggest that the anarchic nature of the international system prevents states from coming together because of mutual distrust, they have no incentive to solve common problems (O'Neill 2009; Enuka 2018). The second factor is the national will. The public puts pressure on the rulers since they do not have enough capacity to execute the necessary steps. Third, it is the interplay of national interests. It represents the barriers between national representatives and international actors during the bargaining process. Finally, Susskind (1994) points out

global North-South, or developed-undeveloped countries clash is another challenge for non-cooperation because differences and priorities will vary between them at the bargaining table.

Theoretical Framework

As this paper's contribution relies on the empirical network investigation, the author tests hypotheses based on the existing literature and theoretical framework. An increasing number of studies have found that economic factors play an essential role between states when they commonly suffer environmental issues. Millimet and Roy (2015) investigate membership of WTO and MEA relations. Their results show that less developed countries ratify fewer MEAs. Indeed, protection and improvement of the environment will require a specific cost, and economic development is also an essential factor in adaptation (Jacobson & Weiss 1995, p.8).

However, this relationship should not be directly interpreted as the high level of adaptation of rich countries. In this area, Egger et al.'s (2011) findings are more promising in that since wealthier countries have more liberalized trade and investment policies, they are more lenient to sign toward multilateral environmental agreements. The relative burden of the agreement on the state is the most critical determinant in this matter. Even if the country's income level in question is high, the intensity of the regulated activity within the country and its importance for the country's economy can make the cost of adjustment unbearable.

Besides et al. (2016) apply two econometric methods to analyze the economic determinants of MEAs. They found that if states are economically significant and of similar economic size, have a mutual preferential trade agreement, and have high volume trade flows, they are more likely to establish MEAs because economic relations strengthen bonds and eliminate free-riding on environmental problems. Besides trade interdependence, more recent evidence also reveals the geographical proximity factor. Davies and Naughton's (2014) study investigated the contiguity to understand whether neighboring countries have greater incentives to cooperate than in distant countries. Their analysis evidenced that as neighbor states ratify MEAs, this creates a spill-over effect on its neighbors.

This paper applies reciprocity and transitivity metrics to understand the mutual co-sponsoring and spill-over effect of the BEAs network in the Mediterranean. Because reciprocity and transitivity play important roles in grasping the structural mechanisms underlying friendship network formation (Block 2015), Schafer defines reciprocity as "the increased likelihood of individuals to send ties to those from whom they receive a tie" (2010, p.164), in other words, the tendency that if State A does help State B, then State B will help back to State A. I apply to trade interdependence between states to better understand this effect. Transitivity, the strategic consideration of a triangular relationship, basically describes the metaphor; "my friend's friend is my friend, and my enemy's friend is my enemy." Therefore, if two states have an environmental agreement, the probability of converging their other partners to each other will be high or low. These factors are also known as endogenous effects in inferential network analysis. Therefore, in the analyses, the below hypotheses will be tested.

H1: *The stronger the reciprocity through trade interdependence, the more likely states cooperate on environmental challenges.*

H2: *The stronger (positive) the transitivity network effect, the more likely states cooperate on environmental challenges.*

Research Design

Data Sources and Selection

This paper argues that as countries increase their membership through IEAs, they may increase collaboration because IEA membership proves their willingness for solutions and sensitivity to environmental problems. The author uses the IEA database project (2002-2020) created by Mitchell to test the hypotheses derived from theoretical explanations. For operationalization, all BEAs shared by 21 Mediterranean countries.[1] These agreements have been active since 1972 are disaggregated because there is conventional wisdom that international environmental governance began in 1972 at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) (Andanova and Mitchell 2010).

I generate two adjacency matrices to serve as initial conditions. The BEA matrix is taken from IEADB, and it is designed dyadically so that while nodes are states, edges are BEAs.[2] The edges are weighted by the number of BEA two states are engaged in. For example, while Lebanon (*ni*) and Syria (*nj*) have five IEAs between each other, the number of IEAs (*w*) is coded as five. Stadtfel claims that "Weighted effects are concerned with not only whether these elements matter for new relationships but also for the deepening of these relationships through multiple concurrent ties" (2017, p.18).

The second network is the trade flow of dyads. It operationalized the sum of the logarithm of bilateral trade flows of two countries measured as the sum of both imports and exports from each other. Trade values are also weighted in the graph. All the data were analyzed through the Network's package. As metrics and evaluation criteria, local and clustering efficiency, transitivity, reciprocity, centrality, modularity, and density measures are used. To better understand these metrics used in the analysis, they are briefly explained as follows.

Network Metrics

Local and Global Clustering Efficiency and Transitivity

Local clustering coefficients measure the prevalence of triadic closure in a network. It is calculated as the fraction of dyadic states that are friends with each other. For example, if Lebanon has 4 BEAs with other states (dc=4) then the total pairs of Lebanon's friends are friends (dc (dc -1)/2). This is also called the denominator. Now it should be determined what the total number of Lebanon's friends are friends. If we assume, there are 2 (triadic closure), so the local clustering coefficient is 2/6=1/3 which means that one-third of all the possible pairs of friends of Lebanon who could have BEAs, actually have BEAs.

$$C(i) = \frac{\#\text{ of pairs of neighbors of } i \text{ that are connected}}{\#\text{ of pairs of neighbors of } i}$$

While global or average clustering measures clustering degree on the whole network, not just one node as local clustering coefficient, transitivity is the percentage of open triads that are triangles or close triads. The main difference between these two parameters is the transitivity of more weights on the node, the most central node.

Modularity:

In many networks of interest, scholars found some natural divisions in which those nodes have a particular characteristic (Newman 2006). This parameter mainly detects a community effect in a network.

[1] I used these countries in the analysis: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

[2] There are 57 dyads and 97 memberships in the BEA network.

As Wagner et al. define, "A network of interactions is called modular if it is subdivided into relatively autonomous, internally highly connected components" (2007, p.921). For example, in an urban demographic settlement network, if Afro-Americans, Hispanics, Asians and Whites each cluster in a certain area separately, this shows us a modularity feature in this network. Therefore, any autonomous, mainly separated with a specific betweenness node, can clue about modularity effect in the network.

Density:

This metric is determined by its ratio of links to nodes in a network and measures how densely connected it is. By calculating the below formula, as the connection increases, density will be increase throughout the network. Put differently, as states increase their interaction with entities, so does their interaction density; states connect each other through membership in a network structure.

$$\text{Potential connections} = \frac{n*(n-1)}{2} \qquad \text{Network density} = \frac{existing\ connections}{potential\ connections}$$

As seen in Table 1, higher edges of a node will mean higher density. In the same fashion, if the number of BEA's of the states increases, we will expect more density in the network.

Degree Centrality:

Centrality is one of the most applied conceptual tools for examining networks. A network identifies who the most crucial node (person, state, agreement) is (Everett & Borgatti 2003). Although there are different centrality metrics such as closeness, betweenness and eigenvector, this paper deals with degree centrality because higher BEA means higher sensitivity to environmental problems. Degree centrality is measured by the number of edges of the node. If a state has 5 BEA agreements, its degree centrality is 5(d_c). If state A is a node that has the highest number node, then this gives clues to us that state A is the most cooperative state in a state network.

Table 1 Parameters of Network

Local and Global Clustering Efficiency and Transitivity	 Triangles Open triads
Modularity	

Density	 Low density High density
Degree Centrality	

Results

Few things become evident in the BEA network in terms of degree centrality. The results that are obtained from network analysis suggest that France and Turkey are the most central countries because they are the countries that have the highest connections with others (Figure 1). This result may be explained by the fact that both are socio-economic and geographically at the central positions and regional power, which influence their proximities. When we look at the weighted values, the countries that shared the highest BEA are France-Morocco, Slovenia-Croatia, Syria-Lebanon and Spain-France dyads. These are all either neighboring or geographically close countries if we pay attention. These results partly reflect those of Stadfelt et al. (2017), who also found a relationship between continuity and cooperation formation using dynamic network actor models.

Figure 1
Bilateral Environmental Agreements Network in the Mediterranean



Table 1 reports local clustering coefficients results. As noted above, this metric measures the possible prevalence of triadic closure among states, for the sake of simplicity, whether the friends of friends are friends or not. As it is seen in the table, all the possible pairs of friends of Slovenia, Spain and Lebanon who could be friends, are friends and one-third of all the possible pairs of friends of France, Israel, Italy, Morocco and Tunisia who could be friends, are friends. Zero values do not have any triadic closure.

The global coefficient and transitivity are also measured to understand the tendency for agreements to form triangles or clustering in the whole network and whether the highest degree nodes have much more local clustering coefficients. The result suggests that the global coefficient (0.28) and transitivity are (0.26). That means most states have low local clustering coefficients and central states have low local clustering coefficients. In other words, neither local nor central states' partners do not create BEA triplets.

The Modularity parameter of the BEA network is found 0.34. The fact that this value is low compared to 1 means no communal-group effect. It was also analyzed by attributing various characteristics of the Mediterranean countries, such as NATO/non-NATO countries, E.U./non-E.U., East-West Mediterranean, and regime types. However, as seen in Figure 2, no structural partition could be observed, suggesting similarities or differences. Hence, it can be concluded that there are only fewer BEAs (edges) within the module than we expect by chance.

Table 2
Local clustering coefficients of Mediterranean countries in BEA network

Mediterranean Countries	Degree Centrality (d_c)	Denominator[1] ($d_c (d_c-1)/ 2$)	Nominator[2]	Local Clustering Coefficient[3]
Albania	3	3	0	0
Algeria	1	0	0	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1	0	0	0
Croatia	4	6	1	0.1666667
Cyprus	3	3	0	0
Egypt	1	0	0	0
France	6	15	5	0.3333333
Greece	2	1	0	0
Israel	4	6	2	0.3333333
Italy	4	6	2	0.3333333
Lebanon	2	1	1	1
Libya	0	0	0	0
Malta	1	0	0	0
Monaco	0	0	0	0
Montenegro	0	0	0	0
Morocco	4	6	2	0.3333333
Slovenia	2	1	1	1
Spain	2	1	1	1
Syria	4	6	1	0.1666667
Tunisia	4	6	2	0.3333333
Turkey	6	15	3	0.2

[1] The total number of pairs of a node's friends.
[2] The number of pairs of friends of a node who are friends with each other.
[3] Nominator/Denominator.

Figure 2
Bilateral Networks by the Community



E.U./Others NATO/Non-NATO



West-East Mediterranean **Democracies-Autocracies**

Finally, the author examines whether BEA network density is low or high because if it is low, then this makes us consider that states do not connect each other densely through BEAs; there are some potential disconnections. The density value is 0.18, and this low density suggests that actual connections through the BEA network in the Mediterranean are quite lower than potential connections.

Figure 3 directed graph represents mutual trade networks among 21 Mediterranean countries. As this graph suggests only mutual relations, all nodes have the same centrality measures. For this reason, the network is designed as weighted. Weighted trade edges represent reciprocal trade volume as million USD. Green arrows, the thickest ones, indicate that most trades happen between France-Italy, France-Spain, Spain-Italy and Italy-Turkey. There are several possible explanations for this result. While functionalist theory posits that trade vitalizes economic relations and disseminates to other areas (Haas 1961), regionalism theories emphasize geographic proximity as the driver of trade blocs (Borzel 2016). It must be noted that BEAs barely have parallels with trade networks.

Discussion and Limitation

This study questioned the relation between environmental cooperation and behavior of ratification of BEA among the Mediterranean countries to understand why some states signed more BEA than others. The first hypothesis tested the reciprocity-tendency of mutual convergence by applying trade interdependence. While the countries with the most centrality are geographically close in the BEA network, some of these countries (France and Spain) have the highest trade volumes in the trade network. This result corroborates Davies and Naughton's (2011) IEA study that neighboring countries have greater incentives to cooperate than distant ones in the presence of environmental pollution. However, the reciprocity degree, mutual co-sponsoring, is relatively low in the Mediterranean BEA network.

Figure 3
Bilateral Trade Network of Mediterranean States



Therefore, hypothesis 1 is rejected since higher trade partly promotes BEA establishment. This outcome is contrary to that of Besedes (2020), who found that more significant bilateral trade flows encourage them to establish bilateral agreements on environmental issues. One possible explanation for this discrepancy can be social constructive ideational factors in Mediterranean countries.

Transitivity, which is the second hypothesis, the author aimed at how two states' agreements have a diffusional effect on others, in other words, whether network dynamics drive bilateral cooperation across the Mediterranean and whether they encourage others for bilateral environmental cooperation. The transitivity degree is 0.26, and the global clustering coefficient degree is 0.28. These low degrees mean that they do not create clustering triplets. Put differently, friends of friends do not establish a friendship. Therefore, we can say that the BEAs have no effects on others.

Furthermore, this study did not find a significant difference between groups when examining the modularity effect by analyzing NATO, E.U., memberships West-East axis, and regime type differences. Overall, apart from reciprocity and transitivity discordances, the results related to economic factors and geographic proximity are likely to play an important role when regional states consider ratifying an environmental agreement, as in line with the literature.

Conclusion

This paper has underlined the importance of the relationship between bilateral environmental agreements and the cooperative behavior of the states. I have obtained satisfactory results showing that while higher trade partly plays a role for BEAs, this agreement between states does not spill over for their other partners across the Mediterranean. In other words, the fact that Slovenia and Croatia have many BEAs with each other does not urge Bosnia-Herzegovina or Montenegro or Serbia to establish BEAs among each other. Also, becoming a member of the E.U. does not attract others, or Arab states do not sign a BEA just because they have a shared identity. The most exciting finding from this study is that some states tend to sign BEAs with their neighbors. This is observed in France-Morocco, Syria-Lebanon and Slovenia-Croatia.

Taken together, these findings highlight that states' motivation for BEA ratification may be only focusing on a particular environmental problem that they share within a specific area. Other distant states may abstain from a BEA since that environmental problem does not affect to the same degree. Another implication is that states sign a BEA without any presupposition regardless of whether they have not shared commonality or not.

A potential limitation regarding the methodology needs to be considered. There are limited BEA agreements that exist in the Mediterranean countries. Given the small sample size, caution must be exercised because this makes it difficult to generalize from relatively small samples. In addition, Mediterranean countries also have Multilateral environmental agreements, and the memberships to these agreements will allow us to understand another dimension of the tendency of environmental cooperation of the Mediterranean countries. Further research needs to examine the links between environmental agreements and the behavior of states through statistical applications. For instance, "the exponential random graph models (ERGMs) allow models to be built from a more realistic construal of the structural foundations of social behaviour (Robins et al., 2007, p.173). Overall, the findings of this study have many important implications for future practice.

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Explaining Income Inequality in Florida, 2000-2016

by Alyson E. Johnson, B.A. (University of Central Florida-Orlando)

2021 Winner FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award

ABSTRACT: Income inequality in Florida is higher than in many states and has worsened over time. What explains variance in Florida county income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient? Bivariate and multivariate weighted least square regressions are conducted for the years 2000 and 2016, and for the change between 2000 and 2016. Three variables achieve statistical significance in all three multivariate models: poverty rate and population density have a positive effect as does educational attainment (although that variable is negative in the 2000 model). Income per capita has a statistically significant positive relationship with inequality in the 2000 model and in the change model. Unemployment rate is statistically significant in the 2016 model and in the change model but has a positive association with the GINI index in the former and a negative association in the latter. Several variables were statistically significant in just one model: cost-burdened housing with a positive relationship to inequality and percentage of minorities with a negative relationship in 2016; and county tax rate with a positive association with inequality in the change model. Conclusions are drawn regarding policy that might be implemented to mitigate worsening inequality in the Sunshine State.[1]

Introduction

In the United States, income inequality – the extent of the income gap between rich and poor – has risen and fallen in waves, peaking in 1928, declining rapidly through the 1930s and 1940s, and continuing a gradual decline in which all wage earners experienced similar income growth until 1979, a year generally noted as the beginning of rapid expansion of rising inequality. In the years since, a lopsided widening of the gap has largely benefited the upper income shares and left lower income ranges stagnant or declining slightly. Some politicians speak of an economic rising tide lifting all boats, but in the Sunshine State, the rising tide only lifts yachts.

Factors that contribute to or are exacerbated as a result of income inequality can be societally problematic, including poverty, crime, health concerns and mortality, education levels, employment levels, and even happiness (Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009, p.642). For the middle incomes, inequality can hinder an improvement in standard of living (Sommeiller, Price, and Wazeter 2016, p.31). Worsening income inequality is self-perpetuating: countries with greater income inequality tend to also see generational economic advantages (or disadvantages) passed along in a long-term stratification phenomenon that economist Alan Krueger labeled the "Great Gatsby Curve". This curve compares income inequality to intergenerational economic mobility and finds approximately 50% of economic advantage or disadvantage is bequeathed from generation to generation in the United States (Corak 2013, p.80-81).

Income inequality is not solely a national problem; inequalities vary at state, county, metropolitan area, and municipal levels, where policies can alleviate – or exacerbate – some of the conditions contributing to inequality. Florida is a state with higher-than-average income inequality: in 2013 Florida had the fifth highest income inequality in the United States according to Sommeiller, Price and Wazeter

[1] A longer more detailed version of this research can be found as an Honors Thesis at the University of Central Florida authored by Johnson under supervision of a committee chaired by Jewett. See https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/521/

(2016, p.8), and Florida counties and metropolitan areas are disproportionately represented among the nation's 25 highest in inequality.

The purpose of this research was to determine the extent, possible causes and potential effects of changes in income inequality in the 67 Florida counties from 2000 to 2016, to ultimately determine whether income inequality growth happens at a rapid rate in only a few places, driving up Florida's overall numbers, or if widespread growth is affecting a majority of Florida's residents.

Literature Review

From 1928 to 1979, the income share of the top 1% fell in every state but one (Alaska); from 1979 to 2007, it increased in every state without exception, with current levels of inequality now near the peak seen in 1928 (Sommeiller, Price & Wazeter 2016). While capital income accounted for most wealth held by the top 1% nearly a century ago, the modern 1% accumulates its income via wage and entrepreneurial income, indicating that the contemporary top income distribution is somewhat less volatile than the capital income that declined as a result of diminishing gains once progressive income, estate and corporate income tax policies were implemented (Piketty & Saez, 2003).

Nationally, income growth for the top 1% from 2009 to 2013 was substantial, accounting for 85% of total income growth; in Florida, the top 1% of earners accounted for all income growth, while the remaining 99% experienced a fall in their share (Sommeiller, Price & Wazeter 2016). Thompson and Leight's 2012 study indicates that nationally, top share increases, especially for the top 1%, do not lead to rises in bottom and middle-income shares; after a long "lagged effect," the bottom shares of low- and middle-income households instead fell while upper-income shares rose. Income growth for the middle share was found to be negatively associated with top incomes; however, at the low-income end, there was not a clear or consistent relationship between rising top share and income, once controlled for other factors.

Impacts of income inequality have been shown to extend beyond structural and economic realms. Research finds links between inequality and mental illness, violence, imprisonment, lack of trust, teenage birth rates, obesity, drug use, and poor performance in schools (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009, p.493); murder rates in metropolitan areas (Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009, p.642); and health outcomes and life expectancy (Gordon & Dew-Becker 2008, 35).

Social compact and societal fragmentation factors have been found to be significant, as have factors of enduring legacy. Tax rates favorable to lower and moderate-income workers, as well as unionization opportunities, can reduce income inequality growth, and historical context indicators like poverty levels and race are relevant in assessing income inequality (Florida & Mellander 2016; Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009). As noted by Piketty and Saez, "changing social norms regarding inequality and the acceptability of very high wages might partly explain the rise in U.S. top wage shares observed since the 1970s" (2016, p.35). Van der Weide and Milanovic's argue "income fragmentation … might promote social separatism" (2014, p.22), when high-income members of a community opt out of publicly-funded and publicly-provided education, health, and other services to utilize privatized equivalent services. Some of these social and historical factors can have measurable effects on inequality for unexpected lengths of time; Glaeser, Resseger and Tobio found 1850s levels of college enrollments, illiteracy rates, and slavery to be predictors of today's income inequality in cities (2009, p.629).

Mark W. Frank (2009) found state-level support for Piketty and Saez's conclusions about the income share of the top decile from 1945 to 2004. Negative effects may even appear to be exacerbated at the state level; Lochner et al. (2001) found that an increased mortality risk exists for individuals living in higher-inequality states compared to those in lower-inequality states. A 2017 Frank study using Gini coefficient as a measure for income inequality ranked Florida at 7th most unequal nationally in 2000, and at 2nd nationally by 2015. Income inequality tends to be higher in large metro areas and their cities than

in the nation broadly (Berube & Holmes 2016) and over 96% of Florida's population resides in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) (MacManus et al. 2015, p.9). As costs of living in MSAs rise, populations "creep" further into the surrounding areas, driving up the costs of housing in an area at the same time its population of low-wage workers expands due to their price-out in the central region of the MSA. Florida is disproportionately representative in income inequality rankings by metropolitan areas and counties. Sommeiller, Price and Wazeter used the percentage of income share held by the top 1% of earners to rank United States metropolitan areas and counties; Florida was home to seven of the 25 highest-inequality metropolitan areas and nine of the 25 highest-inequality counties.

Florida is an interesting state to study at the county level for many reasons, including its population, demographics, tax policies, metropolitan "sprawl", and variety of economic functions (tourist, agricultural, technological, etc.). Jongsup Kim (2004) analyzed Florida's counties for changes in income inequality from 1979 to 2000, focusing on the county's classification by primary economic function. His findings indicated county inequality growth attributable to "globalization, the shrinkage of manufacturing jobs … the expansion of low-wage service jobs, immigration, the weakening of labour market institutions, the proportion of the non-labour population, urbanization and the approach index from the consumer market" (Kim 2004, p.177). County-level and other narrow-region analyses may be particularly important to the lower-income groups: Chetty et al. showed intergenerational income mobility outcomes varied more across regions for low-income families than for those of high-income families, and middle-class erosion may have a more substantial detrimental effect on intergenerational mobility than upper income growth (2014, p.1557).

Methodologies to measure income inequality can result in varied findings and generate disparate rankings, making comparative analyses challenging. One common method for inequality calculation used in many studies generates a comparative ratio: comparing the top 1% of income holders to the bottom 99%, or similar breakdowns (the 95th percentile to the 20th percentile, the 90th decile to the 10th decile, etc.) Obtaining an accurate estimate of high-income shares can be problematic: the U.S. Census and American Community Survey (ACS) define a top income bracket as $200,000 or more, but the threshold for the top 1% in the United States in 2013 was $389,436 (Sommeiller, Price & Wazeter 2016). An often-used alternative, using actual reported tax data, here has two shortfalls: individuals or households earning less than threshold gross income levels may not file returns and are thus omitted from analysis, possibly understating the lower-income range; further, such calculations for households in 67 counties require an extensive analysis of large amounts of data.

Another method of measuring income inequality is with the Gini coefficient, the measure of the distance between theoretical perfect income equality (a value defined as 0) and a nation, state, or locality's proportion of aggregate income relative to population as demonstrated by the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient is relatively invariable: it does not rely on population or production as part of its calculation and is independent of economic and population scale, though it does not take into consideration non-income benefits that may effectively move an earner up the curve, and can misstate inequality because it does not take into consideration the shape or particulars of the Lorenz curve. (An economy where one individual has half the wealth and the remaining individuals have the other half would have the same Gini coefficient as one where half of the individuals have zero income and the other half have perfectly equal income shares.)

Glaeser, Resseger, and Tobio found that these and other income inequality measures have a "fairly high correlation" to each other (2009, p.16), alleviating some concern that any particular measurement would vastly differ from another.

Theories and Hypotheses

As the literature makes clear, a variety of economic, sociological, and political theories seek to explain income inequality. Within these theoretical approaches, a variety of explanatory variables include

poverty and high-income shares, employment rates, mean income, housing affordability, marital rates, race, educational attainment, average wage, percentage of employment that falls into high tech or creative class categories or, in the alternative, percentage of low-skill employment, urbanity, immigrant population percentage, and tax policies.

Economic Indicators

Poverty: There is a positive relationship between poverty and income inequality. Poverty would seem to be closely related to income inequality, but some research signals that poverty may be a weaker indicator than expected. The correlation between poverty and income inequality has weakened over time due to the rapid earnings expansion experienced at the top of the income curve, leading income inequality impacts to be observable in both rich and poor metropolitan areas (Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009). Inequality may be poverty driven, or have a different primary driver, like top share or economic mobility. Thus, while inequality may be similar in two counties, the responses and policy measures best suited to address it may be very different. Research has used poverty to explain inequality, as with Glaeser, Resseger and Tobio, and inequality to explain poverty (Bivens et al. 2014).

Cost Burdened Housing: There is a positive relationship between cost burdened housing and inequality. Florida ranks 49th in all states for affordable available housing, and over one-third of Florida households pay more than 30% of their incomes for housing (Golden 2016); thus, any significant findings are important because measures like inclusive housing policies can be implemented at a county level. Affordable housing burdens show significant impacts on poverty (Golden 2016).

Educational attainment: There is a negative relationship between education and income inequality. In Florida, higher educational attainment levels generally contribute to lower poverty rates (Florida Legislature 2016). Research indicates that places with more college dropouts have been found to be more unequal over time (Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009, p.630). One could hypothesize the relationship to be negative (higher educational attainment lowers poverty rates) or positive (higher educational attainment drives upper incomes higher, widening the divide). As educational attainment is likely to drive the lower, middle and lower-upper shares of income higher, without impacting the very highest shares, the expectation is an increase in education rates will contribute to a decrease in income inequality.

Unemployment rates: There is a positive relationship between unemployment rates and income inequality. Periods of lower inequality, such as the 1928 to 1979 era, were associated with rising minimum wages, strong union participation and collective bargaining successes, and lower levels of unemployment (Sommeiller, Price & Wazeter 2016). Long periods of unemployment drive down household income, possibly contributing to downward mobility and impacting income inequality.

Income Per Capita: There is a positive relationship between per capita income and inequality. Per capita income was selected to gauge the general expansion or contraction of a county population's overall income level. While per capita income rates can be driven from any range of the spectrum, based on Florida's general economic demography and trends, the expectation is that as income rises, inequality rises.

Sociological Indicators

Population density: There is a positive relationship between population density and income inequality. City and metropolitan inequality research suggest densely populated areas experience greater inequality. While counties with large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) may experience high levels of income inequality generally at the set points in time of 2000 and 2016, counties with substantial MSAs may not show the most substantial inequality growth between 2000 and 2016, since those counties were already experiencing substantial inequality by 2000.

Marital rates: There is a negative relationship between marital rates and income inequality. There is some consensus that the "disintegration of the traditional two-parent, two wage-earner family" (MacManus et al. 2015, p.390) contributes substantially to poverty rates and evidence of "geographic intersection of race and poverty" (Florida & Mellander 2016, p.81). Thus, the family structure of a county may be found to have impacts on income inequality: if a decline in marital rates means more single-earner households, which are more likely to be lower-income households, this contributes to inequality from a low-range expansion (however, this relies on a potentially faulty assumption that an unmarried household is a single-earner household).

Race: There is a positive relationship between non-white population and income inequality. Areas with large non-white population often suffer from high levels of inequality due to systemic income effects on racial minorities. While marital rates and race will be examined and regressed separately, there is some evidence that controlling for family structure cancels out race effects on income mobility (Chetty et al. 2014). Thus in a bivariate analysis a positive relationship is expected; in a multivariate analysis, the significance or size of that relationship may be diminished.

Political / Policy Indicator

Regressive tax rates: There is a positive relationship between regressive tax rates and income inequality. Chetty et al. found a modest correlation between upward income mobility and local tax policy (2014, p.1558). Federal policy affects national inequality rates, but it is state and local tax policies that affect inequality at those levels (Florida & Mellander 2016). Florida has no personal income tax and relies heavily on regressive sales taxes and property taxes. Florida counties have some discretion in setting local property tax rates and local option sales taxes within state guidelines.

Methodology and Measurement

The study analyzes income inequality in Florida's 67 counties from 2000 to 2016. Weighted least squares regression is used for a series of bivariate and multivariate models for 2000, 2016 and the change between 2000 and 2016. The regression is weighted for population to account for the large population disparities between Florida's 67 counties.

Dependent Variable: Income Inequality

The research relies on the Gini coefficient to measure income inequality due to its broad acceptance in literature and ubiquity as a measure that can be compared to other counties, localities, states, and even nations. The data used was derived by Mark L. Burkey (2019) from U.S. Census data for 2000 and reported by the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2016 (for this and all other variables that utilized ACS figures, the ACS five-year average was selected as a best measure).

Independent Variables

Poverty -- regressed using two separate measures. The U.S. Census Bureau's Official Poverty Measure (OPM), updated annually, has come under fire by many researchers for defining income solely as pre-tax income, without incorporating tax liabilities, credits, and non-cash benefits, and for making no geographic adjustments or cost-of-living allowance in its calculation (see Meyer & Sullivan 2012). The U.S. Census Bureau developed the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) in 2010 and, while arguably a better measure for poverty with Florida's cost of living, the SPM could not be used for this study due to its non-existence in 2000. For this research, a second poverty variable used a threshold of 150% of the Official Poverty Measure, to offset the understating effects of the OPM. Both measures were taken from U.S. Census/ACS data for 2000 and 2016.

Cost Burdened Housing -- the proportion of cost-burdened households per county. Golden (2016) sets different levels of cost-burden, and figures are reported by the University of Florida's Shimberg Center for Housing Studies. For this measure, the levels were combined to a single figure of those who pay greater than 30% of their average monthly income for housing costs; that figure was then divided by the ACS-reported five-year estimates for the total number of households in the county in 2016 to arrive at the percentage of cost-burdened households in a county. This data was only available for 2016; thus, only the 2016 model incorporates a housing-cost variable.

Educational attainment -- the share of the county's adults with educational attainment of a four-year college degree or higher according to U.S. Census/ACS reported data for 2000 and 2016.

Unemployment rates – the official unemployment rates by county according to the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2000 and 2016. Monthly rates for each county in each year were compiled and averaged in order to arrive at a mean unemployment rate by county year.

Income per capita -- the mean income of county residents using Census/ACS reported data, with 2000 figures adjusted to 2016 dollars using the average Consumer Price Index (CPI) for ease of comparison.

Population density -- the actual number of residents in a county according to U.S. Census/ACS data divided by the county's land-only area in square mileage.

Marital rates -- the percentage of county population over the age of 15 that is married and not separated according to Census/ACS reported data for 2000 and 2016.

Non-White population – the percentage of the county population that is non-White according to Census/ACS reported data; this percentage was computed by subtracting from 100 that percentage of county residents who self-identified as White.

Regressive Tax Rates – the county property tax rate, calculated as the county's total tax revenue divided by total property values as reported to the Florida Department of Revenue for 2000 and 2016. Note: This measure does not account for municipal or special district tax rates, which may substantially affect residents within different areas of a county.

Data Analysis

Analysis proceeds in four stages. First, income inequality by Florida county is examined for each time period: 2000, 2016, and the difference between 2000 and 2016. Next a series of bivariate regressions are estimated, and then multivariate regressions are run for the "best model" for each time period. Finally, the values for the dependent variable are estimated based on the best model and compared to the actual values.

Inequality in Florida Counties

Table 11: Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) in Florida Counties: 2000-2016

Time Frame	Highest Value	Lowest Value	Mean Value	Standard Deviation
2000	0.51483 (Indian River)	0.37917 (Clay)	0.44882	0.02808
2016	0.5308 (Indian River)	0.3952 (Wakulla)	0.46054	0.03024
Change 2000-2016	.05268 (Lafayette)	-.06532 (Liberty)	0.0117	0.02139

Source: Collected by author from various sources listed in the Measurement section.

Table 1 shows that the mean Gini coefficient for Florida counties in 2000 was 0.44882, with a standard deviation of 0.02808. Indian River County had the highest inequality using this measure, at 0.51483, and Clay County experienced the lowest at 0.37917. The mean Gini coefficient for Florida counties in 2016 increased to 0.46054, with an increased standard deviation of 0.03024. Indian River

County again had the highest inequality using this measure, at 0.5308, and Wakulla County experienced the lowest at 0.3952. Average inequality in Florida counties increased between 2000 and 2016. The mean Gini coefficient change in income inequality over 16 years was 0.0117, with a standard deviation of 0.02139. Two of the least populated counties in Florida showed the largest changes: Lafayette with highest increase and Liberty with the largest decrease.

Figure 1 demonstrates the range of income inequality by county in 2000 using the Gini coefficient measurement; the darker a county is shaded, the higher its income inequality. Four of five counties with the lowest inequality are in the north of the state: Union, Wakulla, Baker and Clay (Osceola, number five, is in Central Florida). Four of five counties with the highest-inequality are along the southeastern shore: Indian River, Miami-Dade, Martin and Palm Beach. Interestingly, one of the most equal (Wakulla County) and one of the most unequal (Liberty County) are adjacent to each other in Florida's Panhandle.

Figure 1 Income Inequality by County - 2000



Figure 2 demonstrates the range of income inequality by county in 2016 using the Gini coefficient measurement. Four of the five counties with the highest inequality were unchanged from 2000 with Collier County replacing Liberty County. Thus, the five counties with highest inequality in 2016 are all located in South Florida. Though not all the same as in 2000, once again, four of the five counties with the lowest inequality (Wakulla, Taylor, Clay and Calhoun) are in North Florida with only Hernando located in Central Florida.

Figure 2 Income Inequality by County – 2016



Figure 3 displays change in income inequality by Florida county between 2000 and 2016 as measured by the change in Gini coefficient. Only 14 of Florida's 67 counties saw a decline in inequality. Of those 14, all were located in Northern Florida and Panhandle areas, with the exception of DeSoto County and nearly-northern Sumter and Marion counties in Central Florida. The counties with the highest increases in inequality were spread throughout the state: Lafayette and Columbia in North Florida, Orange and Seminole in Central Florida, and Hendry in South Florida.

Figure 3 Income Inequality Change by County - 2000 to 2016



Bivariate Regression

Table 2 displays the results of bivariate regression seeking to explain the difference in inequality among Florida counties for three different time periods. For 2000 and 2016 the dependent variable is the Gini index for each county and the third model is the change in the Gini index between 2000 and 2016. Each regression is estimated using weighted least squares (weighted for county population). Nine independent variables are estimated for each model. The 2016 model also includes cost burdened housing which was not available for 2000 or the change model.

Table 12
Explaining Income Inequality in Florida Counties – Bivariate Regression 2000, 2016 & 2000-2016

	2000		2016		2000-2016 Change	
Independent Variables	**B**	**R^2**	**B**	**R^2**	**B**	**R^2**
Official Poverty Rate	0.004***	0.191	0.002**	0.061	0.002**	0.087
150% of Official Poverty	0.002***	0.145	0.002*	0.057	0.002**	0.085
Educational Attainment	0.002***	0.132	0.001***	0.246	0.001	0.024
Unemployment Rate	0.017***	0.105	0.007	0.004	-2.014E-05	0.000
Income Per Capita	2.356 E-6**	0.084	0.000***	0.142	6.317E-07	0.008
Population Density	8.221 E-6	0.040	0.000***	0.128	4.964E-05***	0.199
Marital Rates	-0.003***	0.172	0.001***	0.201	0.002	0.041
Race	0.001**	0.088	0.000	0.030	0.000	0.015
County Tax Rate	-0.014	0.025	0.020	0.003	0.003	0.005
Cost Burdened Housing			0.003***	0.490		

Significance levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

For 2000, all but two of the variables hypothesized to have a relationship with income inequality displayed a statistically significant relationship: both poverty measures, educational attainment, unemployment rate, income per capita, marital rates, and race. Only population density and county tax rate did not achieve statistical significance. Two relationships were negative – county tax rate and marital rates, with marital rates being the only significant relationship of the two. As for the hypothesized relationships, only the positively-correlated educational attainment measure was counter to expectation.

At this level of analysis, the two poverty and marital rates measures appear to be the most substantial indicators of income inequality, explaining about 19%, 15% and 17% of income inequality respectively.

The relationship for both poverty measures followed the hypothesized direction. Educational attainment ran counter to the hypothesized direction. While not as expected, the relationship is explainable: larger shares of population with higher educational attainment may drive higher-end incomes upward and widen inequality. The unemployment rate, as hypothesized, was positively related to income inequality. Income per capita was positive as hypothesized as well. Marital rates were significant and negatively related as expected. Finally, race was significant and positively related as hypothesized. Population density was not statistically significant within this regression, nor was the county tax rate.

For 2016, all but three of the ten variables hypothesized to have a relationship with income inequality are statistically significant: both poverty measures, cost-burdened housing, educational attainment, income per capita, population density, and marital rates. Unemployment rates and race lost

significance in 2016 where it was present in 2000; population density gained significance, and county tax rate continued to be statistically insignificant.

In 2016 as compared to 2000, the two poverty measures lost some of their substantive impact and all variables were overshadowed in this sense by cost-burdened housing, which explained 49% of income inequality. Educational attainment and marital rates measures were the next most substantial indicators of income inequality, explaining about 25% and 20% of income inequality respectively.

All but two of the statistically significant variables were in the hypothesized direction. Poverty (in both measures), educational attainment, income per capita, and population density were all positive as predicted. The additional variable of cost-burdened housing, unique to the 2016 analysis, was also positively correlated as hypothesized. As with 2000, educational attainment again ran counter to the hypothesized direction. In addition, marital rate was positive which was reverse of expectation (and different than in 2000).

For the change model only three of the variables hypothesized to have a relationship with income inequality achieved statistical significance: both poverty measures and population density. The relationships were in the hypothesized direction. Educational attainment, unemployment rate, income per capita, marital rates, race and county tax rates were all not statistically significant. Cost burdened housing could not be assessed for impact over time in bivariate or multivariate analysis since the data was not available for the 2000 model.

When explaining the change in income inequality over time, as opposed to the level of income inequality at a given point in time, of the three statistically significant predictors, population density appears to be the strongest, accounting for nearly 20% of the fluctuation. The poverty measures have a lower impact, around nine percent each.

The relationship between inequality and a county's Official Poverty Measure or the secondary poverty measure followed the hypothesized direction as in 2000 and 2016: growing poverty rates in a county were associated with higher inequality across time. Population density was statistically significant and also positive as predicted: counties that became more densely populated saw an increase in respective income inequality.

Multivariate Regression

Table 3 contains the results for the multivariate analysis explaining income inequality in 67 Florida counties for three time periods: 2000, 2016 and change from 2000 to 2016. Six variables were included for all three models: official poverty rate, educational attainment, unemployment rate, population density, race and county tax rate. Cost-burden housing was included for 2016, but was not available for 2000. The official poverty rate was included, but not the 150% of poverty rate variable, since the two measures together would be far too closely correlated to generate an acceptable regression model.

Marital rates correlated closely with population density and poverty (2000 and 2016), as well as educational attainment and race (2000), and thus was excluded from those two models. After removing marital rates from the 2016 model, income per capita remained too closely correlated to educational attainment, thus the income per capita variable was also removed from 2016. Removing these variables from the models eliminated problematic VIF statistics and yielded a best model.

Table 13
Explaining Income Inequality in Florida Counties – Multivariate Regression 2000, 2016 & 2000-2016

	2000		2016		2000-2016 Change	
Independent Variables Model Statistics	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**
(Constant)	.141		0.216		0.032	
Official Poverty Rate	0.010***	1.221	0.003***	0.259	0.004***	0.519
Educational Attainment	-0.001*	-0.172	0.003***	0.626	-7.671E-05	-0.011
Unemployment Rate	0.005	0.088	0.012**	0.212	-0.006*	-0.211
Income Per Capita	9.473E-06***	1.163			2.974E-06***	0.428
Population Density	7.683E-06***	0.185	5.986E-06*	0.142	4.977E-05***	0.448
Race	0.000	-0.082	-0.001***	-0.326	0.001	0.189
County Tax Rate	-0.007	-0.082	0.008	0.052	0.011**	0.281
Cost-Burdened Housing			0.002***	0.531		
Marital Rates					0.001	0.186
R-Square	.861		.724		.470	
Adjusted R-Square	.844		.691		.397	
F Change	52.196		22.094		6.429	
Durbin-Watson	1.644		2.254		1.807	

Significance levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10

For 2000, four of the seven tested variables were statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction: poverty, income per capita, and population density were all positive and educational attainment negative. Compared to the bivariate regression, educational attainment shifted from a positive to a negative relationship with income inequality, indicating that controlling for other measures yields the expected results. Unemployment rate and race lost statistical significance compared to the bivariate model and county tax rate continued to be statistically insignificant. According to the standardized regression coefficient Beta, the official poverty rate and income per capita had the biggest impact on inequality. The 2000 model explains about 86% of the variance in inequality among all Florida counties.

The 2016 model explains about 72 percent of the variance in Gini coefficients. The directions of a few relationships shifted from 2000; county tax rate and educational attainment were again positively correlated with income inequality, though only educational attainment was statistically significant in this model. The number of statistically significant predictors increased compared to 2000, up to six of seven in this regression. Only county tax rates remained statistically insignificant.

In the 2016 regression model, both poverty and cost-burden housing were positively linked with income inequality as hypothesized. Educational attainment's relationship did not support the hypothesized direction, remaining in line with the bivariate regression results. Unemployment rate

regained its statistical significance and hypothesis support in this model. Population density increased alongside income inequality as hypothesized. Race returned to significance in this model, but opposite the hypothesized direction: a higher percentage of non-White residents in a county is correlated with smaller income inequality. The strongest predictors of income inequality according to Beta were educational attainment levels and cost-burdened housing populations.

The model explaining change in inequality between 2000 and 2016 had less explanatory power than the models measuring a single point in time with a R-Squared of 47%. The change model contains five statistically significant predictors: poverty, unemployment rate, income per capita, population density and county tax rate.

Poverty is positively correlated with income inequality. Unemployment rate again holds statistical significance but is negative, opposite the hypothesized direction. Per capita income was statistically significant in the hypothesized positive direction, as was population density. County tax rate achieves significance in this final model, though opposite the hypothesized direction: a one percent increase in county tax rate corresponding with a .011 increase in income inequality. In this model, educational attainment, marital rates, and race were not statistically significant predictors of a change over time in income inequality. The strongest predictors of income inequality in this model were poverty, per capita income and population density.

Predictive Models

Actual county values for the independent variables were inserted into the full models and estimates were generated for the Gini coefficient for each county. These estimates were then compared to the actual Gini values for each county to see how closely the predictions were to the real values and to look for trends in the differences. Table 4 contains the results for the five largest underestimates and overestimates of predicted county income inequality in Florida in 2000 and 2016.

Table 14
Predicting Income Inequality in Florida Counties: 2000 and 2016

Underestimates 2000		**Actual Gini**	**Predicted Gini**	**Difference**	**Percentage**
1	Jefferson County	0.49108	0.45048	0.0406	8.27%
2	Indian River County	0.51483	0.47708	0.03775	7.33%
3	Miami-Dade County	0.5071	0.47112	0.03598	7.10%
4	Gilchrist County	0.44232	0.41644	0.02588	5.85%
5	Liberty County	0.51082	0.48448	0.02634	5.16%
Overestimates 2000		**Actual Gini**	**Predicted Gini**	**Difference**	**Percentage**
1	DeSoto County	0.44009	0.48339	-0.0433	-9.84%
2	Clay County	0.37917	0.41086	-0.03169	-8.36%
3	Baker County	0.40289	0.43112	-0.02823	-7.01%
4	Hendry County	0.4488	0.47899	-0.03019	-6.73%
5	Hardee County	0.44639	0.47519	-0.0288	-6.45%

Underestimates 2016		Actual Gini	Predicted Gini	Difference	Percentage
1	Lafayette County	0.5006	0.39262	0.10798	21.57%
2	Madison County	0.4883	0.41686	0.07144	14.63%
3	Liberty County	0.4455	0.38293	0.06257	14.04%
4	Gilchrist County	0.4695	0.40406	0.06544	13.94%
5	Franklin County	0.4886	0.4238	0.0648	13.26%
Overestimates 2016		**Actual Gini**	**Predicted Gini**	**Difference**	**Percentage**
1	Osceola County	0.4304	0.48117	-0.05077	-11.80%
2	Leon County	0.4848	0.52396	-0.03916	-8.08%
3	Flagler County	0.4306	0.46383	-0.03323	-7.72%
4	Sumter County	0.4344	0.46724	-0.03284	-7.56%
5	Hernando County	0.4236	0.44961	-0.02601	-6.14%

In 2000, twenty-eight of Florida counties' inequality levels were overestimated to varying degrees, and the remaining 39 counties were underestimated. All estimates fell within a ten-percent margin higher or lower than actual income inequality. Regionally, many of the counties that were over- or under-estimated were found in either the southern or northern parts of the state. Population seems to also be a factor, which may be a result of weighting the model: three of the five counties in both most underestimated and most overestimated are in the 20 lowest-population counties.

In 2016, thirty-nine of the counties' inequality levels were overestimated to varying degrees, and the remaining 28 counties were underestimated. In this analysis, while all but one overestimate fell within a 10% margin of the actual number, nine counties were underestimated by greater than 10% and the model underestimated one county – Lafayette – by over 20%. Regionally, all five underestimated counties were in the northern portion of the state, and the counties that were overestimated were found in the central and northern parts of the state. Population again seems to also be a factor at the underestimated end, which may be a result of weighting the model: all five underestimated counties are in the 20 lowest-population counties, though none of the overestimated counties are in that selection of rural counties.

Table 5 displays actual and predicted results of the five highest overestimates and five lowest underestimates of the change in the Gini coefficient between 2000 and 2016. Regionally, the counties that were most underestimated and overestimated were found in the northern and southwestern portions of the state and tended to be lower-population counties. This finding appears consistent with both 2000 and 2016 models in that these regions and less populous areas, particularly the northern panhandle, are some of the most difficult in which to predict income inequality.

Table 5
Predicting Change in Income Inequality, 2000 to 2016

Underestimates		Actual Gini	Predicted Gini	Difference
1	Lafayette County	0.05268	0.01133	0.04135
2	Hendry County	0.03820	-0.00098	0.03918
3	Baker County	0.02711	-0.00001	0.02712
4	Highlands County	0.02078	-0.00232	0.02310
5	Hardee County	0.02381	0.00214	0.02167
Overestimates		**Actual Gini**	**Predicted Gini**	**Difference**

1	Liberty County	-0.06532	-0.02732	-0.03800
2	Holmes County	-0.02084	0.01696	-0.03780
3	Washington County	-0.02679	0.00210	-0.02889
4	Jefferson County	-0.03658	-0.01021	-0.02637
5	DeSoto County	-0.01139	0.01203	-0.02342

Discussion of Results

The two predictors that shared statistical significance in all three models, poverty and population density, maintained a positive relationship to income inequality throughout, as hypothesized. One predictor, marital rates, either never achieved significance (the change model) or had to be removed from the analysis due to multicollinearity issues (2000 and 2016). Educational attainment had significance in the 2000 and 2016 models, but not the change model, and its relationship to income inequality changed direction from negative as hypothesized in 2000 to positive in 2016. This may support findings by researchers, like Bivens et al. who noted the stall or decline in wages for all including college graduates, preventing those with an education from substantially impacting the inequality curve. Educational attainment was difficult to hypothesize because of such competing theories, so the inconsistent findings are somewhat unsurprising. Unemployment rates were significant only in the 2016 and change models but changed direction there as well: positively correlated to income inequality in 2016, as hypothesized, and negatively correlated in the change model.

County tax rates only gained significance in the change model, and in being positively correlated to income inequality, ran counter to the hypothesized direction. One possibility is that tax rate achieved significance in the change model due to how substantially the rate changed in the time span. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in 2016, four of the five highest-tax-rate counties were in the north of the state, where poverty rates tended to run high and inequality was more difficult to predict. Race was only statistically significant in the 2016 model and there too disproved the hypothesis by being negatively correlated with income inequality, which perhaps indicates a tendency for race to be less impactful as a factor on income inequality when controlling for other factors like poverty and educational attainment. These are factors in which other studies have shown race to be significant and correlated; in other words, this research's models may merely indicate that race is not significant twice. Population density was a challenging factor to predict: more rural counties as defined by population density were less predictable in terms of income inequality projections. Possibly a different measure for density would be more predictive; this leaves room for future study.

Conclusions

Potential Impacts – Policy

Understanding the drivers of income inequality is critical to policymaking; while inequality may be similar in two cities or metro areas, the responses and policy measures best suited to address it may be quite different. Looking at poverty or high-income shares in addition to inequality is crucial; inequality may be poverty driven, top income driven, or economic mobility driven (among other factors). For income inequality to be addressed at all ends of the spectrum, the explosive rise of top income shares and accurately-measured poverty and lower-income levels must both be examined.

As housing impacts driven by inequality are disproportionately detrimental to poor households, local (city/county) governments may have greater control over effecting shifts in income inequality than they realize. Governments "should consider monitoring the relationship between income and rental costs at different points in the distribution – not just at the low end, but in the middle as well – to ensure their efforts respond adequately to those affordability challenges and preserve housing opportunities for a

wide range of workers and families" (Berube & Holmes 2016). Density concessions for inclusive housing policies are one of many options available to counties; this concession increases the maximum number of allowable units in a multi-family structure if some are designated as affordable housing and encourage developers to include these options within their planned communities.

Tax rates were not statistically significant in most regressions; they may not vary enough county by county for marked significance, but the low overall taxation rates in the state may contribute to its high standing in terms of nationwide inequality, particularly given that Florida has a general overall regressive approach to taxation, with most taxes based on some ownership of property. Another consideration is how these regressive property-based taxes impact lower-income residents, who frequently rent their residences; while increased homestead exemptions may put money back in the pockets of Florida's homeowners, these exemptions do not trickle down to renters. However, any departure from this mostly property-based taxation by proposing statewide taxation policy would be likely doomed. Florida's constitution bars a state income tax (Article VII), voters must approve any constitutionally imposed new tax by a two-thirds majority (Article XI), and as of the 2018 election, a super-majority would be needed for tax changes proposed by the legislature. Local-level tax policies and redistributive measures that could counter inequality at a national or state level might just drive a flight of the wealthy if implemented at a local metropolitan or county level, and thus not address income inequality directly.

If a state income tax would be difficult to achieve, broad-level changes to capitalism and free markets seem even less likely; however, much evidence suggests that encouraging a broad expansion of wage levels overall, which have stagnated or declined for most Americans, would decrease inequality. The Economic Policy Institute suggests policy decisions are more important in explaining the slowing of wage growth than many oft-cited factors like skill change and technical bias (Bivens et al. 2014, p.6). Support has grown for minimum wage increases over the years, and Florida voters approved a self-executing $15 minimum wage amendment with the 2020 ballot. Though the shift will be implemented gradually, arriving at $15 per hour by 2026 (State of Florida 2019), moving wage-earners further up the income scale and closer to a middle-income range would likely reduce poverty and thus may reduce income inequality from a bottom-shares aspect. It should be noted that as of this writing, the Florida legislature is grappling with establishing excepted groups to the increased wage. Research findings indicate that any policies encouraging economic growth should simultaneously consider how to enhance economic growth without continuing to deepen inequality, as growth may not "trickle down" to anyone, remaining in top shares and in fact repressing bottom growth (Frank 2009; van der Weide & Milanovic 2014).

However, Dye (1969) noted that his "admittedly rough calculations suggest that the *distribution* of social and economic resources within a state may be more important politically than the *level* of social and economic resources." If correct, this fifty-year-old analysis still holds water: policy solutions need not be expensive ones, and a shift in the appropriation of tax dollars may be as or more effective than an increase in them. The Florida Legislature in 1992 passed the William E. Sadowski Affordable Housing Act, which created two new trust funds, one local and one statewide, fueled by a small increase in documentary stamp taxes. The local fund distributes funds to counties and cities for flexible use in production and preservation of affordable housing, mostly home construction but also rental housing to a lesser extent; the state funds are more heavily applied toward construction and rehabilitation of multi-family rental housing. Unfortunately, in many legislative years, the program's funds are swept into general revenues and not fully appropriated as designed (Florida Housing Coalition 2018). Addressing both poverty and cost-burdened housing by ensuring that Sadowski Trust Fund monies are appropriated as intended to counties for affordable housing assistance could lift more families out of poverty and cost-burden and decrease inequality.

Education's impact on income inequality was somewhat inconsistent in these results, but if education – either a via formal university or vocational training – is impactful on either income inequality

or poverty, or both, then the facilitation of attaining such education is an important goal. Particularly in counties where costs of living and housing cost burden is high, governments and institutions both can smooth the path for residents seeking to inch up the income ladder and effect economic mobility. Many cities and counties (and home-owners associations) have regulations on the number of unrelated adults who can legally reside in a single residence – for example, in University of Florida's home town of Gainesville the limit is three, with some areas of the city permitting up to five (Knee 2019). College-adjacent areas can keep costs of living lower while attending college for students by eliminating or increasing limits on the number of unrelated adult roommates who can reside in a single residence, facilitating the financial feasibility of successfully completing their education and moving into higher-paying jobs. Policies can be implemented by school boards and universities to encourage attendance and completion at secondary institutions (colleges and vocational schools alike). School boards could implement courses and workshops on life skills after high school: work-school-life balance, budgeting, time management, etc. Colleges, universities, and vocational schools could relax some of their mandates, particularly those tied to financial aid, governing time frames for completion and maintenance of grades. These institutions might offer additional assistance to those students struggling to complete school while juggling the workload required to cover sometimes substantial living expenses. Finally, the state could eliminate standardized testing, shown to disproportionately favor white and more affluent students (O'Malley Borg, Plumlee & Stranahan, 2009), from use as the primary assessment for everything from school funding to college admissions.

As noted in Piketty and Saez (2003), "changing social norms regarding inequality and the acceptability of very high wages might partly explain the rise in U.S. top wage shares observed since the 1970" (p.35). This normative shift could itself be problematic in addressing inequality – one can rarely use policy recommendations to address societal norms. Social separatism -- flight from public services by the rich – increases with inequality and could have detrimental effects for lower- and middle-income groups in particular; aim for policies that suppress separatism, rather than enable or encourage a separation by classes, which perpetuate the breakdown of this social compact and hasten societal fragmentation.

There may be a sort of silver lining at the county level: some degree of local income inequality (though notably not poverty, per se) is not always a bad thing. Studies suggest there are communitarian effects of income inequality, with an important caveat: if people at income levels do not stratify and isolate into homogenous communities in which their own private institutions replace their use of public ones, inequality can benefit lower income groups (Glaeser, Resseger & Tobio 2009, p.640).

Potential Impacts – Areas for Further Study

The most obvious area for improvement in this study is the inclusion of high-income shares as an independent variable. As noted previously, research has found high-income shares to be highly correlated to income inequality. The research findings here seem to indicate that Florida's income inequality may be driven more strongly by top shares than by expanding poverty rates. Analysis of the predictive models run to test accuracy suggests this would be an important factor in explaining county income inequality: northern panhandle counties, which tend to have fewer index-skewing extremely high-income individuals and households, were the most likely counties to be overstated in terms of inequality. If high-income shares were incorporated, the predictive capability of these models may put these counties closer to their actual inequality levels.

Incorporation of other explanatory variables could inform the models further, by including factors such as percentage of employment that falls into high tech or creative class categories or, in the alternative, percentage of low-skill employment; immigrant population percentage; average wage rates; and further stratification of the race variable used here. As this research shows that population density was unreliable in terms of predicting income inequality in counties measured as more rural by density,

the development and inclusion of other more exacting measures of urbanity/rurality, such as index of relative rurality, might lead to more accurate predictive capabilities in the model (Belk 2019). A simplified binary dummy variable for rural/non-rural might also provide better insight. The results of this study show that population density and income inequality's relationship is both significant and inconsistent on predictive abilities; a question remains, however, whether income inequality and population density are in fact linked or if there is simply a link between poverty and rurality that makes population density look more significant than it is.

Further, there are differences between income inequality and wealth inequality – which is even higher in the U.S. than income inequality – and there is space for more studies on wealth inequalities in Florida's counties.

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

– BOOK REVIEW –

Diane M. Zorri, Houman Sadri & David C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis*

(Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, December 2020, pages 152, ISBN 979-8588669665)

"We brought you to help, but you became like the Pharaoh." (Iraqi colloquialism)[1]

This interesting book co-authored by Diane M. Zorri, Houman Sadri and David C. Ellis, *Iran Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis* (Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, December 2020, ISBN 979-8588669665) is a must read for all analysts and scholars in the Middle East, Intelligence, International Security, International Terrorism and Political Sciences who focus on contemporary politico-military changes in the ever-shifting regional balance of the Middle East/Gulf and its international repercussions over the destabilizing policies of Islamic Iran.

The book published under the U.S. Central Command is co-authored by Diane Zorri, Houman Sadri and David Ellis, who have provided a clear, comprehensive and much needed understanding for policy-makers, government analysts, military strategists, operators, scholars and the general public of the continuing, growing security challenges posed by Islamic Iran to U.S. Strategy and Foreign Policy in the Middle East/Gulf and its regional U.S. allies. In such context, this complex book focuses on the disparate military-political destabilizing activities of Islamic Iran's use of multiple local Shi'a militias as proxy forces throughout the Middle East. Islamic Iran's proxy forces mostly operate in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, as well as enlist the support to the *Houthi* insurgency during the Yemen Civil War who have also launched several explosive drone strikes against key regional U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

The book's vital lessons-learned will help strengthen U.S. and Coalition policy-makers' diplomatico-military reactions to Islamic Iran's destabilizing regional strategy in the Middle East/Gulf, especially against the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. Equally important for Western policy-makers and U.S. Special Operations forces is to develop a better roadmap to counter Islamic Iran's destabilizing activities by understanding how Teheran expands and uses its proxy Shi'a militias and State-supported terrorism throughout the region to widen its politico-socio-religious influence in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. These same lessons also have broader international implications in the cross-section of the re-emerging Great Powers' rivalry between the U.S. with NATO and regional allies vs. the new anti-Western hostile alignment of China and Russia. In this broader context, also Moscow uses proxy militias and cyber-attacks to destabilize--short of open armed conflicts--hostile neighbours, like Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and ultimately also seeks to intimidate NATO's Baltic states and Poland, while China eyes a potential forceful annexation of Taiwan.[2]

Teheran's Islamic régime has relied since the 1979 Islamic Revolution on the politico-military support of its religious-ideological paramilitary force, the Islamic Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, or *Sepah-e pasdaran-e engelab-e eslami,* or *Pasdaran*) as an autonomous branch of the Islamic Iranian armed-forces after the collapse of the previous pro-U.S. Shah of Iranian military, but outside national military chains-of-command and directly under Iran's Supreme Leader. Indeed, the first Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had envisaged the IRGC-*Pasdaran* as main religious-military force to protect the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Iran as an Islamic state, its Shi'a cleric theocracy and national political interests from all internal and external threats.

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[1] Quote from p. 27 of Diane M. Zorri, Houman Sadri & David C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis* (Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, December 2020).

[2] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-140.

Thus, under the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's powerful support and mandate of legitimacy the *Pasdaran* paramilitary service was officially anointed as "guardians of the Revolution and fighting sons of Islam" and exercised since 1979 a vast influence over Iranian domestic politics, economy and society, besides monopolizing very large national commercial enterprises for the sole financial benefit of the Clerical leadership and IRGC itself. In time, the Islamic Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps has grown to include an autonomous land-force, air-force, naval flotilla, *Basij/*"mobilization" auxiliary militia (for internal security and ideological control over society and dissenters) and IRGC-*Quds* Force, which in-turn created many regional Shi'a proxy militias.[1]

The *Pasdaran* (IRGC) fields today a paramilitary force of over 125,000 men, including 15,000 in its autonomous branch IRGC-*Quds* Force (*Sepah-e Quds*) that reports directly to Iran's Grand Ayatollah and exercises a parallel vast influence in foreign affairs. The IRGC-*Quds* Force uses its special operations offices (Levant Corps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Gaza; *Ramazan* Corps in Iraq; *Rasulallah* Corps in Saudi Arabia; *Ansar* Corps in Afghanistan) and Department 400 (*Misaq* Unit) to actively support abroad Iran's state and non-state partners in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, plus Palestinian terrorists *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad,* as well as also since 2020 the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. The IRGC-*Quds* Force first inserted itself in 1982 in Lebanon by organizing a loyalist *Hezbollah* Shi's militia against the parallel Israeli invasion and U.S.-led Coalition Peacekeeping in 1980-85, which under Iranian orders launched constant firefights and several mass-casualties suicide truck-bombings (the 1982-83 two suicide-attacks on Israel's Base in Tyre with 103 Israeli and 46–59 Lebanese dead; and in Beirut the 1983 assaults against the U.S. Marines Base with 241 deaths, France's Base with 58 deaths, and two attacks that twice destroyed the U.S. Embassy and killed the U.S. Ambassador, 17 U.S. and 52 Lebanese civilians). These terrorist attacks provoked the later pull-out of Israeli and U.S.-led Peacekeepers from Lebanon, while in time securing a large socio-economic and veto-strong political degree of influence within Lebanon's politics.

Thereafter, the traumatizing 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War losses where superior Iranian conventional forces were severely blooded and halted by Saddam Hussein's invading Iraqi forces (1-to-2 millions casualties on both sides including 200,000-to-600,000 Iranian deaths, 105,000-to-500,000 Iraqi deaths, and over 100,000 civilian deaths), together with losing targeted skirmishes with U.S. forces in the Gulf in 1988, forced Teheran to shape its post-war strategy to avoid any direct conventional clash with U.S. forces, while escalating instead its predominant reliance on "asymmetrical" warfare in the Middle East/Gulf to curtail the rival regional influence of the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. Thus, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-*Quds* Force (IRGC-*Quds* Force) has exponentially escalated its armed and financial support of sympathetic Shi'a armed militias and non-state partners in Lebanon, Syria (supporting also the tottering Shi'a régime of Bashir al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War against anti-government Syrian reformists and the terrorist ISIL insurgency), Iraq (seeking to dominate local politics and exclude the U.S. since the 2014-19 civil war against terrorist ISIL forces) and Yemen (supporting the *Houthis* insurgents in the local civil war), plus Sunni Palestinian terrorists (*Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad*), while seeking to establish new Shi'a regional "land-bridges" under Teheran's overall control to ferry across the region arms, forces and matériel (including thousands of ballistic missiles to *Hezbollah, Hamas* and the *Houthis*). The IRGC-*Quds* Force's *Misaq* Unit also has staged intelligence-gathering, training, arms shipments, targeted assassinations, bombing opponents, cyber-attacks, shipping ballistic missiles, attack-drones and financial aid to its Shi'a proxy-militias.[2]

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[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-106; Jaroslaw Jarzabek, "Contemporary Praetorians in the Middle East: Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia's National Guard" in *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol.25, n.1 (2016-2017): p.54-65; Seth Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East" in *CIS Brief* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 11 March 2019): https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy

[2] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-140; "Tyre Headquarters Bombings" in *Wikipedia*: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyre_headquarters_bombings; "1983 Beirut Barracks Bombings" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: https://www.britannica.com/event/1983-Beirut-barracks-bombings & https://www.britannica.com/event/Lebanese-Civil-War; "Beirut Bombings: Thirty Years Later" in *Marine Corps University*: https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-

Yet, the IRGC-*Quds* Force's activities have provoked hundreds of counter-strikes in Syria from Israel (and occasionally the U.S. too) decimating local IRGC-*Quds* units and *Hezbollah*, plus their secret missiles installations, equipment and other targets mostly in South-West Syria, near the Israeli and Lebanese borders. A few Israeli attacks destroyed major bases in Syria used by *Hezbollah*, Iran and local Shi'a proxy-militias (including the Homs T-4 Tiyas Airbase, al-Qusayr Airbase and Damascus International Airport) seeking to stop the encroachment and growing capabilities of Iran and its proxies. Nevertheless, Iran's growing regional political influence and paramilitary proxy outreach has continued to increase, escalating under the weaker U.S. Democratic Presidencies of Barack Obama (2009-16) and Joe Biden (2021-current), while only temporarily did the U.S. launch an energetic counter-offensive against Islamic Iran under Republican President Donald Trump (2017-20). Trump withdrew in 2016 from the international nuclear arms-control treaty to postpone 15 years a potential future Iranian nuclear armament (a six-Powers negotiated and signed in 2014 by Obama and his Vice-President Biden, and still pursued by his follower Biden against all hopes, while both Presidents totally disregarded Islamic Iran's use of its repatriated U.S. funds to not bolster its domestic economy, but instead only to fuel its parallel regional expansion of proxy-militias), imposed forceful U.S. sanctions also on European suppliers (secretly stopped by Biden since 2021) that triggered Iran's economic near-collapse, and ordered the 2020 U.S. air-drone night assassination at Iraq's Baghdad Airport of visiting IRGC-*Quds* Force historical leader Major-General Qassem Al-Suleimani.[1]

According to Zorri, Sadri & Ellis' book on *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, Teheran's state-sponsored terrorist strategy and regional plans since 1979 are multifaceted:

1. in its revolutionary quest to oppose U.S.-Western values and influence, it seeks to avoid any open conventional clash with the U.S. and Coalition, while projecting power at low costs/risks to Iran by indirectly harassing regional U.S. forces through attacks by its local Shi'a proxy-militias (controlled by the IRGC-*Quds* Force), as well as by politically pressuring local states to expel any residual U.S. forces from their territory (Iraq and Syria);
2. under the pretext of seeking civilian nuclear power-generation for its citizens (a totally laughable excuse, given Iran's leading role in petrol and gas production) it covertly strives to create an autonomous national military nuclear program paired to long-range ballistic missiles development, first as a "blackmail" tool to extract from the U.S./West more advantageous negotiations on trade, sanctions-lifting and financial concessions, followed by open deterrence of the nuclear-armed U.S. and NATO from any future war against Iran, while also quietly threatening its other ideologico-religious enemy the nuclear-armed Israel;
3. it promotes a revisionist change to Teheran's advantage of the regional balance of power in the Middle East/Gulf by actively expanding its rival local politico-religious penetration ("Proxy Delegation Strategy" through Shi'a proxy-militias and corrupt local Shi'a parties) and asymmetrical interventions by exploiting local conflicts and power-vacuum since the 2003 collapse of Iraq's Saddam Hussein régime and the post-2011 civil wars in Iraq (Al-Qaeda vs. Shi'a; ISIL's offensives vs. Iraq and Syria), Syria and Yemen;
4. it constantly relies on a national "forward deterrence" using asymmetrical military strategy and state-sponsored terrorism through Iranian-financed, trained, armed and hierarchically-controlled local Shi'a religious proxy-militias (Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc.);

History-Division/Brief-Histories/Beirut-Bombing-Thirty-Years-Later/ ; S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; Marc Champion, "How Iran Pursues its Interests via Proxies Partners" in *Bloomberg Quint* (5-8 January 2020).

[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-106; S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; Karen Zraick, "What to Know about the Death of Iranian General Suleimani" in *New York Times* (3 January 2020): https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/suleimani-dead.html

5. it continuously expands "forward deterrence" to also encompass strategic areas that expand Iran's politico-economic reach (and secret wealth-accumulation for Islamic clerics and IRGC-*Quds* Force) throughout the Greater Middle East/Gulf:
   - three aspirational future Shi'a "land-bridges" westwards from Islamic Iran to Lebanon;
   - the geo-strategic Bab el-Mandab Strait across Yemen and Djibouti tying the Red Sea and Indian Ocean;
   - eastwards routes since 2021 to Talibani-held Afghanistan and Pakistan, as it slowly becomes another future geo-strategic link in China's expanding "Belt and Road" Initiative to tie by road and oil-pipelines China's Turkic minority Sinkiang Province to the Indian Ocean and Islamic Iran.[1]

Under IRGC-*Quds* Force's historical leader Al-Suleimani, Teheran has exponentially widened its regional influence and military reach in the Middle East/Gulf by intervening since 2014 in civil war-ravaged Iraq and Syria, while also striving to build three aspirational future Shi'a "land-bridges" westwards from Islamic Iran to Lebanon to retrace King Darius' Ancient Persian Royal Road of the Fifth Century B.C. (now dubbed among more extremist *Hezbollah* fighters as the future Province/*Wilayat* of Imam Alí ibn Abi Talib):

1) an unstable Northern Route from Teheran to Mosul in Iraq to Al-Hasakah in Syria and Tripoli in Lebanon, or de-routing on a north-east variant exit to Latakia in Syria (but both routes require "bribing" the non-interference of strong local Syrian and Iraqi Kurd forces);
2) a stronger Central Route from Teheran to Baghdad in Iraq to Al-Qaim at the border with Syria to Dayr az-Zawr in Syria to then southbound to Damascus and Beirut, or connecting to the north-east variant rout to Latakia in Syria (bypassing the Syrian Kurds choke-hold);
3) a still aspirational Southern Route from Teheran to Baghdad and Anbar Province in Iraq to U.S.-held Al-Tanf on the Syrian border to Damascus and Beirut, or connect from the Anbar Province to the Central Route alternative to reach Syria to Damascus and Beirut (see Map below).[2]

IRAN'S SHI'A ASPIRATIONAL "LAND-BRIDGES" IN THE MIDDLE EAST/GULF[3]



Consolidation of any of these three aspirational future Shi'a "land-bridges" westwards would complete Islamic Iran's politico-military and economic connection to the East Mediterranean with semi-"protectorates" over Shi'a-ruled Iraq (still unstable after the ISIL civil war with local Shi'as split between pro-Iranian and nationalist factions, plus U.S. units and strong Iraqi Kurds fuming at the loss of oil-rich historical Kurdish cities of Mosul and Kirkuk due to Iranian-sponsored Iraqi Shi'a attacks and U.S. inaction against Baghdad), over Assad Jr. Alawite Syria (still civil war-ravaged and contended by strong Syrian Kurd forces

[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-106; S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; M. Champion, "How Iran Pursues its Interests via Proxies Partners", idem; Ashley Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in Middle East" in *Wilson Center* (20 May 2021): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies; S. George Marano, "With China, Russia and Iran Waiting in the Wings, can America Really Leave Iraq?" in *South China Morning Post* (24 January 2022): https://apple.news/ADFSxwvH0SI-_9kSWdDrMyg

[2] S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-106.

[3] See Figure 3 map, courtesy of CSIS, of the three aspirational Shi'a "land-bridges" from Islamic Iran to Lebanon as shown in S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem.

fuming at U.S. inaction against Damascus, U.S. units holding local petrol installations near Al-Tanf, pro-Syrian Russian units, and hidden ISIL terrorist remnants in the north-east rebel Irbil Province) and to strengthen proxy-control over economically-collapsed Westernized Lebanon through Iran-loyalist *Hezbollah.* Teheran's regional Grand Strategy runs parallel with its cyclical attempts to threaten Israel and expel the U.S. from its currently sharply cut-back residual post-Second Gulf War bases in Iraq and Syria, while battling terrorist assaults by the Islamic State of Iraq & Levant-ISIL. Finally, in the east since at least 2019 (after the demise in Iraq and Syria of ISIL terrorist bases and consequent reduction of U.S. forces) Iran has opened a partial military-economic penetration of *Taliban*-held Sunni Afghanistan (on the verge of starvation), especially after the U.S. disastrous August 2021 withdrawal, while exploiting the parallel sectarian civil war in Yemen by backing local Shi'a *Houthis* (to seize power and seek to control the strategic Bab el-Mandab Strait to the Indian Ocean, while constraining Teheran's regional rivals—U.S.A., Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates).[1]

The IRGC-QF Partner Shi'a proxy-militias had first expanded surreptitiously since the 2003 Second Gulf War and U.S.-led invasion of Iraq destroyed the local totalitarian régime of Saddam Hussein, but this also eliminated its traditional role as a regional Power containing Islamic Iran. Thereafter, as the U.S.-led Coalition became unable to prevent Iran from secretly arming local Shi'a proxy-militias against Coalition peacekeepers, smuggle Improvised Explosives (IEDs) and influencing the Shi'a-dominated government in Baghdad to constrain the U.S. presence in the region. Then, after President Obama's December 2011 withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Iraq, contributed to a rise in Iranian political influence and IRGC-QF military assistance to fill the power-vacuum. Especially in Iraq, Iran's Shi'a proxy-militia *Kataib Hezbollah* launched numerous bloody attacks on U.S./Coalition peacekeepers in 2007-11 and 2018-20.

At the same time, the 2011-13 Arab Spring reformist grass-roots demonstrations weakened many Sunni Arab régimes and allowed Teheran to exploit politically the outbreak of civil wars and Islamist insurgencies in Syria (helping with Lebanon's *Hezbollah* to shore-up the collapsing Assad Jr. dictatorship by aiding local Shi'a militias and Russian air-strikes), in Yemen (supporting local *Houthi* forces seize the capital Sana'a in 2014) and in Iraq (fighting in cooperation with Iraqi forces and U.S.-Coalition militaries to defeat the sudden regional onslaught of the ISIL "Caliphate"). In this unstable regional political context, IRGC-QF proxy-militias rose in 2011-13 to a roughly 112,000-130,000 men, then after the 2013-16 dramatic take-over by the ISIL "Caliphate" of a third of Syria and Iraq the IRGC-QF Shi'a proxy-militias quickly redoubled to 135,000-169,000 men, then slowly re-stabilized in 2017-22 at 140,000-183,000 men after massive U.S. sanctions under U.S. President Trump had ravaged Islamic Iran's economy.[2]

This geo-political context is well explained in Zorri, Sadri & Ellis' book, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, while focusing in detail on key Shi'a armed militias and non-state Partner proxies in their relation with Islamic Iran, which the IRGC-*Quds* Force trained, equipped and fund throughout the Greater Middle East (Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Bahrein, Gaza Palestinian Territory, Afghanistan and Pakistan):

- **LEBANON**
  - *Hezbollah*, which the IRGC-*Quds* Force trains and arms since the early-1980s with budgets ($700 millions according to 2018 U.S. estimates), salaries, arms, old Soviet T-72 tanks, old U.S. M-113 armoured-personnel carriers (APCs), 122mm. *Katyusha* rocket-launchers, *Karrar* armed-drones (used against terrorist ISIL targets) and ballistic missiles (used against Israel and for trans-shipment to Gaza's Palestinian terrorist groups *Hamas* and Palestinian *Islamic Jihad*). In 2017, *Jane's* assessed over 25,000 *Hezbollah* fighters and 20,000–30,000 reservists, while 8,000 *Hezbollah* fighters fought in Syria's Civil War with large casualties. *Hezbollah* might also secretly have some left-over stockpiles in Syria of banned chemical weapons (Chlorine).

[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-106; J. Jarzabek, "Contemporary Praetorians in Middle East: Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards vs. Saudi Arabia's National Guard", idem, p.54-65; S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; K. Zraick, "What to Know on the Death of Iranian General Suleimani", idem.

[2] See Figure 2 Map in S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-26 & 97-116; Ashley Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in the Middle East" in *Wilson Center* (20 May 2021): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies

➢ **IRAQ**

In Iraq the *Hashd al-Sha'abi* Front, *Badr* Organization, *Kata'ib Hezbollah* and *Asaib Ahl al-Haq*, while also providing Iranian anti-tank guided-missiles (ATGMs), short-range ballistic missiles, old Soviet T-72 tanks, old U.S. M-113 armoured-personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, portable anti-air systems (MANPADS) and drones. Moreover, in Iraq during combat to retake areas captured by the terrorist ISIL, Iran's IRGC-*Quds* Force coordinated operations of Iraqi Shi'a militias and Iraqi military seized Tikrit, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tal Afar, Mosul (where Iran's IRGC-*Quds* Force led 10,000 Iraqi Shi'a fighters).

- *Hashd al-Sha'abi*, as an umbrella front of local Shi'a militias split into three rival groups below:
  - Shi'a Militias tied to Islamic Iran's Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Alí Khamenei:
    - *Badr* Brigade (armed wing of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Hakim's Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq-SCIRI, of which already in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War over 5,000 Shi'a Iraqi volunteers had died in Iran fighting under IRGC-*Quds* Force);
    - *Asaib Ahi al-Haq;*
    - *Kata'ib Hezbollah;*
    - *Kataeb Sayed al-Shuhada;*
    - *Harakat Hizbollah al-Ataba al-Nujaba.*
  - Shi'a Militias tied to Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Alí al-Sistani (with many fighters embedded since 2014 into Iraq's Security Forces):
    - *Sarayat al-Ataba al-Abbasiya;*
    - *Sarayat al-Ataba al-Huseiniya;*
    - *Sarayat al-Ataba al-Alawiya;*
    - *Liwa Alí al-Akbar.*
  - Shi'a Militias tied to Iraq's populist-nationalist Leader Muqtada al-Sadr:
    - *Sarayat al-Ataba al-Salam* (Peace Brigades)*;*
    - *Hashd* Brigade 313;
    - *Hashd* Brigade 314.[1]

➢ **SYRIA**

In Syria alongside a detachment of 8,000 Lebanese *Hezbollah,* Iran's 3,000-strong IRGC-*Quds* Force detachment trained, armed and funded local Shi'a militias numbering 100,000 fighters (it also planned the 2016 reconquest of Aleppo, coordinating with Assad Jr. régime and Russian aero-naval detachment strikes on civilian areas).

- *Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi Suria* (Islamic Resistance in Syria):
  - *Quwat al-Ridha;*
  - *Al-Ghaliboun: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi Suria;*
  - *Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir* (*Baqir* Brigade).

➢ **YEMEN**

- The *Houthis* or *Ansar Allah*, which the IRGC-*Quds* Force trains and arms since 2016 with sea-shipments to the Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports of Nishtun and Al-Ghayadh of Iranian weapons, sea-mines, anti-tank guided-missiles, unmanned explosive-boats, radars, 122mm. *Katyusha* rocket-launchers, portable anti-air systems (MANPADS), *Karrar* armed-drones, ballistic missiles (used against Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates as U.S. allies and Iranian enemies), as well as international shipping in the geo-strategic Bab el-Mandab Strait (between Yemen and Djibouti connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean) where 5 millions barrels of oil are shipped daily.[2]

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[1] See Charts of Shi'a proxy-militias in Lebanon and Iraq (p.29, 39, 46-47, 49 & 107-116) in D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.15-96 & 107-116; U.S. Congress, *Iranian-Backed Militias: Destabilizing the Middle East—Hearings,* Sub-Committee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation & Trade of Committee on Foreign Policy, House of Representatives, GPO n.115-64 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 4 October 2017); A. Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in Middle East", idem.

[2] See Charts of Shi'a proxy-militias in Syria (p.62) and Yemen (p.74 & 87) in D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.15-96 & 107-116; U.S. Congress, *Iranian-Backed Militias: Destabilizing the Middle East—Hearings,* idem; A. Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in Middle East", idem.

- **GREATER MIDDLE EAST/GULF**
  - **Bahrein**
    - Unknown Bahreini fighters, trained, armed and deployed to fight in Syria by the IRGC-*Quds* Force;
    - IRGC-*Quds* Force trained, armed and assisted Bahrein Shi'a proxy-groups seeking several times to overthrow Bahrein government (an ally the U.S., NATO and Saudi Arabia).
  - **Gaza Palestinian Territory**
    - *Hamas* Sunni terrorist group, which IRGC-*Quds* Force trains and arms with missiles against Israel;
    - *Islamic Jihad* Sunni terrorist group, trained and armed with missiles by IRGC-*Quds* Force against Israel.
  - **Pakistan**
    - *Zaynabiyoun* Brigade (2,000 fighters), trained, armed and deployed to fight in Syria by IRGC-*Quds* Force.
  - **Afghanistan**
    - *Fatemiyoun* Brigade with 10,000-15,000 Afghan fighters (from refugee camps and from Afghanistan), which the IRGC-*Quds* Force trained, armed and deployed to fight in Syria (Aleppo, Daraa, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Latakia, Palmyra and Dayr az Zawr);
    - *Taliban,* unreported number of fighters in Afghanistan.

- **GLOBAL**
  - **Asia**
    - IRGC-*Quds* Force operatives locally.
  - **Africa**
    - IRGC-*Quds* Force operatives locally.
  - **Latin America**
    - IRGC-*Quds* Force operatives locally.[1]

IRAN'S SHI'A PROXY-MILITIAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST/GULF[2]



[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-140; U.S. Congress, *Iranian-Backed Militias: Destabilizing Middle East—Hearings,* idem.

[2] Map of Iran's Shi'a proxy-militias in Middle East/Gulf, courtesy of U.S. Institute of Peace/W. Wilson Center, from: A. Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in Middle East", idem.

In this context, even the current Islamic Iran Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Alí Khamenei has finally publicly confirmed in 1990 that IRGC-*Quds* Force since its 1982 first successes in Lebanon has secretly striven to "establish popular *Hezbollah* cells all over the world." Islamic Iran's strengths are six:

1. Exploit and constantly exacerbate regional sources of tension and crisis to penetrate both anti-Western states (Syria) and once-controlled U.S./Western/Israeli ones (Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Gaza, Afghanistan) using its long-term institutional experience in managing and supplying with arms and funds Shi'a proxy-militias, while shaping them into multiple copies of the well-established Lebanese *Hezbollah* precursor as socio-politico-military proxy-militia clones;
2. propagandizing its common Shi'a religious identity (despite many hidden doctrinary fissures between Iranian Shi'a "Twelvers" and other Shi'a sects) and their revolutionary banner as religious groups oppressed by Sunni Muslim majorities, Christian U.S./West and Zionist Israel;
3. its "Principle-Agent" relationships and "Divide-Empower-Control" operational strategy to leverage international military-economic support of Shi'a proxy-militias and pro-Iranian governments in exchange for local politico-socio-economic leverage to control host-countries political parties and governments over the long-run;
4. presenting itself as a "reliable ally" to most regional terrorist groups fighting America, Israel and Saudi Arabia, compared to the revolving-door of U.S. politics and strategic ambivalence together with European irresolution;
5. flexibility to bankroll and support even aggrieved and isolated minor Sunni terrorist groups against their common Israeli enemy (*Hamas* and Palestinian *Islamic Jihad*), and even partially the ex-enemy *Taliban* in Afghanistan against U.S./Western interests
6. shore-up Teheran's tottering economy and defense posture against the U.S./West/Israel by leveraging growing economic-military-political ties with Russia and China to turn them into a buffer against any overwhelming international sanctions or U.S./Israeli conventional attacks, while seeking to trade symbolical arms-control negotiations with the West to buy vital time to build an independent national Iranian nuclear deterrent (to also assure total national autonomy, like in North Korea vs. any future interference by its Russo-Chinese "protectors").[1]

In conclusion, the six long-term vulnerabilities below can help undermine Islamic Iran and its IRGC-*Quds* Force as highlighted in Zorri, Sadri & Ellis' book on *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*. This is significant as the U.S. and NATO can exploit this book's findings to help undercut Teheran's destabilizing regional interference in the Middle East/Gulf:

1) Iran's tottering domestic economy weakened by U.S. sanctions on trade and oil exports;

2) Islamic Iran's over-extension of its military and financial aid in the region;

3) regional concern and opposition by most Sunni Arab states to Iran's penetration;

4) growing opposition within *Hezbollah* fighters to be redeployed abroad and die in large numbers in the Syrian Civil War on behalf of Islamic Iran's geo-political plotting, instead of fighting Israel;

5) existing popular opposition in Iran against so much treasure and arms funneled by IRGC-*Quds* Force to Syria ($16 billions in 2012-20 to the Assad Jr. régime and its Shi'a proxy-militias), Lebanon ($700 millions annually), Yemen, Iraq and Gaza ($100 millions annually), while Iran teeters on bankruptcy;[2]

6) the persistent deep politico-doctrinary divisions among disparate Shi'a religious communities over Islamic Iran's Clerical Rule system (*Velayat-e faqih*) and national governmental decision-making:

▸

[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-140; U.S. Congress, *Iranian-Backed Militias: Destabilizing Middle East—Hearings,* idem; S.G. Marano, "With China, Russia and Iran Waiting in the Wings, can America Really Leave Iraq?", idem.

[2] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-140; A. Lane, "Iran's Islamist Proxies in Middle East", idem.

- **Iran**'s population and leadership are overwhelmingly religious "Twelver"/*Imamiyya*) Shi'a, but this does not automatically guarantee total and permanent political control of the country for the Islamist clerical régime. Indeed, despite 45 years of clerical-revolutionary repression by the Grand Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei through the IRGC, the Islamist clerical régime has been unable to retain a solidly controlled majority-youth population within the "Twelver" Shi'a doctrine and IRGC revolutionary ideology, as shown by the 2010 and later protests outbursts during national elections. Further, anti-governmental and anti-IRGC domestic anger simmers, due to the dire national economic situation, corruption, economic control of energy and large sectors by the IRGC, as well as criticism of the exorbitant funds drained abroad to bolster Iran's politico-military influence in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, as well their Shi'a proxy-militias. Teheran's clerical régime has recently established military ties with Russia and economic ties also with China (as the two anti-Western Powers cooperate to penetrate the region), with the goal of expanding Iranian shipping of energy exports to China via a future Chinese-developed and controlled port on the geo-strategic Gulf/Strait of Hormuz trade-route (in parallel to the other ones China is developing in Pakistan near Karachi and in Burma/Myanmar, as well as leasing port facilities in Djibouti on the Red Sea/Indian Ocean/Bab el-Mandab trade-route).[1]
- In **Iraq** the pro-Iran religious "Twelver" Shi'a constitute just a large minority co-existing with other rival Shi'a groups split three-ways between rival political parties (Teheran-controlled pro-Iranian Shi'a Arabs vs. moderate Shi'a Arabs, anti-Iranian Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and the increasingly anti-Iranian nationalist-populist "Forward"/*Saairun* Front of the controversial "Red Mahdi" Moqtada al-Sadr), all competing with each other seeking to balance domestic politics, religious sects and changing rival leadership narratives. Indeed, it is the controversial nationalist-populist Moqtada al-Sadr who has recently emerged as both the spoiler and national mediator, who constantly shifted political alliances between Iran (when he feared U.S. hegemony) and then against Iran as a nationalist linking himself to the moderate local Grand Ayatollah Alí al-Sistani (when al-Sadr feared Teheran's unfettered total dominance). Thus, although the Iranian Shi'a proxy-militias and parties had won Iraq's 2006, 2010 and 2014 national elections, now after the 2018 victory on the terrorist ISIL "Caliphate" on Iraq and Syria, Teheran's "Divide-Empower-Control" strategy in Iraq backfired. On one side, both of Teheran's long-standing political heavy-weight Iraqi allies (*Dawa* and ISCI Parties) have split their domestic political allegiances: *Dawa* split its support between the ex-ruling parties led by ex-Premier Haider al-Abadi ("Victory Alliance") and ex-Premier Nouri al-Maliki ("State of Law"), while ISCI split its support between the Hadi al-Amiri (*Fatah* Alliance) and Ammar al-Hakim ("National Wisdom"), undermining Teheran's political "Principal-Agent" influence plans to have a pro-Iranian coalition government win under its new large *Fatah* Alliance (led by the key IRGC-QF Shi'a proxy-militias: *Badr/*"Shi'a Full Moon" Front of Al-Amiri with *Asaib Ahi al-Haq*, *Kata'ib Hezbollah*, *Saraya Khorasan* and Imam Alí Brigade). But the surprising first-place victory in the 2018 Iraqi elections of Moqtada al-Sadr's nationalist-populist *Saairun*/"Forward" (Sadrist Trend and Iraq Communist Party) has undermined Teheran's earlier "Principal-Agent" relationship and controls, leading to a futile spat of assassination attempts on al-Sadr's loyalists, who in-turn has replaced Iran's slipping influence with his own mediated Sadrist mixed-coalition nationalist government by Moqtada al-Sadr (*Saairun*/"Forward", Ayad Allawi's *Al-Wataniya, Saairun*/"Forward" and "Victory Alliance").[2]

[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.1-106.
[2] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.27-52 & 97-116.

- In **Syria** the pro-Iran religious "Twelver" Shi'a are only a tiny minority compared to the dominant Alawites. However, in the future no foreseeable political relationship change between Damascus and Teheran seems likely, given Damascus total dependency under the besieged and weakened Assad Jr. régime for its survival on the IRGC-*Quds* Force. Also any alternative governmental strengthening of ties between Syria with Russia (beyond the existing bilateral military control) or China (beyond future economic/trade discussions) remain largely symbolic and meaningless politically, because Moscow's finances are unable to sustain any post-conflict long-term vital economic growth (unless Russia might highly unlikely get the Syrian oil region controlled by U.S.-Kurd forces), while China is mostly interested in cornering and exploiting regional Gulf resources for Chinese economic growth, but Syria's oil-production remains both limited and still under complete control of the rival U.S.-Kurdish forces.[1]
- In **Lebanon** pro-Iran religious "Twelver" Shi'a are a minority in a country dominated by the historical Christian-Druze-Sunni religious split. Yet, the rise since 1982 of the pro-Iranian Shi'a proxy-militia and party *Hezbollah* has allowed Teheran to dominate Lebanese politics including terrorist assassinations of nationalist political leaders, while tying Lebanon to Syria and Iran for the foreseeable future as the Lebanese national economy collapses under corruption, economic crisis and poverty. As stated in June 2016 by *Hezbollah*'s leader Hassan Nasrallah: "*Hezbollah*'s budget, salaries, expenses, arms and missiles are coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Is this clear? … As long as Iran has money, we have money. Can we be any more frank about that?"[2]
- In **Yemen** the Zaydi "Fivers" dominant Shi'a religious sect, are followed by the *Ismaili*, while only a tiny minority is pro-Iran "Twelver" Shi'a. Thus, should an eventual future peace settlement be reached in Yemen (either more or less favourable to the *Houthis*, or if they are totally defeated), the *Houthis/Ansar Allah* might then choose to distance themselves from Islamic Iran to pursue more advantageous domestic and international politics. Yet, this is an optimistic scenario, given the intensity and length of Yemen's civil war, as well as the total isolation of the *Houthis* in the areas they control except for their ties to Iran. Thus, on one hand once the *Houthis* succeed in stemming-off the Saudi Arabia-led coalition intervention in Yemen and preventing the country's religious Sunni regimentation under the Saudi Islamic fundamentalist *Wahhabism,* then the *Houthis* would loosen their political dependence on Islamic Iran to avoid the opposite religious regimentation under the pro-Iran "Twelver" Shi'a. But on the other hand, the *Houthis*' strong anti-U.S., anti-Saudi and anti-Israeli posture which had cemented their alliance with Islamic Iran, will most likely gravitate towards a looser politico-economic allegiance to the nascent anti-Western coalition of Russia-China-Iran-Syria, thus further diluting Teheran's previously exclusive "Principal-Agent" relationship and "Divide-Empower-Control" strategy.[3]

In the end, Zorri, Sadri & Ellis' book stresses that to successfully contain Islamic Iran's constantly-exacerbated proxy-fights throughout the Middle-East/Gulf region requires an equally activist, consistent and strong U.S. counter-action in coordination with NATO/European Allies, Middle Eastern/Gulf states and Israel against the IRGC-QF destabilizing plans. The U.S. and West should distance themselves from the previous monopoly of counter-terrorism operations and focus more on the politico-diplomatic levers to confront and seek to ameliorate regional politico-economic grievances as much as possible to prevent dissatisfied local oppositions to resort to revolution against both their central governments' unjust policies and by political correlation also the U.S. seen as their external supporter. Of course, this is more easily said than done as the authors also agree, but it is clear from their book's findings that Islamic Iran's main source of international influence is in its ability to exploit regional crises and only as long as they continue, while its much-heralded religious Shi'a brotherhood might fall flat over pre-existing doctrinary fissures and nationalist resistance to becoming a permanent Iranian Islamist "protectorate" once the regional crisis or civil war is safely over.

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[1] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.53-70 & 97-106.

[2] Quote of *Hezbollah*'s leader Hassan Nasrallah from: S. Jones, "War by Proxy: Iran's Growing Footprint in Middle East", idem; D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.53-70 & 97-106.

[3] D.M. Zorri, H. Sadri & D.C. Ellis, *Iranian Proxy-Groups in Iraq, Syria & Yemen*, idem, p.71-106.

However, U.S./Western politico-diplomatic successes to contain Islamic Iran will likely continue to remain mixed (including any purported hope by President Biden to renew the Six-Party Iran nuclear arms deal cancelled by President Trump), since the 2008 hay-day of U.S. regional dominance, due to the ensuing revolving-door of weak U.S. Presidents and European irresolution to retain strong effective Western sanctions. Teheran remains flexible in its tactics and can always transcend its religious Shi'a identity-propaganda to continue existing IRGC-QF ties based on exchanges of arms, training and funds, as long as Iran's domestic repression and domestic economy remain functional over a restive population. Here Teheran's long-term goals, even in case of a successful future U.S./Western economico-politico-military containment of its regional penetration through Shi'a proxy-militias, is to continue its defiance short of an open military clash with the West and play global geopolitics to anchor Islamic Iran with Syria to the nascent anti-Western Russo-Chinese bloc, until the anticipated future date when a national nuclear deterrent will be ready and long-term oil/gas pipelines finally laid from Iran through Pakistan to China to secure continuous, stable revenues for the political and economic survival of its ruling clerical régime and IRGC/*Pasdaran*.[1] As Iran and Russia (as well as in her diplomatic practice also China) are master chess players in plotting their geo-strategic and geo-economic moves against the U.S./West to achieve their parallel dictatorial hegemonic interests, the U.S. better learn fast to up its game by responding consistently and aggressively against its now aligned opponents with its own Western strategy of inventive "tridimensional chess" from Star Trek![2]

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