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Florida Political Chronicle

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Florida Political Science Association

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**Peer-Reviewed Regional Scholarly Journal for Faculty, Students and
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JOIN FPSA: Membership see: www.fpsanet.com

The Florida Political Science Association is committed to promoting political science research, education and service throughout the State of Florida. Our Board of Officers represents the diverse educational opportunities available for higher education in Florida. From the University of West Florida in Pensacola to Florida International University and the University of Miami, our FPSA association spans the state bringing together political scientists at public and private institutions to network, to collaborate on research and to discuss innovative strategies in the classroom.

Join/Renew Membership in FPSA (Includes Annual Conference Registration): [CLICK HERE](#)

- Faculty: \$75 (includes membership fee & access to FPSA publications)
- Student: \$35 (includes membership fee & access to FPSA publications)

**PUBLICATIONS:
FLORIDA POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION**

Florida Political Chronicle

<http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.html>

The ***Florida Political Chronicle*** is the bi-annual peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Sciences Association, which encourages submissions from all discipline sub-fields.

Submission Guidelines on: <http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.htm>

Please contact FPSA journal's **Editor, Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D.** of Saint Leo University at marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu for Submissions and questions.

***The Political Scientist:
Newsletter of the Florida Political Sciences Association***

<http://www.fpsanet.com/political-scientist.html>

The Political Scientists newsletter is a semi-annual publication of the Florida Political Sciences Association. Please contact for information and Submission Guidelines to:

Newsletter Editor, Austin Trantham, Ph.D. of ***The Political Scientist*** of Saint Leo University at austin.trantham@saintleo.edu for Submissions.

See FPSA website: www.fpsanet.com





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Barry University, Miami, l Blumenfeld@barry.edu

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Saint Leo University, near-Tampa, Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu

Austin Trantham, Editor, The Political Scientist Newsletter of FPSA

Saint Leo University, near-Tampa, austin.trantham@saintleo.edu

Past FPSA President: Kelly McHugh, Florida Southern College, Lakeland, kmchugh@flsouthern.edu

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Judithanne Scourfield-McLauchlan (2021-2023), University South Florida-St. Petersburg, dr_ism@fulbrightmail.org

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Kelly McHugh (2023-2025), Florida Southern College, Lakeland, kmchugh@flsouthern.edu

Bradley Gardner (2023-2025), Bethune-Cookman University, gardnerb@cookman.edu



Call for Papers: Florida Political Science Association Annual Conference: Saturday, 22 April 2023 Stetson University, DeLand, Florida

Program Chair: Dr. Kelly McHugh
Florida Southern College, Lakeland
Phone: 1 (863) 680-4111
E-mail: kmchugh@flsouthern.edu

Arrangements Chair: Dr. David Hill
Stetson University, DeLand
Phone: 1 (386) 822-7010
E-mail: dhill@stetson.edu

The 2023 FPSA Annual Conference will be held on **Saturday 22 April** at **Stetson University** in **DeLand, Florida**. All information on conference program, driving directions, parking and hotels posted on FPSA website in **February 2023**.

PRE-REGISTRATION before Conference Day is \$75 for faculty and \$35 for students. All paper presenters, panel chairs and discussants please pre-register. **REGISTRATION AT CONFERENCE** is \$85 for faculty and \$40 for students. Registration includes conference, lunch and subscriptions to *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist Newsletter*.

➤ **PRE-REGISTER** on **NEW FPSA website**: www.fpsanet.com or www.fpsanet.com/annual-conference.html

Faculty, talented graduates and undergraduate students are strongly encouraged to submit papers. **Please send Paper Proposals to Section Chairs below by 15 February 2023. Accepted papers notified by 28 February 2023.** **Proposals must include:** Name, Institution, Rank (Faculty, graduate students, undergraduate students) or general public, Contact Information, Paper Title and Abstract of 150-to-250 words.

A **\$250 award** is given to **FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award** and a **\$200 award** to **FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award**, presented at the annual conference and **Award papers published in Florida Political Chronicle**.

Selected Faculty papers, plus all Best Award Papers and Runner-ups also **published in Florida Political Chronicle**.

Sections/Panels	Section Chairs	Contact Information
American National Politics	Austin Trantham Saint Leo University	austin.trantham@saintleo.edu 352-588-6313
Political Theory	Brian Kupfer Tallahassee Community College	brian.kupfer@tcc.fl.edu 850-201-9951
Public Policy & Public	Douglas Rivero St. Petersburg	rivero.douglas@spcollege.edu 727-394-6948
States & Local Governments	Sean Foreman Barry University	sforeman@barry.edu 305-899-4098
International Relations	Leah Blumenfeld Barry University	lblumenfeld@barry.edu 305-899-3386
Comparative Politics	Houman Sadri, IPAC & University of Central Florida	houman.sadri@ucf.edu 407-823-6023
Regional Security	Marco Rimanelli Saint Leo University	marco.rimanelli@saintleo.edu 352-588-8277
Roundtable: Teaching Political Science	Kelly A. McHugh Florida Southern College	kmchugh@flsouthern.edu 863-680-4111

Call for Submissions to the *Florida Political Chronicle* journal: <http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.htm>
Scholarly articles from past FPSA conferences are welcome as well as other papers not been previously published. Contact and submit papers to Editor Marco Rimanelli at Marco.Rimanelli@saintleo.edu for the peer-review process.

See the FPSA website for conference information and archives of the *Florida Political Chronicle* and *Political Scientist*: www.fpsanet.com

FPSA President's Message

by FPSA President Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D. (Barry University, Miami)

Greetings FPSA members and all interested readers!

Welcome to the latest edition of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol. 29, n. 1 (2022), once again presented under the leadership and direction of our esteemed editor, Dr. Marco Rimanelli of Saint Leo University. This edition features the awards for the Best Graduate Paper and Best Undergraduate Paper from our 2022 annual Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) conference, as well as other articles in issues of domestic and international importance as detailed below.

It is my distinct privilege to serve a third term as President of FPSA; our organization has met many challenges over the past few years, but I am happy to say that we have seen more ups than downs, and I am also grateful to my colleagues who have entrusted me with this position for yet another term. After the COVID-19 pandemic we have finally returned to an in-person annual FPSA conference in March 2022 at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona Beach, FL. Attendance was not as large as some of our previous annual conferences, but it was robust and enthusiastic. Presenters and organizers rose to the occasion, providing thoughtful discussion and a warm reception.

Academics and scholars throughout Florida are facing pressures from our state government to limit the scope and approach of their research, teaching and political participation as private citizens – especially those working in public institutions. In response to some of the controversy, the FPSA has issued a Statement on Academic Freedom, which is included in this issue (see p. 197). We stand in solidarity with all who are pursuing their academic interests and working to gain greater insight through their work. We support open dialogue on all subjects of concern to citizens in the State of Florida and elsewhere.

Questions of state authority and debates about racial and economic justice, voting, privacy, parental rights, as well as the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment will continue to capture the state's – and indeed the nation's – attention. As I have said here before, it seems there has been no crisis, issue, movement, or challenge of the recent past that has not affected or included Florida in some way. We are intimately intertwined with Presidential politics and the two-years national elections cycle. What role will the Florida Legislature's 2023 session and re-elected Governor Ron DeSantis (R) play? Responses to these questions will continue to encompass our research and our lives for the foreseeable future.

The members of FPSA are sure to present numerous and nuanced approaches to these challenges from a variety of perspectives at our next 2023 annual FPSA conference, for which we are diligently preparing. As scholars of politics in Florida, our work is both local and global; our members are engaged in research and writing across the board, which is reflected in the variety of articles for you to enjoy in this issue. More are sure to result from the 2023 FPSA Conference, taking place at Stetson University in DeLand, FL on Saturday 22 April. I expect also this annual conference will again highlight both a high level of discussion and a broad analysis of the 2022 Midterm and Florida Gubernatorial elections, as Florida continues to catch the headlines as our communities and elected officials grapple with the ongoing challenges as well as key topics in U.S. and international politics. I look forward to seeing everyone there!

I also invite you will get to know our organization through our publications, offered free to the public – both the *Florida Political Chronicle*, our scholarly peer-reviewed regional Journal, and *The Political Scientist*, our professional newsletter. Please contact me if you have any questions on the FPSA or wish to become involved in our work.

Sincerely,

Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D.

Associate-Professor Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D.

President Florida Political Science Association (FPSA)

Barry University, Miami

Editor's Introduction: FPSA Changes and Looking Forward

by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. (Saint Leo University & Fulbright Chair College of Europe-Bruges)

Dear FPSA Political Scientists and "Fellow-Travelers",

welcome to this new 200-pages Issue of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol.29, n.1 (2022), regional peer-reviewed scholarly journal of the Florida Political Science Association (FPSA) published on-line and in colour. All our [Current Issues](#) (2022-2023), [Recent Issues](#) (2009-2022) and [Archived Issues](#) (1989-2009) are free for access on the FPSA website with our **new URL domain**: <http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.html> and <http://www.fpsanet.com/> as a community resource for members, scholars, students and public interested in domestic and international affairs, as well as the FPSA work. Connections to both URLs is secure.

Since 2021 the *Florida Political Chronicle* has created a new section, [Books-Special Issues](#), to showcase our two books available free to the public and the interested teaching faculty in Florida:

- ❖ John Bertalan, *A Brief Introduction to Florida Government*, Special Issue-Book of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol. 29, n.2 (Fall 2022 updated to include the results of the 2022 Mid-term Elections), pages 100: <http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.htm>
- ❖ Marco Rimanelli, ed., *World War I and League of Nations Centennial, 1914-2019*, Special Issue-Book of the *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol.28, n.1 (Summer 2021), pages 351: <http://www.fpsanet.com/florida-political-chronicle.htm>

Since 2018, EBSCO Library collection of sources include also the *Florida Political Chronicle* and all its past issues as current references in library and university searches.

This new *Florida Political Chronicle* regular issue, vol.29, n.1 (Summer 2022) at 200 pages, welcomes readers to an introductory "FPSA President's Message" (p. 8-9) of our continuing renewed President of the Florida Political Science Association, Associate-Professor Leah H. Blumenfeld, Ph.D., of Barry University in Miami, discussing on changes at FPSA and the state of the Political Science Discipline, as well as announcing the future 2023 FPSA Annual Conference at Stetson University in DeLand, FL. This is followed by my own "Editor's Introduction" (p. 10-14) summarizing key contributions to this issue from 11 authors in 9 essays.

This issue also salutes the 2022 new FPSA Best Graduate Student Paper Award by Sara Belligoni, ABD and Graduate Teaching Assistant at School of Politics, Security & International Affairs from the University of Central Florida-Orlando with the essay, "Held in the Grip: Governing Institutions and Emergency Management Procedural Arrangements in the Cases of Florida and Puerto Rico", but committed for publication in a different journal. The 2022 Runner-up Best Graduate Paper was from Sarah Snowmann-Hollmann, ABD from the University of Florida-Gainesville with the essay, "Independence in Europe: Secessionist Party Rhetoric and the E.U. in a Post-BREXIT United Kingdom", also committed for publication in another journal. The 2022 new FPSA Best Undergraduate Student Paper Award was conferred to by Carlos Gonzalez, B.A., from the New College of Florida in Sarasota, with the essay, "Paving over Democracy: Relationship Between Highways and Voter Turnout in Florida", but also committed for publication in a different journal.

The first essay in this issue, "The Ombudsman Model to Improve Local Government in Canada: the City of Toronto as Case-Study" (p. 15-22) is by University President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D., of the University College of Cayman Islands. It discusses conflict-resolution in the public sector and local governments, focusing on Canada. The agenda of many local governments seeks to provide tools for citizens to bring forward complaints within governing and administrative systems to fairly and independently assess and resolve issues that are the subject of public complaints. Local governments seek to develop a transparent, fair and effective systematic approach to both resolve individual complaints and offer solutions to broadly improve public services. One specific method increasingly used to resolve public sector complaints is the Ombudsman, as analyzed in its use by the City of Toronto in Ontario, Canada.

The second essay in this issue, “Modern Genocide: China’s Uyghurs” (p. 23-29) by Assistant-Professor of Criminal Justice Joseph Cillo, J.D., of Saint Leo University, with the assistance of his three Saint Leo University Researcher-Assistants: Dylan Hair, 2023 B.A. in Criminal Justice & Homeland Security; Valentina Diaz, 2024 B.A. in Political Sciences; and Brian John, 2024 B.A. in Political Sciences. Dr. Cillo analyzes the current humanitarian and legal tragedy of the Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang province, who are ethnically targeted and terrorized by the Chinese Communist government that also labels them terrorists. Under the pretext of the Global War on Terrorism against Islamic Al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups, Beijing has implemented extreme surveillance, religious restrictions, forced labor and detention centers (labeled “vocational training centers”) all seeking to forcefully assimilate ethnic Turkic Uyghurs into a mono-lingual, mono-cultural Han Chinese way of life, while also having state-sponsored mass-migrations of Han Chinese into both the Xinjiang and Tibet ethnic minority provinces. The People’s Republic of China campaign to forcefully control both ethnic minorities and unify the nation under the ethnic-majority Han has led to the unjustified detention of millions of Uyghurs since 2017 and intense surveillance databases to eradicate their cultural identity and Muslim roots, portrayed as radical separatists undermining the national power of the Chinese Communist Party.

The third essay in this issue, “Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Response to Security Risks in South China Sea” (p. 30-42) by Assistant-Professor Eslam M. Omar, Ph.D., of Kentucky State University, examines Southeast Asia’s regional cooperation and integration in economics and collective security around the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1967, and its response to security risks in the South China Sea from China. ASEAN states adopted regional diplomatic and security cooperation on multiple fronts against threats from China. Beijing instead rejected ASEAN’s security regionalism and pushed for only bilateral negotiate territorial disputes with each ASEAN member-state over the South China Sea contentions, while pressing bilateral trade cooperation to increase the region’s dependency on China’s larger economy. Despite ASEAN’s member-states’ own reluctance, they were forced to embrace instead inclusive regionalism and strategic enhancement by adding key external Powers (United States, Japan and Australia) to deter and rebalance against China’s rising threats in Southeast Asia. In the end, balancing military power in international relations could be the only solution rather than old diplomatic initiatives.

Unprecedentedly, the fourth essay in this issue, “China, United States and South China Sea: Document Analysis and Observations” (p. 43-75) is also by Assistant-Professor Eslam M. Omar, Ph.D., of Kentucky State University. By using a thematic document analysis methodology through neo-Realist Theory, Dr. Omar expands his analysis of the South China Sea as the most disputed body of water on Earth with competing territorial penetrations by China against Viet-Nam, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, each claiming some of these waters and uninhabited islands. The presence of fishing resources, oil and natural gas incentivized since the 1970s regional rival claims within the context of larger geo-political struggles, resulting in military conflicts. Fighting over the islands in the South China Sea began in the closing years of the Second Viet-Nam War when China invaded the Paracel Islands of South Viet-Nam to deny these strategic islands to North Viet-Nam once Hanoi completed its take-over of South Viet-Nam in 1975. Thereafter, regional maritime military conflicts have continued, with China opposing each of the other disputants, mostly Taiwan, Philippines and Malaysia. China’s rising hegemonic activities in the region are met with diplomacy and deterring force from the United States, Japan and Australia whose coordinated Western national interests fill any regional Power-vacuum between China and claimant states, protecting Western oil companies and vital maritime trade routes in South East Asia. The state of the South China Sea is analyzed in several scenarios as they impact on U.S./Western vs. China relations.

The fifth essay, “Southern Strategy in the Sunshine State: Race-Based Political Appeals in Rick Scott’s and Donald Trump’s Florida Campaigns” (p. 76-100) by Liv Coleman, Ph.D. & Alayna Alaras, B.A. of the University of Tampa, Florida, examines historical and textual analyses of Florida political campaign themes, demographic trends and election outcomes that got Donald Trump elected President in 2016. Florida, a bell-

weather state for the nation, has experienced a steady influx of immigration over the last several decades and is projected to be majority-minority by the mid-21st Century, with political implications for this fast-changing state. Racial anxieties in Florida over a changing demographic composition that decenters the White population launched both Rick Scott's rise in his 2010 Gubernatorial Campaign and own Trump's rise in his 2016 Presidential Primary and General Election campaigns in Florida. Like in other countries when there is tension between ethnic majorities and minorities and when demographic numbers make the crucial difference for power and control, also in the U.S. and Florida these political campaign trends are now crucial.

The sixth essay in this issue, "NATO vs. Russia: from the USSR's Threat of World War III and Collapse to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, 1949-2023" (p. 101-147) by Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., Professor of Political Sciences & International Studies at Saint Leo University, analyzes the evolution of NATO security in the "Post-Cold War" (1990-2021) after 40+ years of defensive strategy against the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Warsaw Pact's Communist Satellites' ideologico-military expansionism in Europe. The collapse of Soviet-ruled East Europe/Balkans and the own USSR's disintegration in 15 states, followed by regional ethno-nationalist civil wars in the post-Communist Balkans (Yugoslavia) led the U.S./NATO to launch innovative security policies to stabilize Eastern Europe, Baltics, Balkans, Russia and ex-Soviet successor-states by extending NATO's Euro-Atlantic Collective regional security architecture, arms-control, democratic values and peaceful cooperation from the "Cold War" (1946-90) 16 Allies to today's 32 Allies and 30+ Partners. NATO first extended Western security architecture through interlocking regional Partnerships (NAC-C, European/EAPC, ex-Soviet, Mediterranean, Gulf and Strategic states), followed by 7 sequential NATO Enlargements ("Open Door") to East European/Balkans/Nordic Partners (1999, 2002-04, 2009, 2017, 2020, 2022-23), paralleled by European Union Enlargements (1995, 2002-07, 2013) and Association-Partners. Secondly, the U.S., NATO and E.U. invested 25 years (1990-2013) to also integrate a semi-democratic Russia into the West through arms-control, the highest level of NATO's Partnerships ("NATO+1"), joint NATO peacekeeping (1990s Bosnia and Kosovo Wars), anti-terrorism (2001-02 Second Afghan War), Western trade and Europe-Russia energy integration. However, since the late-1990s Russia has increasingly embraced virulent anti-Western/NATO, xenophobic, neo-nationalist rhetoric cementing Putin's hold on power. Putin instrumentally condemned NATO's Eastern expansions to Russia's borders and sabotaged the bilateral "NATO+1" Partnership to justify his pan-Slavic and neo-Russian imperialist agenda to split NATO and Europe (secret bribes of anti-E.U. politicians, Russian energy dependency), while isolating the U.S.A. at the U.N. (BRICS, Second Gulf War), Middle East and ex-Soviet Central Asia. Putin also used financially-rich Beijing to developed with Communist China a joint economico-security "protectorate" on ex-Soviet Central Asia (Collective Security Treaty Organization-CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization-SCO). Finally, Putin's frozen wars in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014) and East Ukraine/Donbas (2014-2021) sought to destabilize NATO as impotent to guarantee its Partners' security, isolate NATO-E.U. security and trade from their ex-Soviet Partners (Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine through CSTO, Shanghai-7), and divide Europe from a strategically drifting U.S. (Obama, Trump, Biden) with the blackmail of E.U. energy-dependency on Russia. Balkans security remains vulnerable to Russia's anti-Western strategy to undermine NATO's integration (opposing Alliance Enlargements in 1999-2020s, fostering Serbia's resentment on Kosovo, destabilizing Montenegro and Bosnia, opposing NATO's Missile Defense in Romania and Poland) and East Mediterranean (Russia's ambiguous ties with an ambivalent Turkey, penetration in Syria, naval drills with China and security cooperation with Islamic Iran). All this finally empowered Russia's 2022-23 disastrous invasion of Ukraine seeking to reunify most ex-Soviet states (Belarus', Ukraine, CSTO) in a neo-Russian Slavic empire fully aligned in trade, security and dictatorship with Communist China, Islamic Iran and Syria against the West, while supporting Beijing's own annexationist plans over pro-U.S. independent Taiwan. But Russia's failure in 2022 to quickly conquer Ukraine, or split Europe and NATO with her botched energy-blackmails, and horrendous war-crimes in Ukraine has sparked instead broad U.S.-Western sanctions and coordinated escalating military aid to Ukraine (2021-23: U.S.A. \$47 billions, plus \$15 billions by other NATO Allies), plus new NATO enlargements (Sweden and Finland, with NATO-E.U. Enlargement conditional future promise for Ukraine and Georgia), beefed-up NATO military defenses of its previously lightly armed "Eastern Flank" and Scandinavia, while decoupling Europe's energy dependency from Russia, and global "coupling" of Euro-Atlantic defenses vs. Russia to East Asia

Western security ("QUAD" and U.S.-Japan-South Korea) vs. Communist China's parallel imperialist expansionism against Taiwan, Japan and Philippines in this new era of "Global Strategic Confrontations" (2021-now).

The seventh essay in this issue, "License and Registration Please: Florida Sheriffs' Traffic Stop Policy" (p. 148-157) by James Cockerham, Ph.D., at Montreat College and Alexandra G. Cockerham, Ph.D., at Florida State University, discusses how traffic stops are the most common type of citizens vs. Police interactions, but are also the most fraught with uncertainty on both sides. Typical traffic stops have Police Officers approach the vehicle from the side and rear, while also seeking to uncover illicit materials. The authors compiled a unique data set of traffic stop procedures of every Florida county, examining their effect on citations, drug and weapons arrests. In Florida, only Alachua County has citizens ordered to exit vehicles and approach patrol cars when stopped so as to reduce uncertainties in traffic confrontations by offering Police a better line of vision, although this also limits Police pretext stops to uncover illicit materials.

The eighth essay in this issue, "Innovations at the Borders: Designing, Developing, Strategic Positioning and Branding Florida as Premier High-Tech Economy Hub for Latin America and Caribbeans" (p. 158-174) by Professor of Political Sciences Ufot B. Inamete, Ph.D., at Florida A&M University, uses a conceptual/theoretical framework with 12 variables to analyze the strategic positioning and branding of Florida as premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in Latin America (Central and South America) and Caribbean regions. This study also examines how the geographical location of Florida as a transnational bridge and the current excellent trade, economic and cultural ties that Florida has with countries in Latin America and the Caribbeans can help transform Florida into the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for Latin America and the Caribbeans.

The ninth essay in this issue, "A Woman of Power: the Leadership of Speaker Nancy Pelosi" (p. 175-192) is by Hannah Ferrell Anton, B.A. Honors from the University of Central Florida, who analyzes the Congressional Leadership of Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D, CA-12) from her first election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1987 to her rise as first female Speaker of the House since 2007. The author's B.A. Honors Thesis fills the research gap over the lack of academic literature devoted to the effectiveness of Pelosi's political leadership, while seeking to determine if Nancy Pelosi was an effective Speaker of the U.S. House, and has her effectiveness changed significantly over her term as Speaker in her ability to advance her caucus' legislation and retain her party's majority and power? This Honors Thesis uses 5 normative criteria framework developed by Ronald M. Peters and Cindy Simon Rosenthal to judge contemporary congressional leadership. This research concludes that while she has some effectiveness shortcomings, Pelosi remained an effective leader in style and process with few minor changes to account for the quickly evolving political environment her leadership confronted.

This issue showcases the Book Review: "The Challenge to NATO: Global Security and Atlantic Alliance" (p. 193-196) by Houman Sadri, Ph.D., Deputy-Director of the Information and Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida (UCF) and Associate-Professor of Political Sciences at UCF, as well as former FPSA President in 2012-2013.

Finally, this issue displays the Florida Political Science Association's "Statement of Support of Academic Freedom" (p. 197).

The two Back-Covers for the *Florida Political Chronicle*, traditionally highlight the institutional profile of current FPSA University Members:

- the first one (p. 198) covers Saint Leo University, near Tampa, founding institution for FPSA's *Florida Political Chronicle*;
- the second one (p. 199) portrays the Information & Policy Analysis Center (IPAC) of the University of Central Florida in Orlando as a valued FPSA sponsor, under IPAC's Deputy-Director Houman Sadri, Ph.D. who is also Associate-Professor at the University of Central Florida in Orlando (and ex-FPSA President in 2012-2013) who has generously funded the FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Award to meritorious candidates in 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 and 2022.

- Dr. Houman Sadri has reconfirmed IPAC's continued sponsorship of future FPSA Best Undergraduate Paper Awards.

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Thank you for your enduring trust in the *Florida Political Chronicle* ([Submission Guidelines](#) on p.8).

Most sincerely,

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The Ombudsman Model to Improve Local Government in Canada: the City of Toronto as Case-Study

by President Robert W. Robertson, Ph.D. (University College of Cayman Islands)

ABSTRACT: Conflict-resolution in the public sector is a topic that is always compelling on the agenda of many local governments. There is an interest in providing systems for citizens to bring forward complaints within governing and administrative systems to fairly and independently assess and resolve issues that are the subject of public complaints. A systematic approach that is transparent, fair and effective can both resolve individual complaints and more generally offer solutions to more broadly improve public services. One specific method increasingly used to resolve complaints in the public sector is that of the Ombudsman, and this case-study focuses on its use in the City of Toronto in Ontario, Canada.

Introduction

The increasing complexity of modern society has led to more uncertainty and in some cases conflict. As a result of the dynamic environment within which individuals and organizations operate there has been interest in developing conflict-resolution models that can complement the historical reliance on litigation to resolve local conflicts. Contemporary conflict-resolution processes outside the “normal” legal system are often called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) models. The key benefits of using ADR models include increased accessibility, appropriateness, equity, efficiency and effectiveness (Access to Justice Task-Force, Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, 2009).

As conflict increases of, the benefits ADR models are more attractive. However, there have been some concerns related to the widespread use of ADR models. For example, Gill, Creutzfeldt, Williams, O’Neill and Vivian (2017) in a report titled, *Confusion, Gaps and Overlaps: A Consumer Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution Between Consumers and Businesses*, highlight some concerns related to the rapid expansion of ADR models. Specifically, this rapid expansion has added a significant level of complexity for the average consumer with respect to the wide variety of processes in use; the current ADR landscape is not designed with consumer’s needs in mind; and, opportunities to improve ADR provisions are hampered by a lack of good quality data (Gill, Creutzfeldt, Williams, O’Neill & Vivian, 2017, p.6). One element of the ADR issue is to recognize that these models are part of a broader system that should be considered holistically. A specific ADR method that has seen an increasing interest globally is that of the Ombudsman “for which the now preferred terms are “Ombuds” or “Ombudsperson” (Palmer & Roberts, 2020, p.273). Essentially, the Ombudsman is designed to be an independent official, providing findings to complaints that are binding in practice, but not binding in law.

In the public sector, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that, “many countries are committed to designing and implementing open government initiatives and that they increasingly include a wide range of actors in these efforts in order to promote a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth” (OECD, 2017). Many of these initiatives include ADR opportunities such as the Ombudsman, and the OECD sees these initiatives as a method to improve citizen trust in governments. The OECD has advocated that the Ombudsman role as one that can

assist in improving the delivery of public services. Specifically, the OECD suggests that the “Ombudsman institutions (OI’s) act as the guardians of citizens’ rights and as a mediator between citizens and the public administration. While the very existence of such institutions is rooted in the notion of open government, the role they can play in promoting openness throughout the public administration has not been adequately recognized or exploited” (OECD, 2018). Trust in government is an important concept. The Pew Research Center (2021) notes that the level of trust in government within the U.S. has recently reached an all-time low. As a result, the promotion of the Ombudsman model by organizations such as the OECD is designed to build strong structural systems to enhance resolving conflicts between citizens and governments through mechanisms such as those related to ADR. By resolving citizen/government conflicts the OECD sees that an improvement in the level of trust in government will follow.

In summary, Alternative Dispute Resolution has seen increased attention due, in part, to the complexity of domestic and administrative citizen-government administrative conflicts with the need to address the volume of court related cases. In particular, many organizations in the public and private sector have seen benefits in adopting the Ombudsman model to assist in these types of domestic conflict-resolution functions.

History and Evolution of the Ombudsman Model

Palmer and Roberts (2011, p.275) trace the roots of the Ombudsman back to the Ancient Roman Era during which times, “Tribunes of the plebeians whose role was to intervene in the political process on behalf of ordinary citizens”. In Modern times, the Ombudsman ADR method has grown internationally since its 1809 formalization in legislation in Sweden. Essentially, the Ombudsman model was “created by the Parliament of Sweden to protect individual rights against the excesses of the bureaucracy” (United States Ombudsman Association, n.d.).

Currently, the Ombudsman model has been adapted and adopted in approximately 100 countries world-wide (International Ombudsman Institute, n.d.). The International Ombudsman Institute (IOI), is a global network organization established in 1978 representing over 200 professional Ombudsmen and women globally. The primary focus of IOI “is on good governance and capacity building, and IOI supporting its members in a three-fold way: training, research and regional subsidies for projects” (International Ombudsman Institute, n.d.).

The key elements of the Ombudsman model as outlined by the United States Ombudsman Association include: “a governmental office created by constitution, charter, legislation or ordinance; an office with the responsibility to receive and investigate complaints against governmental agencies; an office with freedom to investigate on its own motion; an office which may exercise full powers of investigation, to include access to all necessary information both testimonial and documentary; an office with the authority to criticize governmental agencies and officials within its jurisdiction and to recommend corrective action; an office with the power to issue public reports concerning its findings and recommendations; an office directed by an official of high stature who is guaranteed independence through a defined term of office and/or through appointment by other than the executive and/or through custom; is restricted from activities constituting a personal, professional, occupational or political conflicts of interest; is free to employ and remove assistants and to delegate administrative and investigative responsibility to those assistants” (United States Ombudsman Association, n.d.).

Although the notion of an Ombudsman being neutral is important, it is their knowledge of the bureaucratic systems within which they operate that is so important. Indeed, Rowe and Gadlin (2014, p.1) note that “the organizational Ombudsman is an “odd duck”—perhaps the only professional manager within an organization whose role does not include “representing” the organization. The Ombudsman shares with others a commitment to the mission and values of the organization: however, the loyalty of the Ombudsman to the organization has to be subservient to principles of fairness and impartiality”. It is

important that the Ombudsman recognize the duality of the role that they play—or are perceived to play—in an organization.

Finally, one aspect of the Ombudsman schemes that many suggest as important is related to using that administrative system to improve the organization. As the Ombudsman resolves individual conflicts there may be systemic issues that could be addressed on an organization-wide level. However, “the learning culture which surrounds learning from error is often compounded by the adoption of strategic routines used to pretend that learning has occurred when, in actuality there has been little understanding and/or a covering-up of mistakes in order to avoid embarrassment or threats (Gray & Williams, 2011, p.439). Having such a strategy in place to capitalize on the lessons-learned, or “quality improvement opportunities” identified through the Ombudsman’s dispute-resolution process can assist in ensuring that organizational learning is a reality.

In summary, the Ombudsman has a broad range of functions that they undertake on a confidential basis. Yet, it is also important to consider the functions that are not the responsibility of the Ombudsman as noted by the International Ombudsman Association. Specifically, Ombudsman functions undertaken include: “informal, neutral, confidential and independent positioning of an Ombudsman in an organization, they typically do not undertake the following roles or activities:

1. participate in formal investigations or play any role in a formal issue resolution process;
2. serve in any other organizational role that would compromise the neutrality of the Ombudsman role;
3. receive notice for the organization;
4. make binding decisions or mandate policies; and
5. create or maintain records or reports for the organization” (International Ombudsman Association, n.d.).

Palmer and Roberts (2020, p.273) note that the Ombudsman function is a “hybrid” of dispute-resolution methods that includes umpiring and elements of negotiation and mediation. Clearly, the global expansion of the Ombudsman function speaks to its utility from an organizational perspective.

The Ombudsman in Canada

Canada has a population of approximately 35 million and it includes 10 Provinces and three Territories. Politically, Canada is a federal bicameral parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, n.d.).

In Canada the Ombudsman model is relatively new as it was introduced in 1965 at Simon Fraser University. The expansion of the Ombudsman function quickly followed and between “1967 and by 1996 nine Provinces, one Territory and one Federal government department had legislated Ombudsman offices in place for the purpose of general administrative oversight” (Forum of Canadian Ombudsman, n.d.). In particular, many academic institutions, numerous corporations and a variety of government departments established Ombudsman functions. It is important to recognize that in the first decade of the 21st Century many new Ombudsman/person roles have been established by a wide variety of governments, as well as private and public sector organizations (Forum of Canadian Ombudsman, n.d.). In Canada, the Ombudsman role is generally established within the framework of three broad mandates:

1. “An Ombudsman may be established by provincial, territorial or federal legislation with strong powers of investigation and structural independence.
2. Ombudsman established by policy or terms of reference by both private and public sector organizations. They primarily use various forms of early resolution methods but may also have the power to investigate and the authority to publish annual and special reports.
3. Ombudsman established by corporate or organizational policy or terms of reference, which generally use only facilitative methods for assisting with the resolution of complaints” (Forum of Canadian Ombudsman, n.d.).

Fundamentally, the Canadian system suggests that an Ombudsman is established to assist in securing the fair and expeditious assessment and resolution of public complaints. These complaints must be addressed in a fair, neutral and confidential manner. All three of these elements are important in developing the trust of the complainant and securing an expeditious resolution to any issue generating conflicts between the parties. To ensure broad access to the services of the Ombudsman there is no charge associated with lodging a complaint—all services are free. Although the Ombudsman is most often employed by the organization which is subject of the complaint, the Ombudsman office must act independently and not as a representative of that organization.

Specifically, the role of the Ombudsman is to: “use informal methods of resolution for complaints using tools like mediation, negotiation and shuttle diplomacy; use of Inquiries and structured investigations to determine whether a complaint is founded along with the ability to make recommendations to correct unfair situations, both in individual cases and to address systemic issues; assistance with resolving complaints through advice, referral and discussion and by exploring available options; and looking for trends and patterns in complaints to identify and make recommendations to address potential systemic issues and seek system-wide improvements to influence positive changes” (Forum of Canadian Ombudsman, n.d.). It is important to recognize that conflict-resolution is only a part of the role of the Ombudsman. Looking to improve systems is also important and this can be one way to illustrate the tangible benefits of the work of an Ombudsman (see for example: Rowe, M., 2010, *Identifying and Communicating the Usefulness of Organizational Ombuds: With Ideas About OO Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness*).

The Ombudsman in Local Government in Canada

The responsibility and function of local government in Canada is varied and it differs across the country. Local governments in Canada are called “creatures of the Province” as they rely on legislative authority from individual provinces and territories that delegate specified powers and responsibilities (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, n.d.). In total, there are an estimated 3,598 local governments operating in Canada. Functionally, local governments and territories are responsible for, “the treatment of drinking water and wastewater, the construction and maintenance of local roads, the collection and disposal of waste, the protection of persons and property (Police, Fire-protection), the planning and development of land use, public transit, economic development services, recreational and cultural facilities. Funding for local government includes transfers from senior levels of government called transfer grants often designated for specific projects or programs; permits and fees, and property taxes” (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, n.d.).

The Province of Ontario relies on an Ombudsman office in the Provincial structure to “promote fairness, accountability and transparency in the public sector by investigating public complaints and systemic issues within his jurisdiction” (Ombudsman Ontario, n.d.).

Ontario’s Provincial Ombudsman is precluded from “overturning decisions of elected officials or direct them on public policy; replacing or redoing the work of local integrity commissioners or ombudsmen (once they have completed their work, we can review the process they followed); and, taking complaints about matters within the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto Ombudsman” (Ombudsman Ontario, n.d.). In the five-year period 2006-2021 the office of Ombudsman in Ontario dealt with 14,371 complaints with respect to the 444 municipalities in the Province (Ombudsman Ontario, n.d.). During the year 2020-2021, the Ombudsman office dealt with an escalation of 20,015 cases in just that year. Most cases (58%) were received by e-mail; 31% were received by phone; and 11% by fax. Yet, 50% of cases filed were closed within two weeks. The Ombudsman noted an overall year-to-year decrease in cases due to restrictions around transacting business during COVID-19 lockdowns. Other trends of note included increased cases with respect to long-term care facilities, the rights of young people, language rights, issues related to

Police procedures specifically after the Black Lives Matter movement, and the rights of indigenous people (Ombudsman Ontario, Annual Report, 2021, p.7).

The Case of the City of Toronto Ombudsman

The City of Toronto in Ontario is the largest city in Canada and the fourth largest city in North America with a population of 2.9 million residents. The budget for the City of Toronto is 13.98 billion (CDN) supporting services such as emergency services (15%); social programs (23%); transit and transportation (19%); park and library (17%); water, solid waste and parking (14%); capital finance (6%); and government and internal services (6%) (City of Toronto, n.d.).

The Ombudsman function was created in 2006 by the Province of Ontario, which adopted the 2006 City of Toronto Act, formalizing the role and function of an Ombudsman. This legislation was a part of an independent Accountability Framework for the City with its four specific offices:

“Auditor General, which deals with fraud and waste; Office of Integrity Commissioner, which deals with the conduct of elected officials; Office of the Lobbyist Registrar, which ensures transparency in lobbying of public officials; Ombudsman Toronto, which deals with administrative fairness which ensures transparency in lobbying of public officials (officially opened in 2009); and, Ombudsman Toronto, which deals with administrative fairness” (Ombudsman of Toronto, n.d.).

In terms of the Ombudsman, the legal mandate and specific powers are established “...in sections 170 to 176 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 and Chapter 3 of the Toronto Municipal Code” (Ombudsman of Toronto, n.d.). The Act provides that the Ombudsman is established as an independent Officer of the City Council, and, as a result the Ombudsman reports to and is accountable directly to the elected City Council. Structurally, the office of the Ombudsman operates independently from the bureaucracy of the City which includes having control over developing the budget and resource allocations, staffing decisions and operational procedures and processes.

Based on the legal mandate, the role of the Ombudsman is to “to investigate any decision or recommendation made, or any act done or not done, in administration of the City, its agencies, boards and commissions” (Ombudsman of Toronto, n.d.). On a practical level, the Ombudsman investigates decisions made administratively by city officials. In addition, the Ombudsman is charged with the investigation of acts and omissions related to the machinery of that City that may be perceived as: “...unjust or discriminatory and systems that serve the public poorly” (Ombudsman of Toronto, n.d.). The Ombudsman of Toronto operates using the “principles of administrative law. All people have a right to a fair process, a fair outcome and fair treatment when dealing with their City government” (Ombudsman of Toronto, 2020). The Office of the Ombudsman has a budget of \$2.2 million (CDN) and it employs 14 individuals. The Office reports directly to the City Council as opposed to reporting to the City Manager, which is the traditional structural alignment within local government. The 2,429 cases handled in 2020 represents an increase of 4.7% from the previous year and 85% of all cases are closed within 30 days (Ombudsman of Toronto, 2020). In 2020 there were three key frequent complaint topic areas: “Toronto Community Housing Corporation including maintenance functions, transfers (between units), and neighbour issues; Municipal Licensing and Standards including property standards and noise; and COVID-19 Orders and By-laws” (Ombudsman of Toronto, 2020).

In addition, city council has recently added to the mandate of the Toronto Ombudsman function. Specifically, in April 2021 council unanimously authorized a memorandum of understanding “...giving the Toronto Ombudsman authority to review the fairness of Toronto Police procedures and programs. This is a ground-breaking step in independent, local police accountability on behalf of the people of Toronto, says Ombudsman Susan Opler. It comes at a critically-important time, when public trust in police and policing institutions is low and calls for policing reform echo nationwide” (International Ombudsman Institute, 2021).

One of the key outcomes that an Ombudsman is designed to achieve is related to improving processes and procedures in government operations. In the case of Toronto, the Ombudsman has actively been engaged in developing improvements with respect to specific services. For example, the Ombudsman initiated a review of the 2020-22 COVID-19 pandemic communications to the public with a view to ensuring the clarity and effectiveness of these communiques. Similarly, long term, city-owned, care homes were the subject of administrative reviews related to testing for COVID-19 and accelerating pandemic responses in these facilities. In municipal housing, a process was created to assist tenants with respect to their eventual moving costs if required to move to an alternate unit and a communication standard was developed for housing complaints. Also, the City's Senior Services and Long-Term Care division was guided in the creation of an instructional video on how residents and staff of these facilities can raise complaints.

The Ombudsman office also recommended a call help line to answer the many questions from citizens related to property tax. Likewise, court services were encouraged to improve their public messaging to provide pathways for individuals interested in challenging tickets issued to enforce COVID-19 rules. The Ombudsman office worked with transit Police to have proper procedures developed to effectively serve customers with mental illness. Another area that the Ombudsman assisted a city department to improve was related to public works and Winter maintenance. The Ombudsman recommended a detailed public communication plan that explains the timing and differences of service levels related to snow removal. A key citizen concern related to the expectation of service and improved communication was designed to better explain the expected service. Overall, the Ombudsman was prepared to assist individual city departments to assess and improve services to reduce customer complaints.

Finally, it is important to assess the effectiveness of the Ombudsman office. A report by Siemiatycki, M.; Noack, A.; Kane, J.; Valade, M.; J. Crean, F.; Lim, A. & Cook, G. (2015, p.3) notes that "there was some criticism about the work of the Toronto Ombudsman, but it was largely outweighed by the positive feedback. The Toronto Ombudsman has improved public administration by promoting a people-centred approach to government and advancing equity and fairness in the delivery of services to the public." In particular, survey respondents and interviewees highlighted the fact that the Ombudsman office does provide citizens with a valuable process which allows for an independent and arm's length review of decision-making processes and outcomes. Also, respondents suggest that the Toronto Ombudsman has provided mechanisms to improve communication linkages between the government and the public.

In addition to assessing the status of the Toronto Ombudsman, Siemiatycki et al (2015) provide an evaluation framework to capture key data and report on operational trends. For example, capturing key data, surveys and focus groups are encouraged by the authors as a component of producing an annual report which has been adopted by the Ombudsman.

Conclusion

Conflict is a pervasive aspect of the day-to-day operations of organizations in the private and public sectors. There have been numerous systems developed over time to minimize and resolve domestic administrative conflicts. Initially, a legal framework afforded a systematic process to address these conflicts. More recently, alternative dispute-resolution measures have developed and expanded globally. Many of these models are often used as a specific system improvement opportunity. In the case of the Ombudsman model it was specifically designed in the public sector in Sweden to serve as a type of intermediary between the citizens and their government. The intention was to have a neutral third party that could assist in finding "common ground" between those governing and those being governed. The success of this initial scheme led to the widespread adoption of the model in many other countries. In addition, the Ombudsman model has been adapted and adopted by the private sector.

The increased complexity of organizational dynamics has focused attention on the need to have a formal system to address and resolve citizen-government administrative conflicts. The Ombudsman

model appears to have gained significant support in achieving the goals of making governments more responsive to concerns and complaints of citizens. In this case-study on the City of Toronto in Ontario, Canada, its Ombudsman office continues to see a rise in the number of formal complaints. Also, the role of the Ombudsman office expands as directed by the City Council. The recent approval of a full review of the local Police service is an example of the expansion of the functions of the Ombudsman office. The importance of transparency, independence and fairness as provided by the Ombudsman office will continue to assist in resolving conflict in the delivery of public services, including local governments like in the City of Toronto in Ontario, Canada.

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Modern Genocide: China's Uyghurs

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ABSTRACT: The Uyghur's in China's Xinjiang province are ethnically terrorized by the government that seeks to label them as terrorist themselves. A mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking ethnic group the Uyghurs are forced to culturally assimilate to the state sponsored mass migration of Han Chinese into the region. Labeled as part of China's Global War on Terrorism, the government has implemented extreme surveillance, religious restrictions, forced labor and detention centers that are labeled as "vocational training centers" all aimed to forcefully assimilate the Uyghurs into a mono-lingual mono-cultural way of life. The People's Republic of China aim is to unify their nation by transforming the Turkic minority Xinjiang province into an integral part of China. The Chinese Communist Party's campaign to forcefully control ethnic minorities within the country has led to the unjustified detention of millions of Uyghurs since 2017. The Chinese government view the Uyghur ethnic group as a radical separatist group that undermine the power and unity of the Chinese Communist Party. China is repressing the Uyghur's cultural identity in order to successfully eradicate any trace of the Uyghur's Muslim origins and roots. The Chinese government has implemented intense surveillance databases that keeps Uyghurs Biometric data to generate a randomized list of "suspicious people" or Uyghurs deemed to poses threats to the government.

Introduction

The Muslim Turkic Uyghur minority living in the Xinjiang Province of China have been systematically persecuted since 2016 by Beijing because of their perceived religious, ethnic, cultural and political differences with the Han Chinese national majority. The battle between the Uyghurs' Islamic ideology and the Han Chinese ideology has been long fought throughout the history of China. Only briefly gaining independence from China for two times, the Uyghurs were re-absorbed into the Communist Popular Republic of China in late-1949. From that moment forward the Uyghurs faced the issue of assimilating into the Han culture and dealing with the state-sponsored mass migration of Han Chinese into both Tibet and Xinjiang Provinces to dilute these two troublesome ethnic minorities. Consequently, there have been many armed separatist forces present in the Uyghur movement of independence, like the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan.¹

Due to the already tense history between the Chinese government and the Uyghurs, the interactions between both cultures have clashed on many occasions leading to conflicts and attacks on both parties. The Chinese Government officially initiated their Global War on Terrorism in 2017 and began to forcefully monitor the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Chinese have blamed many of the unrests and protests that have occurred throughout the country on the Uyghurs since they are viewed as the outcasts in the nation. Which led to the Chinese government launching an official anti-terrorism initiative within China focused on the three evils of separatism, religious extremism and international terrorism. The Communist Chinese party that controls the nation has claimed that there is a danger to the cultural identity that the Uyghurs represent and practice and could lead to the death of many Chinese citizens. President Xi Jinping during a campaign rally throughout the country to discuss the nation's security policies on terrorism, stopped in Urumqi the capital of the Xinjiang Province and stated that there was a "toxicity of religious extremism" present. While visiting Urumqi there was a knife and bombing attack that left 3 dead and 79 injured after President Xi

¹ Encyclopædia Britannica (n.d.). "Uyghur" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Uyghur>

Jinping began to talk about the front line of terrorism that was being seen for previous years, which was known as the Xinjiang Conflict. The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) claimed responsibility for Urumqi terrorist attack, which further built tensions and problems between the Chinese Government and local Uyghurs.¹

With each year the Chinese Government has increased and intensified their control and eradication of the Uyghurs since 2019. There is a natural difference between the customs of the Uyghurs and Han Chinese because the Uyghur ideology derives from the Qu’ran Islamic religious text, which outlines their religious practices, beliefs and laws they must follow. Since the Islamic Law found in the Qur’an that the Uyghurs must follow, they cannot accept the laws of the Chinese Government as their own. The Chinese government view the Qu’ran as an extremist threat to their way of life and culture because of the dangers that they see within Islam of religious extremism. The Communist People’s Republic of China is atheist, thus viewing Uyghur religious practices and doctrine as a threat to their own beliefs.

By the same token, China wants to transform the Xinjiang Province from a frontier region to an integral province of a “Unitary” Chinese state. To do that the government has transformed this province into a surveillance Police-state to be able to control the Uyghur people. By collecting fingerprints and facial recognition, while also being assisted with Police checkpoints throughout local cities, all of their information is stored on a database that generates a list of “suspicious people” that must be detained and brought to a reeducation camp. The Uyghurs have no rights and can be just detained if deemed too suspicious or radical for even looking a certain way (“racial profiling”). They have implemented biometric surveillance data that is now kept identifying the threat the Uyghurs possess if they grow their beard too long or frequently visit mosques. By now having intense surveillance of the Uyghurs, they are trying to forcefully assimilate them into a mono-lingual mono-cultural way of life by detaining them and keeping them in mass-detention camps. These re-education camps in Xinjiang are just detention centers where the Uyghurs are forced to denounce their religion, their God and practice Chinese beliefs. In the Chinese propaganda the detention camps are labeled as “vocational training centers” where instead of furthering professional opportunities for the Uyghurs, they are forced to learn Mandarin language, eat pork and drink alcohol (both prohibited in Islam) and sing Chinese patriotic songs. This is part of the indoctrination that the Chinese government is subjecting the Uyghurs for the purpose of removing the extremist threat that such ethnic religious minority represents. Since the Uyghurs follow Islamic law outlined by the Qu’ran it directly clashes with the atheist beliefs of the Han Chinese Communists and their Confucian traditions.²



¹ Council on Foreign Relations (n.d.). *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved March 2022 from <https://www.cfr.org/background/Chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang>

² Council on Foreign Relations. *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, idem; *China's Uyghur Internment Camps Turn to Forced Labor*. *FreedomUnited.org* (23 November 2020): https://www.freedomunited.org/news/chinas-uyghur-internment-camps-turn-to-forced-labor/?gclid=CjwKCAiAg6yRBhBNEiwAeVvL0MPGVRYC22INxZCDqbxWBAAnPJZOaf0GJ0GlfJGSgN65c40uVscsfxc0-n8QAvD_BwE ; Council on Foreign Relations (n.d.). *China's Police State: The Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://www.cfr.org/event/chinas-police-state-human-rights-crisis-xinjiang-0>

Furthermore, the Chinese surveillance does not end within the Xinjiang Province, but extends to those Uyghurs that have traveled outside of China to receive a Western education. The government keeps surveillance on all those that leave and when they come back are sent into the re-education camps and interrogated for hours on their beliefs and their whereabouts. Other countries (like Turkey and Pakistan) are pressured to repatriate Uyghurs residing in their countries back to China. The Chinese Government attacks Islam's religious culture by burning Mosques claiming that they are too unsafe for people to use, condemning fasting during Ramadan as an extremist ideology and prohibiting names based on Islamic culture.¹

Tibet's Complicated Relationship with China

Since the 7th Century China has claimed that Tibet is part of their empire, however Tibet has not always agreed. Throughout history, there have been uprisings by the Tibetan people against their Chinese oppressors and to this day Tibet's legal status remains up for interpretation. Since 1949-50, the Communist People's Republic of China claims Tibet to be a part of China and has severely repressed local rebellions, while denying the politico-spiritual authority of the Dalai Lama, however the Tibetan government in exile claims that Tibet remains an independent nation unlawfully occupied and oppressed by its mighty neighbor. China's long-term repression of the Tibetan minority and forced Han Chinese mass migrations into the Tibet Province to dilute its ethnic minority has provided the original blueprint for later more massive repressive interventions into the neighboring Xinjiang Province against its Turkic minority.



Xinjiang: Home of the Uyghurs in China

In the Northwest region of China lies Xinjiang Province, previously known as East Turkistan, which is home of about 11 million Uyghurs, and is surrounded in Central Asia by the neighboring Turkic Muslim countries of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to the late Saint Leo University *Professor Emeritus* of History Jack McTague, Ph.D., who was one of few Americans who visited East Kazakhstan/Xinjiang to study the Silk Road, the Uyghurs lived in that region over 1,000 years before China annexed it for the first time in the mid-1700s. Since the Middle-Ages, East Kazakhstan had significant cities that were important trade hubs from the Silk Road from Asia to the Middle East. Like Tibet, East Turkistan/Xinjiang is considered a vital, strategic link for China's economic land trade routes leading to different Central Asian countries. Thus, after Mao Zedong's Communist People's Republic of China seized power over the 'Mainland' in late-1949, the Communist Chinese re-conquered independent East Turkistan/Xinjiang. China sought full control of these regions and full submission, or elimination of these regions' ethnic minorities to reach their end goal to make Xinjiang Province part of Chinese President Xi

¹ Council on Foreign Relations. *China's Police State: Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang*, idem.

Jinping's economic master plan, known as the 'Belt and Road Initiative'. This is a series of roadways and railways connecting China's infrastructure directly to the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa. So China's need to use Xinjiang Province for Xi Jinping's 'Belt and Road Initiative' means that any opposition in the region to the Chinese Communist Party must be put down swiftly and decisively.¹

The Uyghur people are of Turkic descent, majority Muslim and speak their own Turkic-related language. The Uyghur people make up about half of Xinjiang Province's population, but that number is rapidly decreasing due to the Chinese Communist government, which has been promoting a mass migration of large numbers of Han Chinese people to the Xinjiang Province to disrupt and dilute the Uyghur people's grip on the region. The Uyghur people being practicing Muslims do not believe that they are subjected to Chinese Communist law, but instead to the Qu'ran Islamic religious dictates. The Uyghurs further believe that Xinjiang Province is both their ancestral homeland and their own independent nation called East Turkistan, and not a Chinese province. For these reasons, the Uyghurs have always opposed Chinese rule, exploitation and occupation of their own sovereign homeland. On multiple instances there have been Uyghur terrorist attacks, that have led to the Chinese government in turn exploiting these small and isolated incidents to mount ruthless and violent actions against all Uyghurs throughout China.²

2016: Beginning of the Uyghur Genocide

Since late-2016, under the guise of 'counter-terrorism action' China's government began an extremely aggressive campaign to destroy the Uyghur people and their way of life. China's goal against the Uyghurs is not only cultural genocide, but a full-blown genocide of the Uyghur people in their entirety. From late-2016 to 2017, China's security forces have been deployed in staggering high numbers into the Xinjiang Province. Chinese officials claimed this to be a 'long-term counter-terrorism operation'. Chinese security forces installed facial recognition cameras every few feet in public spaces and set up check-points every few hundred yards to pat down and check vehicles and belongings of people who 'appear to be Uyghur'. A Chinese security forces officer is assigned to each Uyghur family home and will conduct random checks of the premises at any time for any Muslim religious material, weapons, anti-Chinese, anti-Communist, or anti-Xi Jinping material. Possession of any of those items is considered to be a criminal offence. Additionally, every Uyghur in Xinjiang Province is tracked by the Chinese security forces "24/7" utilizing their cellular data to track them. Indeed, Chinese official reports claim that since 2014, Xinjiang authorities have "destroyed 1,588 violent and terrorist gangs, arrested 12,995 terrorists, seized 2,052 explosive devices, punished 30,645 people for 4,858 illegal religious activities and confiscated 345,229 copies of illegal religious materials."³



¹ Interview of Saint Leo University late-Professor Emeritus of History Jack McTague, Ph.D., in Mariana Navarrete, "China's Repression of the Uyghurs", in *Lions' Pride*, Saint Leo University Student Paper (27 October 2020): <https://lionsprideonline.com/?p=9868>

² Council on Foreign Relations. *China's Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, idem; *China's Uyghur Internment Camps Turn to Forced Labor*, idem; Council on Foreign Relations. *China's Police State: Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang*, idem.

³ M. Navarrete, "China's Repression of the Uyghurs", idem.

At the same time, the World Uyghur Congress claims that an estimated 1.5 million Uyghurs have been forcibly taken from their homes and sent to Chinese government detention facilities, all without a warrant, evidence of a crime, or any other legal proceedings of any kind. At any moment, any Uyghur person can be taken arbitrarily by Chinese forces, never to be seen again. From 2017 to 2019 an estimated 500 Uyghur detention facilities were built in Xinjiang Province and in provinces surrounding Xinjiang. Once China's modern day concentration camps were built and staffed, they began to be filled with modern day victims of genocide, the Uyghur people.¹



The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, via a chain of exiled Uyghurs, released several telegrams from the Communist Party commission in charge of Xinjiang's security apparatus with an operations manual for running these detention camps as a counter-terrorism tactic, while their main objective is to promote long-term pro-Communist socio-political stability in Xinjiang. Instead, the Chinese government's goal is to eliminate the Uyghurs' way of life. In these Chinese detention facilities Uyghur detainees are brainwashed with Chinese Communist propaganda and tortured into denouncing their Muslim faith and Uyghur roots with daily studies of Mandarin language, Chinese law and practical skills. Thus, China's government claims that these detention facilities are voluntary vocational schools and learning centers. This is despite the barbed wire fences, sniper towers, hundreds of armed guards and secret drone surveillance footage showing hundreds of Uyghur people handcuffed on their knees in the courtyards of these facilities. Some former detainees of these camps have claimed to have been raped by other prisoners at the order of the guards, forcibly sterilized, forced to abort babies if pregnant, tortured, starved, beaten and forced into slave labor in these camps. Forced abortions of pregnant Uyghur women and forced sterilization is used to keep the Uyghur population from growing. Other claims of detainees dying from torture or starvation have also surfaced.²

These claims gained further legitimacy when a Chinese state Police officer who goes by the name of Jiang came out as a whistle-blower. As a Chinese state Police officer, Jiang worked in Uyghur detention facilities and his claims are truly disturbing, but his legitimate first-hand experience and evidence only further helps legitimize these claims of torture by former detainees. Jiang fled China to an undisclosed European country, and under the *alias* (cover-name) "Jiang", contacted American media outlets, trying to come forward with the truth of the Uyghur camps. *CNN News* received the exclusive interview with Jiang in which he provided his Chinese police credentials, legitimizing his statements. Jiang had undeniable proof of torture, rape, sterilization, starvation and slave labor at Uyghur detention facilities. He even admitted to participating in the torture and brainwashing of many Uyghur people, while he worked in the

¹ M. Navarrete, "China's Repression of the Uyghurs", *idem*.

² U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (n.d.). *Chinese Persecution of the Uyghurs*. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: <https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/china/case-study/current-risks/chinese-persecution-of-the-uyghurs>

detention camps. Jiang stated that torture tactics were used to make a Uyghur detainee admit to having committed a crime. Jiang said every new inmate in of these camps is beaten and tortured upon arrival to the internment camps in order to ensure physical and psychological suffering. Jiang is speaking up now because he wants the truth to finally come to light.¹

When Uyghur detainees are taken to camps, their children are taken to Uyghur Kindergartens, where they will remain living in until adulthood. These ‘*Kindergartens*’ are another type of Uyghur detention facilities, but for children. Also the aim of these ‘*Kindergartens*’ is to indoctrinate and brainwash these children since a young age, in order for them to grow up not knowing their Uyghur roots and becoming entirely mentally conditioned to be a productive part of the Chinese communist state system. After all Uyghur “students” are eventually released, they still must remain in sight of Chinese authorities for at least one year to make sure that their performance and re-establishment in the Chinese society has excelled and they have not been involved in any act of terrorism.²

Yet, beyond the elimination of a troublesome and unreliable religious minority there are other reasons for Beijing’s repression of the Uyghurs. “The economic growth of Xinjiang is slow, and is mostly based on exploiting coal, hence the Chinese government needs control of the coal, and the ‘politically unreliable’ Uyghurs are in the way, while at the same time Communist China is also expanding in that region its land-based silos of anti-U.S. nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)”, according to Saint Leo University Professor of International Studies Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D. But while Western countries accuse China of human rights abuse, Muslim countries remain silent because China has strategically expanded its economic and political influence in many other countries through abundant easy loans of billions of Dollars in Chinese investments through its “Belt and Road” infrastructure program, as well as targeted corruption of many local political leaders and businesses. Thus, by lending investment funds to so many countries China has recently become an active, influential voice at the United Nations. Indeed, in contrast to Western criticism, 37 countries including Russia and Saudi Arabia have written to the U.N. supporting China’s repression policies in its region of Xinjiang, according to a copy of the letter revealed by *Reuters* in 2019.³

For the Uyghurs their loss of freedom in China has left them with a total loss of hope. Thus, several thousand Uyghur men, women and children have fled Communist China’s massive Police-surveillance and constant fear of arrests by becoming instead radicalized Islamist rebels who join the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an ethnic Uyghur terrorist group allied with *al-Qaida*. Paradoxically, China’s fear of Uyghur Islamist terrorism has come back in a full circle to bite the Communist masters: it was this fear of *al-Qaida*’s international terrorist involvement in Xinjiang that originally motivated China to support the 2001-02 U.S./NATO Second Afghan War and 2003-2021 NATO peacekeeping in Afghanistan against Islamic terrorists, as well as Beijing’s later own anti-terrorist repressions nationally.⁴

Conclusion: International Criminal Court Violations

In the end, Communist China’s repression of the Uyghurs has been condemned in the West and internationally as a crime of genocide against an entire people, due to these legal violations:

- Crimes against Humanity;
- Genocide;
- Ethnic-Cleansing;
- Human Bondage and Slavery.

¹ U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. *Chinese Persecution of the Uyghurs*, idem; Council on Foreign Relations. *China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, idem; *China’s Uyghur Internment Camps Turn to Forced Labor*, idem; Council on Foreign Relations. *China’s Police State: Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang*, idem.

² Council on Foreign Relations. *China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang*, idem; *China’s Uyghur Internment Camps Turn to Forced Labor*, idem; Council on Foreign Relations. *China’s Police State: Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang*, idem.

³ Interview of Saint Leo University Professor of International Studies Marco Rimanelli, Ph.D., in M. Navarrete, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs”, idem.

⁴ M. Navarrete, “China’s Repression of the Uyghurs”, idem.

All of the above violations are outlawed by the terms of the criminal code as set forth by the United Nations International Criminal Court. But as long as Communist China holds her veto-proof permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council, and her unlimited funds keep buying corruption and international complicity, no political solution or legal prosecution will ever be secured on behalf of the Uyghurs.



Photo from *Lions' Pride*, Saint Leo University Student Paper (27 October 2020): <https://lionsprideonline.com/?p=9868>

Photo of International Criminal Court

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Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Response to Security Risks in the South China Sea

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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia and the response to security risks in the South China Sea from the formation of the Associations of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from 1967 to today. Regionalism is the study of the process by which states interact and cooperate based upon their geographic proximity with each other. The process is characterized by states supporting regional integration through formal international organizations, interstate associations, policy coordination, economic integration and collective security arrangements. ASEAN states adopted a policy of cooperation on multiple fronts in order to achieve regional security. The diplomatic initiatives at the regional level were born out of a desire to counter threats from China and were in turn obstructed by China's own desire to bilaterally negotiate territorial disputes with each respective ASEAN state over the South China Sea. Despite their best efforts, claimant states were forced to reckon with a different kind of regionalism, inclusive regionalism. This type of regionalism includes external powers such as the United States, Japan and Australia to deter and balance against China's rising power in Southeast Asia. Despite the strategic enhancement that regional cooperation may allow, balancing military power in international relations could be the ultimate resolution that proves to be more salient than diplomatic initiatives.

Introduction

The South China Sea region encompasses a body of water surrounded by Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, Taiwan and China. This sea contains many islands and archipelagos (mostly uninhabited): Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal. These islands are subject to conflicting claims by local maritime countries following a succession of unresolved historical claims by ex-Colonial Empires, as well as by the 1980s new Third Law of the Seas' regulation of rival maritime countries' Continental shelves (200 miles from inhabited islands coasts with control of soil and sub-soil resources) and Exclusive Economic Zones (control of fisheries above such Continental shelves), but below the seas' surface that remain international bodies of water for all to use.

The region as a whole was inhabited by empires and other sovereign states before being almost completely colonized by European powers, Japan, and the United States. After the Colonial Empires left, the South China Sea region was bordered by rival successor states, who inherited claims to these regional islands by their former colonizers under the doctrine of *Uti Possidetis*:

Uti possidetis, a principle used to define post-colonial boundaries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, is a doctrine under which newly independent states inherit the pre-independence administrative boundaries set by the former Colonial Power. The doctrine posits that title to the colonial territory devolves to the local authorities and prevails over any competing claim based on occupation. Thus, *uti possidetis* is predicated on a rejection of self-determination and assumes that internal, administrative boundaries are functionally equivalent to international boundaries.¹

¹ Brian Taylor Sumner, "Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice," *Duke Law Journal*, 53, (2004): p.1790, <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol53/iss6/3>

Each state's claim to the South China Sea is in conflict to some degree with another state. Vietnam claims all of the Paracel Islands (currently occupied by China) and the western half of the Spratly Islands. Malaysia claims a significant part of the Spratly Islands that intersects with claims by all other claimant states. Brunei only claims a few Spratly islands but its claim is disputed by China and Vietnam. The Philippines claim most of the Spratly islands with intersecting claims by Malaysia, China, and Vietnam and separately claim the Scarborough shoal along with China and Taiwan. Taiwan maintains the same claim to the South China Sea islands as China due to its claim as the sole government of all of China. China's claim to islands in the South China Sea is defined by the "Nine-Dash Line" in documents published since 1948 and encompasses every island group except for the Riau Islands under Indonesian control. Table 1 summarizes each country's claim to major island groups in the South China Sea.

Table 1. Claims of Major Island Groups by Countries in the South China Sea

Claimant	Riau Islands	Spratly Islands	Paracel Islands	Scarborough Shoal
Vietnam	None	Partial	All	None
Malaysia	None	Partial	None	None
Indonesia	All	None	None	None
Brunei	None	Partial	None	None
Philippines	None	Partial	None	All
Taiwan	None*	All	All	All
China	None*	All	All	All

* Indonesia's island claims are not disputed by other states, but its surrounding oceanic claims are disputed by China and Taiwan

Unresolved Claims and the Conflict over Resources in the South China Sea

The conflicting territorial claims must be seen in light of the economic and natural resource potential of the region to their respective countries, most of which lies in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Chinese sources estimate that over 100 billion barrels of oil could be found within the South China Sea and other nation's sources (such as the United States) put the figure at a much lower but still substantial 10 billion barrels of oil, along with significant quantities of natural gas.¹ These oil and natural gas resources are being developed and exploited in areas that are claimed by multiple countries. Furthermore, fishing is also important to the economies of the region. According to researchers at the University of British of Columbia, "the South China Sea is one of the world's five leading fishing zones."² The fishing industry in the region employs over three million people, contributes heavily to the global fish trade, and provides a vital source of protein to millions of others. The South China Sea is also "home to some of the world's richest reef systems and over 3,000 indigenous and migratory fish species, comprising some 12% of the total global fish catch."³ Ships engaged in commercial fishing are often present in the South China Sea and these ships originate from countries with competing territorial claims which only serve as an additional source of tension between countries in the region.⁴

¹ Christopher L. Daniels, *South China Sea: Energy & Security Conflicts* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013): p.14.

² Dan Southerland, "The Real South China Sea Crisis Everyone is Missing," *The National Interest* (27 March 2017), <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-south-china-sea-crisis-everyone-missing-19922>


³ Adam Greer, "The South China Sea is Really a Fishery Dispute," *The Diplomat* (20 July 2016), <https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-is-really-a-fishery-dispute/>

⁴ Michael Williams, "Storm Is Brewing in the Treacherous South China Sea," *The World Today* 68, n. 7 (December 2012): p.29.

China has claimed the majority of the islands and surrounding waters represented in the “Nine-Dash Line”.¹ The “Nine-Dash Line” covers the majority of the South China Sea as shown in Map 1. This allows China to take advantage of the aforementioned abundant resources that are located in its larger area of claim which intersects with the geopolitical front yards of other claimant states whose claims are less expansive. China has sought to expand its military power in order to control such resources to its advantage. Since most of the islands are naturally uninhabitable, nothing prevents a country such as China from setting up forward military bases to project its power.

According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), “Major construction of [Chinese] military and dual-use infrastructure on the ‘Big 3’—Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross Reefs—is wrapping up [as of 2017], with the naval, air, radar and defensive facilities that AMTI has tracked for nearly two years largely complete.”² Consistent with China’s current military strategy in the region, the past enlargement of Chinese power has led to sporadic fighting over islands in the region such as the Paracel Islands takeover by China in 1974, the Johnson South Reef incident of 1988 between China and Vietnam, and the Mischief Reef Incident of 1995 between China and the Philippines.³ These disputes often cause armed conflict as the region has a multitude of uninhabited islands and reefs that often serve as the site of military installations of countries looking to bolster their respective claims.⁴

Map 1: South China Sea Claims



¹ M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33, no. 3 (2011): p.296.

² Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Updated: China’s Big Three Near Completion” (29 June 2017), <https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/>

³ M. Taylor Fravel, *Policy Report: U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University, March 2014): p.3, <https://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf>

⁴ Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Metropolitan/Owl/Henry Holt, 2001), p.112.

Such armed conflicts and military installations create tension in the region, enough to threaten access to the waters and regional stability of the South China Sea. Latent tensions could be ignited among claimant states over “the territorial sovereignty of land features such as islands and coral heads and over maritime rights such as an Exclusive Economic Zone.”¹

Regional stability ensures economic prosperity for both external powers (foremost among them being the United States) and East Asian states “as conflict or intense security competition would divert scarce resources away from development, reduce trade by threatening the security of sea-lanes, and reduce cross-border investment, both in the region and across the Pacific.”² A troubling feature of these conflicts is their ‘zero-sum’ nature. “As zero-sum conflicts, territorial disputes are prone to the pernicious effects of the security dilemma and can quickly spiral out of control.”³ Moreover, the utilization of threats, implied or explicit, and other more subtle means of coercion by each state to advance its claim is also an element that contributes to potential insecurity. “China’s threats to American oil companies in the region in 2007 and 2008 provide one example of such coercive behaviour that can increase instability.”⁴ The naval arms build-up is another point of concern. “In addition to the re-capitalisation and modernisation of China’s South Sea Fleet, Vietnam is also investing heavily in naval and air capabilities to be used in the South China Sea, such as Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia, that will enhance Hanoi’s own area denial capability.”⁵ These disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights have the potential to escalate tensions further, with a broader security competition that creates the possibility of war.

Regionalism in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, despite a much longer history, is made up primarily of newly independent states. These states created a style of political interaction that is characterized by a “commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the affairs of other countries and an informal, non-confrontational approach to negotiations.”⁶ The mechanism for such interaction was through regional organizations formed in the decades after the Second World War. Key results during this time were the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 which consequently created the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976 that went on to include in its membership China, India, and Japan.⁷ Both organizations encouraged cooperation and instituted an optimistic trend of regionalism in Southeast Asia in which ASEAN states recognized a state of peace between themselves and created a framework under TAC for other nations to adhere to in their interactions with ASEAN states.

ASEAN’s version of regionalism was not limited to peace among its member states and neighbors. It endeavored to engage in regional institution-building despite the relative weakness of each individual state. According to Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN was the first major regional player to emerge and has been at the centre of regional developments including APEN, ARF, ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Summit as East Asian regionalism has evolved over time.”⁸ The interaction among these institutions is characterized by the tradition of non-confrontation that places a strong emphasis on discretion and consensus between parties based upon outcomes that are beneficial to all involved. This method of regionalism is characterized as the ‘ASEAN Way’.⁹ The aforementioned ASEAN summits and its associated meetings have adopted such an approach. The ‘ASEAN Way’ has proven to be so influential

¹ Fravel, *Policy Report: U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995*, p.3.

² Fravel, p.3.

³ Fravel, p.3.

⁴ Fravel, p.3.

⁵ Fravel, p.3.

⁶ Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p.3.

⁷ Beeson & Stubbs, p.3.

⁸ Beeson & Stubbs, p.4.

⁹ Beeson & Stubbs, p.3.

that other Asian organizations have embraced it as their manner of deliberation such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Moreover, the use of this approach has led to the development of the Track II diplomatic process between nations in Southeast Asia. Track II diplomacy allows for non-state actors such as academics, policy analysts, and officials in their private capacity to engage in informal discussions about “ways of advancing regional economic and security cooperation on a range of issues.”¹ These discussions generate ideas and outcomes that are used as a basis to further Track I diplomacy that consists primarily of intergovernmental negotiations. It is worth noting that regional Track II and Track I diplomacy were the cornerstone for ASEAN states to generate indigenous solutions for security and territorial issues among claimant states in the South China Sea based on a regionalized framework that also included China.

Despite their best efforts, claimant states are forced to deal with China’s desire to stop any such regional security issues from becoming internationalized.² China strongly prefers to negotiate bilaterally with each claimant state instead of engaging in any type of collective negotiation where its relative position would be weaker. China’s motivation in this regard stems from its desire to have the best negotiating position when potentially resolving any territorial disputes. However, ASEAN states do not favor China’s position. China’s offer of bilateral negotiations constitute a structure that is incompatible with ASEAN’s framework of regionalism, whereby states integrate multi-laterally at the regional level to solve territorial disputes based on ASEAN principles of non-interference and non-confrontation.³ ASEAN states also realize that China’s desire to negotiate bilaterally with individual claimant states as well as China’s desire for exclusive regionalism are two strategies that are linked by their common outcomes of enshrining China as the preeminent regional power by default. China’s desire to negotiate bilaterally and the reluctance of ASEAN states to adhere to such a strategy led to the inability of Track II and Track I diplomacy to resolve the South China Sea conflict, limiting the effectiveness of ASEAN-led regionalism.⁴ Such a limitation is coupled with a power-differential between China and ASEAN states in China’s favor, reducing the incentive of China to change its position. In other words, ASEAN states realized that its framework of regionalism was inadequate by itself to oppose China. The weak position of ASEAN states in terms of power stimulated their desire to push for a more inclusive regionalism. This desire was driven by ASEAN’s understanding that China’s power differential with ASEAN is most acute in situations where outside actors’ influence are minimized.

Relations between ASEAN and China underwent a shift in the early 1990’s as ASEAN states began to recognize China as a rising power in the region. This period was characterized by improving economic ties and perceptions of China as a more constructive player in regional politics. China used the 1997 financial crisis that primarily impacted Southeast Asia as an opportunity to demonstrate goodwill in the region through the provision of bailout packages and most importantly, not devaluing its own currency, thereby avoiding damaging rounds of competitive currency devaluations.⁵ As a result, the ASEAN states’ view towards China significantly improved. It was an opportunity for ASEAN states to establish economic ties and take advantage of the economic opportunities and markets in China. The dichotomy that resulted featured extensive economic interaction between ASEAN and China on one hand and a security risk over

¹ Beeson & Stubbs, p.3.

² All Claimant States aside from China and Taiwan (Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines) are members of ASEAN but ASEAN includes some states, such as Myanmar/Burma that are not claimant states.

³ Amanda Conklin, “Why ASEAN Can’t Stand Up to China,” *The National Interest* (1 July 2015), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-asean-cant-stand-china-13238>

⁴ David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea.” *Asian Survey*, 52, no. 6 (November/December 2012): p.1024, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1019>

⁵ Ian Storey, *The United States and ASEAN-China Relations: All Quiet on the Southeast Asian Front* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2007): p.5, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB812.pdf>

disputed island territories with disparities of power between ASEAN and China on the other. To address this dichotomy, ASEAN states sought to engage in internal balancing by strengthening their respective economies through establishing economic ties with China and consequently modernizing their militaries to fill in the power vacuum against the latter.¹ When ASEAN states were unable to achieve a successful internal balancing due to their economic and military weaknesses, ASEAN cooperated with and included external powers such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, as a part of its inclusive regionalism. China however, advocated exclusive regionalism, a regional cooperation that excluded non-regional powers and ensured China would be by far the most pre-eminent country in the region and able to exert its hegemony over other Southeast Asian States.²

ASEAN led efforts to build regional institutions through Track II and Track I diplomacy, increase trade among member states, cooperate on security issues, and advocate for its members globally were not enough to build a regional framework that could withstand a confrontation with China over the South China Sea. ASEAN states did not gain the relative power nor muster the collective will needed to deal with the threat from China, despite significant economic advancements from regional integration. According to Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, “any attempt [by ASEAN countries] to deal with the rise of a potential hegemon, and the consequent disruption of the balance of power, by non-military means was highly problematic.”³ As a result, ASEAN States realized that the failure of efforts to solidify regionalism in Southeast Asia “put a premium on US involvement, raising the likelihood that an inclusive form of regionalism would take precedence over any exclusive type.”⁴ The preference among ASEAN states for United States involvement as well as closer cooperation with Japan and Australia ensured that a fundamental characteristic of regionalism in Southeast Asia would be counter to China’s designs. Furthermore, any alternative regionalism promulgated by China would be unacceptable to nations that “remain guarded when it comes to setting aside their sovereignty.”⁵

Influence of External Powers as a Part of Southeast Asian Regionalism

Southeast Asia, despite attempts at promoting peace, building regional institutions and economic integration, has not eliminated the South China Sea security issue. Organizations such as ASEAN have not been successful in reaching a settlement with China to end the current dispute. According to Michael R. Auslin:

How then can the nations of the Indo-Pacific navigate through this treacherous region? If simple economic integration were the answer, then an Asia that trades largely with itself and is highly interdependent should have no security risks at all. That is clearly not the case. Nor, clearly, do multilateral organizations by themselves provide a way out of military competition. Were this approach the key, then the existence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the East Asia Summit or a number of other groupings would end the threat of confrontation. That each security flashpoint is different, and therefore requires a different solution, goes without saying. Yet in the absence of any successful intra-Asian approach, we must consider the possibility that an outside actor can help redraw the map of security risk.⁶

¹ Richard Javad Heydarian, “Face-Off: China vs. ASEAN in the South China Sea and Beyond,” *The National Interest* (9 January 2015), <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/face-china-vs-asean-the-south-china-sea-beyond-12000>

² Gilbert Rozman, “East Asian Regionalism,” in Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p.31.

³ Beeson & Stubbs, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism*, p.5.

⁴ Rozman, “East Asian Regionalism,” *idem*, p.24.

⁵ Beeson & Stubbs, *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism*, p.4.

⁶ Michael R. Auslin, *The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation and the Risks to the World’s most Dynamic Region* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2017), p.192.

The United States, Japan and Australia are three such outside actors that can influence the security situation in Southeast Asia. Each one will be examined to assess their influence on China's hegemonic activities within the framework of regionalism.

United States

The United States is by far the most preeminent external power in Southeast Asia. The United States military maintains an extensive presence with over 100,000 personnel stationed at bases in Japan and South Korea and an extensive naval presence in the South China Sea. The presence of the United States military has profoundly influenced the security dynamics in the region. "No small part of Asia's general stability has been a result of the fact that for over sixty years, American ships and planes, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have helped keep the peace through the U.S. alliance system."¹ Formal alliances of the United States with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines as well as with Japan, Australia, and South Korea, were created due to a common desire to address regional security issues such as freedom of navigation and regional stability. "It is no exaggeration to say the United States is a pacific power because of its alliances."²

The extent and acceptance of the alliance system can be attributed to the perception by ASEAN states that the United States has "played a relatively benign role in the region as a guarantor of peace and stability."³ Indeed, ASEAN states, as proponents of regionalism, accept the need for a balance of power in Southeast Asia by the alliance system which itself serves as a pillar of inclusive regionalism. The ability of the United States and its alliance system to deter China's hegemonic activities induces smaller states to be more receptive of external powers in order to fill any power vacuum that would otherwise occur in their absence. On the other hand, the United States alliance system strengthens other external powers by also providing a means for Japan and Australia to participate in regional security through intelligence sharing and joint military exercises. The influence of such alliances ensures undisturbed access to South China Sea waters and encourages a defined stability in the region that otherwise could be disturbed by China's unfettered encroachment given that China claims the majority of the South China Sea within its nine-dash line demarcation and actively expands its military presence when given the opportunity. The expansion of China's military power has caused any desire for exclusive regional leadership to be supplanted by a more inclusive regionalism, one that includes the influence of not only the United States, but Japan and Australia.

Japan

Japan has not claimed any islands in the South China Sea since renouncing all such claims in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty after its defeat in the Second World War. However, Japan claims and occupies the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands northeast of Taiwan, whose ownership is disputed with China. The dispute over the Senkaku Islands has caused several incidents between Japan and China, such as the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with Japanese coast guard ships in September 2010 and the confrontation in February 2013 between Chinese and Japanese naval vessels. Confrontations over the Senkaku Islands indicate that China and Japan are in a constant low-level dispute with China trying to gain control over the area from Japan. China's activities in the Senkaku Islands have caused Japan to evaluate the impact of similar activities in the South China Sea on Japanese interests.⁴ Any Chinese advancement

¹ Auslin, p.192.

² Auslin, p.192.

³ Simon S. C. Tay. "East Asian Regionalism: What's at Stake?" in Hank Lim & Chyungly Lee, eds., *The Emerging North-South Divide in East Asia: A Reappraisal of Asian Regionalism* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), p.9.

⁴ Emma Graham-Harrison, "Islands on the Frontline of a New Global Flashpoint: China vs. Japan," *The Guardian* (4 February 2017), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/china-v-japan-new-global-flashpoint-senkaku-islands-ishigaki>

in the South China Sea, especially ones that threaten freedom of navigation, will give China an additional lever to use against Japan due to the overwhelming volume of trade and natural resources (especially oil) that travel to Japan through the region.¹ As a result, Japan looks toward regional partners for security cooperation in addition to its longstanding alliance with the United States.

In this context, Japan has engaged ASEAN states on two fronts, economic and security. On the economic front, Japan has worked with ASEAN since 2003 to create a Free Trade Area (FTA) that could serve Japan's significant economic interests in the region. ASEAN states represent a major through route for Japan's imported goods. Seventy percent of Japan's oil is shipped via sea lanes that pass through the Malacca Straits (bordered by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore).² Moreover, the region represents a significant market for Japanese products with ASEAN being Japan's second largest trading partner after China.³ The economic relationship between Japan and ASEAN was cemented with the signing of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) Agreement in 2008, a free trade agreement that significantly lowered tariffs between them and may lead to further economic integration in the future.⁴ Such economic integration represents ASEAN desires to include Japan in its regional sphere as Japan has consistently supported regional economic development in Southeast Asia.

Even though ASEAN economic relations with Japan is extensive, Japan's integration with ASEAN in the past brought up security concerns linked to the strength of Japan's economy that experienced remarkable growth since the end of the Second World War. Economic growth in Japan proceeded at a rate of 10% per year from 1950 to 1970, causing Japan to quickly become a developed industrial power and the second largest economy in the world.⁵ The economic resurgence of Japan created mistrust among ASEAN countries about Japan's intentions. The disparity in economic power between Japan and ASEAN countries led to fears that Japan could use its economy to build a military that would once again threaten the region. The mistrust stemmed from Japan's occupation of ASEAN countries during the Second World War and its treatment of local populations. Their fears were partially allayed by the United States-Japan alliance that links Japan's security with the United States' military presence and disincentivizes any independent Japanese military ambition. According to Robert Stoufer:

Japan's past has had a significant influence on ASEAN fears regarding the implications for Southeast Asia of Japan's current pervasive influence on national economies. Indeed, today those fears have been heightened in some circles largely because the post-war Japanese economic "intrusion" into ASEAN has been predicated on the perceived symmetry between the United States and Japan. In other words, Japan's penetration into the ASEAN economy has been more acceptable as long as it was accompanied by a strong U.S. military presence in the region to act as a counterbalance—precluding the possibility of a military role by Japan.⁶

Japan itself has tried to calm ASEAN nations over their concerns regarding a post-war resurgence. In 1977, the Japanese Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda delivered a speech in Manila whereby he articulated

¹ Ian Storey, "Japan's maritime security interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea dispute," *Political Science*, 65, no. 2 (2 May 2017): p.136. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032318713508482>

² Joshua P. Rowan, "The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN and the South China Sea Dispute," *Asian Survey*, 45, no. 3 (May-June 2005): p.431, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2005.45.3.414>

³ Yukiko Okano, *Japan-ASEAN Relations: Post 2015*, Presentation, Mission of Japan to ASEAN (17 February 2016), <http://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000223495.pdf>

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement" (15 November 2017), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean.html>

⁵ Shinji Yoshioka & Hirofumi Kawasaki, *Japan's High-Growth Postwar Period: Role of Economic Plans*, Economic & Social Research Institute (August 2016), p. 1, http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/e_rnote/e_rnote030/e_rnote027.pdf

⁶ LT. Robert A. Stoufer, "The United States in the Framework of ASEAN security: Post-Cold War Prospects and Alternatives" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1991), p.40-41, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a246229.pdf>

the 'Fukuda Doctrine' or Japan's foreign policy towards ASEAN states. The doctrine states Japan's refusal to become a military power, that ASEAN nations will be treated by Japan as equals, and underlies Japan's commitment to creating a stable regional order in Southeast Asia.¹ The Fukuda doctrine clarified Japan's role as a non-military power and ensured that economic advancements would not be used to gain a military advantage over ASEAN states in the future. The impact of the Fukuda Doctrine allowed Japan to achieve greater cooperation, and build mutual trust and confidence with ASEAN states. It allowed Japan to cooperate as a member of regional institutions such as the Asian Regional Forum, ASEAN+3 (ASEAN + China, Japan, and South Korea), and ASEAN+6 (ASEAN + China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea), also known as the East Asia Summit.² Overall, Japan's economic integration and partnership with ASEAN, its renunciation of military expansionism, and its accession to regional institutions all were rooted in its desire to be a part of an inclusive regionalism in Southeast Asia. This type of regionalism was primarily anchored on the economic integration of Japan and ASEAN which serves as a compliment to the increased security cooperation that has taken place in parallel and with the goal of countering China's maritime aggressiveness in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea.³

On the security front, Japanese and ASEAN cooperation has emerged in no small part due to the emergence of China as a regional hegemon. China's hegemonic activities in the South China Sea as well as the Senkaku Islands give ASEAN states and Japan respectively, a common adversary that has contributed to the emergence of regional cooperation and regional institutions to counter China.⁴ According to Kavi Chongkittavorn:

In the past two years [2016 and 2017], Japan has been moving swiftly to strengthen maritime security ties with Vietnam and the Philippines, two main claimants in the South China Sea disputes. The move has been viewed as an attempt to counter the rise of China's maritime power and its presence in the troubled maritime areas. Other ASEAN countries have welcomed Japan's proactive and pro-peace policies under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.⁵

In addition to Japan's attempts to gain a favorable position in Southeast Asia by cooperating with claimant states, Japan has expanded the range of its security cooperation through its alliance with the United States. Japan and the United States signed the bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1978, with a significant revision in 1997, to allow their respective militaries to begin mutual training exercises and grant Japan the ability to deploy its defense forces beyond its national borders to Southeast Asian areas. This was a response to the concerns that arose from Japan towards North Korea's missile launch in 1993 and China's activities in the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996.⁶ More recently, the improvement and growth of China's military presents the greatest regional security concern for Japan and the United States. "The growth in Chinese defense spending and military capabilities threatens to shift the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific."⁷ As a result, Japan and the United States as allies seek to exercise their influence in order to obtain a more favorable distribution of power in the region to counter China's hegemonic activities and its exclusive regional missions.

¹ Tsutomu Kikuchi, "Heart to Heart" Relations with ASEAN: The Fukuda Doctrine Revisited, Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies-Commentary, n.20, 2-3 (21 December 2007): https://www2.ijia.or.jp/en_commentary/pdf/AJISS-Commentary20.pdf

² Kikuchi, p.4.

³ Kavi Chongkittavorn, "ASEAN Strives to Balance Ties with China, Japan," *Reporting ASEAN* (18 May 2018): <http://www.aseannews.net/asean-strives-balance-ties-china-japan/>

⁴ Fredrik Soderbaum, "Theories of Regionalism" in Mark Beeson & Richard Stubbs, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p.17.

⁵ Chongkittavorn, "ASEAN Strives to Balance Ties with China, Japan," *idem*.

⁶ Rachel Hoff, *Next Steps for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation*, Sasakawa USA Forum Issue no. 3 (June 2016): p.3, <https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Hoff-Next-steps-US-Japan-security-cooperation.pdf>

⁷ Hoff, p.4.

Australia

Australia is linked to the regionalization of Southeast Asia through its economic relationship and security cooperation with ASEAN states. Australian and ASEAN trade totaled 93 billion Australian Dollars in 2016, exceeding Australian trade with Japan as well as the United States.¹ Australia and New Zealand signed a joint Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar/Burma, Philippines, Singapore and Viet-Nam in 2010.² The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) agreement formalized Australia's extensive economic links with ASEAN and established a timeline for the elimination of 90% of existing tariffs between these countries.³ Australia's economic relationship with ASEAN states is not the only venue of cooperation. Australia has also participated in ASEAN institutions to address regional security issues as both ASEAN and Australia share maritime trade routes through the Indo-Pacific in Southeast Asia and as a result, cooperate in securing such routes. These institutions are the Asian Regional Forum, East Asian Summit and ASEAN-Australia Maritime Cooperation initiative, a joint ASEAN-Australian program to protect marine resources and strengthen maritime law.⁴

In terms of security, the rise of China's military power have stimulated regional attachments between Australia, ASEAN states, and the United States. Australia and ASEAN promote defense cooperation through the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) framework. The ADMM-Plus allows Australia, ASEAN States, and seven other non-ASEAN (China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States) countries' respective defense ministers to discuss regional security issues, including securing trade routes, facilitating access to waters, and countering China's assertiveness in the South China Sea.⁵ In addition, Australia and the United States maintain a military alliance under the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty, signed in 1951 to cooperate on the aforementioned military and security matters. The ANZUS treaty forms the bedrock of Australia's security cooperation with the United States. The alliance benefits Australia in multiple ways. According to Thomas Price:

Australia supports the US-led order as it benefits from the stability that measured U.S. influence creates across the region [South China Sea]. It also supports the alliance because it benefits directly from ANZUS, through cooperation with the United States in areas such as defense technology and intelligence sharing. Australian contributions to the relationship include regional diplomatic support, military and intelligence-gathering capabilities, forward-basing options and vast military training areas.⁶

Australia's alliance with the United States have extended to discussions for sharing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea. Although Australia has not yet participated in any FONOP, its involvement (along with Japan's) would likely be supported by ASEAN states to protect their shared national interests against Chinese encroachment.⁷ In other words, ASEAN opens a venue to include

¹ Australian Government, Australian Trade & Investment Commission, "Australia, Asean Trade and Investment Relationship," <https://www.austrade.gov.au/asean-now/why-asean-matters-to-australia/australia-asean-trade-investment-relationship/>

² Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Background to the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement," <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/aanzfta/Pages/background-to-the-asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-area.aspx>

³ ASEAN, "Overview: ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA)," <https://aanzfta.asean.org/aanzfta-overview/>

⁴ Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, "ASEAN-Australia Special Summit Initiatives," <https://aseanaustralia.pmc.gov.au/asean-australia-special-summit-initiatives>

⁵ Henrick Z. Tsjeng, "The Case for Making ADMM-Plus an Annual Meeting," *The Diplomat* (2 August 2017), <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-case-for-making-admm-plus-an-annual-meeting/>

⁶ Thomas Price, "Can Australia Keep ANZUS on Track?" *East Asia Forum* (1 October 2017), <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/01/can-australia-keep-anzus-on-track/>

⁷ Ian Storey, "US Conducts 6th South China Sea FONOP under Trump," Institute of Southeast Asian Studies – Yusof Ishak Institute (27 March 2018), <https://iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/7200-us-conducts-6th-south-china-sea-fonop-under-trump-by-ian-storey>

Australia among other external powers in its regional security framework to contain China and pursue policies that find common ground between ASEAN, Australia, Japan and the United States.

Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Managing Security Risk

Based on the aforementioned analysis to the influence of external powers as a part of Southeast Asian regionalism, it is worth noting that ASEAN states represents the core of such relationships with these countries. ASEAN itself, as a proponent of regionalism, acts to coordinate these relationships between external powers and the region as a whole. ASEAN views exclusive regionalism as insufficient to bring about stability at the regional level as China's hegemonic activities cause great consternation among other regional states about their own security. To address this dilemma, ASEAN encouraged an inclusive regionalism strategy whereby external states such as the United States, Japan, and Australia would be actively engaged in the region. "The big powers would strengthen their strategic presence in the region, while simultaneously acting as a check and balance on each other."¹ Under this structure, ASEAN states would be the prime beneficiaries as ASEAN would be better positioned to ensure that no external power would become solely dominant in the region. ASEAN also utilized such regional mechanisms to deter China's hegemonic activities and to provide a balance of power by ensuring that China is not the only large power that could dictate the terms of territorial disputes. On the other hand, external powers prefer this type of regionalism as they share the common objectives with ASEAN that is, to counter China's military power, achieve freedom of navigation, and preserve regional stability.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Southeast Asia functions at the balance of exclusive and inclusive forces of regionalism. Exclusive regionalism advocated by China resembles the imposition of a Chinese Monroe doctrine even though it did not implicitly delineate such a policy to other regional and external actors. Such a doctrine would inevitably reduce the influence of and seek to exclude external powers, leaving China as the foremost regional power. However ASEAN, as the primary regional organization for Southeast Asian nations, opposes China's vision and implements instead a regional framework that allows for extra-regional cooperation of important powers like the United States, Japan, and Australia. The move was the result of the shortcomings of Track II and Track I diplomacy to implement a permanent resolution to the security threats in the South China Sea. ASEAN states realized that the negotiating efforts of multilateral organizations to reduce security conflict did not provide a way out of military competition due to the decisive imbalance of power between China and other claimant states, despite extensive economic integration. In other words, military power in international relations was perceived as a necessity to conduct negotiations (to back Track II and Track I efforts) as well as for securing ASEAN states' sovereignty and interests. Consequently, ASEAN states attempted to achieve internal balancing by benefiting from economic integration among regional states and external powers. However, the failure to achieve a solid internal balancing caused ASEAN states to strive for an inclusive regionalism that incorporated the influence of extra-regional great power cooperation to forge a security framework that may be capable of isolating China in Asia if not countering its military power and hegemonic encroachments. Regionalism in Southeast Asia, therefore is a function of economic and security dynamics directed by regional states and their cooperation with external powers to pursue interests that are common to and beneficial for all.

In an inclusive regionalism structure, the United States, Japan, and Australia operate in the region to strengthen their strategic presence at the encouragement of ASEAN, whose member-states realize that external powers can provide a check and balance upon each other through their alliance system.² The

¹ Zhai Kun, "The ASEAN Power" in Ron Huisken, ed., *The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific*, p.21-32 (ANU Press, 2009), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h898.8>

² Zhai Kun, "The ASEAN Power", idem.

United States ensures that Japan and Australia's security policies do not become independent and prevent each from serving as a vector for hegemony. Under this structure, ASEAN states would be the prime beneficiaries as no external power would be solely dominant in the region. China's ability to dominate the region wanes significantly when it faces such a structure as the ability to act unilaterally against weaker states is stymied by the latent threat of escalation with the United States, Japan and Australia. On the other hand, the United States recognizes the area as a theatre of hegemonic competition with China. The need for United States-ASEAN cooperation further serves the United States in retaining its position as a world power in Southeast Asia while protecting its national interests and at the same time restraining China's power imposition over weaker states. Indeed, military power in international relations shapes the security paradigm in the region. In this context, the dynamics of regionalism in Southeast Asia becomes a structure that is defined by military power even though such a structure is initiated and built upon economic integration and diplomatic initiatives. Economic integration and diplomacy serve the ability to engage in military ventures and subsequently, power projection. It is not an exaggeration to say that military power and cooperation encourages the maintenance of alliances and strengthens regionalism in Southeast Asia. Thus, regionalism in Southeast Asia is influenced by military power, while at the same time defined by two contradictory characteristics among Southeast Asian nations. That is, the need to present a unified front against China, while at the same time respecting each other's independence, which poses a corollary constraint upon their regional integration.

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China, United States and South China Sea: Document Analysis and Observations

by Eslam M. Omar, Ph.D. (Kentucky State University)

ABSTRACT: The South China Sea is one of the most thoroughly disputed areas of water on Earth with China, Viet-Nam, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, each claiming some of the waters or its islands. The origins of the dispute are complex and arose in the aftermath of Decolonization in the 1950s when European Powers failed to completely demarcate their former colonies' maritime boundaries upon their independence. The presence of fishing resources, oil and natural gas incentivized since the 1970s regional disputants to advocate for their respective claims in the context of larger geo-political struggles, resulting in military conflicts. Fighting over the islands in the South China Sea began in the closing years of the Second Viet-Nam War when China invaded the Paracel Islands that were administered by South Viet-Nam in order to deny North Viet-Nam any chance of possessing these strategic islands once it completed its take-over of South Viet-Nam. Thereafter, regional maritime military conflicts have continued, usually with China opposing one of the other disputants, such as Taiwan, Philippines and Malaysia. China's rising hegemonic activities in the region were met with diplomacy and deterring force from the United States, as well as Japan and Australia whose national interests are served by filling any Power-vacuum between China and claimant states, protecting Western oil companies operating in the region, and securing vital maritime trade routes in South East Asia. In the context of this dispute, it is vital to analyze the strategic balance between these two major competing Powers, China's emerging regional hegemony and the United States' influence in the South China Sea. A document analysis methodology is employed with thematic analysis conducted through the lens of the neo-Realist Theory. The state of the South China Sea is further analyzed through several scenarios and their impacts on U.S.-China relations.

Introduction

Maritime conflicts in the South China Sea represents a new dimension in international relations among regional states. The national interests of each claimant state is the driving force for stoking tensions over the disputed land and sea. When we look at incidents that took place between China and Viet-Nam, as well as between China and the Philippines, each state strove to secure exclusive control over the disputed islands for military installations, plus sea-based oil extraction and fishing. China's 1974 takeover of the Paracel Islands from South Viet-Nam, and later the Johnson Reef Battle in 1988 between China and a now unified Viet-Nam, and the Mischief Reef Incident in 1995 between China and the Philippines confirm the importance of these islands and their related maritime claims. These events are seen as turning points in the history of the region because they portend an increase in tensions or the introduction of new means of increasing dialogue between claimant states. Some of the incidents could be characterized as low-level warfare and serve to illustrate the extent to which this ongoing dispute can occasionally escalate to. However, this is not strictly a military dispute and is best understood in the larger context of the political, economic and security dynamics of the region.

National interests are a fundamental component of this dispute however, with the hegemonic posture of China as a new regional Power stoking other disputes, such as Taiwan and the countervailing desire of other claimant states for support from outside Powers, mainly the United States. That is to address the power imbalance between China and other states in the region.

Despite the geographic distance separating it, the United States has maintained a presence in the South China Sea since 1974.¹ The tenor of the United States' involvement has at times changed considerably due to events that may be tied to China's hegemonic activities in the region. China's activities included diplomatic initiatives, the creation and expansion of islands to house military installations, and military assaults. These actions invariably provoked a response from the United States, whose national interests (freedom of navigation and regional stability) are often in conflict with China's designs. Furthermore, the United States' reaction to China has within it a larger goal, which is to influence the overall balance of power and ensure that China is not able to gain a position as the preeminent hegemon in the region.

This study sought to answer an overarching question in regards to international relations in the South China Sea. The primary question is: What is the strategic balance between China's regional hegemony and the United States' influence in the South China Sea? Additional sub questions were also addressed as part of this study. These questions are:

1. How has China maintained its regional hegemony in the South China Sea?
2. What are the areas of convergence and divergence between China's hegemony and U.S.' influence?
3. What changes have occurred in these relationships between Chinese and United States' influence and how did they affect claimant states?

Research Design

The researcher utilizes a document analysis approach to examine policy documents and reports from the United States, China, other claimant states, international organizations and think-tanks that present the dynamics of how strategic balance is achieved between states. Those that were eventually chosen for analysis was drawn from a comprehensive search of documents that were found to be informative, clear, inclusive of different theses and above all related to answering the research question. Examples of such documents included U.S. Department of State original diplomatic communications, U.S. Navy briefings, position papers from the Center for New American Security, and international treaties. This data was collected through primary and secondary sources such as the Public Library of United States Diplomacy, official policy documents from the U.S. Department of State, and official policy documents from China itself (published in English).

To gauge the impact of the United States presence in the South China Sea on Chinese policy designs, documents from the United States Department of Defense, other claimant states, and official think tank documents were examined in detail. The data was analyzed for individual impacts, such as the opinions of individual diplomats expressed in diplomatic communications to general consensus among experts as expressed in policy papers and peer-reviewed journal articles. Details included direct impressions of United States' influence from China as well as inferences concerning more indirect actions that were still relevant to the research question.

Further analysis was conducted using secondary sources to find the means by which the United States has successfully influenced claimant states in the South China Sea conflict using its deterrent capability to oppose China as well as diplomatic and economic measures. Secondary sources for this analysis included documents published by think-tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the National Bureau of Asian Research. Finally, the research attempted to address how China's hegemonic activities are associated with the influence that the United States has in the region. The answer of the research question was arrived at through the aforementioned methods of document analysis to outline the components that define the strategic balance between China and the United States.

¹ The United States maintained Subic Bay Base in the Philippines, only closing it in 1992 after a devastating local volcanic eruption. U.S. Naval presence continued through to the present day.

Data Analysis

This research incorporates the difference between a literature review and a document analysis. In a literature review, sources are used to paint a broad overall context of the topic as it exists at the commencement of the research. According to Lee Harvey, “a literature review context may indicate gaps in the research area, identify theoretical perspectives adopted or provide outcomes against which the new research is compared but it does not add new data that is part of the analysis.”¹ A document analysis rather, uses sources in the data collection process for further analysis to answer a research question by contextualization via thematic analysis. For Political Sciences research, “document analysis is the most frequently used data-collection measure.”²

This paper uses primary and secondary document analysis to define how the strategic balance between China and the United States manifests. This paper presents an analysis of documents and transcripts that are divided into coded categories and further examined for possible thematic patterns. Portions of these documents are coded based upon their respective content and how their most relevant sections of data relate to the codes. According to Johnny Saldana, “A code in qualitative inquire is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.”³ Each code is analyzed to present higher groupings of related data, the categories. The categories and their respective codes have been derived from their significance in reviewed data. Groups of data were developed from analyzing the codes and coded categories. In other words, they are developed from a process of hierarchical codification. Accordingly, “when codes are applied and reapplied to qualitative data, you are codifying -- a process that permits data to be segregated, grouped, regrouped, and relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation.”⁴ The categories are developed into themes. These themes are analyzed to provide an explanation of the components that form the strategic balance between China’s regional hegemony and the United States’ influence in the South China Sea.

Several quotes or data were sometimes labeled under one code. The presence of multiple data points collected under one code is “natural and deliberate – natural because there are mostly repetitive patterns of action and consistencies in human affairs – and deliberate because one of the coder’s primary goals is to find these repetitive patterns of action and consistencies in human affairs as documented in the data.”⁵ In other words, through the process of looking for patterns in data to categorize, associations can be made that are due to commonalities observed. The selected codes serve as a bridge between data collection and the thematic analysis.⁶

The data extracted to answer the research question was often in the form of quoted material from a particular source. Each set of quotes were assigned a code based upon its context and analyzed as part of a certain category which furthermore was developed into themes as previously indicated. “The data can consist of interview transcripts, participant observation field notes, journals, documents, literature, artifacts, photographs, video, websites, e-mail correspondence and so on.”⁷ There were several reasons for why a particular quote or section of text in a document was found to be suitable for further scrutiny. First, a quote was considered for this study if it was found to be from an eyewitness or participant in an event (military confrontations, diplomatic summits, etc.) important to the time period in the South China Sea. Second, a

¹ Lee Harvey, *Researching the Real World: A Guide to Methodology*, 2012–2019, accessed June 8, 2019, <http://www.qualityresearchinternational.com/methodology/RRW5pt2Documentanalysisforwhat.php>

² Harvey, *Researching the Real World: A Guide to Methodology*.

³ Johnny Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2009), p.3.

⁴ Saldana, p.8.

⁵ Saldana, p.5.

⁶ Saldana, p.4.

⁷ Saldana, p.3.

quote was from a law, regulation, treaty, or congressional hearing that covers or applies to the conflict between states in the region. These documents are important even if they illustrate that countries honor a certain agreement in the breach. Finally, a quote was considered of significant interest if it related directly to the research question itself. Overall, the data analysis outlines the process and thresholds whereby information was selected for the study and then served as the basis for further thematic analysis.

Document Analysis and Coding

In this section, the collected documents from primary and secondary sources are analyzed. These documents are coded and presented under increasingly more general groupings of categories and hierarchies. The document analysis was developed into themes which was further expounded upon in a thematic analysis.

The first category comprises an overview of the threats to the national interests of claimant states and the United States. Each type of threat is coded and together provide a picture of the threats China imposes because of its hegemonic activities in the South China Sea. The threats to national interests coded in this paper are *sovereignty*, *economic threats* and *regional instability*. The second category developed is an analysis of the use of diplomacy by the United States and claimant states in response to China's hegemonic threats and how diplomacy could be utilized as a method for securing power or achieving *conflict-resolution*. *Conflict-resolution* is also a code that is categorized under Diplomacy. The third category developed is an analysis of power as a key concept that has been coded into *strategic alliances*, *deterrence*, *balance of power* and *power struggle* in order to articulate the competitive relationship between China and the United States in the South China Sea that shapes the United States' influence in terms of military strategies.

Threats to National Interest

Rival Sovereignty Claims. The South China Sea is claimed by multiple nations who view the region as vital to their territorial integrity and as a result, their national sovereignty.

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam all dispute the sovereignty of several island chains while the Chinese government claims most of the South China Sea's outcroppings as its historic birthright, so-called "integral" or "inherent" territory. China says its control over the disputed waters is justified because it was the first to discover them.¹

China's overlapping claims with claimant states has been the impetus for military actions in the South China Sea. China's actions in 1974 with the Paracel Islands as well as further actions in 1988 in the Spratly Islands and 1995 at Mischief Reef has shown a willingness to use its military advantage against other claimant states to enhance its own position. These activities, along with its island building campaign are part of a larger strategy to achieve a hegemonic advantage over rival claimants. This strategy poses a genuine threat of territorial loss to the aforementioned claimant states.

China from its perspective, simply views the islands as its own² and while the islands themselves are strategically important, the issue of sovereignty is seen in light of the Taiwan issue as well, whereby an entire state is outside the control of the central government of China. In this case, China has long pursued a strategy of isolating Taiwan and resorted to military intimidation, as in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. While most nations worldwide recognize officially that Taiwan is a part of China, China's attempts

¹ Kristyn Byrne, "The Question of Sovereignty in The South China Sea." NATO Association of Canada, May 11, 2016, accessed September 17, 2018, <http://natoassociation.ca/the-question-of-sovereignty-in-the-south-china-sea/>

² Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, Article II, Section 4, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China*, December 7, 2014, accessed September 9, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm.

at intimidation are seen in a similar light to its activities in the South China Sea and imposes the same threats to claimant states' sovereignty.

The United States does not take any position regarding the sovereignty of claims in the South China Sea but when it comes to Taiwan, the United States officially views it as a part of China. Despite this position, the United States maintains a significant unofficial relationship with Taiwan in which the U.S. supports Taiwan with substantial military aid to deter a Chinese take-over.¹ According to J. Michael Cole:

The deepening of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is therefore a consequence of Beijing's military assertiveness and provides the reassurance, as per the Taiwan Relations Act, that Taiwan needs to hold the line against an encroaching China. The status quo in the Taiwan Strait can only be maintained if action is taken to balance against growing Chinese activity.²

Cole's document illustrates the importance of the United States' influence in the South China Sea to counter overall Chinese encroachment towards Taiwan and sustain a status quo for the balance of power in the region. Therefore, the ability of the United States to protect Taiwan is seen as a litmus test of the extent to which it can be relied upon by other claimant states to protect their sovereignty.

Economic Threats. The South China Sea is a rich source for natural resources such as oil, natural gas and fishing. China's claim over the "9-Dash Line" in the region represents the largest overlapping claim with other claimant states' territorial claims. This claim allows for the greatest potential control over natural resources in the South China Sea at the expense of other claimant states. China protects its claims by expanding the deployment of military ships and equipment thereby injecting an element of uncertainty among claimant states into any attempts to extract such resources. In other words, China's military presence and expansion in the sea poses a threat to the ability of other claimant states to exploit the natural resources in the territory they claim. Gu Junfeng's document details China's threats to claimant states operating oil and natural gas exploratory ventures.

Recently, for example, unilateral exploration activities have caused escalating tensions in the region. The Philippines has offered exploration contracts over the next few years for offshore exploration off Palawan Island in an area claimed by China. Viet-Nam is cooperating with India to exploit oil and gas in contested waters, and in response, China has opened nine blocks for exploration in waters also claimed by Vietnam.

These non-cooperative activities in highly contested places have only served to fan the fire of controversy in the SCS. As a counter measure, claimants began to use governmental vessels to harass other parties' oil exploration activities in disputed areas. A recent report stated that two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels cut-off the exploration cables of a Vietnamese oil survey ship searching for oil and gas deposits in the SCS, which was declared by China as "completely normal marine enforcement and surveillance activities in China's jurisdictional area."³

Gu Junfeng views China's encroachment upon claimant states over the extraction of natural resources in the South China Sea as a threat to their economic ambition. Claimant states fear that any hindrance in exploiting resources will be taken advantage of by a rival claimant. This has led to the perception that resource exploitation is a zero-sum game in the South China Sea, with states rushing to

¹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Relations With Taiwan*, August 31, 2018, accessed September 19, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>

² J. Michael Cole, "Taiwan in Dead Center of China's Greater Territorial Ambitions," *The Diplomat*, July 12, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwan-dead-center-china%E2%80%99s-greater-territorial-ambitions-25616>

³ Gu Junfeng, "Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea: from 'Joint Development' to 'Joint Protection'." *Warwick University, 2013 Workshop on International Law, Natural Resources and Sustainable Development*, 2013, p.3-4, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/research/clusters/international/devconf/participants/papers/gu_dispute_resolution_in_the_south_china_sea.pdf

obtain natural resources before other claimant states tap into them first. The extent to which China pressures claimant states in the South China Sea dictates a political environment among claimant states to stand against Chinese incursions and power over their sovereignty even if that entails the involvement of external powers like the United States to balance against China vis-à-vis weaker states.

Conflict in the South China Sea is not limited to fights over oil and natural gas exploitation but extends to the other major indigenous resource, fisheries. Stein Tonnesson, in a report to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, argues that a consequence of the territorial dispute is the inability of any of the claimant states, including China, to manage their fishing stocks to maximize the long-term productivity of the region. The result is that fishers from opposing nations, in order to maintain the volume of their catch as well as their livelihood, often sail into disputed waters to accomplish this. In Stein Tonnesson's document:

Fisheries in the South China Sea are virtually unregulated, and coastal waters have been seriously overfished. Consequently, fisherman from Thailand, China, Taiwan and other nations go further and further out to sea, and also venture into the waters of neighbouring states. A great number of fisherman, especially from Thailand, have been arrested for poaching in other countries' territorial waters. There have been frequent episodes with Vietnamese, Malaysian and Philippines naval patrols.¹

These naval patrols are aimed at excluding fisherman from rival claimant states. When they encounter foreign fishermen, the naval patrols treat them as intruders. The result is that tension among claimant states over fisheries have escalated to include internment of ships and personnel. China is the most aggressive state at detaining foreign fishing boats and their crews as Dr. Jingdong Yuan elaborates:

With the fish stocks depleting [in the South China Sea], fishing vessels increasingly move in and out of overlapping claim zones more frequently. Incidents such as detention of fishing boats and crew, and heavy fines become more frequent, further raising tension. Viet-Nam, for instance, claims that 63 fishing boats and 725 fishermen have been detained between 2005 and 2010. The latest incident involves 21 Vietnamese fishermen and two boats being held on an island near the Paracels by the Chinese enforcement maritime authorities, which demand \$11,000 for their release. Hanoi also charges that Chinese patrol boats have cut off Vietnamese oil exploration cables. Likewise, Chinese fishermen also face detention as their vessels venture into other countries' EEZs.²

Such measures from China are a part of efforts to exert control in its claimed territory. China has gone further and moved to impose wholesale fishing bans in certain waters, at least partially in recognition of the overfishing that has occurred.³ The limits come in the form of an annual months-long ban on fishing in a large part of the South China Sea, which overlaps with the claims of other states and has caused a significant increase in tensions. Dr. Yuan continues to detail the extent and consequence of these fishing bans:

... since 1999, China has also imposed ban on fishing over 128,000 square kilometers of waters in disputed territories with Vietnam; enforcement of the unilateral ban involves lengthy and regular patrols and run-in and detention of foreign fishing boats and fishermen. Viet-Nam and the Philippines have responded and retaliated in kind.⁴

¹ Stein Tonnesson, *Resolving the South China Sea Conflict*, Draft Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1999, p.16, <http://www.cliostein.com/documents/1999/99%20lec%20resolving%20the%20south%20china%20sea%20conflict.pdf>

² Dr. Jingdong Yuan, *Emerging Maritime Rivalry in the South China Sea: Territorial Disputes, Sea-Lane Security & the Pursuit of Power*, International Security Research and Outreach Programme, International & Intelligence Bureau, Centre for International Security Studies, Summer 2012, p.18, http://www.international.gc.ca/isrop-prisi/assets/pdfs/Report-South_China_Sea.pdf

³ Wang Xiaodong, "Bans Help Replenish Sea Fish Stocks," *China Daily*, December 12, 2017, accessed September 21, 2018, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/27/WS5a42ec6fa31008cf16da3a41.html>

⁴ Dr. Yuan, *Emerging Maritime Rivalry in South China Sea: Territorial Disputes, Sea-Lane Security & Pursuit of Power*, p.22.

China's encroachment upon the fishing resources of the South China Sea destabilize the fishing industry. Indeed, China's policies reduce the ability of fishermen to meet their target catches and deprive the region of the political certainty needed to manage the fishing stocks of the South China Sea for the benefit of all claimant states, as well as the other nations that consume its catch. In other words, with no country clearly in charge of the waters that comprise the South China Sea, the fishing industry has no idea which set of rules to abide by and no incentive to husband resources to ensure a continually viable fishing stock. The ability of China to manage the fishing industry of disputed waters and curtail the fishing industry of other claimant states from access constitutes an economic threat.

China's hegemonic activities in the South China Sea not only creates an economic threat to claimant states, as discussed previously with regard to oil, natural gas and fishing industries. China also poses an economic threat to the oil exploration industry of external Powers like the United States as the threat is not regionally contained. Leszek Buszynski elaborates in his document on how China uses its claims to prevent U.S.' oil companies working on behalf of other claimant states from exploring in the region. China argues that oil companies operating in the South China Sea are a violation of its territorial sovereignty and integrity. China also threatens American companies' other Chinese business interests should they not heed the warnings about operating in the South China Sea. In the words of Buszynski:

China warned the American oil company ExxonMobil when it signed a preliminary cooperation agreement with PetroVietnam relating to an exploration project in the South China Sea. It claimed that this activity would "infringe on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the South China Sea". China's Foreign Ministry threatened the American company saying that if it went ahead with the project it would jeopardise its future business on the Mainland.¹

Indeed, U.S. apprehensions increased due to China's policy of intimidating U.S. oil companies considering new oil ventures off the coast of Viet-Nam in 2008. Thus, the economic threats that China imposed was considered a threat to U.S. commercial interests in the region. Such perception was increased by China's harassment of the USNS Impeccable and other U.S. naval ships, constituting a threat to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.² The freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is among the economic threats China imposes on the region besides threats to the operation of U.S. oil companies. Paul Pedrozo validates the U.S.' stance on freedom of navigation operations, due to China's hegemonic activities:

Over the past several years, China has engaged in a series of provocative actions in the South China Sea that have heightened tensions and raised regional concerns over Beijing's self-proclaimed "peaceful" intentions. Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels have bullied and intimidated rival claimants. People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and naval vessels have engaged in unsafe and unprofessional air and maritime behavior in violation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Rules of the Air and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Collision Regulations (COLREGS). China has also embarked on a massive land reclamation program to expand disputed features and construct artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, and there is growing evidence that China is militarizing these features.

... China's irresponsible and unexplained actions hinder regional efforts to manage and resolve the South China Sea territorial and maritime disputes peacefully. As a result, over the past several years, the Departments of State and Defense have sought to reinvigorate the FON Program to ensure China's unlawful maritime claims are regularly and consistently challenged by U.S. naval and air forces.³

¹ Leszek Buszynski, "Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Prospects for a Resolution of the Issue," *Security Challenges*, 6, n.2 (Winter 2010), p.90, <https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol6no2Buszynski.pdf>

² Taylor M. Fravel, *Policy Report: U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, p.4-5.

³ Raul Pedrozo, "The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program: South China Sea Focus," in *Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. The National Institute for Defense Studies, p.99, accessed September 28, 2018, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2017/e-06.pdf>

The United States seeks to insure that maritime shipping can transit freely through international waters in the South China Sea without disturbance. The United States takes any possible interference to such sea-lanes seriously. According to LCDR Sainath Patrick Panjeti, the South China Sea accounts for “30% of the world’s maritime trade transits annually—including approximately \$1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States.”¹ These ships will be forced to find a new, less optimal, route to their destination in the event of a conflict, pay a premium for insurance and the auxiliary effects will cause disruptions to global economies.² With such economic interests at stake, the U.S. is committed to operating the Freedom of Navigation Operations to secure these sea-lanes from China’s encroachment.

The United States, throughout history, has expanded its influence in the South China Sea, partially to secure trade routes and sea-lanes. For example, the United States’ naval participation to deter China’s missile tests in the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996 was not just to protect Taiwan’s status, but to ensure that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea would still operate in practice and the region is still accessible for global free trade. Some authors stress that since the U.S.’ response to the Straits Crisis, China has stated its support for the principle of freedom of navigation. Timo Kivimäki outlines such premise in his document as follows:

On 10 May 1995, the U.S. foreign minister warned local governments against moves that could endanger the security of sea-lanes. The U.S. naval reaction to the PRC’s missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 was not just meant to bolster Taiwan’s democracy, but to demonstrate Washington’s resolve to protect the freedom of navigation, as a prerequisite to global free trade. The PRC has since been eager to affirm that it also intends to uphold and safeguard the freedom of navigation.³

Yet, China’s support for the freedom of navigation has fallen significantly short of its rhetoric. Hindrance on the part of China for allowing foreign naval ships (including U.S. warships) to traverse its claimed EEZ is cited by Bonnie Glaser as indicative of limitations on Chinese support for the freedom of navigation:

Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China’s development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies.⁴

For that reason, the United States further realized the importance of maintaining a long-term presence in the South China Sea through FONOP operations in order to protect such sea lanes from interruption. In other words, economic threats from China drove the United States to realize the importance of expanding its influence in the South China Sea in order to protect its own interests.

Regional Instability. China’s growing influence in the South China Sea through military modernization, expansion, and installations have drawn concerns among the United States and claimant states in the region regarding regional instability, a concern that is critical to their national interest. According to the Boston Global Forum document:

¹ Sainath Patrick Panjeti, LCDR, U.S. Navy, “Preserving Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea and the Strategic Significance of the Philippines to U.S. Maritime Strategy,” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, October 6, 2016), p.1, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020341.pdf>

² Bonnie S. Glaser, *Contingency planning memorandum no. 14: Armed Clash in the South China Sea*, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, April 2012, p.4, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2012/04/CPA_contingencymemo_14.pdf

³ Timo Kivimäki, “War Or Peace In The South China Sea?,” Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2002, p.59, <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:789761/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

⁴ Glaser, *Contingency planning memorandum no. 14: Armed Clash in the South China Sea*, p.3.

China's influence-seeking efforts in the South China Sea are obvious. China uses its most advanced military techniques in support of these activities, and the resulting instability extends beyond Southeast Asia. China's investment in cyber-weapons, artificial intelligence, drones, naval vessels, and its shrinking of Asian military distances through long-range weaponry and the construction of artificial island military air fields are threatening regional stability.¹

China's specific activities introduced by the Boston Global Forum constitutes the threat China imposes on the region. These activities allow China to inch closer towards gaining the upper hand in the South China Sea which raise concerns among claimant states and external powers to their national interests and how threats to regional stability would manifest from Chinese strategy. Regional stability benefits claimant states and the United States by protecting economic affluence, reducing the incentive to spend limited resources on security competition, limiting risks to sea-lanes and diminishing risks to international investment.² These are the interests at stake when considering the rise of China's military power in the region. M. Taylor Fravel illustrates in his policy report the ends to which China's military could be used and their threats to regional stability:

Regional stability faces several threats in the South China Sea. The first is the potential for armed conflict among the various claimants in the disputes over the territorial sovereignty of land features such as islands and coral heads and over maritime rights such as an Exclusive Economic Zone.³

There have been several incidents throughout the past between China and claimant states that have caused clashes over sovereignty, such as the Paracel islands, Johnson Reef, and Mischief Reef incidents. The nature of these conflicts are characterized by Fravel as "zero-sum" game that further describes the territorial disputes as vulnerable to escalation into an out of control crisis. Moreover, there have been several incidents where China has harassed military ships and personnel of claimant states and external powers like the United States and Japan which would escalate the risks of accidental conflicts. Fravel further details the second and third threats to regional stability:

A second threat to stability would be the increasingly frequent use of coercive measures short of armed conflict to advance a state's claims. China's threats to American oil companies in the region in 2007 and 2008 provide one example of such coercive behaviour that can increase instability. A third threat would be on-going naval modernisation in the region.⁴

Such modernization has been noticed among China and Viet-Nam respectively. China's South Sea Fleet has gone through several rounds of modernizing while Vietnam has correspondingly upgraded its naval and air forces through the purchase of Russian submarines, with the view towards using them for its area denial capability in the South China Sea. As a result, the territorial and maritime disputes between China and claimant states continues to pose a risk of evolving into wider race of capabilities, with heightened security competition and an increased risk of armed conflict.

Fravel continues with the fourth threat to regional stability where China and the U.S. compete for military superiority and the ability to deny the other access to the region that could result in heightened competition for regional access and increased instability. In the words of Fravel, this source of instability:

¹ Boston Global Forum, *Chinese Disputes in the South China Sea: Risks and Solutions for the Asia-Pacific* (Boston: 2015), p.1-2, <https://bostonglobalforum.org/wp-content/uploads/BGF-Report-16-10-2015-official.pdf>

² Fravel, *Policy Report: U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea since 1995*, p.3.

³ Fravel, p.3.

⁴ Fravel, p.3.

...would be the potential for a spiral around efforts by China and the United States over threatening and maintaining access, respectively. In response to new Chinese “anti-access/area denial” capabilities, including an anti-ship ballistic missile, the United States military has developed a new operational concept known as Air-Sea Battle intended to ensure U.S. access to these waters in wartime. Peacetime efforts to develop such capabilities could result in an “access” arms race and increased instability.¹

The “access” arms race that Fravel writes is not a conventional arms race but a strategy used by each country to deny the other the ability to operate militarily in the South China Sea in the event of a conflict. The competition for access and access-denial is ripe for escalation, which could result in hostile military encounters similar to past incidents involving China and the United States. These potential encounters each pose a danger to regional stability were they to materialize. In addition to the United States’ concerns of China’s shifting capabilities and its relationship to access to maritime waters, freedom of overflight was another potential flashpoint that threatened regional stability. Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael McDevitt in their foreign policy briefing details the worries of the United States concerning China’s potential strategy to impede air access in the South China Sea:

There is concern that China might seek to impose an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, such as it has announced in the East China Sea and of the kind that many other countries, including the United States, have established. Establishment of a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea, covering an area claimed by a number of other countries, would be destabilizing, would heighten tensions and should be strongly discouraged.²

The authors do not view the threat to aviation in the South China Sea as immediate, and are further skeptical of China’s ability to enforce such a directive. However, the establishment of an ADIZ in the South China Sea would set further precedent for actions by China that will constrain the United States’ ability to ensure free access to the South China Sea or the freedom of overflight and stability in the region.

Diplomacy

Conflict-Resolution. There have been efforts to achieve conflict resolution in the South China Sea by claimant states and the U.S. The incentive of claimant states to resolve their conflict with China is clear, as a resolution would mean the avoidance of potential war and the security of claimant states’ sovereignty. In the 1992 Manila meeting, claimant states reemphasized their position through an initiative declaring their support for a negotiated resolution multilaterally. However, China stressed its desire to negotiate its South China Sea conflicts on a bilateral basis. The difference between the two approaches resulted in a lack of common ground regarding the forum for diplomatic discussions on this issue. Tonnesson gives a synopsis of attempts at conflict-resolution as well as the differences between China and ASEAN states’ preferred method of negotiation:

When meeting in Manila in 1992, the then six foreign ministers of ASEAN adopted a “Declaration on the South China Sea” in which they emphasized “the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resorting to force.” All of the ASEAN countries seem willing to engage in multilateral negotiations. The PRC, however, has so far insisted that it will only negotiate bilaterally with each of the other claimant states, not in a multilateral forum. China has repeatedly declared itself in favour of the principle of “joint development,” a formula which might form a premise for conflict resolution, but has not specified what it means by “joint development.”³

¹ Fravel, p.3.

² Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal & Michael McDevitt, *Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective*, The Foreign Policy Brief, Brookings Institute, August 2014, p.6, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt.pdf>

³ Tonnesson, *Resolving the South China Sea Conflict*, p.28.

China has promoted the Joint Development principle since the 1970s but has only offered the most general explanation of what a scheme would entail. Gu Junfeng provides a description of Joint Development in his document:

It [Joint Development] is usually used as a “generic term” and extends from unitization of a single resource straddling an international boundary to joint development of a shared resource where boundary delimitation is shelved because it is not feasible or possible to reach an agreed boundary at the time. Generally, boundary delimitation is a competition of to win or to lose, but in the mode of “joint development”, parties can share resources and reach a win-win result. In areas with multiple claimants, such as the SCS, it may be difficult for the parties to resolve the disputes through negotiation, especially if sovereignty disputes are also involved. Hence it is generally agreed that the most viable interim solution for managing the disputes in the SCS is for the claimants to set aside the sovereignty disputes and jointly develop the natural resources.¹

Joint Development offers the advantages of sidestepping the issue of sovereignty while allowing all nations involved to benefit economically from the natural resources of the disputed waters. However, entrance into any agreement usually involves good-faith intentions in order for the goals of Joint Development to be accomplished. Given that the region is experiencing tensions due to sovereignty disputes, it is difficult for claimant states to set aside their high guard for their sovereignty and agree on a jointly developed natural resources. China’s hegemonic activities have removed any incentive that other nations would have to hold economic development above a final resolution on matters of sovereignty. Moreover, the insistence by China on bilateral negotiations for any final boundary settlement is further complicated by the other claimant states’ disputed borders among themselves that would also have to be settled and cannot be adequately addressed in a non-multilateral setting.

Indonesia has had its course to promote diplomatic solutions for sovereignty conflicts in the South China Sea. Indonesia has instituted series of workshops in an attempt to facilitate multilateral dialogue that will improve Track II diplomacy (non-governmental dialogue) initiatives regarding disputes in the region. In the words of Tonnesson:

After ten years of track II workshops [1990-1999], the prospects of such negotiations remains remote. Many commentators therefore claim that the results of the costly workshop process have been meager. They see the main stumbling blocks in the Chinese reluctance to go along with multilateral schemes, and to engage in genuine talks in the presence of representatives of Taiwan. It may be argued, however, that the workshops have had effects of a less tangible kind. New generations of experts have acquainted themselves with each other, and may form a critical mass in the future behind a process of conflict resolution.²

Tonnesson argues that diplomatic initiatives are stifled by China’s refusal to negotiate multilaterally with claimant states and its reluctance to engage Taiwan in any diplomatic forum. Despite this reluctance, the workshops are seen by Tonnesson as a way to provide a forum for potential negotiators and leaders of respective claimant states to serve the process of conflict resolution and increase the utility of Track II diplomacy.

Non-governmental organizations have been founded in Indonesia with the goal to advance conflict resolution in the South China Sea. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asian Pacific (CSCAP) is a one such organization whose aim is to further track II diplomacy for conflict resolution. The CSCAP membership includes countries outside the region such as Australia, Russia, Canada, European Union and

¹ Junfeng, “Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea: from ‘Joint Development’ to ‘Joint Protection’”, p.6.

² Tonnesson, *Resolving the South China Sea Conflict*, p.27.

the United States. These countries among ASEAN states have collaborated through workshops to create guidelines for regional maritime cooperation and security which should feed from Track II diplomacy to formal diplomacy.¹ It was among the efforts that ASEAN states adopted in order to achieve conflict-resolution peacefully and advance the other common interests that claimant states have regarding maritime cooperation and security.

A part of these efforts is the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The ARF was created as a means of allowing governments in Southeast Asia to respond to the South China Sea conflict.² The end goal of the ARF is the progression of confidence-building measures towards preventative diplomacy and a robust conflict-resolution capability.³ In their document, Whasun Jho and Soo A Chae asserts that ASEAN states and powerful states as a part of the ARF work towards that goal but the behavior of these powerful states limit the accomplishments of the ARF. These states base their decisions on positions that serve their national interests even if it means taking a passive approach to outcomes that emerge from the ARF diplomatic initiative or changing the roles of the ARF to serve their national interests.⁴ According to Jho and Chae, this means that, “the formation, operation, and roles of multilateral institutions depend mainly on the interests of powerful nations...”⁵

The striving of powerful states to realize their national interests often supersedes the ability of multilateral institutions like the ARF to foster international cooperation through diplomacy when these two aims do not coincide. Powerful states then define their degree of participation with the ARF based upon their “functional relations with their national interests.”⁶ Subsequently, “they decide their participation strategies according to these national interests”⁷ and as a result, powerful states’ participation strategies are also subject to change when national interests shift over time.

Before 1997, China’s participation in the ARF was limited as it was not interested in any participation of multilateral negotiation for the South China Sea conflicts. China’s perception of the ARF was as a front for continued United States’ influence at the expense of Chinese expansionary interests. Despite this perception, China still viewed a minimal level of participation as beneficial for maintaining communication with ASEAN states and possibly reducing United States’ influence, an essential national interest for China. In 1997, China shifted course and started to actively participate in multilateral institutions like the ARF. China’s pivot was pursued to achieve outcomes more favorable to itself. It viewed multilateralism as a policy that has abundant advantages towards its national interests. The first advantage for China was reducing the magnitude of United States’ influence over ASEAN states by enhancing relations with these states and reducing their mistrust of China. The second advantage allowed China to pursue energy security (the oil and natural gas in the South China Sea) through diplomacy and kept rival claimants in check. The third advantage allowed China to advocate for a multipolar regional order instead of a unipolar international order dominated by the United States. Since there was a fluctuation of China’s participation in the ARF and its diplomatic initiatives for conflict resolution, the purpose was only to serve its own agenda and “increase its voice in the hope that the ARF could benefit its own interests.”⁸

¹ Tonnesson, p.27.

² Whasun Jho & Soo A Chae, “Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum.” *Pacific Focus*, XXIX, n.2 (August 2014), p.237.

³ “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),” Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed May 1, 2017, <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/Pages/asean-regional-forum-arf.aspx>

⁴ Jho & Chae, “Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” p.239.

⁵ Jho & Chae, p.239.

⁶ Jho & Chae, p.242.

⁷ Jho & Chae, p.242.

⁸ Jho & Chae, p.248.

To the United States, the ARF was a low priority to its interests during this time. “The United States believed that multilateralism, such as the ARF, could not be substituted for existing U.S. bilateral alliances and would conduct an agenda unrelated to its interest goals and so participated far more passively.”¹ The United States valued the strength of its hegemony above active multilateral participation in the ARF. Moreover, the United States supposed that the cost of protecting its economic and political interests in the region outweighed the benefits they would receive from their ARF participation. Nevertheless, the United States did not completely refuse involvement in the ARF but was only active to the extent that its existing alliances were not threatened. The United States also wanted to use ARF membership to have good relations with claimant states, to strengthen its alliances, and maintain a superior position over China at a low cost. The United States diplomatic strategy for the region was not entirely dependent upon its membership in the ARF. “Multilateralism was a complementary tool for their [U.S.] pre-existing bilateralism in the region.”²

In the mid 2000s, the tenor of U.S.’ participation in the ARF changed to a more active strategy to reflect new political realities. The reasons for this change are outlined by Whasun Jho and Soo A Chae:

The South China Sea conflict began to intensify towards the mid-2000s around the same time that the ARF’s conflict resolution proved ineffective. This was due in large part to the U.S. changes in its position with Southeast Asia, shifting from a passive and conservative approach to more expansionary diplomatic strategy. The most important reasons for stronger U.S. participation in the ARF were: first, the United States was threatened by post-9/11 and Chinese expansion in the region and wanted to maintain its position as the supreme regional power in Asia; and second, the United States sought to secure energy sources essential to its continuing economic power development and to secure an easily accessible sea route to the East Asian market.³

Like China, the fluctuation of the United States’ participation in conflict resolution initiatives in the ARF is based upon whether such involvements serve the national interests and strategies of the Great Power participants. Indeed, in an anarchical international system, nation-states find it imperative to pursue their own self-interests, placing such a pursuit above all others. As a result, in Whasun Jho and Soo A Chae’s view, international institutions created in an anarchic environment and at the crossroads of great-power interests will eventually become a forum for powerful states to pursue their own goals. This pursuit will usurp the original purpose for said institution and often render its original goals as an afterthought. The multilateral institution will become a means to validate and rationalize the existing order that benefits powerful states. As in the case of the ARF, China and the United States compete for regional hegemony and utilize the ARF’s diplomatic initiative for conflict resolution when it serves the respective country’s national interests, even when concessions might otherwise achieve peaceful resolution of the South China Sea conflict. In addition, the priority that powerful states place on their own interests and restraining their rival’s interests limits the extent of true cooperation that is possible through a multilateral institution like the ARF.⁴ In the end, ARF-sponsored initiatives become relatively ineffective and captive to the whims of powerful states with ulterior motives.

Power

Strategic Alliances. The rise of China has imposed several threats to energy security, trade routes, freedom of navigation, regional stability and territorial sovereignty of claimant states. Because of the

¹ Jho & Chae, p.249.

² Jho & Chae, p.250.

³ Jho & Chae, p.250.

⁴ Jho & Chae, p.241.

shortcomings of diplomatic initiatives to resolve these threats accompanied by China's assertiveness and encroachment in the South China Sea, weaker states have formed alliances and partnerships, especially with the United States and other external Powers like Japan and Australia in order to bring such power to their side. Claimant states have realized the importance of possessing sufficient military power to check China's threats. Claimant states' alliances with external powers comes at a point of conclusion that power is a key element in any geo-political confrontation. For that reason, claimant states strive to acquire such power through strategic alliances, especially with the United States.

Bonnie Glaser illustrates in her memorandum the outcome that claimant states would encounter if the U.S.' military and strategic commitments were absent from the region. According to Glaser:

If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims.¹

The presence of the United States dissuades claimant states from an arms buildup needed to fill the power-vacuum resulting from the difference between them and China and allow claimant states to be more assertive without shouldering all of the burden of confronting a more powerful China. Furthermore, claimant states are less likely to be accommodative to China's demands and are able to make decisions free of intimidation. The United States ensures that China is not able to consolidate complete control over the region and tempt other states to band-wagon, while also maintaining the veracity of its other security commitments outside the region as a global actor. In other words, countries are more apt to consider the United States' commitments in a more serious and dependable light, given that its commitments are related to stabilizing the region and changing the nature of the relationship between claimant states and China to the benefit of claimant states.

China's aggression, island expansion, and military intimidation has created a backlash in its regional competition with the United States. It has driven claimant states reject concessions to China and instead form alliances and cooperate with the United States while consequently strengthening the United States' influence in the region vis-à-vis China. According to congressional testimony by Admiral Dennis Blair:

China's hard line and aggressive action have been completely unsuccessful in gaining concessions from rival claimants in the South China Sea. On the contrary, the other claimants have all reached out to other countries for support, primarily to the United States. China has paid a heavy price for its aggressive activities in the hostility of the other claimant states and the strengthened American position in the region for the relatively minor gains it has made in island enlargement and naval coercion. Viet-Nam, Philippines and Malaysia have all welcomed American military exercises using their bases. They have also strengthened their own military and maritime law enforcement organizations, although none of them is a match for China's, and they have been partially successful in forming a unified front against China in ASEAN.²

¹ Glaser, *Contingency Planning Memorandum n. 14: Armed Clash in the South China Sea*, p.4.

² Dennis C. Blair, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific & International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, July 13, 2016, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg27231/html/CHRG-114shrg27231.htm>

The extent of China's actions in the South China Sea have clearly not gone far enough to entice band-wagoning behavior. If anything, a "reverse band-wagoning" effect has occurred with claimant states more willing to embrace the United States as a security partner. The United States in-turn has used the threat posed by China to its advantage. It has orchestrated a strategy to expand its influence in the South China Sea to gain an upper-hand regarding its hegemonic competition with China. This strategy is built on strategic alliances and cooperation defined through bilateral relations with claimant states such as the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Malaysia, and other major Powers in East Asia, like Japan. All operate for regional stability and security on one hand while countering China's rise on the other. In the words of U.S. Admiral Dennis C. Blair:

The United States has taken advantage of China's heavy-handed and aggressive actions in the South China Sea to strengthen its bilateral relations, including its defense cooperation, with the other claimant countries. It is cooperating closely with the Philippines in maritime exercises, it has removed its prior prohibitions on the sales of lethal military equipment to Vietnam, and it routinely deploys surveillance aircraft to Malaysian bases. Both the United States and Japan are pursuing assistance programs to the air and maritime forces of the other claimant countries. China believes that the United States is orchestrating a sophisticated South China Sea strategy using China's rival claimants to constrain China's growing power in the region.¹

Indeed, the United States desires for its strategic partners to more closely cooperate with each other to create a "networked regional security architecture." Such an architecture would allow claimant states and other states like Japan and Australia to shoulder a greater share of the military expense of collective security. In addition to Japan's cooperation *with* the Philippines and Vietnam, strategic cooperation continues *between* Viet-Nam and the Philippines, as well as between Australia and South Korea, with all serving as a catalyst to the United States influence that is partially driven to limit China's growing power. The result of all this cooperation places the United States at the hub of an alliance structure with the aforementioned states working closely to secure such a security architecture.²

The United States is not a passive cheerleader in these efforts. The U.S. actively encourages and facilitates cooperation between claimant states through the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). This partner capacity building program initiated by the Pentagon aims to increase the capabilities that claimant states would otherwise not possess to actively observe their own waters and share relevant intelligence with each other. The end goal is to build a more regionally oriented security capability among claimant states.³ According to congressional testimony by Kurt Campbell:

...the Pentagon has begun to implement the Maritime Security Initiative, with the important support of this committee. This partner capacity building program seeks to help states improve their maritime domain awareness capabilities so that they can monitor their waters more effectively and share information with other actors. This program is laudable because it not only gives much-needed maritime aid, but because it encourages recipients to network those capabilities. In so doing it seeks to enable and empower regional partners to contribute to regional stability.⁴

The program is a function of strategic alliances and cooperation between states in the region. It also shows how the United States contributes to claimant states' ability to implement collective security

¹ Blair, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea."

² Kurt Campbell, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea," *Hearing Before The Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific And International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, July 13, 2016, <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114shrg27231/html/CHRG-114shrg27231.htm>

³ Campbell, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea."

⁴ Campbell, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea."

measures for regional stability. Strategic alliances and partnerships between and among claimant states, as well as external powers have as a primary goal the impression upon China that its military expansion, land reclamation at new locations, and enforcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, will be perceived as malign in intent and will provoke a response from the United States and its allies.¹ This response ensures that Chinese actions are not without cost or negative consequence to China. It also puts a check on China's power and complicates any attempts to intimidate weaker claimant states through military might alone. This situation exposes a competition between China and the United States over influence to determine the future status of the South China Sea.

Deterrence.

"Credible extended deterrence convinces adversaries that the risks of aggression far outweigh any benefit."² The United States seeks to assure China and others that its military capabilities and deployments are for the purpose of deterring against unprovoked aggression and to send the message that any encroachment towards destabilizing the region and threatening United States' allies would initiate a response that outweighs any benefit that China would seek to acquire. Joshua Kurlantzick elaborates in his report on the efforts the United States has undertaken in the South China Sea to deter China such as U.S. Naval maneuvers, declaration of United States' policy, arms sales and joint exercises. Among the strategies the United States adopted is sending U.S. Naval vessels into the South China Sea to demonstrate the commitment that the United States has to its partners and the freedom of navigation. "The United States has already used a variant of this strategy by purposefully sending B-52 bombers through disputed areas claimed by China as its air defense zone without informing China in advance."³ This use of military maneuvers is clearly among the efforts the United States undertakes to demonstrate power and to deter China from being a regional hegemon. Kurlantzick argues that deterrence has other dimensions, like diplomacy. In outlining options for contingency planning in the region, Kurlantzick emphasizes in his report the importance that diplomacy has in recommending courses of action for the United States:

A second step [in using declarations of U.S. policy to deter China] could be to use public and private diplomacy to clarify U.S. commitments to allies with claims in the South China Sea. U.S. leaders could state publicly that U.S. forces will come to the aid of any treaty allies if they face unprovoked attacks in areas of the South China Sea claimed by multiple countries.⁴

Indeed, clarifying to China that the United States will function as a bulwark against any military weakness of treaty allies is a form of deterrence in its own right. Kurlantzick asserts that the United States has adopted this strategy in 2014 by approving U.S. lethal arms sales to Viet-Nam in addition to aircraft and naval vessels. The United States has also engaged in military exercises with Viet-Nam in order to strengthen its defense capabilities and to act as a joint collective deterrent capability with the United States vis-à-vis China. In the words of Joshua Kurlantzick:

A third step [in using arms sales and joint exercises to deter China] could be to upgrade Vietnam's defense capabilities by expanding the range of U.S. lethal arms sales to Hanoi, which Congress approved in Autumn 2014, to include aircraft and naval vessels. The United States also could help improve Viet-Nam's defenses by developing annual U.S.-Viet-Nam combat exercises. These types

¹ Campbell, "U.S. Policy Options in the South China Sea."

² Robert A. Manning, "The Future of US Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025," Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, October 2014, p.1, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Future_US_Ext_Det_in_Asia.pdf

³ Joshua Kurlantzick, *A China-Vietnam Military Clash*, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventative Action, Contingency Planning Memorandum n. 26, September 2015, p.5.

⁴ Kurlantzick, p.5.

of deterrence could put U.S., Vietnamese, and Chinese forces into close proximity and heighten the risk of miscalculation. Yet deterrence could be effective in stopping China from projecting power in ways that could provoke a confrontation with its neighbors.¹

Robert Manning in his document analyzes the deterring response of the United States towards China's anti-access/area denial (A2AD) strategy. Manning shows that the United States takes the threat of Chinese military forces seriously enough to plan detailed countermeasures in the event of a conflict:

U.S. planners have responded [to A2AD] with the concept of AirSea battle (ASB), a joint forces effort designed "to ensure freedom of action in the global commons" that is "intended to assure allies and deter potential adversaries." A Department of Defense document says, "The ASB Concept's solution to the A2AD challenge in the global commons is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces."²

The AirSea Battle (ASB) strategy outlines the responsive actions the United States would take to impair China's ability to project forces in the region and involve numerous military targets in China itself. Part of the deterrent strategy of the ASB involves an early and overwhelming strike in the event of a conflict that eliminates China's ability to retaliate. The development of such a strategy is due to China's increasing military capabilities that are often tit-for-tat with corresponding United States capabilities and the growing possibility of a conflict between two nuclear powers. Manning further clarifies the purpose for this strategy by stating "...ASB is an important concept to signal to both China and the U.S. allies that the United States has answers to A2AD challenges that could undermine extended deterrence."³

Joshua Kurlantzick and Robert Manning in their respective documents emphasize that the United States' deterrent role towards China is inevitable in order to protect its own interests and prevent the rise of China as a regional hegemon. However, deterrence can take place through an alliance system in which the United States cooperates with and enhances the capabilities of claimant states on military affairs in order to contain China, a common goal. This type of cooperation requires the United States to assure its alliances that it is capable of meeting its security obligations. Thus, a conclusion common to both documents, is that assurance by the United States is an overlapping and significant component of deterrence, even though the two terms are not completely interchangeable. Assurance "is a policy objective seeking to convince an ally of the United States' ability to fulfill its security commitments."⁴ The ability of the United States to assure allies of its intentions and the extent to which these assurances are taken seriously can be viewed as an exercise of influence. Therefore, a key part of the United States' influence in the South China Sea is to assure allies of its ability and willingness to deter China.

Balance of Power.

The balance of power is a strategic means adopted by states to achieve global security and peace by distributing military power to the extent that one state is never strong enough to dominate the other. The balance of power is a strategy that states utilize to respond to the rise of Great Powers and attempts by said Powers to expand their security at their expense. These states try to achieve such a regional balance in order to avoid finding themselves in a weak state of national power, the avoidance of which is critical to survival and security. This is the case in the South China Sea. Claimant states give the opportunity for external Powers, like the United States to expand their influence in the region through economic and military alliance with themselves and other Powers, like Japan and Australia. The main

¹ Kurlantzick, p.6.

² Manning, *The Future of U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025*, p.6-7.

³ Manning, p.7.

⁴ Manning, Executive Summary.

purpose is to avoid a weak state of power vis-à-vis China's rising hegemony by keeping the United States involved as a regional "balancer" seeking to fill the power vacuum that a rising China presents.

The regional balance the United States provides in the South China Sea is a counter-weight to competition from China. The United States tends to maximize its military power to meet the needs required to rebalance against China's rising power. Namrata Goswami sheds light upon this type of competition in her document from a realist perspective:

Classical Realism and structural/defensive Realism both argue that the most apt response to the rise of new powers is maximising security through a balance of power. Alternatively, 'offensive realism' argues that states must maximise relative power through a policy of containment and perhaps preventive war. The fear projected is that if China becomes an economic power, this would translate into military power. Great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states; their ultimate aim is to be the Hegemon, the only Great Power in the system. The logic follows that the U.S. wants no peer competitor. China's rise as a potential regional hegemon is therefore disconcerting to the U.S.¹

There is a fear from the United States that China would become a regional Hegemon sustaining economic and military power that upsets the existing regional balance at the expense of its position as a Global Power. The United States, in response, plays the role of a powerful off-shore "Balancer" to shift power in favor of its global interests and responsibility to preserve the post-World War II Global Liberal Order the Western Allies had created, claimant states, and other strategic regional allies such as Japan and Australia to protect their own national interests.

From a neo-Realist perspective, Namrata Goswami asserts that the distribution of capabilities defines political relations and states' behavior in the international system. A State that has higher relative capabilities compared to its neighbors' capabilities could proceed to construct a unipolar regional order. This is the case if China were to be left to its own devices. However, Goswami acknowledges that Unipolarity, to the extent it may occur in the South China Sea, is not a permanent state of affairs and one that will soon be replaced by the balance of power in which other nations rebalance, rise, and compete for power with none attaining true dominance. She emphasizes that the balance of power is an iterative process, with new iterations of balancing occurring over time. The change in balancing among states will eventually result in substantially different regional orders due to this process.

In the case of South-East Asia, there is a shift from Unipolarity to Multipolarity. Goswami asserts that the shift is from a United States dominated world and regional order to one whereby China and Japan are rising and possess greater relative capabilities in terms of power along with the United States.² Given that Japan is allied with the United States, and both are allied with substantial powers like Australia and South Korea, it indeed reflects the emergence of a multipolar system in Southeast Asia. The multipolar system arises to serve the needs of the regional order in which states form alliances to balance against a rising power like China. Therefore, Multipolarity could be perceived as a natural response from states to achieve the balance of power to the benefit of regional order.

The United States and its alliances did not just act as balancers to the region without the approval of regional states. The United States, its allies, and claimant states share common national interests in the South China Sea. According to Clarence Bouchat's report:

¹ Namrata Goswami, "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism," The Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, *Perceptions*, Spring 2013, XVIII, Number 1, p.7, http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013//06/Namrata_Goswami.pdf

² Goswami, p.9.

The United States and the region's powers need each other's support to achieve their shared interests of preventing conflict and developing stability and prosperity in the South China Sea region, especially for freedom of navigation and access to the resources of this regional commons. The Southeast Asian states have traditionally been wary of China's growing military capability and assertiveness, which have put each at an economic, political, and military disadvantage, but these states have been unable to coalesce or effectively counter China on their own. China's antagonism sometimes pushes these Southeast Asian states to seek more U.S. diplomatic and military presence to balance the Chinese hegemon.¹

Claimant states' perception of balance does not require a uniform behavior among states. However, they require a common goal. This common goal is to create a security paradigm that prevents the encroachment of the rising power and limits its hegemonic ambition. States' behavior and security measures vary based upon the capability of each state and for that reason, weaker states seek an anchor that solidifies their security strategy through its enhanced military capability and world status. In this case, it is the United States. Moreover, realists view balancing as "a strategy of survival in an anarchic international order"² and consequently take the stance that China's activities are concerning enough to claimant states and the U.S. to justify a balancing strategy. Congruent to these concerns, the United States seeks to achieve a balance of power through the presence of its military power and alliances with claimant states on one hand, and external states like Japan, Australia and South Korea on the other.

Power Struggle.

The struggle for power can be seen as the struggle of nations competing for influence in a given region. In the case of the South China Sea, the United States and China compete for influence and ultimately, power. The United States uses its military presence to protect its influence, guard its interests, and protect its allies while also preventing China from gaining status as the preeminent power in the region. On the other hand, China seeks to increase its own influence and achieve a level of dominance over its neighbors while diminishing the influence of rival hegemons, especially the United States. The outcome is a power struggle between the United States and China that is characterized by a hegemonic competition among them.

The nature of hegemonic competition between the United States and China arises out of the aim of each state to preserve and enhance their geopolitical position as great powers. The United States, as the preeminent world hegemon since the end of the cold war, must limit the rise of China to maintain its status. An important goal to this end is an enduring relative economic and military dominance over China as an underpinning of the United States' influence in the region. China's rise presents a serious challenge to the United States as its economic growth has not only improved its relative geo-political position, but has provided the means for a modernization of its armed forces and allowed it to engage in hegemonic activities in the South China Sea that imposes a threat on the United States' interests. The result is China expanding its regional influence and striving for greater hegemonic power. The ability of China to achieve its goals will only be possible if the United States' influence in the region wanes. This will be accomplished by China maintaining a cooperative relationship with its neighbors accompanied by economic incentives that may encourage them to bandwagon, leaving the United States in a weak position relative to its alliances. On the other hand, the United States utilizes its diplomatic and military reach to keep its alliances and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. Thus, a struggle for power between the United States and China is unavoidable.

¹ Clarence Bouchat, "U.S. Land-Power in the South China Sea," (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, July 2017), p.16-17.

² Goswami, "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism," p.10.

To Paul H.B. Godwin, China has undertaken a strategy to weaken the United States' influence. This strategy encompasses two corresponding courses of action, with an active diplomatic effort designed to increase China's regional influence as well as a modernization of its armed forces and purchase of military equipment from Russia.¹ Despite China's strategy to increase its influence, China will face significant pushback from the United States and claimant states as Godwin points out in his document that China's strategy will not take place in a vacuum.

Countering American power and influence over the next decade or two could well be a near-term objective. Beijing's long-term purpose could be to engage the United States in a strategic competition with the objective of supplanting U.S. influence in maritime Asia. If displacing U.S. influence is China's long-term objective, Beijing faces an extremely difficult task. Most of the states on Asia's maritime periphery view China's growing power, especially its growing military capabilities, as their major potential external challenge. Their approach to China is therefore one of hedging against the worst possible outcome.²

Indeed, claimant states interests converge with the United States as both view China as their major external challenge, but for different overarching reasons. The former is engaged in a conflict over sovereignty, while the latter is engaged in hegemonic competition for dominance in the region and their main rival is China. The power struggle between the United States and China is due to a distrust over each other's intentions. The United States is wary of Chinese future ambitions, especially as China gains in economic, technological and military fronts. On the other hand, China is suspicious of United States' military cooperation with Taiwan, alliances with the Philippines and Japan, and its freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. China's temporary acquiescence to the United States' position is ephemeral at best and paralleled by a robust military modernization that according to Godwin appears "to be specifically focused on countering the U.S. maritime strategy and the foreign-hosted bases enabling that strategy in the Western Pacific."³

The United States' strategy towards the region's hierarchy of power is to prevent a new hegemon in Asia however, moves taken by the United States to avoid hostility are diametrically opposed to China's ambitions as outlined by Godwin:

Long-standing U.S. policy and strategy in Asia has been to prevent hostile domination of the East Asian littoral. The United States has never had the strategic objective of becoming the hegemon of Asia. Asia is simply too vast and complex to set such a goal. U.S. policy has been to prevent the rise of a regional hegemonic power or coalition of powers. Thus, whereas the United States would oppose a Chinese thrust for hegemony, a multipolar Asia would be, or should be, as acceptable to the United States as the current bipolar Asia. Whether Beijing would find a future multipolar Asia acceptable for its security interests cannot be determined at this time. To the extent that a multipolar Asia has diminished U.S. influence, there is good reason to believe that China would find that arrangement acceptable.⁴

With China trying to become a hegemon and engaging in a strategy to displace the United States' influence while the United States tries to prevent any new hegemon from dominating Asia, a power struggle between the two states is a certainty. The United States does not have the intention of becoming

¹ Paul H.B. Godwin, "China as a Regional Hegemon," in Jim Rolfe ed., *The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition*, Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004, p.92.

² Godwin, p.92.

³ Godwin, p.100.

⁴ Godwin, p.100.


a hegemonic power. The current Bipolar power structure or a new Multipolar power structure, may be acceptable to the United States and its partners as neither scenario allows China free reign over the region. A Unipolar Asia under China extends a grand opportunity to impose Chinese claims, control trade routes and corral navigation in the sea, a position that is unacceptable to the United States and claimant states. Thus, a power struggle is inevitable and for that reason the United States continues to enhance its influence in the South China Sea to curtail China’s hegemony.

Findings and Data Analysis--Themes

Theme 1 (Sovereignty – Maritime Boundaries): The relationship between China and claimant states may resemble the relationship between China and Taiwan, with both defined by disputes over territorial integrity and sovereignty. China’s encroachment in the late 20th Century towards claimant states in the South China Sea in addition to its missile exercise in the Taiwan Straits Crisis, provides evidence of China’s aggressiveness towards its neighbors. China’s activities and the maritime boundary disputes create a considerable avenue through which other claimant states perceive their sovereignty as devalued by China. China refuses to publicly acknowledge that any opposing position regarding the disputed territories of claimant states or Taiwan could have any legitimacy, leaving no room to make concessions or negotiate their position.

Figure 1: Document Analysis and Coding Structure

Document Analysis and Coding Structure



Source: Coding technique adapted by the author from Johnny Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2009), p.12.

Theme 2 (Sovereignty--Taiwan): The United States' takes no position regarding the sovereignty of claimant states in the South China Sea. However, in the case of Taiwan, the United States considers it a part of China yet, it provides military assistance to Taiwan to deter a Chinese take-over. The extent to which the United States will go to defend Taiwan is seen as a proxy of its commitment to the defense of other allies and strategic partners in the South China Sea.

Theme 3 (Economic Threats): The South China Sea contains substantial natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and fisheries. China's claim is far larger than all other claimant states and allows for maximum control of all maritime resources. China has expanded its military to protect its natural resources in the region and intimidate other claimant states from attempting to benefit from them. This intimidation extends to harassment of oil explorations from other claimant states like Viet-Nam and the Philippines. In addition, seasonal bans on fishing have been imposed by China with a significant impact on the incomes of fishers in the South China Sea. As with claimant states, China's actions represent an ongoing threat to the oil exploration industry of the United States, disturbing sea lanes essential for global trade and the freedom of navigation, which makes China a common economic threat to both claimant states and the United States. Economic threats from China are a prime reason that the United States continues to involve itself in the South China Sea and subsequently maintain its influence to protect its interests and its allies in the region.

Theme 4 (Regional Instability): Chinese efforts to upgrade its military, artificial island airfields, and investments in other forms of warfare such as cyber weapons, naval vessels, and drones threaten regional stability, a common interest between claimant states and the United States. Regional stability protects economic activity, reduces the risks to sea-lanes, and diminishes the motivation to engage in an arms race as well as the risks of international investment. These benefits of regional stability are imperiled by the increase in China's military power in the region. Such an increase is defined as a shift in China's capabilities to threaten access to maritime waters, freedom of navigation, and overflight. All are concerns to the United States in which it expands its influence in the region to counter China's capabilities and its consequences. Its influence is aimed at ensuring continued regional stability through discouraging an arms race and risks of armed conflict between China and other claimant states.

The code of *conflict-resolution* has been developed under the category of Diplomacy. Under this category, the following themes have been developed from analyzing the data provided under the code.

Theme 5 (Conflict-Resolution--Methods): There are multiple ways in which China, other claimant states, and the United States would like to use diplomacy to resolve the South China Sea conflict. China prefers bilateral negotiation with each claimant state to settle its conflicting claims. The other claimant states prefer a multilateral approach through organizations such as the ARF whereby each claimant state has a say in the overall resolution of the conflict. The differences in approaches for engaging in diplomacy has proven to be a fundamental roadblock to diplomatic progress.

Theme 6 (Conflict-Resolution--Efficacy): Among the diplomatic efforts, China and the United States as a part of the ARF work towards certain goals that only serves their national interest and limits the diplomatic accomplishments of the ARF. These powerful states base their decisions exclusively on serving their interests even if it means taking a passive approach to outcomes that emerge from the ARF diplomatic initiatives or changing the roles of the ARF to serve their national interest.¹ The result can often see institutions like the ARF commandeered to serve the goals of great power states. They become means to validate and rationalize the existing order that benefits these states in their hegemonic competition.

¹ Jho & Chae, "Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum," p.239.

Therefore, power may dictate diplomacy and not vice-versa in the South China Sea, while diplomatic initiatives from international institutions become relatively ineffective and subordinate to Great Power interests.

Finally, the codes of *Strategic Alliances*, *Deterrence*, *Balance of Power* and *Power Struggle*, were developed under the category of Power. Under this category, the following themes have been developed from analyzing the data provided under the code.

Theme 7 (Strategic Alliances): The series of confrontations that China has had over islands in the South China Sea coupled with its threats to sovereignty and regional stability has caused other claimant states to look elsewhere for assistance in balancing China's power. Due to China's aggressive military actions and the inability of diplomacy to resolve the conflict, nations such as the Philippines, Viet-Nam and Malaysia have sought strategic cooperation and alliance with the United States and other nations like Japan and Australia. *Strategic alliances* become an approach of weaker states accepting increased United States influence in exchange for a better military position in confronting China. It is an alternative route that claimant states take towards maximizing their power when it would otherwise be inadequate to stave off Chinese hegemony. On the other hand, the United States finds alliance with weaker states, Japan, and Australia an approach to ensuring a stronger military position in the region while preventing China as a rising hegemon with the benefit of expanding its influence in the South China Sea to gain an advantage in its hegemonic competition with China.

Theme 8 (Deterrence): The United States has taken several measures to deter China that includes but is not limited to United States naval maneuvers, declarations of U.S.' policy, arms sales, and joint exercises. U.S. naval maneuvers seek to demonstrate its power and capability to protect the freedom of navigation and deter China from further encroachment. The United States also uses deterrence via public diplomacy to proclaim that the U.S. will intervene in the event of unprovoked attacks from China. Such declaration involves clarification of the U.S.' position towards its partners in the region. The United States adopted this strategy by approving U.S. arms sales to Viet-Nam and engaging in joint military exercises with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei in order to enhance the capabilities of its allies and create a deterring security architecture in the region. This type of cooperation requires assurance from the United States towards its security partners that it will honor its commitments towards them even if it includes enhancing weaker states' capability. Thus, assurance becomes a component of deterrence and an exercise of influence. A key part of the U.S.' influence in the South China Sea is to assure allies of its ability and willingness to deter China.

Theme 9 (Balance of Power): The United States was traditionally by far the most powerful state in the South China Sea since 1945. However, in the Post-Cold War (1990-2021) the U.S. declined to take a clear stance on sovereignty claims and for a while (in early-1990s) reduced its role in the region, allowing China and the other claimant states the latitude to fight over islands and territory. The United States began to take the South China Sea more seriously after the Mischief Reef incident and the Taiwan Straits crisis in the mid-1990s and as a result, signed new security treaties with the Philippines and eventually increased security cooperation with other claimant states like Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia. Eventually, the United States rebalancing culminated in the pivot to Asia under the Obama administration (see Appendix C for former President Obama's speech outlining this policy). This pivot is a response to a rising China. From a neo-Realist perspective, the rise of China has forced the transition from Unipolarity dominated by the United States to Multipolarity because its relative power has become too prominent to ignore by regional states and external Powers like the United States, Japan and Australia. While China would like to be the sole Great Power in the region and create a Unipolar order centered around itself, the United States continues to maintain a balancing presence shaped by alliances with Japan and Australia that forces the regional order to be Multipolar in character by default.

Theme 10 (Power Struggle): China and the United States compete for power in the South China Sea. Such competition arises due to the desires of each state to augment their influence and power in the region to protect their respective national interests. China seeks to realize as much as possible control over territorial claims and resources in the South China Sea at the expense of competing claimant states and the United States. In doing so China has utilized its improved relative economic standing to finance military modernization and island building campaigns that allowed it to engage in hegemonic activities and consolidate control over territory and resources in the region. On the other hand, the United States utilizes its diplomatic and military capacity to keep the South China Sea within a bipolar order or a multipolar order through alliances with claimant states, Japan and Australia to prevent the rise of a unipolar order in the South China Sea dominated by China. A Unipolar Asia under Chinese domination would allow uncontested control by China over disputed territories, sea lanes, trade routes and navigation in the sea, a position that the United States and claimant states are keen to oppose. Therefore, a power struggle is inescapable and for that reason, United States' efforts to increase its influence and restrict China's hegemony will continue.

Thematic Analysis

The reason the United States seeks influence in the South China Sea is because of threats to its national interests. The reason claimant states allow the United States to gain influence is because of threats to their *sovereignty*. China imposes threats to the United States and claimant states' national interests through its actions in the South China Sea. The former are threats to freedom of navigation, the security of sea lanes, and associated economic disruption accompanied by China's encroachment while the latter are threats to territorial integrity, the exploitation of oil and natural gas, and the fishing industry. Moreover, China's ongoing efforts to increase its ability to project military power through building artificial islands, increase its naval strength, and augment all of these capabilities with asymmetric means of fighting such as cyber-weapons and drones, poses an overall threat to *regional stability*.¹ Consequently, China established hegemonic activities in the region that constitutes threats to sovereignty of claimant states, economic prosperity to both claimant states and the United States, and regional stability to all. All clarify the underlying reasons that tie together China's regional hegemony and the United States influence in the region, whereby China imposes threats to national interests while the United States, by virtue of its strategic size and position, has increased influence among claimant states in addressing these threats.

In response to China's threats, the United States has attempted to utilize diplomatic influence to achieve *conflict-resolution*. This included supporting claimant states' initiatives to negotiate multilaterally with China over disputed territories in the South China Sea.² However, China opposed the Multilateral approach, emphasizing its desire to conduct a series of bilateral negotiations to prevent the internationalization of this conflict. The roadblock of diplomatic influence the United States had was due to China's belief that the result of these multilateral negotiations would be at the expense of Chinese expansionary interests. China is hesitant to accept proposed dispute settlement mechanisms from the United States and claimant states due to fears that a less than maximally beneficial outcome would constitute a loss of power in the larger strategic competition with the United States.³ Outwardly, the United States does not support any country's claim in the South China Sea but its interest lies in solving the disputes peacefully, advocating regional stability (a key national interest to the United States and claimant states) and not allowing China to dominate other claimant states.

¹ Boston Global Forum, *Chinese Disputes in the South China Sea: Risks and Solutions for the Asia-Pacific*, p.1-2.

² Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "The South China Sea," Press Statement, Washington, DC, July 22, 2011, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168989.htm>

³ Harriet Moynihan, *China's Evolving Approach to International Dispute Settlement*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House Briefing: International Law Programme, March 2017, p.5, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-03-29-chinas-evolving-approach-international-dispute-settlement-moynihan-final.pdf>

The competition for dominance in the South China Sea has led China and the United States to manipulate diplomacy in such a way to serve their national interests in the region. China and the United States have all changed their positions over time regarding the level of participation in international forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China has swung from barely participating to active participation, while the United States' level of participation has similarly fluctuated.¹ Their different strategies reflect their changing needs to use diplomacy to serve their hegemonic competition. For example, China changed its strategy of participation in the ARF in the late-1990s after realizing the possibility of using the ARF to gain better outcomes in international relations. China's participation in the ARF increased to reduce the extent of United States influence over ASEAN states, reduce claimant states mistrust of China, and also allow China to advocate for a more multipolar regional order instead of a unipolar order dominated by the United States.² On the other hand, the United States has also had different levels of participation in the ARF over time. The United States' participation in the ARF was limited by the higher priority it placed upon its existing bilateral alliances with the Philippines and Japan in the region until the mid-2000s.³ Due to China's activities after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks that were of an expansionary nature in the South China Sea, the United States increased participation in the ARF. The ARF was seen by the United States as beneficial towards its goals of maintaining good relations with claimant states, strengthening its alliances and sustaining its supreme regional power in Asia.

Since both China and the United States compete through diplomatic participation in the ARF to gain a better position with claimant states at the expense of each other, therefore, diplomatic competition confirms an underlying competition for alliance between China and the United States. China seeks to attract weaker states to bandwagon, promoting economic incentives and presenting its Charm Offensive policy. China's desire for claimant states to band-wagon is ultimately directed towards its strategy to reduce the United States' influence in the region and push the United States out of Asia. On the other hand, the United States seeks to form strategic alliances with weaker states through economic partnership, arms sales, joint military exercises, and military presence in the region like the situations with the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore. The purpose is to create a security architecture that is capable of curtailing China's rising power. One could conclude that hegemonic competition in the South China Sea between China and the United States is characterized by great power competition in a "zero-sum" game contest for alliances of claimant states. China and the United States, as regional Great Powers realize that the more alliances of claimant states they have in the region, the more influence they would have at the expense of the other Great Power.⁴ Diplomacy then, is reduced to another way to secure power and influence as a means to form alliances in the South China Sea between competing powers. These alliances forged through diplomacy partially represent the influence of the United States and how it utilizes this web of power to curtail China's hegemonic activities. Therefore, diplomacy is a component that shapes the strategic balance between China's regional hegemony and the U.S.' influence in the South China Sea.

Similar to the view held by the United States that *strategic alliances* are important to secure power and increase influence within a hegemonic competition, claimant states are also of the persuasion that it is important to secure a balancer to augment their power vis-à-vis China. China's clear demonstration of its power with its military actions and disregard for comprehensive diplomatic resolution with claimant states have left these states with no better alternative than to form alliances or cooperate with the United

¹ Jho & Chae, "Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum," p.242.

² Jho & Chae, p.247.

³ Jho & Chae, p.249.

⁴ Adam P. Liff, "China & U.S. Alliance System," *China Quarterly*, 233, March 2018, p.137,

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/1FF369905B4A8110DC8693A3C8A7857B/S0305741017000601a.pdf/china_and_the_us_alliance_system.pdf

States and other external powers like Japan and Australia. *Strategic alliances* become a strategy that claimant states adopt to have a better military position in confronting China while accepting increased United States influence in exchange.¹ On the other hand, the United States forms alliances with claimant states to have a long-term military presence in the region like the one in the Philippines and engage in other forms of military partnership with countries like Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei to expand its influence and to ensure a stronger military position in the region that could operate to prevent China as a rising hegemon. The results are two forces of mutual interest towards forming alliances between claimant states and the United States in which each serves the other in achieving the same objective that is, to curtail China's hegemonic Power. Claimant states have largely chosen the United States over China, especially in military cooperation, as their interests intersect and overlap with the United States while all of their territorial claims overlap with China. *Strategic alliances* become a means to serve claimant states' interests vis-à-vis China and expand the United States' influence in its hegemonic competition with China. Therefore, *strategic alliances* are an important component that could shape the strategic balance between China's regional hegemony and the United States influence in the South China Sea.

Establishing *strategic alliances* was not the only method through which the United States sought influence in the South China Sea. *Deterrence* is a method of the United States' exercise of power and influence in the region to respond to China's hegemonic activities. *Deterrence* for the United States involves maintaining a credible military presence and deployments of troops and ships to make sure that all parties are implicitly aware of its potential use. This military presence is to certify that China would face significant resistance to any effort to destabilize the region or otherwise act in an aggressive manner and that the cost of action is not offset by any gains that China seeks to attain.

The United States has adopted several measures or strategies to deter China. The creation of the AirSea Battle concepts by the Pentagon to counter the A2/AD strategy by China and its Dong-Feng anti-ship ballistic missile are examples of how the United States prepares itself to combat such systems.² The United States has also coordinated Cobra Gold missions (Asia's largest multinational military exercise) and CARAT–The Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training program, which invites different militaries of ASEAN states to work as a single unit towards a common goal, whose purpose is to deter China.³ A part of the United States' deterrent efforts is cooperation with claimant states through the aforementioned programs to enhance their military capabilities and create a powerful security architecture that may achieve such a goal. An integral part of this cooperation is the assurance of the United States that it will fulfill all its security obligations to its allies. The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), a unified combat command of the U.S. military also prepares for military confrontation with North Korea and specifically China.⁴ It is a deterring effort the U.S. adopts in case China acts aggressively in the South China Sea or any other potential theatre of conflict such as Taiwan or North Korea. *Deterrence* is therefore an outcome of the U.S.' military influence to demonstrate power and deter China from being a regional hegemon.

In addition to *deterrence*, the *balance of power* is a form of the United States' influence in the South China Sea in which the United States sustains distributing military power to the extent that China is never strong enough to dominate other states or rise as a regional hegemon. The balance of power in the South China Sea was shaped by a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar regional order.⁵ The shift started with the United States dominating the regional order where other states like Japan, Australia and South Korea rose in terms of power and participated in military and economic partnerships in the region to

¹ Liff, p.137.

² Bill Hayton, *The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), p.221.

³ Hayton, p.228.

⁴ Hayton, p.229.

⁵ Goswami, "Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism," p.9.

counter China's rise.¹ In this context, a shift towards Multipolarity as a result of the relative increase in economic and military positions of Japan, Australia, and South Korea can be viewed as a natural response from states that are apprehensive of China to achieve the balance of power. Their relative capabilities in terms of power along with the United States served the needs of the regional order in which they constructed an alliance to balance against China's expanding power.

Although China does not prefer its current strategic position in the South China Sea and the restraints it imposes on its ability to dominate the region given that the United States is engaged militarily in China's home region, China indirectly benefits from having the United States involved as a balancer. The United States--Japan alliance, despite its perception by China as a means for containment and encirclement, has promoted regional states' security and stability. The alliance has provided Japan with a security guarantee that provides a strong disincentive to develop nuclear weapons. "Without the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Japan would have developed nuclear weapons a long time ago, prompting South Korea and even Taiwan to develop their own nuclear weapons."² With the United States absent, a region where multiple states are armed with nuclear weapons would in some ways complicate China's strategic ascendancy even more than the current situation. In other words, the absence or decline of the United States' role in the region is not necessarily in China's long-term interests. "Although Beijing may not like some of the rules and norms made under the U.S. leadership, Beijing's interests will be served best by participation in the making and remaking of the rules rather than by challenging the rule-based regional order."³

China, in its *power struggle* with the United States, may have two general options going forward. China can attempt to eliminate United States' influence and replace it wholesale with its own or accept the role of the United States as a regional balancer. The former, which is sustained by nationalist elements in China is extremely costly and presents unknown risks that may result in pyrrhic victories upon attainment or worse, significant geo-strategic setbacks which make the current situation preferable.⁴ The latter may not yield great victories in the short term, but still leaves open long-term achievements economically with the United States and strategically with claimant states in which China would have the opportunity to entice its rivals in the South China Sea into more favorable policies and bandwagon with China.⁵

China's considerable ambition for increased hegemony does not extend to a complete replacement of the United States as a world power. The current position of the United States as a global hegemon, with military commitments on every continent, involvements in conflicts far from its borders, and extensive involvement in international institutions, is not a position that China is prepared to emulate. This unwillingness to take on the burdens of global hegemony in the same vein that the United States currently experiences it should not be seen as an assumption that China lacks a global strategy. "Although China does not want to usurp the United States' position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential."⁶ China's global strategy is to secure its place as a world power to allow maximum latitude to implement its foreign policy, while avoiding the pitfalls of global entanglement. In South-East Asia however, China seeks a position of complete hegemony. It strives for the removal of the United States from Asia as a consequential foreign power and to bolster itself as "the region's unchallenged, economic, political and military hegemon."⁷ In other words, China's global strategy should be seen as a

¹ Bouchat, "U.S. Landpower in the South China Sea," p.16-17.

² Suisheng Zhao, "A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-US strategic rivalry and Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, n. 93 (2015): p.395.

³ Zhao, p.395.

⁴ Zhao, p.394.

⁵ Zhao, p.394.

⁶ Oriana Skylar Mastro, "The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid its Global Ambitions," *Foreign Affairs* 98, n.1 (January/February 2019): p.31.

⁷ Skylar, p.31.

nuanced vision of its preferred position on the world stage and not as an extension of its Southeast Asian one, which is complete regional hegemony.¹

Despite China's aim, it may not be successful in taking on the role that the United States plays in the South China Sea. Not only because of its conflicted claims over territory with other claimant states, but also due to the United States' strategic position when it comes to its alliances with the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. In other words, the influence of the United States presented through its alliance with Japan and other regional Powers makes China's ability to replace the United States' power impossible. "While China is rising, many surrounding states are also on the rise and may not be keen to accept a Chinese-dominated regional order."²

Furthermore, any increase in Chinese power over other claimant states would exacerbate its conflict with them if it resulted in the decline of United States power and would impair China's ability to exercise influence in any way save for blunt military force. The region will likely feature a China that is stronger than other regional states in the future but it is also unlikely that China's power will eclipse the United States *and* other regional states whose growing motive to cooperate is heightened by China's hegemonic activities.

Conclusion

The South China Sea conflict encompasses more than a dispute over islands and lines in the ocean. The islands and ocean waters represent far more than territory. Throughout recent history, the South China Sea has simultaneously been a possible resource bonanza, a vital route for oceanic trade, a battleground of neighboring militaries, and a proxy for great power struggles. Claimant states have been forced to consider the impact of their decisions in the South China Sea in a wider international context as their actions will have ramifications beyond the enforcement of their claims. On the other hand, great Powers, like China and the United States, act with a view to furthering their overall national interests in the region and beyond.

In response to the research question that characterizes this study, there are several conclusions that can be drawn. The U.S.' response to China's encroachment from the end of the Second Viet-Nam War in 1975 to the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996 was limited. This is because of the U.S.' desire to avoid extensive involvement in the region as a result of the domestic divisiveness of the recent war in Vietnam and other security concerns due to the Cold War. The U.S.' interest in the region was renewed in the 1990s with the Mischief Reef incident in 1995 between China and the Philippines whereby China consolidated control over its territorial claims. The U.S. realized that China was moving to expand its territorial claims and exercise its military power in the region. The occurrence of the incident after the withdrawal of the U.S.' military from the Philippines confirms in this study the willingness of China to expand in the South China Sea at a time when a balancing and deterring power such as the U.S. was absent.

The United States found the opportunity to rebalance and reassert itself in the region in the wake of the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. When China exercised military power by test-firing missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan, the U.S. mobilized its navy in the Taiwan Straits to deter China. The U.S. succeeded in curtailing China as China stopped its missile firings against Taiwan and was unable to prevent the U.S.' fleet from operating in the Taiwan Straits. The response of the U.S. in 1996 confirms in this study that the U.S. established itself as a deterring power from the perspective of China as well as claimant states. China realized that exercising military power against Taiwan or other regional states would be met with a retaliatory response from the U.S. while claimant states realized the importance of enlisting the participation of a balancing power (with deterrent capability) in their conflict with China.

This study concludes that the United States has taken advantage of China's aggressive approach in the South China Sea to expand its influence through strengthening its bilateral relations with claimant

¹ Skylar, p.31.

² Zhao, "A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-U.S. strategic rivalry and Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific," p.394.

states. The United States' relations with the Philippines went from being asked to leave its military bases in 1991 over a dispute in leasing costs to signing agreements in 1999 again allowing the stationing of United States' troops in the country and eventually a further agreement in 2014 opening up to five bases to United States' military presence. The catalyst for this reversal is primarily due to the strategic threat that China poses to the Philippines and its neighbors. Indeed, the United States was able to gain significant influence with Viet-Nam, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, due to the same pressures of Chinese encroachment on their claims, even if the United States did not consider them a major non-NATO ally as it does the Philippines.¹ The influence with these countries was improved in part through increased arms sales, other military aid, and joint military exercises whose purpose was to strengthen the military power of weaker states in their conflicts with China. This partnership allowed the United States the opportunity to maintain a military presence in the region and create a security paradigm with claimant states that may be capable of providing a balance of power and a deterring effect to China's encroachment that would otherwise cause future regional instability.

This study concludes that the United States increased its influence in the South China Sea by utilizing the understanding of claimant states that inclusive regionalism is a necessity to curtail China's rising power and its hegemonic activities. In other words, the United States capitalized on claimant states' understanding that power is a prerequisite in effectively dealing with China. Such understanding is due to the failure of claimant states to achieve conflict resolution through Track II and Track I diplomatic initiatives. These initiatives were opposed by China to the extent that they promoted the internationalization of the issue. China preferred to negotiate bilaterally with claimant states instead of engaging of any type of collective negotiation where its relative position would be weaker. ASEAN States do not agree and instead call for a multilateral resolution of the South China Sea conflict and rebuff any attempts by China to implement exclusive regionalism. ASEAN sees exclusive regionalism as an inadequate solution to creating regional stability in the face of China's hegemonic activities. Disagreements between China and other claimant states over how to resolve the South China Sea conflict create an impasse that exposes the shortcomings of diplomacy. These shortcomings arise out of the luxury that China enjoys of ignoring other claimant states' call for diplomacy, due to its greater military power.² China is not incentivized to concede its position on any front through diplomacy, but to view the region in terms of power, given its military expansion and island building in the region.

Power then becomes a key concept that claimant states have no choice but to address, especially with the military modernization and expansion of China. Attempts by multilateral organizations to reduce security conflict did not provide a way out of military competition due to significant inequity in military power between China and ASEAN states. The advantageous position of China in terms of power stimulated the push by ASEAN states for a more inclusive regionalism. Claimant states realized the significance of allowing for such a type of regionalism that permits the opportunity for external powers like the U.S., Japan and Australia to participate in regional affairs in terms of military power. Consequently, the U.S. gained the opportunity to increase its influence in the region partially because claimant states were more receptive to the arrangement due to their experience with failed diplomacy and their own deficits in power vis-à-vis China. In other words, the difference in power between China and claimant states constitutes an important backdrop that informs the desire of ASEAN states for greater U.S. participation and creates an opportunity for synergy with the United States' desire for influence.

In an inclusive regionalism structure, the United States, Japan, and Australia operate in the region to strengthen their strategic presence at the encouragement of ASEAN. ASEAN states realize that external

¹ "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961," Department of State, *Code of Federal Regulations*, 22 CFR §120.32 – Major non-NATO Ally, accessed December 29, 2018, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/120.32>

² For China's position concerning its claims in the South China Sea, see: "I. Nanhai Zhudao Are China's Inherent Territory." n.d. accessed May 21, 2017, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2016-07/13/content_38869718.htm

powers can provide a check and balance upon each other through their alliance system.¹ The United States ensures that Japan and Australia's security policies do not become independent and prevent each from serving as a vector for hegemony. Under this structure, ASEAN states would be the prime beneficiaries as no external power would be solely dominant in the region. China's ability to dominate the region wanes significantly when it faces such a structure as the ability to act unilaterally against weaker states is stymied by the latent threat of escalation with the United States, Japan and Australia.

This study concludes that the United States understood that the more major alliances among claimant states it has, the more regional influence it would have in its hegemonic competition with China in the South China Sea. The corollary argument is also true with China. The U.S. competes with China for the favor of the majority of claimant states as the U.S. has entrenched alliances with some, such as with the Philippines, but overall its level of cooperation is uneven. The United States offers security incentives through military partnerships while China extends economic incentives to claimant states, attempting to give them an enticement to bandwagon. Claimant states have an important role to play in the dynamic of such a power struggle through the extent to which they engage in a multi-dimensional approach with China and the United States. In this case, claimant states benefit from engaging with China on the economic front but neither do they ignore the need to balance their power via cooperation with the U.S. on both the economic and military fronts. One may conclude that claimant states become the major beneficiaries of the competition for alliance between the United States and China in which they are receiving both economic and security benefits from China and the United States, respectively.

Even though the literature may have highlighted some of the dynamics of the conflict between China, claimant states, and their relationship with the United States, this study was able to add to the literature the components that shape the strategic balance between China's hegemonic activities and the United States' influence in the South China Sea. This study concludes that threats to national interest constitute a reason for how claimant states and the United States operate to curtail China's hegemonic encroachment in the region. Indeed, national interests are central to explaining state behaviour from a neorealist perspective. China's threats to claimant states are sovereignty, the exploitation of oil and natural gas, and the fishing industry while its threats to the United States are freedom of navigation, security of sea-lanes, economic and investment disruptions that could be caused by china's regional encroachment leading to regional instability. China imposes such threats and the United States has increased its influence through its strategic position to address these threats.

This study concludes that the use of diplomacy by the United States and claimant states to achieve conflict resolution in their competition with China is part of a strategy to enhance the strategic balance with China in their favour. However, conflict resolution was not the ultimate goal of the U.S. ' participation in diplomatic initiatives. For example, the U.S. utilized its participation in the ARF and its diplomatic initiative to improve relations with claimant states (who are advocates of the ARF initiatives) that in turn increased its influence in the South China Sea and consequently weakened China's. The U.S. appreciated that alliance is a "zero-sum" game and utilizing diplomatic participation to win such a game is a valid foreign policy measure to attain power relative to China. While diplomacy has shown itself to be limited in its utility to solve conflicts between China and other claimant states, it has been more productive in fostering cooperation between the United States and claimant states. Diplomacy is then perceived by the U.S. as a component for securing power and influence as well as a means to form alliances at the expense of China, shaping the strategic balance between China's regional hegemony and U.S. influence.

This study concludes that strategic alliances are another component that shape the strategic balance stated in the research question. Strategic alliances between the U.S. and claimant states resulted

¹ Zhai Kun, "The ASEAN Power." in *The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific*, Ron Huisken ed., p.21-32. ANU Press, 2009, accessed December 11, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h898.8>

from the converging forces of mutual interest and complimentary means pursuing a common goal, which is to curtail China's hegemonic activities. The U.S. takes advantage of these alliances (which in this context includes forms of strategic cooperation falling outside of a formal alliance) to secure power and increase its influence with its hegemonic competition with China, while claimant states obtain a balancer of power to augment their position vis-à-vis China. Neo-Realism's assumption that states value their survival in an anarchic international system does not categorically exclude cooperation between states if any cost or obligation is more than offset by an increased chance of survival. In the case of claimant states, the U.S. is the preeminent reason that their military situation with China is untenable. China's refusal to consider a comprehensive diplomatic resolution with claimant states have deprived these states of no better option but to form alliances with the United States. These alliances provide claimant states the opportunity to have a better military position in its conflict with China while at the same time augment U.S. influence in the region at the expense of China's desire for future regional supremacy.

In addition to the formation of strategic alliances, this study concludes that the United States has taken on another strategy to increase its influence, which is to demonstrate itself as a deterrent element to China's hegemonic activities in the South China Sea. The creation of the AirSea Battle strategy to counter China's A2/AD strategy and its Dong-Feng anti-ship ballistic missile are methods the United States adopted to combat China's strategy. Additionally, the United States also conducted Cobra Gold missions and CARAT exercises with claimant states to exhibit its military power in the region and deter China. "These partners [claimant states] may not be capable of defeating China in a direct conflict, but they can contribute meaningfully to contingency operations."¹ A regional security network that has the capabilities to cooperate can construct an effective military coalition with effective deterrent capability towards China. Moreover, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) has focused on United States force deployments in the Asia-Pacific region which include Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations and naval patrols by the United States and its partners.² These deployments and FON efforts are several elements the United States utilized at its disposal to pursue a proactive approach to regional security that is also characterized as deterrence. The United States conveys to China that any future encroachment that could cause regional instability would be met by a punitive response. In this context, deterrence becomes a component of influence to curtail China's hegemonic activities.

This study concludes that the balance of power is another component that reflects the United States' influence in the South China Sea. The balance of power between China and the U.S. exists as a result of a distribution of power that is equitable enough to ensure that China cannot solely dominate the region. Neo-Realism facilitates the development of this conclusion as an assumption by Waltz concerning the distribution of power and capabilities in the international system.³ The U.S. and claimant states together work towards having enough military power to curtail China's appetite for further encroachment in the South China Sea. Japan, Australia and South Korea, as external powers have further incentive to cooperate with the United States and claimant states to balance against China's power. However, it is mainly the U.S. that projects sufficient military power to provide such a balance. It is a component of U.S. influence and acts as a response to China's hegemonic activities in the South China Sea.

This study concludes that the strategic balance between China's regional hegemony and the United States' influence is best explained as a function of the power struggle between the two states as well as a reluctance to escalate the tensions that result. The United States and China compete for influence and ultimately, regional and eventually global power. From the neo-Realist perspective, the main goal of such a competition is the accumulation of power to implement each nation's foreign policy

¹ Tommy Ross, "Deterrence & Security Assistance: The South China Sea," *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters*, 47, n. 4 (Winter 2017–2018), p.69, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2017-18/8_Ross.pdf

² Ross, p.66.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1988): p.18.

objectives. The U.S. and China contend for power through attracting alliances and deploying military forces. They both desire military supremacy and each attempts to undermine the other's influence over the South China Sea. Each one is currently pursuing long-term military strategies to this effect. In other words, they aim to preserve and enhance their geo-political position as Great Powers. Due to the overlap in their goals, it is inevitable that some amount of competitive exclusion between the two countries will take place. As a result, China and the U.S. will continue to struggle for power with each other and attempt to use other claimant states to enhance their respective positions. They are both engaged in this power struggle but neither country possesses the ability to completely supplant the other in the region. Their regional power struggle is characterized by a strategic balance that is a product of their mutual desire to avoid the risks and consequences of an escalation of hostilities up to and including war.

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Southern Strategy in the Sunshine State: Race-Based Political Appeals in Rick Scott's and Donald Trump's Florida Campaigns

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ABSTRACT: This paper examines Florida political trends as both driving and exemplifying the forces that got Donald Trump elected President in 2016. Florida, a bellwether state for the nation, has experienced a steady influx of immigration over the last several decades and is projected to be majority-minority by the mid-21st Century, with political implications for this fast-changing state. This paper employs historical and textual analysis of political campaign themes and analysis of demographic trends and election outcomes to show how racial anxieties in Florida over a changing demographic composition that decenters the white population launched both Rick Scott's rise in his 2010 Gubernatorial Campaign and Trump's rise in his 2016 Presidential Primary and General Election campaigns in Florida. The paper argues that these political campaign trends in the U.S. and in Florida specifically, are not that different from what happens in other countries when there is tension between ethnic majorities and minorities and when demographic numbers make the crucial difference for power, status and control -- with democracy in the balance.

When an outsider businessman without ties to the political establishment who ran on inflammatory anti-immigrant and racial campaign themes won Florida on Election Night against a woman making a historic bid for office, it shocked the nation. Are we speaking of Rick Scott's campaign for Florida Governor in 2010, or Donald Trump's presidential campaign in 2016? Both, of course. Yet neither candidate was expected to win the state of Florida with those campaign themes amidst an electorate that was demographically diversifying.¹ For years, political observers and strategists predicted that Republican Party candidates in Florida would need to adapt to demographic changes portending a more diverse electorate as the white population gradually recedes into minority status. They would need to moderate and calibrate their message to win over racial and ethnic minority voters, especially the rapidly growing Hispanic population. Even after the 2008 financial crisis and housing market collapse in Florida, scholars were still noting that "ethnic and racial differences have not dominated the political and social discourse in Florida, as many expected they would. Efforts to instill race into the politics of Florida have also failed in recent years because of the opposition of popular governors Lawton Chiles, Jeb Bush and Charlie Crist."²

This paper, however, argues that Scott and Trump, top-of-the-ticket Republican Party candidates in the bellwether state of Florida, employed the "long Southern strategy"³ of race-based appeals, anti-feminist appeals, and religious right activism to spur maximum white voter turnout -- and that Donald Trump's Presidential Campaign of 2016 built closely on the template of Rick Scott's 2010 campaign for Governor thematically, shared campaign staff and personnel, and had electoral bases in similar areas of the state with large white populations, particularly rural areas in the panhandle and White, retiree-heavy South-West Florida.

¹ For example, see Frank Alcock, "Donald Trump: Still Statesman of the Year?" *Sarasota Magazine*, July 9, 2015, <https://www.sarasotamagazine.com/news-and-profiles/2015/07/donald-trump-still-statesman-of-the-year>.

² David R. Colburn & Lance deHaven-Smith, *Florida's Megatrends: Critical Issues in Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), p.10.

³ Angie Maxwell & Todd Shields, *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

This paper also argues that race-based appeals in Florida have deeper roots and have been used more frequently over Florida's recent political history than many analysts have realized or discussed.

Thematically, both Scott and Trump opposed the country's first Black president, Barack Obama, as they politically catered to the voices of angry, older, white voters in the Tea Party movement.¹ Scott nationalized the 2010 gubernatorial race by running against Barack Obama as a foil and by stoking anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment in campaign ads and press statements, showing "proof of concept" that the Southern strategy would still work in Florida amidst a changing electorate. Trump used Florida, the biggest swing state in the nation, as a launching pad to the Presidency in 2016 by doubling down on Southern strategy in the state. Trump's Presidential Campaign speech demonizing immigrants from Mexico was not part of a "series of missteps," as some scholars have suggested,² but were deliberately calculated for electoral gain and planned well in advance, with early testing of the "build the wall" campaign message and line that "Mexico will pay" in front of GOP audiences in Sarasota, Florida in 2015 before Trump took it nation-wide.³ With their shocking victories, Scott's and Trump's campaigns successfully mobilized an older, white electorate who felt threatened by demographic changes that decenter their majority status both in Florida and the country.

The "long Southern strategy" has significant roots in Florida, and this paper situates the Scott and Trump campaigns in a longer state history of racially inflammatory campaign themes in response to cultural backlash against progressive norms of racial justice, gender equality, and openness to sexual orientation. While Florida is a state that Barack Obama won twice, it is also the Southern former slave-holding Confederate state that Richard Nixon won twice, where George Wallace nearly came in second place one year,⁴ and today has the second highest number of Southern Poverty Law Center-identified hate groups of any state in the country.⁵ Florida has witnessed numerous voter suppression campaigns aimed at Black voters dating back to the Jim Crow-era's white primary system, poll taxes, and malapportionment of districts.⁶ In recent decades, even after the gains of the civil rights movement, tough-on-crime state laws made Florida into a "prison state" with bipartisan support,⁷ turning disproportionate numbers of Black men into felons ineligible to vote or, more recently, eligible but disenfranchised by fees and fines, a kind of modern-day "poll tax."⁸ Florida Republican local government officials have redrawn precinct lines in ways that have disproportionately disadvantaged Hispanic voters.⁹

¹ On the Tea Party, see Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson. *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

² Aubrey Jewett, "The Importance of Florida in Presidential Elections," in *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump*, eds., Matthew T. Corrigan & Michael M. Blinder (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019), p.14.

³ Chris Anderson, "Sarasota's Role in Trump's Border Wall. *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, January 28, 2019, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20190128/anderson-sarasotas-role-in-trumps-border-wall>.

⁴ David R. Colburn, *From Yellow Dog Democrats to Red State Republicans* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013).

⁵ Jack Evans, "Florida Among Top States for Hate Groups, Violent Extremists, Report Says," *Tampa Bay Times*, February 1, 2021, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida/2021/02/01/florida-among-top-states-for-hate-groups-violent-extremists-report-says/>.

⁶ Robert Mickey, *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁷ Heather Schoenfeld, *Building the Prison State: Race and the Politics of Mass Incarceration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018).

⁸ Ryan A. Partelow, "The Twenty-First Century Poll Tax," 47 *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly*, 425 (2020), https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol47/iss3/4/

⁹ Brian Amos & Daniel A. Smith, "Reprecincting and Voting Behavior," *Political Behavior*, 39, n. 1 (2017): p.133-156.

The Florida Legislature's Johns Committee from 1956-1965 investigated and harassed LGBT individuals,¹ and the Florida Senate voted against the Equal Rights Amendment in 1975 that would have codified equality of the sexes.² Florida has been a pioneer of the "school choice" movement that recalls earlier attempts by white parents to avoid integration through religiously-affiliated segregation academies by providing vouchers for students to attend private schools.³ Public voucher funds flow today to private schools that refuse to admit children of LGBT couples.⁴

The Scott and Trump campaigns did not capitalize on free-floating racially resentful voters across Florida, but rather built campaign networks out of geographic regions of this diverse state that are highly rural such as the panhandle or that in the 1960s and 1970s had been strongholds of resistance to federally-enforced school desegregation, such as the predominantly White, retiree-heavy areas of South-West Florida from Manatee county down to Collier county, as well as a swath across central Florida, closer to Orlando, where many Republican Mid-Westerners had settled.⁵ The two campaigns were socially embedded in many of the same county party organizations and campaign networks, with Scott based out of his hometown of Naples and Trump based out of Sarasota, where both Scott and Trump found a friendly ally in Sarasota GOP Chair Joe Gruters, who now serves as State Senator and Florida GOP Chair. Because the two campaigns built social power in these regions, we might expect this white-centered ethno-nationalist faction of the GOP to have staying power going forward. Their campaigns built organizational and electoral capacity with social influence and network effects that have persisted and will continue to do so over multiple election cycles, despite the changing statewide demographic composition of the electorate that has eroded the white majority's numbers.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explore the literature on political opportunities for campaign mobilization created by cultural backlash. Then we use historical and textual methods of analysis to read the Scott 2010 and Trump 2016 campaigns in Florida as a response to anxieties in the electorate about a changing demographic composition decentering the white population and changing cultural norms of gender and sexual orientation. While Scott's and Trump's campaign themes say something about the continued resonance of these messages with a Florida electorate, they also say something about trends in national politics. As Colburn and deHaven-Smith noted many years ago, "If Florida is indeed a bellwether -- and we think it is -- then the nation's transition to a larger, more senior population and increasing racial and ethnic diversity is likely to be tumultuous."⁶ The question for citizens and scholars alike is ultimately one of democratic governance: Will Florida and the country forge a new commitment to a multiracial democracy, or will the GOP remain in thrall to a Trumpist wing that can only remain in power through increasingly authoritarian tactics to preserve influence for the declining white population and a conservative evangelical movement that seeks to turn the tide of changing sexual and gender norms?

Southern Strategy and Voters Primed for Cultural Backlash

"Southern Strategy" refers to attempts by the national Republican Party to target white voters in the South disaffected by President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Democratic Party's passage of the Civil

¹ Stacy Braukman, *Communists and Perverts under the Palms: The Johns Committee in Florida, 1956-1965* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012).

² Joan S. Carver, "The Equal Rights Amendment and the Florida Legislature," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 60, n. 4 (1982): p.455-481.

³ Jennifer LaFleur, "Centring Race in Contemporary Educational Privatization Policies: The Genealogy of U.S. 'Private School Choice' and Its Implications for Research," *Race Ethnicity and Education* (2020): p.1-21.

⁴ Giuseppe Sabella, "Bradenton School Refuses 'Homosexual' Parents. It Got \$1.1 Million in Vouchers, Report Says," *Bradenton Herald*, February 8, 2020, <https://www.bradenton.com/news/local/education/article240076653.html>

⁵ Benjamin Houston, "Voice of the Exploited Majority: Claude Kirk and the 1970 Manatee County Forced Busing Incident," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 83, no. 3 (2005): p.258-286.

⁶ Colburn & DeHaven Smith 2010, p.12.

Rights Act and Voting Rights Act in 1964 and 1965. Republican Party presidential candidates Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon appealed to white voters upset and unmoored by civil rights advancements, often in coded or subtle ways, to signal that they would protect white interests.¹ Ronald Reagan continued this strategy by using coded language about the social safety net to cultivate racial resentment by implying that people of color who use public benefits engage in pathological behavior.² Maxwell and Shields define the “long Southern Strategy,” the concept used in this paper, as a more extensive process that involved not just racial appeals but also organizing to capture voters uncomfortable with changing norms of gender and sexuality, drawing in religious right voters affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention and other conservative religious groups.³ Maxwell and Shields argue, “most white southerners have never been rational-choice economic voters, and continuing to measure them by that yardstick further distorts the view. They can desperately need access to healthcare and yet still vote for a candidate who will repeal it. They have been rational-choice identity voters long before the phrase ‘identity politics’ entered the scholarly or punditry vernacular. They vote for someone they perceive to be like them (or who they want to be) because the election of one of their own is their best protection for their way of life.”

Social conformity has long played a role in molding society, including politics, and can often explain social behaviors not well-explained by traditional rational models.⁴ Achen and Bartels argue that social identities “play a key role in shaping responses to political candidates and events,” and they note that even in the case of the Southern strategy, party identification changed more slowly than voting behavior and was “partly but by no means wholly, a matter of generational replacement” and was “not primarily about racial policy issues, but about White Southern identity”:⁵ “As Southern Blacks became mobilized as Democrats, that psychological connection [of whites with the Democratic Party] was broken, and southern whites increasingly came to think of the Republican Party first as a potential home and then as their natural home.”⁶ Similarly, changing gender norms also caused a drift in partisan realignment starting in the late-1970s, when the Democratic and Republican Parties, previously internally divided on these issues, started polarizing on it.⁷

The trend of political mobilization of backlash against social change has been widespread across advanced industrial countries. In the comparative politics literature, Inglehart and Norris (2016) examine data from 31 European countries to test whether support for populist parties was determined more by economic insecurity or cultural backlash. They find support for the cultural backlash theory, which posited that older generations “who sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values” showed stronger support for populist parties.”⁸ With changing cultural mores, these voters became resentful of ethnic and racial minorities and voted for politicians who embraced anti-foreigner, Islamophobic and anti-asylum stances. The American politics literature notes rising support for authoritarianism in politics and the tendency to emphasize differences between in-groups and out-groups and concerns about fraying social order, including controversial issues of gender and sexuality.⁹

¹ Joseph A. Aistrup, *The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

² Stephanie Lynn Williams, *In Defense of the "Forgotten Man": The Sustained Legacy of the Southern Strategy on the Post-Reagan Era Presidency* (University of South Florida, 2019).

³ Maxwell & Shields, 2019.

⁴ Stephen Coleman, *Popular Delusions: How Social Conformity Molds Society and Politics* (Youngstown, N.Y.: Cambria Press, 2007).

⁵ Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, *Democracy for Realists* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), p.246, 249 & 252.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.252.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Ronald F. Inglehart & Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash” (2016): p.3, https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/jaro2018/POL494/um/premiovy_ukol/Inglehart-Norris-populism.pdf

⁹ Marc J. Hetherington & Jonathan D. Weiler, *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

The jarring September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by al Qaeda combined with downward mobility caused by the 2008 financial crisis, which hit the Florida housing market especially hard, created an electorate ripe in Florida for mobilization using the old Southern Strategy, with a new set of demographic concerns for anxious white voters: Muslims and nonwhite, particularly Hispanic, immigrants. These concerns were given a patina of legitimacy with the scholarly works of Harvard's Samuel Huntington as he signaled the rise of Islamic civilization as an external threat to "the West" in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) and rising Hispanic immigration as an internal threat to US unity in his *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, written with Peter Dunn (2004).¹ Hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan had also already started focusing on immigrants as the newest boogeyman,² and groups such as Numbers USA started flooding the airwaves with ads talking about the importance of reducing immigration, illegal and legal alike, as well as on Facebook, in Florida and other battleground states especially.³ In Florida, Hispanic voters outnumbered Black voters starting in the 2004 presidential election cycle,⁴ heightening the saliency of these issues in Florida. Moreover, many of the 9/11 hijackers had ties to Florida,⁵ and President George W. Bush was reading *The Pet Goat* to students at Booker Elementary School in Sarasota when the attacks happened and he was first informed,⁶ so Florida voters operated in an information environment with great scrutiny for and concern about 9/11 connections.

In the new millennium of Florida politics, demographic changes and international events combined to create new uncertainties and anxieties that entrepreneurial politicians have framed for older white voters as existential challenges to their way of life. In 2011, America arrived at a vital and historic turning point in its domestic racial makeup, marking the first time the United States had seen the births of non-white minority babies outnumber the births of white babies.⁷ The twenty-first century ushered in a pivotal demographic transition to a new white minority, with the U.S. Census Bureau predicting that non-white racial groups will surpass the white population by 2050.⁸ The state of Florida has mirrored these demographic predictions, with similar trends suggesting that Florida will also reach full majority-minority status by the middle of the twenty-first century.⁹ As of 2018, Florida has already experienced the demographic flip to a non-white racial majority for state residents under the age of 70.¹⁰ However, while these demographics reflect the sweeping diversity of Florida's youth population, they contrast strongly against Florida's prevalent older, white population.

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington & Peter Dunn, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

² Brad Knickerbocker, "Anti-Immigrant Sentiments Fuel Ku Klux Klan Resurgence," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 2007, <https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0209/p02s02-ussc.html>

³ Kim, Young Mie, Jordan Hsu, David Neiman, Colin Kou, Levi Bankston, Soo Yun Kim, Richard Heinrich, Robyn Baragwanath & Garvesh Raskutti, "The Stealth Media? Groups and Targets Behind Divisive Issue Campaigns on Facebook," *Political Communication* 35, n. 4 (2018): p.515-541.

⁴ Susan A. MacManus, Cal Everett, Andrew Quecan & Brittany L. Penberthy, "Florida: The South's Premier Battleground State," *American Review of Politics*, 26 (2005): p.170-171.

⁵ Eliot Kleinberg, "The 9/11 Hijackers Who Lived Among Us in Palm Beach County," *Palm Beach Post*, September 9, 2016, <https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/local/hijackers-your-grocery-store-called-palm-beach-county-home/fgckdMZktzN4Rq1PwpjzNK/>; Lee Williams and Matthew Sauer, "The Deep Links Between Terror Attacks and Southwest Florida," *The Florida Times-Union*, September 10, 2016, <https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20160910/deep-links-between-terror-attacks-and-southwest-florida>.

⁶ Williams & Sauer, 2016.

⁷ William H. Frey, *Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Colburn & deHaven Smith, 2010.

¹⁰ Langston Taylor, "Florida's Under-70 Population Now Majority-Minority," *Tampa Bay Times*, June 20, 2019, <https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/06/20/floridas-under-70-population-now-majority-minority/>

In the context of demographic changes in Florida, a perennial swing state and battleground prize in nationwide Presidential contests, we examine two Florida political campaigns in the aftermath of the election of the first Black president, Barack Obama: the Rick Scott campaign for governor of 2010 and the Donald Trump campaign in 2016, to examine the extent to which and how they, with aligned groups, implemented a Southern Strategy, defined as attempts to mobilize resentment against racial and ethnic minorities; against changes in mores regarding gender and sexuality; and with support of religious right activists. We employ textual and interpretative analysis of secondary historical accounts, journalistic accounts from newspapers and periodicals, and first-person narrative accounts of political players involved to describe these campaigns. We looked for elements that fit with the “long Southern strategy” by examining when and how these campaigns as part of their official political communications mentioned ethnic and racial minorities; gender and sexuality; and discussions of religious right activism and attempts to mobilize white, or occasionally nonwhite, voters on these bases. We also traced personnel choices and decisions for the campaigns both within and across the Scott and Trump campaigns to show patterns of continuity and change in delivering this message, as well as looking at the places they mobilized in the state and the political surrogates and partners they worked with to deliver their messages and mobilize voters.

A study of Southern strategy is ultimately a study of political campaigns. The study of campaigns is important because campaigns are organizational platforms for political messaging through advertising and voter mobilization,¹ and when these messages demonize or stigmatize racial and ethnic minorities, women, and the LGBT community, it can have a significant impact on the quality of Florida’s democracy and ability for all people to have their civil rights respected and to be safe in their communities. We might also expect a Southern strategy-based political campaign to have institutional, sticky characteristics as it develops social infrastructure by passing legislation to solidify electoral gains and by cultivating personnel who can serve in public administration, political parties, interest groups, and activism organizations in the community; and it is troubling when these personnel and institutions have anchored their social support on the basis of maintaining white power, to the detriment of racial and ethnic minorities. Campaigns facilitate social networking among professional operatives and volunteers upon which they develop reputations and leave behind organizational capacity for future political mobilization,² which suggests that Southern strategy-style campaigns such as Rick Scott’s and Donald Trump’s might leave lasting political legacies in Florida and other states, not to be regarded as merely a “bump in the road” for a GOP trying to maneuver around changing demographics in the electorate. Indeed, we show how Florida became a base for the “January 6, 2021 Insurrection” as well. Rather, the legacy is that the party is shaping political consciousness around well-known traditional biases and cementing political orders that privilege older, white conservative evangelical voters, reinforcing traditional hierarchies of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and immigration status.

Piloting a 21st Century Southern Strategy: Rick Scott’s 2010 Gubernatorial Campaign

Rick Scott, an Illinois native, had only recently moved to the state of Florida and just gained eligibility to run based on his years of residency, thus he was an unlikely candidate for Florida Governor. Without government experience, Scott was regarded as a political outsider with no significant connections to the Florida political establishment. In the Republican Party primary, he ran against Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, a former congressman with extensive political credentials who had served as an impeachment manager in President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial. Scott took his own lack of experience as a virtue, touting his credentials as a “successful businessman” against Tallahassee’s insider career

¹ Travis N. Ridout & Michael M. Franz, *The Persuasive Power of Campaign Advertising* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011).

² Dennis W. Johnson, *No Place for Amateurs: How Political Consultants are Reshaping American Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Dennis W. Johnson, *Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

politicians. However, as chief executive of Columbia/HCA hospital chain, Scott's major claim to fame was pleading the Fifth Amendment dozens of times in connection with the largest case of Medicare fraud ever prosecuted by the federal government. He also managed Solantic, a chain of walk-in urgent-care centers in northeast Florida, some located inside Walmarts. Yet with a canny media strategy and willingness to employ a Southern Strategy style of messaging that highlighted inflammatory racial issues, nonwhite immigration, Islamophobia, and anti-feminism to boost conservative white voter turnout, Scott grabbed public attention, quickly established conservative credentials, and won the primary against McCollum and later the general election against Adelaide "Alex" Sink, Florida's Chief Financial Officer who was making a historic bid to be the first woman and Asian-American governor of Florida. Republican Paula Dockery and Democrat Lawton "Bud" Chiles III were also briefly in the mix as candidates.

During the primary season before a Republican nominee was chosen, Republican operatives deployed attack ads that fit with a Southern Strategy race-based appeal. The Republican Governors Association ran an ad in February 2010 attacking Alex Sink's record as a banking executive, blaming her for taking an excessive salary while cutting jobs. The commercial ends with the tagline: "Alex Sink: Not one of us. One of them."¹ Although ostensibly the tagline referred to her occupation, it seems likely intended as a racist dog whistle, to call attention to her Asian heritage and cast her as an outsider who did not belong in Florida politics. Sink's great-grandfather was the legendary Siamese twin Chang Bunker from China, who traveled on the Ringling Bros. Barnum and Bailey circus circuit before settling in Mt. Airy, North Carolina and marrying into a local family. Sink recalled on the campaign trail that when she was growing up people in town inferred that she was in the Bunker clan because of her, in her words, "slanty eyes."² The ad ended with a focus on her eye with a twinkle to highlight it.



Screenshot: RGA Ad, "Fired," 22 February 2010.

Scott developed strong ties to the Tea Party movement that began as a reaction to the Obama administration in 2009, first in his home base of Naples, Florida. Before he ran for governor, Scott also led Conservatives for Patients' Rights, a group that placed national ads against the Affordable Care Act, Obama's landmark healthcare reform legislation. Scott spent \$5 million of his own money and hired C.R.C., the public relations firm "well known for its work with Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, the group that smeared Senator

¹ Jessica Taylor, "RGA throws at Sink in Florida." *Politico*, February 23, 2010, <https://www.politico.com/story/2010/02/rga-throws-at-sink-in-florida-033347>

² Adam C. Smith, "Celebrity Runs in Sink's Family," *Tampa Bay Times*, September 28, 2010, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/09/26/celebrity-runs-in-sink-s-family/>

John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, during his Presidential Campaign in 2004.”¹ Scott’s move confused conservative healthcare experts because they had not yet seen the proposed healthcare legislation. “There is no Obama plan that has been made public yet, so what’s the point of running ads? I don’t see that you gain anything except attention for Rick Scott,” said one conservative expert.²

Scott had developed ties to top business interests in Florida before running for office and some Florida business interests were reportedly looking for an alternative to McCollum. Scott had previously served on the board of the Associated Industries of Florida (AIF), an insider’s lobbying group of top Florida corporations.³ In the telling of disgraced former Florida GOP Chair Jim Greer,⁴ some in the Florida business community weren’t comfortable with McCollum because of questionable business stances he had taken as a congressman and as attorney general and were looking for an alternative -- but because the Republican donor base had solidified around McCollum, any new recruit would have to be independent wealthy to be a serious contender. Scott fit the part.

Scott immediately hired a professional, veteran campaign team. Susie Wiles, a GOP operative from Jacksonville, managed Rick Scott’s 2010 Gubernatorial Campaign, a role she later reprised for Donald Trump’s presidential campaigns in in 2016 and 2020 in the state of Florida, as well as for Ron DeSantis’s gubernatorial campaign in 2018. Karen Giorno, another future Trump campaign co-chair in the state of Florida in 2016, “supported Scott during that campaign” and “went on to work for the governor as well.”⁵ Scott employed Tony Fabrizio as a pollster and consultant,⁶ a hire that Donald Trump made later, too.

Scott poured his own money into TV and radio ads that blanketed the airwaves emphasizing his outsider businessman credentials and close affinity with the Tea Party movement. Scott’s first radio ad for the primary campaign immediately nationalized the race by invoking President Obama, emphasizing Scott’s Tea Party connections and his willingness to take the fight to liberals: “On Tax Day, I spoke to the Tea Party rally in my hometown, Naples. It wasn’t a bunch of politicians or lobbyists -- just hard working folks fed up with bigger government, higher taxes and more spending. When we fight back, it scares the liberals. So they attack. When I lead [sic] a grassroots fight against ObamaCare, I took the same hits. But every time Obama’s gang attacked, we grew stronger. The Tea Party will grow for the same reasons. People are more powerful than politicians.”⁷ The reference to “Obama’s gang” also seemed designed to prime negative stereotypes of Black criminality.

Scott early on took the position of supporting a version of Arizona’s anti-illegal immigrant bill for Florida. Arizona’s “SB 1070 made being in the country illegally a state crime. It also ... barred people from hiring or knowingly transporting unauthorized immigrants; and allowed police to detain anyone suspected of being in the country illegally.”⁸ The law allowed police to ask for proof of citizenship during routine law enforcement stops, so the bill became known as the “papers please” bill. The Arizona immigration law was drafted with the assistance of Kris Kobach, who helped with similar initiatives all across the country; Kobach went on to become Kansas Secretary of State where he tightened voter ID laws and later co-

¹ Jim Rutenberg, “Health Critic Brings a Past and a Wallet,” *New York Times*, April 1, 2009. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02scott.html>

² Ibid.

³ Mary Ellen Klas, “The Buzz: Florida Politics. Republican Foes, Lobbyists Now Flock to Scott,” *St. Petersburg Times*, September 3, 2010.

⁴ Peter Golenbock, *The Chairman: The Rise and Betrayal of Jim Greer* (Montgomery: NewSouth Books, 2014), p.365.

⁵ Kenneth P. Vogel & Marc Caputo, “Trump Fires Top Aide,” *Politico*, May 5, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/trump-parts-ways-with-top-aide-223590>

⁶ Adam C. Smith, “The Buzz: Florida Politics. GOP Gov. Candidate Rick Scott Hires Campaign Manager,” *St. Petersburg Times*, April 20, 2010.

⁷ Adam C. Smith, “The Buzz: Florida Politics. Rick Scott’s First Radio Ad,” April 21, 2010, *St. Petersburg Times*, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/04/21/the-buzz-florida-politics/>

⁸ Arizona Republic Staff, “SB 1070: A Legacy of Fear, Divisiveness and Fulfillment,” *Arizona Republic*, March 2, 2020, <https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2020/03/02/sb-1070-legacy-arizonas-immigration-enforcement-law/4732918002/>

chaired President Donald Trump's short-lived commission on election integrity and voter fraud.¹ Although Scott could be wooden on the campaign trail, reporters noted that the "one consistent applause line in Scott's speech [was] his support for an Arizona-styled immigration law, which is political gold in the conservative panhandle."²

Sentiment against illegal immigration among the electorate was perceived to be so high, and the pressure from the right-flanking Tea Party movement so strong, that Republican Party candidates started widely embracing the Arizona immigration law. In Florida, both Bill McCollum and Marco Rubio flip-flopped their stances on the Arizona immigration law from opposing the bill to supporting it, though Connie Mack and Jeb Bush both steadfastly opposed it. In Arizona, Senator John McCain, facing a right-leaning primary challenger of his own, flip-flopped on the immigration bill and issued a campaign ad calling on the government to "complete the danged fence."³

Scott also took a prominent stance in the campaign against Islamic extremism. In August of 2010, Scott ran a TV ad touting his opposition to the so-called "Ground Zero mosque" in New York City's Lower Manhattan. The ad, titled "Obama's Mosque," criticized Obama's support of an established mosque near the sites of the former World Trade Center, calling his actions those of "a cowardly politician, not [those] of the leader of the United States of America."⁴ Scott solidified his disapproval of the mosque by terming it a "victory monument to Mohammed Atta and other 18 terrorists," as well as offensive to 9/11 victims and their families.⁵ Directed at Florida's anxious white population, Scott concluded that if this construction was occurring in Florida, he would "do anything and everything" to prevent its actualization.⁶ Rubio similarly opposed the mosque, and McCollum said he thought it should be "farther away" from Ground Zero.⁷ Scott had led the primary position-taking pack once again with his far-right stances.

Scott campaigned on anti-feminist and anti-LGBT stances as well, in a bid to connect with religious right and social conservative voters. In the Republican primary, Scott touted his pro-life credentials by pointing to a case during his tenure as Columbia/HCA chief when they "lost a \$43 million lawsuit because we saved the life of a child that the parents didn't want us to"; the parents complained that their story was being unfairly exploited by the campaign.⁸ Scott alleged on TV and in mailers that McCollum took money from lobbyists for Planned Parenthood, which earned Scott a "Pants on Fire" rating from Politifact.com for its falsehood; nonetheless, the ad made clear that Scott opposed Planned Parenthood.⁹ On the stump in front of Tampa Young Republicans Scott made clear that he opposed both abortion and gay rights.¹⁰ Scott's campaign ran ads that employed sexist dog whistles that prime negative stereotypes of women as weak, inferior, incompetent, and in need of men's protection. An ad called "Bad Investments" showed a video clip of Sink faltering slightly while asserting that she was a "watchdog"; labeled her "weak," with pause for emphasis, while decrying her record as CFO; and framed a question at

¹ Mitch Smith, "How Kris Kobach Built a National Profile," *New York Times*, August 6, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/us/politics/who-is-kris-kobach.html>

² John Frank, "The Buzz: Florida Politics. Rick Scott: (Not) as Seen on TV," *St. Petersburg Times*, June 12, 2010.

³ Beth Reinhard, "McCollum Flips on Arizona Immigration Law," *Miami Herald*, May 14, 2010.

⁴ Scott, 2010.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Evan McMorris-Santoro, "How New York's 'Ground Zero Mosque' Fell Into Florida's Political Spotlight," *Talkingpointsmemo.com*, August 16, 2010. <https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/how-new-york-s-ground-zero-mosque-fell-into-florida-s-political-spotlight>

⁸ Alex Leary, "The Buzz: Florida Politics. Rick Scott Accused of Exploiting Family's Pain for Antiabortion Message," *St. Petersburg Times*, July 10, 2010, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/07/10/the-buzz-florida-politics/>.

⁹ NPR Staff, "Ad Wars are Fierce as Florida's Primary Approaches," NPR, August 22, 2010, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129320883>.

¹⁰ William March, "Scott: Politics is Like Business," *Tampa Tribune*, May 30, 2010.

the end of the ad that seemed designed to elicit a hostile sexist response among voters who might want to put women in their place: “And now she wants a promotion?”¹

Scott’s campaign also engaged in racial priming through his policy proposals while neglecting outreach to Black voters. Scott campaigned on a policy promise to drug test welfare benefits,² which primed negative stereotypes of Black residents as lazy, immoral “takers.”³ Scott also deliberately did little to no outreach to Black voters in Florida, alleged Jennifer Carroll, who Scott tapped to be his running mate for lieutenant governor. Carroll was an immigrant from Trinidad, Black woman, and, like Scott, a fellow U.S. Navy veteran, so she balanced the ticket and potentially neutralized him symbolically from charges of racism, sexism, and xenophobia. Yet, in Carroll’s 2014 autobiography *When You Get There*, written after she had fallen out with Scott, she wrote that as early as 2000, the Republican National Committee (RNC) didn’t want her to campaign against a Democratic opponent when she had the opportunity to do so out of fear it would increase Black voter turnout.⁴ Carroll wrote “that Scott showed no interest in reaching out to black and Hispanic voters in 2010, so she did over his campaign’s objections.”⁵ “Working hand-in-hand with black political consultant Clarence McKee in the 2010 campaign, Carroll said she built a Republican outreach plan to black voters who vote reliably Democratic, using newspapers, radios, and phone calls. Despite the campaign’s objections, she attended a forum in Miami hosted by Bishop Victor Curry, a radio host and prominent voice in Miami’s black community.”⁶

Rick Scott’s campaign was given a boost by early backers in two key regions of the state for conservatives: then-Florida State Rep. Matt Gaetz in the panhandle and Joe Gruters, the Sarasota GOP chair on the South-West Gulf Coast; both were local opinion leaders with populist flair for catching attention and generating media. Gaetz and Gruters have been known themselves for hardline immigration stances,⁷ and both grew up in conservative religious political environments that were strictly anti-abortion. Gruters protested outside abortion clinics with his father as a child and served as president of the Respect Life Club at Cardinal Mooney High School in Sarasota;⁸ Gaetz’s mother refused to terminate a pregnancy with life-threatening complications, partially paralyzing her, and Gaetz grew-up in a community where two abortion clinic doctors were killed.⁹ Matt Gaetz, son of State Senator Don Gaetz, stepped out early to back Scott from the Tea Party wing; Matt Gaetz was “one of the few legislators who supported Scott in the primary.”¹⁰ Gruters became fast friends with Scott and found spots for him to speak during the primary campaign against McCollum;¹¹ Gruters coached Scott to serve free food at the events,

¹ ScottforFlorida. “Bad investments,” 2010. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwTkgV-NQVM>. Accessed March 2020.

² Aaron Sharockman, “Scott Gets His Wish on Drug-Testing Welfare Recipients,” *Tampa Bay Times*, May 6, 2011, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2011/05/06/scott-gets-his-wish-on-drug-testing-welfare-recipients/>

³ On racial priming studies, see Tali Mendelberg, “Racial Priming Revived,” *Perspectives on Politics* 6, n.1 (2008): p.109-123.

⁴ Jennifer Carroll, *When You Get There: An Autobiography* (Charleston: Advantage, 2014), p.84.

⁵ Steve Bousquet, “Former Lt. Gov. Jennifer Carroll Rips Gov. Rick Scott, Others in New Book,” *Tampa Bay Times*, August 27, 2014, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/former-lt-gov-jennifer-carroll-rips-gov-rick-scott-others-in-new-book/2194683/>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ For example, see Ana Ceballos, “Florida GOP Chairman Joe Gruters Postpones ‘Listening Tour,’” *Bradenton Herald*, August 12, 2019, <https://www.bradenton.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article233785757.html>

⁸ Zac Anderson, “Bill Formulated by Sarasota Lawmakers Would Restrict Abortion in Florida,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, January 8, 2017, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20170108/bill-formulated-by-sarasota-lawmakers-would-restrict-abortion-in-florida>

⁹ Stephanie Mencimer, “How Matt Gaetz Used Daddy’s Money to Become Trump’s Favorite Congressman,” *Mother Jones* (September/October, 2019), <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/07/how-matt-gaetz-used-daddys-money-to-become-trumps-favorite-congressman/>

¹⁰ Tom McLaughlin, “Northwest Florida was Rick Scott’s ‘Victory Lane,’” *Northwest Florida Daily News*, November 4, 2010.

¹¹ Mark Gordon, “Trump’s Man in Florida Gets Pumped for 2020,” *Business Observer*, March 1, 2019, <https://www.businessobserverfl.com/article/trumps-man-in-florida-gets-pumped-for-2020>

so Scott's campaign team arranged for free pie and coffee at Troyer's Dutch Heritage Restaurant in Sarasota on one occasion and on another Scott's team held a rally with free barbecued pulled pork sandwiches and side fixings in Parrish, a small unincorporated town in Manatee county,¹ where in 1976 Rufus Shackelford, CEO of Four Star Tomato, once launched his Vice-Presidential bid alongside Tom Anderson of the American Party; the American Party grew out of George Wallace's 1968 bid for president.² Gruters continued to be a strong Scott backer, as the Sarasota GOP later awarded Scott its "Statesman of the Year" prize in 2016, after Trump won it twice.³ Gaetz, however, fell out with Scott several years later due to power struggles related to the Florida legislature and Don Gaetz, despite both Scott and Gaetz later being two of Trump's strongest allies in Congress.⁴

Scott eventually won the support of major business players, though Sink won the support of the two biggest police unions in the state. Despite Sink's strong relationship with the business community based on her background as a banker with Bank of America and experience as CFO of Florida, "the state Chamber [of Commerce] and many business leaders sided with Scott and his Tea Party supporters, preferring to have a conservative Republican businessman as governor, even if they barely knew him, than a conservative Democratic businesswoman."⁵ The state's two biggest police unions backed Sink, on the other hand, criticizing Scott over his plans to cut the state budget, which they believed would lead to prison budget cuts and prison closures.⁶

Ultimately, TV helped Rick Scott prevail as a previously unknown outsider by allowing him to introduce himself directly in the many communities where he could not campaign in person. Scott ran a paid media-heavy campaign, spending \$73 million of his own money on scripted messages across Florida's ten media markets with roughly 18.5 million viewers as of 2010.⁷ The Florida GOP also ran ads nationalizing the election by linking Sink to Obama and support for Obamacare and economic stimulus. Scott tacked slightly toward the center during the general election campaign on issues where he had previously taken inflammatory stances, proclaiming support for national Hispanic Heritage Month in September⁸ and urging the rogue Florida pastor who wanted to burn a pile of Korans not to do it, calling it "deeply wrong and even dangerous."⁹ He had also reached out to Cuban-American seniors and appeared on conservative Radio Mambi in Miami.¹⁰

Scott defeated Sink on Election Night in the closest gubernatorial election in over 100 years. Sink had grown up on a tobacco farm and campaigned heavily in rural north Florida, where she had done well

¹ Jeremy Wallace, "Rick Scott Makes Another Sarasota Area Stop," *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, August 15, 2010, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20100815/rick-scott-makes-another-sarasota-area-stop>

² Manatee County Public Library, "American Party candidate Rufus Shackelford," n.d. <https://cdm16681.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16681coll1/id/27930>; "Florida Tomato Grower on American Party Slate," *Naples Daily News*, June 23, 1976, p.4B.

³ Jenna Buzzacco-Foerster, "Rick Scott to Be Honored as Sarasota GOP's 2016 Statesman of the Year," *Saintpetersblog.com*, 2016, <https://saintpetersblog.com/rick-scott-honored-sarasota-gops-2016-statesman-year/>

⁴ Marc Caputo & Gary Fineout, G. "Inside the Gaetz-Scott Florida Feud," *Politico*, March 4, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/04/trump-allies-florida-gaetz-scott-1202995>

⁵ Colburn 2013, p.238.

⁶ Aaron Sharockman, "Police Union Attacks Rick Scott's Budget Plan, Saying It Closes Prisons and Releases Prisoners Early," *St. Petersburg Times*, October 4, 2010.

⁷ Adam C. Smith, "Forget Grass Roots; TV is King in Florida This Year," *St. Petersburg Times*, June 17, 2010.

⁸ Rick Scott Campaign Staff, "Rick Scott Statement on National Hispanic Heritage Month," September 15, 2010, <https://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20101001220127/http://www.rickscottforflorida.com/home/news/press-releases/2010/09/15/rick-scott-statement-on-national-hispanic-heritage-month/>

⁹ Rick Scott Campaign Staff, "Rick Scott Calls on Organizers of Koran Burning to 'Stop, Reflect and Change Their Plans,'" September 8, 2010, <https://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20101001221843/http://www.rickscottforflorida.com/home/news/press-releases/2010/09/08/rick-scott-calls-on-organizers-of-koran-burning-to-%e2%80%9cstop-reflect-and-change-their-plans%e2%80%9d/>

¹⁰ Beth Reinhard, "GOP Candidate Scott Reaches Out to Hispanics in Miami," *Tampa Bay Times*, June 29, 2010, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/06/29/gop-candidate-scott-reaches-out-to-hispanics-in-miami/>

in her 2006 CFO campaign with radio ads featuring her Southern “twangy accent,”¹ but Scott dominated north Florida election results in 2010, as he had during the primary. He ran up the score in three northern counties -- Okaloosa, Clay and Santa Rosa -- while Sink could not replicate Obama’s 2008 presidential victory margins in urban areas such as Miami-Dade or along the I-4 corridor.² An white male outsider with a Southern Strategy had defeated a daughter of the South.

Planting Seeds for a Nationalized Southern Strategy: Florida Roots and Branches of Donald Trump’s 2016 Presidential Campaign

Donald Trump sounded early campaign themes that fit the long Southern strategy in their anti-immigrant, sexist and anti-Muslim messages. Trump announced his campaign bid with a racist and xenophobic diatribe against Mexico and Mexican drugs and rapists coming across the border, along with people “probably from the Middle East,” pledging to build a Great Wall to stop it.³ Trump had spent the last several years decrying the legitimacy of President Obama’s birth certificate and calling him a Muslim, in an attempt to elevate himself and endear himself with the Tea Party movement that feared Obama was radically transforming America. Trump declared that he would shut down all Muslim immigration to the U.S. with a ban and made multiple degrading comments about women, amongst other controversial proposals and incendiary comments. Long-time Florida politics watchers noted that racial themes were predominant in Trump’s campaign from start to finish. Corrigan and Binder (2019b) call Trump “the most racially divisive presidential candidate since George Wallace.”⁴ Corrigan, Moreno and Lastre (2019) note, “Trump’s comments about Mexican immigrants being rapists set the tone for the most anti-immigrant Presidential Campaign since Calvin Coolidge’s in 1924.”⁵ Florida had seen an “America First Coalition” headquartered in the state once before, however; Bo Gritz, a Mormon “Christian identitarian,” ran on the Populist Party ticket in 1992, building on his support base with the patriot movement during the Jeb Bush and Terri Schiavo era.⁶ Gritz asserted that he served as the model for Hollywood’s *Rambo*, though Rambo’s creator denied the association with Gritz,⁷ Rambo-style macho iconography later showed up on Trump’s America First campaign flags and merchandise as well.⁸

Trump’s high-profile rhetoric, celebrity status, and perceived personal wealth helped him cut through his primary political opposition, even in Florida where several strong contenders were vying for the presidency as well. Although Florida’s own former Governor Jeb Bush and Senator Marco Rubio had strong relationships with the Cuban-American community in Florida, Trump still handily won the Republican Party primary in 2016, particularly among conservative evangelicals and voters who favored the Muslim ban, according to exit polls.⁹ In fact, the period before the March 2016 Republican Party

¹ Michael C. Bender, “Sink Tunes Her Pitch to Rural Floridians,” *St. Petersburg Times*, October 26, 2010, <https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2010/10/23/sink-tunes-her-pitch-to-rural-floridians/>.

² Marc Caputo, “The Buzz: Florida Politics. Did Rural Florida Sink Alex Sink,” *St. Petersburg Times*, November 3, 2010.

³ Suzanne Gamboa, “Donald Trump Announces Presidential Bid by Trashing Mexico, Mexicans,” *NBC News*, June 16, 2015, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/donald-trump-announces-presidential-bid-trashing-mexico-mexicans-n376521>

⁴ Matthew T. Corrigan and Michael Binder, “Introduction,” In *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump*, eds., Matthew T. Corrigan & Michael Binder. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019): p.3.

⁵ Matthew T. Corrigan, D. Mareno & R. A. Lastre, “Trump Beats Florida’s Favorite Sons,” In *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump*, eds., Matthew T. Corrigan & Michael Binder, eds., (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019): p.37.

⁶ “Ultra-conservatives Say Church is Purging Them,” Associated Press, November 29, 1992. <https://apnews.com/article/81040a276f4310f7934e6f855c268501>; Leonard Zeskind, *Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream*, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009); Southern Poverty Law Center, “Bo Gritz,” n.d., <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/bo-gritz>

⁷ Zeskind 2009, p.295.

⁸ Jeff Sharlet, “‘F--- Your Feelings’: In Trump’s America, the Partisan Battleflag is the New Stars and Stripes,” *Vanity Fair*, September 8, 2020, <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/trump-partisan-battle-flag-is-the-new-stars-and-stripes>

⁹ Corrigan, Moreno & Lastre, 2019.

primary in Florida was a boom time for party switches to Republican Party registration: “According to the director of the Florida Chamber Political Institute, Marian Johnson, the most switches between Florida’s major political parties occurred between September 2015 and March 2016, and the net gain for the Republican Party totaled 54,585 new registered voters.”¹

Trump’s Florida campaign roots went back to the previous cycle in 2012, when he started to lay the groundwork for his future presidential bid. The Sarasota GOP, chaired by Joe Gruters, awarded Trump a “Statesman of the Year” award in 2012, and gave him a “bust of Ronald Reagan for his stately leadership.”² Trump, denied a speaking spot at the RNC, was available and the Sarasota GOP was looking for a speaker for their fundraising dinner. Trump riveted the audience of over 1,000 attendees at the Ritz Carlton and helped the Sarasota GOP raise about \$200,000.³ In the 2012 audience was future Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, “then an unknown congressional candidate... just another curious Republican intrigued by Trump.”⁴ The Sarasota GOP awarded Trump its “Statesman of the Year” award again in 2015, as Gruters marveled at the ability of Trump to “fire up the GOP base,”⁵ which turned out to be important in maximizing turnout of white GOP voters amidst changing demographics in the electorate. Gruters had long admired Donald Trump, gushing in 2005 that his former boss, Congressman Vern Buchanan, one of the wealthiest members of Congress, was a “superstar” who was “almost like the Donald Trump of Sarasota.”⁶ For Gruters’ early and continual efforts on Trump’s behalf, Trump later rewarded Gruters with a position on the Amtrak board of directors.⁷

The “Statesman of the Year” award from the Sarasota GOP in 2012 may have been “the grandest imaginable title from the dinkiest possible entity” in the eyes of national journalists,⁸ but southwest Florida is one of the top political fundraising locations for aspiring presidential candidates, and Trump was getting in front of an important audience for his future in national politics. Jeremy Wallace, writing for the *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, once called Florida “essentially an ATM for candidates to help them pay for their operations in Iowa, New Hampshire and other early primary states”; Wallace pointed out that in 2012 Florida voters from Manatee to Collier counties on the southwest Gulf Coast of Florida raised almost \$7 million for GOP presidential candidates, which was about \$1 million more than the total raised for GOP presidential candidates in Iowa and New Hampshire combined.⁹

Trump had difficulty finding personnel to staff his Florida campaign operation in 2016 “because of the influence of [Senator Marco] Rubio and former Gov. Jeb Bush,”¹⁰ but he piggybacked off Joe Gruters’ and Rick Scott’s current and former personnel, and this network of staff continued to exercise influence in Washington D.C. through personnel appointments and proximity to the president once Trump was

¹ Peter Dunbar & Mike Haridopolos, *The Modern Republican Party in Florida* (University Press of Florida, 2019), p.98.

² Chris Anderson, “Anderson: Donald Trump: Sarasota’s ‘Statesman of the Year,’” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, October 16, 2016, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20161016/anderson-donald-trump-sarasotas-statesman-of-year>

³ Alex Mahadevan, “Trump Electrifies as Statesman of the Year,” *YourObserver.com*, August 27, 2012, <https://www.yourobservers.com/article/trump-electrifies-statesman-year>

⁴ Steve Contorno, “Donald Trump Is Headlining a Florida Statesman Dinner. Remember the First Time?” *Tampa Bay Times*, December 7, 2019, <https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/12/07/donald-trump-is-headlining-a-florida-statesman-dinner-remember-the-first-time/>

⁵ Jeremy Wallace, “Trump to Get Local GOP’s ‘Statesman’ Award Again,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, May 5, 2015, <http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2015/05/05/trump-to-get-local-gops-statesman-award-again/>

⁶ Lauren Mayk, “Not Quite a Simple Story of Success; Congressional Candidate Vern Buchanan’s Messy Departure from American Speedy is a Seldom-Told Tale,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, October 6, 2005.

⁷ Alex Leary, “Trump Taps Joe Gruters for Amtrak Board,” *Tampa Bay Times*, February 1, 2018, <https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/02/01/trump-taps-joe-gruters-for-amtrak-board/>

⁸ Elspeth Reeve, “Donald Trump, Statesman of the Year,” *The Atlantic*, July 9, 2012, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/donald-trump-statesman-year/326145/>

⁹ Jeremy Wallace, “Sarasota Quickly Shifting Its Focus to 2016,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, November 15, 2014, <http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2014/11/15/sarasota-quickly-shifts-focus-2016/>

¹⁰ Kenneth P. Vogel & Marc Caputo, “Trump Fires Top Aide,” *Politico*, May 25, 2016, <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/trump-parts-ways-with-top-aide-223590>

elected. Rick Scott, who “long admired Trump,” served as co-chair of the national pro-Trump super PAC Rebuilding America Now Super PAC.¹ Gruters became Trump’s campaign co-chair in the state of Florida along with Susie Wiles, a veteran GOP operative who was long-time friends with Paul Manafort,² Trump’s national campaign chair from June to August 2016 who became known for his closeness to Russian intelligence. Jennifer Locetta worked closely with both of them as state director of Florida for Trump, while serving concurrently as Gruters’ own campaign manager in his election bid for Florida State Representative for District 73 in 2016 and as Executive Director of the Sarasota GOP. Locetta was later tapped to be Special Assistant to the President and White House Associate Director of Presidential Personnel; she stepped down from that position in 2018 to help run Ron DeSantis’s campaign for Florida governor with Susie Wiles, after which she was appointed to Florida GOP Executive Director in 2019.³

Trump’s personal lobbyist in Florida, Brian Ballard, later became chief national lobbying liaison to the Trump administration with his Ballard Partners firm, which was known for its extensive portfolio of foreign clients and habit of encouraging clients to book reservations at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.⁴ Susie Wiles was previously employed by Ballard Partners, and her husband Lanny Wiles, another veteran GOP operative, once helped organize a meeting between pro-Putin Congressman Dana Rohrabacher and Russian nationals at the Capitol Hill Club a day before Republican House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy was recorded on tape saying, “There’s two people I think Putin pays: Rohrabacher and Trump.”⁵

Roger Stone and Steve Bannon both have significant Florida ties and were active in Florida politics on behalf of Trump in the 2016 campaign and beyond. Ft. Lauderdale, Florida-based political dirty trickster Roger Stone, an acolyte of Richard Nixon with a tattoo to prove it, served as campaign surrogate for Trump in the 2016 campaign and helped connect Trump to Infowars conspiracy theorist Alex Jones;⁶ Steve Bannon became Trump’s campaign CEO after Manafort stepped down in August 2016, moving from the helm of Breitbart News, which was known for the same kind of incendiary news stories about race and immigration that Trump was capitalizing on as part of his Southern Strategy-style campaign. Earlier, Bannon had also rented a home in Miami in 2014 and shopped for homes in Sarasota, while he “set up a research outfit in Tallahassee that churned out investigations on Hillary Clinton and, along with Breitbart News, went after two of Florida’s top Republicans, former Gov. Jeb Bush and Sen. Marco Rubio.”⁷ Bannon was later appointed to Trump’s National Security Council in the White House, even though he was registered to vote in Sarasota county at a Casey Key address shared by a questionable associate that should have raised questions about his security clearance; however, Bannon actually voted in New York City in 2016.⁸

¹ Marc Caputo, “Scott To Chair Pro-Trump Super PAC,” *Politico*, 27 July 2016, <https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2016/07/rick-scott-to-chair-pro-trump-super-pac-104308>

² Vogel & Caputo, 2016.

³ Jacob Ogles, “Jennifer Locetta Tapped as New Executive Director of Florida GOP,” *Florida Politics*, January 27, 2019, <https://floridapolitics.com/archives/286398-jennifer-locetta-hired-as-republican-party-of-florida-executive-director>

⁴ Theodoric Meyer, “The Most Powerful Lobbyist in Trump’s Washington,” *Politico Magazine*, April 2, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/02/most-powerful-lobbyist-in-trump-washington-217759/>; Caitlin Moniz, “Clients of Trump-Tied Lobbying Firm Ballard Partners Keep Spending at Trump Properties,” *CREW*, March 29, 2019, <https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-investigations/clients-of-trump-tied-lobbying-firm-ballard-partners-keep-spending-at-trump-properties/>

⁵ Nico Hines, “GOP Lawmaker Got Direction from Moscow, Took It Back to D.C.,” *Daily Beast*, July 19, 2017, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/gop-lawmaker-got-direction-from-moscow-took-it-back-to-dc>.

⁶ Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Roger Stone Helped Donald Trump Get Elected President -- Now He’s Helping Himself,” *Washington Post*, April 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/roger-stone-a-master-of-dark-political-arts-is-playing-the-russia-scandal-for-all-its-worth/2017/04/18/1518184e-236f-11e7-b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html

⁷ Alex Leary & Adam Smith, “Long Before Trump Hired Him, Steve Bannon Was Making Deals and Kindling Political Fires in Florida,” *Tampa Bay Times*, 12 March 2017, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/long-before-trump-hired-him-steve-bannon-was-making-deals-and-kindling/2316078/>

⁸ Chris Anderson, “Column: Does Steve Bannon Live in Sarasota County? Because He’s Registered to Vote Here,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, January 24, 2017, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20170124/column-does-stephen-bannon-live-in-sarasota-county-because-hes-registered-to-vote-here>; Chris Anderson, “Steve Bannon, Andrew Badolato, Casey Key and a Questionable Association,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, August 20, 2020, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/story/news/local/2020/08/20/steve-bannon-andrew-badolato-and-sarasota-connection/5616202002/>

The 2016 Trump campaign in Florida embraced a core aspect of the Southern Strategy -- attempting to suppress Black voter turnout. On the eve of the 2016 presidential election, a senior Trump campaign official offered, "We have three major voter suppression operations underway," aimed at "White Liberals, young women and African-Americans."¹ The Trump campaign used an old quote in which Hillary Clinton referred to "super predators" as "the basis of a below-the-radar effort to discourage infrequent black voters from showing up at the polls -- particularly in Florida."² The campaign placed spots on Black radio stations and Facebook "dark posts" that were nonpublic but could be seen by Black voters they were targeting. The team also attempted to "drive down voter turnout in Miami's Little Haiti neighborhood with targeted messages about the Clinton Foundation's controversial operations in Haiti."³ Britain's Channel 4 News later reported that 2016 Trump campaign partner Cambridge Analytica created a category of voters marked for "deterrence," over half of whom were "Black, Asian, or Latino, with particularly high percentages in predominantly Black neighborhoods in key areas such as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Florida."⁴

The Trump campaign in 2016 and the Southern strategy they employed were successful, as Trump beat Hillary Clinton in Florida and won the Presidency via the electoral college. Florida, the biggest swing state, was crucial to the Trump camp toward that end. Despite high new voter registration numbers from Latino voters, "Trump's counter-mobilization of the white electorate, especially in urban and rural areas of Florida, ultimately enabled him to eke out a narrow victory" in a "strategy consonant with the politics of the Old South."⁵ The "ten strongest counties for Romney and Trump [were] all contiguous and reside at latitudes north of Ocala. These Old South/Old Florida counties used to be the backbone of the Democratic Party but are now a Republican bastion of contemporary Florida presidential elections."⁶ "While these counties are small in population, the tremendous Trump victory margins in these areas represented over half of his statewide winning margin in a state decided by just 1.2%."⁷

Of demographic groups, "senior citizens have consistently exhibited the strongest support for Republican Presidential candidates" in Florida,⁸ which also fits the notion of a group seeking to keep the forces of social and demographic change at bay. Clinton's campaign targets of racial and ethnic minorities as well as younger voters "turned out to vote at lower levels than Trump's strongest supporters --- older and whiter voters,"⁹ exactly as the Trump campaign had hoped for and actively worked to make happen.

¹ Joshua Green & Sasha Issenberg, "Inside the Trump Bunker, with Days To Go," *Bloomberg*, October 27, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/inside-the-trump-bunker-with-12-days-to-go>

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Craig Timberg & Isaac Stanley-Becker, "Cambridge Analytica Database Identified Black Voters As Ripe For 'Deterrence,' British Broadcaster Says," *Washington Post*, September 28, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/28/trump-2016-cambridge-analytica-suppression/>.

⁵ Jonathan Knuckey & Aubrey Jewett, "Florida: Old South Electoral Strategy Trumps the Newest Southern Politics," In *The Future Ain't What It Used To Be: The 2016 Presidential Election in the South*, eds., Branwell DuBose Kapeluck & Scott E. Buchanan (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2018): p.147-174.

⁶ Seth C. McKee & Daniel A. Smith, "Trump Territory," In *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump*, eds., Matthew T. Corrigan & Michael Binder (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019): p.58.

⁷ Corrigan & Binder. 2019, p.176.

⁸ McKee & Smith. 2019, p.61.

⁹ Susan A. MacManus, David J. Bonanza & Anthony A. Cilluffo, "The I-4 Corridor: The Sunshine State's Premier Battleground," In *Florida and the 2016 Election of Donald J. Trump*, eds., Matthew T. Corrigan & Michael Binder (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2019): p.98.

Governing from the South at the Winter White House: Florida's Base for Trump's Presidency and 2020 Reelection Effort

During the Trump Presidency, Florida continued to be a major base of operations for him at his Palm Beach home of Mar-a-Lago, where he found personnel to help him during his impeachment proceedings, mingled with donors and supporters, and planned his 2020 reelection effort. Trump called Mar-a-Lago his "Winter White House," a name first given to the property aspirationally by its original owner Marjorie Meriwether Post dubbed a potential "Winter White House" when she gave it to the federal government years before Trump bought the property. In practice, during Trump's presidency, Mar-a-Lago functioned in Florida much like the Trump Hotel in Washington D.C. in bringing lobbyists and influence-seekers into the orbit of Trump administration members, including the president himself on his many weekend sojourns to Florida.¹

Florida personalities were heavily involved in Trump's first impeachment defense and prosecution. Trump's first impeachment defense relied heavily on Florida lawyers. From the Miami area, Jane and Martin Raskin represented him.² From the Sarasota area, his impeachment team included Stuart Roth, a long-time legal partner of Jay Sekulow, head of the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLU), a right-wing counterpart to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which was created to support religious freedom cases for the religious right.³ Former Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi joined the effort as well.⁴ Democrats in Congress impeached Trump because of his attempts to influence the 2020 presidential election by digging up dirt on his rival, Joe Biden, via unethical and potentially illegal pressure on Ukraine by withholding Congressionally-appropriated military aid and a visit to the White House; in Ukraine, Trump associate Rudy Giuliani leveraged the help of Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, South Florida businessmen who had incorporated their firm, "Fraud Guarantee," in Boca Raton, and who were fixtures at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach.⁵ Parnas and Fruman were also photographed with Florida Governor Ron DeSantis on many occasions and donated \$50,000 to his election campaign in 2018 the day before Trump endorsed DeSantis.⁶

The Trump 2020 reelection campaign for the entire nationwide effort was formally headquartered in Arlington, Virginia but effectively anchored in Florida, reflecting the Trumpist organizational capacity built up in the state. Journalist Marc Caputo noted that the campaign's "beating heart is located roughly 1,000 miles away [from Virginia] in sun-splashed South Florida"⁷ because it was the personal residence of Trump campaign manager Brad Parscale and pollster Tony Fabrizio in Ft. Lauderdale; home to Trump's residence of Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, a center of conservative wealth; as well as home to conservative media personalities including radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh, Newsmax CEO Christopher Ruddy, and the National Enquirer tabloid headquarters.⁸ The Trump campaign put so much emphasis on winning the

¹ Sarah Blaskey, Nicholas Nehamas, Caitlin Ostroff & Jay Weaver, *The Grifter's Club: Trump, Mar-a-Lago and the Selling of the Presidency* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020).

² Marc Caputo, "How South Florida's Exotic Cast of Political Characters Fuels Trump's Reelection Bid," *Politico*, October 25, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/amp/news/2019/10/25/trump-south-florida-057010>.

³ Nancy Cook & Darren Samuelson, "Trump Team Scrambles to Formulate an Impeachment Plan," *Politico*, September 30, 2019, <https://www.politico.com/news/2019/09/30/donald-trump-impeachment-staff-012914>

⁴ Julia Arciga, "Ex-Florida AG Pam Bondi to Join White House to Help with Impeachment Matters: Report," *Daily Beast*. November 6, 2019, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/pam-bondi-former-florida-attorney-general-to-join-white-house-to-help-with-impeachment-matters-report>

⁵ Rosalind S. Helderman & Paul Sonne, "'Once This Is Over, We'll Be Kings.': How Lev Parnas Worked His Way into Trump's World -- And Now Is Rattling It," *Washington Post*, January 18, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/once-this-is-over-well-be-kings-how-lev-parnas-worked-his-way-into-trumps-world--and-now-is-rattling-it/2020/01/18/68542ff4-3940-11ea-9541-9107303481a4_story.html

⁶ Steve Contorno, "DeSantis Downplayed Ties to Giuliani Associates. Then We Found Them Hugging," *Tampa Bay Times*, October 18, 2019, <https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/10/18/ron-desantis-downplayed-ties-to-giuliani-associates-then-we-found-them-hugging/>

⁷ Caputo, 2019.

⁸ Ibid.

state of Florida that it was the only state to have the title of its own “region” in the campaign’s overall strategy and it was the first place that Trump held an official reelection rally.¹ At that kickoff rally in Orlando, Trump railed against illegal immigrants, the “fake news” media, and told rally goers that Democrats want to “destroy you and they want to destroy our country as we know it,” reprising his 2016 “us versus them” campaign themes,² evoking the Southern Strategy once again.

New grassroots conservative women’s groups bolstered the anti-feminist component of the “long Southern strategy” in Florida. In Southwest Florida, Women for Trump Florida, originally called Women for Trump Sarasota-Manatee, was led by Caroline Wetherington to mobilize voters for Trump’s reelection. Wetherington is a member of the Board of Governors of the Council for National Policy,³ a secretive, radical-right, Christian nationalist hub group that provided crucial political support for Trump’s presidential bid in 2016 and 2020 by bringing together money, political operatives, and grassroots supporters⁴ and which was also heavily involved in January 6, 2021 Stop the Steal rallies in Washington, D.C. to protest the legitimacy of the November 2020 presidential election.⁵ Women for Trump Florida was a “nonprofit, faith-based group” that hosted speakers for luncheons at Lakewood Ranch Golf and Country Club and boasted an email list with over 5,000 members by 2020.⁶ Wetherington commented that one of her top priorities was “overturning Roe v. Wade.”⁷ Women for Trump Florida also notably sponsored a legal fundraiser for political operative Roger Stone in 2019 before he was pardoned by Trump.⁸

Many of Trump’s top supporters in Florida, including GOP operatives and grassroots leaders, promoted or participated in the January 6, 2021 Stop the Steal protests in Washington, DC, and more Floridians have also been arrested in connection with the U.S. Capitol siege than any other state. Rick Scott, elected U.S. Senator in 2018, voted to decertify the election results of Pennsylvania,⁹ after a group of protesters including Roger Stone gathered outside his home in Naples urged him to overturn the election results.¹⁰ Florida GOP Chair Joe Gruters of Sarasota promoted the bus trip to the January 6 Stop the Steal protests on his Facebook account.¹¹ Florida GOP Vice Chair and Sarasota County Commissioner Christian Ziegler attended the January 6 protests in Washington, D.C. himself.¹² The national Proud Boys,

¹ Ibid.

² Zac Anderson, “Trump Takes Aim at ‘Radical’ Democrats During Campaign Kickoff in Orlando,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, June 18, 2019, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20190618/trump-takes-aim-at-radical-democrats-during-campaign-kickoff-in-orlando>

³ Council for National Policy, Council for National Policy April 2020 Membership Directory (2020), <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/7241474-CNP-Membership-Directory-April-2020.html>.

⁴ Anne Nelson, *Shadow Network: Media, Money, and the Secret Hub of the Radical Right* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2019).

⁵ Robert O’Harrow, Jr. “Rallies Ahead of Capitol Riot Were Planned By Established Washington Insiders,” *Washington Post*, January 17, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/capitol-rally-organizers-before-riots/2021/01/16/c5b40250-552d-11eb-a931-5b162d0d033d_story.html.

⁶ Steve Newborn, “‘Women for Trump Florida’ Focus on the Future, Not the Past,” WUSF Public Media, March 12, 2020, <https://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/politics/2020-03-12/women-for-trump-focus-on-the-future-not-the-past>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Zac Anderson, “In Sarasota, Trump Ally Warns of Censorship By Tech Companies,” *Palm Beach Post*, May 13, 2019, <https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190513/in-sarasota-trump-ally-roger-stone-warns-of-censorship-by-tech-companies>

⁹ Alex Daugherty and David Smiley, “Scott Votes to Decertify Pennsylvania Electors; Rubio Doesn’t,” *Tampa Bay Times*, January 6, 2021, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/nation-world/2021/01/06/rubio-scott-vote-to-uphold-arizona-electors-after-capitol-chaos/>

¹⁰ Brad Hamilton, “Roger Stone Attends Naples Rally Demanding Florida Senators Object to Electoral Votes,” *NBC-2*, January 4, 2021, <https://nbc-2.com/news/2021/01/03/roger-stone-attends-naples-rally-demanding-florida-senators-to-object-electoral-votes/>

¹¹ Chris Anderson, “Anderson: Gruters Helped Peddle Trump’s Election Lie with Bus Trip Promotion on Facebook,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, January 16, 2021, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/story/opinion/columns/2021/01/16/gruters-pushes-election-fraud-fallacy-promoting-trip-washington-d-c/4173125001/>

¹² Zac Anderson, “Congressmen Greg Steube and Vern Buchanan Condemn Lawlessness at U.S. Capitol,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, January 6, 2021, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/06/u-s-rep-greg-steube-joining-republicans-challenging-election-results/6564750002/>

a hate group supportive of “Western chauvinism” and led by Enrique Tarrío of Miami, has long had an active presence in Florida,¹ and multiple Florida members were arrested in connection with the U.S. Capitol riots. The leader of the Florida Oath Keepers militia group, Kelly Meggs, has also been charged in connection with the U.S. Capitol riots, during which the Confederate flag was paraded in the Capitol building; Meggs had privately claimed in December 2020 to have “organized an alliance between Oath Keepers, Florida 3%ers, and Proud Boys.”²

Despite Trump’s 2020 presidential election loss, his Florida roots remain strong and this state is clearly a power base from which he could mount another presidential bid. Florida GOP Chair Joe Gruters is now head of the RNC’s Election Integrity project,³ facilitating election the diffusion of election reform laws developed in Florida across the country. The Florida Legislature in 2021 passed new election legislation to restrict drop boxes for mail ballots and tighten requirements for voting by mail, including requiring voters to register for the option every year, a set of changes that Florida supervisors of elections widely opposed as unnecessary after completing what they perceived to be a successful 2020 election administration. Democrats worried that the measure was designed to suppress votes of Democratic voters who had amassed a lead over Republicans in vote-by-mail registrations during the 2020 cycle. In 2021, Gruters was the only Senator to speak in favor of the election bill during its first Senate committee hearing; it eventually passed and was signed into law.⁴ The following legislative session, Defend Florida, an election conspiracy group led by Women for Trump Florida’s Caroline Wetherington, urged an audit of the 2020 election and lobbied for tighter election laws based on false claims of a “stolen election.”⁵ The legislature passed, and Governor DeSantis signed, a bill that made ballot harvesting a felony and required supervisors of election to move from biyearly to annual voter roll maintenance to weed out voters who moved, died, or were no longer eligible. The bill also authorized the country’s first election police squad in a new “Office of Election Crimes and Security” located within the Department of State, with support for 25 officers working jointly with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.⁶ As scholars have noted, this broader kind of phenomena toward tightening the franchise could be described as the “Southernization of American politics.”⁷

Democrats are not the only ones to characterize Republican concerns about election integrity as a voter suppression scheme. Jim Greer, the former Republican Party of Florida Chair who served prison time for a criminal conviction related to his malfeasance with party finances, later spoke openly on the record that Governor Rick Scott and Republican legislators tried to reduce and eliminate early voting based on the “lie” of voter fraud: “There’s very little voter fraud in Florida. When I was chairman, no one ever came

¹ Dan Sullivan, “Extremist Groups Sit at the Fringes of Florida Politics,” *Tampa Bay Times*, October 7, 2020, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/10/07/extremist-groups-sit-at-the-fringes-of-florida-politics/>.

² Kyle Cheney, “New Evidence Suggests ‘Alliance’ between Oath Keepers, Proud Boys Ahead of Jan. 6.,” *Politico*, March 24, 2021, <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/24/oath-keepers-proud-boys-alliance-capitol-riot-477741>

³ Jacob Ogles, J. “Joe Gruters to Lead RNC ‘Election Integrity’ Committee,” *Florida Politics*, February 17, 2021, <https://floridapolitics.com/archives/404334-joe-gruters-to-lead-rnc-election-integrity-committee>.

⁴ John Kennedy, “Elections Bill that Bans Ballot Drop Boxes and Makes Other Changes Advances in Florida Senate,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, March 10, 2021, <https://www.heraldtribune.com/story/news/politics/state/2021/03/10/florida-legislature-moving-forward-controversial-mail-ballot-drop-box-changes/6936429002/>

⁵ Steve Contorno, Romy Ellenbogen & Allison Ross, “Trump Won Florida, But Online and at Your Door, His Supporters Are Trying to Force an Audit,” *Tampa Bay Times*, October 15, 2021, <https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/2021/10/15/trump-won-florida-but-online-and-at-your-door-his-supporters-are-trying-to-force-an-audit/>; Zac Anderson, “Voting Fraud Conspiracy Group Has Pipeline to Florida Governor as Election Changes Considered,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, February 6, 2022.

⁶ Gary Fineout, “DeSantis Signs Bill Creating One of the Nation’s Only Election Police Units,” *Politico*, April 25, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/25/desantis-florida-election-police-units-00027577>.

⁷ Charles S. Bullock III, Susan A. MacManus, Jeremy D. Mayer & Mark J. Rozell, *The South and the Transformation of US Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

to me and talked about voter fraud. It's clearly their manipulating the political process to win elections. I can tell you right now, the Republican political strategists and political consultants will do whatever they have to do to win Election Day. If they have to keep minorities from going to the polls, they'll do it. If they have to change the laws for their benefit, they'll do it..."¹

Discredited though Greer may be, his words have been echoed by other prominent party apostates² and are the most open acknowledgement of the ways that race cynically plays out in the Republican Party of Florida, at least in some corners. In his 2014 book, Greer explained:

"We would have one or two blacks at our quarterly meetings only because we needed them for show. If most of the radical Republicans had their way, there's [sic] wouldn't be any in the entire Republican Party. The haters come from two areas, the old-time Republicans in leadership who've been there for years, and those who come from the rural counties. Nationwide if you look at the voters in the rural states, they haven't moved up to the 21st century. Our county voters are the same way. Some of these people still can't accept that the South lost the Civil War. They want things to go back to the way they were. They still don't accept civil rights for blacks. The other segment of the party trying to keep minorities from voting comes from the professional side, the political consultants and political strategists, the ones who used to report to me. In most cases, they are not racists, just professionals doing a job. And their job is to win on Election Day."³

Conclusion

At Joe Biden's presidential inauguration, poet laureate Amanda Gorman spoke to the social uncertainties and racial anxieties that had brought our country to its political moment: "It's because being American is more than a pride we inherit/it's the past we step into/and how we repair it/We've seen a force that would shatter our nation/rather than share it."⁴ The message spoke to the political convulsions of massive resistance in backlash to strides toward multiracial democracy in America and in support of the highly personalized authoritarian project of Donald Trump's presidency. The fractious moment was long in the making both nationally and in the state of Florida because of successive political campaigns focus on a Southern strategy and political administration by governorships and presidencies that attempted to implement the same goals in public policy to provide continued place of privilege for the slowly demographically declining and aging conservative, White electorate.

Yet Republican Party of Florida politicians are clever, hard-working, and will do what it takes to win, even if it means broadening appeal by tacking back-and-forth between hard-right messages for their older, white base and more welcoming messages for Black and Hispanic voters, particularly the latter, which in Florida are widely known to be a diverse group of people with roots in many different Latin American countries, each subgroup with their own distinctive perspectives and relationships to politics. Rick Scott knew that he needed Hispanic voters to win a U.S. Senate seat amidst a diversifying electorate in the long run. Consequently, he began learning Spanish in 2011, and toward the end of his second term in office, he made seven trips to Puerto Rico in 2017 because he was "unwilling to concede the new arrivals to the Democratic voting bloc."⁵ Donald Trump, meanwhile, gearing up for his 2020 reelection campaign, courted Venezuelan-American and Cuban-American voters with his foreign policy proposals, which were

¹ Golenbock, 2014, p.365.

² Stuart Stevens, *It Was All a Lie: How the Republican Party Became Donald Trump* (New York: Vintage, 2020); Tim Miller, *Why We Did It: A Travelogue from the Republican Road to Hell* (New York: Harper, 2022).

³ Golenbock, 2014, p.394.

⁴ CNN, "READ: Youth Poet Laureate Amanda Gorman's Inaugural Poem," January 20, 2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/20/politics/amanda-gorman-inaugural-poem-transcript/index.html>

⁵ Dunbar & Haridopolos, 2019, p.303.

steered considerably by Senator Marco Rubio,¹ and with his message of jobs and economic opportunity for breadwinners, even amidst the pandemic, and outreach to Latino evangelical churches.² Many were surprised that Trump performed so well in Florida in 2020, racking up more votes in Miami-Dade county compared to what Hillary Clinton was able to win in 2016.³ The election results validated the second and third legs of the "long Southern strategy" that broadened outreach to new members of the coalition through social conservatism and religious right activism.

Florida where the object of political competition is to win elections on the basis of marginal improvements with as many of the state's diverse demographic groups as possible;⁴ Micro-targeting voters may have worked for a while, so that voters would not be aware that politicians said different things to different groups at different times. But it almost doesn't even matter anymore. Studies of racial priming by political scientists show that the American public is growing to care less in the first place about explicitly racially biased political communications,⁵ which suggests that Republicans can have their cake and eat it too -- that is, they can "say the quiet part out loud" to spur massive conservative white voter turnout, as Scott and Trump did with their explicit racism and xenophobia, while successfully courting minority voters with specific niche policy proposals or more direct appeals at the same time. Some commenters see Florida's Republican Governor Ron DeSantis implementing a similar Southern strategy of his own through adoption of legislation targeting "divisive" racial curriculum in school and his own Congressional election maps eliminating Black-majority districts in preparation for a possible Presidential bid of his own, even while trying to inoculate himself against charges of racism through actions such as pardoning the Groveland Four Black men who were falsely accused of raping a white girl in 1949 in Florida.⁶ This is the Southern Strategy adapted, but still alive in the 21st Century that can win elections, while killing the spirit of multiracial democracy.

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² Suzanne Gamboa and Carmen Sesin, "Trump's Gains Among Latino Voters Shouldn't Come as a Surprise. Here's Why," *NBCNews.com* (5 November 2020): <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/trump-s-gains-among-latino-voters-shouldn-t-come-surprise-n1246463>

³ David Smiley, Alex Daugherty, and Bianca Padró Ocasio, "Trump Wins Florida with Lift from Hispanic Voters in Miami-Dade County," *Tampa Bay Times* (4 November 2020): <https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/11/04/trump-wins-florida-with-lift-from-hispanic-voters-in-miami-dade-county/>

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⁶ C. Isaiah Smalls II, "'History is Repeating Itself': Are DeSantis Policies Stoking Racial Division?" *Bradenton Herald* (3 August 2022): <https://www.bradenton.com/news/state/florida/article263119958.html>

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“NATO vs. Russia: from the USSR’s Threat of World War III to NATO Enlargements to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, 1949-2023”

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ABSTRACT: During the “Cold War” (1946-1990), NATO waged a 40+ years defensive strategy against the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Warsaw Pact’s Communist Satellites ideologico-military expansionism in Europe. The Cold War sudden end with a sequential collapse of Soviet-ruled East Europe, Warsaw Pact (1989-90) and USSR (1991-92) ended risks of World War III. But new “Post-Cold War” (1990-2021) regional ethno-nationalist civil wars in the post-Communist Balkans (Yugoslavia) and USSR’s disintegration as 15 states has sparked innovative security policies by the U.S./NATO to stabilize fragile Eastern Europe, Baltics and Balkans, as well as Russia and ex-Soviet successor states by extending NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Collective regional security architecture, arms-control, democratic values and peaceful cooperation to 32 Allies and 30+ Partners. On one hand, the TransAtlantic Alliance crafted interlocking regional Partnerships (NAC-C, European/EAPC, ex-Soviet, Mediterranean, Gulf and Strategic states), followed by 6 sequential NATO Enlargements (“Open Door”) to willing East European and Balkan Partners (1999, 2002-04, 2009, 2017, 2020), strengthened by parallel European Union Enlargements and Association-Partners (2002-04, 2007, 2013). On the other hand, the U.S., NATO and E.U. invested 25 years (1990-2013) to also finally integrate a semi-democratic Russia into the West through the highest level of NATO’s Partnerships (“NATO+1”), arms-control, joint NATO peacekeeping (Bosnia and Kosovo), anti-terrorism (Second Afghan War), Western trade and Europe-Russia energy integration. However, even before Vladimir Putin’s rise, Russia has embraced increasingly virulent anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetorics first to cement Putin’s xenophobic neo-nationalist hold on the country (condemning NATO’s expansion to East Europe up to Russia’s borders) to then justify his pan-Slavic and neo-imperialist agenda to split NATO and Europe (targeted rhetorics, secret bribes of anti-E.U. politicians, Russian energy dependency) and so isolate the U.S.A. at the U.N. (BRICS, Second Gulf War), excluding them from the Middle East and ex-Soviet Central Asia. Russia also has built with Communist China a joint economico-security “protectorate” over the ex-Soviet Central Asia (Collective Security Treaty Organization-CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization-SCO) financed by Beijing. Thus, Putin’s frozen wars in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014) and East Ukraine/Donbas (2014-20) sought to destabilize NATO as impotent to guarantee its Partners’ security, isolate NATO-E.U. security and trade from their ex-Soviet Partners (Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine through CSTO, Shanghai-7), and divide Europe from a strategically drifting U.S. (Obama, Trump, Biden) with the blackmail of E.U. energy-dependency on Russia. All this finally empowered Russia’s 2022-23 invasion of Ukraine as Putin’s final step to reunify most ex-Soviet states within a neo-Russian Slavic empire fully aligned in trade, security and dictatorship with Communist China against the West, while being complicit of Beijing’s own anti-U.S. annexationist plans against pro-Western independent Taiwan. Balkans security remains vulnerable to Russia’s ultra-nationalist anti-Western strategy to undermine NATO’s cohesion in the Balkans (opposing Alliance Enlargements in 1999-2020s, fostering Serbia’s resentment on Kosovo, destabilizing Montenegro and Bosnia, opposing NATO’s Missile Defense in Romania and Poland) and adjoining East Mediterranean (Russia’s ambiguous ties with an ambivalent Turkey, penetration in Syria, naval drills with China and security cooperation with Islamic Iran). However, Russia’s failure in 2022 to quickly conquer Ukraine and split Europe and NATO with its gas-blackmails, as well as her horrendous war-crimes in Ukraine has sparked instead broad U.S.-Western sanctions and coordinated escalating military aid to Ukraine, while revamping NATO through new enlargements (Sweden and Finland, with NATO-E.U. Enlargement conditional promise for Ukraine and Georgia), beefed-up military defenses on its new “Eastern Flank” (previously lightly militarized) and novel “coupling” of anti-Russian Euro-Atlantic defenses to East Asia security (“QUAD” and U.S.-Japan-ROK) vs. Communist China’s parallel imperialist expansions against Taiwan, Japan, Philippines and India. Finally, Russia’s botched 2022-23 invasion of Ukraine and her trade-security alignment with China and Islamic Iran

has started a new era of “Global Strategic Confrontations” (2021-now) and “the most dangerous moment in European security in a generation” forcing NATO-E.U. since 2021 to militarize their unmanned borders in East Europe, Balkans and Scandinavia against Russia (seen as a renewed “adversary”) and globally vs. China (a “systemic challenge” but not yet an open “adversary”), while quickly decoupling Europe’s energy dependency from Russia.

U.S., NATO & E.U. vs. USSR/Russia in European & Balkan Security in the Cold War, 1949-1990

During the “Cold War” (1946-90), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) waged a 40+ years defensive strategy against the Soviet Union (USSR) and its Communist Satellites’ ideologico-military expansionism in Europe. NATO has assured for nearly 75 years since 1949 its evolving security missions of regional TransAtlantic Collective Defense, arms-control and democratic values to its slowly expanding Allies (from 12 Western Founders in 1949 to 32 Allies and 30+ Partners by 2022-23, including ex-Communist Eastern Europe, Baltics and Balkans). The Cold War sudden end with a sequential collapse of Soviet-ruled East Europe, Warsaw Pact (1989-90) and USSR (1991-92) ended risks of World War III. But the “Post-Cold War” (1990-2021) unleashed new regional ethno-nationalist civil wars in the post-Communist Balkans (Yugoslavia) and the USSR’s disintegration as 15 states, thus forcing U.S./NATO to adapt with innovative security policies by extending its regional security to stabilize fragile Eastern Europe, Baltics and Balkans, as well as Russia and ex-Soviet successor states, as well as also the adjoining strategic East Mediterranean.

Thus, as the longest alliance in History, NATO has continued to assure for 75 years (1949-2023) its evolving security missions with constantly modernizing Strategic Concepts: 1) first through 45 years of the “Cold War” (1949-1990) with conventional/nuclear deterrence against a divided Europe and risk of World War III by the “common enemy” Soviet Union (USSR); 2) then since the USSR’s 1991 collapse followed by 30 years of “post-Cold War” (1990-2021) with its sequential Enlargements, multi-layered Partnership structure and international peacekeeping along the United Nations (U.N.) against regional ethno-nationalist civil wars (1990s five Yugoslav Civil Wars), terrorism (2001-02 Second Afghan War and “War on Terror”) and regional wars (Iraq in the Two Gulf Wars of 1990-91 and 2003); 3) finally since 2008 to the slowly emerging new “Global Strategic Confrontations” era (2021-current) with also regional short devastating wars provoked by Russia (Georgia, Ukraine-Crimea, Ukraine-Donbas, Invasion of Ukraine) and Azerbaijan (Second Nagorno-Kharabak War, 2020 with 2023 skirmishes). As a multi-national integrated alliance, NATO also provides vital military coordination and peaceful cooperation among its slowly expanding Allies and Post-Cold War Partners on all “common” security issues, arms-control, regional stabilization, democratic values, anti-terrorism and bilateral/multilateral training.¹

As an integrated multi-national “Western Alliance”, its enduring success in centered in closely integrating Euro-Atlantic geo-strategic security, international Partners and democratic values, while sequentially tying together since 1949 a semi-isolationist U.S.A. with a hegemonic-weary Western Europe, Canada and Turkey, while adding since 1991 post-Communist East Europe, Baltics, Balkans, ex-“neutrals”, Partners and for a while Russia. As the only truly integrated Euro-Atlantic alliance, the Allies’ politico-ideological cement remains their common combat/security history and their common democratic heritage as symbolically “equal” Allies from both World Wars (1914-18, 1939-45) to the Cold War (1946-90) and Post-Cold War (1990-2021), transcending past rivalries among winners and losers into a new joint Western political identity, security integration and socio-economic democratic stability. Following this historical pattern, the 1990-91 Cold War’s end and USSR’s collapse sparked innovative security policies by the U.S. and NATO to finally integrate from 1990 to 2023 into the Post-Cold War’s New European Security Architecture the

¹ Stephen Ambrose & Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, 9th (New York: Penguin, 2010); John L. Gaddis, *Know We Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Marco Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & Other International Security Organizations* (Plymouth, G.B.: Scarecrow/ Rowman & Littlefield, January 2009), p.980.

Atlantic “winners”, “neutrals”, ex-Communist/Soviet “losers” and peripheral but vital “Out-of-Areas” from the traditional Euro-Atlantic area to the Mediterranean (from Israel to Morocco), Gulf Emirates (with external outreach also to Saudi Arabia), Middle East (briefly involving Iraq and Afghanistan), and Strategic Partners in East Asia (Japan and South Korea, with external quiet outreach also to India and Taiwan) and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand):

1. The first step was to integrate to NATO in bilateral cooperation a new level of pro-Western Partners (European “Neutrals”, ex-Communist Eastern Europe, ex-Soviet Baltics, Russia and other ex-Soviet Successor States).
2. The second step was to integrate in Euro-Atlantic Western Europe through six sequential NATO and E.U. Enlargements (1999-2023) most of these new European Partners (European “Neutrals”, ex-Communist East Europe, ex-Soviet Baltics) to create finally an integrated “Europe, One and United” (Atlantic Western Europe, European “Neutrals”, ex-Communist Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet Baltics) according to U.S. President Bill Clinton (D).
3. The third step continued enlarging NATO’s Partnerships to include Russia and ex-Soviet Successor States to new pro-Western Partners (Mediterranean, Gulf and Strategic ones).
4. Finally, the most important task for the U.S., NATO and E.U. acting in concert was also to slowly integrate in parallel a fragile, semi-democratic post-Communist Russia into the West through the highest level of NATO’s Partnerships and international cooperation in arms-control, joint NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, anti-terrorism, a Second Afghan War and peacekeeping, trade, and energy integration between Russia and the E.U.

Politically, NATO as an integrated Euro-Atlantic alliance of “equals” under symbolic U.S. leadership (not hegemony like the USSR over the Warsaw Pact) and diplomatico-political administration by European Secretary-Generals preserves each Ally’s national independence and security, while dampening old European ethno-nationalist tensions over rival minorities and borders, as well as being a beacon of democracy since 1975 and post-Cold War (1995 Principles on NATO Enlargement) for all Allies and Partners assuring 75 years of mutual politico-security integration among past enemies, reinforced by the parallel European Community/Union (E.U.) economic integration (1950-92 and 1992-2020s).¹

In military terms, as the longest integrated alliance in peacetime and war, NATO is led by U.S. Command through SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command-Europe), and its mix of conventional/nuclear forces guarantees all its Allies’ mutual security under U.S. forces and nuclear umbrella since the bipolar Cold War era (1946-90) against the USSR’s “common threat” of a conventional/nuclear World War III apocalypse by superior Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Soviet-Communist expansionism. U.S. front-line troops and nuclear umbrella also assured the automatic combat involvement of a now vulnerable America to a distant weaker Europe, reversing the old U.S. Isolationism preceding both World Wars. Thus, the “Lessons-Learned” of Two World Wars against Germany and a Cold War against the USSR/Russia are that the security of Europe against any hegemonic threat of conquest depends on U.S. forces and leadership, while the security of America depends on U.S. democratic leadership of Europe in a mutually-beneficial TransAtlantic Alliance.

Geo-strategically, during the Cold War NATO always suffered from weaker conventional forces spread out in Europe over a Central Front (West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark), Northern Flank (Scandinavia and Great Britain) and Southern Flank (Italy, Malta Base, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar Base), while the bulk of Alliance conventional reserves, *matériel* and nuclear forces remained cut-off by the Atlantic Ocean in the U.S.A. and Canada, forcing a parallel massive aero-naval anti-submarine and convoys efforts to keep Western Europe resupplied. By comparison, the USSR relied on geostrategic land

¹ Michael O. Slobodchikoff, G. Doug Davis & Brandon Stewart, eds., *The Challenge to NATO: Global Security & the Atlantic Alliance* (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books & University of Nebraska Press, 2021); S. Ambrose & D. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism*, idem; J.L. Gaddis, *Know We Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, idem); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem.

contiguity between its front-line strike forces in Communist East Germany and Czechoslovakia with Soviet occupation forces in all its East European and Balkan Communist satellites, all linked across the borders to the Soviet strategic reserve districts of Leningrad (today St. Petersburg), Moscow and Kiev. In the context of such East-West “Iron Curtain” in the Cold War, the Communist Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia) remained mostly a militarily-linked southeastern side-show to the major area of confrontation along the “Inter-German” borders (NATO’s West Germany and Luxemburg, pro-Western neutral Austria and Switzerland) vs. Soviet East European satellites (Communist East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Further, the 1949-53 and post-1956 Yugo-Soviet Split isolated from the Soviet-Eastern Bloc front-line defenses its previous rebellious satellite Yugoslavia, which became a neutral Communist state with limited military protection from NATO against any Soviet invasion and a global pulpit as a symbolical Non-Aligned Third World leader.¹

The Kremlin’s loss of pro-Soviet Communist Yugoslavia since 1949 eliminated militarily its front-line defenses along the Adriatic Sea opposite NATO Ally Italy and U.S.-protected Greece, and access to any major naval base to counter U.S./NATO sea-power, leaving only a brief minimal submarine presence in pro-Soviet Communist Albania, now militarily isolated between a hostile “neutral” Yugoslavia (due to both countries’ rival ethnic claims over Serb-controlled Albanian Kosovo) and NATO Allies Italy, Greece and Turkey. Then, the 1963 Sino-Soviet Split left a totally isolated Albania to reject Moscow and join in symbolical alliance anti-Soviet Communist China against the triple parallel threats of being invaded either by a pro-Western “neutral” Yugoslavia, or by NATO in some form of cooperation with “neutral” Yugoslavia, or by a Soviet politico-military conquest of Yugoslavia (luring to Moscow’s orbit local ethnic Serbs in Yugoslavia, plus ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia’s Vojvodina province, and Bulgaria’s own ethnic claims over Yugoslav North Macedonia). Thus, having lost her Western Balkans satellites, Moscow was left only with the strategically marginalized East Balkans as linchpin between Romania to Hungary in the northwest and Soviet Moldova in the northeast to threaten wartime support operations against Yugoslavia, and in the south from Bulgaria against Greece and the vital Turkish Straits.

During the Cold War, initial U.S./NATO operation-plans (O-Plans) in the 1947-60s envisaged World War III as a quick Soviet/Warsaw Pact (WPO) conventional invasion of Western Europe from Soviet-occupied Communist East Europe (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) by wiping out the Alliance’s Central Front (plus neutral Austria and Switzerland). Parallel secondary Soviet side-offensives would strike the closest Northern Flank (plus neutral Finland and Sweden) and from the Communist Northern Balkans (Hungary, Romania) against neutral Austria and renegade Communist Yugoslavia to then seize strategic Italy, while from the Southern Balkans Soviet/Bulgarian/Albanian forces would overrun Northern Macedonia, Greece and the vital Turkish Straits. Once NATO had been defeated in Europe and both France and Italy also collapsed, further Soviet/WPO offensives would seek to break retreating NATO defenses along the Pyrenees to conquer Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar, followed then by later offensives against Turkey, Middle-East, North Africa and the Mediterranean islands. This would further push back NATO’s splintered defenses into an Anglo-American maritime bulwark in the North Atlantic (Great Britain, Ireland, Iceland, Canada, U.S.A. and Caribbeans), with distant weaker military-economic support from other U.S. global alliances: Organization of American States (Latin America), ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand), Philippines, South Africa and Japan, but all equally concerned of parallel Soviet/Chinese/North Korean offensives against South Korea and Taiwan (as such escalation was feared already since the localized 1950-53 Korean War).²

¹ Elliott V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office of U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2012); Marco Rimanelli, “NATO from Cold War to Post-Cold War Peacekeeping”, *2011 Florida Conference of Historians Annals*, vol.19 (Fall 2011); *NATO Handbook* (Brussel: NATO, 1985).

² E.V. Converse III, *Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960*, idem; David C. Isby, *Weapons & Tactics of the Soviet Army*, 1st & 2nd Eds. (London: Jane’s Publ., 1981 & 1988); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem, Entries: Warsaw Pact & World War III; James Golden, Asa Clark & Bruce Arlinghaus, eds., *Conventional Deterrence* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).


With World War III initially forecasted by both sides during the 1940s-60s to possibly last several years (like World War II), only a massive Anglo-American invasion of Europe from the British Isles (also like D-Day in 1944) would finally destroy the Soviet “Empire”, but at the price of devastating all of Europe, if the SuperPowers did not already escalate hostilities to an all-out nuclear war (U.S. President Harry Truman’s “Massive Retaliation” strategy). Already in the 1950s, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-60) “New Look” strategy modified “Massive Retaliation” by adding controversial limited tactical nuclear strikes to buttress NATO’s conventional defenses against multiple massed Soviet armour attacks on NATO’s Central Front (targeting the Fulda Gap, Northern Germany, neutral Austria, neutral Yugoslavia and Italy’s Gorizia Gap), while striving to preserve U.S. strategic nuclear forces as a final escalation threat of all-out nuclear war vs. stopping East-West hostilities prior to NATO’s collapse. By the 1960s, a fully rearmed U.S.A. and NATO adopted President John Kennedy’s “Flexible Response” strategy to match and beat back all types of Soviet/WPO aggressions at each level of a rising “Escalation Ladder” (from counter-insurgency to limited/regional conventional wars, to all-out conventional war, to limited nuclear war and finally to all-out strategic nuclear war).

However by 1970s-88, modernized Soviet/WPO traditional conventional superiority over U.S./NATO forces was geared to achieve a surprise, four-weeks short World War III conventional offensive with massive fast armoured breakthroughs from her Western Theater of Operations (TVD) into NATO’s Central Front to crush the Alliance by conquering West Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium, prior to the arrival of U.S./Canadian reinforcements through the Atlantic via REFORGER convoys (“Return of Forces to Germany” annual war-exercises since 1975) seeking to rescue NATO from collapse. Soviet/WPO forces would not invade an ambiguous nationalist France (hoping to peel her off) and focus most forces against the Central Front, with only two limited additional Balkan strikes by its South-West TVD (into Northern Yugoslavia/Croatia and Italy vs. in the south the Turkish Straits and Northern Greece) and a North-West TVD limited invasion (Finland, plus Northern Norway and Northern Sweden). In this way, the Kremlin’s strategy would force a savaged, but not yet defeated NATO, into a quick armistice with loss of West Germany and Central Front (and likely soon after also of Italy, Greece and Serb-dominated rump-Yugoslavia over their domestic political collapse to Communist/Leftist parties), or face escalating East-West conventional combat into nuclear warfare as a desperate U.S. gamble to halt World War III and NATO’s defeat. Moscow’s ultimate politico-military success would hinge psychologically on breaking the will to keep fighting of U.S., French and NATO public opinions by threatening America and Western Europe with retaliatory Soviet nuclear strikes, should they seek to rescue an already hopelessly crushed West Germany and Austria (already demonized in Soviet global propaganda under the “Neo-Nazi” label). Such a weakened NATO would either collapse politically into capitulating into accepting unfavourable peace-terms (if militarily vulnerable France, Italy and Turkey peeled-off once Soviet forces reached the Rhine and Ardennes bordering France, and seized most of Italy, Istanbul and the Turkish Straits in the Mediterranean and Balkans), or desperately reconsolidate its shattered forces along a smaller TransAtlantic axis under U.S. nuclear protection (France, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Iceland, USA and Canada).¹ With the Post-Cold War declassification of documents and reduction of East-West forces, a crop of Alternative

¹ James M. Morris, *American Armed Forces*, 3rd Ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2009); David C. Isby & Charles Kamps Jr., *Armies of NATO’s Central Front* (London: Jane’s Publ., 1985); Yves Debay, *Armor of the West* (Hong Kong: Concord, 1992); D.C. Isby, *Weapons & Tactics of the Soviet Army*, idem; Jeffrey Simon, ed., *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988); *Soviet Military Power, 1985 & 1987*, 1st & 2nd Eds. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1985 & 1987, Unclass.); *Soviet Military Power: Assessment of the Threat, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1988, Unclass.); M. Rimaneli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem, Entry: World War III; Steven J. Zaloga, *Tanks at the Iron Curtain, 1946–1960: Early Cold War Armor in Central Europe* (New York: New Vanguard, 2020); Steven J. Zaloga, *Tanks at the Iron Curtain, 1960-1975* (New York: New Vanguard, 2020); Kenton White, *Never Ready: NATO’s Flexible Response Strategy, 1968-1989* (Europe@War).


History books by retired officers and military historians have explored different secret war-scares, O-Plans and worst-case scenarios for World War III.¹

USSR COMBAT REACH NATO-USSR/WARSAW PACT FORCES COMPARISON (1975-1985) INTERMEDIATE, SHORT & STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 1985



Sources: All 4 Maps: NATO: https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

Maps 1-2-3: USSR/Warsaw Pact vs. NATO World War III Scenarios 1-2-3



Soviet/Warsaw Pact World War III Invasion Plans of NATO/West Europe (top), Balkans & Turkey (left) & Scandinavia (right) vs. NATO's REFORGER Convoys to Europe

Sources: Left 3 Maps: *Soviet Military Power, 1987-89* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense Department, 1987-88, Unclass.) & Right Map: NATO: https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

Only by 1988, renewed East/West *Détente* led to deep NATO-Warsaw Pact arms-control cuts halving conventional forces and eliminating the risk of a surprise Soviet World War III strike (1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty/CFE), while parallel nuclear arms-control eliminated all tactical nuclear “Euromissiles” (1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces/INF Treaty and 1990 Short-range Nuclear Forces/SNF unilateral deal), and finally strategic nuclear weapons were also halved and further reduced to 1,500 each side (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties/START I, II, III and IV). Surprisingly, the Cold War bipolar conventional and nuclear Balance of Terror ended following Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachëv’s indecision between reforms and repressions, leading in-turn to the 1989-90 anti-Communist revolts in East Europe, fall of the Berlin Wall and 1990 Germany’s reunification, USSR’s loss of East Europe and Warsaw Pact defenses against NATO, 1991 Warsaw Pact dissolution and finally also the USSR’s own collapse, while all ex-Communist East European satellites immediately rushed to join both NATO and E.U. as new “Western” and “Europeans”.²

¹ Alternative History books on World War III: Harry Turtledove, *Bombs Away: the Hot War 1950s* (New York: Del Rey-Random House, 2016); William Stroock, *The Great Nuclear War of 1975* (New York: Createspace Independent Publ., 2022); Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War, August 1985* (New York: Macmillan, 1978); Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War: Untold Story* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); Jim Storr, *Battlegroup!: Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War* (New York: Helion Co., 2021); Joel Fulgham, *World War III: the Beginning* (New York: Author Solutions, 2003); Leo Barron, *OPLAN Fulda: World War III* (New York: Independent Publ., 2022); Alex Aaronson & James Rosone, *Advance to Contact: 1980 (Soviet Endgame)*, 2 vols. (New York: Front Line Publ., 2022-23); Ralph Peters, *Red Army* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); William Stroock, *World War 1990: Artic Storm* (New York: Createspace Independent, 2015); William Stroock, *World War 1990: The Weser* (New York: Createspace Independent, 2022).

² Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989 & 1990*, 4th-5th Eds. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1989-1990, Unclass.); George Bush Sr. & Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998); Michael Beschloss & Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Level: Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).

The Cold War's end and Warsaw Pact/USSR collapse were so sudden that the USA was left as the world's sole SuperPower, but was unable to consistently shift from its previous TransAtlantic Cold War Containment strategy and *Pax Americana* against the USSR as "common enemy" to any new long-term post-Cold War unitary EuroAtlantic Realist strategy as basis for an enduring and *Pax Americana* to counter a "New Arc of Threats" and "Out-of-Area" crises of regional imperialist wars (Middle East/Gulf imperialism (Saddam Iraq, Islamic Iran, Russia in Ukraine), as well as ethno-nationalist civil wars (post-Communist Balkans, Caucasus, Ukraine). While this "New Arc of Threats" immediately challenged the U.S.-led Western Liberal Global Economic Order, NATO regional security was extended to stabilize the adjoining strategic East Europe, Baltics and Balkans areas, but the U.S./West remained long confused by its domestic non-sense visions of a Liberal "End of History", "Peace-Dividend" pacifism and "Globalization" capitalist integration into the West of the Third World and Communist ex-enemies (which ended-up unwittingly favouring China's fast modernization and emergence as an anti-Western global Power by 2000-2020s). Thus, the lack of any consensus on a long-term national strategic vision increasingly curtailed U.S. global effectiveness and strategic goals, especially since 2008 (Obama, Trump, Biden). The result was the development of five competing U.S. Post-Cold War strategies over the latest six Administrations with partial security overlaps (Bush Sr.--Clinton, Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama--Biden, Trump).

Cold War Era: Globalist Containment and Interventionism (1946-1990). In the Cold War, American foreign policy influenced NATO's security with a long-term unifying semi-Realist and semi-bipartisan U.S. strategic vision over the "common threat" of a dreaded USSR-led World War III (1946-90) for over 45 years and 9 U.S. Presidents: Truman (D), Eisenhower (R), Kennedy (D), Johnson (D), Nixon (R), Ford (R), Carter (D), Reagan (R) and Bush Sr. (R). This same "common threat" forced the TransAtlantic Alliance to jointly implement the U.S. bipartisan Containment global strategy against the USSR-China Communist Bloc, despite later sharp inter-NATO contrasts over its implementation and the Allies' respective security contributions vs. U.S. domestic political "doves-hawks" contrasts and occasional American "Unilateralism" (1946-48, 1968-75, 1979-80). Containment as a doctrine did expand from a Euro-Mediterranean regional policy (1946-50) to a globalist anti-Communist crusade (1950-68, 1990-95), but after the Second Viet-Nam War it returned to a more practical case-by-case semi-regional doctrine interlaced with periods of East-West cooperation during two periods of *Détente* (1968-80, 1995-91).¹

Post-Cold War Fragmented Globalism vs. Semi-Isolationism (1990-2020s). The 1991 collapse of the Communist bloc and dissolution of the USSR erased the U.S.' and NATO's long-standing Cold War "common" enemy and Containment strategy. But as sole global SuperPower left, American foreign policy remained relatively ambiguous in a shifting post-Cold War palette of old and new threats through four different and partially interconnected U.S. Policies over 6 Administrations, increasingly weakened by lack of a unifying bipartisan strategic Realist vision amidst rising partisanship divisiveness. Indeed, after President Bush Sr.'s initial attempts at a unified post-Cold War bipartisan U.S. strategic vision, America still lacks a coherent long-term strategic vision, which is equally bemoaned by legendary National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger under President Nixon-R, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski under President Carter (D), and Advisor and president of Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass under both Presidents Bush Sr. (R) and Bush Jr. (R). At fault is the historico-political confluence of four factors:

¹ Jerald Combs, ed., *Nationalist, Realist & Radical: Three Views of American Diplomacy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: Popular Library, 1974); H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, idem; G. Bush Sr. & B. Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, idem; M. Beschloss & S. Talbott, *At the Highest Level*, idem; Richard Ellis, *The Development of the American Presidency* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2015); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1998); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and Crisis of American SuperPower--Bush Sr., Clinton & Bush Jr.* (New York: Basic, 2007); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and Crisis of Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Walter Russel Mead, "Kissinger Sees a Global Leadership Vacuum" in *Wall Street Journal* (26 December 2022): <https://www.wsj.com/articles/kissinger-sees-a-global-leadership-vacuum-world-order-peace-power-civilization-universities-depth-11671990402>

1) initially strong Presidencies weakened by rising ideologically-divided governments, recession or scandals: the extremely competent “globalist” Bush Sr. (R), “Third Force globalist” wily “Teflon” Clinton (D), religious-fundamentalist NeoCons crusader Bush Jr. (R) and “retrenchist” dashing First Black President Obama (D) with clashing leadership personalities and divisive national political ideologies leading to half-hazard fragmented decision-making policies;

2) directionless, weak Presidencies with ideologically-divided and stalled dysfunctional governments under one-term leaders: the “America First” wily ultra-Conservative “Teflon” Trump (R), too temperamentally volatile and constantly distracted by domestic crises and latest fads to stick to any long-term strategy or listen to his competent National Security Advisors (Vice-President Pence, Secretaries of State Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, NSC Advisors General H.R. McMaster and John Bolton; Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley) vs. a “retrenchist” failing incompetent ultra-Leftist Biden (D), increasingly senile and “managed” by a hidden consensual domestic panel of Leftists ideologues and a more coherent unofficial foreign experts panel of unimaginative ex-Obama operatives striving to keep the shop together (Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, NSC Advisor Jake Sullivan, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley);¹

3) America’s inability to fully align in a bipartisan national security vision difficult Realist policies (TransAtlantic security, East-West arms-control and trade, U.S.-led Coalitions anti-imperialist combat missions in the Gulf against Iraq and Iran) with increasingly divergent Idealist wishful dreams (expand the U.N. Liberal Order, Democratic values, U.N. peacekeeping, Europe’s free unification, and economic Globalization), except occasionally over measured NATO-E.U. Enlargements to ready Aspirants, or U.N.-NATO “Humanitarian Interventions” with anti-imperialist peacekeeping in the Balkans (IFOR, SFOR, AFOR, KFOR) and Libya, plus a global War on Terror with combat operations against *Al-Qaeda* and *Talibani* in Afghanistan (ISAF), against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq;

4) dual transitions of the international system after the ideological Cold War Era (1946-1990) from initially a Western-based Liberal World Order and Globalization in the Post-Cold War Era (1990-2021) besieged by regional imperialisms (Saddam’s Iraq, Serbia, Islamic Iran) and global Islamic terrorism (*Al-Qaeda*, *ISIL*, *Talibani*) to the current overt neo-imperialist “Strategic Confrontation” Era (2021-now) driven by the aligned dictatorial Russia and China regional Powers seeking to undermine both the U.S. global politico-economic leadership and Western-based Liberal World Order.² On one hand, this represents Moscow’s long-term anti-Western destabilization and neo-imperialist strategy to politico-economically control and re-annex most ex-Soviet successor states (Ukraine War, Central Asia) along divisive energy blackmail policies, corruption of leaders and electoral interference to weaken the Balkans and E.U. states, while undermining U.S. global leadership, U.N. and Middle East. On the other, Beijing’s own long-term anti-Western destabilization strategy blends trade cooperation and economic espionage to overtake the U.S. and Europe as new global economic leader (“Globalization” and “Belt-and-Road Initiative”), with domestic ethno-political repressions in Tibet, Sinkiang and Hong Kong, shadowing China’s neo-imperialist expansions into the Sino-Indian border, South China Sea (“Nine-Dash-Line”), future annexation of Taiwan to then expel the U.S. while

¹ John Ikenberry & Peter Trubowitz, eds., *American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); Z. Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America & Crisis of Global Power*, idem; Richard Haass, *A World in Disarray* (New York: Council Foreign Relations & Penguin, 2017); John Bolton, *The Room Where It Happened* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

² Z. Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and Crisis of American SuperPower--Bush Sr., Clinton & Bush Jr.*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Geostrategic Imperatives*, idem; Robert Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and Battle Against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2013); Z. Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America & Crisis of Global Power*, idem; R. Haass, *A World in Disarray*, idem; Walid Phares, *The Choice: Trump vs. Obama-Biden in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Post Hill Press, 2020); Stephen F. Cohen, *War with Russia? From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate* (New York: Hot Books, 2019).

isolating South Korea and Japan from the nearby U.S./Western Pacific islands defenses (“First Islands Chain”, “Second Islands Chain”, Solomon Islands).¹

Thus, since 1990 five different U.S. Post-Cold War strategies were pursued by the latest six Administrations with partial security overlaps (Bush Sr.-Clinton, Clinton, Bush Jr., Obama-Biden, Trump), while any consensus on a long-term national strategic vision sharply declined in coherence and effectiveness especially since 2008 (Obama, Trump and Biden):

- 1) “U.S. New World Order Globalism” (1990-94) initiated by President George Bush Sr. (R) as a Conservative cosmopolitan leader with deep foreign policy expertise (a 50% Realist-50% Idealist with a Presidential leadership model blending micro-management and Group-think in the strongest foreign security team). This new U.S. strategic vision was based on unprecedentedly strong U.S.-U.N.-NATO international political cooperation and NATO logistical support of trapped U.N. peacekeeping in the Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia), while building on the Cold War’s end and USSR’s collapse by strengthening U.S.-Russia arms-control and cooperation, starting an unprecedented NATO security Partnership (NAC-C: North Atlantic Cooperation-Council) with both Western “neutrals” and ex-enemy Communist Bloc states (East Europe, Balkans, USSR/Russia and ex-Soviet states), but no Enlargement except to the E.U.; a U.S./Coalition First Gulf War 1990-91 vs. Iraq; “dual-containment” of Iraq-Iran; Capitalist trade Globalization by adding Russia and China.
- 2) “Globalization and Humanitarian Internationalism” (1994-2000 & 2009-11) boldly under Presidents Bill Clinton (D) and tentatively Barack Obama (D): both were Liberal cosmopolitan leaders with no military or foreign policy expertise (strong Idealist vision and Group-think government leadership model), buttressed under Obama by his controversial U.S. Senate Foreign policy “experts” Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (ex-First Lady). Thus, NATO/E.U. Partnerships and Enlargements to ex-Communist East Europe/ex-USSR (1995-99), while economic “Globalization” added Russia and China seeking to democratize them; U.N. sanctions and NATO combat humanitarian U.N. peacekeeping (Haiti; Bosnia; Kosovo); risk preemptive strike on N. Korea nuclear program (1994, arms-control); and Climate-Ecology (Kyoto Accord, cancelled by Bush Jr. and Trump, and then ineffectively briefly revamped as unwritten verbal accords by Obama and Biden).
- 3) “American Empire and Preemptive Strikes/Global War on Terrorism” (2001-08) under President George Bush Jr. (R), as cosmopolitan with no foreign policy expert, Religious/Neo-Con “American Empire” and leadership model as Formal-CEO): NATO/E.U. Second Enlargement (2002-07) and U.S./Coalition preemptive wars against Islamic terrorism (Second Afghan War 2001-02 vs. Al-Qaeda and Taliban) and “rogue nations” (Second Gulf War 2003 on Iraq and eliminated Saddam Hussein); U.N. sanctions and regional diplomatic arms-control (Russia, Libya, North Korea II/III, Iran I); anti-West rivalry (Russia, Islamic Iran and China); Ecology (no Kyoto First Climate Accord). However, inter-Allied controversy over U.S. “unilateralist” policies reemerged under President Bush Jr. when he first fought the Second Afghan War and Occupation as a three-tiered global coalition based first on U.S.-British forces, then an *ad hoc* coalition, and also NATO’s ISAF peacekeepers, which by 2008 had absorbed all the other components as a new insurgency war by the *Talibani*. But a severe anti-U.S. TransAtlantic and international rift was sparked in 2003-05 by Bush Jr.’s controversial “Preventive Doctrine”:
 - a. a globally-lauded anti-Terrorism War against Islamic Fundamentalists (“first-tier” strategy);

¹ Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin, 2011); Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Tears Marathon* (New York: St.Martin’s-Griffin, 2016); Gordon Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China* (New York: Random House, 2001); Peter Navarro, *Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World* (New York: Prometheus, 2015); R.D. Kaplan, *Revenge of Geography*, idem; R. Haass, *World in Disarray*, idem; H. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Second Chance: 3 Presidents & Crisis of American SuperPower*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Grand Chessboard: American Primacy & Geostrategic Imperatives*, idem; John Poindexter, Robert McFarlane & Richard Levine, *America’s #1 Adversary: China & What We Must Do About It Now!* (Sterling, VA: Fidelis, 2020).

- b. an internationally controversial parallel “second-tier” strategy of preventive “Out-of-Area” wars against WMDs proliferant “rogue-states” (“Axis of Evil”: Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya);
 - c. a “third-tier” international strategy of multilateral diplomatic pressures, sanctions and threats of possible military strikes on WMD threats (Libya, North Korea, Islamic Iran and Syria);
 - d. finally, a controversial “fourth-tier” strategy addressed anemically both the stalled Israeli-Palestinian “Two-states” Peace Initiative and Middle-East Democratization, which backfired by helping the Palestinian *Hamas* Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists to seize power in the Gaza Strip after winning local elections against the rival corrupt ex-terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization/Authority (PLO/PA).¹
- 4) “U.S. ‘Soft-Power’ Security Retrenchment and Globalist Liberal Economy” (2009-16 & 2021-now) under President Obama (D) with his Vice-President and later President Biden (D) as “Obama IV” successor: both were 100% Idealists and Liberal cosmopolitan leaders with no military experience (strong Idealist vision and Group-think government leadership model), buttressed by Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (ex-First Lady and much touted future First Woman President as “Obama III” successor) as both controversial U.S. Senate foreign policy “experts”. Key foreign policy initiatives were: NATO/E.U. Enlargements (2008-22); end U.S./Coalition peacekeeping in Iraq (2016); cuts down and ends U.S./NATO peacekeeping in Afghanistan (2021); strikes Islamic terrorism and killed Osama bin-Laden (*Al-Qaeda*, Libya, *ISIL* conquest of parts of Syria and Iraq); small bases in Africa; limited nuclear arms-control with Russia and Iran (but not with North Korea, or China); Ecology (Paris-Montréal “Clean New Deal”); Pandemics (SARS, Ebola, COVID-19); U.S.-Saudi Arabia tensions over human rights and U.S.-led international nuclear arms-control with Iran; U.S.-Israeli tensions over Iran; derailed U.S.-E.U. (TATP) and U.S.-Asia/Pacific Trade deals (TPP); failed containment of illegal immigration into the U.S. Southern border; NATO froze Russia from the Partnership due to Putin’s annexation of Crimea and destabilizing attacks on East Ukraine in 2014-20; but unable to develop a coherent strategy to contain an emerging anti-West Russia-Iran-Syria-China Bloc.
- 5) “American Semi-Isolationist Unilateralism” (2017-20) under President Donald Trump (R): a celebrity real-estate tycoon turned into controversial arch-Conservative politician or “agent of chaos” with no foreign policy expertise (as a semi-Isolationist “American First” Unilateralist with a conflictual leadership model as Formal-CEO Narcissist “Raging Bull” and revolving-door foreign policy “experts” team). His key policies were pro-energy independence and anti-Ecology accords; strikes on Islamic terrorism (*Al-Qaeda*, *ISIL*, Syria); Pandemic (COVID-19); oppose both a U.S.-E.U. Trade (TATP) and U.S.-Asia/Pacific Trade accords (TPP); U.S.-China Trade-War (2016-20); harangue NATO to expand the Allies’ national defenses to 2% GDP as agreed in 2000s or America threatened to reduce her own commitment (a hidden not uncommon U.S. pressure tactic occasionally used throughout the Cold War, but now condemned because done openly and seen as destabilizing by the anti-Trump opposition); U.S.-NATO support of East Europeans and Ukraine defenses against Russian threats; cut U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Africa (2021); cancel the U.S.-led international nuclear arms-control with Iran; shepherd the Middle East Abraham Accords and unofficial Israeli-Gulf Arabs regional defense league against Islamic Iran (Israel, UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt); stopped illegal immigration into the U.S. Southern border; and attempted to contain the rise of an anti-West Russia-Iran-Syria-China Bloc through disjointed official controversial cordial diplomacy with

¹ R. D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*, idem; J. Ikenberry & P. Trubowitz, eds., *American Foreign Policy*, idem; H. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Second Chance: 3 Presidents & Crisis of American SuperPower--Bush Sr., Clinton & Bush Jr.*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America & Crisis of Global Power*, idem; Bob Woodward, *Obama’s Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); Ioannis Pantzalis & Marco Rimaneli, “U.S. Economic & Foreign Policy Strategies to 2050: Geo-Economic Challenges & Opportunities” in *Saint Leo University IInd International Business Conference Proceedings* (Tampa, FL: Saint Leo Press, 2011).

Putin as a leader together with selected bombings in Syria against Russo-Iranian mercenary units; and ending both U.S.-Russian arms-control over flagrant Russian violations.¹

U.S., NATO & E.U. vs. Russia in European & Balkans Security in the Post-Cold War, 1990-2021

The Cold War sudden end and sequential collapse of the Soviet-controlled Warsaw Pact in East Europe (1989-90) and USSR (1991-92) freed NATO from risks of World War III, but the post-Cold War (1990-2021) unleashed both a “New Arc of Threats” and “Out-of-Area” ranging from Middle East/Gulf imperialism (Saddam Iraq, Islamic Iran) to regional ethno-nationalist civil wars in the post-Communist Balkans (Yugoslavia) and extended Alliance regional security to stabilize the adjoining strategic East Europe, Baltics, Balkans and East Mediterranean. As the Warsaw Pact was disbanded by its restless East European satellites in late-1990, these new democracies as “Vilnius-13” bloc immediately sought U.S. protection and integration in both NATO and E.U. against fears of future threats from ex-Soviet Russia or each-others over rival minorities and unjust borders.

Thus, in the post-Cold War era (1990-2021), NATO successfully revamped its military structures from a Cold War regional defensive TransAtlantic Alliance to a post-Cold War global collective defense system by constantly enlarging its new two-tiered integrated Euro-Atlantic security structure (Allies and Partners from North America and Western Europe to East Europe, Mediterranean, Gulf and security cooperation also in the Asia/Pacific area), while confronting a fractured “Arc of Crisis” from the Balkans to the Middle East/Gulf and Afghanistan. The “New Threats” pushed NATO and the U.S. to implement three parallel major military reorganization in 12 years to better cope with the entire range of missions: on one hand, NATO’s old Central Front Allied Command Europe (ACE) became Allied Command Operations (ACO) for all combat operations throughout NATO’s Euro-Atlantic area and globally; on the other, Allied Command Atlantic (ACA) became Allied Command Transformation (ACT) with innovative XXIst Century technologies. The U.S. massively restructured its forces a third time in 2006-16 since the end of the Cold War by pulling-out 70-100,000 troops from Europe and Asia, plus 100,000 dependents, given the “lack of Cold War strategic justification and the need to face XXIst Century world threats and terrorism.” Two-thirds of U.S. troops repatriated come out of Europe, where in 2004 the U.S. had 100,000 forces, mostly in Germany with 70,000 men of which 50% will leave (including the two U.S. armored divisions), while cutting NATO bases in Germany and thousands of U.S. troops transferred to new rapid-deployment bases in East European Allies: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania.²


Additionally, as the West’s beacon of democracy in the post-Cold War, NATO crafted a new “European Security Architecture” interconnecting the Organization of Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and E.U., while NATO’s 1995 “Principles on Enlargement” for all Aspirant-Partners and Aspirant-Allies seeking its protection required that all new Partners adopt OSCE/NATO democratic values and capitalism, Western civil-military control, politico-military reforms, NATO’s joint-training and peacekeeping. This fostered a series of bilateral and regional NATO Partnerships with neutral and ex-Communist states in Central-East Europe, Balkans and ex-Soviet States (1991 North Atlantic Cooperation Council/NAC-C; 1995 Partnership for Peace/PfP and 1999 EuroAtlantic Partnership Council/EAPC; a special 1996 NATO-Ukraine Council/NUC and enhanced Joint-Partnership Council with a semi-democratic Russia in 1996 and 2000), 2005 Mediterranean Partners and 2008 Gulf Partners.³

¹ R. Haass, *A World in Disarray*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Grand Chessboard: American Primacy & Geostrategic Imperatives*, idem; Z. Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America & Crisis of Global Power*, idem; R. Haass, *A World in Disarray*, idem; W. Phares, *The Choice: Trump vs. Obama-Biden in U.S. Foreign Policy*, idem; H.R. McMaster, *Battlefields: The Fight to Defend the Free World* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2020); J. Bolton, *The Room Where It Happened*, idem; Robert D. Blackwill, *Trump’s Foreign Policies are Better than they Seem* (New York: Council Foreign Relations, 2019); Marco Rimanelli, “Why Trump and Tillerson will View NATO as Asset, not Liability” in *The Hill* (January 2017): <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/315282-why-trump-and-tillerson-will-view-nato-as-asset-not-liability/> ; Marco Rimanelli, “NATO Needs to Woo Trump and Speak Plainly to Him” in *Newsweek* (December 2016): <http://www.newsweek.com/nato-needs-woo-trump-and-speak-plainly-him-521456>

² *NATO Handbook* (Brussel: NATO, 1998); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem.

³ Marco Rimanelli, *NATO Enlargement after 2002: Opportunities and Strategies for a New Administration* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, Unclassified limited U.S. Government circulation, June 2001), p.128; Marco Rimanelli, ed., *Strategic Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War* (Tampa, FL: Saint Leo Press, 1998); Marco Rimanelli, “Allied Views on NATO Enlargement in 2002” in Hall Gardner ed., *NATO & European Union: New World, New Europe, New Threats* (Aldershot, G.B.: Ashgate, 2004), p.91-106.

MAP 8: NATO, E.U. & EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, 2008



Only when ex-Warsaw Pact East European/Balkans Aspirant-Partners embraced democratic values, conflict-resolution and peacekeeping with NATO, they could apply to join NATO as 16 full Allied members (“Open Door”) in gradual sequential Enlargements in 1999–2022 both ratified unanimously by NATO (and later also the E.U. in parallel European integrations):


- 3 new East European Allies in the 1997-99 First Enlargement (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland);
- 7 new Allies (5 East Europeans and 2 Balkans) in the 2002-04 Second Enlargement (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia);
- 2 new Balkan Allies in the 2008 Third Enlargement (Albania, Croatia);
- 2 new Balkan Allies in the 2016-to-2020 Fourth/Fifth Enlargements (Montenegro, North Macedonia);
- 2 new Scandinavian Allies in the 2022 Sixth Enlargement (Finland, Sweden);
- 7 unready “Left-Out” Partners (Austria, Bosnia, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Serbia, Switzerland, Georgia, Ukraine) who might slowly join throughout the 2020s.

Europe’s integration process was also strengthened as most new NATO members soon joined as equal “Western” members the E.U. in parallel Enlargements as Association-Partners and several then as full member-states (2002-2007, 2013, 2020s):

- 4 new E.U. members (2 Europeans and 2 Scandinavians) in the 1995 Enlargement (Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, while Norway and Switzerland dropped their applications);
- 12 new E.U. members (10 Europeans) in the 2002-2004 Enlargement (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia);
- 2 new E.U. members (Balkans) in the 2007 Enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania);
- 1 new E.U. member (Balkans) in the 2013 Enlargement (Croatia);
- 2 ready Candidate-members (Balkans) expected to join by 2023 (Albania, North Macedonia);
- 1 former E.U. member (Great Britain) who joined in 1973 and left in 2020;
- 10 “unready” Partner-Candidates (5 Europeans and 5 Balkans) who might slowly join later in the 2020s (Montenegro, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Serbia, Bosnia, Turkey, plus Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova added in reaction to Russia’s 2022-23 invasion of Ukraine).¹

¹ M. Rimanelli, *NATO Enlargement after 2002*, idem; M. Rimanelli, “Allied Views on NATO Enlargement in 2002”, idem, p.91-106; M. Rimanelli, *NATO Enlargement after 2002: Opportunities and Strategies for a New Administration*, idem; “Enlargement of European Union” in *Wikipedia* (2022): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_the_European_Union;

DUAL EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS in COLD WAR to POST-COLD WAR: NATO & EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENTS



Sources: "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/NATO Map" in *Mappr* (2022): <https://www.mappr.co/thematic-maps/nato-map/>; "History of NATO Enlargement" in *Wikipedia Commons* (2022): https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:History_of_NATO_enlargement.svg; "NATO Enlargement" in *Wikipedia Commons* (2022): https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_enlargement.svg; "Enlargement of European Union" in *Wikipedia* (2022): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_the_European_Union

At the same time, it became clear that the end of the Cold War bipolar era of global conventional/nuclear/economic containment had also assured an unprecedented degree of regional stability in Europe with East-West deterrence, paralleled by the respective inter-blocs' "policing" to cajole reluctant members to overcome their own past rival nationalist hatreds and cooperate as new partners on daily inter-bloc politico-military identity and alliance integration within both NATO (against the Warsaw Pact) and in the WPO (against NATO). Thus, once the Cold War "common enemy" disappeared, an explosion of pent-up ethno-nationalist and religious hatreds during the 1990s followed the collapse of the ex-Yugoslavia and parts of the ex-USSR with countless deaths and refugees, while threatening to spread out of control to most of Eastern European and ex-Soviet states. In the post-Cold War, NATO was left as the only efficient security organization (compared to the hopelessly inadequate U.N. peacekeepers and a virtually unarmed E.U.) capable of guaranteeing permanent U.S. commitment to European security and an integrated military alliance to intervene on behalf of the E.U. and U.N. in these new regional conflicts. Regional ethno-nationalism, civil wars and international terrorism have been confronted militarily by joint NATO-U.N. peacekeeping in the Balkans (1991-2000s: Croatia, Bosnian War, Kosovo War, Albania, North Macedonia) and East Mediterranean (2001-current: War on Terror naval patrols; 2012: air-strikes on Libya; 2024-19: air-strikes against ISIL in Syria and Iraq), while NATO power-projection operated out of Italy's key geo-strategic role by hosting NATO's AFSOUTH (Allied Forces-South) and U.S. Sixth Fleet.

- In the Balkans/East Europe, the collapse of Communism (1989-90) and USSR (1991-92) also led to the brake-up of neutral Communist Yugoslavia along internal politico-religious lines seceding from a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia under President Slobodan Milošević. At the same time, Serb minorities in these new ex-Yugoslav states seceded themselves and fought to forge a nationalist "Greater Serbia" with Yugoslav military aid manipulated by . The break-up of Yugoslavia ushered five civil wars in a decade (1991-2000): Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-92, 1995), Bosnia (1992-95), Kosovo (1998-99) and Macedonia (2000-2001), with Serb-led ethnic-cleansing and atrocities (150,000-to-250,000 dead, tens of

Silvia Amaro, "Sweden and Finland want to join NATO. Here's how that would work" in *CNBC Reports* (7 June 2022): <https://www.cnbc.com/video/2022/06/08/sweden-and-finland-want-to-join-nato-heres-how-that-would-work.html> ; "Sweden, Finland joining NATO would be tough for Russia, top U.S. General says" in *Reuters* (4 June 2022): <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-finland-joining-nato-would-be-tough-russia-top-us-general-says-2022-06-04/> ; Andrew Roth, "Putin issues fresh warning to Finland and Sweden on installing NATO Infrastructure" in *The Guardian* (29 June 2022): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/29/russia-condemns-nato-invitation-finland-sweden?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1 ; "Erdogan Raises Possibly Nixing NATO-Nordics Deal if Promises are Not Kept" in *Reuters* (1 July 2022): <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-raises-possibly-nixing-nato-nordics-deal-if-promises-not-kept-media-2022-07-01/> ; Dan Sabbagh, "Turkey Lifts Objections to Finland and Sweden's NATO Bid" in *The Guardian* (28 June 2022): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/28/turkey-lifts-objections-to-finland-and-swedens-nato-bid?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1 ; "NATO Allies sign Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden" in *NATO Update* (5 July 2022): https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197763.htm?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NATO%20Update%20week%2027&utm_content=NATO%20Update%20week%2027+CID_813254ab07ec89bfeb9a08c7c5b271ed&utm_source=Email%20marketing%20software&utm_term=NATO%20Allies%20sign%20Accession%20Protocols%20for%20Finland%20and%20Sweden

thousands of rapes and 2 millions refugees fleeing to Europe), dashing E.U., U.N. and NATO diplomatic mediations, while isolating U.N. Protection Forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers during 1992-95.


- NATO air-naval patrols of the Adriatic Sea imposed a U.N. naval embargo against arms shipments to the ex-Yugoslavia in 1992-96, with the blockade under direct NATO Command enforced by Allied Forces Southern Europe-AFSOUTH out of Italy next-door, but this did not stop the secret arms flow from Serbia.¹
- Since 1992 NATO also enforced a U.N. “No-Fly Zone” over Bosnia to prevent attacks, followed by selective NATO air-strikes since April 1993 against the Serbs. These were NATO’s first combat actions since its founding in 1949, destroying selected Serb positions, providing NATO humanitarian air-drops, protecting from the air U.N. humanitarian convoys. But persistent Allied divisiveness and U.S. opposition prevented any NATO ground combat operations until the Bosnian-Serbs overran in summer 1995 the U.N. “Safe-Area” of Šrebreniça, slaughtering all Bosniak Muslim males and attacking more “Safe-Areas”. This precipitated NATO’s “Operation Deliberate Force” (August-September 1995) with air-strikes destroying all Bosnian-Serb Command-Control and heavy weapons, while Croatia’s entry in war defeated Serb forces both inside Croatia (Serb Krajina) and West Bosnia.
- These parallel, independent NATO-Croat actions forced all warring ethnic factions to sign the U.N. Dayton Peace Accords (November 1995), with their disarmament and peace enforced on the ground by NATO’s heavily armed peacekeepers pouring in from Germany in Winter (“Operation Joint Endeavour”) to absorb local U.N. peacekeepers in NATO’s Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR, 1995-96). IFOR was the largest military operation in Europe since World War II with 65,000 IFOR peacekeepers: 50,000 NATO troops from all Allies and 17 non-NATO Partners with Russia (NATO’s historic Cold War enemy), plus 15,000 ex-U.N peacekeepers, quickly separating the three ethnic armies into cantonment and storage sites, while transferring areas between hostile communities. IFOR’s success enabled the High-Representative for Bosnia to implement Dayton’s civil provisions, while IFOR was replaced by a smaller NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR, 1996-2004) with 32,000 peacekeepers (“Operations Joint Guard/Joint Forge”). SFOR force-levels were gradually drawn down through six-month reviews (NAC+N Meetings) until replaced by the E.U. Force (EUFOR, 2005-now). NATO’s 2006 Riga Summit agreed to turn Bosnia into a Partner, while E.U. aid promotes economic integration of all South-West Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia) through E.U. Stabilization.²

NATO had to fight a second time in the Balkans against Yugoslavia/Serbia in the 1998-99 Kosovo War to stop ethnic-cleansing of Albanian Muslims in Serbia’s province of Kosovo. During 1998, tensions among ethnic Albanians and Serb minority within Kosovo broke out between Serbian military and secessionist insurgents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), leaving over 1,500 Kosovar-Albanians dead and 400,000 refugees in a major humanitarian crisis as the Serbs forced civilians to flee Kosovo. International diplomatic pressures coupled with NATO’s threat of air-strikes on Yugoslavia/Bosnia forced its President Milošević in October 1998 to slowly withdraw Serbia’s forces out of Kosovo.

- As fighting resumed in January 1999 between Kosovar-Albanian insurgents and massive Serbs reinforcements violating the October 1998 Accord, only renewed threats of NATO air-strikes forced the two sides to the Rambouillet talks in France (February-March 1999). In the end peace talks collapsed, while the Serb forces’ scorched-earth strategy evicted 80% of Kosovo’s Albanians (1.5 million people as 90% of the population of Kosovo compared to the Serb minority): by late-May 1999 over 5,000 were dead, 800,000 had fled abroad and 580,000 more were homeless inside Kosovo.

¹ Marco Rimanelli, “NATO’s Security Transformation, Partners and Post-Cold War Peacekeeping” in *Florida Political Chronicle*, vol.22, n.1-2 (2011-13): p.19-43; Jasminka Udovički & James Ridgway, eds., *Burn This House: Making & Unmaking of Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997); *Il Richiamo dei Balcani*, issue of *Limes* (Rome, Italy: March 1995); David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (New York: Touchstone, 2001); *Italy and the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS & Limes, 1998).

² Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998); D. Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, idem; Marco Rimanelli, “NATO as Post-Cold War Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Organization”, p.415-432, in Hall Gardner & Oleg Kobtzeff, eds., *Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins & Prevention* (Aldershot, G.B.: Ashgate, 2012).




1991-98 Bosnia: Bosniak Muslims (Greens), Bosnian-Serbs (Reds), Bosnian-Croats (Blues); 1995-now: Bosnia Federation (Sky-blue) & *Republika Srpska* (pink) vs. Bosniaks (Greens), Bosnian-Serbs (Blues), Bosnian-Croats (Reds)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8f/Ethnic_makeup_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_before_and_after_the_war.jpg https://politheor.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/clip_image002.jpg

- As fighting resumed in January 1999 between Kosovar-Albanian insurgents and massive Serbs reinforcements violating the October 1998 Accord, only renewed threats of NATO air-strikes forced the two sides to the Rambouillet talks in France (February-March 1999). In the end peace talks collapsed, while the Serb forces' scorched-earth strategy evicted 80% of Kosovo's Albanians (1.5 million people as 90% of the population of Kosovo compared to the Serb minority): by late-May 1999 over 5,000 were dead, 800,000 had fled abroad and 580,000 more were homeless inside Kosovo.
- NATO launched massive air-strikes in March-May 1999, while pro-Serb Russia and China broke-up temporarily with NATO over its U.N.-backed intervention in a sovereign state (both feared Kosovo foreshadowed future U.N. interventions against Russian repression in Chechnya and China's in Tibet and Sinkiang), but the start of NATO's ground offensive was met by a total Serb military withdrawal from Kosovo on 9 June 1999 to NATO's peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR), while civilian duties were ran by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR comprised 50,000 peacekeepers, with 40,000 from all 19 NATO members and 20 non-NATO countries, including 16 Partners, Switzerland and an unwelcome Russian contingent of 3,200 men who broke-off from their Bosnian base to race with NATO to occupy the Priština Airport in Kosovo.
- Despite the return of all refugees and NATO/international aid to rebuild Kosovo under the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), constant local ethnic tensions forced KFOR to protect the local Serb minority from revenge. By 2008 the U.N. allowed Kosovo to become independent, despite vigorous condemnations only from semi-authoritarian Russia and newly democratic Serbia (after a 2000 coup deposed Milošević who was then tried with captured former Serb-Bosnian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić for their "Greater Serbia" imperialism and bloody war-crimes by the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal on ex-Yugoslavia-ICTY), while the E.U. continues local and sub-regional aid and trade to slowly integrate peacefully together these ex-enemies Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo.¹

¹ David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998); Marco Rimanelli, "NATO's Transformation and 'Out-of-Area' Peacekeeping: Afghanistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia & Mediterranean, 1970s-2010", in Gregory T. Papanikos Ed., *ATINER Conference Proceedings* (Athens: ATINER, December 2011); *Kosovo*, issue of *Limes* (Rome, Italy: June 1999); Roberto Belloni & Roberto

KOSOVO ETHNICITIES, KOSOVO WAR & NATO PEACEKEEPING vs. "GREATER ALBANIA" DREAM



U.S., NATO & E.U. "Out-of-Area" Security in a Post-Cold War "Arc-of-Crisis", 1990-2021

Throughout the Post-Cold War, NATO also repeatedly updated its Cold War Strategic Concept to meet "Out-of-Area" threats (in 1991 TransAtlantic arms-control, military cuts, multinational mobile forces, NATO and Coalition or Coalition combat peacekeeping in the Gulf and ex-Yugoslavia, and Partnerships; in 1999 Enlargements, NATO combat peacekeeping and Partnerships; in 2010 NATO and/or Coalition global War on Terror and peacekeeping against Islamic Terrorism from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria; 2022 NATO Enlargements, support of Ukraine and new NATO "Eastern Flank" defense against Russia and possibly China) to preserve European peace through "Out-of-Area" regional stabilization and humanitarian peacekeeping missions in a broader Euro-Atlantic area, alongside arms-control, deterrence and NATO/E.U. parallel European Enlargements. This has repeatedly confounded critics mired in heated controversies on the TransAtlantic Alliance's "inevitable" future collapse over domestic political contrasts against open-ended, bloody and unpopular "Out-of-Area" NATO-based Coalition peacekeeping missions (Iraq in First and Second Gulf Wars of 1990-91 and 2003, plus peacekeeping in 2003-11; Second Afghan War of 2001-02 and peacekeeping in 2003-21), where mounting losses, declining resources and political "fatigue" have led to sudden withdrawals in 2011 and 2021, while stunting residual NATO/Coalitions' limited missions.

Already in the aftermath of the Cold War's end in 1990-2003, NATO's finely tuned military remained often paralyzed by internal political and public opinion fears of bloody post-Cold War guerrilla. The Alliance failed repeatedly to quickly intervene militarily outside its traditional European border into vital other "Out-of-Area" regional crises ignited by the collapsing Cold War system, which threatened Western security and economic interests, and were temporally patched only by U.S.-led Western "Coalitions-of-Willing" informally supported by NATO: Sinai MFO peacekeeping (1980-now); Lebanon MNF I and II peacekeeping (1982-84); Western protection of oil tankers in the Gulf from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War to 2020; First Gulf War against Iraq over control of regional oil assets (1990-91); Yugoslav Civil Wars (1991-99); Southern and Northern Watch Air Patrols against Iraq (1992-2003); Second Gulf War against Iraq (2003) over risks of proliferation in weapons of mass destruction; Iraq's Occupation and peacekeeping (2003-11).¹

Saddam Hussein Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and threat to Middle-Eastern oil routes propelled President Bush Sr. to organize international U.N. sanctions against Iraq, backed by a grand U.S.-led coalition under U.N. mandate to defeat Iraq ("Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm"). Although NATO did not officially fight in this 1990-91 First Gulf War (due to domestic opposition in Germany and Greece to "Out-of-Area" combat), most Allies and NATO assets contributed to the war, with the bulk of U.S. troops in Europe shipped over and REFORGER used to trans-ship in six months 600,000 men, heavy weapons and materiel to Saudi Arabia (twice the operational range of REFORGER). SHAPE also protected Mediterranean Allies from

Morozzo della Rocca, "Italy and the Balkans: Rise of a Reluctant Middle Power" in *Modern Italy*, Vol.13, n.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, May 2016): p.169-185.

¹ *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2001); M. Rimanelli, "NATO's Transformation and 'Out-of-Area' Peacekeeping: Afghanistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia & Mediterranean, 1970s-2010", *idem*.

feared Iraqi missile strikes through NATO Airborne Early-Warning aircrafts, naval protection of Mediterranean shipping, massive logistics and air-defense of Turkey. Iraq's defeat in a short war (one month of air-bombardment of Iraqi fortified defenses; a U.S. Marines manoeuvre to fake an imminent landing near Kuwait City to distract local Iraqi defenses; a real dual U.S./Coalition southern frontal strike with a much wider and stronger left-hook armoured strike through the desert to flank, envelop and destroy the bulk of the Iraqi Army and elite armoured Special Republican Guard) was a vindication of both Bush Sr. diplomatic skills in crafting a fragile, but wide international war-coalition, and for the U.S./NATO 1980s Cold War combined-arms combat (FOFA) which decimated the Soviet-trained and fully-armed Iraqis, themselves veteran of the brutal 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.


With Saddam's Iraq defeated and still under sanction, the country saw in 1991 massive insurgencies in the Kurdish north and Shi'a south that failed to topple Saddam, followed by extremely brutal Iraqi repression (tens of thousands Kurds killed with 1,5 millions refugees and 100,000 Shi'a killed with half-million refugees) forcing the U.S./Coalition to stop Iraqi air-strikes through the dual Southern and Northern Watch "No-Fly" Air Patrols (1992-2003), while U.N. observers disarmed in 1991-92 most Iraqi WMDs (chemical, biological and nuclear) and again in mid-1990s (hidden chemical weapons). Meanwhile, U.S./Coalition forces enforced a "Dual Containment" of Saddam's Iraq and Islamic Iran until the Second Gulf War in 2003.¹

Thereafter, the new post-Cold War "Arc of Crisis" in 1990s-2000s indicated the global emergence of diffused "New Threats" (WMDs proliferation, ethno-nationalist civil wars, Islamic terrorism, illegal migrations, trafficking, pandemics, ecological blight), which contrasted starkly with the all-too-brief "End of History" Liberal triumph after the fall of Communism and USSR, and "Globalization" trade policy to economic integrate in the West's global Liberal Capitalist Order also "reformed" compliant Russia and China. This, the U.S. focused in 2001-08 on quick diplomatic or military strikes at all WMD "rogue-states" (especially Iraq militarily, while threatening Iran, North Korea and Libya) well "before" they could mature their individual growing WMD threat against the West (and totally oblivious until 2006-22 of the parallel rise of Communist China as a long-term future security-economic threat). The international consensus among U.S., NATO, U.N. and all intelligence services, plus high-placed witnesses (like Saddam's sons-in-law, before he had them killed) was that Iraq retained some secret WMD weapons despite losing the 1990-91 First Gulf War, U.N. sanctions and 1991-96 U.N. inspectors' disarmament. Bush Jr.'s *NeoCons* hard-liner government also pushed embarrassingly unsubstantiated allegations that anti-Islamist Saddam Hussein's Iraq might even lend WMDs technologies to Islamic terrorists to indirectly strike again the U.S. through *Al-Qaeda*.

Thus, both the world and Western Allies became sharply divided over the later 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq, which surprisingly deeply split the U.N., NATO and E.U.: on one hand, acrimonious international public opposition and unprecedented acrimonious anti-Americanism fostered by an unlikely "pacifist" front of few Allies/Partners (Jacques Chirac's "nationalist" France, Gerhard Schroeder's "leftist" Germany, Greece, Belgium, Turkey, Austria, Sweden and Turkey), semi-rivals (Russia, China) and Western Leftist public opinions (Great Britain, Italy, Spain), which scuttled U.S. attempts to forge an interventionist consensus with U.N., E.U. and NATO military support in a Second Gulf War against Iraq, unless a new U.N. Resolution declared war; on the other, most "old" and "new" Allies joined a U.S.-led anti-Iraqi Coalition fighting in the name of the U.N.'s previous 12 years of anti-Iraq Resolutions.²

¹ Dilip Hiro, *Desert Shield to Desert Storm* (New York: Routledge, 1992); William Head & Earl Tilford Jr., eds., *Eagle in the Desert* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1996); Marco Rimanelli & Col. Eric Dell'Aria for Inter-Committee B, "Defense Barriers in International Security"/"Murs-Murailles et Sécurité Internationale" in *Reports Institut Hautes Études Défense Nationale-École Militaire* (Paris: IHEDN, 2005); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem, Entry: First Gulf War; "1991 Iraqi Uprisings" in *Wikipedia*: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Iraqi_uprisings

² John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Vintage, 2004); M. Rimanelli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem, Entries: Second Gulf War; M. Rimanelli, "NATO's Transformation & 'Out-of-Area' Peacekeeping: Afghanistan, Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia & Mediterranean, 1970s-2010", idem.




Sources: Maps above: John Keegan, *The Iraq War* (New York: Random House, 2004)??

The open Franco-German anti-war vetoes at NATO, E.U. and U.N. (opportunistically backed by Russia and China at the U.N. to weaken U.S. global leadership) against a U.S.-led Second Gulf War on Iraq, briefly undermined NATO's 50 years of common security gains and TransAtlantic solidarity, until the 2006-08 reversals of governments in Germany and France favoured pro-U.S. and pro-NATO policies (likewise Italy, Spain, Australia and Japan flip-flopped electorally twice between governments supporting either the U.S. in Iraq with national combat troops vs. Leftist governments that later withdrew their troops). The global storm of anti-U.S. criticism in 2002-03 reflected mostly a dramatic chasm in style and international authority between Bush Sr.'s 1990-91 "Desert Storm" Coalition against Saddam's Iraq and "dual containment" (both Iraq and Islamic Iran) vs. Bush Jr.'s Second Gulf War coalition of 2003-10 that destroyed Iraq and captured Saddam, but was unable to exercise an effective Occupation over a fractured country in near-civil war between rival Iraqi insurgencies (Ba'athists nationalist Sunnis; *Al-Qaeda* Islamic terrorists; Iran-backed Shi'a Islamic fundamentalists) fighting the U.S./Coalition and each other for power. Both U.S. Presidents pursued energetic wars as main U.S. strategy to prevent Saddam's Iraq WMD proliferation and imperialism, but the first had the more compelling *casus belli* (1990 Kuwait's invasion) and diligent assembly of a U.N. sponsored international effort, while clothing U.S. unilateralism in the face of future threats by Saddam's Iraq. Thus, applying the innovative "Cobra II" O-Plan, the U.S./Coalition in 2003 raced out of its Kuwaiti bases and with full air superiority destroyed in few weeks all Iraqi forces along a quadruple offensive (Anglo-American forces conquering in the south-east Basra and the oil fields intact; the U.S. Army and Marines in parallel armoured/mechanized offensives north-west along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; while a U.S. Marines Army remained afloat near Turkey's coast faking an imminent landing and invasion of Northern Iraq to force Baghdad to disperse its defenses also there), reaching Baghdad and toppling Saddam's régime, while unwittingly unshackling a destabilizing Islamic Iran from such "dual containment" strategy.

The West's earlier-1990s optimistic Euro-TransAtlantic "Arc of Stability" to replace Cold War divisions and Saddam Iraq's imperialism with new international cooperation, Europe's unification and NATO-E.U. Enlargements was soon challenged by the shockingly random anti-Western global Islamist terrorist attacks by *Al-Qaeda* and other Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists starkly highlighted by their 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C., the 2002 attacks in Madrid, Spain, and later in London, Great Britain, and around the world. In reaction since 2001, the U.S.-NATO launched a global "War on Terror" (Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Somalia) in parallel to the Second Afghan War, which in time curbed anti-Western terrorist groups, but its

exhausting and mostly “under-the-radar” counter-terrorism international cooperation was not fully understood by an inward-looking hedonistic Western popular opinion.¹



Sources: Maps above: NATO

During the 2001-02 Second Afghan War, NATO's International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF) was created in December 2001 helping the new Afghan government democratize, humanitarian aid, military and police training, plus combat peacekeeping to relieve U.S.-Coalition forces. By July 2002 ISAF had 5,000 peacekeepers from 19 states based only in Kabul, then since 2005 ISAF assumed command from the U.S.-Coalition in North and West Afghanistan, while by 2006 it expanded also in pro-*Taliban* Southern Afghanistan. By December 2006 ISAF had complete peacekeeping control of Afghanistan, including U.S.-Coalition forces, while fighting since 2006 resurgent *Talibani* attacks and suicide-bombings out of Pakistan (where local *Talibani* also attacked the government on Tribal North-West Frontier until partially crushed in 2009-10 by the Pakistani Army).

NATO's regional and international role remains fragile, despite application of Art.V (self-defensive war) for the “9/11” attacks and Second Afghan War. As NATO grew since the Cold War from a tighter massive military Alliance (NATO-16) to a larger, political security organization of 32 Allies and 30+ Partners, its post-Cold War influence has increasingly sponsored U.S.-led “Coalitions” and E.U. humanitarian peacekeeping globally for joint U.N.-Western goals. Yet despite U.S.-led Coalitions and NATO enforcement of U.N. Mandates for peace, the rise in peacekeeping casualties against Islamist insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, while Leftist “pacifist” opposition monopolized Western Media and public opinion, pushed NATO to bolster its “Out-of-Area” geo-strategic reach since 2004 by integrating also its Mediterranean Dialogue and Gulf Partners (Istanbul Initiative), plus new Strategic Partners in 2006-08 (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India and Pakistan). Nevertheless, such domestic opposition to further Western anti-combat peacekeeping impacted the actual U.S.-NATO ability to develop long-term stabilization peacekeeping also in Libya, Syria and Iraq after the half-hazard emergency U.N.-mandated NATO air-combat humanitarian missions in Libya for local rebels fighting Moammar Ghaddafi's régime (2011), and anti-terrorism ones against the Islamic State in Iraq (2014-19) and Syria (2013-20). Parallel to this, targeted massive U.S., NATO and Afghan military campaigns that repelled *Talibani* insurgents in southern Afghanistan were countered since 2011 by brazen suicide attacks against high-profile Afghan and NATO officials. This further hastened Western “pacifist” popular opposition to further combat peacekeeping missions and forced NATO-U.S. slow withdrawals from Afghanistan in 2014-21, until finally all U.S. support of the Afghan government's counter-guerrilla efforts were tentatively announced in May

¹ Michael Gordon & General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: Inside Story of Invasion & Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006); J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, idem; M. Rimaneli, *Historical Dictionary of NATO & International Security Organizations*, idem, Entries: Second Gulf War; Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

2020 by President Trump and then by August 2021 suddenly and unnecessarily withdrawn by President Biden, precipitating the country's immediate collapse back under *Taliban* Islamist rule (and opening the region to converging Chinese-Pakistani-Iranian politico-economic influence and cooperation).¹

U.S.-NATO-E.U. vs. Russia's Imperialist Destabilization: Balkans, "Near Abroad" & Ukraine, 2000-2023

The peaceful post-Cold War "International Liberal Globalization Order" that evolved as a global continuation of the U.S. post-World War II system could not be taken for granted any longer, nor could U.S. hegemony be preserved since President Obama's inglorious U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. After its 70th anniversary NATO has faced both internal threats from within its member-states (pacifism, declining demographics and shrinking militaries) and external ones to its survival in a new international arc of crises fostered first by threats from radical jihadist Islamic terrorists, and more recently by a more aggressive Russia and a growing open rival in China. Unbeknownst to the West, the post-Cold War successful joint U.S.-NATO-E.U. policies to stabilize and gradually integrate all the Balkans and extend trade association to Ukraine and Georgia, while also closely cooperating with post-communist Russia on security and trade was slowly undermined by Putin's neo-Slavic nationalist-imperialist "Grand Design" secretly since 2000s, then tentatively by 2008 (Georgia-Russia War) and openly since 2013 (Ukraine destabilization vs. Maidan Revolution, 2014 secession and annexation of Crimea, 2014-21 covert secessionist invasion of East Ukraine/Donbas, 2022-23 invasion of Ukraine). Additionally, a combination of post-2008 U.S. strategic drift, economic crisis and weak, indecisive political Presidents (Barack Obama-D, Donald Trump-R, Joe Biden-D) were systematically aggravated by aggressive disruptive regional challenges from Russia, Islamic Iran and China who are striving to establish a rival new imperialistic world order based on their own anti-Western expansionist aims ushering a new "Global Strategic Competition" era (2021-now). Thus, although NATO member-states (Estonia) and Partners Georgia and Ukraine have been victims of Russian hybrid warfare attacks since Putin's 2008 invasion of Georgia, the Alliance neglected to forcefully face this challenge. Only with Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea did NATO Allies agree on a common burden-sharing goal of 2% GDP on security, and NATO security aerial umbrella as a diplomatico-military signal to protect the vulnerable Baltics (both NATO-E.U. member-states) against Putin's future major aggressions seeking to exploit post-World War II Russian minorities. But any long-term NATO strategy to protect the Baltics should also involve socio-political outreach to the local ethnic Russian minorities to strengthen their ties to NATO and E.U. against Russia's anti-Western propaganda and threats in Europe.²

The other area of regional budding competition between Russia and NATO-E.U. remains the Balkans (the geographic region south of Hungary and Slovenia and north of Greece). Historically an economically poor, marginal transit area in European wars and the long East-West Cold War mostly focused on the more industrial Western, Central and Eastern European core sub-regions. The Balkans remain characterized by intense political factionalism cutting through a fragmented geography and ethno-religious lines with deep entrenched rivalries, *vendettas* and bloody local conflicts with countless atrocities against civilians. Local nationalist dream of rival ethno-political unifications has long focused on five larger homogeneous nation-states ("Greater Serbia", "Greater Croatia", "Greater Romania", "Greater Bulgaria" and "Greater Albania"):

- Serbia in the 1912-13 Three Balkan Wars; 1914 Sarajevo Assassination sparking World War I; 1941 collapse of Yugoslavia in World War II; and five ex-Yugoslav Civil Wars in 1991-99 (including Bosnia and Kosovo);
- Croatia's 1941-1945 and 1991 dual secessions from Yugoslavia, and two ex-Yugoslav Civil Wars over Croatia and Bosnia in 1992-1995;
- Romania in the 1912-13 Three Balkan Wars, 1914-1918 World War I, and 1939-1945 World War II;
- Bulgaria in the 1912-13 Three Balkan Wars, 1914-1918 World War I, and 1939-1945 World War II;
- Albania in 1912-13 Three Balkan Wars, 1914-18 World War I, Fascist Italy's annexation during 1939-45 World War II, and two ex-Yugoslav Civil Wars in 1998-1999 (Kosovo, North Macedonia).

¹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004); B. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, idem.

² M.O. Slobodchikoff, G.D. Davis & B. Stewart, eds., *Challenge to NATO: Global Security & Atlantic Alliance*, idem, Chps. I-V.

However, both the Allies winners of World War I and World War II after the ravages of large-scale combat imposed an artificial political geography for these new states favouring the Allies' interests and then consolidated by their Cold War Communist oppression as Soviet Satellites, which destroyed and denied four of such possible homogeneous nation-states ("Greater Serbia", "Greater Croatia", "Greater Bulgaria" and "Greater Albania"). In all cases, for the sake of regional diplomatic peace no post-war territorial changes were allowed to challenge the *status quo* and risk a wider conflict. Thus, during the Cold War both the U.S.-led NATO and USSR-led Warsaw Pact strove to coordinate their respective Blocs into primarily focusing on the East-West politico-military clash, while freezing all member-states' historico-ethnic border contrasts and claims. Likewise, the 1989-91 collapse of the Soviet Communist "empire" and USSR forced the neo-democratic "Vilnius-13" states to continue to respect their artificial frozen borders of both World Wars as Western condition to peacefully join the U.S.-led NATO and E.U. as new protectors against a future resurgent Russia, while the 1991-99 bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia into five Civil Wars (propelled by a rising "Greater Serbia" clashing against a rival "Greater Croatia" and smaller weaker ethnicities—Bosnia and Kosovo), reconfirmed the risks and costs of arbitrary and unjust redrawing by force of contentious ethno-nationalist borders.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in late-December 1991, successive governments in Moscow have striven more or less effectively to retain a minimal degree of influence over many former-Soviet Successor states, be it politico-military (retention of ex-Soviet military bases) and/or politico-economic (old Soviet oil/gas-routes through Russia, trade and economic ties to Russia). As post-Communist Russia has striven to stabilize its collapsed economic and military structures within the context of a new semi-democracy open to Western trade, Capitalism and international cooperation, still her residual heritage of Communist and Imperial claims slowly, but steadily pushed the new Russian Federation towards more Slavic nationalist rhetoric and regional clashes to re-impose a degree of influence among the many of the other remaining "Near Abroad" 11 ex-Soviet Successor states (given the three Baltic states' successfully transition from the despised, oppressive Soviet orbit to integrating into the West by joining the European Union and NATO within a decade of the USSR's collapse in 1991-92). Already since 1992, Russia's used regional limited military interventions and "peacekeeping" missions to retain some influence both within her federation (reabsorbing a potentially secessionist Muslim Tartarstan, while temporally losing break-away Muslim Chechnya in two-three regional civil wars) and in the "Near Abroad" by supporting and protecting with her own local post-Soviet garrisons few ethno-Russian enclaves and minorities who rejected joining their neighbouring independentist ex-Soviet Successor states (the successful 1992 break-away ex-Soviet/Russia Transnistria from Romanian-speaking Moldova as a sandwiched thin enclave along the border between Moldova and Ukraine gaining *de facto* independence under Russian protection; the failed 1991-93 Georgia Civil War to control Tbilisi; the successful 1991-93 Abkhaz War with break-away Abkhazia seceding from Georgia's North-West as a *de facto* independent area under Russian protection; and the since 1992 also ex-Soviet Georgian South Ossetia *Oblast'* enclave thereafter socio-economico-politically reattached to Russia's own autonomous North Ossetia *Oblast'*).

Gradually Russian interventionism became more widespread and blatantly anti-Western in the 2000s after the successful 1999 bloody re-annexation of Chechnya and consolidation of Premier Vladimir Putin as new President, although in 2001-02 Putin ostensibly supported the U.S./NATO/West in its international campaign against *Al-Qaeda's* global terrorist network and its affiliated *Taliban* in Afghanistan (due to their close support against Russian interests also for the affiliated Chechen Islamic terrorists and Uzbekistan Islamic Movement). By 2002-04, Putin opportunistic diplomacy had quietly repositioned Russia within two parallel rhetorically anti-U.S. new blocs of aspiring emerging regional Powers: the first in the shadow of French President Chirac's neo-Gaullism within the United Nations Security Council (France, Germany, Russia, China) unsuccessfully seeking to corner America's "unilateralist" "HyperPower" and

U.S.-led coalition against a 2003 Second Gulf War to destroy Saddam Hussein's Iraq, while the second with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) reflected a more global economico-politico bloc seeking to cooperate as an open rival to the U.S.-led West. Yet, both blocs in few years quickly petered-off (the anti-U.S. bloc inside the U.N. Security Council fragmenting by 2005 once opposition to the U.S.-Coalition destruction of Saddam's Iraq and ensuing long-term peacekeeping against local insurgents undercut U.N. influence and sparked pro-U.S. political changes inside France and Germany, while the post-2008 Global Recession undermined not only the economies of the U.S. and E.U., but even worse those of South Africa, Brazil and Russia as trade hubs hollowing fatally the BRICS.

At the same time, Putin had been striving to surreptitiously re-extend Russian politico-economic influence in the ex-Soviet "Near Abroad" first through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) politico-military cooperation for regional peacekeeping as a regional alternate to NATO's Partnership with the same countries (CSTO: Russia, Belarus', Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzia, Armenia and ex-members *Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan*), then linking economically the old Central Asian Turkic states to both Russia and China through the 1996 Shanghai-6 Bloc (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzia, Uzbekistan, enlarged in 2001-23 to India, Pakistan and Belarus'). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) banks on China's growing regional trade and investments "to lift all boats together" towards Moscow's self-interest, while finally developing a Russian-controlled Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Belarus', Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzia, Armenia) as a rival to the E.U.'s Neighbour Partnerships.¹

Applying the ground-breaking book by legendary British geo-strategy scholar Paul Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, contemporary I.R. Theory has focused on the concept of "Overstretched Great Power", that gradually loses the ability to retain its long-held hegemony over a shifting International System (like the Habsburg Empire's long decline from 1588-1790s; or the British Empire from 1920s-1975; or the American Empire's in 1898-2020). David Felsen (Vice-President of Epoka University in Tirana, Albania) in his lecture on "Russia's Foreign Policy and Destabilization of the Balkans" at the 2022 Florida Political Sciences Association Conference, applies this I.R. theory to "Russia who is plagued by regional Power overstretch" since the 1991 collapse of the Communist Soviet Union (USSR). Since the 1990s, Russia has sought to reassert her regional Power influence in the "Near Abroad" (Central Asia, Caucasus, Ukraine), East Europe and Balkans to stem these regions sequential slow integration in the E.U. and NATO. However, Russia as an "Overstretched Great Power" since 1992 always faced fundamental difficulties in extending her perceived area of influence, due to domestic difficulties in marshalling economico-financial resources and military modernization, while paying diplomatic lip-service to collaborating with the West. Thus, Russia has frequently relied on secret destabilization strategies in different global areas to maximize her diplomatic efforts to undermine the U.S.-led Western Global Liberal Order, including since 2014 an open instrumental alignment with Communist China.² Russia's post-Soviet Foreign Policy can be divided into these three phases.

1. Cautious Russo-Atlanticist Phase (Yelt'sin Leadership, 1990s):

- good Russian-U.S./West cooperation on global-regional issues, arms-control and trade;

¹ "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)" in *Wikipedia* (2023): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization

"Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)" in *Wikipedia* (2023): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation; *La Russia in Guerra in Limes* (Rome: Italy: December 2014); S.F. Cohen, *War with Russia?*, idem; Lawrence Freedman, "Why Wars Fail: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Limits of Military Power" in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2022); Vladislav Zubok, "Can Putin Survive? Lessons of the Soviet Collapse" in *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2022).

² Paul Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987); *Putin's Russia: Down but Not Out*, issue of *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2016); Michael Beckley & Hal Brands, "The Return of Pax Americana? Putin's War is Fortifying the Democratic Alliance" in *Foreign Affairs* (March 2022); David Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy and Destabilization of the Balkans", unpublished lecture at 28 March 2022 Florida Political Sciences Association Conference at Bethune-Cookman University in Daytona Beach, FL.

- stronger politico-economic integration with the West and NATO as top-Partner (“NATO+1” forum) in NATO’s Partnership for Peace with East European and ex-Soviet states (1993-96), while the First Enlargement under U.S. President Clinton integrated Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (1996-99);
 - good Russo-West cooperation in the Balkans during the 1990s five Yugoslav Wars, when Moscow mostly cooperated closely with the U.S., NATO, E.U. and U.N. (1991-1994 Croatia’s Independence War, 1992-95 Bosnia’s War, 1998-99 Kosovo War), while covertly supporting Serbia. Thus, with reluctance Russia supported in 1995 NATO air-strikes against the Bosnian-Serbs and joined in NATO peacekeeping in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, but in the Kosovo War opposed NATO’s bombing of Serbia and side-stepped Alliance Command to rush Russian peacekeepers to Priština Airport in Kosovo as a buffer for the local defeated Serbs and briefly broke-away from NATO’s Partnership;
 - Yelt’sin’s cautious Atlanticism briefly contained Russia’s historical anti-Western nationalism.¹
2. Quiet Neo-Imperialist Phase (early-Putin Leadership, 2000-2006):
- with Yel’tsin’s retirement as leader in December 1999 followed by Putin’s defeat of secessionist Islamist Chechnya, Russia soon reverted to a mix of status-symbol quest and limited regional aggressions to recover lost territories in the context of reconstituting a semblance of the old Soviet “empire” by sending Russian peacekeepers to Transnistria after it seceded from Moldova, South Ossetia after it left Georgia and reconquering Chechnya with a long post-war brutal repression and human rights violations, while instrumentally alleging discrimination against her own Russian ethnic minorities in the Baltics.
 - Putin’s diplomacy and worldview mixed symbolic pro-Western diplomatic cooperation (calling for greater ties between Russia and Germany, including easier European access to cheaper Russian oil/gas through a future *Nord Stream* pipeline, while actively supporting the U.S. and NATO in the 2001-02 Second Afghan War against the common Islamic terrorist threat of *Al-Qaeda* and *Taliban*) with rising public distrust of Western democracy and Liberal Order institutions, plus official recriminations for the USSR’s end as a world SuperPower and historico-nationalist revival of Czarist Russia’ Great Power glories from Peter the Great to the country’s twin survivals against the invasions by Napoleon’s Franco-European Empire in 1812 and Hitler’s Nazi Germany in 1941-45 during World War II.
 - Putin’s growing opposition to both NATO and E.U., publicly decrying NATO’s First Enlargement of 1997-99 and later ones all among East European/Balkan states that Moscow still considered part of its “sphere of influence”. Yet, Putin was never able to oppose effectively both NATO’s 2002-04 Second Enlargement to 7 new Allies (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and the parallel E.U. 2002-07 Enlargements to 13 East European/Balkan states, after NATO’s Second Enlargement of 2002-04 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). Further, in 2008-09 also Croatia and Albania joined NATO, followed in 2016-19 by Montenegro and 2020 by North Macedonia (once finally solved Greece’s veto).²
 - On one hand, Putin avoided antagonizing directly U.S. President Bush Jr. by alternating regional and intelligence cooperation in new U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control accords (START III) and active support of U.S./NATO in the 2001-02 Second Afghan War against their common *Al-Qaeda* terrorist enemy.

¹ D. Felsen, “Russia’s Foreign Policy and Destabilization of the Balkans”, idem; *La Russia in Guerra in Limes*, idem; *Putin’s Russia: Down but Not Out*, idem.

² Yaroslav Trofimov, “How Far do Putin’s Imperial Ambitions Go?” in *Wall Street Journal* (25 June 2022); D. Felsen, “Russia Foreign Policy Destabilization of Balkans”, idem.

- On the other, Putin strove to semi-covertly align Russia “behind” any emergent anti-U.S. ephemeral bloc, where Moscow’s influence remained limited by the group and could never realistically become dominant:
 - a. the fleeting anti-Second Gulf War U.N. bloc (France, Germany, Russia, China and few other states) cooperating with Paris’ attempt to stall the American “HyperPower” and oppose the 2003 U.S.-Coalition’s Second Gulf War against Saddam’s Iraq (which was friendly to Moscow);
 - b. the weak economic BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a semi-Third World nascent trade alternative to the U.S./West Liberal Order;
 - c. the regional “Near-Abroad” economic trade and security coordination of the Shanghai-7 bloc (Russia, China, Belarus’, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), which traded Chinese economic-financial leadership in ex-Soviet Central Asia and Russia for Moscow’s economico-political shared control.
 - At the same time, Putin supported and financed in 2004 as new President of Ukraine pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich in a bid to stop Kiev’s nationalist pro-Western drive and force a joint partition of the ex-Soviet Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol’ more favourable to Moscow.
 - However, Russia’s nationalist neo-imperialism clashed with her “Overstretched Regional Power”, due to her limited industrial economic output beyond international sales of arms, grain, raw materials and mostly oil:
 - a. the U.N. Security Council opposition to the 2003 U.S.-led Second Gulf War was swiftly nullified by the U.S.-led Coalition’s lightning conquest of Iraq and U.N.’s abdication of post-war peacekeeping rule, followed by 2005 by major pro-U.S. reversals of governments in both Paris and Berlin;
 - b. the BRICS collapsed as a new bloc once the parallel 2008-14 U.S. Great Recession and 2010-14 EuroZone Crisis wiped-out the economies and governments of South Africa and Brazil, while weakening also the economies of Russia and India;
 - c. in November 2003 pro-Western reformists toppled the corrupt pro-Russian government of Georgia in a grass-root “Rose Revolution” and promoted future membership in the E.U. and NATO; then in Ukraine the November 2004 pro-Russian victory of Presidential candidate Yanukovich was marred by domestic and international revelations of massive corruption, electoral fraud and voter intimidation by the pro-Putin camp, as well as the failed late-2004 assassination with poison of reformist leader Yushchenko (a covert tactic later openly linked to Putin’s secret services in multiple assassinations attacks on opponents in Russia and abroad), that led to massive anti-Russian and pro-Western Orange Revolution protests in Ukraine bringing Yushchenko into power in January 2005 on a platform of reforms and future joining the E.U. and NATO to rebuff Russian penetration.¹
3. Neo-Slavic National-Imperialist Phase (later-Putin Leadership, 2006-2020s):
- fully adopting the more extreme positions held by pro-Kremlin Russian Nationalists (“Browns”) since 1990s and Pan-Slavism traditions originally advocated by Czarist Russia to assimilate Poland and overtake the Balkans prior to World War I. This allowed Putin to expand his Parliamentary party “We Are Russia” and use nationalist propaganda and the West/NATO as an alleged foreign enemy to then restrict domestically the divided reformists despite large criticism of Kremlin corrupt politics. By 2022, Putin’s quest to resurrect propagandistically past glories to justify his own absolute power at home conflated his ultra-nationalist claims for a return to Russia’s greatness by securing national lands lost with the USSR’s 1991 collapse (starting with Ukraine) with also Czarist Russia’s historical lost in World War I or squandered by Vladimir Lenin’s

¹Y. Trofimov, “How Far do Putin’s Imperial Ambitions Go?”, *idem*; D. Felsen, “Russia Foreign Policy Destabilization of Balkans”, *idem*; *Russia in Guerra in Limes*, *idem*; *Putin’s Russia: Down but Not Out*, *idem*.

Communist Revolution, while the Kremlin influential Eurasianist faction led by Defense Minister General Sergey Shoigu idealizes Russia as both the inheritor of Stalin's brutal USSR and Mongol Empire (that destroyed to rubble entire enemy cities).

- More hardline anti-Western isolationist phase bordering a new Cold War emerged as open reaction to perceived Western policies limiting Russia's interventions within her presumed "area of influence", especially after U.S. President Bush Jr. refused Putin's pleas that NATO reject Ukraine's and Georgia's application for full membership under the "Open Door".
- To prevent pro-Western nationalist Georgia from becoming a full NATO Ally after her 2006 formal application and the U.S. refusal to openly veto this on behalf of U.S.-Russian cooperation, Putin's secret agents deftly provoked a hostile Tbilisi into attempting to reconquer in 2008 her own break-away ethnic South Ossetian minority that had joined Russia's North Ossetia since Georgia's 1991 independence from the USSR. This was immediately countered by Russian forces who quickly defeated the Georgians, expanded the break-away ethnic areas (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and virtually annexed them with permanent Russian peacekeepers threatening Georgia through such new "frozen conflict" to both deter and prevent Georgia's future NATO membership as NATO shrunk from any armed reactions.
- Putin also supported in Ukraine the reversal of the divided local Orange reformists through Yanukovich's second successful and fair election of 2010, but overplayed his hand in Fall 2013 when he vetoed Yanukovich's widely popular application for a free-trade and labour association treaty with the E.U. (both Russia and the E.U. insisted it was incompatible with Russia's advocacy of a parallel free-trade economic treaty with the "Near-Abroad"), precipitating months of massive demonstrations and bloody failed state repression in the second grass-roots "EuroMaidan Revolution" of November 2013-February 2014 which forced Yanukovich into exile in Russia (in 2019 Ukrainian Courts charged him with treason on the 2013-14 events and asking Putin for Russian troops to invade Ukraine in 2014).
- Strengthen Russian political institutions and dictatorial involution, while censoring pro-Western Media and reformist politicians (Boris Nemtsov's assassination; Alexei Navalny's sequential imprisonments) by using anti-Western/NATO nationalism to strengthen Putin's shaky domestic hold against reformists, which finally led first to Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2014-21 Donbas stalled secession, followed by open dictatorship during the 2022-2023 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.¹

However, even before Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 1999, Russia has embraced increasingly virulent anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetorics first to cement Putin's xenophobic neo-nationalist hold on the country (condemning NATO's expansion to East Europe up to Russia's borders) to then justify his pan-Slavic and neo-imperialist agenda to split NATO and Europe (targeted rhetorics, secret bribes of anti-E.U. politicians, Russian energy dependency) and so isolate the U.S.A. at the U.N. (BRICS, Second Gulf War), excluding them from the Middle East and ex-Soviet Central Asia.

Russia also has built with Communist China a joint economico-security "protectorate" over the ex-Soviet Central Asia (Shanghai-6 Group-SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organization-CSTO) financed by Beijing. Thus, Putin's frozen wars in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014) and East Ukraine (2014-20) sought to destabilize NATO as impotent to guarantee its Partners' security, and pave the way for Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a final step to reunify the ex-USSR into a neo-Russian Slavic empire fully aligned with Communist China against the West and complicit of Beijing's own anti-U.S. annexationist plans against pro-Western independent Taiwan. Russia's failure to quickly conquer Ukraine and split Europe and NATO with its gas-blackmails has sparked instead U.S.-Western sanctions and military aid to Ukraine, while revamping NATO through new enlargements (Sweden and Finland), beefed-up military defenses on its

¹ Y. Trofimov, "How Far do Putin's Imperial Ambitions Go?", *idem*; D. Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy Destabilization of Balkans", *idem*; *Russia in Guerra in Limes*, *idem*; *Putin's Russia: Down but Not Out*, *idem*.

new “Eastern Flank” (previously only lightly militarized since 1992) and open “coupling” of anti-Russian Euro-Atlantic defenses to East Asia security against Communist China’s parallel imperialist expansionism.¹



Putin’s Russian neo-imperialist aspirations extended her ambitions also to Eastern Europe and the Balkans since the 1992-95 Bosnian and 1998-99 Kosovo Wars under the initial guise of joining NATO’s regional peacekeeping forces, but Russia’s “Overstretch Regional Power” and reliance on corruption limits her anti-Western influence. Moscow hostility against any NATO and E.U. Enlargements to ex-Communist Eastern Europe, ex-Soviet Baltics, “neutral” Scandinavia and ex-Soviet “Near Abroad” (from Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova to NATO’s Central Asian Partners) is motivated by the Kremlin’s geo-strategic dream of eventually reconstituting in some form the ex-USSR around an ultra-nationalist *revanchist* Russia irrationally obsessed on seeking to also recreate a “buffer” belt of weak, subservient, semi-disarmed states at her extreme periphery with the West. This was never possible since the revolt of all ex-Communist East European, Balkan and Baltic states against the USSR and Warsaw Pact, followed by their immediate integration as the “Vilnius-13” advocating their successful “Open Door” access to Euro-Atlantic Partnerships (1990-97) and full membership in parallel, sequential, NATO and E.U. Enlargements (1999-2022). At the same time, Russia also opposed Balkans integration in the E.U., given Putin’s belief that the E.U. is just a U.S./NATO “Trojan Horse” (eerily echoing nationalist French President Charles De Gaulle’s own 1960s criticism and attempts to undermine both NATO and the European Community), while blending made-up domestic-focused propaganda and censorship to claim alleged anti-Russian neo-Nazi extremism from Ukraine to East Europe and Germany together with NATO/Western aggressiveness against Russia as justification for Moscow’s blistering threats against the three NATO/E.U. Baltic states (alleged discrimination of Russian minorities and in 2022 access through Lithuania to Russia’s Kaliningrad *Oblast*), Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Scandinavia and NATO. Thus, Europe as a whole has come to agree that Putin’s stalled invasion in Ukraine will further aggravate his nationalist-imperial claims to drag war for years as in the original Donbas 2014-21 “frozen conflict” with fake armistices to gain time to regroup, rearm and attack over and over until victory and his belief that a democratically weak and divided West will ultimately give in, then allowing Putin to target other vulnerable states as even Russian top officials brazenly confirmed publicly in 2022.

On one hand, in Europe and the Balkans, Russia’s long-term careful diplomatic interplay of low-costs energy trade contracts in Europe, backed by secret corruption of local politicians and parties, have been exposed as another dangerous hidden tool in Putin’s long-game blackmail to make Central-East Europe (*Nord Stream II* pipeline) and Balkans (*South Stream* and other pipelines) vulnerable to regional energy dependency on Russian gas/oil exports readily “weaponized” to create multiple politico-energy rifts among vulnerable members in the E.U. and NATO. Europe already experienced several “manufactured” Russian energy crises under Putin over Belarus’ (2007), Georgia (2008) and three Ukrainian crises (2009, 2014, 2022-23) until the big

¹ “Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)” in *Wikipedia* (2023): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization ; “Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)” in *Wikipedia* (2023): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation

global blow-out with the E.U. over Moscow's 2022-23 invasion of Ukraine ending with the July 2022 cut of energy exports to Germany.

On the other, the Balkans' fragile ethno-politico-economic patchwork of local rival ethnic fiefdoms has been laid bare by recent Russian openly threats against specific vulnerable poor states (Bosnia's three-ways power-vacuum, defeated nationalist Serbia and neo-independent ethnic-Albanian Kosovo, as the only independent West Balkan states still outside the E.U. and NATO, alongside ethnic-Romanian Moldova in East Balkans) and privately pressured others with arbitrary coercive economic gas-stoppages to "weaponized" energy-dependence and secure indirect local political control for Moscow, especially after Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia joined NATO, and are E.U. Aspirants together with Bosnia, Serbia, Moldova, as well as Ukraine and Georgia. In the West Balkans, Moscow's strategy pivots on the Bosnia-Serbia rivalry and since 2006 Moscow sought to expand her limited influence in the Balkans through economic (energy dependency on cheaper Russian gas/oil imports via new pipelines to Moldova, Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria) and political means (corruption of local politicians, anti-Western and anti-NATO nationalism, pan-Slavism) against the predominant regional role of the U.S. and E.U., as well as China's emergence as a neo-colonial investment rival actor. In the West Balkans, since 2006 Russia started to implement a strategy of regional destabilization against Western influence by targeting especially Serbia, *Republika Srpska*, Montenegro and Kosovo to support Serbia's dejected nationalist claims after Belgrade's sequential defeats during the ex-Yugoslav Civil Wars of 1991-2000, followed by Serbia's own partition with the loss of Kosovo in 1999 and finally Montenegro's 2006 secession cutting-off her vital access to the Mediterranean Sea.¹

Bosnia became an unexpected side-show for Russia's destabilizing influence since 2006, to further undermine her internal lack of stability to stop Sarajevo joining NATO and E.U., plus any constitutional and anti-corruption reforms (required by both NATO and E.U.) to offset her unmanageable domestic three-ways power-vacuum between the pro-Western Muslim-dominated shell Bosnian Federation hobbled by absentee pro-Western Bosnian-Croats long under Croatia's *de facto* (skipping an outright controversial secession, but totally ignoring Sarajevo's authority) rule, and openly threatened by President Milorad Dodik of the pro-Russian autonomous Bosnian-Serb *Republika Srpska* openly advocating for secession and independence from the powerless Western-backed Muslim-led Bosnian Federation and thereafter outright ethnic union to Serbia (with Moscow's support to both). The Bosnian-Croats regions too had secured "virtual independence" without secession through *de facto* administrative union with Croatia, without upsetting NATO and E.U. or officially dissolving the Western-protected Muslim-led Bosnian Federation. Throughout the following years Russia supported Dodik as Premier and then President of the *Republika Srpska* who continued to threaten to break away from the 1995 Dayton Accord on a co-ruled Federal Bosnia. He was twice sanctioned financially by the U.S. for his destabilizing policies (2016 and 2022), but in 2021 he announced that the *Republika Srpska* would withdraw from the Bosnian Federation's joint-military and in December visited Putin in Russia to cement bilateral ties.²

Putin's strategy to keep Bosnia corrupt, politically unstable and religiously divided three-ways, would keep her out of the Euro-Atlantic area by painting this failed country as too unstable and ethnically divided, while halting any constitutional reforms required for NATO-E.U. integration, to ultimately foster a potential new regional conflict for the violent secession of local Serb proxies in the *Republika Srpska* and Kosovo's Serb minority to join Serbia and totally dependent on Moscow's politico-economic penetration with vital energy, substandard trade, paltry aid and outdated ex-Soviet weapons (as a long-term Kremlin

¹ D. Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy Destabilization of Balkans", idem; *Russia in Guerra in Limes*, idem.

² D. Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy & Destabilization of Balkans", idem; S.J. Blank, "Balkans & Euro-Atlantic Energy Security", idem, p.58-77; I.F. Čančar, "Russia is Weaponising Bosnia's Gas Dependence", idem; Azem Kurtić, "Joint Serbia-Srpska Power Plans Leave Bosnia in the Cold" in *BalkanInsight* (30 June 2022): <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/30/joint-serbia-srpska-power-plans-leave-bosnia-in-cold/>

ally supporting Russian economic and energy penetration in the *Republika Srpska*, Dodik even advocated a “strategic alliance” between the *Republika Srpska* and Russia as brotherly Slav Orthodox countries). Thus, since mid-December 2020, Russia’s *Gazprom* cut by 50% its exports to Bosnia (later blaming this as a “technical error”) and forcibly rerouted in 2021 its remaining gas exports through the *Turk Stream* pipeline (from Russia to Turkey to Serbia) to the autonomous *Republika Srpska* local *Gas Res* company, while other states sharing the same *Gazprom* main pipeline (Hungary and Poland) were not hit with similar cuts. Existing international gas-routes and possible partnerships to curb Bosnia’s Russian gas dependency through the newly-built *Turk Stream* are:

- a) building and integrating the *Southern Interconnection* gas-pipeline from Split to Travnik with a capacity of 1.5 bcm per year, proposed by *BH Gas* and Croatia’s *Plinacro*, follows the Ionian-Adriatic gas-pipeline project to ultimately connect the existing regional Bosnian network to Croatia’s international gas system with Western Europe, while diversifying Bosnia’s energy supply from the existing exclusive Russo-Serbian gas-route;
- b) connecting Bosnia to the rival existing gas-pipeline network Trans-Adriatic–Trans-Anatolian Pipelines (TAP–TANAP), as part of the Southern Gas Corridor from the Caspian to the Adriatic Seas, and key alternative energy supply for many Southeast European states;
- c) expanding and partially diversifying Bosnia’s commercial gas market through liquid gas (LNG) imports from the U.S. through Croatia’s LNG terminal in Krk, with the U.S. willing to use its own LNG to replace in the future all of Russia’s gas quota.¹

Likewise, once in 2008 Kosovo secured full independence from the United Nations (not recognized only by Serbia, Russia, China and few countries), Moscow responded by engineering high profile “aid flights” to the minority Kosovar-Serb enclaves without any coordination and with open opposition by the Kosovo government, while in 2009 it reiterated its full support for Serbia as a key Russian partner. But in the end, Moscow could not prevent her own slow political decline in the Balkans once Putin’s covert destabilization strategy as “spoiler” against the West’s dominant regional influence backfired: Russia failed to politically turn anti-Western nationalist Serbia into a full-fledged “client-state” once Moscow could not stop in May 2006 pro-West Montenegro’s secession and independence from Serbia; or in in February 2008 veto at the U.N. Security Council the U.N.-mandated independence of Kosovo; nor Serbia’s further international isolation once her ex-enemies Croatia and Albania joined both NATO (2008) and E.U. (2013, and expected 2023 for Albania). Moreover, once Montenegro started talks since 2012 to join both NATO and E.U., Putin’s interference in the October 2016 Montenegro elections were embarrassingly unsuccessful in preventing the victory of pro-Western but corrupt Premier Milo Djukanović, while Moscow at the same time was caught red-handed in an election day failed anti-Western coup attempt by Serb and Russian agents with a botched planned assassination of Djukanović.

The slow steady erosion of Russian influence widened as also her traditional Balkan friends joined both NATO and E.U. (Bulgaria in 2002-07, Montenegro in 2017 in NATO and North Macedonia in 2020 in NATO), was further compounded once also “loyalist” Serbia very slowly started E.U. membership talks as Russia’s naked imperialism was fully revealed with her 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2014-21 sponsored Donbas secessionist insurgency to undermine pro-Western Ukraine. Yet, despite Russia’s aggressions of Ukraine in 2014-21 and recently her 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Serbia in both instances has refused to join U.S.-NATO-E.U. sanctions against Russia. Indeed, as a politically fractured state after her own losses in Bosnia and Kosovo,

¹ “World Bank Concerned by Ukraine War Impact on Serbia’s Energy Dependence” in *Euractiv* (18 April 2022): https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/world-bank-concerned-by-ukraine-war-impact-on-serbias-energy-dependence/; S.J. Blank, “Balkans & Euro-Atlantic Energy Security”, idem, p.58-77; I.F. Čančar, “Russia is Weaponising Bosnia’s Gas Dependence”, idem; Bojan Stojkovski, “Balkan Countries ‘Still Heavily Dependent on Russian Gas’” in *BalkanInsight* (24 November 2020): <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/11/24/balkan-countries-still-heavily-dependent-on-russian-gas/>; Azem Kurtić, “Joint Serbia-Srpska Power Plans Leave Bosnia in the Cold”, idem.

Serbia has leaned on Russian support to sponsor since 2014 her own destabilization campaign in both Kosovo and more covertly in *Republika Srpska* on behalf of her Serb minorities, with the most violent clash in September 2021 over Kosovo's new car license plates (bomb throwing, demonstrations by Kosovar-Serbs and Serbian military planes briefly violating Kosovo air-space), while Moscow publicly denounced Kosovo for "provoking" Serbia. As Russia continued to encourage in 2021-22 the radicalization of the Kosovar-Serb minority to please Belgrade, Montenegro reacted by denouncing Russian interference, in response Serb units joined in 2021 Russia and Belarus' in military exercises.¹

Europe's *energy crises* show the E.U. and NATO failure to counter increasing *dependence* on *Russian* gas and Moscow's "weaponizing" energy for enhanced political leverage, which are further aggravated by Brussel's own bureaucratic slow inertia on speeding future West Balkans Enlargements as politico-economic incentives for integration in the West. Indeed, the E.U.'s controversial slow policy over future membership for the West Balkans has been further complicated by the E.U. linking together her Albanian and North Macedonian applications (E.U. candidate since 2005, meeting most membership requirements), which unexpectedly left Albania hostage to parallel ethno-nationalist controversies and vetoes against Macedonia, first by Greece until 2019 (when Macedonia agreed to change its country's name to North Macedonia to distinguish it from historical Greek Macedonia across the border) and then by Bulgaria (which historically considered it as ethnically part of Bulgaria and twice annexed it in the Two World Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45). Continued delays to E.U. Enlargement exacerbated disillusionment and political instability in the Western Balkans over stalled integration in the E.U. and NATO, leaving exposed the whole Balkans to further anti-West destabilization and politico-economic influence by Russia and China. Thus, after years of internal political opposition, the E.U.'s slow stance towards completing its Eastern Enlargement to new members in the Balkans has shifted since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, quickly dissipating in the shock of regional war with Russia years of political European resistance to completing its controversial integration of this unstable region. Thus, by late-June 2022 the E.U. suddenly decided to accept Ukraine and Moldova as official candidates (despite the process would take years to be completed into full membership), alongside a parallel E.U.-Western Balkans summit to unblock the stalled regional integration process (especially vital towards the most disillusioned North Macedonia, Albania and Serbia). Indeed, E.U. officials had finally concluded that delays to E.U. Enlargement would exacerbate political instability throughout the Balkans and deepen disillusionment over Europe's stalled integration, while undermining the region's Western vocation and exposing the whole Balkans to further destabilization and rival influence by Russia and China.

In this context on the eve of the 23 June 2022 E.U.-West Balkans Summit and despite Bulgarian ex-Prime Minister Boyko Borisov's pledge that: "...for the future of the Balkans, E.U. and Bulgaria... [w]e will not remain on the dark side of Eurasia, we will not allow Putinization".² But Bulgaria's pro-Western government suddenly fell on a no-confidence vote over surging inflation, budget spending, attempts to curb corruption and domestic opposition to lifting the 2020 veto against North Macedonia's E.U. accession (which also blocked the liked Albanian accession). Beyond the domestic political crisis (leading to a fourth national election in just one year, plus freezing millions of Euros from E.U. recovery funds and plans to adopt the Euro as currency by 2024), this event has thrown into turmoil both Bulgaria's strong pro-European and pro-NATO policies since the 2022 Russia invasion of Ukraine against the threat of regional Russian and Chinese penetration, and internationally the E.U.'s own fragile plans to start integrating the West Balkans (an uneasy posture for a recent post-2007 new Western state always seeking to balance its historical close ties to Moscow). Thus, geopolitical events propelled the 23 June 2022 E.U.-Balkans Summit to unambiguously pledge to integrate (in a process of at least a decade to meet all E.U. reforms) as new accession candidates Ukraine and Moldova (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia had

¹ "Montenegro" in *Wikipedia*: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montenegro>; D. Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy & Balkans", idem.

² Quote from Ben Hall & Henry Foy, "Bulgarian Party's U-turn Boosts Hopes for E.U. Expansion in Western Balkans" in *Financial Times* (22 June 2022): <https://www.ft.com/content/c8fe88a3-df24-4b44-b8bb-64df547f12fb>

submitted E.U. applications after Russia's invasion of Ukraine), to strive to unlock the prior accession candidacy in the West Balkans of North Macedonia (2005), Serbia (2012) and Albania (2014), as well as also in the near-future for Georgia, and supporting Bosnia's stability, while coordinating regional coordination against Russian threats of economic blackmail (both energy and food), sabotage, hybrid-threats (cyberterrorism and disinformation) and even invasion. The whole drama of Bulgaria's political crisis and continuing opposition to unlock the accession candidacy of North Macedonia and Albania precipitated behind the summit scenes a major row by the fuming West Balkan candidates against Sofia, prompting *in extremis* a "French Proposal" (E.U. would integrate in the accession negotiations the Bulgarian-North Macedonia identity talks, in exchange for Sofia dropping the veto in a still hoped-for Bulgarian parliamentary vote), only to be scuttled by the internal clash between pro-Western government and pro-Russian opposition parties, forcing a government collapse and new elections in Fall 2022. At the same time North Macedonia opposition claims Bulgaria wants the "Bulgarization" of their state, while in Bulgaria's the unprecedented expulsion of 50 Russian diplomats follows parliamentary revelations of the extent of Moscow's spy networks influencing "high-ranking Bulgarian politicians who openly work for the interests of Russia, not of Bulgaria."¹

This latest interconnected Bulgarian and North Macedonian crises will continue to be exploited by secret Russian agents and their corrupt local political confederates until Western pressures will secure hopefully by Fall 2022 North Macedonia and Albania entry into the E.U., while further north Russian influence supports constant attempts of the *Republika Srpska* to secede from Bosnia (if no international agreement will finally modify the arbitrary 1995 Dayton Accord's imposition of an inefficient and locally hated Bosnian Federation on its simmering warring ethnicities). On the other, Russian attempts to continue to "horse-trade" political blackmail for energy dominance over most of the Balkans (Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia, Moldova, Bulgaria, North Macedonia), shows how difficult is the delicate diplomatico-economic struggle to both stabilize the Balkans and fully integrate it into the E.U. and NATO, while countering Russia's constant anti-Western regional subversion and corruption tools. To counter Russia's Balkan oil dominance, the E.U. has secured in May 2022 major regional energy cut-backs from *GazProm* with new urgency on the 2020s Western plans to create a new rival regional energy source by strategically linking Greece to Bulgaria and North Macedonia (Thessaloniki-Skopje-Hellenic pipeline) with option to use North Macedonia to also transport low-cost natural gas to Albania, Kosovo and Serbia. Finally, Russia's Spring 2022 invasion of Ukraine and parallel botched destabilization of Moldova through Russian-occupied Transnistria forced both Serbia and Moldova to openly distance themselves diplomatically from Moscow, although Belgrade still rejected joining anti-Russian sanctions. In reaction to this, also Kosovo and Bosnia denounced Russian threats against them and officially requested that NATO speed-up both of their applications from Partners to full Allied members.²

¹ Camille Gijs, "Western Balkans Leaders Fume after Summit Fails to Unblock E.U. Bids" in *Politico* (23 June 2022): <https://www.politico.eu/article/western-balkan-leader-fuming-bulgaria-veto-deadlock-summit/> ; Christian Olivier, "Bulgaria will Take Key Step to Drop North Macedonia Veto on Friday" in *Politico* (23 June 2022): <https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-take-key-step-drop-north-macedonia-veto-friday/> ; Reuters, "Bulgaria's Pro-Western Government Collapses After Just Six Months" in *The Guardian* (22 June 2022): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/22/bulgaria-government-collapses-kiril-petkov?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1 ; Sinisa Jakov Marusić, "Opposition to 'French Proposal' Mounts in North Macedonia" in *BalkanInsight* (30 June 2022): <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/07/04/opposition-to-french-proposal-mounts-in-north-macedonia/> ; Svetoslav Todorov, "Petkov Awaits New Mandate—but New Bulgarian Elections Likely" in *BalkanInsight* (30 June 2022): <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/30/petkov-awaits-new-mandate-but-new-bulgarian-elections-likely/>

² Azem Kurtić, "Joint Serbia-Srpska Power Plans Leave Bosnia in Cold", idem: B. Stojkovski, "Balkan Countries 'Still Heavily Dependent on Russian Gas'" idem; S.J. Blank, "Balkans & Euro-Atlantic Energy Security" idem, p.58-77; Ismet Fatih Čančar, "Russia is Weaponising Bosnia & Herzegovina's Gas Dependence", idem; "World Bank Concerned by Ukraine War Impact on Serbia's Energy Dependence", idem; "Doorstep of President Charles Michel Ahead of European Council and E.U.-Western Balkans' Leaders Meeting" in *European Council Press Release* (23 June 2022): <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/23/doorstep-of-president-charles-michel-ahead-of-the-european-council-and-the-eu-western-balkans-leaders-meeting/>

Future NATO and E.U. Enlargements in the Balkans remain openly opposed only by Serbia and Russia, but in the 2020s Belgrade sees her eventual integration in the E.U. as less controversial politically at home, due to its immediate benefits for Serbia's economic woes and high unemployment, while the E.U. is engaged in tricky long-term negotiations for the entire West Balkans sub-region in a package integration deal among these poor local rival states (North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo). Few stubborn bilateral issues remain:

1. reducing over time Serbia's energy dependence (and linked political influence) on cheaper Russian oil/gas imports via its East European and Balkans pipelines;
2. continue the slow Western politico-cultural integration of the ultra-nationalist, resentful sectors of Serbia's population and political class through future E.U. membership and careful bilateral NATO Partnership coordination (but not full membership to avoid the real risk of long-term Russian covert influence manipulating Serb security votes towards instrumental vetoes to paralyze Alliance consensus decisions—similar to President Erdogan's Turkish nationalist "blackmail" diplomacy, or France's 1960s defunct Gaullist "Grand Design" rivalry);
3. serious international mediations by a new Contact Group of U.S., E.U. and NATO (but not the U.N., given the constant threat of Russo-Chinese instrumental vetoes in its Security Council to keep the Balkans destabilized) for a West Balkans comprehensive regionally-acceptable revision of both the Kosovo status and Bosnia 1995 Dayton Accord to stop inter-ethnic tensions by trading linked major border land-swaps for regional fast-track E.U.-NATO memberships, protection and economic growths:
 - strong two-steps linked international negotiations (U.S.-NATO-E.U. side-stepping the U.N. Security Council) for an internationally-guaranteed border-revisions accord along ethnic lines with favourable local referenda to eliminate simmering local inter-ethnic tensions by trading on one hand Serb annexation of the ethnic Serb North Kosovo larger area that Priština does not control, plus also the fragmented smaller South-East Kosovar-Serbs enclaves as demilitarized enclaves linked to Serbia via some especially-built "safe-passage" interconnected "hardened" highway (or their virtual total ethnic autonomy with cross-border ethno-cultural ties), while on the other hand having Serbia recognize Kosovo's independence and option to eventually merge with Albania (popular in both Albanian countries)—explored in late-2017 and late-2020 under President Trump's secret U.S.-Serbia-Kosovo talks, but stalled by German then-Chancellor Angela Merkel's veto over border-swaps and French President Emmanuel Macron's veto to E.U.-NATO West Balkans Enlargements until local corruption be reduced by new institutional reforms in Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia (sparking Kosovo threats to merge regardless with Albania);
 - strong internationally-agreed linked negotiations (U.S.-NATO-E.U. side-stepping the U.N. Security Council) for an internationally-guaranteed border-revisions accord along politico-religious lines with favourable local referenda and dissolution of the long still-born Bosnian Federation as to internationally guarantee with politico-military-economic protection of a non-demilitarized smaller Muslim rump-Bosnia from her rival neighbours, plus supervised parallel mergers of both a "demilitarized" Bosnian-Serb *Republika Srpska* with Serbia (long pushing for her own inevitable future secession from Bosnia) and of a "demilitarized" Bosnian-Croat Herzegovina with Croatia, in exchange for joint E.U.-NATO entry of Serbia and a smaller Bosnia (with EuroAtlantic guarantees and peacekeepers for her independence and future prosperity—but dissolving the artificial international "Free Zone" status of the strategic east-west Brčko Crossroads Corridor linking the *Republika Srpska* to Serbia, followed by its own merger with Serbia, provided a residual tiny E.U.-NATO peacekeeper

force guarantees open transit for Brčko's other north-south corridor linking Bosnia to Croatia), together with comprehensive West Balkans regional minority rights protections.¹

In the end, as the West Balkans remains trapped inside its historic quagmire of poverty, rival ethno-religious and local personalistic fiefdoms at the crossroads between a democratic wealthy Euro-Atlantic West vs. a corrupt authoritarian insular agrarian past (exploited by Russia and China), this essay's author believes that the only fast solution to stabilize the Western Balkans and minimize regional inter-ethnic conflicts based on mirror-like fears of a resurgent "Greater Serbia" vs. "Greater Albania", remains in the controversial linkage of internationally-guaranteed West Balkan land-swaps and localized demilitarization areas (*Republika Srpska*, Brčko Free Zone, Kosovar-Serb enclaves) with targeted E.U./NATO peacekeeping (Brčko, Bosnia, Kosovar-Serb enclaves), plus very large infusions of E.U. capital in productive local investments (energy, infrastructures, tourism small-businesses, agriculture) with open access to the Continental E.U. market for work-based emigration and trade. However, such internationally-negotiated bold peaceful regional border-swaps would inevitably spark pointless condemnations that such diplomatic solution "rewards" Serbia's past evil deeds, while furthering more inter-E.U./inter-NATO contrasts and fresh diplomatic talks to de-conflict other long-buried regional issues. Meanwhile, U.S. frustration on E.U. failures to diplomatically shepherd a fast integration of Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro (the latter three already NATO Allies) rose under President Trump who had sought to integrate also Serbia and Kosovo into the TransAtlantic alliance to prevent Russia and China from seeking to destabilize the Balkans by backing Serbia's non-recognition of Kosovo's independence:

1. a future "Greater Albania" state (Albania, most of Kosovo and Albanian areas of North Macedonia) could likely run against different local Albanian interests ("fiefdoms"), where rival Albanian political leaders might prefer maximizing their respective bargaining leverage and multiple institutional representations within both E.U. and NATO Enlargements in the West Balkans.
2. North Macedonian Slavs vs. local Albanians (20% of North Macedonia) to possibly join Albania;
3. Bulgaria's veto on North Macedonia joining the E.U. (blocking also Albania's accession);
4. Greece to seek Albania's Greek-populated southernmost Argyrokastro (Gjirokastër) city (otherwise a potential Greek veto might scuttle all South-West Balkans land-swap deals);
5. but if accepted this could likely prod Hungary to seek stronger minority rights and dual-citizenship for the Hungarian population of Vojvodina in North Serbia (instead any open push by Budapest to secure that area's annexation could spark vetoes from Romania, Slovakia and Czech Republic fearful this might also revive secessionism in the Hungarian minority lands of Romanian Transylvania and Southern Slovakia);
6. Turkey too might seek to scuttle a West Balkan territorial stabilization or any potential Albanian land concession to Greece (Argyrokastro), unless also Ankara's most unfounded controversial claims and on/off threats against Athens' Aegean islands and Continental Shelf be added to the international diplomatic table to pay-off Turkey with some quota of future new Mediterranean oil/gas from Greek and Cypriot sea-reserves, as well as a future faster pathway to eventual E.U. membership (despite the risk of Erdogan's aggressive independentist neo-Ottoman diplomacy posing a future Gaullist-style threat to E.U. political cohesion as it already does within NATO since the Turkish President's rise to power.²

¹ James Pardew, "Opinion: Redrawing Borders in the Balkans is a Recurring, Bad Idea" in *DW* (6 September 2018): <https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-redrawing-borders-in-the-balkans-is-a-recurring-bad-idea/a-45349140>; Ante Beljo, *Greater Serbia: From Ideology to Aggression* (Zagreb: Croat Information Center, 1993); Catherine Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015); "Greater Albania" in *Wikipedia* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Albania Timothy Less, "Could the Kosovo Story End in Greater Albania?" in *OpenDemocracy* (2 February 2021): <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/could-kosovo-story-end-greater-albania/>; Hamza Karčić, "Analysis-How Advantageous is a 'Greater Albania'?" in *AA Analysis Europe* (4 May 2021): <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-how-advantageous-is-a-greater-albania-/2229109>

² J. Pardew, "Opinion: Redrawing Borders in Balkans is a Recurring Bad Idea", idem; A. Beljo, *Greater Serbia: Ideology to Aggression*, idem; C. Baker, *Yugoslav Wars of 1990s*, idem; "Greater Albania" in *Wikipedia*, idem; T. Less, "Could Kosovo Story End in Greater Albania?" idem; H. Karčić, "Analysis-How Advantageous is a 'Greater Albania'?" idem; Hamdi Firat Buyuk,

In this fluid and fragile geo-political context, Putin’s anti-Western neo-imperialism and destabilizing strategy will continue unabated in both the “Near Abroad” and Balkans in the vain hope to eventually undermine through threats, corruption, sabotage and economic blackmail the region’s dominant E.U./NATO influences, despite the paradox of Russia as an “Overstretched Regional Power” increasingly constraining her capacity to condition all her neighbours. Thus, Putin will continue to secretly fund and support the destabilization of at least Serbia, Bosnia (*Republika Srpska*) and Kosovo in parallel efforts to show symbolical support of Serb ethno-nationalism against NATO and E.U. in the West Balkans, while also striving to undermine politically vulnerable Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Moldova. Putin’s destabilizing anti-Western strategy has been built on decades of Moscow’s misleading nationalist ambivalence and lies, aggravated by years of outrageous nationalist propaganda falsely portraying NATO and E.U. as regional threats to Russia to justify his own widening domestic dictatorship and neo-imperialist expansionism over ex-Soviet states 30 years since the 1989-91 twin collapses of the Soviet empire and USSR.

Indeed, until Putin’s constantly denied and then brazen unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, most world governments had failed to react forcefully to his constant instrumentalizing anti-Western and pan-Slavic nationalist propaganda against a quiescent NATO, despite the Alliance always fully compliant of conventional-nuclear arms-control cuts and had no forces deployed along its eastern borders with Russia and Belarus’, while U.S. President Obama had even accommodated Russian objections by not deploying NATO’s long-planned anti-nuclear Missile Defense against Iran. Putin’s multiple machinations were not openly confronted by the Obama and the West, except with ineffective U.S.-NATO sanctions after Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Russian-speaking Crimea from Ukraine, and subsequent failed covert first invasion of Ukraine’s Donbas region by massively armed local Russian “secessionists” (2014-21). Even Russian violations of 30-years-old East-West nuclear arms-control treaties (CFE, SNF, INF) was only confronted by U.S. President Trump’s withdrawal from them without any significant investment in Western nuclear defenses. Putin’s anti-Western destabilization strategy was enhanced by his attempts to exploit domestic political divisiveness in the U.S. and Europe by politically splitting Europe and NATO through anti-democratic elections interference among Western states, while blackmailing energy-vulnerable European governments through quietly linking the Balkans and Northern Europe to cheap Russian oil/gas pipeline imports and opposing E.U. trade integration of the Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia.¹



“Full Blown Conflict in East Med Seen as Unlikely, Unless by Accident” in *BalkanInsights* (27 August 2020): <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/08/27/full-blown-conflict-in-east-med-seen-as-unlikely-unless-by-accident/>

¹ *Putin's Russia: Down but not Out*, idem; L. Freedman, “Why Wars Fail: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine & Limits of Military Power” idem; V. Zubok, “Can Putin Survive?” idem.

All this clever long-term strategy only backfired in a strategic and financial disaster for Moscow once Putin shocked the world by invading Ukraine in 2022, despite repeated denials until the last minute, and after eight years of low-key Russian secessionist border insurgency in the Donbas (2014-2021). But Russia completely failed to quickly overrun Ukraine's stubborn defenses at the cost of massive Russian losses in dead and *matériel*:

1. Russian losses in combat against Ukraine in its first five months of a slowly stalled invasion (February-July 2022) reached 30% of her modern armoured (600+ tanks) and mechanized vehicles (1,725 APCs), plus 25% of deployed troops (17,500 men), 75 fuel-tankers, 305 artillery, 96 missile-launch trucks, 54 anti-air trucks, 1,185 cars, 130+ planes, 130+ helicopters and 7 combat ships (with the flag-missile-cruiser *Moskva*);
2. Yet with determined national leadership, Western intelligence and arms-shipments to Kiev, Ukraine was able since end-March 2022 to launch targeted mobile offensives that forced weakened Russian front-lines into rapid vast sequential retreats of stunned troops from the failed encirclement of Kiev in late-March 2022 to liberating Northern Ukraine in April, Kharkiv in April-September and Kherson in August-November;¹



3. Russia has been left in 2022-23 diplomatically and economically isolated as a *pariah* from the West, parts of the Third World and the global economy, although not from China, India, Turkey and many Third World authoritarian states, whose governments quickly circumvented the West's anti-Russian financial-energy sanctions to buy heavily-discounted Russian oil;
4. since Spring 2022 concerted massive Western financial and energy sanctions have savaged Russia's economy, but not stopped her invasion of Ukraine, while Putin has reacted by cutting and rerouting most of his lost pre-war oil/gas exports from Europe (which he had massively expanded since the 2000s to create a major trans-European economic and political dependency on Russia's blackmail and financial corruption against the dominant U.S./E.U./NATO Western Liberal Global Order) to Asia and China (secondarily to India and even NATO Ally Turkey) by fatefully tying Moscow's control of her national economy and political choices to Beijing as increasingly dominant "silent partner".²

¹ Anthony Blair & Tariq Tahir, "Freedom Fighters: How Surrendering Russian Troops are Switching Sides and Joining Ukrainian Forces to Fight Back against Putin" in *The Sun* (30 March 2022).

² D. Felsen, "Russia's Foreign Policy in Balkans", *idem*; *Putin's Russia: Down but not Out*, *idem*; L. Freedman, "Why Wars Fail: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine & Limits of Military Power" *idem*; V. Zubok, "Can Putin Survive?" *idem*.



Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kiev in 2022 Zelenskyy & E.U. fast-track candidatureship 1 March 2022 Zelenskyy visiting Ukrainian troops 2022

Conversely, despite both Russia and China vetoing any security mediation or intervention by the United Nations over the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the U.N. and World Bank openly denounced this conflict as equally devastating economically to Ukraine and Russia, as well as world-wide by drastically curtailing these countries' global sea-shipments of grains and fertilizers once Moscow blockaded Ukrainian ports and Odessa, sparking world food shortages to 276 million people across Asia, Africa and Latin America.¹ Meanwhile, by late-June to early-July 2022 the West consolidated its unified opposition to Russia's continuing bloody invasion and atrocities on civilians in five back-to-back Summits (Ukraine Defense Contact Group, E.U., G-7, NATO and G-20) seeking with difficulty to further isolate Russia and China on the international stage:

1. the 15 June 2022 U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting in Brussel, Belgium, of over 45 Allies and Partners (including NATO and E.U.) cooperates in sending massive military aid to Ukraine, of which the U.S.A. has provided from August 2021 to June 2022 over \$7.3 billion in security assistance and \$4.26 billions via the Presidential Drawdown Authority (immediate transfer of *matériel* from U.S. stocks "to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders and improve interoperability with NATO");
2. the E.U. 24 June 2022 Summit formalized new long-term member applications of Ukraine and Moldova along with slow-moving West Balkan Aspirants ("ready" but stalled Albania and North Macedonia, followed later by Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia);²
3. both back-to-back G-7 and NATO (24-26 and 29-30 June 2022 respectively) Summits reassessed publicly that Putin's long-term strategy had slowly shifted from its initial disastrous rapid "Special Military Operations" of February-March 2022 (failing to kill Ukraine's leader Volodymyr Zelenski and decapitate his government, or quickly conquer the capital Kiev plus all of East Ukraine up to the Dniepr River and southern coastline to reach Odessa and Russian-held Transnistria enclave bordering Moldova) to a new ponderous attrition strategy of relentlessly grinding her into collapse by destroying with overwhelming artillery-fire one city at the time, forcing Ukrainian defenses into very slow orderly fighting withdrawals, deporting away their populations as refugees, blockading Odessa and stopping most Ukrainian global grains sea-shipping, while hoping "combat fatigue" or the long Russian Winter would finally slacken Western aid and arms to Kiev;
4. NATO's Madrid Summit officially repealed its second Post-Cold War Strategic Concept of 2010 (welcoming Russia as a "Real Strategic Partner" with "peace in the Euro-Atlantic area... and threat of a conventional attack on NATO territory low") with a new 2022 Strategic Concept confirming that since Moscow's 2014 and 2022 twin unprovoked invasions of Ukraine now "Russia poses the most

¹ "World Bank Group & Ukraine" in *World Bank* (7 June 2022); "Secretary-General Warns of Unprecedented Global Hunger Crisis with 276 Millions Facing Food Insecurity, Calling for Export Recovery, Debt Relief" in *United Nations Press Release* (24 June 2022).

² Jim Garamone, "Austin Convenes Meeting of Contact Group at 'Pivotal Moment' for Ukraine" in *DoD News* (15 June 2022): <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3063730/austin-convenes-contact-group-at-pivotal-moment-for-ukraine/>; Quote from Congressional Research Service, "Overview of U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine" in *USNI News* (7 June 2022): <https://news.usni.org/2022/06/07/overview-of-u-s-security-assistance-to-ukraine> ; "Statement of the Euro Summit, 24 June 2022--Consilium" in *European Union* (24 June 2022): <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/statement-of-the-euro-summit-24-june-2022/>

significant and direct threat to our security, values and rules-based international order” in a new Cold War era of “Strategic Competition”, forcing NATO to massively increase its High-Readiness NATO Response Force (NRF) from 13,000 to 40,000-men (taken after the 2014 Crimea-East Ukraine Crises) to now a new Allied Reaction Force (ARF) of 300,000-men by 2023 with permanent forces deployed to the entire new continuous “Eastern Flank” (Baltics, Scandinavia, East Europe and Balkans, plus 10,000 permanent U.S. troops with an Army HQs in Poland and Romania, along continuing rotational U.S.-British troops in the Baltics). This was further strengthened by the fastest NATO Enlargement in 2022-23 to Partners Finland and Sweden (after Turkey lifted its temporary objections) who suddenly reversed decades of pro-West neutral balance towards Russia after her bloody invasion of Ukraine openly threatened their security as well.¹

According to retired Lt.-General “Ben” Hodges III (DSO), ex-Commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, NATO’s June 2022 Madrid Summit and new Security Concept are “the direct result of a colossal strategic mistake by Vladimir Putin, whose unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has reminded all of Europe that security and stability are not to be taken for granted”, while several Russian attempts to scare the West by instrumentally threatening nuclear war against Alliance interference in Ukraine has led NATO to respond officially by both advocating open communications to avoid escalation and restating its Art.V Collective Alliance Defense commitment and resolve to impose “unacceptable” costs on any adversary launching a nuclear attack. Thus, with Russian forces stretched extremely thin by this slow Pyrrhic attrition war and Kremlin propaganda fantasies about Ukraine, NATO and E.U. “destabilizing” Russia as the excuse for this invasion (still purported as a limited “military operation”), it is clear that it was Russia’s constant denials until her bloody invasion of Ukraine that stampeded Scandinavians into joining NATO as new Allies, while prompting also all post-1999 Baltic, East European and Balkan Allies to demand permanent NATO force-deployments as additional security guarantees to protect them from future Russian threats (U.S.-NATO troops in Baltics, Poland and Romania, plus a future NATO naval base to be built in Albania, and Russian diplomatic spies expelled from NATO HQs in December 2020 and from Bulgaria in June 2022).

With Western long-term resolve unabated in massively supporting Ukraine (arms, ammunition, air-defense systems and billions of aid) and by NATO and E.U. continuing enlargements to any qualified Aspirant, despite Russia’s attempted vetoes, Putin has been cornered into vainly threatening Sweden and Finland not to join NATO or expand Atlantic defenses northbound along this new long non-militarized Arctic front, otherwise Moscow would respond “symmetrically” by building-up Russian Baltic defenses (which he had depleted with his Ukrainian invasion), by redeploying theater nuclear weapons to the isolated Kaliningrad *Oblast’* (already a well-documented Russian violation of East-West arms-control deals since 2010s, which pushed President Trump to withdraw from all bilateral accords in 2018), unprecedentedly deploying Russian air and land-cruise missiles into Belarus’ and finally openly warning of the inevitable union of Russia and Belarus’ to jointly threaten Ukraine and Baltics!²

¹ Both quotes by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Alexandra Brzozowski, “NATO to Massively Increase High-Readiness Forces to 300,000” in *Euractiv* (27 June 2022): <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/nato-to-massively-increase-high-readiness-forces-to-300000/> ; “G-7 Leaders’ Summit 2022” in *IISD/SDG Knowledge Hub* (26-28 June 2022): <https://sdg.iisd.org/events/g7-leaders-summit-2022/> ; “Fact-Sheet: The NATO 2022 Madrid Summit” in *White House* (Washington, D.C.: 29 June 2022): <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/29/fact-sheet-the-2022-nato-summit-in-madrid/>; *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* (Brussel: NATO, 28 June 2022): <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>; D. Sabbagh, “Turkey Lifts Objections to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO Bids” *idem*; Alexander Smith, “NATO invites Finland, Sweden to Join as Alliance Eyes ‘Direct Threat’ from Putin” in *NBC News* (29 June 2022): <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nato-invites-finland-sweden-join-putin-threat-ukraine-biden-troops-rcna35851> ; Humeyra Pamuk, “Blinken to Seek G-20 Pressure on Russia to Open Sea-Lanes and Warn China on Ukraine” in *Reuters/APAC* (5 July 2022).

² Quote by retired Lt.-General “Ben” Hodges III (DSO), ex-commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe in A. Smith, “NATO invites Finland, Sweden to Join as Alliance Eyes ‘Direct Threat’ from Putin”, *idem*; *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*, *idem*; Leo Sands & Ben Tobias, “Russia Invasion: Putin Still Wants to Take Most of Ukraine–U.S.” in *BBC News* (30 June 2022): <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61990495> ; Andrew Roth, “Putin Issues Fresh Warning to Finland and Sweden on Installing NATO Infrastructure” in *The Guardian* (29 June 2022): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/29/russia-condemns-nato-invitation-finland-sweden?CMP=oth_b-aplnews_d-1

After tough slow rearguard fights by Ukrainian forces, the continuous infusion of massive U.S./NATO/E.U./Western military-financial aid and unprecedented sanctions in February-December 2022 finally stalled and then significantly-reversed Russia's invasion in sequential severe reversals and humiliating retreats (Kiev in March 2022, north Ukraine in April, Kharkiv in April-September, the strategic access to Odessa in June and Kherson in August-November). Still, military observers deem illusionary the hopes of Kiev, Washington and Brussel to force Moscow into a humiliating peace, given Putin's brutal dictatorial hold in Russia (quashing domestic oppositions and anti-war demonstrations, while mysteriously scores of oligarchs whose past loyal support of the régime had turned into public criticism were "suicided") and 5 factors prompting his relentless strikes:

1. Putin (like Stalin in World War II) remains totally committed to ensure his own political survival, with no moral or domestic political qualms about sacrificing any extreme amount of Russian troops, *matériel* and resources to win at all costs, despite international isolation, shrinking geo-strategic goals and military strategy against Ukraine. By relentlessly relying on devastating massive artillery barrages and missiles to obliterate Ukrainian defenses and regional Russo-Ukrainian civilian urban areas through a bloody "escalation dominance" attrition offensive in the obsolete industrial-mineral Donbas (steel, iron, coal), Putin feels he has finally weathered the stalled invasion by seizing almost 20% of Ukraine (from Crimea annexed in 2014 to the vast "Azov land-corridor" in East and South Ukraine), by bombing most infrastructures and ports (including Odessa) to strangle Ukraine's economy and viability as a state (including vital global grains sea-exports to the Third World), and cut Russian energy exports to Europe to punish her anti-Russian sanctions, all the while relying on China and strict domestic financial controls to insulate most of the Russian economy from punishing Western sanctions. Fully imposing at home strict censorship, political repression and dictatorial propaganda over Russia's domestic arena against all criticism and economic woes, Putin could cut his foreign losses and easily declare "victory" to his blinded public by just annexing the entire Donbas and South Ukraine (as for Crimea in 2014). Instead, Putin is now reassured that Russia has not collapsed economically and can push for more strategic land grabs and missile strikes on Ukrainian defenses and economic assets before Autumn muds and Winter stop new offensives.
2. Putin discounts the long-term domestic degradation of the Russian economy wrought by punishing Western sanctions against Russia after her Ukrainian invasion, wrongly believing that those Western sanctions are backfiring and causing the economic inflation and recession now spreading within Western economies (especially U.S.A., Great Britain and Germany) with sky-high oil, gas and food prices (paradoxically echoing Biden's false domestic political blame-game that Putin's war has jacked-up global energy prices, instead of Biden's failed U.S. rigid ecology-driven energy restrictions and ultra-inflationary "COVID-19 government rescue" spendings).
- 3/4. With Russia's oil/gas exports and earnings booming globally, her national economy now semi-insulated and dependent on China's finance-trade links, Putin now believes he can continue to prioritize financing his invasion, while "waiting-out" Western "fatigue" and banking on "Germany's economy... potential collapse, possibly dragging down the rest of Europe with it..." as also Great Britain plunges into an unexpected politico-economic crisis over the collapse of Premier Boris Johnson's government and the U.S. too falls into recession over its failed inflationary domestic and energy policies. Putin also plans on the rigors of Winter to cut drastically Russian oil/gas exports to Europe so as to further enhance future Western "fatigue" and domestic contrasts by "cutting off gas to coerce European leaders to abandon their support of Ukraine is a standard tool in Putin's playbook". Parallel to this, Moscow was feared to also escalate cyberattacks against the U.S. and Europe in retaliation for the sanctions and foment internal disorder within Western democracies, while seeking to exploit politically somehow the U.S. Mid-Term elections in November 2022 (which is predicted to dramatically trunch the ruling Democratic Party of President Biden, turning him into a weaker "lame-duck" leader until the 2024 Presidential Elections, as U.S. global policies fizzle out).

5. “The conflict in Ukraine [remains] an existential issue for Russia... as a ‘red line’ for NATO expansion, because Russia ... views the country as part of its strategic security perimeter”, but this was dramatically curtailed by NATO’s fast 2022 Enlargement to Sweden and Finland, plus the E.U.’s 2022 offers of future integration also for the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Further, Putin feared since the 2000s “Colour Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine that U.S./Western policies to encourage the democratization of the “Near Abroad” all the way to Asia, plus other dictatorial states (Afghanistan, Iran, Egypt, Iran) was a long-term bipartisan U.S. and European policy to prevent “a single hostile power [Russia] from dominating the Eurasian landmass.” Thus, any clear Russian defeat would politically undermine Putin’s hold on power and pan-Slavic national-populist strategic vision, while aggravating rumours on his ill-health and a ultimately a potential destabilizing succession crisis. Russia’s failed invasion strategy and follow-up protracted attrition war both seek to destroy Ukraine and prevent her from joining NATO and E.U. could still be somehow attained by default by Moscow, because any eventual armistice or peace talks would be immediately swallowed by another “frozen conflict” (like the 2014-21 one in the Donbas in full violation of the de-conflict 2014 Minsk Accords with Russia, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and Partnership, and 1997 NATO-Ukraine Commission), which conveniently run against both organizations’ key membership requirements of no territorial disputes and no conflicts.¹

In the end, as Ukraine fights on to survive Russia’s invasion into 2023, the united Western U.S./NATO/E.U./G-7 politico-military front and economic sanctions against Moscow still remains vulnerable to the domestic impact of a parallel global economic slow-down, inflation and slow impact of sanctions on Russia. Further, any Western “fatigue” slippage would only embolden Putin’s current destabilization strategy “at all costs” both against Ukraine and later the Balkans (NATO’s most vulnerable back-yard and economically-weaker new member-states). Likewise, Putin’s occasional calls for peace talks only mask his plans to wait-out his opponents throughout Winter to strengthen Russian stranglehold on European oil/gas supplies mostly stopped (as the U.S. struggles to produce at home and export more energy, due to Biden’s ideological anti-energy and pro-environmental policies that reversed national energy independence attained by his predecessor Trump), while rebuilding combat offensive forces for renewed 2023 attacks to seize the remaining Donbas hastily annexed to Russia together with the “Azov land-corridor” to Crimea.

Russia’s diminished international status and massive losses of troops, *matériel* and treasure has not fully eliminated her influence in Europe and only weakened it in the corruption-plagued Balkans or NATO’s weakest Ally Turkey under the mercurial President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, nor has it stopped Putin’s total drive to conquer at any cost through the bloodiest attrition war Ukraine’s Donbas and southern regions connecting her to Crimea. Legendary U.S. Secretary of State and Nobel Henry Kissinger in his 7 July 2022 interview on *FOX News* on his latest book, *Leadership: Six Studies in Strategy*, also predicted that the World War I attrition-style slog of the 2022 Russian invasion and conquest of 20% of Ukraine, followed by limited Ukrainian counter-offensives, will peak by August in a renewed all-out bilateral clash once each side is fully rearmed and Moscow rushes to the front in Winter barely trained new reserve forces armed only with obsolete tanks and APCs out of long-term storage against entrenched fierce Ukrainian defenses and slow tactical withdrawals. Yet Kissinger, like NATO’s ex-SACEUR Commander Wesley Clark and U.S. Lt.-General Mark Hertling are split on which side might ultimately win in a protracted long war into 2023, while agreeing that the diplomatic conundrum is complicated by Putin’s lack of any serious armistice or peace talks, by the international lack of trust over Russia’s repeatedly broken past security guarantees, and by Ukraine’s rejection of any diplomatic ratification of the military loss of so much of her land. All this will force NATO to

¹ Rebekah Koffler, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: 5 Reasons Why Putin Won’t Stop” in *FOX News* (5 July 2022): <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/russias-war-ukraine-5-reasons-putin-wont-stop> ; Henry Nicholls, “Boris Johnson Resigns as British Prime Minister” in *Reuters* (7 July 2022): <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/boris-johnson-resigns-british-pm-2022-07-07/>

support Ukraine to the bitter end, even at the risk of rising escalation with Russia either if Ukraine succeeds in reconquering large parts of her lost lands, or if Russia eventually defeats Ukraine by seizing even major swaths of land and propagandistically portrays the U.S./NATO as impotent to prevent it.¹

Like for Putin whose survival as a dictator ultimately rests on his self-imposed test to conquer Ukraine, this same Russo-Ukraine conflict is also an existential challenge for the TransAtlantic Alliance and E.U. committed to their ideals of European peace, trade and democracy, not imperialist wars. Indeed, Putin's long-term neo-imperialist plans have finally been unmasked in 2021-22 as a resurgent Power seeking to conquer, or at least thoroughly destroy a rump-Ukraine, as a prelude for Russia's "virtually annexation" of most old ex-Soviet "Near Abroad" states (Belarus', Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Transnistria), despite losing influence over some (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), while others openly seeking E.U.-NATO protection (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). Moscow will also strive to mask her declining economico-military strength (compared to the old USSR) under the cover of higher global oil prices and military alliances with Islamic Iran, Syria and especially an economically-superior China. Yet, for all his clever geo-strategic and geo-economic manoeuvres, Putin's brief battlefield victories in Ukraine (February-March 2022: Eastern Donbas, "Azov land-corridor", Zaporizhzhia region, Kherson region, Kharkiv region, Kiev encirclement) were slow, incomplete and left over-extended the severely unprepared Russian armed forces, already lulled into the false propaganda narrative of a short victorious war against neo-Nazi Ukrainian nationalists. Thereafter, mobile Ukrainian offensives Ukraine was able to launch targeted mobile offensives that forced weakened Russian front-lines into rapid vast sequential retreats of stunned troops from the failed encirclement of Kiev in late-March 2022 to liberating Northern Ukraine in April, Kharkiv in April-September and Kherson in August-November. Since June 2022 a weakened Russia also lost her own politico-economic dominance over ex-Soviet Central Asian states in the CSTO and Shanghai-6 who unofficially "reopened" to the West and politically "realigned" towards China as strongest regional "leader" and political buffer against Putin's possible future plans to annex also Russian minorities in Northern Kazakhstan or even all CSTO states and Belarus'.

Russia's humiliating combat reversals and massive losses in armour and personnel have forced Putin to return to the old Russian playbook of relying to its advantage both time and extreme regional Winter conditions to regroup by training 300.000 reserve troops, plus Wagner private mercenaries, stabilize the front, and launch a limited counter-offensive against Soledar and Bakhmut in East Donetsk (symbolically becoming for both sides a new Stalingrad siege), while launching waves of "suicide" drones and missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian areas and power-infrastructure. In retaliation to this anti-population terrorist strikes, the West finally has abandoned its past excessive caution in arms deliveries to Ukraine by adding also since January 2023 vital Armoured Personnel Carriers (Germany, France, USA, Great Britain) and heavy-tanks (Poland, Great Britain and USA) to train Ukrainians for combined armour offensives to possibly defeat entrenched Russian defensive lines and artillery barrages, plus their future massive-waves counter-offensives elsewhere: "[Russia is] preparing for new battles, new offensive operations, not for talks. Nothing speaks in favor of Russia being ready to talk," as stressed in January 2023 by Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. And this view is echoed also the same day in the West by NATO's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg: "There is no indication that President Putin has changed the overall aim of his brutal war against Ukraine. So we need to be prepared for the long haul... We should not underestimate Russia. They are mobilizing more troops, they are working hard to acquire more equipment, more ammunition and they have shown willingness to actually suffer to continue the war."²

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Leadership: Six Studies in Strategy* (New York: Penguin, July 2022); Natasha Turak, "Russia is Bringing More Reserve Forces Close to Ukraine" in *CNBC News* (9 July 2022); "Two Generals Share Different Views on State of War in Ukraine: Wesley Clark vs. Mark Hertling" in *CNN* (8 July 2022): <https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/07/08/ukraine-military-perspective-gen-wesley-clark-lt-gen-mark-hertling-intv-sciutto-nram.cnn>; Yaroslav Trofimov, "The War in Ukraine Will Be Long. Is the West Ready?" in *Wall Street Journal* (13 January 2023): <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-long-west-ready-11673571215>

² Claire Parker, "How Western Combat Vehicles Bound for Ukraine Could Change the War" in *Washington Post* (15 January 2023): <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/13/what-are-bradleys-other-western-combat-vehicles-bound-ukraine/>; Y.

Equally ominous remains Russia's dictatorial neo-imperialist *compadre* China, who although taken aback by Putin's embarrassing failure to quickly conquer Ukraine and the extremely costly military-economic tolls against the Kremlin, has not been deterred from continuing to quietly support Moscow economically (yet short of a full military alliance, while expanding in exchange Chinese financial control of more Russian and "Near Abroad" key assets, if not possibly economically supplanting Russia in the Balkans as well), while Xi constantly recalculates the politico-economico-military risks/costs/benefits of China's strategic drive to supplant the U.S.A. and E.U. as the world premier industrial Power, dominate regional and global resources through her neo-colonial "Belt and Road" Initiative's massive investments, and her own frequently touted possible future invasion to finally annex "rebel" independentist Taiwan. Thus, as the Sino-Russian post-2014 economico-politico-military alignment has reached by January 2022 the level of an almost new anti-Western Bloc, Russia and China propagandistically extolled at the mid-2022 G-20 Summit their stronger "Strategic Resolve" against a temporally unified West seeking to contain Putin's slow invasion of Ukraine (despite such setbacks dangerously embarrassing Xi's own power-play calculations on the advantages/costs of backing Russia as diversion to split the West before any Chinese future invasion of Taiwan).¹

Indeed, this nascent Sino-Russian post-2014 economico-politico-military Bloc has finally alarmed NATO into establishing for the first time an unprecedented official security coordination extended also to Asia/Pacific area with her Strategic Partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) against "the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China [that] runs counter to NATO values and interests", plus their dictatorial hegemonic regional threats (South China Sea and Taiwan) now labelled as a "systemic challenge" (but not yet as open "adversary" given Beijing's global trade interconnections compared to Moscow's exclusive major global energy impact and threat to cut-off by Summer 2022 all her oil/gas exports to energy-vulnerable Europe to punish the E.U. and NATO for sanctioning Russia over the Ukraine War). Thus, at the very contentious early-July 2022 G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, the U.S. pressured again those reluctant regional sub-Powers (India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey) or pro-Russian supporters (South Africa, Argentina) to join the West to pressure Russia's blockade of Ukraine's ports with vital grains and fertilizer sea-shipments that has provoked sudden global food shortages and anger. Secretary of State Tony Blinken's efforts likely swayed only Western-leaning Saudi Arabia and Brazil, given many other countries desire to remain officially uninvolved, while his parallel efforts with China to keep open communications and warn her not to violate sanctions or help Russia's invasion with arms remain inconclusive. But America has also publicly and strongly driven home to both Russia and now China how their destabilizing mutually-reinforcing neo-imperialist power-plays in Middle East/Ukraine and South China Sea/Taiwan have boomeranged at the 2022 NATO and G-20 Summits with a stronger united global Western front and novel "dual containment" strategy from the now linked TransAtlantic to Indo-Pacific arenas through the unprecedented diplomatic presence at both summits of NATO's key Global Strategic Partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand), whose concerns over China's aggressiveness and a Sino-Russian Bloc have openly pushed these Western countries and public opinions to strengthen in 2022 their informal regional security and democratic cooperation with NATO, the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ("QUAD": U.S.A.-Australia-Japan-India condemned by China as an "Asian NATO") and 2021 AUKUS Pact (Australia-Great Britain-U.S.A. where the unfortunate diplomatic side-lining of France and initial confrontation with the E.U. turned into support once most E.U. states retorted that Europe's alliance with the U.S. and NATO was a vital counter-weight against the twin threat of Russia and China), while similarly the Middle East/Gulf 2022 July Summit in Saudi Arabia saw the crowning of both U.S. Presidents' Trump and Biden efforts since 2017 to forge a pro-Western nascent regional military alliance (an "Arab NATO") uniting Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council with Israel (the latter ones already also

Trofimov, "War in Ukraine Will Be Long. Is West Ready?", idem; "Two Generals Share Different Views on War in Ukraine". idem; Paul Sonne & Isabelle Khurshudyan, "Bloody Bakhmut Siege Poses Risks for Ukraine" in *Washington Post* (15 January 2023).

¹ "U.S. Blinken Challenged G-20 to Hold Russia Accountable—Senior U.S. Official" in *Reuters* (8 July 2022); Timothy Nerozzi, "Chinese Diplomat Says 'Reunification' with Taiwan Near, Cites China's 'Growing Comprehensive Strength'" in *FOX News* (7 July 2022).

members of NATO's Gulf and Mediterranean Partnerships since early-2000s) against Islamic Iran's nuclear plans and devastated Syria as junior members of such unofficial Sino-Russian military-economic Bloc.¹

Nevertheless, Putin and Xi continue to agree that they must quickly exploit their perceived temporary global politico-economic advantage to secure most of their regional strategic military aims as possible prior to the 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections or within 5 years, and this has been the likely explanation for Putin's miscalculation of the best timing to invade and seize Ukraine (after the domestic political defeat of strong and unpredictable Trump), to then consolidate into a new Russo-Slavic "union" Moscow's strong controls over Belarus', Kazakhstan and ex-Soviet Central Asia. After the departure from domestic politics of the strong, wily and unpredictable President Trump who had cornered China with a trade-war and Russia with major U.S./NATO forces in East Europe and Baltics, plus strikes in Syria and Iraq against both *ISIL* terrorists and Russo-Iranian mercenaries whenever they directly threatened U.S. interests, since 2021 Putin and Xi have sought to fully exploit a now clearly hostile, but temporally in decline American SuperPower under President Biden who had blindly pushed his country into stagflation (mix stagnation and inflation) by the incompetent domestic policies of a senile President haunted by family scandals and potential foreign compromises, protected by his feckless uncompromising government dominated by an ideological cabal of Leftist Democratic Party *apparatchiki* struggling to hold on to a paper-thin evanescent majority within a sharply-split dual partisan national political scene, already teetering since late-2021 towards a forecasted overwhelming victories in November 2022 and 2024 against an extremely unpopular President Biden since his disastrous August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan and botched COVID-19 response tanking his then job approval rating from 56% down to 33/30% by July 2022 (worse than Trump's ratings after his incendiary "Stop the Steal!" unproven claims of elections fraud against Biden's 2020 victory sparked the 6 January 2021 riots storming Capitol Hill by thousands of his enraged supporters). At the same time, an equally ideologically-hostile arch-conservative Republican opposition seeks by the November 2024 elections to win control of Congress and the Presidency, to then reverse both the Democrats' ultra-partisan "6 January Insurrection" House inquest (hopelessly seeking in future elections to tar all Republicans as just Trump accomplices) and their Leftist extreme socio-economic policies, while promoting again ex-President Trump's (with or without his very controversial leadership in the 2024 Presidential Elections) "American First" unilateralist fast global economico-techno-military-energy resurgence.

Thus, as Dean Andrew Michta of the Marshall Center for European Studies in Germany warns, such anti-Western imperialist calculus of Russia and China is also driven by fears of their own countries' near-future decline vs. faster rising U.S. and Allies power-capabilities seeking to quickly repurpose Western national industrial cores by reducing energy vulnerability from Russia and Globalization supply-chain dependence from China (policies largely shared by both Trump and Biden). Three factors dominate Sino-Russian imperialist decision-making:

1. the U.S. military has focused for 20 years on peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, anti-terrorism and nation-building missions, while cutting forces and neglecting the hard edge of inter-services large-scale armour/air/sea total warfare against new global territorial threats (Islamic Iran, Russia, China), but Putin and Xi are painfully aware that the U.S. Modernization Strategy initiated in 2019 under Trump will quickly mobilize

¹ Elizabeth Economy, "Xi Jinping's New World Order: Can China Remake the International System?" in *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2022): <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-09/xi-jinpings-new-world-order>; "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" in *Wikipedia*: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue; "AUKUS" in *Wikipedia*: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS>; M. Beckley & H. Brands, "Return of *Pax Americana*? Putin's War is Fortifying the Democratic Alliance" idem; Michael Beckley, "Enemies of My Enemy: How Fear of China Is Forging a New World Order" in *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2022): <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy>; Maria Silow, "Asia-Pacific Leaders at NATO Summit a Sign of Strategic Shift Amid Russia, China Threats" in *South China Morning Post* (5 July 2022): <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3184082/asia-pacific-leaders-nato-summit-sign-strategic-shift-amid>; Jevans Nyabiage, "Should NATO be worried about China and Russia's influence in Africa?" in *South China Morning Post* (5 July 2022): <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3184769/should-nato-be-worried-about-china-and-russias-influence>; "Israel's Unexpected Military Alliance in the Gulf" in *The Economist* (30 June 2022): <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/06/30/israels-unexpected-military-alliance-in-the-gulf>; "Ukraine Prepares for Fresh Russian Assaults, West Braces for Worsening Energy Crisis" in *Reuters* (12 July 2022).

superior U.S. R&D in weapons technology and full transformation of its military into a global strike-force by 2030s, fast reducing the perceived Sino-Russian current temporary superiority (this analysis before the near-collapse of the Russian forces' combat capabilities in Ukraine, still considers the Chinese drive to expand their military in few more years to compensate and learn from Russia's failures);

2. Russia and China both face massive internal societal pressures due to fast-declining populations and lower birth-rates: Russia's population was 175 millions in 1990s after the USSR's collapse, but shrunk by 2020 to 146 millions and will further fall to 120 millions in 2050; China has peaked at 1.4 billions in 2022 reaching "demographic parity" with rival and semi-hostile India, and will lose 6 more millions by 2025. This is already affecting their respective military strengths, industrial output and socio-economic nets for fast aging populations also impacted by undisclosed massive COVID-19 deaths (Russia and China) and related economic shut-downs (China), which have the potential to destabilize both régimes and have likely contributed to both Powers' recent domestic political retrenchments into almost full-blown dictatorships to repress all dissent;

3. Russia and China have brazenly sought to exploit growing Western societal crises in democratic Europe and America (COVID-19; mass illegal migrations and drugs via Mexico into the USA, and via North Africa into Europe), the recent politico-cultural-economic Leftist/Progressist movements against both the authority of the state (law and order issues) and as a semi-anarchical distrust in all governing institutions. The confluence of these Western societal crises and rising inflation put major strains on national cohesion and the will to repress political riots and rampant crime, especially undermining America's international authority and prestige (likely only after the 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections will a degree of traditionalist normalcy reemerge by delegitimizing and punishing the ideological misdeeds of the previous administration). Both Powers (USA in the early-Cold War; Russia since the 2010s) have also striven with relatively little dividends to influence U.S. and European elections with illegal funds (Ukraine, France), economic and political espionage (in Europe and USA), selected cyberattacks (in Europe), corruption of selected politicians and academic institutions (in Europe and USA), selected assassinations of Russian opponents abroad.¹

Such imminent global power-shifts could be possibly countered by any sudden U.S. reversal of its slow domestic and strategic decline back into full SuperPower strength with related international politico-economic-military relevance by 2024-30, which would then quickly reverse the Sino-Russian long-term destabilizing neo-imperialist strategy aimed at shattering the West's post-1945 old peaceful Liberal Global and Free-Trade Order. The outcome would be a faster stronger strategico-economic confrontation for dominance or containment of these old/revamped Sino-Russian dictatorial adversaries in a new "Global Strategic Confrontations" era (2021-current), where the politico-security fate of Ukraine, Balkans, "Near Abroad" and ultimately also Europe are once again shockingly back into play since 2021-23, yet collectively reduced to just vital side-shows to the much bigger geostrategic game: the ambitious limitless rise of a new non-ideological neo-imperial Bloc of dictatorial personalist régimes (Putin's ex-Communist Slavic-Nationalist Russia and Xi's neo-Communist klepto-Capitalist China with a *côtérie* of semi-autonomous unstable new satellites: Islamic Iran, devastated dictatorial Syria, dictatorial Burma, ambiguous Pakistan and unpredictable Communist North Korea) seeking to break the old U.S.-dominated Western Liberal Global Order into new rival exclusive regional areas of influence, all then left vulnerable to China's neo-colonialist "Belt and Road" trade investments (Asia, Africa, Latin America, Greater Middle East), buttressed by Russian energy relevance (Asia, Europe) and arms-sales to the Third World.

¹ Andrew Michta, "Russia's and China's Dangerous Decline" in *Wall Street Journal* (14 December 2021); Miranda Devine, *LapTop from Hell: Hunter Biden, Big Tech and the Dirty Secrets the President Tried to Hide* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021); Peter Schweizer, *Profiles of Corruption: Abuse of Power by America's Progressive Elite* (New York: Harper & Collins, 2020); Mollie Hemingway, *Rigged: How the Media, Big Tech and the Democrats Seized Our Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publ., 2021); Bob Woodward, *Fear* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021); Hall Gardner, *World War Trump* (New York: Prometheus, 2018); German Lopes, "Biden's Unpopularity" in *New York Times* (6 May 2022): <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/briefing/ioe-biden-approval-rating-covid.html>; Aaron Blake, "How Bad Things are for Biden?" in *Washington Post* (9 June 2022): <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/09/biden-polling-lack-base/>; David Leonhardt, "Dueling Weaknesses: First Polls of 2022 Mid-Term Cycle" in *New York Times* (11 July 2022): <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/11/briefing/midterms-poll-president-biden-rating.html/>

Sadly, it is too late now for any well-intentioned and inspired world leader to step into the old shoes of Kissinger's legendary *Realpolitik* diplomacy to defuse any rising new Cold War between the Sino-Russo-Iranian Bloc vs. the West (an option long advocated from France by former-Chair Hall Gardner of the American University of Paris in his meticulous geo-strategy books, like his latest 2022 *Towards an Alternative TransAtlantic Strategy*), given the clear unwillingness of Putin and Xi to either honestly negotiate or respect any old treaties freely agreed once they clash with their own geo-strategic imperialist goals. Indeed, the February 2022 unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine (purportedly to protect and annex the Russian-speaking Donbas) has been a wake-up call for the West and the world equivalent to the end of "Appeasement" after Nazi Germany's March 1939 violation of the internationally-agreed fateful 1938 Munich Accord (which had allowed her to peacefully annex the German-speaking Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia) to avoid World War II: instead the end of "Appeasement" led six-months later to a fast-rearming but desperately divided West to enter into World War II against a stronger Nazi Germany once it invaded Poland in September 1939 with the complicity of the Communist USSR (August 1939 Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact as the infamous brief Nazi-Soviet alignment of convenience to jointly partition Poland and East Europe). In such dangerously unpredictable new "Global Strategic Confrontations" era, how closely will the U.S./NATO/E.U./West be able to tip-toe around Professor Graham Allison's reexamined geo-strategic "Thucydides' Trap", that Putin's and Xi's imperialist personalist régimes and Sino-Russo-Iranian-Syrian Bloc have provoked? To most observers this remains just a guess of time, Power rebalancing, diplomacy, deterrence, brush-wars and luck!¹

In the end, any global stabilizing rebalancing is possible only with the U.S.-led TransAtlantic Alliance, now closely allied with the E.U., which for 75 years has maintained peace and security in Europe, uniting different ethnic and religious people in peace and under common democratic values. Historically a majority of scholars and policy-makers have focused on external threats to NATO, previously underestimating internal threats to NATO and significant long-term impact of demographic factors that are gradually changing the economic, socio-political and security foundation of Europe's NATO member-states. NATO has not only survived the end of the Cold War, the integration of ex-enemies as new Partners and Allies, the Islamic terrorist attacks on Western populations since the 2001 "9/11" Attacks, the 2011 withdrawal from Iraqi peacekeeping, the 2021 withdrawal from Afghan peacekeeping, but also the equally problematic dearth since 2009 of a long-term unifying U.S. strategic vision. Yet, despite both internal and external crises since its establishment, NATO has prevailed over all external and internal threats, due to its adaptability to all these new socio-political and security challenges, including unexpected attacks like "9/11" in 2001 and 2022-23 botched Russian invasion of Ukraine. Thus, although the early-21st Century remains marred by the U.N.'s renewed security irrelevance and a global vacuum of Realist statesmen (according to centenarian Kissinger), it is only the U.S.-led TransAtlantic Alliance that will continue also in the future during this dangerous new "Global Strategic Confrontations" era (2020-now) to be the most significant security organization guaranteeing peace for Allies and Partners, both regionally in Europe against renewed Russian threats, and globally against its equally dangerous imperialist partner China.²

¹ M. Beckley & H. Brands, "Return of Pax Americana? Putin's War is Fortifying the Democratic Alliance" idem; H. Pamuk, "Blinken Seek G-20 Pressure on Russia to Open Sea-lanes & Warn China on Ukraine", idem; "U.S. Blinken Challenged G-20 to Hold Russia Accountable", idem; A. Brzozowski, "NATO to Massively Increase High-Readiness Forces to 300,000", idem; A. Smith, "NATO invites Finland, Sweden to Join as Alliance Eyes 'Direct Threat' from Putin", idem; A. Roth, "Putin Issues Fresh Warning to Finland & Sweden", idem; L. Sands & B. Tobias, "Russia Invasion: Putin Still Wants to Take Most of Ukraine", idem; Reuters, "China, Russia Ties Show 'Strong Resilience' & 'Strategic Resolve'—Wang Yi" in *Reuters* (7 July 2022); T. Nerozzi, "Chinese Diplomat Says 'Reunification' with Taiwan Near", idem; H. Kissinger, *Leadership: Six Studies in Strategy*, idem; Hall Gardner, *Crimea, Global Rivalry & the Vengeance of History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Hall Gardner, *Towards an Alternative TransAtlantic Strategy* (Paris: Ginkgo Éditeur, 2022); John Keegan, *The Second World War* (New York: Viking, 1989), p.10-49; Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America & China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

² Walter Russel Mead, "Kissinger Sees a Global Leadership Vacuum" in *Wall Street Journal* (26 December 2022); <https://www.wsj.com/articles/kissinger-sees-a-global-leadership-vacuum-world-order-peace-power-civilization-universities-depth-11671990402>; M.O. Slobodchikoff, G.D. Davis & B. Stewart, eds., *Challenge to NATO: Global Security & Atlantic Alliance*, idem, Chps. VI-IX.

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License and Registration Please: Florida Sheriffs' Traffic Stop Policy

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ABSTRACT: Traffic stops are the most common way in which a person comes in contact with the Police, yet these interactions are often riddled with uncertainty both on behalf of citizens and Police. During a stop, it is typically assumed that the Police officer will approach the vehicle. However, only in Alachua County, Florida, the citizen is expected to exit their vehicle and approach the Sheriff patrol car when stopped. This reduces the uncertainty in the traffic confrontation by removing the citizen from their comfort zone and offering Police a better line of vision. However, at the same time this limits the ability of Police to conduct pretext stops that result in the uncovering of illicit materials. We compile a unique data set containing the traffic stop procedures of every county in Florida and examine their effect on citations, drug arrests and weapons arrests, finding that encounters with reduced uncertainty are more likely to result in traffic citations.

Introduction

On 4 September 2014, just weeks after Michael Brown was killed by a White Police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, a White South Carolina State Trooper (Sean Groubert) shot Levar Jones, a Black male, during a traffic stop. From the dash cam, Groubert can be heard requesting to see Jones' license. Jones checks his pocket and then reaches into his vehicle. Groubert then fires multiple shots at Jones and striking him. Groubert can be heard saying "get out of the car" and "get on the ground" on multiple occasions. Jones places his hands in the air and tells Groubert, "I just got my license, you said get my license, what did I do?" Jones was stopped for a seatbelt violation (CNN, 2014).

In Evansville, Indiana, in 2019 body camera footage portrays a Police officer pleading with a drunken motorist to stop reaching below his seat: "Whoa, whoa, whoa, let me see your hands!" When the man did not comply, Officer Mario Reid shot him—then discovered that he had been grabbing a hammer, not a gun (Seibert, 2019).

Each year, Police conduct millions of traffic stops and these traffic stops are the most common way in which a person comes in contact with the Police (Durose et al., 2007; Zhongming & Wei, 2021). Often there is confusion as to what a person should do during a traffic stop; hands on the steering wheel; turn the interior light on; get license and registration out; etc. Citizens are not informed until after the traffic stop is initiated and contact has been made with a law enforcement officer, of how they are expected to behave during the stop. This is complicated by the fact that each state (and at times even different county) handles traffic stops with different rules and norms.

The uncertainty of the procedures involved in the stop and the general pressure of being stopped by law enforcement can be a stressful event. This stress is further heightened for Black drivers, who are more likely to be pulled over and searched than White drivers (Doyle & Nembhard, 2021; Ingram 2007; Schafer et al., 2006). This fear is not unfounded, as over 400 drivers or passengers who did not have a knife or gun were killed by Police in the last five years (Kirkpatrick, Eder, Barker & Tate, 2021).

Uncertainty also grips law enforcement officers who are conducting the stop. Indeed, it is often said that there are not "routine traffic stops" for Police. Instead, stops are often called as "unknown risk stops", due to their uncertainty of danger (Woods, 2018). Contact can unexpectedly and quickly turn into a deadly scenario for Police with drivers potentially hiding illegal drugs, weapons, or having outstanding warrants, one can see how a "routine stop" can rapidly turn into a use of force scenario (Kirkpatrick, Eder, Barker &

Tate, 2021). This fear is grounded in cases in which the Police have been killed in the line of duty. For example, although dated, the Bristow (1963) study found that 32% of Police shootings (35 out of 110) occurred while Police officers were attempting to “investigate, control, or pursue suspects who were in automobiles.” Of those 35 cases, 22% were shot while exiting from their citation, or requesting a record check on the suspect (Bristow, 1963).¹

Research has been conducted to examine the best practices for vehicle stops with regard to data collection, reducing racial profiling, etc. (Tillyer, Ingram & Cherkauskas 2009). However, there has been little focus relating to the policies and procedures of the traffic stops themselves. During a traffic stop, it is typically assumed that the Police officer will approach the vehicle. But just in Alachua County, Florida, it is their policy that citizens must exit their vehicle and approach the front of the Sheriff’s patrol car. Having a citizen step in front of their patrol car reduces the uncertainty in the traffic stop confrontation by removing the citizen from their comfort zone and allowing the Police to have a better line of vision on the encounter. At the same time, it also limits the ability of the Police to conduct pretext stops that result in the uncovering of illicit materials (i.e, drugs and weapons). In this study, we compile a unique data set containing the traffic stop procedures of every county in Florida gathered through public information requests. Then we examine the effect of these policies and procedures on citations, drug arrests and weapons arrests.

Background

There have been different strategies proposed for improving the safety of traffic stops such as:

1. using unarmed civilians to conduct stops (Bliss, 2021);
2. a Police department in Texas only stopping vehicles for major infractions and instead sending text message citations for any minor infractions (Neaves, 2022);
3. relying more heavily on using traffic violation detection systems such as red light cameras and speed detection devices for the issuance of citations (Mohamed, 2019); and
4. implementing the use of a safety pouch in which occupants can place their documents in a pouch and hang it out of the window of their vehicle (Marquis, 2020).

The majority of these strategies require major changes for law enforcement agency policies, have costs associated, or have the potential to place civilians into harm’s way. These approaches do not address the methodology of the traffic stop itself. Citizens and police alike have a great deal of uncertainty during a traffic stop. Citizens are often unsure of what actions they should take and both Police and citizens are concerned with the unknown dangers that could be lurking.

Police curriculum in Florida suggests two approaches that officers can take during a traffic stop. However, each of these methods have Sheriff officers approaching the offender’s vehicle. The nuance between the two is whether they approach the driver or passenger side of the vehicle. A third approach, often deemed the “no approach” tactic, this manner of conducting a traffic stop is also discussed in the Florida law enforcement academy training manual, however it is suggested as a technique to implement as an alternative to the “approach” method in the case that the officer does not feel safe approaching the vehicle (Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission, 2022). This latter strategy likely reduces the uncertainty of traffic stops in having citizens exit their vehicle and come to the front of the officer’s vehicle. With this strategy, occupants are told by law enforcement (via their patrol cars’ loudspeaker) exactly what they are supposed to do. It is announced for individuals to collect documents that Police will need and for (all) occupants of the vehicle to exit and walk to the front of the patrol car. The Alachua County Sheriff’s Office in Florida has been conducting traffic stops in this manner for approximately 30 years and is the only Sheriff’s Office in Florida that has an explicit policy directing Deputy’s to conduct traffic stops in this manner.

¹ Critically, the study did not separate these 35 vehicles stop cases in terms of their underlying basis—the same shortcoming with most available LEOKA statistics. It is unclear how many of the 35 cases involved criminal enforcement stops as opposed to routine traffic stops for traffic violations. Because of the over-inclusive nature of the findings, the Bristow study cannot provide insight into the dangers that routine traffic stops specifically pose to the Police.

Alachua County

In an interview of Alachua County Command Staff, it was mentioned that this style of traffic stop begun with an eye on protecting deputies from being ambushed during traffic stops. Furthermore, the reaction gap is shortened when Police officers stand beside a person's vehicle. A reaction gap is generally considered the amount of space required for police to be able to react to a threat, such as a person with a gun (Wisecarver & Tucker, 2007). The idea is that the larger the gap, the better police are to adjust to threats. With their policy, law enforcement has the ability to view a person walk to the front of their vehicle and check for bulges that may be a concealed weapon as well as having occupants step away from their comfort zone.

Another reason provided by Alachua County is for more practical reasons such as in-car camera views. Until recently, the Sheriff's office only had cameras in their vehicles and not body-cameras. As such, by having a citizen step in front of the Sheriff patrol car, they are able to view the encounter more easily than if a Deputy approached the driver's vehicle. The agency mentioned that exceptions are made for those drivers and other occupants who need accommodations such as impairments that do not allow them to walk to the Sheriff officer's vehicle. In these cases, it is the Deputy(s) who approach the impaired persons' vehicle.

Despite its perceived benefits, there are also some challenges with conducting traffic stops in this way. Some of the difficulties mentioned by the Alachua County Sheriffs Office's (ACSO) Command Staff are; people do not want to get out of their car because they are embarrassed, people have less protection against being hit by a car, and not everyone is able to exit their vehicle. Indeed, there may be scenarios in which someone is standing at the front of a Sheriff vehicle while passerby's slow down to see what is going on. Rubbernecking is when drivers become distracted when passing a traffic crash or the like. Oftentimes, this has the potential to distract drivers and potentially cause additional accidents (Colon, Rupp & Mouloua, 2013). Given this issue, another concern is the risk of standing between two vehicles on the side of the road, rather than of inside of the vehicle, which may offer additional protection to a driver. Lastly, individuals with disabilities, elderly, or small children may make this form of traffic stop more complicated and in these cases, a different approach is needed.

Importance of Policy

With regard to law enforcement in particular, the presences of policies and procedures delineating acceptable behavior is uniquely important. Officer actions are dictated by department policies and there is a potential liability to officers who go outside of what policy dictates as well as to agencies whose policy allows too much officer discretion. The policies and procedures of Police agencies provide the organization with rules and standards to operate and assist law enforcement personnel in navigating their daily processes and procedures (PowerDMS, 2021).² Indeed, Police policies provide standards, expectations, guidance and reduces risk to the organization, as well as personnel (Lexipol, 2022).

According to the Executive Order on Safe Policing for Safe Communities, "State and local law enforcement agencies must constantly assess and improve their practices and policies to ensure transparent, safe and accountable delivery of law enforcement services to their communities." (Exec. Order No. 13929, 2020). In a study from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding professional Police traffic stops, organizational policy, officer training and data collection are three elements of implementing professional traffic stops (Carrick, 2000). Furthermore, this study states that law enforcement agencies should implement policies that outline the expected actions of Police during a stop as that this standard for consistency offers one way to reduce racial discrimination.

² PowerDMS is a policy management company that is used by over 3,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States. <https://www.powerdms.com/why-powerdms-home>

Theory

When conducting a traffic stop, police must have a reason to force a citizen to stop and submit to their authority, something more than just a hunch (see: *Minnesota v. Dickerson* (1993)). Therefore, many traffic stops lead to either citation or sometimes arrest. Traffic stop policies and procedures vary across agencies within a state and across states, but the biggest tangible difference in procedure can be simplified broadly to whether the Police officer approaches the civilian's vehicle, or the civilian is expected to exit their vehicle. The latter is much less common and we theorize about the difference in these policies on the outcomes of the traffic encounter.

Whenever a Sheriff officer approaches the vehicle there is increased uncertainty between the officer and the citizen (Lichtenberg & Smith, 2001). However, when the Police officers are tasked with calling the civilian back to their vehicle this has the potential to increase transparency of the interaction, lessening the potential for misunderstanding and thereby reducing the overall cost for an officer to pull someone over.

This type of policy would be more likely to put the Sheriff officer at ease during this interaction, rather than being distracted and potentially concerned about what the civilian is doing in the vehicle. Indeed, in the Florida's training program textbook this "no approach" method is offered as an alternative to the typical practice of Sheriff officers approaching the vehicle in the event that there is some extenuating circumstance that makes the officer feel unsafe in some way (Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission, 2022). This decreased perceived risk of pulling vehicles over could potentially increase the Police officer's likelihood of doing so. Marcou (2019) describes this approach as a "heavily fortified defensive position on wheels", due to the ability for officers to analyze the driver without exposing themselves, as well as potentially confusing and confounding occupants who expect officer to approach their vehicle.

This research argues that since the Sheriff officer is not approaching the vehicle they are less likely to find drugs or weapons. This means that in these interactions, Police officers are able to focus on the traffic violations at hand, rather than diverting their attention from the traffic violation to other criminal violations not related to the traffic stop itself such as drugs, weapons, etc. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H1: Agencies whose policy dictates that the civilian approach the Police officer's vehicle will issue more traffic citations.

When it is standard practice for the Police officer to approach the vehicle, the officer is much more likely to search the vehicle and find illegal items. This brings up the common practice of a pretext stop. A pretext stop is when any Police officer stops a vehicle for a minor infraction, but in reality is wanting to look inside or search the vehicle because of their suspicion of illegal items such as weapons, drugs, or other contraband (Harris 1996). In fact, in many states if Police smell marijuana, it is grounds for a warrantless search of your vehicle. In addition, if a Police dog alerts to the presence of illegal substances, they are also allowed to search the vehicle.

Many searches during traffic stops are related to reasonable suspicions of drugs. The legalization of recreational marijuana usage has reduced the number of searches that are conducted during a traffic stop. For example, after marijuana use was legalized in Colorado and Washington, there were substantially less searches (Stanford Open Policing Project, 2021). Under the traffic stop policy of discussion, unless officers have backup or are forced to approach a vehicle under extenuating circumstances, they will never be in a position to view inside a person's vehicle. More broadly, there will be less opportunities for these officers to peer inside of a vehicle, therefore this leads to the following two hypotheses.

H2: Agencies whose policy dictates that the civilian approach the officer's vehicle will have fewer drug arrests.


H3: Agencies whose policy dictates that the civilian approach the officer's vehicle will issue fewer weapons arrests.

Determining Policies Across Florida

In order to test our hypotheses this study first constructed a independent variable of interest. Records requests were sent to every Sheriff’s office in Florida for their traffic stop policy specifically explaining the procedures of their stop.¹ If a county had any sort of policy, it was coded as having a policy or not having a policy. This study then reviewed policies to determine whether they explicitly provided procedures on how Deputies should conduct a traffic stop.⁴ The majority of law enforcement offices that had a traffic stop policy, provided procedures for the stop in their policy (69%). If a policy did not speak to the type of approach they were coded as such, and then a representative of that law enforcement office was asked how traffic stops were conducted for routine or unknown risk stops. We also broke counties down for the type of approach (or approaches) that should be taken by Police officers.

Figure 1 shows how the policies and procedures vary across Sheriff’s offices in Florida. As is apparent from the map, Alachua county is the only entity that explicitly specifies that the civilian should approach the front of the Sheriff officer’s vehicle during a stop while most of the others explicitly specify that the Sheriff officer should approach the civilian’s vehicle (58%). Of the Sheriff office’s that provided procedures within their policy, the majority (63%) instruct law enforcement personnel to approach the vehicle during a routine stop. However, there are a number of law enforcement agencies that leave that discretion up to their own Deputies, either by not having a policy (12%), by stating either option in their procedures (24%), or not identifying the specific procedures in the policy (6%).⁵

Figure 1: Florida Sheriff’s Office Traffic Stop Policy



Note: Among the law enforcement agencies that have a traffic stop policy, some do not specify the specific procedures and those are indicated *Unidentified*.

¹ The Miami-Dade Police Department was also included in this number.

⁴ Miami-Dade Police Department is also included since Dade County does not have a Sheriff’s Office. The Director of the agency is the Chief law-enforcement officer of the region.

⁵ It should be noted that during discussions with agency representatives, it was mentioned that as of March 2022, there is an initiative for all Sheriff’s Offices in Florida to become accredited. In turn, this would require a policy that addresses traffic stops.

Data

This study's primary variable of interest, *Treatment*, is whether a law enforcement agency has a policy that requires the civilian to approach the front of that law enforcement vehicle. While as discussed above some Sheriff's offices vary with regard to how detailed their policies and procedures surrounding traffic stops, we know that for the few cases where there seems to be some discretion, based on conversations with representatives of those offices, it is customary that the officer approaches the civilian's vehicle, unless there is some extenuating circumstance. To test the first hypothesis, we employ three measures of our dependent variable. These variables measure the number of non-criminal traffic citations, criminal traffic citations, and non-moving traffic infractions from each Sheriff's office per year. The traffic citation data was collected from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. The last two dependent variables measure the number of drug arrests and weapons arrests per Sheriff's office per year and were retrieved from the Uniform Crime Report. Table 1 lays out the types of infractions that characterize these traffic citations.

Table 1: Traffic Citations Definitions

Non-criminal (moving) Traffic Citations	Red light violations, stop sign violations and speeding
Criminal Traffic Citations	DUI, Reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident
Non-moving Infractions	Driver's license and registration violations, and seatbelt violations

In addition to the indicator measuring the policy of interest, our model also includes several other variables that might be expected to influence the number of traffic citations and arrests in a given county. It is well established that Black people are more likely to be pulled over and are disproportionately affected by citations and arrests, therefore we control for *Percent Black* in the county (*Stanford Open Policing Project, 2021; The Sentencing Project, 2018*). This study also controls for other county demographic characteristics such as, *Poverty, Crime Rate, Population* and *Median Age*. It is also likely that the *Number of Agencies* in a county and the *Size of the Agency* could affect the number of calls a Sheriff office receives, and the amount of resources they have. Smaller agencies with less staff may have less back up support, which may make them less likely to pull people over, especially on a shift with a higher call volume. As such, a higher call volume may limit the Sheriff officer's ability to be utilize a more proactive patrol method, in turn, creating a reactive method that limits the number of traffic stops.

An Event Count Model

The unit of analysis is the county-year during the five-year period of 2015-2019. Since the dependent variable is a number of citations or arrests issued in a year, this study uses an event count model. Also this study uses a negative binomial regression—rather than Poisson regression—to account for any potential of over dispersion (i.e., that the variance of the dependent variable exceeds its mean).

Empirical Results

Table 2 presents coefficient estimates for the event count models. However—following the advice of King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000)—to test this study's hypotheses the author uses these coefficients to generate more meaningful quantities of interest: the estimated effect *Treatment* on the number of traffic citations and drug and weapons arrests in a year when other independent variables are held at central values. H1 predicts that when a civilian is required to exit their vehicle and approach the law enforcement officer's vehicle, there will be more traffic citations issued. This study finds empirical support for this hypothesis. When this policy is in place Sheriff's offices are more likely to issue non-criminal traffic citations

and citations for non-moving traffic infractions, reaching statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.001 levels, respectively. In addition, while the third measure of criminal traffic citations does not reach conventional levels of significance it is also in the expected direction. Holding all else constant when agency has a policy that requires the civilian to approach the front of the law enforcement vehicle, they issue on average 5856 more non-criminal traffic citations ($p>0.05$), and 5538 more non-moving infractions ($p>0.05$) per year. These first differences do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance for criminal traffic citations.

This study does not find support for H2 and H3. When a civilian is required to exit their vehicle and approach the law enforcement officer’s vehicle, there is no statistical difference in the numbers of weapons and drug arrests. The associated first differences are also not statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising given that drug and/or weapons arrests are often the reason behind a pretext traffic stop (Harris, 1996). Generally, law enforcement must also have the ability to look inside of the vehicle to see and drugs or weapons in plain sight. However, other items may narrow the playing field and explain the lack of statistical support. For example, these offenses are not exclusive to traffic stops. Drug and weapons arrests are made on foot patrols and other encounters outside of traffic stops. The approach of a Sheriff officer during a traffic stop may not impact their ability to search a person’s vehicle. The “plain smell doctrine” allows any law enforcement officer to develop probable cause to search a vehicle if they smell marijuana coming from the vehicle or its occupants. It is also possible that law enforcement can detect the smell of marijuana without being right next to a vehicle (Doty, Wudarski, Marshall & Hastings, 2004). In addition, Sheriff officers have the ability to search a vehicle after an arrest is made, in some circumstances.⁶ In these incidents, Sheriff officers may locate weapons or drugs regardless of the procedures of the stop.

Table 2: Coefficient Estimates for Event Count Models Predicting the effect of Treatment

	Non-criminal citations	Non-moving infractions	Criminal citations	Weapons arrests	Drug arrests
Treatment	1.01** (0.48)	1.56*** (0.50)	0.39 (0.35)	-0.07 (0.38)	0.31 (0.35)
Population	0.007* (0.0004)	0.001** (0.005)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.004)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Crime Rate	-0.001 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0006 (0.0005)	0.0006 (0.0005)	0.0008* (0.0005)
Agency Size	0.002*** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.002*** (0.0002)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.00001 (0.0002)
Number of Agencies	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Poverty	-0.17*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Percent Black	0.03*** (0.08)	0.02* (0.008)	-0.33*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.01** (0.006)
Median Age	0.013 (0.009)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.02** (0.008)
Intercept	9.03*** (0.55)	7.16 (0.59)	7.77*** (0.42)	4.24** (0.45)	4.33*** (0.42)
	N=335	N=335	N=335	N=335	N=335

***p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.10

⁶ See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

Some of this study's control variables consistently reach statistical levels of significance. Unsurprisingly, the percent of Black people living in a county has a positive and significant effect on the number of non-criminal traffic citations, non-moving infractions and number of drug arrests, however this variable is negative and significant for the number of criminal traffic citations. Also, unsurprisingly, larger agencies issue more traffic citations of all types, while counties that have higher populations also have more traffic citations of all types. Counties that have higher rates of poverty see fewer traffic citations of all types and counties with a higher median age have higher rates of non-moving traffic infractions and more drug arrests.

Discussion: Additional Measures of Uncertainty

As it is rare for a law enforcement agency to have an explicit policy that instructs Sheriff officers to conduct the "no approach" method, we acknowledge that our *Treatment* variable only covers Alachua County over five years. However, in addition to this "no approach" method, there is another form of traffic stop practices that reduce the uncertainty of law enforcement action. Surprisingly, agencies vary with regard to whether they have traffic stop policies. To get a better sense of the effect of traffic stop policies on these outcomes of interest, we also ran these models with a dummy variable, *Policy*, indicating whether an agency has an explicit policy or does not. This is an interesting distinction because the presence of such policy reduces officer discretion and may create a sense of legitimacy for action. This explicit policy has the potential to insulate officers from any adverse outcome as a result of the traffic stop as long as they act within the confines of the policy.

This research finds that agencies with an explicit traffic policy are also more likely to issue traffic citations, including criminal citations, but the substantive effects of these differences are much more modest than the effect of the "no approach" policy. Holding all else constant when agency has an explicit policy for traffic stops, they issue on average 828 more non-moving infractions ($p > 0.05$), 2036 more non-criminal traffic citations ($p > 0.05$), and 731 criminal traffic citations ($p > 0.05$) per year than those agencies without an explicitly stated policy. These results are not statistically significant for drug or weapons arrests.

Conclusion

This article makes an important contribution to our understanding of traffic stop policies and procedures. There is research on the effect of civilians, Sheriff officers, and situations characteristic of traffic stops and encounters (Engel & Calnon, 2004; Paoline & Terrill, 2005; Petrocelli et. al, 2003), as well as research on neighborhood characteristics on traffic enforcement practices (Ingram, 2007). However, there is little research about how the traffic stop policies and procedures vary across agency and the effect this has on outcomes of the traffic encounter. This is probably due to the wide assumption of similarity between policies across different localities.

This study turns to Florida's traffic stop policy and procedures for every Sheriff's office in the state. Alachua county stands apart in their expectation that the civilian will approach the Police vehicle during a traffic stop. The curriculum at law enforcement academies across Florida does not provide the "no approach" method as a normal method of conducted a traffic stop, but as a secondary method to consider when Sheriff officers have additional concerns about their safety. (Criminal Justice Standards & Training Commission, 2022). This research finds that traffic encounters with reduced uncertainty (both those that use the "no approach method" and those that have explicit traffic stop policies), result in significantly more traffic citations. This study argues that this is because the increased transparency reduces the transaction costs of these traffic confrontations. It should be noted that this study does not address other topics of concern with traffic stops such as pretext stops; racial biases in stops and searches therein. Also this analysis only includes Florida Sheriff's Offices, so we should take care when generalizing to the broader context of local law enforcement. We plan to make public our database of these policies and procedures as we expand this study, due to the difficulty of making non-compulsory, civilian information requests and the difficulty of receiving responses.

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Innovations at Borders: Designing, Developing, Strategic Positioning & Branding Florida as Premier High-Tech Economy Hub for Latin America & Caribbeans

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ABSTRACT: The focus of this study is the design, development, strategic positioning and branding of Florida as premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in Latin America (Central and South America) and Caribbean regions. This study uses a conceptual/theoretical framework with 12 variables or attributes to examine how they can drive the accomplishment of the above goals, through the inter-connections and synergies they emanate. This study also examines how the excellent nature of the current trade, economic and cultural ties that Florida has with countries in Latin America and the Caribbeans can aid the goal of this study (transforming Florida into the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for Latin America and the Caribbeans). This study also comprehensively examines the key role of the geographical location of Florida as bridge between the U.S.A. and the Caribbeans.

Introduction

The key objective and research question of this study is to conceptually discover, analyze, synchronize and mesh all elements and variables needed in designing, developing, strategic positioning and branding of Florida as the premier innovation/high-technology economy hub for countries in Latin America (Central and South America) and Caribbeans. This study builds on the author's earlier study that focused on the Rio Grande Valley (Inamete, 2015), thus adopting the conceptual and theoretical frameworks previously used for the Rio Grande Valley study. In order to enhance analytic ease and flow, this study is divided into seven sections: Introduction, review of the literature, goals and objectives of this study, rationale for this study, methodology, analysis and conclusion.

Review of the Literature

This study is thoroughly informed by very relevant literature from a wide array of knowledge areas. On the whole, the literature that anchors this study is grouped into five categories: creativity, innovations, high technology firms, start-up firms and general entrepreneurship literature; as well as high technology economy regions literature; economic and business frameworks and dynamics in international border regions literature; international business literature; and Florida international trade and economic relations literature.

In the area of creativity, innovations, high-technology firms, start-up firms and general entrepreneurship literature, an article by Usha Lenka, Minisha Gupta and Debashish Kumar Sahoo (2016) represents an excellent research and scholarship. This article, "Research and Development Teams as a Perennial Source of Competitive Advantage in the Innovation Adoption Process" (Lenka, Gupta & Sahoo, 2016), focuses on the importance of the need to translate creativity (in terms of research and development activities) into innovations (in terms of creations of new innovative products and ideas), and the factors that enable and enhance research and development activities to result in new innovative products and ideas. The article also emphasizes the importance of firms engaging in "continuous creativity and innovation," and encouraging "research and development teams to launch new and innovative

products/ideas,” in order for firms to survive competition in the market place and to prosper (Lenka, Gupta & Sahoo, 2016, p.700).

Open innovation is a phenomenon that is now becoming important. An article entitled, “Mapping Open Innovation: A Bibliometric Review to Compare Developed and Emerging Countries” (Fabianne de Paulo, Cagica Carvalho, Costa, Lopes & Galina, 2017) focuses on this phenomenon. Essentially, the thrust of the article is the comparison of the phenomenon of open innovation in developing and emerging countries. Another article, entitled, “How Open System Intermediaries Address Institutional Failures: the Case of Business Incubators in Emerging-Market Countries” (Dutt, Hawn, Vidal, Chatterji, McGahan & Mitchell, 2016), examines how business incubators can serve as open system intermediaries in emerging-market countries, and the roles of private, academic, government and non-governmental entities in sponsoring this sort of business incubators.

In the article, “Fail Often, Fail Big, and Fail Fast? Learning from Small Failures and R&D Performance in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Rajat Khanna, Isin Guler and Atul Nerkar (2016) examine the impacts of learning from failures on innovations, general productivity and outputs of firms in the pharmaceutical industry. They note that a “previous research on learning from past experience, including failures, has argued that experience in general leads to higher productivity and lower unit cost in manufacturing and service industry” (Khanna, Guler & Nerkar, 2016, p.453). However, they also state that “failure offers firms many opportunities to learn, but learning from failure is far from guaranteed” (Khanna, Guler & Nerkar 2016, p.438). The study by Raghu Garud and Joel Gehman (2016) focuses on the reality of fluidity of plans and models involved in ventures and enterprises. Thus, they state that “the unexpected is to be expected” (Garud & Gehman 2016, p.547). Also, they add that this fact “means that entrepreneurs should anticipate overflows of their business models that will, of necessity, have to change when performed” (Garud & Gehman, 2016, p.547). Realism framework in entrepreneurship is the focus of the study by Stratos Ramoglou and Eric W.K. Tsang (2016). Concisely, they posit that “according to the leading theoretical perspective of entrepreneurship, the possibility entrepreneurial profit requires the preexistence of entrepreneurial opportunities waiting to be discovered” (Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016, p.410).

A study by Stephen Cummings and Todd Bridgman (2016, p.251) focuses on how the involvement of different and many academic disciplines, and different and many cultural perspectives, lead “to more innovations, idea generations, and problem solving”. To buttress their analysis, Cummings and Bridgman (2016, p.251) note that “one of the first scholarly books on creativity, Arthur Koestler’s (1970) *The Act of Creation*, links creativity to the Latin verb ‘cogito’ (to think),” a verb which Cummings and Bridgman say Arthur Koestler explains as meaning “to ‘shake together’... the creative act, by connecting previously unrelated dimensions of experience is an act of liberation [and] defeat[er] of habit (Koestler, 1970, p.96)” Arthur Koestler quoted in Cummings and Bridgman, 2016, p.251.

The book, *Managing Industrial Knowledge: Creation, Transfer and Utilization*, edited by Ikujiro Nonaka and David Teece (2001), is an important work that contains excellent studies by many scholars. The book is fundamental and comprehensive. It contains many path-breaking works on the dynamics and frameworks of the creation, innovation, utilization and management of knowledge by firms, in order to create new, innovative products and services, as they seek to compete, survive and prosper in the market place.

Due to the fact that the conceptual/theoretical framework that is used for this study sees world class research universities as constituting the most important (and most monumental) variable or attribute that enables a region to be transformed into a premier innovation/high-technology economy region, a large portion of the literature review section of this study focuses on a major publication that excellently analyzes this variable or attribute. This other publication, “Campus Leadership and the Entrepreneurial University: A Dynamic Capabilities Perspective,” by Sohvi Leih and David Teece (2016), is a study that focuses on the comparison of the leadership dynamics and frameworks at Stanford University and University of California-Berkeley, in terms of the impacts on the developments of world leading

universities, which are entrepreneurial universities; and in the process of achieving the research objectives of their study, Leih and Teece also produce a major study of how great world class major research universities constitute the pivotal/monumental factor in the emergence of the following phenomena: creativity, innovations, high-technology firms, growth of start-up firms, the fostering and growth of innovations ecosystems, the creation and growth of innovation/high-technology clusters and regions.

According to Leih and Teece (2016, p.184), "Great research universities are characterized above all by commitment to the independent truth-seeking inquiry of their scholars seeking to push the frontiers of our understanding of all phenomena and pass on that knowledge to successive generations." However, Leih and Teece (2016, p.184) also add that current modern developments "require universities to not only continue to pursue their historic mandates," but that universities need to be also "managed more strategically and purposefully using modern concepts, frameworks and techniques." Also, a very prominent university leader adds that "reputations built on the memorable success of the past do not of themselves provide a stable foundation for the future" (Sir John Hood, when he was Vice-Chancellor of University of Oxford, as quoted by Leih & Teece, 2016, p.184). In this vein, it has been noted that "better strategic management of the university is not just a matter of favoring commercial and entrepreneurial values over academic and research values" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). Leih and Teece (2016, p.185) see the two as "complements, not substitutes". Furthermore, it has also been noted that studies suggest "that at both the individual faculty and institutional levels, faculty who are excellent in outreach and external (entrepreneurial) engagement are also most likely to be better researchers" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185).

Additionally, studies in the United States and European countries show "that engagement in entrepreneurial activities," by researchers, "coincides with increased publications outputs, without affecting the nature of publications involved," and "that faculty entrepreneurs are among the most productive and best-cited in their respective fields, even after they form these start-up companies" (D.S. Siegel, M. Wright and A. Lockett as quoted in Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). Universities such as University of California-San Francisco, Stanford, New York University "that have embraced close engagements with external partners have done well because of it, and have used the additional resources and brand value acquired to cross-subsidize research and teaching in other areas-including the arts and sciences" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). In terms of great research universities, "there is the sheer size and importance of universities and their central role not just in teaching and research, but also in spawning new businesses and assisting with the development of industrial, agricultural, and service sectors through innovation and problem solving" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.184). Therefore, "the expectation that research universities can both expand their contributions to basic research and teaching and help solve society's particular problems seems to have become amplified in recent years" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.184).

A comparison of Stanford University and University of California-Berkeley, is also done by Sohvi Leih and David Teece (2016, p.198 & 201). Though both universities are world leading great research universities, Stanford University is seen as being more successful than University of California-Berkeley, due to the fact that Berkeley more embrace big research projects for the Federal government, while Stanford more often embraces the private industry (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.198 & 201).

It has been noted that "Berkeley's motto, *Fiat Lux* ("Let there be light"), was selected at its founding in 1868 and reflects the school's emphasis on deep scholarship," and that "quality research, not entrepreneurship, is most valued campus focus," and, also, that "even academic entrepreneurship has not been highly valued" (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201). "Consistent with this focus, is Berkeley's long-standing involvement with Federal government-sponsored national labs, such as Lawrence Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley, founded in 1952 and 1931, respectively," and other national lab and scientific projects (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201). It has also been noted that Berkeley culture views "links with the national labs as 'safer' than collaboration with industry and the pursuit of start-ups in terms of impact on values". Thus, Berkeley "focused on links to the national labs more than links to industry" (both quotes from Leih

& Teece, 2016, p.201). It has also been suggested that the “generous federal research funding” that the national labs provide Berkeley may also reduce the need for Berkeley “to reach out to industry” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201 to 202). Also, the fact that “as a public institution, Berkeley is more highly regulated than Stanford” is seen as another factor that makes Berkeley not to be as entrepreneurial as Stanford (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.202).

However, the culture in Berkeley is still seen, on the whole, as the biggest factor that made the plan of Berkeley, in 1998, to have a research partnership “with Novartis, a Swiss pharmaceutical giant and producer of genetically engineered crops (whose agriculture biotech business has since become Syngenta)” to cause a lot of controversy within the university (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.199). “Some faculty” members in Berkeley “believe that involvement with industry” will create dynamics “that will get in the way of independent research” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.199). It has also been noted that “there are plausible partnerships or joint efforts that might be done with companies,” but that “the pushback on campus ... is very, very strong from faculty members, and some administrators,” since “there is a concern that essentially academic values are going to be sacrificed,” and, therefore, “the depth of that resistance is very strong” (Earl Cheit, former-Dean of Berkeley’s Business School, quoted [during a personal communication] in Leih & Teece, 2016, p.199 to 200). All these sorts of dynamics make Sohvi Leih and David Teece (2016, p.202-203) to perceive “Berkeley’s attitude” as being “lukewarm (some might say even hostile) to the commercialization of faculty research.”

Compared to Berkeley, Stanford is very industry-friendly, and very entrepreneurial. “Stanford’s leaders, while not eschewing Federal contracts and other public funds,” have “an industry-friendly strategy” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.198). This strategy creates “a virtuous cycle in terms of not only funding, but also the local economy and sponsored research” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.198). The Engineering School at Stanford is seen as the center of the links to the industry. Right from the start, the Engineering School at Stanford “actively engaged with pioneering firms in the Silicon Valley, assisting them where they could with teaching, research, and, more important, the supply of qualified graduates” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.198).

One person stands out as the key person that make the Engineering School at Stanford to play the key role with Silicon Valley. That person was Frederick Terman, a former-Dean of the Engineering School at Stanford, who used “unorthodox hiring technique” to build capacity in the Engineering School (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201). “He sought out the most knowledgeable and talented electrical engineers in Silicon Valley and ‘anointed’ them as adjunct or consulting professors at Stanford, because Stanford faculty were not yet sufficiently conversant with the new technology to teach it” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201). Terman, who later became the first Provost at Stanford (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201), also used another unusual method to build a group of world leading faculty members in Stanford. He was always willing to offer the highest salaries to recruit the very best faculty members from any place in the country and world-wide for Stanford. “Terman was a real bandit in some ways,” since he relished “in competitive bargaining, hiring the best, and doing what it took to get them,” and therefore, Terman “is the one who made Stanford what it is today” (Albert Bowker as quoted in Leih & Teece, 2016, p.201).

The fact that Stanford is a private university is another factor that vitally contributes to its being more entrepreneurial (while Berkeley, as a public university, tends to be less entrepreneurial because it “is more highly regulated than Stanford,” and therefore, Berkeley is also very “bureaucratic”). Thus, it is stated that if Frederick Terman was at Berkeley he will be less successful (Leih & Teece 2016, p.202). Thus, “if Terman had been at Berkeley rather than Stanford, he is unlikely to have had anything like the same impact on either the school or the regional economy” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.202). This view makes one to wonder whether Silicon Valley could have been created if Stanford University had been a public university. Nevertheless, though a public university and less entrepreneurial than Stanford, Berkeley still makes significant research contributions to the Silicon Valley business community.

On the whole, “while universities have for centuries contributed to economic development, advances in science and engineering have come to enhance the centrality of research universities in cities and in regional innovation ecosystems” (Leih and Teece, 2016, p.185). Examples of these great research universities are “Stanford, Berkeley, and U.C.-San Francisco (UCSF) in the San Francisco Bay Area/Silicon Valley bio-tech and electronic clusters; Carnegie Mellon in the robotics/artificial intelligence cluster around Pittsburg; and Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Boston University and others in the biomed cluster in Cambridge and the greater Boston area” (Leih & Teece. 2016, p.185).

Apart from the above great research universities, other research universities also play important roles in their communities and regions, for examples Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut; the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor; Texas A.&M. University in College Station; and Cornell University in Ithaca, New York (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). Also, “in the past decade the University of Pennsylvania has outstripped industrial, financial and public entities to become the largest employer in Philadelphia” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185).

Also, Leih and Teece emphasize pioneering, monumental and pivotal roles some individuals have played in these innovations/high technology transformative roles great research universities have played. As examples, “MIT President Karl Compton had an important effect on promoting academic entrepreneurship in the 1930s and 1940s, funding a number of MIT spinoffs”. Also, more prominently and more pivotally, the “former Stanford Provost Frederick Terman is (hyperbolically) called the ‘father of Silicon Valley’ because of his leadership in contributing to the rise of Stanford and the growth of the high-tech region” (both quotes from Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185).

Such transformation in great research academic centers also means that these universities are “managed as large creative and instructional enterprises that, beyond performing world-class research and providing world-class instructors, must also be prepared to assist not only government and industry, but also new enterprise development, while advancing their own strengths and survival prospects” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). Therefore, “more than ever, universities will generate and sustain the world’s idea capitals,” and serve “as vital creators, incubators, connectors, and channels of thought and understanding” for the world (John Sexton, President of New York University, as quoted in Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). “In short, research universities are big businesses” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185).

The high technology economy regions literature is the second category of literature that informs this study. The book edited by Ikujiro Nonaka and David Teece (2001) contains studies that informs the frameworks and the dynamics of high technology economy regions. As shown above, the study by Leih and Teece (2016) provide immense knowledge about how great research universities play pivotal roles in the creation and growth of high technology economy regions. DeBlij and Muller (2008) book also has immense comprehensive geographic, economic and socio-cultural information on all major regions in the world, including high technology economy regions. The book by Annalee Saxenian (1996) is unique and most relevant, since it specifically focuses on the factors that make Silicon Valley to be different from the innovation/high-technology region in the greater Boston area in Massachusetts (and is closely linked to MIT and Harvard University and other regional research universities).

The economic, business frameworks and dynamics in international border regions literature is the third category of literature that informs this study. There is virtual dearth of scholarly literature that specifically focuses on this topic area. Therefore, a very significant portion of the current research thrust of the author of this study is the focus on this research area. Logically and obviously, one of the goal of this study is to help fill the research void in this specific area. Similarly, a previous study by the author, on the economic and business frameworks and dynamics in the Rio Grande Valley international border region (Inamete 2015) aims to fill the void in this specific area, as the author’s current research areas focus on the comparative studies of the design, development and creation of premier high-technology economy corridors in international border regions, as well as on the comparative studies of the economies of the international border regions. Thus, this study solidly bridges both research areas.

The fourth category that informs this international business literature is the excellent article by Professors Arindam Banik and Tirthankar Nag (2016), "Bharti Airtel and Zain: A Journey into New Territories," that comprehensively analyzed the frameworks and dynamics of Bharti Airtel acquisition of Zain operations in Africa, to allow Bharti Airtel to develop a very strong presence in the African continent as one of the top its mobile companies there. The article analyzes the decision-making processes involved in the acquisition of Zain operations in Africa by Bharti Airtel, and the financial dynamics of the firm during the early years of the acquisition. This study also shows that having strong operations in Africa, and in countries in other continents, was important for Bharti Airtel, since it knew that operations in other countries were necessary developments, in order for the company to become one of the top global mobile phone companies. International business and operations obviously, greatly play vital roles in enabling firms to become global firms.

In a study, entitled "Project Management and Development of Human capital in the Caribbean: Three Case studies," Professor Arindani Banik and Professor P. Bhaumik (2006) make a major and a vital contribution to international management studies and international business studies. This study (Banik & Bhaumik 2006) used three case studies to analyze the relationship between project management and the development of human capital in the Caribbean region.

An article by Ravinder Kumar Arora (2016) posits the differing dynamics and impacts of domestic institutional investors and foreign institutional investors in India. The article by Caitlin N. Benton, Madeline Napier and M. Ali Ulku (2016) analyzes the impacts that Free Trade Zones, in the United States of America, have on supply-chains and regional economic development. Financial development leads to rise in import demands as "imports are negatively affected by relative prices," and economic growth vs. import prices results in decreases in import consumption, which are the major conclusions of this study by Muhammad Ahad, Talat Afza and Muhammed Shahbaz (2017). A third article, entitled "Beyond the Borders: Yellow Goes International" (Ahmed, Rifat, Nisha, Manirujjaman & Shrensky, 2016), focuses on Yellow, a top fashion brand firm in Bangladesh. The article analyzes the factors that made Yellow to embark on international operations, the dynamics of the company international marketing frameworks, and the challenges Yellow encountered in terms of its thrusts. The publication by Diemo Urbig, Siri Terjesen, Vivien Procher, Katrin Muehlfeld and Arjen Van Witteloostuijn (2016) compares the behavior of students in foreign language setting and native language setting within business schools. The following works by A. Al-Gasaymeh (2020); V. Alterman, P. A. Bamberger, M. Wang, J. Koopman, E. Belogolosky and J. Shi (2021); A. O. Aluko, O. Fapetu and J. O. Ibitoye (2021); K. Aoki (2020); N. Arora, G. Malik and D. Chawla (2020); A. Banik and C. Chatterjee (2021); Samuel S. Holloway and Anne Parmigiani (2016); Warren R. Plunkett, Raymond F. Attner and Gemmy S Allen (2002); Carmen Weigelt and E Kundayo Shittu (2016); Gannon (2004); Inamete (2014); Daniels and Radebaugh (1992); and Sawyer (2006) all focus on management, international business, international economics, and on general management frameworks and principles.

Florida international trade and economic relations literature is the fifth category of the literature that inform this study. Mark Smith (2004a & 2004b) provides a very comprehensive and detailed study of the impacts that the free trade agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic/and countries in Central America (DR-CAFTA) has on the state of Florida. Numerous excellent regular and periodical publications by Enterprise Florida (2017a & 2017b); Florida Chamber of Commerce (2017a & 2017b); Florida International University, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Kimberley Green Latin American Caribbean Center (2017); InBound Logistics (2004); and University of Florida, College of Liberal Arts & Sciences, Bureau of Business Research (2017a to 2017zb) provide excellent, comprehensive, periodical, regular, up-to-date, and continuous analysis on Florida trade and economic relations with South and Central American countries, and the Caribbeans, as well as other parts of the world, that are immensely useful for scholars, researchers, policy-makers and business leaders.

A study by Bryan Riley (2012) examines how Florida trade relations contributes to economic prosperity in the state. A publication by Edie Ousley (2015) focuses on the trade and economic goals of the meeting the Florida Chamber of Commerce had with Perú's Chamber of Commerce, while a publication by Terry L. McCoy (1987) analyze the general trade and economic ties that Florida has with all the countries in Latin America and Caribbean region. Franco Ordonez (2017) examines how the visit of the President of the People's Republic of China may impact on the trade and economic relations that Latin America has with both the United States and China. The frameworks and dynamics of how the City of Miami in Florida and the City of Houston in Texas compete for trade relations with Latin America is the focus of the publication by Ashley D. Torres (2012).

Goals and Objectives of this Study

Florida is a state that has very robust and immense trade and economic relations with countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean, with a great number of studies and publications focused on this subject (see Enterprise Florida [2017a & 2017b]; Florida Chamber of Commerce [2017a & 2017b]; InBound Logistics [2004]; McCoy [1987]; Ordonez [2017]; Ousley [2015]; Riley [2012]; Smith [2004a & 2004b]; Torres [2012]; and University of Florida, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Bureau of Business Research [2017a to 2017zb]). Therefore, the focus of this study is not an analysis of the general trade economic relations Florida has with countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean region. Instead, the key research goal of this study is to conceptually discover, analyze, synchronize and mesh the attributes or variables that are needed in designing, developing, strategic positioning and branding Florida as the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean.

Rationale for this Study

Two current major research areas of this study are the comparative studies of the design, development and creation of premier high-technology economy corridors in international border regions; and the comparative studies of the economies of international border regions. Therefore, the rationale for this study is that it fits perfectly into these two research areas.

Methodology

This study builds on my earlier work on the Rio Grande Valley (Inamete, 2015). Thus, the methodological, conceptual and theoretical frameworks that were used for that study on the Rio Grande Valley and named the "Premier Global Economic/Business Region (PGER) conceptual/theoretical framework" (Inamete 2015, p.1146-1161), are also applied in this study with the same type of qualitative methodology (more specifically, a qualitative case method).

Essentially, the PGER conceptual/theoretical framework consists of 12 variables (or attributes) which link, inter-connect, synchronize and mesh to create a key global economic business region (in the form of a premier innovation/high-technology economy region) within an international border region (Inamete, 2015, p.1151). Therefore, this study will utilize these twelve variables (attributes) to conceptualize how Florida can be designed, developed, strategically positioned, and branded as the premier innovation/high technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region. These 12 variables (attributes) are: Many Major Research Universities, Accelerated Scientific and Technological Innovations and Creativity, Numerous Start-Up High-Technology Firms, Many Venture Capital Firms, Big High-Technology Firms, High-Technology Manufacturing Economy, Producing Rather than Trading Economy, Many High Paying High-Technology Jobs, Highly Educated Population, High Standard of Living, International Cross Broder Region Many and Long Socio-Cultural and Economic Ties, and Border Region More Prosperous than Other Regions in Respective Countries.

Analysis

As stated previously, this analysis section essentially involves the utilization of the 12 variables or attributes (PGER conceptual/theoretical framework) to conceptualize how Florida can be designed, developed, strategically positioned and branded as the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean region.

The Florida Group for the Florida of the Americas

As is very obvious, the task of designing, developing, strategically positioning and branding Florida as the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for the countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region is a challenging task. On a very positive note, the fact that Florida is a state in the United States of America that has excellent economic and trade ties with South and Central America and Caribbean region (Florida Chamber of Commerce, 2017a; InBound Logistics, 2004; Ousley, 2015) will make this task a lot easier for Florida, than it will be for many other states in the United States, that do not have the sort of excellent trade, economic and socio-cultural ties, or geographical proximity that Florida has with South and Central America and Caribbean region. However, the fact that the task is not about general economic and trade ties with South and Central America and Caribbean region (which Florida already has, compared to many other states in the United States of America), but the task is specifically about transforming the economy of Florida into a globally leading innovation/high-technology economy, which will enable Florida to become the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for all the countries in South and Central America and in the Caribbean region.

This type of reality will also be an immense accomplishment that will enormously and vastly increase the excellent trade and economic ties that Florida currently has with South and Central America and the Caribbean region, and, therefore, make Florida to be a place that has one of the best economy in the whole world, and, thus, enable Florida to have a top global innovation/high technology economy that vastly increases employment opportunity, in the form of top world class very highly paid high technology jobs, and top world class economic and social prosperity. The task of transforming the economy of Florida to this sort of a top world class innovation/high-technology economy will require the people and government of the State of Florida to vastly increase the amount of money (in terms of several billions of dollars) for all levels of education (especially for higher education in Doctoral Degrees in Engineering, Physical Sciences and Biological Sciences, as key academic disciplines), and greatly increase expenditures (also in terms of several billions of dollars) for other areas of economic infrastructures, for examples, transportation infrastructures like airports, seaports, freight train systems, high-speed passenger rail systems, road highways, to build a very integrated inter-modal transportation system. Additionally, this sort of economic transformation of Florida will also require the government of the State of Florida (and also city and county governments in Florida) to create new legislations and new regulations, change and eliminate some existing legislations and regulations.

Vastly increasing expenditures on education and other economic infrastructures, and also creating, changing and eliminating, legislation and regulations will present significant political challenges that will need to convince the people of Florida, and all related levels of government (state, county and city governments), that such transformation is a vital and excellent investment that will make Florida a top world class innovation/high-technology economy that will increase employments, provide world class highly-paid high-technology jobs, and create economic and social prosperity in Florida.

Top business leaders are the best group of people that will be able to convince the people of Florida and political leaders to make this such investments will be the top business leaders in Florida. This is due to the fact that the top business leaders in Florida have the most influence over the political leaders in Florida (including the Governor of Florida and top legislative leaders in the Florida legislature [Florida Senate and House of Representatives]), and the opinion leaders in all parts and counties in Florida (who

will be able to convince people in all parts and counties in Florida that the vast investments, and changes in legislations and regulations, in order to transform the economy of Florida into a top global innovation/high technology economy will be a very excellent idea).

A fewer number, instead of a large number, of top business leaders in Florida should be in the group study proposed (in order to ensure that the group will speedily, efficiently and effectively, make decisions and takes actions, instead of being unwieldy). Therefore, the group should consist of about seven prominent business leaders in Florida. This study also proposes the name the Florida Group for this group, in order to properly signify to the people of Florida that this group exists to solely serve the interests of Florida and all Floridians, rather than the interest of business élites. Since the members of the Florida Group are top-most business leaders who have their own respective business firms to run, the Florida Group will need to hire full-time staff (who are top experts in various areas like business development, regional planning and development, economic development, finance, entrepreneurship, innovation and creativity management, advertising, marketing, brand management, public relations, lobbying, public policy, law, fund raising, events management, and international relations) headed by a competent full-time Executive-Director. The seven most prominent business leaders will then lead the Florida Group as its Board Members. The staff and Executive-Director will work under this Florida Group Board Members by giving them data, information and analysis for decision-making, and by implementing the decisions made by the Board.

In order to be successful, the Florida Group will need to work very closely with the head office of the Florida Chamber of Commerce (and all chapters of the Florida Chamber of Commerce in all parts of Florida), as well as Enterprise Florida (since these two organizations play key roles in the business and economic growth and progress in Florida). The Florida Group will also need to maintain formal continuous contacts and strong linkages with key political leaders in Florida, including the Governor and top leaders in Florida's Senate and House of Representatives.

The Florida Group will also have the continuous key task of proposing how many billions of Dollars Florida has to annually add for education (especially for higher education at doctoral degree studies level in engineering, physical sciences, and biological science academic disciplines) and other infrastructures, like transportation infrastructures and systems. The Florida Group will also decide how much of these huge amounts of money will come from the government of Florida, private firms, charitable foundations, private-government partnership arrangements, and grants from the U.S. Federal government. The Florida Group will also have the task of ensuring that the government of the state of Florida, business leaders and organizations, annually provide additional huge amounts of spending on education and other economic infrastructures in Florida.

Another task of the Florida Group will be to closely work with the Governor of Florida, leaders of Florida Senate and Florida House of Representatives, county and city governments to ensure that at state, county and city levels in Florida, laws and regulations be regularly created, changed or eliminated to ensure that Florida speedily and excellently has a top world class innovations/high-technology economy.

The Florida Group will also have the task of constantly lobbying the U.S. Federal government's executive branch departments and agencies, and U.S. Senate and House of Representatives directly, and through the Florida Congressional Delegation [which consists of all Florida members of the U.S. House of Representatives and two Florida United States Senators), in order to ensure that the U.S. Federal government annually provides more money for scientific and high technology research organizations in Florida, state universities and transportation infrastructures and systems, in ways that help to speedily create a top world class innovation/high-technology economy in Florida.

Additionally, the Florida Group will have the task of ensuring that an economic environment is speedily created in Florida that grows or attracts for relocation to Florida venture capital firms that robustly fund high-technology start-up firms and attracts to the "Sunshine State" numerous highly

successful, profitable, major global high-technology manufacturing firms from other U.S. states. Also, the Florida Group will have the task of constantly expanding trade and economic ties with all the countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

The Florida Group will also be the strategically best positioned body able to constantly market and brand Florida as a world class innovation/high-technology economy place and hub for the South and Central America and Caribbean region. The board members of the Florida Group will be aided in this particular task by full-time staff of the Florida Group (especially those have expertise in public relations, advertising, marketing and brand management) with contracted public relations, advertising, marketing and brand management firms.

Florida Gold Standard Education to Lead the Way as the Pivotal Launching Pad

This section of this study focuses on two variables or attributes (and these are the attribute of many great world class research universities and of a highly educated population). As shown in the above section, one of the pivotal/monumental roles of the Florida Group will be to add massive additional funding for education (especially higher education at the Doctoral Degree level studies in engineering, physical sciences, biological sciences, and other academic disciplines). This action will result in Florida having many great world class research universities and in turn, for Florida having a very highly educated population.

In order to ensure great world class research universities, Florida will also need to have solid and sound foundations for such kinds of great universities, by funding and having excellent elementary and high schools, whose students graduate as excellent high school students, who, in turn, graduate as excellent undergraduate students and later graduate into excellent graduate students.

A strong world class innovation/high-technology economy requires a very large number of employees with excellent graduate degrees in academic disciplines in engineering, physical sciences and biological sciences. The best way Florida will be able to have a very large number of employees with graduate degrees in these academic disciplines, will be for Community Colleges in Florida to increase graduating people with Bachelor's Degrees. Therefore, Community Colleges in Florida will need to have two tasks, which will be graduating students with Associate Degrees and, additionally, graduating the majority of people in Florida earning their Bachelor's Degrees in Florida. This additional mandate for Community Colleges in Florida will enable all public universities to vastly increase the number students who graduate with Graduate Degrees (especially, engineering, physical and biological sciences) for the proposed top world class innovations/high-technology economy in Florida.

A top world class innovation/high-technology economy also require a greater number of employees with Doctoral Degrees (again privileging engineering, physical sciences and biological sciences as key academic disciplines) to work as researchers, senior scientists and engineers. This is due to the fact that it is the research outputs, of this sort of researchers, that produce the new and innovative high-technology products and services that are needed in a world class innovations/high-technology economy. The best way Florida will be able to supply adequate employees with Doctoral Degrees (in engineering, physical sciences and biological sciences) for the proposed world class innovations/high-technology economy, will be to vastly increase funding for universities to enable Florida to have about seven world class great research universities to become members of the Association of American Universities (AAU). Any university member of AAU means that such a university is one of the very top world class research universities.

AAU membership serves as a powerful magnet that attract the best faculty members and Ph.D. students to universities which are members of AAU. AAU universities produce a very large percentage of high quality research outputs in the United States (relative to the total percentage of AAU university members), and graduate over 50% of U.S. Ph.D. degrees. These achievements by AAU universities are remarkable, since there only 62 AAU universities in the whole world, of which 60 AAU universities in the United States and 2 in Canada. These achievements and qualities of AAU universities attract more high-

technology and global firms to those U.S. states where AAU universities are located. Therefore, as many U.S. states do not have any AAU universities, several seek to greatly improve their economies by attracting one or more AAU universities. In this context, Florida is better positioned than many other U.S. states, since it has one AAU university (University of Florida), compared to California that has the largest number with nine AAU universities (six public AAU universities and three private AAU ones). Linkages between technological firms (located relatively near to Stanford University—itsself an AAU university), faculty members and graduate students gave birth to Silicon Valley in northern California around the City of San Jose. The relatively large numbers of AAU universities in northern California and other parts of California enables Silicon Valley to continue to grow as the world's number one innovations/high-technology cluster and region. Frederick Terman, a very brilliant and enormously entrepreneurial professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University who worked there since 1925, later Dean of its Engineering School, and finally Provost at Stanford) is “called the ‘father of Silicon Valley’ because of his leadership in contributing to the rise of Stanford and the growth of the high-tech region” (Leih & Teece, 2016, p.185). Today, Google, Apple, Facebook and many other top world high-technology firms are headquartered in Silicon Valley.

Following the example of California, also Florida as the third-most populous U.S. state, should aim to expand its AAU universities from the current one (University of Florida) to six more to reach a total of seven future AAU universities. This study suggests that three of these six AAU universities should be public universities and the remaining three should be private universities. The fastest and easiest way to add three more Florida public universities as AAU universities is for three current Florida public universities to mandate their graduate students (who are mostly enrolled in Ph.D. Degree Programs) constitute 50% of their respective student populations, and for these three public universities to also have huge additional research funds, and attract more world class professors.

Also, this study suggests that three future AAU private universities (that are proposed by this study) should be brand new universities created by Florida business leaders, under the auspices of the proposed Florida Group, with abundant world class research outputs and only enroll graduate students (and the vast majority of these graduate students should be Ph.D. degree students studying engineering, physical sciences, biological sciences and business). This study also suggests that such proposed three private AAU universities should be geographically located in Miami, Orlando and Tampa. These proposed three private AAU universities, unlike the public AAU universities, will be less regulated and less bureaucratic, more agile, more flexible and more entrepreneurial to better exploit their role as private universities in working very closely with high-technology firms and other types of business firms in Florida. All this would greatly help Florida to speedily become a world class innovations/high-technology economy.

This study also suggests that the Florida Group should create permanent frameworks that enable the proposed three additional future public AAU universities and three future private AAU universities to have continuous funding to recruit top world class professors, who are global leaders in their respective academic specialties (with very high salaries and most excellent research facilities) and also be able to recruit the most talented world class Ph.D. students. These sorts of abilities for these proposed seven AAU universities in Florida will greatly enable them to speedily and robustly help Florida to develop a top world class innovations/high-technology economy and as hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region through robust research ties with major research universities in important Latin American countries (for example major research universities in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Jamaica, Mexico and Uruguay).

The Innovations/High-Technology Economy Florida

This portion of this study focuses on six variable or attributes: accelerated scientific and technological innovations and creativity attribute; numerous start-up high technology firms attribute; many venture capital firms; many big high technology firms attribute; high technology manufacturing economy attribute; and producing rather than trading economy attribute. The proposed major research

universities in Florida producing massive quality research outputs, and graduating enormous numbers of Ph.D. Degrees in engineering and sciences, will accelerate Florida's scientific and technological innovations. This sort of development will result in many start-up high-technology firms to grow and be attracted to Florida, alongside also many venture capital firms and many big high-tech firms. This will allow Florida to develop a massive high-technology manufacturing economy, turning the "Sunshine State" from a mostly trading economy to a mainly producing economy to realize the hopes of Florida Chamber of Commerce to expand "manufacturing efforts ... to become the number one state in the nation for innovation and economic development, we must continue to attract and retain high-skilled talent, target growing industries" (Florida Chamber of Commerce, 2017a).

Prosperity Florida

This section of this study focuses on four variables or attributes (and these are many high paying high-technology jobs attribute, high standard of living attribute, border region more prosperous than other regions in their respective countries attribute, and international cross border region, and socio-cultural-economic ties attribute). Florida, in future, having a top world innovations/high-technology economy will result in numerous high-paying high-technology jobs and high-standard of living in Florida, with the "Sunshine State" being more prosperous than many other U.S. states. Moreover, a very significant number of Floridians have ancestral and language ties to countries in South and Central America and Caribbean regions, alongside that Florida has long and enormous trade and economic ties to these countries will very easily make Florida to be the premier innovations/high-technology regional hub.

Florida's Five Innovation and High-Technology Clusters

This study also suggest that the proposed Florida Group will need to create five innovation and high technology clusters, similar to the style of Silicon Valley to grow and attract top world class high-technology firms. These five clusters will also need to have very close and robust research links with nearby universities:

1. The first proposed clusters, called the Orlando/Interstate Highway 4 (I-4) Corridor Cluster, should focus on computers/electronics, bio-technology, artificial intelligence, robotics, aerospace sciences and technologies with close and robust partnerships with University of Florida and University of Central Florida, plus a future private AAU university this study proposes for Orlando.
2. The second proposed cluster should be called the Miami Region Cluster, focused on bio-technology, computers/electronics, game design and technology, with close and robust research partnerships with University of Miami, Florida International University, Florida Atlantic University, and a future private AAU university that this study proposes.
3. The third proposed cluster should be called the Tampa Region Cluster, focused on bio-technology, computers/electronics and game design and technology with close and strong research partnerships with University of South Florida and Florida Polytechnic University, plus a future private AAU university proposed for Tampa.
4. The fourth proposed cluster should be called the Panhandle Region Cluster, focused on computers/electronics, cyber security, robotics, artificial intelligence and aerospace with close robust research partnerships with the Florida State University, Florida A&M University and University of West Florida.
5. A fifth proposed cluster should be called Jacksonville Region Cluster, focused on computers/electronics, robotics and bio-technology, with close and strong research partnerships with University of North Florida and Jacksonville University.

The continuous excellent new and innovative high-technological products and services, that will generate from these five innovation clusters, will further deepen Florida's position as the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

Florida as the Banking Hub of Americas

Florida is currently the banking hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region with many banks from these countries having branches in Miami (Enterprise Florida, 2017b), while also many United States and European global banks have branches in Miami to mainly serve Latin America and also help Florida to become the premier innovation/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

Florida Airports Hubs of the Americas

Due to its geographical location, Miami International Airport serves as a major international hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region. This geographical reality has made some to light-heartedly state that "it's a perennial joke that Miami is the only South American capital in North America" (by Bunny Schreiber, cargo marketing specialist at Miami International Airport, quoted in *InBound Logistics*, 2004). Orlando International Airport and Tampa International Airport, due to their locations, can also serve in future as key international hubs for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

Seaports of the Americas

Due to the geography of Florida, seaports and other transportation infrastructures and systems in Florida, together "with intermodal connections" are regionally and internationally vital for "Pan-American trade" (*InBound Logistics*, 2004) for many countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region. These geographical reality, transportation infrastructures and systems realities, of Florida will also very strongly enable Florida to be the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

Tourism

Currently tourism and agriculture are the two main pillars of the economy of Florida. If in future the economy of Florida is transformed into a top world class innovations/high-technology economy, high technology manufacturing, tourism and agriculture, will be the three main pillars of the economy of Florida.

The fact that Florida attracts millions of tourists from all over the world, due to the attractiveness of the state, means that this reality will also make a future Florida, with a top innovations/high-technology economy, to very easily attract the top best engineers and scientists from other states in the United States and from other countries to relocate to Florida to work for possible numerous world class high-technology firms that will exist in Florida. Also, a possible future Florida premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region, will also greatly increase the number of tourists that visit Florida as over 50% of tourists visiting Florida are from Latin America.

Conclusions

As this study elaborately shows, Florida currently has a strong elaborate trade, economic and cultural ties with countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region. Also, the geographical location of Florida makes these excellent ties with the Latin American region almost inevitable and also enables Florida to vastly increase trade, economic and cultural ties, and in future easily become the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region.

The early sections of this study note that embarking on transforming Florida into a top world class innovations/high-technology economy will have some challenges, as will be expected in any political system. This study proposes creating a “Florida Group” (consisting of the top seven business leaders in Florida) as the best structural framework that will easily handle the challenges, and also very successfully accomplish the transformation of Florida into a top world class innovation/high-technology economy. Additionally, this study places in the hands of such “Florida Group” the tasks of powering and inter-linking the variables or attributes that are needed for the transformation of Florida’s into a top world class innovations/high-technology economy. This study sees a world class gold standard higher education as the pivotal attribute that will power and drive all the other attributes to accelerate and expand scientific research outputs, new and innovative technological products and services, and a very highly-educated population. The creation and invention of very numerous new and innovative technological products and services, and cultivating a very highly-educated population in Florida, in turn attracts to Florida many start-up technology firms, venture capital firms, which will aim to fund and invest in the start-up firms, and big global high-technology firms, which all aim to commercialize, mass manufacture, and market the new and innovative technological products and services. These attributes will, in turn, transform Florida into high-technology manufacturing economy and a producing (rather than a trading) economy. These additional attributes, in turn, result in Florida having a very high-standard of living, and also in making Florida to be enormously prosperous than many other states in the United States. Additionally, the attribute of Florida having long-standing enormous trade, economic and cultural ties with countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region will, in future, help Florida to have a top world class innovations/high-technology economy.

On the whole, all the above attributes will inter-link to create in future a top world class high-technology economy in Florida, as noted in other portions of this study, the factor of current trade, economic and cultural ties with countries in South and Central America and Caribbean region, and the factor of geographical proximity for the “Sunshine State”, will enable Florida to become the premier innovations/high-technology economy hub for all countries in Latin America and Caribbean region.

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A Woman of Power: the Leadership of Speaker Nancy Pelosi

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ABSTRACT: Nancy Pelosi (D, CA-12) was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1987 and was the first female Speaker of the House since 2007. Despite the length and significance of her career in the House, there is very little academic literature devoted to the effectiveness of her leadership. In an attempt to fill this research gap, this thesis will raise the following questions: Is Nancy Pelosi an effective Speaker of the House, and has her effectiveness changed significantly over her term as Speaker? For purposes of this Honors Thesis, leadership effectiveness is defined as the Speaker's ability to advance her caucus' legislation and retain her party's majority and power. Leadership style is defined as the actions taken and choices made by the Speaker in order to achieve these goals. Thus, this Honors Thesis utilizes the framework developed by Ronald M. Peters and Cindy Simon Rosenthal of 5 normative criteria in which to judge contemporary congressional leadership. This thesis considers leadership episodes that occurred after their work in order to continue the study of Pelosi's leadership and evaluate any changes. This research concludes that while she has some effectiveness shortcomings, Pelosi is an effective leader and her leadership style and process has remained relatively constant with few minor changes to account for the quickly evolving political environment her leadership exists within.

Introduction

Nancy Pelosi (D, CA-12) of the Democratic Party was first elected Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives on January 3rd, 2007 making her the first Californian, first Italian-American and first woman to hold the position. Only increasing the significance of her election, she was the highest-ranking female official in United States history prior to the election of Vice-President Kamala Harris in 2020. Pelosi held the speakership until the 2010 Midterms and was reinstated upon the Democratic party regaining a majority in the House of Representatives in the 2018 Midterm elections. Additionally, Pelosi has served in the House of Representatives since June 1987 and has held multiple leadership offices including House Minority Whip, Leader of House Democratic Caucus, and House Minority Leader. Despite the length and significance of her career in the House, there is very little academic literature devoted to the effectiveness of her leadership. In an attempt to fill this research gap, this Honors Thesis raises the following questions: Is Nancy Pelosi an effective Speaker of the House and has her effectiveness changed significantly over her term as Speaker? For purposes of this research, leadership effectiveness is defined as the Speaker's ability to advance her caucus' legislation and retain her party's majority and power. Leadership style is defined as the actions taken and choices made by the Speaker in order to achieve these goals.

Context and Justification

During her 34-years term in the House and over the course of her multiple speakerships, relevant ideological shifts have taken place in both the Democratic and Republican parties and their congressional representatives. A vital duty of the Speaker is to garner support and votes for their party's legislative priorities therefore the ideological make-up of Representatives and how a Speaker handles this make-up has an impact on their effectiveness. While there have been changes in both parties, Political Sciences research shows an asymmetrical pattern of polarization. As shown in Hacker and Pierson's 2015 study, "polarization is primarily about steadily increasing GOP extremism" (Hacker & Pierson, p.61) with

conservative Republicans replacing those who are more moderate and the rise of the Tea Party movement. This shift and strongly held value to block Democratic legislation at all costs have led to consistent usage of the filibuster to block legislation, the passage of systemic voter suppression and disenfranchisement, the appointment of more extreme Supreme Court justices and lower court judges, and the nomination of farther right candidates for all levels of office from Presidential nominees to state legislatures. In the context of Congressional leadership, House Republicans have become increasingly extreme and unwilling to collaborate on Democratic-led legislation.

However, there is disagreement amongst academics and even some popular media sources relating to the characterization of polarization. There are many reasons for this, some of which are outlined in Hacker and Pierson's publication, including a fear of appearing biased. Journals, newspapers, and other academic and popular media sources fear that not emphasizing neutrality or equal blame on both parties for polarization will discredit their work as biased or left-leaning. (Hacker & Pierson, p.61) This has skewed the perception of the American public on this topic which complicated the roles of Democratic leadership, including Speaker Pelosi, as they are battling public opinion and elections as well as an increasingly extreme opposing party.

Aside from broad ideological shifts that have taken place during her tenure in Congress, Speaker Pelosi has served under four different Presidents, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, two Republicans and two Democrats. This thesis will continue the research of Ronald M. Peters and Cindy Simon Rosenthal and therefore focus on Pelosi's leadership under Obama, Trump and Biden. Other defining historical moments to have taken place during Speaker Pelosi's terms include the election of the first African-American President in 2008, the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, the 2010 Midterm election with record numbers of women elected to the U.S. Congress, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 and 2021, the 2020 election of Joe Biden and the first female Vice President, Kamala Harris, and the Storming of the U.S. Capital on January 6th, 2021.

Nancy Pelosi's speakership has taken place during a historic time in American history, but has she been an effective leader? The vast majority of political science and leadership research takes an empirical approach using data-driven algorithms and proposing conclusions to be broadly applied across situations and time periods. There is a large body of this style of research on female politicians and leadership that draws conclusions regarding electoral patterns, political engagements, gender bias among female candidates and politicians, types of bills, and issues of interest to female leaders. Additionally, relating to House Speaker's characteristics specifically, there is research that models and draws conclusions about effectiveness based on the notion that both personal characteristics and outside context impact leadership effectiveness using an empirical style (Owens, Schraufnagel & Li). However, normative analysis, unlike this empirical style, is able to provide practitioners and the leaders themselves with clear suggestions. Therefore, this research will take a normative approach in an attempt to reach conclusions and produce research useful in research as well as in practice.

To evaluate leadership effectiveness in a normative fashion, I will utilize the framework designed by Ronald M. Peters and Cindy Simon Rosenthal and discussed in their 2008 article entitled *Assessing Nancy Pelosi* and their 2010 book entitled *Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the New American Politics*. Their framework is based on the following questions;

1. "How effective is the Speaker as an electoral strategist and fundraiser?
2. How effective is the Speaker in setting an agenda that furthers her party's electoral and policy interests?
3. How effective is she in building majority coalitions in support of that agenda?
4. How effective is the Speaker in sustaining a favorable public image, and how effective are the Speaker's communications organization and public relations strategies?

5. Is the Speaker willing the challenge her caucus majority when in her judgment it is in the best interest of the party or country?
6. How fair has the Speaker been in enforcing the ruled and norms of the House?" (Peters & Rosenthal, p.3).

The article and the related book published in 2010, only evaluate Pelosi's leadership prior to her Speakership and in her first term as Speaker, under President Bush. In order to continue this research, I will evaluate her leadership in terms since, under Presidents Obama, Trump and now Biden.

Speaker Pelosi's service as the first female Speaker of the House is of extreme historical importance as she was the highest-ranking female elected official until very recently. As we have seen with the election of Vice President Kamala Harris, Speaker Pelosi's historic leadership is only the beginning of female political leadership in the United States and the study of her leadership will continue to be relevant as more women achieve these higher levels of power. Beyond female leadership, the political era Pelosi is leading in has seen major changes on multiple fronts. Termed New American Politics by Peters and Rosenthal, this phenomenon is characterized by changes in the American political sphere that relate to "partisanship, money, organization, technology and representation" (Peters & Rosenthal, p.9). Pelosi is one of the first Speakers to lead through this evolved time in American Politics and her successors, both male and female, will benefit from an understanding of her actions in this new environment. The study of her leadership is relevant for political scientists and female leaderships academics and also for current and future House leadership to learn from her successes, failures and leadership style.

Chapter 1: Intra-House Effectiveness

The effectiveness criteria developed by Peters and Rosenthal can be segmented into two main categories, intra-House and extra-House effectiveness. Intra-House effectiveness is measured through the following framework questions;

1. "How effective is the Speaker in setting an agenda that furthers her party's electoral and policy interests?
2. How effective is she in building majority coalitions in support of that agenda?
3. Is the Speaker willing to challenge her caucus majority when in her judgment it is in the best interest of the party or country?
4. How fair has the Speaker been in enforcing the ruled and norms of the House?" (Peters & Rosenthal, p.3).

Each of these criteria explore and evaluate Pelosi's effectiveness as a Speaker inside the Capitol building and in terms of the official duties of House leaders. To begin, this work will explore Pelosi's effectiveness in agenda setting and building support.

Agenda Setting and Coalition Building: "How effective is the Speaker in setting an agenda that furthers her party's electoral and policy interests? How effective is she in building majority coalitions in support of that agenda?"

In order to evaluate effectiveness in agenda setting, furthering the Democrat's electoral and policy interests, and building majority coalitions I will look at leadership episodes relating to the 2018 "Better Deal" agenda and the 2020 "For the People" agenda. Political party agendas are vital to the success of the party and party leaders, like the Speaker of the House or Minority Leader, are instrumental leaders in ensuring platforms are relevant, achievable, and clear. In his book, *Understanding American Political Parties*, Jeffrey M. Stonecash explains the role of political agendas as a communication and identity tool for parties that aids in mobilizing voters and hopefully in successful elections (p. 5). While Pelosi was not Speaker of the House in 2018 when the "Better Deal" agenda was released, the Democratic party was successful in regaining a House majority during this midterm election and she regained the Speakership. As the Speaker, it then became her responsibility to ensure the promotion and enactment of the agenda.

It is important to note that the success of the 2018 and 2020 agendas cannot be directly compared due to the macro environment that each exists in. While the Democratic Party controlled the House of Representatives during both, control of the White House and the Senate plays a vital role. Between 2018 and the 2020 election, the Republican Party controlled both the Presidency and the Senate while following the 2020 election Democrats have taken control of both entities. Additionally, we must recognize that while Pelosi plays a party leadership role, she does not have absolute control over the passage of legislation. She must work with other party leaders, namely President Joe Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.

Election night of 2016 was a difficult one for the Democratic party and its leaders, Pelosi included. She was unsuccessful in regaining the House majority, and the Republican Party secured the presidency, and both congressional majorities. In 2018, Pelosi and other Democrats vowed to learn from the party's 2016 mistakes and unveiled an economically focused platform, "A Better Deal". This agenda showcased to voters a Democratic party unified under a commitment to working people, raising wages, lowering healthcare costs, strengthening and enforcing antitrust laws, and investing in infrastructure to rebuild rural America. These policies as well as understanding the mistakes of 2016 show Pelosi and all Democrats' willingness to learn from mistakes and address the needs of the American people.

Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats wasted no time introducing legislation to begin acting on their campaign promises. On January 4th, 2019, day two of the 116th Congress, Speaker Pelosi and House Democrats introduces H.R 1 with sponsor Representative John P. Sarbanes (MD-3) and 236 Democratic cosponsors, Pelosi included. This bill focuses on expanding voter registration and voting access, creating a fair and nonpartisan redistricting commission, strengthening election security, reforming campaign finance, and instituting ethics requirements across all branches of the federal government. Two months later on March 8th, 2019 this bill passed the House on a strict party line vote of 234 to 193 (*Congress.gov*). In a floor speech two days prior to the vote, Pelosi commends her caucus, specifically the Freshman class and the bill's sponsor for their work and attempts an appeal to Republican members stating that regardless of party each legislator, "should want everyone to be able to vote without obstacles" (Pelosi). It could be argued that H.R 1 was a success and illustrates Pelosi's effectiveness regarding building coalitions to further her party's policy interests. However, Pelosi and other House Democrats knew that this bill would not pass the Senate as Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell previously vowed not to bring this bill to a vote on the Senate floor. He remained committed and the bill went to die in the Senate Committee on Finance without ever receiving a vote. While Pelosi has no power over McConnell or then President Trump, it is difficult to consider this a success in "furthering her party's... policy interests" (Peters & Rosenthal, p.3) when it never had any chance of becoming law. Electorally however Pelosi can be considered successful. Many aspects of this bill, including automatic voter registration, making election day a national holiday, and same day registration, are popular with American voters (Pew). There are fairly wide partisan gaps in terms of support on these issues, as there are with many issues, but in a study conducted by Pew Research, each of these issues received overwhelming support from independent and Democratic or Democratic leaning voters. Additionally, the same poll reported that 67% of Americans, 84% of left leaning voters, and 48% of right leaning voters agree that "everything possible" must be done to ensure easier voting access for all citizens (Pew). With each of her members being up for reelection in 2020, along with President Trump and 1/3rd of Senators, the passage of this bill allows Pelosi to show the American voters that Democrats are unified around tackling corruption in elections and government, an issue 82% of voters support (Vox).

In hopes of retaining the House majority, regaining the Senate majority, and winning the Presidency, Democratic leaders released the 2020 "For the People" agenda. This platform contains many of the same issues as the 2018 agenda, focusing on combatting economic and political corruption, lowering healthcare costs, strengthening public education, rebuilding infrastructure, and supporting working families.

Electorally, this strategy provided mixed results. Democrats successfully won the White House and took a slim Senate majority while in the same election House Democrats faced a net loss of 10 seats. While they still hold the House majority, this was an unexpected and significant loss that created legislative difficulties as Democrats must be absolutely unified in votes in order to overcome Republican opposition.

Exactly two years later on January 4th, 2021 Representative Sarbanes again filed H.R. 1 – For the People Act of 2021. This version of the bill is essentially identical to that from 2019 and again works to expand voter registration and voting access, create a fair and nonpartisan redistricting commission, strengthen election security, reform campaign finance, and institute ethics requirements across all branches of the federal government. Following a very similar path as 2019, this bill passed the House on March 3rd, 2021 on an almost party line vote of 220-210, with only one Democrat voting against the provision. While this is again a testament to Pelosi's ability to rally her extremely diverse caucus around the party's legislative priorities, she did face a small amount of resistance as Representative Bennie Thompson (MS-2), who had voted for the bill in 2019 and cosponsored both the 2019 and 2021 version, voted with Republicans. In a statement to Fox News following the vote, Thompson claimed his vote aligned with the will of his constituents who opposed the redistricting and public finance portions of the bill. Similar to 2019, H.R. 1 is currently being held up in the Senate. Although we have yet to see the enactment of this legislation, it is fair to consider this a success for Pelosi in terms of agenda setting and coalition building. She was able to introduce a substantial bill that corresponded to her party's campaign platform and obtained 99% party unity on its passage.

In addition to voting rights and issues with corruption in H.R. 1, Pelosi and the Democrats are again working to fund and update American infrastructure. In 2019 Pelosi successfully passed H.R. 2, the Moving Forward Act, which allocated funds for all aspects of infrastructure and climate change solutions but the bill never reached a vote in the Senate. Now, with a Democratically-controlled Senate and White House, Pelosi is taking a different approach to ensure time isn't wasted passing a House bill that will be blocked by Senate Republicans, budget reconciliation, which allows the Democrats to pass legislation with a simple majority vote. Throughout her career, Pelosi has demonstrated a deep and unwavering understanding of Republican tactics to derail Democratic policy. A previous example of this is found in 2010 during the passage of the Affordable Care Act as former President Obama was determined to work across the aisle and pass this provision in a bipartisan manner despite warnings from Pelosi. In recent statements, Pelosi has ensured there will be no bipartisan infrastructure bill without budget reconciliation, a declaration that is putting pressure on both the progressive and moderate wings of her party to support both measures in order to achieve their goals. (Diaz & Foran). While this tactic will allow Pelosi to circumvent her Republican opponents, she must still be able to unify her caucus around this ambitious bill, a feat that is proving difficult. At the time of publication, this bill is still being debated and undergoing alterations in the House however it appears Pelosi is facing more obstacles within her own party than anticipated.

In regard to coalition building, one of the greatest challenges Pelosi has faced in recent years is unifying an extremely ideologically diverse Democratic Caucus and the many districts and voters they represent. This challenge is only amplified by the intense unification of the Republican Party and their commitment to opposing any Democratic initiative. In order to unify her caucus around party initiatives, Pelosi takes a lesson from her politically active father, Thomas D'Alesandro Jr., former Baltimore Mayor and Congressman from Maryland, and relies on loyalty and the exchange of favors to ensure support for the party's initiatives. In her biography of the Speaker, Molly Ball illustrates actions taken by Pelosi to build loyalty with her members such as personalized letters and meetings with members, the use of political favors, and working to ensure her members' reelection. These tactics are extremely successful and loyalty among her members is strong. When Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives in 2018, a bloc of members publically opposed Pelosi's run for speaker but their rebellion quickly fell apart when no member was willing to run against her. Additionally, while she has been characterized throughout her

career as a “San Francisco Liberal” and has often been a champion for liberal policy, she governs closer to the ideological center of her caucus and is careful about the votes she brings to the floor. She is always cognizant of what she asks of all members of her caucus in terms of votes and is careful not to force those from more conservative swing districts into votes that could cost their reelection.

Challenging Her Caucus: “Is the Speaker willing the challenge her caucus majority when in her judgment it is in the best interest of the party or country?”

Maintaining a united caucus is an extremely difficult task, especially given the increasing partisanship and diversification in ideology the Democratic party has seen in recent years. Given the strenuous nature of this task, it is difficult for a Speaker to challenge her caucus majority as it puts the success of votes at risk. However, “a Speaker must at times lead and move members beyond parochial goals or narrow self-interest,” (Peters & Rosenthal) in order to achieve a greater good for the party or the county. It is impossible for Pelosi or any Speaker to satisfy each one of her members with every decision and when tough decisions must be made, the Speaker’s leadership abilities are tested. A major role of political leaders is to obtain a deep understanding of the wants and needs of their members and the citizens as well as the realities each policy exists in, including that of the opposition and limitations of the political structure. It is the leader’s role to “convert hopes and aspirations into sanctioned expectations,” (Burns, p.118) which sometimes leads to a need to act against the will of her caucus. In my evaluation of Pelosi in this aspect of leadership, this research will focus on the passage of the 2010 Affordable Care Act and her actions regarding environmental legislation.

Originally, the Affordable Care Act was intended to allocate funding for family planning and abortion services however this was hindering the bill’s ability to receive endorsement from the Council of Catholic Bishops, and therefore vital votes from some more religion conscious legislators. Pelosi, a staunch and lifelong advocate of safe and legal abortion (Ball, 179), was unable to create a compromise with the Bishops and was instead forced to plead to the liberal women of her caucus to vote for a bill without the funding. Pro-choice Democrats made up a vast majority of the caucus, with 190 in the Pro-Choice Caucus, but without the votes of the religious minority, the bill could not pass and Democrats would yet again be unsuccessful in bringing Americans more affordable healthcare, a top issue for voters during Obama’s 2008 campaign (Ball, p.182). Pelosi was successful in persuading the women of her caucus and the bill advanced through the House but faced unfortunate circumstances in the Senate due to the death of Senator Kennedy. A smaller version of the bill along with reconciliation additions was later passed. This instance shows Pelosi’s effectiveness in going against her caucus, and even her own beliefs, for the greater good of the country and the party. Since its passage, the Affordable Care Act has expanded coverage to over 20 million previously uninsured Americans (Bloomberg) and brought “the largest expansion of insurance coverage since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid” (Weil) with “significant improvements in women’s health insurance coverage, access to care, and use of health care services” (Weil) and more. In addition to the benefits brought to the American people, it showed voters that the Democratic party could create changes in the healthcare system. Pelosi’s choice and ability to challenge her caucus majority heavily impacted the passage of the Affordable Care Act and shows great leadership effectiveness.

Climate change has been a major threat to our country and the planet as well as a major issue in American politics for many years. Pelosi has been a champion for climate action for years, creating the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming during her first speakership in 2007, leading U.S. lawmakers in the 2019 U.N. Climate Change Conference, and working to pass Obama’s 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act (Roberts). However, this issue has been a contentious one among American lawmakers and between members of the Democratic caucus. Obama’s 2009 Clean Energy and Security Act was not universally accepted by the Democratic caucus in Congress with many representatives, especially from coal-producing and heavily industrial states opposing the energy restructuring the bill presented (Sheppard).

However, understanding the importance of climate action to the party, the country, and even the world, Pelosi played a vital role in the House's passage of this bill, calling members, exchanging favors, and whipping votes up until the last second. The bill did pass the House by one vote, with 44 democratic members voting against it. Unfortunately, the bill was never able to successfully pass the democratically controlled senate and all of Pelosi and other House Democrats' work amounted to no real change for the country or success for the party to use during the upcoming 2011 Midterm election. In this case, Pelosi's decision to go against the more moderate and pro-coal wing of her caucus was unsuccessful due to greater issues within the party, specifically the Senate Democrats' inability to gain a majority of votes on the legislation. In more recent years, evidence that this failure still affects Pelosi's actions on climate change can be seen in her hesitation to pursue large scale, progressive environmental legislation, like the Green New Deal. Since regaining her Speaker position in 2019 there has been a renewed Congressional interest in climate change and even the passage of H.R. 113, an appropriations bill, signed by President Trump, that allocated funding and updated the nation's energy policies, (National Conference of State Legislatures, p.1), but Pelosi has remained unwilling to bring forward legislation of the same caliber since the failure of the Obama era legislation (Center for Climate & Energy Solutions).

Pelosi's actions with the 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act and her continued hesitance towards climate change legislation show inadequacies in leadership when going against the will of her caucus. The blame does not fall on Pelosi alone, especially since she was able to pass the bill in the House, however, this legislative and leadership misstep must still be considered. In recent years, there has been a renewed interest and increased pressure put on the Speaker by climate activists and the progressive wing of the party (Dunn, p.115) for climate action, specifically the Green New Deal, but the Speaker has been hesitant to respond with tangible legislative action. While Pelosi may be attempting to learn from past errors in order to avoid failures like that of Obama's 2009 American Clean Energy and Security Act, 82% of Democratic voters consider the environment to be "very important" (Pew Research Center, p.14) and it is unlikely she will be able to ignore this issue much longer. There are lessons to be learned from the 2009 failure in challenging her caucus, however, Pelosi must not allow this to prevent any environmental legislation or progress.

Rules and Norms: "How fair has the Speaker been in enforcing the rules and norms of the House?"

In their book, *Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the New American Politics*, Peters and Rosenthal discuss this concept of "new politics", an idea that the political realm that Speaker Pelosi is leading in differs from that of her predecessors. They characterize this transformation as consisting of five tenants, "partisanship, money, organization, technology, and representation," (Peters & Rosenthal, p.9), the most applicable to this factor of effectiveness being partisanship. Historically, the American two-party system functioned in a way that both parties centralized their views to better cater to moderate voters in order to create a majority and win elections however more recently both parties, but more so the Republican Party, have deployed a base-voter strategy that has ushered in an era of increased partisanship in Congress (Peters & Rosenthal, p.9). This has changed the role of the Speaker as she must now focus on unifying her caucus to fight Republican obstructionism in order to pass any legislation and deliver on her party's agenda. Historically, it is not the norm for the Speaker to abandon attempts to reach across the aisle when passing legislation and this could be categorized as an unfair attempt to silence or ignore the opposing party, however, in this case, this is not evidence of a lack of Pelosi's effectiveness. Rather it proves her ability to adapt Congressional norms to meet the modern challenges she faces. Despite the obstructionist "party of no" approach Congressional Republicans took during the Obama presidency (Grunwald), Pelosi and other Democratic leaders were able to pass much of his agenda including healthcare reform, economic stimulus, LGBTQ+ protection, and more. Pelosi's ability to unify her caucus and whip votes for important legislation comes from her extensive knowledge of each member, their district and elections, their ideology, and key

issues. With this knowledge, she has been able to continue governing despite the constantly evolving macro environment including Republican obstructionism. While this does not necessarily align with historic norms, it has been vital to her success.

During the 117th Congress (2021-2023), Speaker Pelosi also took procedural steps to quell Republican interference. On January 4th, 2021, the first day of the 117th Congress, Speaker Pelosi and other House leadership introduced and passed H.R. 8, Adopting the Rules of the House of Representatives of the 117th Congress, and for other purposes, to establish changes to the existing rules for the new Congress. One notable change is made to a House procedure known as a motion to recommit which enables a member to send a bill back to committee for amendment and additional debate before the final vote is taken. Motions to recommit are a tool for the minority party and often “constitutes the Minority’s one opportunity to obtain a vote on an alternative or a proposal to improve the measure” (Slaughter). During her term as Speaker of the 111th Congress, Pelosi removed the option to recommit with general instructions, leaving the straight re-committal or specified instructions options and H.R. 8 further limits this procedure effectively removing its power (Roberts). The motion had previously allowed the Republican minority to block many Democratic efforts for many years while the Democratic minority rarely had success with the motion, and inequality related to the consistency in party unity seen in the Republican party. Pelosi’s removal of the motion to recommit can be characterized as unfair treatment of the minority as it is a rule that dates back to the 1st Congress. Further, Democrats will again find themselves in the minority and it is unlikely that a Republican majority would reinstate this rule given that it is a tool for the minority therefore it is possible Pelosi has created issues for future Democratic leaders. However, given the historic failure of Democratic motions to recommit it is entirely possible that this issue will never emerge. While the alteration of the motion to recommit is an attempt by Pelosi to control Republican obstructionism, it can also be seen as unfair treatment mainly since the majority is also able to limit the power of the motion by voting it down.

Additionally, this rules update takes steps to ensure that House rules and norms are updated to maintain fairness and reflect modern concerns. This bill includes measures that make the Office of Diversity and Inclusion, and therefore the Director of the Office, permanent House structures. In an effort to make House rules and other literature more gender inclusive, words such as “mother”, “father”, “sister”, “brother”, among others, have been changed to “parent” and sibling” as well as “he or she” being replaced with non-gendered alternatives. Despite Republican’s concern over the “wokeness” of these changes (Howell), these actions ensure that the House of Representatives acts out of fairness for all and follows procedures that reflect its increased and growing diversity.

Chapter 2: Extra-House Effectiveness

The second effectiveness category, extra-House effectiveness explores Speaker Pelosi’s effectiveness as Speaker of the House in her unofficial duties that extend beyond the walls of the Capitol building. Extra-House effectiveness is measured through the following questions:

1. “How effective is the Speaker as an electoral strategist and fundraiser?
2. How effective is the Speaker in sustaining a favorable public image?
3. How effective are the Speaker’s communications organization and public relations strategies?”
(Peters & Rosenthal, p.3).

How effective is the Speaker as an electoral strategist and fundraiser?

Prior to her career in the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi served in multiple campaign related roles from volunteer to Chair of the California Democratic Party and has utilized her experience to aid House Democrats in election pursuits. As with many facets of her career as Speaker, the context in which she is strategizing has changed immensely in recent years and Pelosi must evolve her strategies to reflect this. She

has taken on a more active role in the campaigning and fundraising portion of her responsibilities than previous Speakers as she is focused on campaign strategy constantly, not only during election cycles.

A prominent example of Speaker Pelosi's electoral success can be found in the 2018 Midterm elections. The previous 2016 election saw the election of Republican President Donald Trump and Republican control of both houses of Congress, and while House Democrats did gain six seats in this election they fell far short of the majority by 23 seats. Pelosi was determined to regain control of the House of Representatives as it would enable her and fellow Democrats to place a check on President Trump's power. In order to achieve this, she ran a diverse slate of candidates on a platform centered around the issues that are important to voters while also highlighting the failures of their opponents. As discussed in the agenda setting section, Pelosi's 2018 "Better Deal" agenda was a commitment to the average American and focused on issues that polled well with Democratic voters such as healthcare costs, higher wages, antitrust and more, and highlighted that Democrats were able to learn and grow from their previous mistakes to better serve working class people. In terms of candidate recruitment, Pelosi invested in a research endorsed strategy with a candidate pool consisting of a historic number of people of color in an effort to mobilize voters. Political science research suggests that running candidates of color increases voter turnout among people of color, especially black women, who have proved in recent years to be vital to the success of left leaning candidates (Medencia & Fowler).

Additionally, candidate diversity has been found to promote turnout amongst young people (Amuedo-Dorantes & Bucheli), a demographic that saw a 15.7-point increase in turnout between the 2014 and 2018 elections (Misra). This strategy was an overwhelming success both for overall voter turnout and for House Democrats. The 2018 Midterm election saw record breaking turnout with total votes for House candidates only 2% lower than the general 2016 election, most of this increase being among Democratic voters (Galston). Democrats were able to gain 40 House seats giving them the majority and control of the chamber as well as reinstating Nancy Pelosi as Speaker. Pelosi's commitment to diversity led to more than 100 women, the most in American history, being elected to the House. Additionally, the 116th Congress was the most diverse in history with only one-third of Pelosi's caucus being comprised of white men, compared to the Republican's almost 90% (Ball). It is important to mention the contextual structure of this election, factors outside of Pelosi's control, as well. First, Congressional Democrats were historically slated for success as the out of power party typically is during off year elections. Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the absence of President Trump from the 2018 midterm ballot which caused a 20% decrease in Republican voter turnout from 2016 (Galston). However, while contextual factors were at play, the level of success attained by House Democrats far exceeded expectations and Pelosi played a large role in the Democratic success in this election, which speaks to her abilities as an electoral strategist.

Compared to 2018, the 2020 election tells a different story for Pelosi and House Democrats. Generally, the 2020 election may seem like an electoral success for the Democratic Party as they elected President Joe Biden, regained a (slim) Senate majority, and retained their House majority giving them seemingly ultimate control of 2 branches of the federal government. However, Pelosi and House Democrats lost 10 seats narrowing their majority considerably and giving Republicans an easier path to the majority in the 2022 midterms. There are many factors that contributed to this loss including Republican recruitment strategies, a misunderstanding of the Republican and pro-Trump electorate, and reliance on outdated strategies. Democrats have consistently far exceeded Republicans in terms of racial diversity and the presence of female candidates. While the Democratic caucus still contains far more female and diverse members than its Republican counterpart, Republicans borrowed from Pelosi's 2018 strategy and "made a concerted effort to recruit and fund" (Jacobson, p.35) and more diverse candidate pool, an effort that proved successful. While this is not Pelosi's fault, if anything it speaks to the strength of a strategy she previously implemented, it did play a role in her electoral loss in the 2020 election.

Additionally, Democrats faced issues relating to the misunderstandings of the electoral behavior and power of Trump and pro-Trump. Since the rise of the Tea Party movement in the Republican Party, on multiple electoral occasions, Pelosi and Democratic leaders have underestimated their power. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) report on the 2020 election identified the under-representation of Trump and GOP voters in pre-election polling as a key issue (Kane), one that persisted from the 2016 general election, with little having been done to rectify this error. It is clear that Pelosi and other Democratic leaders must develop better systems of prediction that consider polling biases and the under-representation of the threat Democratic candidates face with pro-Trump voters in order to allocate resources more effectively and protect their majority in the future. Finally, Pelosi and Congressional Democrats continue to rely on and allocate funds to antiquated campaign strategies that do not take advantage of modern technologies. Another substantial misstep during the 2020 election was a commitment to utilizing old media, such as television advertisements and not enough emphasis on new digital platforms (Kane). These modern digital strategies have proven successful by the Republican Party, most notably President Trump but others as well, and the Democratic Party, for example, Stacey Abrams and the 2020 Georgia Senatorial successes, but have not been widely embraced by House Democrats. Pelosi is relying on outdated polling and campaign strategies that, while successful in the past, do not fare well against the challenges Democrats face against the modern Republican Party.

Her skills in electoral strategy are not limited to election cycles. Pelosi is extremely conscious of the decisions she is asking her members to make and is careful not to force vulnerable members to break campaign promises or make difficult decisions unnecessarily. For example, during her campaign for the Speakership in 2019, a group of Democratic Representatives, some newly elected and others reelected, had made campaign promises not to support Pelosi's run for the Speakership, however, they were unsuccessful in identifying a candidate to oppose her. In an effort to allow those members to keep their promises, Pelosi prepared the ballots with yes and no boxes next to her name (Ball, 283). Additionally, she does not bring controversial votes to the floor without proper reason to avoid endangering the reelection of her moderate "majority makers" unless it is absolutely necessary. An example of this can be seen in her handling of the impeachment proceeding against President Donald Trump. As early as one month into his presidency, some Democrats began calling for impeachment proceedings to be brought against the President, but Pelosi knew, with the Republican Controlled Senate, they had almost no chance of producing tangible results and delayed endorsing this measure. She did eventually pursue impeachment in September of 2019, a calculated risk as she was acting ahead of public opinion, a rare occurrence for the Speaker. While this can be seen as forcing some of her members into a difficult decision, much of her caucus was behind her as evidence had surfaced of foreign manipulation utilizing Congressionally allocated funds, and Pelosi was able to shape public opinion on this issue with her actions (Ball, p.311-314). Speaker Pelosi understands that campaigning is more than fundraising and election strategy and is careful to ensure that her leadership and actions do not put her members, and ultimately her majority, in danger. This does not however mean that she never takes political risks, but she is cognizant of the electoral effects of her actions at all times.

On the fundraising front, Pelosi has been honing her abilities since the beginning of her political involvement as a volunteer and in other party positions and she even served as the Finance Chairwoman for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee prior to her election to the House. Upon election to party leadership, she has committed to utilizing her fundraising abilities to further her party's majority. She attends fundraising events for candidates, instituted mandatory call times and donations minimums for her members, and established Federal Political Committees for regaining or retaining the House majority. Pelosi obviously excels in this area and has been a leading fundraiser in the House since her election, (Peters & Rosenthal, p.10). It is difficult to quantify exactly how much she has raised for candidates in any particular election as these donations are made to various committees, campaigns, and

funds. However, donations made to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee can provide insight, especially in comparison to previous years and its Republican counterpart, the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC). During the 2016 election cycle, between January 1st, 2015, and December 31st, 2016, the DCCC far outraised the Republican's bringing in over \$220 million compared to the NRCC's \$170 million while the DNC' and RNC's fundraising totals are within \$7 million of each other. Even more impressive is Pelosi's fundraising success in the 2018 Midterm election cycle as the DCCC outraised not only the NRCC by almost \$90 million, but the Democratic National Committee as well, bringing in over \$120 million more than the DNC, (Federal Election Commission). It is not uncommon for midterm fundraising to lag behind that of presidential election years, as we see with the DNC, but Pelosi was able to overcome this precedent and it proved successful as she regained the House majority in this election (Federal Elections Commission). Compared to the NRCC, the 2020 election cycle tells a similar story and yet again confirms Pelosi's skill in fundraising.

Public Relations and Communication Strategy: "How effective is the Speaker in sustaining a favorable public image, and how effective are the Speaker's communications organization and public relations strategies?"

Peters and Rosenthal discuss two important aspects of public relations and communication strategy, personal image and party message. Personal image refers to the Speaker's ability to address the public and handle criticisms while party message includes public relations strategy for the party's agenda or legislative priorities. As discussed in Peters and Rosenthal's book the rise in popular usage of the internet and social media is a key aspect of modern American politics and has affected the media landscape the Speaker leads in. This shift has put the Speaker's public relations ability under increased scrutiny and forces her to excel in promoting herself and her party to a greater extent than before.

On personal image, Pelosi does not dedicate much time or energy to being the focus of the media. She has taken on a role as an insider and mainly stays out of the media limelight (Ball, p.97), a position she is able to take due to her essentially guaranteed reelection, in her liberal San Francisco district, and her lack of presidential or higher office ambitions. Pelosi struggles greatly with public speaking and therefore often reverts media attention to others. As a politician, and specifically as Speaker, it is not possible for her to avoid public speaking completely. When presenting a prepared speech, she is able to communicate effectively however when forced to go "off-script" such as in interviews or when taking press questions, she often stumbles and has difficulty communicating her point. This shortcoming has been present throughout her career and while there has been improvement, she continues to struggle. In order to mitigate this weakness as much as possible, throughout her career she has evaded the public eye and instead turned her focus to internal matters. Her elevation to the Speakership and the immense resources the Republican Party has committed to attacking her have made this slightly more difficult however, she mostly ignores public opinion polls (Ball, p.97).

As is common with congressional leaders, Pelosi's favorability has remained relatively low, ranging between 29% and 44% in her most recent term as Speaker, however, this is relatively average, and even slightly higher, compared to other Congressional leaders (*Gallup*) and does not directly point to weaknesses in sustaining a favorable public image. In fact, in December of 2018, Pelosi polled a 53-points net favorability among Democratic party voters, higher than that of Democratic Senate Leader Chuck Schumer, and Republican Senate Leader Mitch McConnell among Republican voters (*Gallup*). Instead of committing resources to a robust media presence, Pelosi defers attention to other leaders and instead focuses on producing achievements for her party's legislative priorities with little concern for receiving credit in the media, a strategy that has proved successful with voters from her party. There are many examples of this throughout her career such as her actions during her first speakership relating to the Iraq war. She allowed Congressman Murtha, a centrist veteran, to take on the more publically anti-war stance while personally declining to comment on the situation in an effort to avoid her concerns being brushed aside as merely those

of an anti-war leftist and giving public opinion time to evolve while giving herself time to craft legislation that her entire party could unify behind. While the legislation was eventually vetoed by President Bush and then abandoned due to budget issues and government shutdown, Pelosi was able to alter the narrative surrounding the war to more heavily focus on an exit strategy (Ball, p.135-141).

However, it is impossible for Pelosi to stay out of the media completely. As a female politician, and the first female Speaker of the House, Pelosi has faced gender bias and sexism throughout her career. This is not unique to the Speaker and there is a large amount of political science research on how female politicians are treated and perceived by the media and others (Lawless, Fridkin & Kenney, Telleson-Rinehart & Josephson), however, Pelosi's public relations strategy for overcoming these biases is unique and effective. In their study of media coverage of the Speaker, Dabbous and Ladley explore how women's portrayal in the media is often a lose-lose situation, as female leaders are often criticized for being too forceful and domineering, as well as facing scrutiny for being too "soft" and not well equipped to handle the stress and difficulties faced by political leaders. Pelosi however, utilizes both of these gendered stereotypes to her benefit by leaning into them when advantageous. As opposed to steering away from gendered roles like motherhood, Pelosi leans into them consistently mentioning her experience as a mother and grandmother in an effort to humanize herself to the media and to advance issues relating to women and children. One key example is found during both her 2007 and 2019 swearing ceremonies when she invited all children in attendance to join her on stage. Conversely, Pelosi does not shy away from displaying herself as a forceful leader who is well equipped to lead when it aids her in gaining a seat at the table or being taken more seriously.

In regard to party message, Speaker Pelosi's communication strategy must not only promote the Democratic party's message but also highlight the downfalls of the Republican's platform and governing abilities. An example of this is found in the framing of Republican Tax legislation. *Gallup* reported that in 2017 a slight majority of American's believed their taxes were too high and the general idea of cutting taxes polled favorably therefore Trump and congressional Republicans framed their tax bill, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, as a remedy to these issues. However, the support for this bill never surfaced as Pelosi quickly went to work, giving this plan the moniker "GOP Tax Scam", and launching a public relations and communication strategy to publicly highlight the fact that most of the promised tax cuts would be enjoyed by corporations and the wealthy, not the average American. Her office published press releases, she took interviews and made floor speeches, and shared this content across social media platforms, and this strategy was successful. Public opinion for this legislation remained disapproving with only 40% approval (*Gallup*). Even more importantly, however, is the perception of the cuts. The Tax Policy Center reported that in 2018 that 65% of American households paid less in taxes as a result of the bill with the average cut being roughly \$1,300, and only 6% of households had their taxes raised. However, only 14% of Americans recognized this cut, while 21% reported their taxes had increased (*Gallup*).

Pelosi's public relations campaign against these attacks was widely successful for multiple reasons. The first being the historic misunderstanding of tax legislation. Tax laws can be extraordinarily complex and many Americans do not have a firm grasp on the implications of these types of bills. Pelosi was able to capitalize on this misunderstanding by bringing the true effects of the bill, a major tax cut for the extremely wealthy, to the forefront of voters' minds. Additionally, Pelosi intentionally chose to attack legislation that, historically, should have been a success for the Republicans. Previous tax cuts, under the Reagan and Bush administrations, and extensions made during Obama's presidency were well received among the public with approvals ranging from +4% to +25% (*FiveThirtyEight*). Pelosi thoroughly understood the threat this legislation posed to her party with the 2018 Midterm elections and saw the opportunity it presented and was able to employ a public relations strategy to successfully reframe the public's perception.

Chapter 3: Evolution of Effectiveness

Nancy Pelosi was originally elected to the House of Representatives in 1987. Over her nearly two and a half decades as a Congresswoman, she has served in a variety of leadership positions, including six years as Speaker of the House. Given the extraordinary length of her career, it is relevant to discuss whether her leadership decisions, and therefore effectiveness, have changed and why this may have occurred. So, has Nancy Pelosi's effectiveness changed significantly over her term as Speaker? In order to evaluate this question, this Honors Thesis compares the above findings on Pelosi's effectiveness during her most recent term as Speaker, to the findings of Peters and Rosenthal in their study of Pelosi's first term as Speaker. In their study, they evaluate Pelosi's relative effectiveness through comparison to past Speakers however, given the amount of time that has passed since the leadership episodes they discuss and the quickly evolving macro-environment Pelosi's leadership exists in, it is important to discuss any differences in analysis.

On agenda setting and coalition building, Peters and Rosenthal discuss how Pelosi's effectiveness stems from her ability to combine congressional leadership theories and adapt her strategy based on the issue at hand. For example, she brings forth widely popular legislation, like the 6 for '06 agenda, to build consensus while on divisive issues, like the Iraq War, Pelosi takes more control to ensure party unity. Additionally, they mention how heavily she relies on loyalty and favors to "utilize the diverse talents of her members, organize relentlessly and deliver results operationally," (Peters & Rosenthal, p.13). As evidence, they site her 92% Democratic Party unity in 2007 and her ability to lead from the center while her personal ideology and voting record remain more liberal. It is clear Pelosi has continued to rely on similar strategies during her more recent terms as Speaker, most likely because they are extremely effective. She has focused on popular legislation to build consensus, for example attempting to tackle voting rights with HR 1 immediately after regaining the majority as this is an issue that is popular with voters. Further, her reliance on loyalty and favors remains extremely prevalent, especially on decisive issues. Pelosi's effectiveness and decisions relating to agenda setting and coalition building have remained relatively constant across her tenure as Speaker and given the difficulty of building consensus in an increasingly diverse party during increasingly partisan times, it is no surprise that Pelosi has continued to rely on tactics that have proven successful in the past with few changes.

When evaluating effectiveness in challenging her caucus, Peters and Rosenthal argue that Pelosi's effectiveness in this area comes from her knowledge of when to push her members, sometimes against their will, for issues that will advance the party in the long run, even if this means protecting her majority from itself. An example of this is seen with ethics legislation when Pelosi pushed her members to pass legislation to avoid attacks surrounding corruption that would have been detrimental to the party. In more recent years, Pelosi has continued not to be afraid of challenging her caucus when necessary and when she believes it is in theirs and the party's, best interest. That being said, while she has found successes in calling in favors to advance legislative priorities that go against her members' preference, like the Affordable Care Act, she has also allowed past failures to obstruct her ability to take on important issues, like with environmental legislation. She has consistently dismissed calls from her party to bring environmental issues to the forefront, seemingly due to fears it will end similarly to Obama-era climate legislation. While I do not doubt she believes she is acting in the best interest of her caucus, environmental legislation is popular with voters, and calls from her members and activists will not quickly disappear.

Peters and Rosenthal do criticize Pelosi's effectiveness relating to fairness in enforcing rules and norms of the House as her record on special rules is essentially the same as that of the Republicans, whom she criticized while her party was in the minority. However, they do provide an explanation for why this is the case considering the polarized Congressional environment and her commitment to protecting her members. Additionally, Pelosi has honored some attributes of the Minority Bill of Rights she authored during the Democratic minority and they ultimately conclude that while she has not shown complete

fairness in enforcement, “she can reasonably claim to have treated the Republicans more fairly than they had treated the Democrats” (Peters & Rosenthal, p.17). Pelosi has remained on a similar path in her most recent Speakership relating to fairness of enforcement as she has taken action to limit the minority's power with a notable change being alterations made to motions to recommit. While this may be considered ineffective as far as fairness is concerned, I completely agree with Peter and Rosenthal's assessment that given the partisan environment and obstructionist actions of the Republican party, she could not have reached her level of effectiveness without these shows of strength. Additionally, she has taken steps to ensure that Congress is an open and inclusive space for everyone, steps criticized by the opposing party, which point towards increased fairness in general. The norms of the United States Congress have been drastically altered over Pelosi's career and while she is not as fair as she fought for the Republican Party to be while she was in the minority, she has been effective at adapting the House rules and norms to ensure that Congress can continue to produce results for their constituents as well as working towards a more inclusive environment.

Relating to electoral strategy and fundraising Peters and Rosenthal couldn't rate Pelosi more highly stating that she is “clearly superior” (Peters & Rosenthal, p.10) to other Speakers and noting that she has taken on an involved role in elections and has been a fundraising leader since the beginning of her career in politics. On campaign strategy, they note her election time strategies, such as the Red to Blue campaign, but also her focus on setting up her members for electoral success by allowing them to “vote their districts” (Peters & Rosenthal, p.10) and offering legislative opportunities for them to lean on during elections which allow Democrats to compete in swing and flip districts. They do not however offer any electoral data to evaluate the success of these strategies. In addition to calling on electoral and finance skills from her extensive career and relying on strategies mentioned by Peters and Rosenthal, in recent years Pelosi has introduced additional strategies in an effort to gain and retain majority power in the House.

In 2018, she had great success with additional resources committed to recruiting and running a diverse slate of candidates which put the Democrats back in power with a landslide election. However, in the most recent 2020 election, she was unable to adapt and update outdated campaign strategies to overcome electoral challenges by the Republican party which resulted in a difficult election for House democrats. One unsuccessful cycle does not discredit her lifetime of skills in electoral strategy and finance, however, in order to remain effective, Pelosi must be able to modernize the Democratic Party's strategy in future cycles.

Finally, on communication strategy and public relations, they discuss how Pelosi was able to shape her public image and focuses public attention on herself as a middle class, Catholic, New England based mother and grandmother to soften her image and evade the “San Francisco liberal” trope Republican's criticize her for. On party image, she has shifted not only the content of the party's platform but the way it is portrayed to the public to ensure the message is “clear, consistent, and pragmatic,” (Peters & Rosenthal, p.15) and point to election results as evidence of effectiveness. They do not ignore low Congressional approval ratings; however, they do consider the partisan nature of the modern congress and believe the stability of the Speaker's favorability combined with the relatively higher approval given to Democrats compared to Republicans outweigh low approval and therefore do not consider this to show a lack of effectiveness. Since the publication of their study, Pelosi's communications strategy relating to personal image has remained constant as she continues to direct media attention away from herself as well as embrace her feminine roles as a mother and grandmother to soften her image and evade Republican attack. Her most obvious lack of effectiveness in this area comes from her poor public speaking ability which has persisted throughout her career with little improvement. Her strategy relating to the Democratic party's image has remained very similar but her strategies in dealing with the opposing party have evolved as she has more aggressively attacked the Republican Agenda, for example, the “GOP Tax Scam,” than is mentioned in Peters and Rosenthal's work.

In conclusion, while there have been changes in Pelosi's leadership since her first term as Speaker in 2007, much has remained the same which is not unexpected given the success these strategies have brought. The areas in which there has been evolution are mainly a result of the quickly changing, hyper-partisan macro-environment Pelosi's leadership exists in. The most prominent erosions of effectiveness are in relation to willingness to challenge her caucus and electoral strategy and fundraising as she has difficulty responding to calls for action where she has been unsuccessful in the past and has been unable to modernize her campaign strategy to adequately compete in the modern election space. On other factors, she has remained effective over her career as Speaker with leadership that combines historically successful strategies with modern adaptations to respond to the changes in her leadership environment.

Conclusion

Is Nancy Pelosi an effective Speaker of the House and has her effectiveness changed significantly over her term as Speaker? While her leadership is not perfect, as no leader is, Pelosi has been an overall effective Speaker of the House. She has been especially effective with leadership relating to agenda setting, coalition building, and fundraising while she has struggled with challenging her caucus and some aspects of electoral strategy. Additionally, her leadership appears to have remained constant over time with few minor changes as a result of the quickly evolving environment she is tasked to lead in.

Normative analysis of Speaker Pelosi's leadership can provide insight and strategies that are applicable for practitioners of political leadership, specifically future Speakers, other politicians in positions of leadership, and their staff members. Additionally, it is important to note that while Pelosi has been a champion for Democratic ideals throughout her career, lessons of her leadership style and effectiveness may be of use to future leaders of any party or ideological background. By assessing leadership in a case study style approach, conclusions can be reached that are directly applicable to scenarios and situations that these practitioners find themselves in and provide concrete examples and results of certain actions. Additionally, it is important to highlight that practitioners in this context extends beyond politicians, future speakers and other political leaders to also include their staff members who play an important role in the actions taken by politicians.

Pelosi's main shortfalls come in the form of her willingness to challenge her caucus and electoral strategy, specifically in modernization and issues with polling. In both of these areas, she has shown mixed effectiveness with the recent deterioration that can provide insight for other party and political leadership. On willingness to challenge the caucus, Pelosi recently has struggled with allowing past failures to obstruct future opportunities. This phenomenon of mixed effectiveness, the fact that she has had both success and failure in this area, allows study of her effectiveness to produce even more practical lessons for practitioners. As with many aspects of leadership, a balance must be achieved between learning from past experiences and understanding modern context and party wants. This Honors Thesis does not argue that it is bad leadership or effectiveness to learn from past missteps, however, it is important that leaders do not allow these failures to obstruct future opportunities.

Lessons from Pelosi's leadership relating to electoral strategy have possibly the most widespread practical implications as they are relevant not only to politicians and their staff but to non-politician party leaders and electoral staffers due to the fact that the weaknesses in Pelosi's leadership are not unique to her alone but rather seen across the Democratic party. In order to stay competitive against their Republican counterparts, it will be vital for the Democratic Party and its leaders to modernize their campaign strategy to more effectively reach voters and shape the narrative surrounding elections through digital platforms like social media. Further, issues with polling data have plagued House Democrats and the larger party in recent cycles as they have faced difficulty with understanding polling biases, especially in the realm of pro-Trump voters. Pelosi's leadership effectiveness relating to electoral strategy shows an extremely important picture that illustrates how trusted and tested effective electoral strategy can be

easily overshadowed or minimized by an inability to adapt to a changing electorate and electoral environment. It will be vital for the future of the Democratic Party that they remedy these issues, not only in the House but party wide, as quickly as possible.

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
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– BOOK REVIEW –

Michael O. Slobodchikoff, G. Doug Davis & Brandon Stewart, eds., *The Challenge to NATO: Global Security and the Atlantic Alliance* (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books & University of Nebraska Press, 2021), pages 296, ISBN 9781640124974, review by Associate-Professor Houman Sadri, Ph.D., of University of Central Florida (UCF) & Deputy-Director IPAC

This interesting book co-authored by Michael O. Slobodchikoff, G. Doug Davis & Brandon Stewart, eds., *The Challenge to NATO: Global Security and the Atlantic Alliance* (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books & University of Nebraska Press, 2021) is a must read for all analysts and scholars in International Security.

The Challenge to NATO is one of the best contemporary books focused on analysis of NATO's structure and politics after its 70th anniversary, especially when compared to other similar books on the market. This book covers NATO's historical development, present functions and future challenges. All three editors shine in the editing and writing of this valuable and thought-provoking book. Following a 70th anniversary of NATO conference, the editors organized a diverse group of academics, as well as former and current policy-makers involved with NATO to contribute chapters to this edited volume. The result is an important edited work, which is balanced between the contributions of scholars, as well as policy-makers and practitioners who have dealt with real-world domestic and foreign policy issues of NATO and its member-states.

This book of 15 chapters is divided into five parts: "History of NATO"; NATO Regional Operations; Hybrid & Cyber Warfare and NATO"; "Threats to NATO"; and "The Future of NATO". The volume begins with an effective forward section penned by retired U.S. Marine Colonel John Schmidt, who has 25 years of distinguished and diverse service; from platoon leader in Vietnam to strategic planner for the First Gulf War as part of General Norman Schwarzkopf's staff. In addition to his experience with the U.S. military, his extensive international experience includes previous work with the French Foreign Legion and U.N. forces in Bosnia. Colonel Schmidt began his forward with a fundamental question: "Would we or could we form a NATO Alliance, if one did not exist?" In fact, this text provides a clear, categorized and comprehensive analysis of NATO's past, present and future, encompassing its challenges and opportunities over its 70-years anniversary.

Part One of the book titled, "History of NATO" consists of four chapters: the Atlantic Alliance in the 21st Century"; "The Strategic Importance of the Atlantic Alliance"; "A Strategic Examination of the Past, Present and Future"; and "The Historical Significance of NATO".

In Chapter 1, the editors begin with the premise that the post-Cold War international order established by Washington was at a crossroad. They correctly and prudently admit that the liberal international order and the hegemony of the USA could not be taken for granted any longer. General Hayden, former-director of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA), notes that as Moscow and Beijing were battling to establish a new world order of their own, Washington was struggling to maintain its hegemony and the liberal post-WWII international order. After its 70th anniversary NATO faced both external and internal threats to its survival. NATO was established to keep the U.S. involved in Europe, the Soviet threat out, and to prevent Germany from again threatening European stability following the Two World Wars. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has found itself in a new international environment with a more aggressive Russia and a growing rival in China. NATO must now consider new internal challenges coming from within its member states such as the evolving attitudes of younger Europeans and the changing demographic factors in many European countries.

In Chapter 2, former-NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter describes the causes behind the establishment of NATO, explains the developmental changes of the organization after the Cold War, and discusses how the tragedy of the “9-11 Terrorist Attacks” has altered NATO.

In Chapter 3, Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Mrazik covers the earliest debates surrounding the formation of NATO. He goes further by explaining how NATO could still satisfy its mandate of promoting deterrence and protecting peace through abiding the internationalist and democratic ideas of its founding fathers.

In Chapter 4, Professor Mary Hampton addresses the question: How stable is NATO? She explains how NATO has already survived a number of serious political-security encounters and geopolitical challenges since its establishment following the Second World War.

The Second Part of the book titled “NATO Regional Operations” consists of three chapters: “Examining the ‘Ground Truth’ from Military Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq”; “Gunship Diplomacy”; and “Why Oriental Studies are Essential to NATO’s Struggle against Jihadist Islam”.

Reflecting on the significant role that religion plays in the Middle East; Richard Ledet, Sharon Emeigh and Peter Turner analyzed the interconnections between religion and political development considering the latest military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for Chapter 5. They determined the factors by which NATO-led operations could involve religion in more effective ways to support the political actions of NATO leading to a longer-term stability through the state-building process.

In Chapter 6, Chris Rein focuses on the regional operations of NATO in Baltic countries. After the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, the security of the former-Soviet states; especially Baltic States, was a special priority. The spreading of an aerial umbrella over the region represented a guarantee of the Baltic States sovereignty and territorial integrity. Besides its instrumental military value, the increasing use of airpower has had the additional policy value of a diplomatic signal to Moscow.

In Chapter 7, Boris Havel observes that despite the “War on Terror,” the threats from radical Islam have increased and developed in other unanticipated places. He claims that winning against Jihadist Islam requires understanding its fundamental ideas and the theory behind its activities.

The Third Part of the book titled “Hybrid and Cyber Warfare and NATO,” consists of two chapters: “Hybrid Warfare and the Challenge of Cyberattacks”; and “NATO Burden Sharing in the Age of Hybrid Warfare”.

In Chapter 8, General Wesley Clark, the former supreme allied commander of NATO, contends that NATO member states have been victims of Russian hybrid warfare attacks. However, NATO has mainly

neglected to either identify the depth of this new threat, or establish a proper solution addressing this difficult specific challenge.

In Chapter 9, Tad Schnauer remarks that NATO has continuously confronted the increasing threats of various forms of hybrid warfare. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, NATO members have emphasized the burden-sharing goal by spending 2% of their GDP on security and military projects. Considering the seriousness of hybrid warfare, a more comprehensive NATO plan is needed to address this major challenge.

The Fourth Part of the book titled “Threats to NATO” consists of three chapters: “The Defense of the Baltic States”; “Fractured Loyalties: Ethnic Minorities, Russia and the Threat to NATO”; and the Demographic Threat”.

In Chapter 10, the Latvian Policy Director in the Ministry of Defense, Janis Karlsbergs writes about his concerns of Russian threats following Moscow’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its 2014 annexation of Crimea. The author provides a European and an insider perspective around the vulnerabilities of the Baltic States to major Russian aggression despite the NATO security umbrella.

In Chapter 11, Brandon Stewart suggests that any long-term strategy of NATO should involve sociopolitical factors associated with ethnic groups in the Baltic States. He strongly advocates that such a strategy would make NATO’s narrative much stronger against Russian threats in Europe.

In Chapter 12, Michael Slobodchikoff and Doug Davis masterfully make an original observation highlighting a previously underestimated source of threat to NATO. Historically a majority of scholars and policymakers have focused on external threats to NATO for understandable reasons. Slobodchikoff and Davis highlight internal threats to NATO and concentrate on the significant long-term impact of demographic factors that are gradually but steadily changing the economic, sociopolitical, and security foundation of European NATO member states. This chapter is well-supported by graphic tables that Slobodchikoff uses to showcase the significant demographic changes that have occurred in Europe.

The Fifth Part of the book titled “The Future of NATO” consists of three chapters: “The Relevance of the Atlantic Alliance”; “The Future of NATO and the Strategic Black Sea Area”; “NATO’s Future: the Show Must Go On”.

In Chapter 13, Robert Bell, former Assistant-Secretary-General of Defense Investment for NATO, states that NATO has maintained peace in Europe and endured despite suffering both internal and external crises since its establishment. Despite domestic challenges of member states, NATO will continue to be a significant security organization that will maintain peace both regionally in Europe and globally.

In Chapter 14, Ambassador George Cristian Maior of Romanian to the U.S.A., remarks about the significance of NATO for Eastern and Central Europe. He emphasizes that NATO has united ethnically and religiously diverse people with the same goal of peace and security in Europe. The author argues that the post-Cold War Order will continue due to NATO’s efforts and accomplishments.

The Concluding Chapter, has the three editors first highlight the general challenges that NATO has already faced and will confront in the remaining years of the current century. They emphasize that NATO has not only survived but also succeeded despite numerous external and internal threats due to its adaptability to new socio-political and security environments. Optimistically, they argue that NATO will continue to exist and flourish as long as it continues in its ability to adapt to any new challenges.

In sum, this text is an exceptional book. I especially admire the efforts of the editors to create a book balanced between the works of academics and those of current and past policymakers in order to provide a comprehensive final product. The contributors fairly and clearly examine the record of NATO, the causes behind its existence, and the instruments that have assisted NATO in remaining relevant and suitable in the post-Cold War era. The editors explain both internal and external sources of threats to NATO and its member states and provide honest estimates of the possible and plausible future of these organizations. Their writings are clear, organized, and comprehensive with real-world examples which support their arguments. Their writing styles, including those of non-English speaking contributors, are very readable for both experts in the field and upper division students interested in international security topics and policies.

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**Information & Policy
Analysis Center, Inc.**

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Our Motto: *“Making positive differences in education and communication leading to opportunities for a more peaceful world.”*



Left to Right: IPAC President Dr. Sadri giving IPAC contribution cheque to President Dr. Leah Blumenfeld of Florida Political Sciences Association



Left to Right: IPAC President Dr. Sadri, IPAC PR Director Ms. Malisci meeting with Mr. Stewart, International Business Manager of Enterprise Florida

About Us

The Information and Policy Analysis Center, Inc. (IPAC) has built a foundation of broad and deep knowledge to impact and make a difference in the most important and pertinent areas of opportunity in today’s world. Our interdisciplinary expertise in policy, communication, education, socio-economic development, defense, energy, homeland security and environmental protection combines theory with real-world experience.

Mission Statement

IPAC is dedicated to producing exacting research and unbiased analysis through quality education. Our mission is to stimulate and support relevant social science research that addresses major domestic and international issues and to disseminate those findings widely to professionals, scholars, policy-makers and the public at large.

Education

As a non-partisan, non-profit educational foundation, IPAC seeks to promote constructive dialogues among diverse cultures and civilizations. While our educational efforts extend to the general public, we acknowledge that today’s students need to develop an understanding of communication, international relations and cultures to compete in the global environment. Whether pursuing careers in business, public service, education, or non-governmental organizations, IPAC promotes such goals by providing funding for student awards to organizations such as the Florida Political Science Association.

Quality Research Standards

IPAC provides high caliber and realistic research on significant national and international issues. At IPAC, we are proud of the ways by which we ensure that our training sessions, research products and consulting services reflect our core values of dedication to excellence and objectivity in a complex world.

